



**Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive**  
**DSpace Repository**

---

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

---

1994-03

# The element of fear in the practice of military leadership

Borcherding, Ruediger

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

---

<https://hdl.handle.net/10945/30876>

---

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

*Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun*



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

**Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School**  
**411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle**  
**Monterey, California USA 93943**

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
Monterey, California



**THESIS**

THE ELEMENT OF FEAR  
IN THE PRACTICE  
OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

by

Ruediger Borchering

March, 1994

Principal Advisor:

Roger D. Evered

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Thesis  
B71353

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY  
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB Np. 0704

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

|   |  |   |                                  |
|---|--|---|----------------------------------|
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY <i>(Leave blank)</i>   | 2. REPORT DATE<br>March 1994                             | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED<br>Master's Thesis   |                                  |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE<br>The Element of Fear in the Practice of Military Leadership   |  | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS  |                                  |
| 6. AUTHOR(S)<br>Ruediger Borchering   |  | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER  |                                  |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br>Naval Postgraduate School<br>Monterey CA 93943-5000   |  | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER  |                                  |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)   |  | 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES<br>The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. |                                  |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.   |  | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE<br>A   |                                  |
| 13. ABSTRACT <i>(maximum 200 words)</i><br><br>As a contrast to Edward Deming's requirement to "Drive out fear" from the workplace many managers still view fear as an appropriate management tool. This was supported by the Ryan and Oestreich report in 1991. To explore the current status of fear in the military workplace, this study investigates a particular superior-subordinate relationship at company level in the Army environment at Fort Ord, California. A sequence of in-depth interviews with a Company Commander and his Executive Officer provide the data base. A fear model is developed to assist in categorizing and analyzing the articulated fears. The array of fears recorded during the interviews enabled us to address the following issues: (1) the extent to which fear is applied as a management tool, (2) whether the use of fear in a leadership context is viewed appropriate by the officers, and (3) the possible impact of the use of fear on the relationship between the two officers. |  |   |                                  |
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS<br>Fear, Military Leadership  |  | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES<br>301  |                                  |
|   |  | 16. PRICE CODE  |                                  |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT<br>Unclassified   | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE<br>Unclassified | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT<br>Unclassified   | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT<br>UL |

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

THE ELEMENT OF FEAR  
IN THE PRACTICE  
OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

by

Ruediger Borchering  
Lieutenant Commander, German Navy

Submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

March 1994

Author:

Ruediger Borchering

Approved by:

Roger D. Evered, Principal Advisor

Benjamin J. Roberts, Associate Advisor

David R. Whipple, Jr., Chairman,  
Department of Systems Management

## ABSTRACT

As a contrast to Edward Deming's requirement to "Drive out fear" from the workplace many managers still view fear as an appropriate management tool. This was supported by the Ryan and Oestreich report in 1991. To explore the current status of fear in the military workplace, this study investigates a particular superior-subordinate relationship at company level in the Army environment at Fort Ord, California. A sequence of in-depth interviews with a Company Commander and his Executive Officer provide the data base. A fear model is developed to assist in categorizing and analyzing the articulated fears. The array of fears recorded during the interviews enabled us to address the following issues: (1) the extent to which fear is applied as a management tool, (2) whether the use of fear in a leadership context is viewed appropriate by the officers, and (3) the possible impact of the use of fear on the relationship between the two officers.

*Thesis  
871353  
e.2*

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

|      |  |    |
|------|--|----|
| I.   | INTRODUCTION . . . . .   | 1  |
| II.  | BACKGROUND FOR THIS STUDY . . . . .                              | 3  |
| III. | STATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS . . . . .                        | 7  |
| IV.  | CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR FEAR AND MANAGEMENT . . . . .               | 9  |
|      | A. ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR . . . . .                           | 10 |
|      | B. THE NOTION OF FEAR IN THE TQM ENVIRONMENT . . . . .           | 17 |
|      | C. POSSIBLE COUNTERPOLES OF FEAR: TRUST AND FAITH . . . . .      | 24 |
|      | D. EXPLANATION OF LEADERSHIP . . . . .                           | 32 |
|      | 1. What is a leader? . . . . .                                   | 33 |
|      | 2. Presentation of leadership theories . . . . .                 | 34 |
|      | 3. Presentation of leadership styles . . . . .                   | 37 |
|      | E. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADERSHIP AND FEAR . . . . .     | 40 |
|      | F. TWO VIEWS OF MANAGING FEAR IN THE MILITARY . . . . .          | 42 |
|      | G. TWO ARMY STUDIES RELATED TO EFFECTIVE<br>MANAGEMENT . . . . . | 48 |
| V.   | METHODOLOGY . . . . .  | 52 |
|      | A. GENERAL THOUGHTS . . . . .                                    | 52 |
|      | B. SCOPE OF THE STUDY . . . . .                                  | 52 |

|     |  |     |
|-----|--|-----|
| C.  | EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY . . . . .             | 53  |
| D.  | CONDUCT OF THE STUDY . . . . .                     | 56  |
| E.  | THE FEAR MODEL . . . . .                           | 62  |
| F.  | OBTAINING DATA ABOUT A PERSONS FEARS. . . . .      | 66  |
| G.  | EXPLANATION OF THE TERM "INHERENT" . . . . .       | 70  |
| H.  | DIFFICULT DISTINCTIONS . . . . .                   | 72  |
| I.  | LIMITATIONS . . . . .                              | 73  |
| VI. | PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED FROM THE INTERVIEWS | 78  |
| A.  | INTRODUCTORY MEETING . . . . .                     | 79  |
| B.  | FIRST INTERVIEW: FIRST INTERVIEW WITH CO . . .     | 80  |
| C.  | SECOND INTERVIEW: FIRST INTERVIEW WITH XO . . .    | 87  |
| D.  | SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . . . . .                      | 98  |
| E.  | FIRST ITERATION OF THE MODEL . . . . .             | 103 |
| F.  | SECOND TYPE OF THE FEAR MODEL . . . . .            | 104 |
| G.  | THIRD INTERVIEW: SECOND INTERVIEW WITH CO . . .    | 105 |
| H.  | FOURTH INTERVIEW: SECOND INTERVIEW WITH XO . .     | 112 |
| I.  | SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . . . . .                      | 126 |
| J.  | SECOND ITERATION OF THE MODEL . . . . .            | 133 |
| K.  | THIRD TYPE OF THE FEAR MODEL . . . . .             | 134 |
| L.  | FIFTH INTERVIEW: THIRD INTERVIEW WITH XO . . .     | 136 |
| M.  | SIXTH INTERVIEW: THIRD INTERVIEW WITH CO . . .     | 151 |
| N.  | SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . . . . .                      | 161 |
| O.  | THIRD ITERATION OF THE MODEL . . . . .             | 168 |
| P.  | FOURTH TYPE OF THE FEAR MODEL . . . . .            | 169 |
| Q.  | SEVENTH INTERVIEW: FOURTH INTERVIEW WITH XO . .    | 170 |



|       |  |     |
|-------|--|-----|
| R.    | EIGHTH INTERVIEW: FOURTH INTERVIEW WITH CO . . .   | 177 |
| S.    | SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . . . . .  | 195 |
| T.    | FINAL ITERATION OF THE FEAR MODEL . . . . .  | 196 |
| U.    | FINAL MEETING . . . . .  | 197 |
| VII.  | DATA ANALYSIS . . . . .  | 204 |
| A.    | OBSERVED PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE<br>INTERVIEWEES . . . . .  | 204 |
| B.    | ANALYSIS OF EXPRESSED FEARS . . . . .  | 206 |
| C.    | EXPRESSED FEARS IN RELATION TO THE FEAR MODEL . . . . .  | 218 |
| D.    | VARIATIONS IN TERMINOLOGY . . . . .  | 224 |
| E.    | THE ROLE OF FEAR IN MANAGEMENT . . . . .   | 230 |
| F.    | DOES THE CO'S LEADERSHIP STYLE FOSTER A FEARLESS<br>SUPERIOR - SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP? . . . . .                   | 233 |
| G.    | THE INFLUENCE OF THE DOWNSIZING ENVIRONMENT ON<br>THE INTERVIEWEES . . . . .   | 235 |
| H.    | NINTH INTERVIEW: THE VIEW OF DAVID WILLARD, PH.<br>D., CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST . . . . .                               | 236 |
| VIII. | CONCLUSIONS . . . . .  | 248 |
| A.    | THE FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION: DO THE TWO OFFICERS<br>FEEL ANY FEARS AND IF SO, WHAT ARE THEY? . . . . .               | 248 |
| B.    | THE SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION: IS IT POSSIBLE TO<br>ELIMINATE FEAR ENTIRELY FROM THE MILITARY<br>WORKPLACE? . . . . . | 250 |
| C.    | THE THIRD RESEARCH QUESTION: DO THE INTERVIEWED  |     |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT FEAR IS AN APPROPRIATE<br>MANAGEMENT TOOL? . . . . .                              | 253 |
| IX. RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .   | 255 |
| APPENDIX A: EXPRESSED FEARS LISTED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER<br>OF EXPRESSION . . . . .                    | 258 |
| APPENDIX B: EXPRESSED FEARS LISTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF<br>APPARENT IMPORTANCE TO THE CO/XO . . . . . | 267 |
| APPENDIX C: EXPRESSED FEARS LISTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF<br>FREQUENCY . . . . .                        | 277 |
| APPENDIX D: EXPRESSED FEARS IN RELATION TO THE 3-CIRCLE<br>MODEL OF FEAR . . . . .                      | 279 |
| APPENDIX E: RESUME DAVID L. WILLARD, PH.D. . . . .  | 288 |
| LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . .  | 290 |
| INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . .   | 292 |

*When the master governs, the people*

*are hardly aware that he exists.*

*Next best is a leader who is loved.*

*Next, one who is feared.*

*The worst is one who is despised.*

(TAO TE CHING NR 17)

## I. INTRODUCTION

Fear is a fundamental component of our human existence. Our daily lives are filled with occurrences we often denote as fearful. People are afraid to loose their jobs, students are afraid to fail in a test, some individuals are afraid of height or darkness, and children fear the increased violence on school compounds. The variety of fears is enormous, different individuals experience different fears, and fears can have positive and negative aspects.

The phenomenon of men's fear seem to be as old as mankind and started probably as early as described in the Bible's book "Genesis". After Adam and Eve failed to comply with the Lord's order to stay away from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, they instantly realized that they were naked and they felt ashamed about it. When the Lord walked around and called them, they hid from his presence. Adam said to the Lord: "I heard the sound of thee in the garden and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself." [Ref. 21:Genesis 3:10].

Fear can have a tremendous impact on our lives. The spectrum embraces negative as well as positive extremes. It may stimulate us and activate powerful energy resources, it may be the driving force for great achievements or the major

impediment to accomplish our tasks, or it may paralyze and even ruin us. Psychologists have formulated various fear theories and embarked on experimental research. Reasons for fear were researched, individual responses to fearful situations analyzed, and methods to overcome fear were developed.

In the 1950s Dr. Edward Deming published his guidelines for "Total Quality Management", including his well-known list of 14 points to be used in the implementation of his philosophy of a new management style. Point number eight elaborates on the requirement "Drive out fear" from the workplace. My interest was stimulated by this particular fundamental point. The idea of an entirely fearless workplace is exciting. But is it really achievable to the extent described by Deming? Ryan and Oestreich reported in 1991 that managers still want to use fear as a management tool rather than eliminate it from the workplace.

This contrast between the requirements of Deming and the findings by Ryan and Oestreich are the basis for this study. My intentions are (1) to explore the fears present in a particular workplace, (2) to determine the impact of fear on the performance of workers in that particular workplace, (3) to inquire managements opinion about the appropriateness of fear as a management tool, and (4) to answer the question, whether fear can be eliminated entirely from a workplace.

## II. BACKGROUND FOR THIS STUDY

Edward Deming asserts a set of 14 points which in his view are necessary for creating excellence in organizations that can generate quality. Point eight of his 14 points declares: "Drive out fear". He described a variety of aspects where he found evidence that fear was prevailing in the workplace and suggested ways to eliminate it. Since then, many organizations have started to implement Deming's theory of Total Quality Leadership (TQL) including the point about driving out fear.

On the other hand, most management today seem to use fear to some extent. Examples range from ignoring subordinates, to cut them off the information flow, to being aggressive, to using physical threat. In a recent book by Kathleen D. Ryan and Daniel K. Oestreich "Driving Fear out of the Workplace" the authors state that today's managers often view fear as a desired element within their organizations. These managers didn't want to eliminate it but asked for appropriate methods to control and manipulate fear. Their argument was that controlled fear can be used to achieve higher goals of productivity [Ref. 15:p. xv].

Ryan and Oestreich demonstrate that a strong inverse relationship exists between fear and productivity. Their investigation is limited to "the fear of speaking up in the

workplace". Nevertheless, for this particular type of fear the results seem to demonstrate that productivity can be increased significantly by reducing the fear. They also found evidence that levels of productivity were lower in cases where fear was prevalent in the workplace.

The contrast between the findings of Ryan and Oestreich and the opinions of some managers stimulated my interest. The question arose about the role of fear in the practice of today's military leadership. I was interested in finding out to what extent the relationship between fear and productivity was realized in the military context. Furthermore, I wanted to explore to what degree Deming's TQL philosophy had been adopted and probably implemented by the armed forces. I was particularly interested in finding out (1) to what extent, if at all, Deming's TQL philosophy had been disseminated down to the company level, (2) to what extent, if at all, the actual practice of leadership in this particular company reflected TQL theories, and (3) the opinions of officers about Deming's requirement to drive out fear in the workplace.

Another point of interest was that Ryan and Oestreich limited their research to one specific fear: the fear of speaking up in the workplace. My impression is that more than just one type of fear is present in the workplace, and those fears have not received very much attention. My intention is to map the variety of fears which can be found in the

workplace, in order to understand their presence and their effects.

More detailed knowledge about fears and their interdependencies will be helpful to better understand and evaluate employee's behavior and reactions. It may also provide helpful guidance for leadership improvements. Ryan's and Oestreich's research is strictly in line with Deming's point number eight. They explored thoroughly the various aspects of the fear of speaking up and provide methods for leadership improvements to eliminate this specific fear. My approach is broader. To pursue Deming's goal to eliminate fear in the workplace, it seems vital for me to identify whatever fears are actually present. In a second step, corrective actions can be developed to eliminate those fears. This study will attempt to accomplish the first step: to identify the fears in one particular situation.

I found, that the different services of the US Armed Forces have launched efforts to implement TQL-techniques in the recent past. The degrees of acceptance, dissemination, implementation, and enforcement vary between units. The first studies are underway to assess the actual situation and discover ways for improvements and corrections.

My study will be conducted in a stock-taking manner focusing on a very particular situation. The study is intended to cover intensively the relationship of two officers in a superior-subordinate situation. Different fears will be



discussed and recorded. The study is intended to lay a groundwork for probable future research. Even though I will primarily pursue my intention to answer the research questions, I also presume that my discoveries will stimulate a variety of new questions. The research will focus on the identification and differentiation of (1) the individual fears, reported by the two officers, (2) fears, which are based upon or related to their particular relationship, and (3) fears, which are related to their civilian and military environment.

The study will add to the body of knowledge about the aspects of fear within the superior-subordinate relationship. Furthermore, the complexity of fear in the workplace will be described and an attempt will be made to analyze it. The intention is to increase the understanding of this complexity and inform the reader about the variety of identified fears. The reader may also gain valuable information about how various fears influence the atmosphere of a workplace as well as the behavior and, ultimately, the productivity of the employee.

### III. STATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Deming stated in his point number 8 of his 14 points: "Drive out fear". This appears to be a very rigorous statement and his request seems to be, to eliminate fear entirely from the work place. The findings of Ryan and Oestreich show that managers don't want fear to be eliminated. Their intention is to use fear as an appropriate management tool. In the light of these contradictions I wanted to explore in depth the element of fear in a particular case to find out, to what extent fear is prevalent in a workplace and to what extent it is purposefully applied as a management tool.

Specifically, my study is directed to research the following questions:

1. Do the two officers feel any fears and if so, what are they?

I will explore the various manifestations of fear currently present in each individual. Furthermore, I will examine, to what extent fear may influence or shape their relationship.

2. Is it possible to eliminate fear entirely from the military work place?

This question will try to evaluate Deming's requirement, that fear has to be eliminated completely, to arrive at an

effective TQM work environment. I will carefully attempt to explore whether his requirement may be overstated or whether it is appropriate and applicable in the absolute way he stated it.

3. Do the interviewed officers believe that fear is an appropriate management tool?

I will solicit their opinions and try to find out, to what extent they may have already followed or applied management techniques which result in a fear free work environment. Do they agree, that fear can and should be eliminated from the military work place? A special interest is generated by the additional question, whether the military environment has a major influence on the officers attitude towards fear.

#### IV. CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR FEAR AND MANAGEMENT

A literature search was conducted based on different combinations of terms related to the fields of management (e.g. organization, organizational behavior, organizational psychology) and fear (e.g. threat, intimidation, uncertainty). Journals covering the field of psychology were examined seperately. After I narrowed down the vast variety of available publications I reviewed briefly about 100 publications, before selecting about 50 books and articles for detailed review.

My readings focused on the areas of psychology and organizational behavior. I found many references to fear and leadership, but I couldn't find any work which described my specific topic. Many articles present the research findings in the fields of fear and leadership with regard to quality issues, leadership theories, or organizational behavior in general. My particular intention is to explore the various manifestations of fear in the leadership process.

To find an explanation or definition for the term fear is an interesting experience, since the topic is vast and there are many, many definitions of fear. First, it is impossible to find an appropriate version suitable for all purposes. Fear definitions usually serve a very specific purpose and are not

applicable outside that particular field of interest. Second, the various sciences (like biology, psychology, and ethology) pursue different approaches to explain the various phenomena associated with fear. Third, the observations and conclusions differ from each other and are, which is common in a relatively young scientific discipline, sometimes very controversial.

I will give a brief introduction into some of the discoveries. The focus of my study will remain on a management perspective and thus, I will be more interested in any kind of relationship between fear, managerial duties and the work place.

#### **A. ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR**

I will present a brief description of the development of the various fear theories and the background of the studies that have led to these theories.

A difficulty is that most of the experiments have been done with animals. The findings of animal experiments are transferable to human behavior only to a limited extent. Animals are widely led by their instinct while human reaction is a combination of instinct and behavior based and related to intelligence.

The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology [Ref 9:p. 232] provides the following definition of fear: " A motivational

state aroused by specific external stimuli and promoting avoidance, defensive and escape behavior."

Fearful behavior thus detracts from the original task and diverts energy into protective behavior. The individual feels threatened and focuses now primarily on actions like defense, protection, or counterattack. In all cases, the energy is no longer available for the original mission which will suffer. This is in line with Deming's ideas. In an organizational context, aspects like productivity, product quality, safety, and long term thinking will get less attention and go down.

What in general stimulates fear? Various classification systems for fear stimuli have been developed during the short history of experimental psychology. Different scientific approaches yielded different explanation models.

The psychologist J.B.Watson [Ref. 1:p. 5] found in his studies in the early 1920s evidence to formulate his fear theory. He stated that "...the innate stimuli for fear (i.e. those which are capable of causing fear without special learning that they are dangerous or noxious) can be limited to loud noise, sudden loss of support, and pain.". His observations led him to the conclusion that "all other stimuli which can be seen to produce fear are then supposed to acquire this power as the result of a form of learning known as classical conditioning,...". He presented a short list of three unconditioned fear stimuli (loud noise, sudden loss of support, and pain) and attributed all other stimuli to

conditioning. Furthermore, the behaviorist Watson limited his studies to animals and generalized his findings for all species.

Gray [Ref. 1:p. 21-23] revised Watson's list and offers five general principles for fear stimuli: intensity, novelty, special evolutionary danger, stimuli arising during social interaction, and conditioned fear stimuli. Intensity includes all distal (stimuli with which the receptor is not in direct physical contact) and proximal (the body of the receptor is in direct contact with the source of stimulation) intense stimuli (e.g. noise, light, electrical shock, etc). The fear of novelty is closely related to the fear of strangers or, in more general terms, to the novelty of a situation. In the same context Gray discussed, that suddenness in general seems to be a notable element to determine the effectiveness of a fear stimuli. The rapid and unanticipated change of a situation creates a different and in many cases novel condition. The unaware mind may respond with fear to this sudden change, especially when it doesn't fit familiar and well-known schemes. In the same context Gray discussed the phenomenon of lack of stimuli. When the individual has been accustomed to a certain pattern of actions and responses, the absence of an expected action or response is similar to a novel circumstance and can create fear.

Maturation is one phenomenon related to fear. Not all fears are present at all times. Observations, described by

Gray [Ref 1:p. 8-12], led to the conclusion, that some types of fear are innate and others got developed over time. Furthermore, the strength of a particular fear can change over time. It may increase as well as decrease. For example, the fear of snakes may be developed by children, but not before the age of four.

The evidence from humans suggest that the fear of snakes is innate, but does not develop until the child is several years old. In 1928 Jones & Jones set a large, active, but harmless snake free in an enclosure with children of different ages. There were no signs of fear before the age of two; between three and four the children showed signs of cautiousness; and at four and over there were definite signs of fear which increased with age [Ref. 1:p. 9].

The studies were limited to children up to the age of 71 month. No data were presented for adults. The observations showed, that for one group of fears (e.g. noise, strange objects, pain, falling, loss of support, specific objects and situations) the level of fear was decreasing over time. For another group (e.g. ridicule, robbers, dreams, death, dark, animals, threat or danger, traffic, drowning, fire, imaginary creatures) the fear level was increasing over time. In both cases the individual gained more knowledge about the particular stimulus. The fear matured and the person showed different reactions with increasing age. Interesting is, that fears seem to mature in both directions; they may go up or down.

Even though the explanation for this phenomenon appears to be still weak, it seems that those fears increase which are



related to a learning process. They do not seem to be innate, they seem to be subject to the individual's development, the exposition of a person to it's environment, the person is raised in, and their education, to name a few factors. For example, the implications of interpersonal relationships in a factory have to be learned, they are not innate. Problems, related to those relationships, and the possible fears, which may results from them, are thus subject to a learning or development process. The fears which seem to be innate decrease with the development of knowledge. People, as they mature, seem to understand the phenomenon better and may find logical explanations which help them to cope with the previously unknown or unfamiliar situation or object.

For my study I want to expand this theory beyond the original time frame of 0-71 month carefully. I assume, that the theory of maturation will be valid also during the life of an adult. Individuals get exposed to novel situations all the time during their life. Especially in the work environment, frequent changes confront employees with new challenges. Peter Vaill, in his book Managing as a Performing Art offers a metaphor, which demonstrates the situation in modern organizations. He calls it "permanent white water". The story tells us that managers often believe in paddling their canoes in still, calm organizational waters, and in assuming they are able to go wherever they want. They handle temporary

disruptions and are led by the hope, the canoe will reach calm waters soon. But the truth is somewhat different:

But it has been my experience, . . . , that you never get out of the rapids! No sooner do you begin to digest one change than another one comes along to keep things unstuck. In fact, there are usually lots of changes going on at once. The feeling is one of continuous upset and chaos [Ref 8:p. 2].

These frequent changes, the permanent uncertainties, and the numerous confrontations with novel conditions in our jobs may result in the development of fears if we believe in the reality of calm organizational waters. People are seldom prepared to cope with conditions of "permanent white water" sufficiently. Most of the workers have been trained to handle standard situations and are more or less confused, when unanticipated changes occur. A thought of Peter Vaill may illustrate this point:

How much change, uncertainty, and turbulence can the modern manager handle? Everyone these days seems to be talking about the need to handle substantial amounts of change, uncertainty, and turbulence, but seldom do we find people talking about the possibility that we may be approaching some kind of a red line of the psyche, some state where it is all just too much to cope with [Ref 8:p. 1].

The unpreparedness and the possible feeling of insufficient capabilities to respond effectively may lead to the development of fears, especially the fear of failure. If a person has already encountered novel situations, where he or she failed, the knowledge may be developed that novel situations are related to failure. This, in turn, may lead to the development of fear of new and uncertain situations. The

fears about situations we encounter in our jobs are not innate. They are developed over time while we are exposed to the stimulus. Some people will get accustomed to the challenge of changes, others will respond by developing an increased fear. In both cases we can say, the fear has matured.

One distinction between two fear-motivated behaviors may be helpful to improve our understanding of human behavior. Everybody tries to avoid negative stimuli whenever possible. Two different types of reactions, available to us, have been identified: "passive avoidance" and "active avoidance" [Ref. 1:p. 138]. Passive avoidance is related to a situation, where the desired behavior brings the individual in contact with a negative stimuli.

The typical situation is, that a worker detects a deficiency and reports it to the supervisor with the request for clarification and/or change of the current state. The supervisor is unreceptive for this unfavorable report. If the worker insists in demanding a change, the supervisor may rate his subordinate badly or treat him or her negatively. The worker will terminate his complaints to avoid that negative treatment (punishment) in the future. The message from the top is clearly: Don't do this, or else...! In the active avoidance situation, the individual is in permanent contact with the negative stimulus, until he shows the behavior, the superior wants him to show. The individual learns one particular

behavior, which enables him to avoid punishment; any other behavior will be punished.

In my opinion, active avoidance is a rare occurrence in the organizational world. It would mean, that the entire setting for a new person would be negative from the beginning. This adverse environment would be changed gradually, when the new person displayed a behavior, which is in congruence with the organizational culture. In general, organizational environments are not entirely negative from the beginning. If the new person shows behavior which is in contrast to the existing norms, an educational process will be initiated. Negative reinforcements may be used if conventional educational practices do not yield the desired outcome. If the new person responds to those negative reinforcements, this can be explained by passive avoidance.

#### **B. THE NOTION OF FEAR IN THE TQM ENVIRONMENT**

In his book about Deming's theories, Rafael Aguayo devoted a chapter to Deming's point number eight "Drive out fear, so that everyone may work effectively for the company" [Ref. 3:p. 183-198]. He stated that bad management practices are continuing to reinforce the idea that fear can be employed as a useful and acceptable management tool (this is the point made by Ryan and Oestreich, Ref 1:p. xv). He goes on to describe that managers often seem to confuse fear with pressure. Individuals may induce pressure in themselves to

achieve higher goals or to satisfy themselves, their superiors or even peers. But in no case would these people experience any type of fear. The intrinsic desire to excel is the driving force behind the specific effort in those instances and not any extrinsic pressure, which could induce fear. The difference in those cases clearly is between the voluntarily selfimposed, selfmotivating versus the external pressure.

Individuals who operate under fearful conditions will invest enormous energies to overcome the fear or to eliminate the source of fear. This behavior has two negative effects on a company. First, valuable resources will be used for defense purposes by individual workers. The employees will be very careful in choosing their actions and will also devote much time and energy to check, whether actions will be safe for them. The "zero defect" mentality is considered counterproductive to a company's performance, because it diverts employee energy away from the actual objectives (e.g. improve company's profit, improve quality). Second, the employee may manipulate his performance figures in an attempt to make them look favorable. In this case, management would be deceived and would probably operate for a long time with the manipulated figures.

Aguayo's final statement summarizes this point: "Fear, even if it were to produce greater effort, will not produce greater results" [Ref. 3:p. 184]. According to this idea, the attempt to use fear as a leadership tool would inevitably end

in a loose-loose game for all participating parties. The employee might loose trust to his superiors, confidence in his own abilities, or the loyalty to the company. He also looses effectiveness, because he is splitting his energy between production efforts and his individual safety system. The manager will loose clearly on the production side. Efficiency and quality will drop, division performance in all areas may be affected negatively by the behavior of the employees, which is now governed by fear rather than company oriented effectiveness. The manager will not be able to fulfill his goals in the long run. The company as a whole will suffer most, especially in the long and very long run. The mission can only be accomplished partially or not at all. Customers may leave the organization as well as suppliers, robbing the company off it's vital basis. Internal problems will be reflected by indicators like high turn over rates, dissatisfaction of the employees, and/or increasing number of grievances or complaints.

My study is geared to discover different types of fear in the specific military environment under investigation. From Deming's theory I learned, that a variety of fears exist in the corporate world. Aguayo concentrates on two types of fear in his book [Ref 3:p. 185-186]. First, he describes, how the situation of mismanagement is apt to stimulate the fear in the employee, whether his job will be secured for the future or whether he will be facing unemployment soon. This fear is

based on observations, made by the employee. He may have discovered, that the company uses faulty parts, ineffective procedures, or simply wastes money in various ways of conducting it's business. The employee may ask himself, how long this behavior may keep the company in business and his job available. This uncertainty creates the fear, how long he will be employed with this company. In this context, Aguayo mentions again, that managers would like to control and use fear effectively, because "...they perceive fear to be a motivator.". Managers did not seem to have realized, that fear can be a motivator indeed, but it will not direct worker's energy towards constructive actions. The worker will be motivated to make his performance look good, even though it may not be good. The company loses all the energy, the employee puts into his efforts to change a faulty picture into a good looking one, without changing the process to make the performance itself good. The second type of fear, he mentions, is the fear of failure. Employees are under the pressure of meeting quotas and deadlines. These are the performance criteria against which salaries and evaluations are measured and ranked. In Deming's theory, this false focus results in ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and strained relationships between management and workers.

Mary Walton points out another fear in her book about total quality management [Ref 4:p. 72-73]. She describes the fear to speak up and report any kind of deficiency in the work

area. Any comment about a situation which is not along with company standards or procedures may denounce the messenger a nuisance maker. And those people are the first one's to get rid of in a situation, where the company must lay off workers. It may also have negative effects on the evaluation reports, which, in turn, will affect salary and promotion. This is a fear which can be found in all levels of a corporate hierarchy. Even higher level managers, who don't understand certain facets of their jobs or have detected failures or inefficiencies, may worry to ask for clarification or additional guidelines. Deming says:

What are people afraid of? Afraid to contribute to the company. Better not get out of line. Don't violate procedures. Do it exactly this way.

Aguayo's book has a paragraph about fear in the military [Ref 3:p. 184-185]. He talks about the question of whether fear is a necessary tool in the military. His observations didn't support this theory. He considered military manager as effective as their business counterparts. In his view, fear should not be used in the military at all. He demonstrates, by citing the battle of Marathon, that the voluntary Greek army, which was intrinsically motivated, was superior to the involuntary Persian army, which was managed by fear and extrinsic motivation. Even though the Greeks were outnumbered by the Persians, they won the battle.



Nearly at the same time the Greek won against the Persians (490 BC), Sun Tzu wrote in his book "The Art of War" about the relationship between military leaders and their subordinates:

War is a matter of vital importance to the state...Therefore appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors...The first of these factors is moral influence; the second...By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life unto death without fear of mortal peril...When one treats people with benevolence, justice, and righteousness, and reposes confidence in them, the army will be united in mind and will be happy serve their leaders. The Book of Changes says: 'In happiness at overcoming difficulties, people forget the danger of death.' [Ref 5:p. 63-64]

Sun Tzu ranks the moral influence higher than all other factors. Thus, a positive relationship between the leaders and the led is a crucial prerequisite for success. Every manager should thus try to vitalize and concentrate all energy of his subordinates towards a common goal. In order to achieve the maximum possible success, it will be necessary for management to establish and maintain a trustful and harmonic environment for all participants to work in. Another quotation of Sun Tzu may illustrate and underscore this thought:

He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious. Tu Yu: Therefore Mencius said: 'The appropriate season is not as important as the advantage of the ground; these are not as important as harmonious human relations.' [Ref. 5:p. 83]

Sun Tzu establishes a direct link between the harmonious human relationships and the capability to unify forces towards a common goal. Human relationships are viewed as the most important factor to allow the leader to concentrate his

available manpower. I believe, that the inverse conclusion is also true: if a leader is incapable of establishing and maintaining positive relationships with his subordinates, he will not be able to arrange their efforts in a way which is necessary to accomplish his mission. To achieve this favorable constellation of trustful relationships, fear is, according to Sun Tzu and Deming, the most inappropriate means, because, as Deming pointed it out, "the economic loss from fear is appalling." [Ref 4:p 72].

One of my research questions is whether it is possible to eliminate fear entirely from the military work place. Aguayo's view is as follows:

Fear is harmful to the company and to individuals. To eliminate fear, management must strive to tap intrinsic motivation. Management may not be able to eliminate all fear from the lives of its employees but it can eliminate the sources of fear built into the management structures [Ref. 3:p. 189].

He admits, that the endeavor to create a fearless work environment is limited. But he also makes the distinct point, that management has the chance to reduce the fear significantly by creating favorable management structures. Those structures should apparently reflect the ideas of Deming's TQM philosophy. Aguayo does not talk in more detail about the probable reasons, why the entire elimination of fear may be unattainable. From my perspective, one reason is the complexity of the construct of fear. Fear is a multi layer phenomenon. Different areas of our lives can stimulate fears.

When we come to our work place, we carry those fears with us. It is impossible to separate "private and business fears". Furthermore, those fears influence each other and may even increase each other. No manager has knowledge or control over all aspects, which may stimulate fear in his workers. Not even the worker himself may have this ability. Thus, the elimination of all fears can not be a reasonable approach for managers. But, as Aguayo clearly stated, the elimination of fears, which are based on management structures and behaviors can and should be eliminated by management. This would reduce the entire fear potential in the workers significantly. Moreover, the workers would develop a much more favorable attitude towards a "fearless work place". Employees would then concentrate their efforts voluntarily and happily towards corporate goals.

#### C. POSSIBLE COUNTERPOLES OF FEAR: TRUST AND FAITH

The term fear can not be explained sufficiently in an isolated fashion. Fear is just one element of an emotional continuum, that portrays parts of our lives and behaviors. At the other end of this spectrum we find expressions like trust or faith. Jack R. Gibb and Charles D. Bass describe the relationship between fear and trust and fear and faith, respectively. Their common intention is to evaluate this relationship and provide theories for overcoming fear. They offer the reader two distinct ways of approaching and,

finally, solving the fear problem. Gibb provides a scientifically based theory, while Bass uses the religious avenue. Despite their different methods, they have many aspects in common. For example, both authors use the symbol of a seesaw, with fear at the one end and trust or faith at the other end. If one element dominates, the other suffers. If fear is high, trust or faith will be low. It is also remarkable, that both authors agree that the entire elimination of fear is not possible. They admit, that this would call for an ideal condition, which is probably not attainable.

Bass bases his theory on the Bible. He starts with the situation when Jesus and his disciples crossed the Sea of Galilee and a storm came up suddenly and unexpected. The disciples showed strong signs of fear under the impression of getting drowned soon. For Bass, the question, Jesus asked his disciples, is the basis for his theory:

'You of little faith, why are you so afraid?'...The positioning of 'fear' and 'faith' in Jesus' remark is of major significance and explains his disappointment over their behavior. Observe the two questions side by side: (a.) 'Why are you so afraid?' (b.) 'Where is your faith?' A causal relationship can be seen between the two sentences. If a, than b: 'If you are so afraid, then you must have little faith.' [Ref. 10:p.5].

Bass goes on to conclude: "While fear may evidence a lack of faith, the reverse is also true. FAITH CAN CONQUER FEAR!" [Ref. 10:p 5]. In his book he also describes the relationships between fear and anxiety, stress, anger, depression, timidity,

and embarrassment. He arrives at two interesting conclusions, which he derives from the discussion of those relationships: First, if you are able to overcome fear, you will, in most cases, overcome the other factors also. Second, a vast amount of our energy is used to cope with fear. The elimination of fear will free this energy, which then can be used for constructive, positive purposes. Bass' system is tailored to provide valuable assistance for the individual to improve his or her particular life situation. It is a belief-type system, where the mental processes and attitudes determine the success and the magnitude of the improvement.

While Bass provides a viable technique for the individual, Gibb's approach apparently targets the organizational arena. He investigates the consequences of the existence of fear in an organizational setting, establishes a counterpole to offset fear, and finally creates his TORI (trust, openness, realization, interdependency) management theory [Ref. 11:p. 238]. For Gibb, most organizations are places with low trust levels. He goes even further by saying:

Trust, unhappily, is not part of the American, or global, political way of life. In fact, our present national culture - social, economic, even artistic, as well as political - is inhospitable to trust [Ref. 11:p. 13].

He characterizes those organizations as being often depersonalized and dehumanized. Their employees (workers and managers) invest a great deal of their time in strategizing and defending activities. As a possible reason he identified

fear. His remedy is trust. In his opinion, the size of an organization is one determinant for the high fear and low trust level. In a small group (family, peer group, or ethnic group) the trust level is usually high. People know each other well, a high degree of openness is prevalent, little questions are asked, and people trust each other ("Trust makes it unnecessary to examine motives, to look for hidden meanings, to have it in writing,..." [Ref 11:p. 14]). A common tendency is, that, the bigger the group gets, the more the interaction gets formalized, standardized, and often dehumanized.

As trust ebbs, we are less open with each other, less interdependent, less interbeing - not into each other in deep and meaningful ways; we look for strategies in dealing with each other; we seek help from others; or we look for protection in rules, norms, contracts, and the law. The ebbing of trust and the growth of fear are the beginning of alienation, loneliness, and hostility. In a very real sense, we can say that trust level is the thermometer of individual and group health [Ref. 11:p. 14].

Gibb uses a definition for trust, which "implies instinctive, unquestioning belief in and reliance upon something." [Ref. 11:p. 14]. These are factors which require that the group member have an intimate knowledge of each other. They believe the other person, without checking every activity. They also don't refer to or rely on procedures, rules, and norms as much as strangers would do. Strangers have a need to protect themselves, because they lack trust of each other. In an environment, where people are unfamiliar with each other, the

situation, and/or the mission, more rules are established quickly to regulate the way of doing business.

Gibb identifies four behaviors, which are integral parts of his defense process. Those behaviors are exhibited when the fear level is increasing and, consequently, the trust level decreasing: The first is depersonalizing, which means, that a fearful person switches from being personal into some type of formal role. This role is usually created on external pressure and serves a protective function. The gain might be respect or control. Included in the apparent losses are social relations and the results might be increased anxiety or hostility. The second behavior is masking. In an effort of self protection facades are created to avoid intimacy and personal contact. Gibb assumes, that information are filtered and distorted, distances are increased, and people resort to more formal postures. In this context, people start strategizing which "...produces counter-strategy, social distance, circumvention, and an array of counter defenses." [Ref. 11:p. 30]. The third one is ouighting. The individual is asking itself what the appropriate behavior would be in response to external requisites. Own desires and wishes are suppressed in order to conform with organizational requirements and to avoid any kind of pain. The fourth behavior is depending. The fearful person is seeking or developing various types of controls, rules, or protective devices to keep it's life in order [Ref. 11:p. 26-31]. All those behaviors require a huge amount of energy to

build up and to maintain. The behaviors are counterproductive to any effective organizational function. The energy is not available for production processes, management duties, or any other necessary type of action which would support the organization. Gibb provides a list with activities, which consume the energy: evaluation, distrust, moralizing, circumvention, distortion, formality, influence, passivity, resistance, dependency, management, and rebellion. This list seem to fit Deming's statement, that the economic loss of fear is appalling. If all those energies would be used in a trustful environment to the benefit of the organization, the gain in productivity, quality, and finally profit would be enormous.

Following Gibb's and Bass' principles, trust or faith will increase and thus improve our wellbeing, effectiveness, productivity, confidence, to name a few factors. In both theories, fear is to be substituted by either trust or faith. This would allow people not to have fear in the first place. The successful implementation of either method would eliminate the primary problem, to cope with fear at all, because the development of fear is prevented.



The approach of Cangemi and associates combines the elements of fear and trust with organization's and employee's needs. They made the observation, that trust is at a high level, if the two needs overlap significantly. Their interpretation of the overlap is, that it indicates

...the presence of leadership behavior that is supportive of and sensitive to the needs of the employees; we can also assume that the employee behavior is supportive of the organization's goals and the organization's leadership [Ref. 12:p. 3].

In this situation, where trust is high, we can talk about a win/win situation. Both, the organization and the employee will gain from the positive atmosphere. Workers feel free to think, to participate, and make their contributions to the organizational development. In this setting even mistakes are made, because nobody fears retribution. When trust declines, distrust takes over and fears are developed. The overlap of the two needs will be reduced, because the attention for this overlap decreases also. Employees and managers are more focused on their own problems, their defenses, and their strategies to survive. Cangemi and associates provide a list of leader behaviors which goes along with the decline of trust in an organization. I will display some examples [Ref 12:p. 4]:

- Threats and punishment with little praise
- Public criticism
- Personal criticism
- No interest in input from employees

- The leadership is always right
- Favoritism
- Downward communication/none upward
- Constant rejection of ideas
- Little respect for employees
- Employees are looked upon as pawns/objects

If fear increases, the employees feel increasingly vulnerable and unprotected. They will invest time and energy to develop protectional systems like internal work groups with informal power or they will move toward unionization [Ref. 12:p.4]. The new state, which is described by Cangemi and associates in a dramatic fashion as war, is characterized by severe communication barriers between the employees and the management. The following outcomes are predicted by the authors (examples from the complete list only [Ref 12:p. 5]):

- Product quality deteriorates
- Scrap rate is high
- Absenteeism is high
- Many capable/marketable people leave
- Deadlines are rarely met on time
- Careless use of machinery and equipment is seen
- There is much short term thinking
- There is little or no creativity
- The company is seen as an enemy

In their conclusions they go along with Deming's statement, that the economic loss of fear is enormous. They agree, that

the company will not be able to sustain a competitive position in the marketplace. A downturn will follow.

#### **D. EXPLANATION OF LEADERSHIP**

In order to find answers to my research questions, it will be necessary to explore what is meant by the term "leadership". Associated questions like "What is a leader?", "What is leadership?", "What is good or bad leadership?", or "How can we improve the quality of leadership?", come into mind. These questions can be answered in an organizational context. I will use behavioral terms to specify the explanations. The science of organizational behavior is interested in exploring, understanding, and explaining human behavior in various types of organizations. Human behavior is examined in relation to organizational performance. Both factors are closely related and affect each other significantly.

Organizations exist for a reason. One basic assumption is, that the existence of any organization is based upon or can usually be justified by the pursuit of some type of mission. Missions differ substantially and may range from making profit to provide service without the intention to make any profit. It may include the supply of a superior quality product or a unique item, or to capture market share. The organization can be a production plant, where end products are manufactured or assembled, a service organization like an accounting or

consulting firm, the governmental administration, or one of the military services like the Army. All those organizations need to establish formal structures to specify and arrange organizational design factors like authority, power, responsibility, tasks, and jobs. The formal structure is then filled with individual workers who actually perform the broad variety of distinct tasks which finally sum up to the end product.

#### **1. What is a leader?**

In the organization, people are arranged in a hierarchical structure, which identifies superiors and subordinates. People working in positions from the top to the second to the last level of the hierarchy are called leaders. They may have different labels like CEO, Vice President, Director, manager or supervisor. In all cases they perform the leadership functions.

In order to stay in business and to fulfill the mission, the company has to be successful. Leaders are tasked with the accomplishment of certain goals and objectives. The leaders arrange, coordinate, guide, control, manipulate, check, counsel, coach, or evaluate their available resources. Those can be human resources (workers, employees), hardware resources (property, buildings, machinery, equipment, tools), or procedures/regulations/instructions. To achieve the goals in the most effective and efficient way, the leaders should

find the optimal configuration of their resources. But this is only the mechanical portion of a leader's responsibility. The human interaction or human relationship aspects are crucial components to be considered carefully, when we talk about organizational success. The leadership, the way the leader interacts with his subordinates, determines to a great extent factors like success, organizational climate, job satisfaction, etc.

## **2. Presentation of leadership theories**

It is impossible to answer the question "What is leadership?" in a direct approach or a single sentence. Behavioral scientist have been working on a single definition since decades. There success is limited. Fiedler presents a collection of definitions which is apt to illustrate the problem. I will repeat some of the definitions here [Ref. 13:p. 3-4]:

- The leader is one who succeeds in getting others to follow him (Cowley, 1928)
- Leadership is the process of influencing group activities towards goal setting and goal achievement (Stogdill, 1948)
- The leader is the person who creates the most effective change in group performance (Cattel, 1951)
- Leadership is the exercise of authority and the making of decisions (Dubin, 1951)
- Leadership is the initiation of acts that result in a consistent pattern of group interaction directed toward the solution of mutual problems (Hemphill, 1954)

Leadership is a very complex theme. It involves the leader and

his subordinate as well as the environment. The environment can be divided up into three distinct sub-environments: first, the situation in the workplace, where the leader-subordinate interaction takes place. Second, the private environment of the leader. Third, the private environment of the subordinate. The private environment is comprised of factors like family, cultural background, education, or individual feelings and thoughts. Thus, leadership is at least a five-dimensional relationship, with each factor constantly influencing the others.

Over time several distinct theoretical bases for leadership have been developed. The oldest one is the trait theory or "great man" theory, which implied, that some individuals were born to be leaders. They exhibited certain traits, which might be inborn or acquired, and which made the people follow them. Researchers failed in most attempts to identify traits common to all leaders, to support the theory. The only trait which was clearly a frequently found factor in all investigations was intelligence.

Group and exchange theories of leadership emphasized the interaction between the leader and the subordinates. Fiedler mentioned, that

the leader-member interaction thus involves some kind of psychological or economic exchange. In the business world, this is usually a wage or salary. But there is also likely to be some "psychic income", such as security, the chance to do something unusual, the pleasure of a gratifying relationship with one's workers, or the sense of achievement when the group reaches an assigned goal. [Ref.

13:p. 4]

He also mentioned an emotional relationship. The leader was no longer viewed as isolated and unaffected by the group. Reactions from the group were found to be apt to influence the leader. Fiedler discovered, that the leader was responsive to the group behavior. The leader's ego was identified as a part of the leadership process and Fiedler stated, that "it makes a difference to him whether he is liked or disliked; whether he is perceived as fair or unfair and above all whether he has the support of his group in performing assigned tasks." [Ref 13:p. 5].

In the 1940s, social psychologists discovered, that situational factors seem to influence leadership behavior. Earlier studies had precluded the situation as a variable. Now several situational factors were discovered. But it took till the early 1970s when Fiedler offered the first contingency model of leadership, which included situational factors in a sufficient way [Ref. 13].

The path-goal leadership theory [Ref 14;P. 426-429] identified four major types of leadership styles: (1) Directive leadership, which is very similar to the authoritarian style. (2) Supportive leadership, which proposes, that the leader has a genuine concern for his subordinates. (3) Participative leadership. The superior solicits input from the subordinates and eventually incorporates them into his decision. But the decision is still

made by the boss. (4) Achievement-oriented leadership. The leader allows a high degree of freedom for his subordinates to achieve goals. The goals are relatively broad and set by the superior. The theory assumed that the superior acts as a facilitator. He prepares the path for his subordinates to reach their own goals by choosing one of the four leadership styles appropriately. This theory is similar to the idea of the organizational and individual needs fulfillment, described by Cangemi and associates [Ref. 12].

All these theories attempt to explain leader behavior. It is recognized and widely accepted today that contingency models which incorporate the interdependencies between the leader's behavior, the leader, the subordinate, and the environment are most apt to explain the leader's behavior sufficiently.

### **3. Presentation of leadership styles**

The leadership style is the way in which the leader influences his subordinates. The style is assumed to have a great impact on the effectiveness of leadership and thus, finally, on the effectiveness and the success of the organization. Various styles, related to or derived from the previously mentioned theories, have been developed over time. They range from two-dimensional grids to elaborate three-dimensional models. I will present a brief description of some styles.



In the 1950s, Tannenbaum and Schmidt articulated a shift in the prevailing leadership principles [Ref. 14:p. 434]. During the first half of the century, leadership theory was dominated by the simple "black and white" approach which divided the workforce into leaders and followers, and which sought to identify the right attitude of the leader. The development of the concept of group dynamics changed this system in the 1950s and introduced a shift in the focus away from the leader and more towards the group members. As a consequence, the increased emphasis on the human relationships rather than on the structural components of an organization called for new leadership behaviors. The authors offer a continuum of leadership [Ref. 14:p. 434] with boss-centered leadership styles at the left end and subordinate-centered leadership styles at the right end. The left corner symbolizes the authoritarian manager, who makes all decisions by himself. At the right end we find the participative manager, who permits subordinates to operate with much freedom within specified boundaries. The subordinates will have a lot of freedom to make their own decisions and influence their work processes. Moreover, they describe seven different leadership style which change gradually as they go from the right to the left side and which cover the entire continuum. Tannenbaum and Schmidt suggest that managers chose the appropriate style in accordance with the particular leadership situation at hand.

The managerial grid, developed by Blake and Mouton, defines management in a two-dimensional grid, with the horizontal axis representing concern for people and the vertical axis representing concern for production. Management styles are explained in accordance to the preferences of the superior [Ref. 14:p. 435].

The normative model, developed by Vroom-Yetton, allows the manager to select a specific behavior in a given situation. They provide a decision tree with seven distinct questions. According to the problem and the situation at hand, the manager answers himself through the decision tree and selects the most appropriate behavior, which is described at the end of each branch [Ref. 14:p. 442].

The two previous described models allow the identification of a certain style, but they are not related to effectiveness. The most elaborate system, Reddin's 3-D model of leadership effectiveness, makes up for that deficiency. He discriminates more effective and less effective styles, starting out with four basic leadership styles. The model also incorporates the elements of task orientation and relationship orientation, which captures the preference of the particular manager. His model offers twelve different styles, with four of them assumed to be the most effective ones. The model includes leader traits as well as the situation and the personal relationships between superior and subordinates. Reddin emphasized that a manager should be adaptive to the

situation to choose a style which would lead to effectiveness [Ref. 14:p.436].

#### **E. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADERSHIP AND FEAR**

In the book by Ryan and Oestreich "Driving fear out of the workplace" the authors present their findings about fear in the workplace. Also stimulated by Deming's point number eight, they focused their research on the negative impacts that fear can have on the production process and ultimately on the quality of the product. They chose a definition which is closely related to this issue:

We define fear in the workplace as *feeling threatened by possible repercussions as a result of speaking up about work-related concerns* [Ref. 15:p. 21]. One significant factor in this definition is, that the threat does not have to be real. It is the individual perception (feeling threatened) which shapes the fearful feeling and thus, the response of the individual. Another important finding was, that "management practices" were the largest single category of issues, people did not dare to talk about, regardless of the possible need to express their feelings or to make viable suggestions for improvements. The basic reason was the fear of repercussions [Ref. 15:p. 31].

Ryan and Oestreich also investigated the relationships and the interpersonal communication between managers and their subordinates. In this context, they identified an array of different fears:

- Having one's credibility questioned
- Being left out of the decision making
- Being criticized in front of others
- Not getting information necessary to succeed
- Having a key assignment given to someone else
- Disagreements which might lead to damaged relationships
- Getting stuck in a dead-end job
- Not getting deserved recognition
- Not being seen as a team player
- Suggestions being misinterpreted as criticisms
- Poor levels of performance
- Getting fired [Ref. 15:p. 4-5]

All those fears were apt to have negative impacts on the work atmosphere, productivity, and overall company performance. Effectiveness and efficiency are reduced. Furthermore, the consequences are held to deplete the competitive power of an organization and to endanger it's long term survivability. The authors mentioned four sources, where fearful feelings can originate from:

- Actual experience in the current situation, or in a past similar situation
- Stories about other's experiences

- Assumptions and private interpretations of other's behavior
- Negative, culturally based stereotypes about those with supervisory power.
- Any given situation can reflect on or more of these sources [Ref. 15:p. 21].

The authors acknowledge that fear can be a phenomenon based on a single stimulus as well as being a complicated, multi layer structure, combining different sources of fear. This makes it very complicated for everybody (superior, peers, subordinates, and the individual itself) to cope with this situation and to seek for possible solutions.

Ryan and Oestreich briefly touch on the idea, whether fear could be used as a positive motivator. Their overall findings were disapproving. Fear keeps a destructive mode whether it is used under short or long term conditions. An interesting finding was that fear seems to work for some people as a motivator if it is self-imposed. The authors comment, that "when a person takes on a risk as a personal or professional stretch, fear may be a successful self-motivator." [Ref. 15:p. 68] In all other cases, the interviewed workers reported, that fear has negative consequences, when used as a motivator.

#### **F. TWO VIEWS OF MANAGING FEAR IN THE MILITARY**

One opportunity to explore the notion of fear in the military is to look at the time when fear is assumed to be at a peak: war time. I found a variety of statements related to

fear in Porter B. Williamson's book about General Patton's principles [Ref 6]. Patton was known as a very hard and strict leader, who was sometimes missing a sense of delicacy, when dealing with his subordinates. Even senior Colonels were frequently addressed harshly or even bluntly.

Every man serving with Gen. Patton knew that to make a mistake was to expect the wrath of his anger. It was not unusual to hear Gen. Patton's voice on the tank-command radio, 'Col. Blank, you are removed from command immediately!' [Ref. 6:p. 34].

The same Patton, who was a very religious man and had an intimate knowledge of the Bible, devoted deep and serious thoughts to the possible deaths of his soldiers. For him, death was a natural part of life and it was said, that he never feared death.

But death was not death to Gen. Patton. With the faith to destroy fear, death would be a phase in the cycle of life. Much of Gen. Patton's total philosophy is in the words 'Those in fear will die a thousands deaths.'...When you have the faith to fight for something to death, there is no death. Death will only be a phase in the cycle of life. [Ref 6:p. 158].

His favorite wish was to be killed in combat and his ultimate wish was to be killed by the last bullet fired in the last war. This does not mean, he was eager to reach the end of his life quickly, but it reflects his attitude towards the relationship between death and life. The core element in his thoughts was the relationship between fear and faith.

Everything is in balance! Just perfect. Just like fear and faith. You get to having too much fear, you gotta find the faith to match the fear. You get more faith, you will get more fears to test your faith. God keeps you trying to conquer all fears to see just how much you can take. He

will never give you more than you can conquer. Of course, you can give up and fall down with your fears. But if you don't give up, you can destroy all of your fears. [Ref 6:p. 151]

Patton never refused to admit that he was scared about many things. He believed that fear was a natural part of life. But he also made a clear distinction, when a soldier should respond to his fears and when not. "There is a time to take counsel of your fears, and there is time to never listen to any fear. It is always important to know what you are doing." [Ref. 6:p. 78]. He favored the idea to listen to any concerns and fears in the preparation phase of important decisions. Once a decision was reached, it should be carried out without further listening to any fears. The person should control the situation and his or her actions, not vice versa. "When you have collected all the facts and fears and made your decision, turn off all your fears and go ahead!" [Ref 6:p. 78]. Gen. Patton devoted an enormous amount of time to drive out fear out of his soldiers. Williamson considers Patton's ability to take fears from the minds of his soldiers as one of his greatest talents. Patton used a simple equation to determine his approach, how to create fearless troops: "He was constantly striving to kill the fears of every one of his soldiers. Faith and confidence builds pride, and pride destroys fears." [Ref 6:p. 69]. He applied this simple formula first to himself and made himself the incarnation of what he wanted his soldiers to live up to.

In his speeches he conveyed his opinions and explained the benefits of following his ideas: First, to be a member of the Third Army and thus be among the best soldiers around and second, because of that, to have a much higher chance to survive longer. His visits in the front lines and his exposure to enemy fire underscored his thoughts and made his man believe that he meant what he said. Patton was convinced that it was possible to eliminate fear in his soldiers. But it seems that he wanted to achieve this not by actually eliminating their fears, but by teaching his troops ways to gain ultimate and total control over their fears. So they were able to pursue their objectives, driven by their confidence which was based on their training and their military skills. He trained and disciplined his troops to such a high level of competency, that they believed to be invincible. In Patton's view, the combination of faith and competency would give the soldiers the solid mental basis to control their fears effectively.

From his commanders he demanded that they should never show fear in front of their troops. Patton believed, that this would automatically discourage the soldiers. This could result in failure to accomplish the mission, in a higher number of casualties, or in the decrease of moral. Any commander had to control his fears, if he had some, in order to provide permanently a motivating and perfect military image for the troops.



It takes a lot of courage to lead men into battles where they can be killed. A commander does not dare to have any fears. If a commander shows any fear, the men can tell [Ref. 6:p. 76].

General Patton favored traditional leadership principles and had a distinct aversion to new management practices. Officers, who tried to introduce innovative ideas were reminded, that "All that 'save the ego' business is not for war." [Ref 6:p. 33]. In Patton's philosophy, a dead man did not have an ego any longer, and part of his mission was, to keep his men alive. He considered his leadership style the appropriate way to assure success for this critical part of his mission. He demanded perfect discipline from every man and was willing to use fear to ensure that this goal was reached. Even in a training situation it was apparent that he used intimidation to enforce perfect discipline:

I cannot kill a man in our combat training, but I can make every man wish to be dead rather than take the wrath of my anger! [Ref. 6:p. 35].

General Patton seemed to accept the application of fear in a training and/or disciplinary context.

Sun Tzu described in his chapter about estimates command as one of the five factors, which should be thoroughly studied, before getting engaged in war. Strictness is one element, Sun Tzu viewed essential for a good general. "If strict, his troops are disciplined because they are in awe of him and are afraid of punishment." [Ref. 5:p. 65]. It seems, that even Sun Tzu tolerates some degree of fear with regard to

discipline. Moreover, I assume that he, as well as Patton, viewed it as a logical consequence in order to achieve discipline.

It seems to me, that the awareness of just punishment, in the case of failure, is not based on the active use of fear by the military leader. It seems to be inherent in the people. They have been trained to execute certain functions and they know exactly, what they are expected to do and also, what they will receive, if they fail. A leader, who enforces discipline, does not have to use fear at all. The neutral announcement, that discipline will be strictly enforced, instills fear in those, who know that they failed.

The Department of the Navy issued in January 1993 an article, written by J .G. Suarez, about "Managing Fear in the Workplace". The author states, that "fear is a response to a clearly identifiable and circumscribed stimulus" [Ref 16:p. 1]. In his opinion, fear can never be entirely eliminated, but managers have the duty to manage it. The first step to managing fear successfully is to acknowledge it. Fear has to be accepted as a natural fact of life, experienced by almost all individuals some time. His list of possible fears include "fear of reprisal or receiving poor appraisals, fear of failure, fear of math [related to the increasingly data driven work environment], fear of change, fear of speaking up, and, surprisingly, the fear of success." [Ref. 16:p. 4]. The fear of success is explained by the increasing number of enemies,

which are encountered in the wake of successful operations. The author believes, that three factors are necessary to create the environment, which would allow the individual to cope successful with fear. First, the leadership has to include certain attributes like "the system is composed of people, quick responses to employee concerns and ideas, reward of cooperation and innovation, and freely shared information." [Ref. 16:p. 6]. Second, trust must be built up between all levels of the hierarchy and horizontally at each level. This includes the solicitation of true inputs from all employees. Questions, which ask simply for "yes" or "no" responses, have to be avoided. Suarez proposes an initiative, taken by management, to launch the trust building endeavor:

It is the leader's duty to find out what generates fear in the organization. In addition to listening to and observing the signs of fear, management should take the lead on speaking up about fear [Ref. 16:p. 6].

His third point is, that management has to provide a clear vision for the organization. This will be a sign of certainty and a goal to strive for all employees. It also gives the workers the feeling, that their job will be secured for the future.

#### **G. TWO ARMY STUDIES RELATED TO EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT**

In an attempt to analyze satisfaction with current leadership practices, the Army launched a series of studies in the early 1970s. The "Leadership Monograph Series" was the

first effort to cope with the leadership issue. One intention was to provide specific guidance for the Army leaders in the 1970s and perhaps 1980s.

The ultimate objective of the monographs is to contribute to the combat effectiveness of the Army by continued improvement of individual leadership and the leadership climate in which operations and training take place. It is recognized throughout this discussion that leadership remains an inexact, personality-orientes, situationally-dependent function; and that leadership is but one of the key elements which determine organizational effectiveness [Ref. 17:p. vi].

The findings, reported in this monograph were positive, if not enthusiastically:

This is a highly positive indicator of the generally high caliber of Army leadership...Army leadership... is extremely good. Most of those involved--superiors, leaders, and subordinates alike--are generally satisfied with the leadership at all levels within the Army [Ref. 17:p. 12].

The comment is supported by data, which show, that in all surveys at least 70% of the people reported some degree of satisfaction. Detailed findings demonstrated, that open communication was one determinant for satisfaction. Furthermore, the facts, that the leader was setting an example on and off duty, and that he was setting high performance standards, were identified as being highly related to satisfaction [Ref. 17:p. 13].

At the same time, an interesting personal experiment was conducted by an Army battalion commander. Based on his training in psychology and sociology, he applied modern leadership techniques to his battalion.

Unlike common military practices, the BC used contingency management techniques to motivate subordinates. He would wait (when circumstances permitted) until his subordinates behaved in appropriate ways and then reward them, rather than tell them what to do and then threaten them if they failed to do it. In fact, punishment and threats were absent by design... Instead, he told his commanders to 'Do what you think is best.' Later, when they passed [the inspection], he verbally rewarded them with references to their ability and self-initiative [Ref. 18:p. 2-3].

The battalion commander used trust and confidence to shape the work atmosphere and he treated his personnel as "competent individuals and professionals." [Ref. 18:p. 3] The people were working hard, but "none felt that their enthusiasm for getting the job done could be attributed to fear or threat of punishment, verbal or otherwise." [Ref. 18:p. 3] Open communication was a basic design element in this experiment. The battalion commander kept an open door policy and was quickly recognized as a good listener. People felt comfortable to present their problems and suggestions to him. His calm and relaxed appearance motivated his subordinates and gave them the safe feeling to approach him, whenever they felt, it was necessary.

Because he always maintained a relaxed, analytical, problem-solving approach, subordinates did not feel threatened or embarrassed by letting him know their ideas or feelings [Ref. 18:p. 3]

Included in the open communication was a continuous evaluation process rather than a one time rating event. Thus, the soldiers were always aware of their performance and specifically about the areas, where improvements were required

within a given time frame. This reduced the anxiety level significantly and fostered a minimization of individual stress.

An interesting question is raised at the end of this report. The way this battalion commander chose, was not totally perfect with respect to the effectiveness of his organization. Failures occurred and it is reported, that he got punished for them by his superiors. Thus, the experiment had an individual price for him. What gave him the security to continue his way in the light of punishment? His believe to get his next assignment for sure, might have given him some security. The authors raised the question, whether the risk was appropriate or perhaps too high. The question was assumed to be especially important under the assumption, that other officers may want to repeat or extent the experiment in the future. No answer is provided for this question.

## V. METHODOLOGY

### A. GENERAL THOUGHTS

The overall objective of this study is to explore the phenomenon of fear in the workplace, and in particular to document various manifestations of fear in a superior-subordinate relationship. Specifically I will address the three research questions stated in Chapter III. While much work has been done to apply Deming's "Total Quality" theory in toto after an organization decides to embark on the TQM course, I have found little research material on specific points out of the array of his 14 points. My special interest concentrates on his point number eight, "Drive out fear".

### B. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study focuses on the exploration and documentation of various manifestations of fear in a limited and clearly defined environment. My intention is to provide basic information on a very specific topic which has received little attention in the past. The emphasis will be on information depth rather than breadth. A generalization of the findings to a larger environment is not intended and would not be appropriate without further work, because the data will only allow conclusions for the small sample under investigation.

Nevertheless, it is my intention to identify material which may lead to further research questions.

The study will be based on the information provided by a pair of officers who serve in the US Army, stationed at Fort Ord, Monterey, California. I chose a Commanding Officer and his Executive Officer to include a superior-subordinate relationship into the study (in the following text they are referred to as CO and XO respectively). This relationship serves the purpose to explore whether fear was used by the leader and how it may be perceived by the subordinate.

### **C. EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY**

A variety of epistemological and methodological approaches are used in social sciences. By social sciences I mean those studies which seek to understand human systems or systems of human interaction. Certainly management in the workplace is a human system, and its study is a part of social science, regardless of the material and technical components.

Research into human systems is most commonly of the "snapshot" or sociological variety. This kind of research generally tries to "discover" and assess the relationship between previously defined categories across a population, or sample, of identical cases, or objects, at a given point in time. The result is to provide information on the pattern of relationships which is presumed to exist and endure through time. On these discovered relationships a law is hypothesized



and tested. Subsequent real world events fit this law with a some probability. This is the conventional paradigm of positivistic research.

The research approach chosen for this study is not of that kind, but is of the anthropological or phenomenological variety. In this kind of research, a particular case is studied in depth in order to observe what is actually occurring in that particular, concrete case. The actual phenomenon is attended to and noted, often before relevant categories can be specified. The yield from such research is the generation of meaningful categories for subsequent research and the exploration of possible mechanisms that might account for the phenomenon in the observed case. Subsequently the "theory" that is developed from the single, particular case is then applied and modified by the phenomena in other particular cases.

Such research is common in anthropology, in clinical studies (where the development of new practice is the goal), in case research, and in ethnographic studies. It is sometimes referred to as "N of one" research, (in contrast to "multiple N" research) and is necessary whenever a new field or topic is being studied. This is the situation with the topic of fear in the workplace.

The distinction between these two types of research has often been discussed in the epistemological literature, as illustrated by the following table.

| <u>Sociological</u><br>Type of Research | <u>Anthropological</u><br>Type of Research | <u>Associated Name</u> |
|---|--|------------------------|
| Extensive                               | Intensive                                  |                        |
| Multiple "N"                            | "N" of one                                 |                        |
| Surface                                 | Deep                                       | Chomsky                |
| Reconstructed<br>logic                  | Logic-in-use                               | Kaplan                 |
| Etic                                    | Emic                                       | Pike                   |
| Aristotelian                            | Galilean                                   | Lewin                  |

Lewin's distinction is particularly useful. What he calls the "Galilean" approach to theory construction is based on the study of concrete, individual cases, whereas the "Aristotelian" approach to theory construction is based on the average over a great many cases in which the relationship between general categories is determined. In the Galilean approach, the individual case, or event, or occurrence, is the source of our knowledge. The unique, concrete, individual case is precisely governed by whatever actual laws are actually operating. In the Aristotelian approach, the individual case, or event, is thought of as a chance occurrence around some presumed general law. Events are viewed as having a variance around a rule.

This study of fear in the workplace is designed to be conducted in the Galilean mode. Data are collected through a sequence of in-depth interviews with the two persons who comprise the particular, focal, authority dyad (subordinate-superior) that I selected for this study.

#### D. CONDUCT OF THE STUDY

This study explores the dynamics of a superior-subordinate relationship. The selection of the authority-dyad was based on the following criteria:

- The military installation had to be close to the Naval Postgraduate School to allow for convenience and flexibility in scheduling the interviews
- The second reason to chose a close by facility was that I intended to establish private contacts beyond the interview process to create growing personal relationships. I considered this helpful for the conduct of the study and for the discovery of deeper rooted fears.
- Fort Ord offered the largest number of superior-subordinate pairs which allowed me to pick the pair at random from that large population
- As a Navy officer I found it very interesting to explore the culture of another service
- The choice of Fort Ord reduced travel expenses

To answer the research questions stated in the previous chapter, data was collected and evaluated. As an explanation aid I used a three-circle model in an attempt to explore and classify the various detected fears. The model is displayed in Figure 3. A description of the model, and some of its inherent difficulties, will be provided at the end of this section. The

model was created before the interviews actually started. My intention was to evolve the model over time, depending on the incoming information from the interviews. This action-research-type approach allows me to finetune the model. Adjustments will reflect the current state of the research process and allow me each time to start the next interviews with a modified model.

The Data collection encompassed four sets of interviews. Each single set consisted of one interview with the CO and one with the XO. They were to be interviewed separately to maintain their personal integrity and respect their military relationship. Furthermore, my intention was to capture their individual impressions without any interference with the other person or the other person's opinions. Individual interviews were likely to produce more authenticity in the collected information. Furthermore, one of my main interests is to find out, whether the superior used or was using fear as a management tool and how it might be perceived by the subordinate. Individual inquiry was considered the only appropriate technique to get information on that particular and sensitive issue.


At the end of each set of interviews the information was examined and classified in accordance with the model. As a next step, the model will be changed, if the collected data justify or require an adjustment. The ultimate goal is to develop the model on a constant basis to improve its

capabilities to aid me in the classification of all or, at least, most of the incoming data.

A final meeting was scheduled after completion of the four sets of interviews. This meeting would serve the purpose to give the officers some feedback and enter into a discussion about leadership styles. During this discussion I wanted to solicit their opinions about the element of fear in the leadership process. Furthermore, I expected interesting data on how they would discuss this topic in the light of their superior-subordinate relationship. Figure 1 gives a graphic display of the process and the iterations.

The interviews were set up in an attempt to achieve an increasing focus. I started out with a broad, unrestricted, range, allowing the officers to explore any type of fear during the early phases. A basic assumption was that fear is a very intimate issue which someone usually does not freely and easily share with somebody else. Furthermore, I took into account, that I was a foreigner for the two officers; not even somebody of their own nationality. Thus, the first interviews served two purposes: First, to reduce the reluctance (or fear) to explore one's own fears. The officers were given time and opportunity to familiarize themselves with the perhaps unusual topic. They had the chance to explore fear as a multifarious construct without being forced to link the sensitive topic immediately to themselves. I assumed that, while we were talking about fear in a theoretical and broad sense, we would

Figure 1 Timing of the Interview Process



steadily and automatically approach the links between the theory and the individual officer. Second, to build a trustful relationship as quickly as possible. I considered the time I decided to invest for the reduction of possible barriers between us, the vital factor for the success of the entire study. For the pursuit of this delicate topic a harmonious relationship would be crucial. Would the officers exercise strong restraints over a longer period, the likelihood of uncovering meaningful information would be decreased significantly. As a consequence, the results of the research would be severely limited. During the progress of the interview process I gradually directed the focus more and more to the military environment and, finally on the particular relationship between the two officers. Thus, I switched from unstructured interviews, which were employed during the first three sessions, to a structured interview in the fourth meeting. Furthermore, I restricted the scope of the interviews more towards the military topics and away from the civilian environment.

As a final step I conducted an interview with Dr. David Willard, a clinical psychologist. My intention was to solicit his analysis of the data base from the perspective of a psychologist. I compared his findings and comments with my results in an attempt to outline differences and similarities.

A graphical display of the interview protocol is provided in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Interview Technique

| First Set  | Second Set                                  | Third Set  | Fourth Set   |
|--|---|--|--|
| Unstructured Interviews  |   |  | Structured Interview   |
|  | List with terms as guideline / aid provided |  | Questions  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Military and civilian aspects of fear</li> <li>◆ Range unrestricted</li> <li>◆ Freedom to explore own thoughts</li> <li>◆ Very few questions</li> <li>◆ Very few guidelines / aids</li> </ul> |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Military aspects</li> <li>◆ Range unrestricted</li> <li>◆ Few questions</li> <li>◆ Few guidelines/aids</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Focus on relationship CO / XO</li> <li>◆ Only questions, no freedom to explore topic</li> </ul> |



#### E. THE FEAR MODEL

To aid in the classification of the gathered data, I developed a model, which is displayed in Figure 3. My expectation was to get confronted with a large variety of different types of fear, which would probably include novel ones that I had not anticipated.

The model consists of three primary source circles named A, B, and C. Overlapping areas were labeled I, II, III. Observed fears could be classified into one of those circles or areas.

I discovered an interesting parallel between my model and an approach Tannenbaum and Schmidt developed in the late 1950s to analyze changing management requirements which had been identified in the 1950s [Ref. 22]. They formulated their concept of the three factors or forces which influence the leadership situation. The origins of their forces are (1) in the manager, (2) in the subordinate and (3) in the situation. While Tannenbaum and Schmidt based their theory of forces, the focus of my study will be on the fears which are prevalent in a leadership situation.

My basic fear model consists of three circles which represent the origin of the different fears. The origins are identical with those used by Tannenbaum and Schmidt. The circles are labeled "Fear inherent in the superior", "Fear inherent in the subordinate", and "Fear inherent in the




Figure 3 The Preliminary Fear Model

situation". Additionally, my particular arrangement of the three circles creates overlap areas which reflect multiple origins for a fear.

It was my intent to start the interview process without limitations. The first set of interviews was meant to give my interview partners an unrestricted opportunity to present their thoughts about various aspects of fear. My intention was to allow them to explore all possible dimensions they might have experienced. The collected information were then used to iterate and modify the model, which would serve as the basis for the second set of interviews. The basic model was designed with the following elements:

- Fear inherent in and/or created by the CO (Circle A)
- Fear inherent in the XO (Circle B)
- Fear inherent in the situation (Circle C)

The term "inherent" will be described in the following section.

The arrangement in circles creates some areas of overlap (I, II, III, and IV). The intention of this configuration is to capture types of fear which may be a mixture of two (areas I, II, or III) or at most all three different types of fear (area IV). Let's assume for example, that the CO would be a very shy person, who is afraid of speaking in front of many people and he would be confronted with a situation, where he had to give a very crucial briefing to an audience known for its criticism and impatience. Fear would arise from the

attitude of the CO as well as from the unfavorable situation. This fear would be related to the area I, because the origin for it lies in the intersection of the two circles A and C.

This model allowed me to classify the information provided during the interviews and assign them to one of the three categories. All the data which were not related to either of the categories would be treated separately.

Additionally, I extracted some basic factors from the literature that are associated with fear. I selected the following nine broad terms which would help me during the actual interviews to listen and respond appropriately:

- Uncertainty
- Helplessness
- Loneliness
- Isolation
- Unknown
- Novelty
- Ambiguity
- Threat
- Intimidation

Furthermore, it would be interesting to see if the officers mention the positive aspects fear can have sometimes. Under certain circumstances fear can be a driving force that provides power to overcome threats, obstacles, and barriers. It gives people an unusual and, for outsiders, generally unexpected staying power. Humans are then capable of enduring

situations that are generally considered to be beyond all bearing.

In most cases the negative features are recognized more easily and more frequently than positive. This stems from our perception that fear in general is related to a negative situation. We feel threatened, lost, we are uncertain about circumstances or outcomes, we are intimidated, or feel lonely. In each instance there is nothing positive attached to our feelings or perceptions. The positive facets of fear are rarely recognized by the individual because the negative aspects are dominant.

The information of the interview was expected to be helpful and suitable to answer the question: "What creates or influences fear?"


#### **F. OBTAINING DATA ABOUT A PERSONS FEARS.**

The preparation for the interview raised some concerns. First, to what extent would the interviewees be willing to respond to my questions? Questions about fear target a very sensitive area of an individual's personality. Not everybody may want to expose sensitive feelings, emotions, or memories publicly, even not for the purpose of scientific research. For example, some memories about situations where the individual experienced fear may be very painful. Thus, the person would not be willing to recall this situation deliberately and live

through a probable pain again. I expected, that my interviewees would try to hide unpleasant memories or situations from me. My major concern was to what extent I would encounter denial and what would the impact be on the data gathering process and finally on the development of the model. Second, I presumed that the success of my research was closely tied to the personal relationship between me and my interview partners. A factual and distant atmosphere deemed inappropriate for this type of topic and would not allow to access the desired information. The introductory meeting at Fort Ord had served administrative purposes and gave me the impression that at least one additional meeting would be beneficial to establish a more personal contact before the interviews started. The following week I met each of them separately in a private and casual atmosphere. During these meetings I tried to establish an environment of mutual trust and respect. My intention was to reduce probable barriers between us as much as possible. The officers should feel comfortable during the interviews to talk about their fears in some depth. Third, every interpersonal communication process is subject to certain rules and dynamics which are often not fully realized by the people involved in the communication. Joe Luft and Harry Ingram developed the "Johari Window" in an attempt to explain various communication styles. "The model measures interpersonal style in terms of communication awareness by presenting a two-dimensional, four-celled figure

based on the interaction of two sources of information - the self and others. In the model, each cell represents a particular area of knowledge about the self and illustrates the quality of the interpersonal communication process." [Ref. 23:p. 297]. The first cell, "the public area", involves all the behaviors, feelings, and thoughts which are known to the speaker and others. In the second cell, labeled "the blind area", we find thoughts, feelings, and behaviors which are not known to us, but which are well recognized by others. The feelings, thoughts, and behaviors of the third area, "the closed area", are not known to others. We are aware of them and an intentional disclosure is necessary if we want to share them with this audience. The last cell, "the unknown area", represents all the feelings, thoughts, and behaviors which are not known by us nor by our audience.

The relevance of this concept for my study is the limitation which flows from it. As I rely solely on interviews as the data gathering instrument, I have to be aware of the problems verbal interpersonal communication create. First, each officer's awareness of his fears is restricted to the "known area". The "unknown area" is not accessible for him. Second, he may not be willing to present all his known fears to me. Thus, his selection of fears he deliberately provides in the interviews further reduces the percentage of finally discovered fears. He may want to keep certain fears unidentified and will thus not express them. Third, from the



**Figure 4** The Influence of Interpersonal Communication Problems on the Interview Process



number of fears expressed, a unidentified number may escape my attention. Thus, the total amount of finally recorded fears is only a fraction of the entire fear potential. Fourth, a general problem which must be recognized in this context is the fact that the dimension or the importance of the recorded and the not recorded fears can not be assessed exactly. It is theoretically possible that the major fears have not been expressed and are thus not included in the study. An example would be, that the fear is an element of the "unknown area", or the officer decided not to present this fear at all. Figure 4 displays the concerns graphically.

#### G. EXPLANATION OF THE TERM "INHERENT"

The expression inherent needs to be explained. In the context of this study I will use the word inherent to describe that the specific fear under investigation is originated in either the CO, the XO, or the particular situation. For the two persons and their respective areas A and B it means that the fear is based for example upon their particular mental structures, experiences, knowledge, backgrounds, attitudes, feelings, and educations. For the area C it means that the fear is based on what the particular situation allows or prohibits. This represents the general playing field for the two players, the CO and the XO, with all its degrees of freedom as well as all the boundaries and limitations. Certain courses of action may or may not be available to them.

Constraints, which they may or may not be aware of, influence their actions. The impact of actions or non actions of other individuals, not represented explicitly in the model, will be captured under area C. Two examples may illustrate the structure. Let's assume the CO has the fear of failure. If his fearful feeling is based on an actual or perceived weakness of himself, I will attribute this fear to area A (fear inherent in the CO). In this case, the origin of the fear can be traced back to the conscious of the CO. It is not originated in the XO or a situation. A similar example can be used to demonstrate what is meant by fear inherent in the situation. In this case we will assume that the CO is confident about his capabilities to achieve the goals of his actual assignment. His confidence is based on his education, knowledge, and experience. Fear comes in when his superior sets goals which exceed or are inconsistent with the requirements for the billet. The CO may be very well prepared for his job, but if his superior puts the benchmark at extraordinary high levels, the fear of the CO will be generated by the unfavorable situation he faces. In general, when fear is inherent in the situation, individuals have no or only very little control over the conditions which constitute this particular situation.

## H. DIFFICULT DISTINCTIONS

It is some times hard to tell whether an expressed fear belongs to exactly one of the categories A,B, or C. In many cases fear will be inherent in only one category, but in other instances it may also depend on the relationship with at least one other category. A hypothetical example will illustrate this. The XO may be required to make a decision, but the information available at that point in time is deemed insufficient to him. As a consequence he develops a fear of making an improper decision. Based on my model there are two different ways capable of explaining this phenomenon. First, it could have been exclusively the fault of the XO. He may have neglected to gather or to utilize data which were attainable for him. This would be an occasion where we would attribute the fear solely to the area B (fear inherent in the XO), because the origin lies in his behavior and is not influenced by actions or non action of the CO (area A) or by any problems originated in a particular situation (area C). Second, the XO may not have been able to collect the appropriate amount of data. A typical constraint would be a very short deadline. The available time span is insufficient for a thorough investigation. Another explanation could be that the required files are not accessible at that point in time for some reasons. In either case, circumstances over which the XO has no control dictate the conditions under which he has to make his decision. His process of arriving at the

decision is heavily influenced by factors originated in area C. Thus, his fear would be attributed to area C. In the case where the explanation would include a failure of the XO (he failed to collect data) as well as a constraint, originated in the situation (files not accessible), the fear would be attributed to area II, the overlap between fear that is inherent in the XO and the fear that is inherent in the situation.

#### **I. LIMITATIONS**

1. The study was constructed to capture the information gathered from a pair of officers who worked in a company in Fort Ord. Thus, the study will only reflect the data provided by these two people who were interviewed intensively to explore their specific opinions and their relationship. The research was conducted in the military environment, specifically in the Army environment at Fort Ord. During the time of my research Fort Ord was a very turbulent Army post in the late stages of the elimination of the 7th Light Fighter Division. Units were moved to other places all over the US or disbanded and soldiers were transferred between units. This created straining work conditions for all military personnel in leading positions. This particular unit was facing a change in command at the end of my investigation period. Furthermore, the unit was to be disbanded two month after my research was scheduled to be finished. I anticipated, that these

unfavorable circumstances would influence my work somehow. Expected influences could, for example, stem from the availability of the officers, their willingness to devote the necessary time for the interviews, their ability to focus on the subject while pressing duties were waiting, or demands from superior authorities, which would the officers not allow to participate in the inquiry as scheduled.

2. My study focused on a very small socio system, the pair of two Army officers in a specific superior-subordinate relationship. To maintain a narrow focus is one method to start research. The in depth examination of this limited system was assumed to provide valuable data on the research questions. I recognized, that the narrow focus may not allow for generalization or the application of the findings to any other, nonsimilar situation. This limitation was acceptable, because the main emphasis of the study was to explore the dynamics of fear in the superior-subordinate relationship in order to approach the research questions. Furthermore, I anticipated the results to be suitable to stimulate further research. This study was not conducted in an attempt to find exhaustive answers on a broad scale which may allow generalization. Rather it was to explore a complex, relatively unexamined topic.

3. A salient advantage of the interview technique is its ability to capture people's impressions, which was exactly intended in my study. But the method has also some

deficiencies. One is the selection of the participating people. I have tried to reduce any bias by selecting the participants randomly. The selection process was only restricted by the factor "availability". It was a requirement, that both officers were available for a certain time period to conduct the interviews properly. Another deficiency can be the introduction of some sort of bias by the researcher in selecting the questions for the interviews. My approach to minimize this deficiency was to give the interviewees during the first three interview sessions ample freedom to express their opinions. Even though I gave them some broad guidelines as an orientation aid, they were not forced to comply with them. They were invited to follow their own train of thoughts and provide whatever they felt would be valuable and meaningful information with regard to the described topic. The fourth interview was more structured and thus entailed the danger of some bias. For this type of research it is impossible to eliminate bias entirely. My approach was set up in an attempt to keep any bias at a minimum.

4. Another limitation was the sole dependence on verbal information. I used interviews as a data gathering method and I was aware of the fact that it was highly subjective. No written questionnaires were employed. I favored a mixture of unstructured and structured interviews over questionnaires, because they offered a very suitable method to explore the opinions of my interview partners without imposing too tight

restrictions on them. Moreover, I wanted to give them as much freedom as possible to describe their thoughts. The exploration of a persons various fears is a very delicate endeavor. For two reasons I considered it helpful to give the two individuals the opportunity to express their thoughts in an open fashion. First, I believed that the climate of a personal interview situation would be more favorable to reveal more deeply rooted fears. Second, a questionnaire bore the danger of uncovering only a portion of the available information, because the questions may not have been stated accurate enough or may have covered the wrong area. Thus, the interview had the advantage that the officers could explain whatever they considered valuable and, at the same time, it would allow me to follow up with questions about areas of specific interest to me.

5. It is also recognized that interview is a dynamic process. Interviewer and interviewee will inevitably affect each others behavior to some extent. This is partially attributable to the Hawthorne effect, which means in this case, that the mere presence of a researcher may shape the behavior of the interviewees [Ref 7:p.16]. Other determinants, which may affect the interview outcomes could be the different backgrounds (US vs German education, training, thinking), age (both interviewees were some years younger than I), rank (I was superior to both of them), attitudes, motivations, perceptions, or previous experience with research programs. I

expected a variety of invisible and intangible factors to be present during the entire research process. My concern from the beginning was, to what extent any of those factors might hinder or constrain my work efforts. I was surprised throughout the program about one fact in particular. Basically no barriers seemed to exist. Both officers provided intimate, private information to a degree that I did not expect in advance. A possible explanation is offered later. The effect of the other determinants is not assessable. No data have been gathered to evaluate their specific influence.

6. Some other factors limit this specific study and are considered additional reasons, why generalization will not be possible: (1) My study was conducted with two males. The outcomes would probably be different if females or members of minority groups would be included. (2) I focused on a very specific Army environment. Similar questions may be researched under different conditions in the Army or in any other service. (3) The unit under investigation had an administrative mission during the time, the research was conducted. I assume, that different findings would be made in units with a combat or technical mission. (4) My study targeted the CO of a company, a relatively low level in the military hierarchy. It might be interesting to conduct similar research at higher levels to compare the outcomes.



## VI. PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED FROM THE INTERVIEWS

The statements and descriptions made in this chapter represent the opinion, experience or the theoretical construct of the interviewees. They do not represent the author's opinion, experience or theoretical construct. Comments and conclusions made by the researcher are clearly labeled as such.

This section contains my written records of the sequence of interviews, I held with the CO, the XO, and the psychologist at Fort Ord. In all, an introductory meeting, eight interviews, a final meeting, and a review interview with a third party were carried out, lasting approximately 18 hours. Here is a chronological list:

1. Introductory meeting
2. First interview with CO
3. First interview with XO
4. Second interview with CO
5. Second interview with XO
6. Third interview with XO
7. Third interview with CO
8. Fourth interview with XO
9. Fourth interview with CO
10. Final meeting with CO and XO

## 11. Interview with Dr. Willard Fort Ord Psychologist

### A. INTRODUCTORY MEETING

The introductory meeting was arranged to introduce myself and present the topic in more detail to the two officers. We met at Fort Ord in an office late in the afternoon. During my presentation I got the impression that both officers were interested in the topic. Especially the CO started immediately to ask questions and was interested in more detailed information. The CO appeared to be dominant in the discussion while his XO kept a relatively quiet position. I addressed some questions directly to the XO and he responded very short and precisely. It seemed to me that their behavior was in accordance with their typical military roles.

The CO expressed concern about how the collected information would be used. He was especially worried that the findings of the thesis may contribute to a negative image of the Army. He was proud of serving in the Army and wanted to avoid every action or statements that could have a negative impact on the Army. Finally, he made clear that one of his concerns was that any unfavorable information provided by him probably could be traced back to his person. Besides his honorable concern of not wanting to damage the image of the Army, he was afraid of personal repercussions if one of his superiors would be able to identify him as the source of undesirable information. Both officers accepted my statement

that the names of all my interview partners would be kept anonymous throughout the research process.

#### **B. FIRST INTERVIEW: FIRST INTERVIEW WITH CO**

For this interview we met in the library of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). I recommended this place to ensure we would have a very quiet environment without any interruptions. I favored the isolated study room atmosphere over any room in the company buildings in Fort Ord. It seemed crucial to me that the first interview could be conducted without any interruptions. Furthermore, I intended to bring the interviewee in a neutral environment and away from his daily routine. My reasoning was to give him enough time to let go his thoughts about all the problems he had encountered in his company and get focused on the interview topic during the transit to the library. It did not work out perfectly, because he had some difficult problems to solve. I felt we were ready for the interview after we talked about some relaxing topics like sport and weekend activities.

The intention of the first interview was to identify the interviewee's various perceptions of fear. He was asked to state different types of fear he has experienced and provide supporting examples wherever possible. I did not limit him in any specific way at the beginning of the interview.

In the CO's view all types of fear are characterized by the common denominator of "...something is at risk.". In

particular he distinguished three categories of fear: physical fear, concerns for other people, and fear of personal failure.

The first type, physical fear, is related to physical injuries and in the worst case physical disabilities. In the military as well as in civilian life people are exposed to dangerous situations: Especially the military requires soldiers to incur a certain amount of risk during training and operation to acquire and use skills necessary to fulfill the mission. Nevertheless, there is a fear of suffering an injury during these activities. In another example he mentioned that elements like risk and challenge make extraordinary sport activities (deep snow skiing, mountain biking) attractive and exciting especially when they are done in groups. The thrilling experience of going right to the edge of one's abilities and skills provides a lot of fun but it also creates fear the more the edge is approached. At this point it is extremely difficult to maintain control (over the ski or the bike) and a mistake will most likely result in major injuries. Fear is present and is usually recognized but in most cases the excitement still prevails and the exhilarating activity will be continued. This behavior can be explained by two factors: the hope that nothing will go wrong and the fear of admitting to have fear. He emphasized that he needs a certain amount of risk to make a job interesting and challenging for him ("People who are afraid of injury of their body or their ego never make it off their living room couch.").

He related his second fear, the fear of selecting always the correct course of action derived from his concerns for others, to the responsibilities of a leader. ("A fear for the welfare of the soldiers that work for me if I am always making the right decision.") This permanent fear is rooted in a possibility that negative consequences for his people as well as for himself could result from wrong decisions. His subordinates may receive unfair or incorrect treatment. He was worried about negative consequences showing up in his next evaluation. A constant element of doubt shaped his precaution towards decision making. He mentioned he never felt sure he had done everything that could be done. He related this fear to the vast amount of regulations pertaining to his current position and the special difficulties he was currently experiencing in his company. For example, he has to decide legal cases that were initiated by other units. During the case these units had been eliminated and the soldiers had been transferred to his company. The law requires that the decision has to be made within a certain time frame. As a consequence he has to base his decisions mostly on written evidence, which doesn't make him feel comfortable ("Have I ruined somebody's life", "There is a fear in there, am I doing everything that's just, that's honorable?").

He made a clear statement that he has absolutely no fear to make any decision ("I don't fear. I make the decisions."). His problem is whether he makes the correct decision.

His third category is fear of personal failure. He emphasized that this is his greatest fear. He gave some examples to demonstrate what personal failure means to him:

- (1) A former superior worked from 0530 a.m. till late in the night to do everything as correctly as possible to minimize the chance of personal failure.
- (2) Wrong decisions lead to personal failure. He stated that this creates a tremendous source of fear for a lot of officers in the Army.
- (3) In many groups conformity and adherence to group values and norms is enforced by peer pressure. The CO believed that this creates the fear of failure within many group members.
- (4) He also related the fear of losing control closely to the fear of failure. In his opinion the average leader is striving for a high degree of personal security in a sense that operations will go correctly to a certain degree. He mentioned COs who were afraid of handing over their units to the XO for the time they were on business trips or vacations. They feared their subordinates couldn't do the job satisfactorily without their presence. It was the interviewees opinion that such a behavior is inconsistent with modern management practices. He felt that a superior who doesn't feel comfortable to give responsibilities to his subordinates hasn't done his job correctly in the first place.
- (5) He considers himself a good public speaker without fear of acting in front of people. But he experienced fear when he had to give presentations to higher ranked officers. The reason is the higher risk.

Speaking in front of superiors includes the chance that all of a sudden your own career is at stake if you fail. A failure may result in a situation where "...your name gets known by the senior rater...". The senior rater is one of two persons who have distinct influence on the career via the evaluation process. The phrase "gets known by the senior rater" means known in a negative sense. The widespread perception seems to be, that, if one's name is "known", this knowledge can only be based on negative events and thus will be likely to have negative consequences for the career. In the current military environment, which is highly competitive due to the downsizing process, every failure has the fatal potential to put somebody on the termination list, which creates a threat for the military career as well as for the welfare of the families. As a result, everybody tries to avoid failure which in turn creates a constant fear of failure. (6) The fear of looking foolish in front of soldiers and losing the respect of the troops. For example, Cos conduct award ceremonies on a regular basis. Despite a lot of rehearsals usually something goes wrong ("You drop the award. Somebody pronounces the name incorrectly."). Nobody would dare laugh but "There is that feeling in the air". And the CO feels dumb. (7) The fear of changing a situation even though it is obvious that the organizational arrangements are inappropriate to respond effectively to present challenges. Part of this fear is the doubt in own's abilities such as sufficient knowledge,

analytical skills, problem-solving skills, presentation of facts to superiors, etc. ("Risk causes doubt, doubt works his way into fear."). Furthermore, these people often lack the necessary self-confidence to confront superiors with the detected problems. This confrontation usually means fighting one's observations and proposals through higher layers of the echelon to convince higher ranked officials of a real problem that needs to be solved. The CO stressed again that the fighting for a safe position in the current competitive Army environment ("...lay low, don't make any waves...") has a much higher priority for many people than articulating a potentially competent but different view. The primary goal is to secure one's position rather than to take any risk. (8) The fear of getting punished for failures the subordinates make. He mentioned a situation where a gunnery sergeant pointed the gun in the wrong direction and fired outside the safety range. The CO and the sergeant were relieved of their duties. The CO had absolutely zero control over that particular situation at that particular point of time. But he was responsible for the action of his subordinate. Superiors tend to respond to threats like that by implementing more and more safety regulations and organizational control mechanisms to achieve the highest level of control and thus personal security. This behavior reduces risk taking and the willingness of experimentation.



The CO mentioned that the fear of failure goes beyond military career. It affects the overall balance of life. For example, he wants to progress in the Army and make it a career. At the same time he wants his son to receive a very good education. He and his wife have already determined which schools they consider appropriate to guarantee the desired education and which will definitely not. Furthermore, the parents want to live in a distinct geographic area to provide the proper family environment. Fear arises because these requirements are very likely to be incompatible with the military career prospects and the interviewee hasn't found a solution yet. Thus, the interference of military and individual environment is the basis for this type of fear.

Some of his examples referred to combat situations. The combat environment is not part of this study, but I want to derive a general idea from his comments. He talked about his fear that a bomb may fall upon the head of his soldiers, that some of his soldiers may get killed. This is a fear that relates to a certain situation and it is related to other people not only to himself. This is a fear which is inherent in the situation and that is beyond his direct control. He recognized that fear is related to the situation and that it will change if the environment changes.

At the end of the interview when the tape had already been turned off the CO asked me to investigate an issue for him. Some time ago he had offered the XO the general opportunity to

present suggestions for improvements. This offer included comments about the CO's behavior or his way of doing his business. Basically, the CO had asked the XO to criticize him. The XO never responded to that offer. The CO, while waiting for the respond, was not sure about the XO's reasons. He supposed the XO was too fearful to confront his CO. He asked me to talk to the XO and investigate his motives.

#### **C. SECOND INTERVIEW: FIRST INTERVIEW WITH XO**

For this interview I chose the same environment as for the CO's interview. We met in one of the study rooms in the NPS library. The XO arrived after a short drive from Fort Ord. I got the impression that he could relax much quicker than the CO. His appearance was at ease and we started talking about different things (not military related) while we were walking to the study room. We could begin the interview immediately and the XO seemed to be exited about participating in this research. Overall it was a very supportive and constructive climate.

The intention of the first interview was to identify the interviewee's various perceptions of fear. He was asked to state different types of fear he has experienced and provide supporting examples wherever possible. I did not limit him in any specific way at the beginning of the interview.

His first statement included that fear is something "...people deal with all the time, on a daily basis..."

Furthermore, he emphasized that fear includes for him the element of the unknown ("People fear what they don't understand.", "For me the biggest thing about fear is the unknown.") As an example for this phenomenon he mentioned the fear of death. In contrast to the CO's physical fear, the XO was not afraid of the physical part of death. He related his fear about death to the inability of assessing or predicting by any means what might happen after death ("...You don't know what happens once you die. Is there something once you have died or does everything just cease.")

The XO's fear about the unknown was bigger in the past than it is today. He also recognized that while, with the passage of time, the human species increased its volume of knowledge and learned to master the "previous unknown", each new day bears "new unknowns". Thus, we seem to be in an endless spiral of learning to handle old fears while continuously being confronted with new ones.

His second category was related to expectations he saw himself confronted with ("...the fear of the expectations that are placed on you."). These expectations can be originated in superiors, a peer group, or subordinates. For example, to be the new officer in a company places a lot of expectations on him from all three directions. He was concerned about his overall ability of meeting these expectations. His even more significant concern was associated with the probability, that he might not explicitly be aware of all expectations. The

realization of this potential problem area often stimulates a feeling of uncertainty which in turn leads to skepticism whether his behavior is appropriate. The fact that somebody may not meet certain standards can have severe consequences. He mentioned a particular effect many officers seem to be afraid of. ("If you are not...qualified you are looked at as less of a man, as less of an officer, as incompetent, and that's really not the case.")

In the same context he also mentioned the fear of failure, like the CO did. The XO's opinion, examples, and feelings were very similar to the one's described earlier by the CO. The XO gave some examples to illustrate his opinion. (1) Wrong decisions lead to personal failure. He stated that this creates a tremendous source of fear for a lot of officers in the Army. He is working long hours to make sure he has done everything he could possibly do to achieve a high degree of accuracy. Nevertheless, the fear of failure remains, because nobody is capable of knowing all procedures, orders, and regulations pertaining to a certain situation. Especially the handling of the very sensitive issues in the company (legal and medical questions related to the regular termination of the contracts of enlisted personnel) requires application of regulations officers do not use frequently under normal conditions. In addition, the time constraint today is much higher. terminations have to be made in accordance with downsizing regulations. In some cases the available time for

the paper work is extremely short. (2) In many groups conformity and adherence to group values and norms is enforced by peer pressure. The XO believed that this creates the fear of failure within many group members. (3) The fear of looking foolish in front of troops. The respect the soldiers have for their superiors is a very sensitive point to him. Respect is a vital element for him in any military unit. It is relatively easy to lose this respect by not behaving in accordance with the leadership role. To regain this respect is very hard if not impossible. (4) He feared also getting punished for mistakes somebody else makes. In any leadership position work is delegated. Supervisors control work stations, processes, and outputs, but they don't have the potential to be omnipresent. Thus, somebody may make a mistake and the superior is not even aware of it. The fear is, that a higher level superior may be made aware of the failure earlier than he recognizes it himself.

A third dimension was the fear that can be created by the various myths about situations people may encounter in their very near future ("They inspired a great deal of fear in me going to that course.", "...I was so scared, I wasn't myself when I got there."). These myths, conveyed by people who have already been there and thus are deemed to have the proper experience, have the potential to generate a negative notion or bias up front. It is recognized that the bias can be positive as well but the positive bearing is not under

investigation in this study. This inspired fear can negatively affect people's performance. The bias may create an adverse attitude towards the unknown situation which could hamper a person's ability to perform in an optimal way. Another aspect is that people may be too cautious, too respectful, to develop their full potential. In both cases the fear might lead to negative outcomes in the form of a reduced level of performance and thus, higher risk of failure.

The XO viewed fear as a natural occurrence in human life. ("It's nothing wrong with being scared. I firmly believe you are legitimately authorized to be scared of things.") Furthermore, he recognized that fear has a life-saving aspect, because "...when you lose fear of something you are asking for something bad to happen." In his opinion fear functions as a healthy reminder. It usually sends early warning signals which can prevent people from getting careless if they are recognized appropriately ("Fear makes people be meticulous.").

Beyond the point of merely acknowledging the legitimacy of having fear the XO emphasized that he feels it is important to develop mechanisms or procedures to deal with fear effectively. He expressed the opinion that fear can be controlled ("...once you got used to that fear it wasn't so bad. You realized, yes, that is tough but it's not going to kill you.") He referred to an increased knowledge as a basis for reducing fear. For the XO, fear gets reduced in an automatic-type fashion when learning takes place. The

increasing knowledge (which may be acquired through training or by actually performing a task in the work environment) about the previous unknown circumstances provides a more comfortable feeling. People learn how to master difficult and unfamiliar situations which in turn reduces their fear and strengthens their self confidence. Furthermore, he stressed that fear has to be controlled by the individual to the greatest extent possible in order to accomplish the mission ("...if you let fear control you and let it get the best of you, then you can become ineffective. Then you are wrong."). He demanded that everybody should try to "...control fear to the best you can...". The control of fear as a means to successful mission accomplishment seems to be a fundamental requisite for him.

He was scared that somebody else "...may screw up your life." As an example, he mentioned that in preparation for parachute jumps the parachutes are packed by different people than who actually jump with the parachutes on their back. Everybody picks up one of the prepacked parachutes. The fear of having got a faulty packed (having no control over the packing process) remains until the parachute actually opens when they are in the air. He mentioned that in an organization of a certain magnitude tasks have to be delegated. But very often there exists a continuous doubt whether the person the job was delegated to will do it correctly. This in turn relates to the responsibility issue. A superior is responsible

for his subordinates. If they don't fulfill their jobs, the superior is threatened with being negatively evaluated, because he is unable to accomplish his missions either. A superior is held responsible for the action, or not action, of his subordinates.

Next the XO described a relationship between fear and action. Fear can cause quite different reflexive or intended actions in each individual. He characterized the extreme points of a probable reaction spectrum as "...fight or flight...". Fight means that the individual stays and pursues the mission thus, deals positively with fear and finally overcomes it, whereas flight indicates that fear is of such a magnitude that the individual withdraws for safety reasons, basically to save his life. Another possible type of reaction is paralysis. Again, as the XO mentioned, the magnitude of fear can be such that the individual is incapable of any reaction. He stressed that the latter type of reaction is the least preferred for soldiers because it dramatically increases the danger of getting shot. The XO mentioned that training is aimed at preparing the soldier for situations such that "...when fear kicks in so does training.". Training experience should guide the reaction, giving the soldier a feeling of security based on his skills and knowledge. The confidence gained through his automated response should then reduce the fear and finally let the person fully regain his ability to act consciously. He emphasized that the last point is



extremely important for leaders. They are expected to keep their freedom of action all the time. If the leader gets paralyzed by fear the entire unit is in danger to get eliminated or at least the mission is not going to be accomplished ("I think probably the biggest fear I have is to not be able to control fear. In the minute fear controls you, you are done.").

The XO mentioned he fears whether he is executing tasks in a professional manner. He felt responsible for the welfare of all people in the command. He gave the example of a flu vaccination that had to be administered to the company. He contacted the hospital in advance to learn about the vaccine and the potential problems related to the vaccination. He did it for two reasons. First, he wanted to exclude all imaginable risks for his people to the extent possible for him. This action originated in the fear that somebody could get hurt by that particular vaccine (e.g. allergic reaction with severe consequences). Second, he was driven by the fear of negative consequences for himself in the case of an accident. He was responsible for that vaccination and, even though the medical personnel actually performed it, he would ultimately be held responsible if something went wrong. Thus, he prepared the action as careful as possible to protect himself and his people ("...that fear inspires me to maintain a degree of control...that I feel good about of what we are doing, and what we are doing is safe, and what we are doing is proper.").

The particular situation in Fort Ord creates a novel type of fear for the XO. The fear of failing in the handling of paperwork. As an infantryman his main emphasis in the past had been on training, on getting soldiers ready for combat ("...paper work wasn't a big deal..."). Arriving at Ford Ord he had to learn that priorities had changed. Training was no longer important. The absolutely correct administration of the soldiers paperwork became the highest priority. Negligence or insufficiencies in the administrative process could be disadvantageous for the soldier. Furthermore, these failures now have a high potential to affect the career of the officer negatively. The adjustment to the new (and now crucial) priorities takes some time and includes a longer learning process. During this phase of change fear is a constant factor in the daily work ("We have commanders who are very particular about the way things are done. They won't even look at a document...if it is not in the proper format, regardless of what it has to say...You could tell them, hey, your house is on fire. If it was not in the proper format they don't want to see it..."). The problem in this situation seems to be that all echelons are confronted with the dilemma the downsizing agenda imposes on them. The procedures have to be followed meticulously, otherwise serious consequences like law suits may result. This sword of Damocles and the fact that some people are not that familiar with the red tape amount to a new dimension of fear of failure. The XO made clear that correct

paper work is essential to an organization but, at his point, the overemphasis of format over the content looks like a personal safety device to ensure one's survival in the rapidly changing and downsizing environment. He gave the example that documents are transferred to other units by having somebody from that unit sign a delivery book, where each document is listed precisely, for check out. ("That's how crazy we are about paperwork right now. It's just to cover your ass."). The range of possible repercussions embraces all legal actions available to higher levels of the hierarchy. Additionally, it creates the fear that a bad mark on the file has the threatening potential to put you on the termination list very quickly. In the XO's view mistakes seem to become a very welcome selecting device used to terminate soldiers careers early. Thus, everybody has a vital interest to keep his personal records clean. This is counterproductive to innovation and risk taking, and raises obedience to formal procedures to an unusual high priority.

The XO stated that the leadership style creates the climate for the company and especially the work climate. Some company commanders use the autocratic style which usually makes the subordinates "...set back and turn off." Initiative for subordinates is either not permitted or not sought. He preferred a more cooperative leadership style where the CO gives directions and allows for ample room to maneuver. In his opinion the best COs provide directions and "...a command

philosophy...". They recognize the capabilities of their subordinates and utilize them effectively towards the accomplishment of the mission ("...he uses the vast bank of experience and intelligence and draws from it to create a winning company."). Furthermore, the XO mentioned "...that one of the best leadership traits for a commander is humility to realize that you are not perfect...and the ability to say I made a mistake...". The least preferred style, and the one that may create fear in the subordinates, is one where the autocratic CO (the XO called some COs tyrant) has no confidence in his subordinates, gives no directions, doesn't back them in the case of mistakes, and doesn't encourage or inspire their subordinates to work with pride towards a common goal. The XO mentioned that, if the CO has confidence in his people (e.g. decision making ability) and he announces to back them in a case of a minor failure, this would reduce the fear of failure and in turn increase the ambition of each individual to do the best they can, in this case to make the best decision possible ("...you don't encourage them to fail...But you tell them if you fail, it's not the end of the world. We'll take it and we'll learn from it.", "...rather than inspire the fear in the subordinates, he needs to inspire an attitude of I can do anything...to make a mission go successfully.").

#### D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Before I discuss the data I want to make a general comment on the interviews. I was surprised by the openness of both officers. With respect to my earlier concerns I didn't expect them to be so frank in providing information. Neither one refused to answer any question and they addressed all subjects without hesitation. I conclude from their attitude that they didn't purposely try to hide sensitive information. For example, both admitted to have different types of fear including the fear of failure. I attribute their openness to the trustful work atmosphere that was created during our informal meetings.

The interviews offered a variety of information that can be related to the preliminary model. Most of the data provided are attributable to their own personality (The respective circles in the model are: inherent in or created by the CO, and inherent in or created by the XO). Examples for these fears are: Fear of suffering an injury, fear of admitting to have fear, fear of personal failure, and fear of the unknown. These fears correspond to the background of the individual. They are related to factors like the level of education, the current level of knowledge, the value system, and the personality. For example, the fear of admitting fear may be based on the education. A child, especially a boy, may have learned from his father that it is in general inappropriate for a man to show fear. The same fear can be explained by

looking at the value system. The XO mentioned in our preliminary meeting that the Army environment does not permit an officer to show fear. Any presentation of fear from an officer is deemed to have demoralizing effects on the troops. It is expected that an officer has his feelings under control permanently. Especially the fear of the unknown is a fear that is related to the personality. People respond differently to situations where they are exposed to unknown factors. Some may have a positive feeling and the desire to explore whereas others may not be delighted to enter unfamiliar terrain.

Some of the fears mentioned are attributable to the fear that is inherent or originated in the situation. Examples are the fear about a presentation in front of a high ranked audience (the officer is well prepared and confident, but the mere presence of higher ranked people stimulates fear in him), fear created by circulating myths about certain affairs (the person feels capable of performing a future task and is confident, but suspicious myths stimulate fear, because they introduce a distorted picture), and the fear of getting punished for a mistake a subordinate makes (the superior is not present at the scene of action and he has no chance to influence the outcome of an action a subordinate takes). In these circumstances the individual has little to zero control over the action that gets them into trouble. Somebody or something else influences the actual performance and is responsible for the unpleasant and probably harmful outcome.

The example of the gunnery sergeant who fired outside the safety range clearly depicts the fact how dependent superiors are on their subordinates. The inability to control everything personally or to be omnipresent leaves some superiors in a fearful mood. This fear is originated in the situation not in the superior himself.

The information collected in the interviews can be related to some of the basic factors that are associated with fear. First, the XO declared that his greatest fear is the fear of the unknown. He prefers to operate from familiar positions and a situation where he is confronted with or anticipating obscure stimuli creates some type of fear. The second factor that was mentioned was uncertainty. The CO mentioned that he is concerned about the future of his family. His desires to combine his military career and a decent life for his family in a positive fashion are confronted with a lot of uncertainty. He knows that his career will include many moves to unpleasant locations; localities he has basically ruled out as places where he wants his family to live and his son to grow up. The biggest uncertainties are created by (1) the downsizing military environment, (2) moves that are required for promotion, and (3) his capabilities to exert any influence on decisions concerning assignments to certain areas.

The XO mentioned that, in general, fear would be created if he felt that his boss had little or no confidence in his abilities to handle a task professionally. Additionally, he

emphasized that the same holds for a superior who would not lead by giving directions or would not back subordinates in a case of minor failures. In his opinion this would create great uncertainty about what the boss expects and what behavior to show as a subordinate. He also mentioned that at his present command this fear does not exist.

The factors novelty and ambiguity are reflected in a situation described by the CO. He tried to implement a change. He was convinced that the new program would be an enhancement over the existing one. But he was doubtful about his own abilities to present his case to his superiors. Furthermore, he was scared to start fighting his proposal through the various layers of the hierarchy until it would be approved eventually. The ambiguity of the outcome finally prevented him from pursuing his change.

Both officers reported that threat is an element which can stimulate fear easily. They related their comments to promotion or, as a more severe consequence, early termination of their contracts. This threat had an direct and indirect notion to it. The direct one is that personal failure or insufficient overall performance has the potential to affect promotion negatively or may lead to early termination. The indirect one, and probably more fearful, is that failures committed by subordinates can have the same unpleasant effects. The downsizing situation of the Army adds to the problem. The personnel departments have to cut back on all



ranks and all forces. My interview partners assumed that to accomplish their goal the departments are looking for military personnel with "bad marks" on their records. These troops are then primarily targeted for stops of promotions or early termination of their contracts. The fear of committing a failure shapes the behavior of many people in the Army because the threat of getting fired due to that mistake is increasing. Their careers and the welfare of their families are more and more at stake.

Both officers made some comments about fear in general. The CO is convinced that fear is related to a particular situation. Different situations inspire distinct feelings and some situation are suitable to inspire positive or peaceful feelings and others are inspiring fear. If the situation changes the perception changes as well. The XO claimed that fear is a natural occurrence in life. He continued to say that having fear should not decrease the standing or the reputation of a person. In his view fear has a life saving aspect. It sends early warning signals to which everybody should pay close attention. Ignoring these signals may lead to severe consequences, in the case of a soldier probably to his death. He also mentioned that fear can and should be controlled. people may loose control over themselves and react inappropriately, which may increase the problem. He argued that effective training provides the skills to cope with fear in most cases. The reaction is then based on acquired skills

and knowledge which helps the person to regain control over himself and the situation.

#### **E. FIRST ITERATION OF THE MODEL**

The data gathered in the first set of interviews fit in the preliminary model. Statements and examples could be assigned to the three basic areas representing the different types of fear (fear inherent in the superior, fear inherent in the subordinate, fear inherent in the situation). I found some evidence for the areas I and III; I didn't find evidence so far for the overlapping areas II and IV.

The data could be explained by five out of the nine factors I used as associations to describe fear. Indications for the last four factors may be found also. The appearance of the two officers makes me believe that it is questionable if evidence for helplessness, loneliness, and isolation will be discovered. Their personality and the job environment are not suitable for these descriptors. However, I will keep them for further investigation. If they are not useful they will be eliminated from the list later.

For the second set of interviews the model will be kept in its original form. I hope to find more evidence for the single fear areas and especially for the overlapping areas.

#### F. SECOND TYPE OF THE FEAR MODEL

The original model will be kept for the second set of interviews. Additionally, I will provide a list of words to the interviewees that relate to the civilian and military environment. My intention is to provide some expressions which the officers may use as links to their fears. This is not considered to be a limitation but an aid. During the previous sessions there were no guidelines or hints. The officers were asked to present their views. My experience from the first interviews was that the officers were willing to present and describe their fears without many leading question from my side. The new list is meant to set a broad framework. The officers can use it as an orientation but if one interviewee wants to talk about different subject that will be accepted. I recognize that the elements in each column are not mutually exclusive. They may influence each other or build on each other. Words from one column could also be used in the other column. My intention is not to provide a perfect distinction between the various terms, but to get the interview started. The list includes the following items:

| Civilian Environment | Military Environment  |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Society           | 1. Job                |
| 2. Family            | 2. Task               |
| 3. Value System      | 3. Role Definition    |
| 4. Prejudice         | 4. Reward System      |
| 5. Unemployment      | 5. Communication      |
| 6. Neighborhood      | 6. Information        |
| 7. Childhood         | 7. Structure          |
| 8. Parents           | 8. Military - Society |
| 9. Education         | 9. Promotion, Career  |
| 10. School           | 10. Competition       |
|                      | 11. Relationship      |
|                      | 12. Procedures        |

**G. THIRD INTERVIEW: SECOND INTERVIEW WITH CO**

For this interview we met again in the study room in the NPS library. The CO arrived after a 20 minute bike ride and I had the impression he was a little bit exhausted. He tried to combine his fitness program with his commitment to the interview. It was not completely in line with my intention to

have relaxed and focused interview partners. Furthermore, I found out that he was facing increasing difficulties in his daily work. He seemed to be unhappy of "losing" so much time with the interview. He didn't state that directly, but I concluded it from his comments and his nervous behavior. So I suggested to meet next time in a place that would be more convenient for him. We agreed upon the conference room in his company, a solution that put him immediately more at ease. I felt, he wanted to keep his promise to support my research, but he also wanted to keep the time investment as low as possible; which was absolutely legitimate given his current problems at work.

"Anger and fear are closely related....Sometimes your anger produces results that make you afraid. You did something you didn't want to do. And that makes you afraid.". This statement described his concern that it can be dangerous to express an opinion when you are uncontrolled, irritated, angered, or even infuriated. He referred back to a college situation and talked about his view of affirmative action programs. In his opinion, the program should be limited to the extent that everybody "...has the same chance." He also believed that some of the current programs went too far and put majorities at disadvantages. He admitted, that he became very outspoken in discussions sometimes which, in turn, brought him under public scrutiny. Additionally, he was considered to be completely against affirmative action

programs and thus a racist ("...because whenever you say that you are against affirmative action...they automatically take it to the full extreme that you are a racist."). He generalized this example and mentioned that he sometimes fears the consequences when he sticks to his beliefs. Especially in certain positions or at certain ranks he believed he had to be more carefully in expressing his opinion. He further fears that his statements may be misinterpreted to the extreme he experienced in college. This would be much more dangerous in his current situation and may have a negative bearing on his career and as a consequence on his family ("...I'm one who speaks out. And when you speak out in front of the crowd a contrary opinion, no matter what it is, you are automatically targeted...").

"Neighborhood would be another point that causes fear...I feel there is a moral decay in the states right now." He related moral to words like common decency and constitution. Moral and ethical values are the foundations of a society although he made clear that he does not relate it to religious values. He mentioned specific fears like the impact of aids on the society, the increase of gang-related violence, and violence in schools. He has a son and is worried about his future. The military probably forces his family to move to places which are not in harmony with what he considers a safe place for his family to live and for his son to grow up

("...and you can't shield your children, your family from the bad environment all the time.").

He went on making an interesting comment about his view of death: "...I'm not afraid personally of very many things...To me dying is not a big deal. When it happens it happens. I've kind of blocked that out. And because I do that, I have a better concept of reality...I just don't dwell on it." He has a lot of fear about his family and what may happen to them. At the same time he puts aside all fear about himself. His fear is that he will not be able to act as the protector for his family when a dangerous situation calls for him ("...I can not always be there and watch out for them...and that creates the fear..."). Thus, he suppresses concerns about himself and his security and concentrates on his responsibilities for his family. This fear is also related to the before-mentioned decay of morals in society.

He explained his concerns for the family in more detail by describing his wife as a fearful person. She would get anxious when he is leaving for a field trip. She would ask him to slow down when she feels he is driving too fast on curvy road. He believes that she becomes frightened really quick. That behavior inspires in him the feeling that he has to provide a safe and secure environment for her all the time. Furthermore, he fears not being available for her at a time when she is fearful and may need him and his strength ("...her personality

is part of the reason...that's what causes the doubts and the fear." ).

He remembered some trouble he had during school time. He was a skinny and tall kid, probably the largest kid in school. Furthermore, he was very quiet and shy. Being without many social relationships on campus, but being the tallest boy, other kids targeted him frequently to find out who would be the strongest. Thus, he lived in the permanent fear of getting beaten up. This experience did not change his attitude towards seeking more social contacts. He developed the physical capability to fight back and thus kept his position ("I played the quiet, tough guy image in high school."). He mentioned that even today socializing is not a strong side of his personality ("I have no problems speaking in front of a crowd but shaking people's hands and remembering their birthdays...I'm poor at that." ).

With respect to information, he stated that he feared to make decisions based on too little information. He referred back to the first interview where we talked about his fear of making the wrong decision. Not to have information available that he feels is necessary for the decision making process is a great concern for him. He likes to investigate issues thoroughly before making statements. This behavior is rooted in some unpleasant experience during his military career. When he was a young Lieutenant he tended to make statements quickly and, from his today's perspective, unprofessional. He realized



that this was not career enhancing, even though the statements reflected his opinion and his current state of information. He also learned that his "...black and white..." oriented thinking was not appropriate in all situations. He discovered that different answers to a problem "...can be right...", if the person making that argument has a different perspective. Thus, he decided to do more research before arriving at a decision. That, in turn, leaves him today with the dilemma that he doesn't always know what the correct and sufficient amount of information is. This creates the fear of making a decision based on too little information ("...I have to make the decision right now without all the information and you have to be able to do that...", "...people have to make decisions right now. There wasn't time go and play courses of action and that kind of stuff...").

When I asked him whether too much information would create any fear in the decision making process he made the following remarks: "After an exhaustive investigation of a case you can be confident to have revealed most of the relevant information. Thus, you feel comfortable with the decision you make because you feel it is the right decision". But "...where the fear comes from is how many people's lives you have affected and how many people are upset with you for making the incorrect decision in their mind."). This is the fear of having too many people involved in the decision making process who may have different interests in the case. The continuous

revealing of new information also unearths new stakeholders. Sometimes, this creates more problems than it helps clarifying the question at hand. His fear is what he may dig up when he is digging too deep.

In a very impulsive statement he emphasized his fear that one of his subordinates could make a wrong decision while he is absent. He related this to his concern whether he trained his subordinates well enough to perform their duties correctly during his absence (...and the fear is that I come to work or I get called in the middle of the night and the totally wrong decision has been made. Yes, that is a fear.")

At the end of the session the CO asked me to interview his XO on a particular point. He mentioned that they have very different writing styles. The CO was aware that he "...caused him [the XO] a lot of grief about the way he writes...very wordy...uses passive tense". In the CO's perception the XO felt "...offended a lot of times when I take on something he has written and mark all over it.". The CO made clear that the XO doesn't make errors but "...it's his style.". He explained the problem more precisely by saying: "He doesn't write what my boss wants to see, in my opinion.". It seems that the CO is concerned about the XO's actual perception of this controversy. He doesn't feel comfortable with the situation and he tries to take advantage of me to get more information. Perhaps, he wanted me to build the bridge to the XO for final clarification. Furthermore, the CO obviously has learned which

writing style pleases his boss. Thus, he makes sure that every document that leaves the company has the proper style. The reasons for this behavior is rooted in the evaluation process. The CO will be evaluated by his superior. If he definitely knows the preferences of this person, it is a legitimate concern that the company's output has the required standard. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to observe the XO's response to this problem.

#### **H. FOURTH INTERVIEW: SECOND INTERVIEW WITH XO**

This was the first meeting in the company's conference room. The new environment had no apparent impact on the XO's behavior. He was relaxed as usual and willing to support the discussion. This meeting was interrupted a couple of times by people who entered the room not knowing that an interview was going on. The XO seemed to be used to this work style (working with interruptions) because he nodded his head slightly each time a person came in and kept on talking. It seemed to me that he responded to the opportunity to stay in the company positively. The fact that I moved while he was staying in his environment may have had a beneficial impact on his motivation.

With respect to the term "society" the XO considered himself a member of different social groups like nation, city, neighborhood, work group. For him it is important to be accepted within these groups and to conform with their rules,

norms, standards, and regulations ("...you want to be a good citizen..."). It seemed to be a very positive challenge to develop himself towards a valuable group member who is capable of contributing effectively to the groups mission. Furthermore, he feels a high responsibility for acting as a competent group member. He expressed fear about the possibility that his contribution may not be sufficient and the group may suffer from his incapacibilities or deficiencies ("...fear of letting those people down...who depends on you...", "...you want to be part of the team...help the group to succeed...be a valuable part of the group..."). I got the impression that his statements were mostly military based. His military training and especially the Ranger course helped to shape his strong group orientation. Nevertheless, he has developed (1) a strong feeling that every group member (military and civilian) has to contribute to the group success as much as possible to be valuable to the team and (2) the fear not to conform sufficiently with these norms and standards.

Next he talked about value systems. The various groups in the military have different values ("...Rangers have a Ranger creed...officers have an officers creed... NCOs have their creed..."). For himself he considered the officers oath the basis for his moral values. It is imperative for him to adhere to the ethical standards he accepted once he swore his oath ("...I don't have any problems with the values that are

espoused by the military. I think they are very wholesome and lofty. That's a good thing."). He also stated that this system of high ideals creates some types of fear. "I guess the biggest fear in it is that you don't live up to the values that are espoused by it, the values that you believe in...". Two different types of fear can be derived from this quotation. First, the fear that a group member is not able to fulfil the ethical standards of the value system. This inability may have it's roots in a deficiency in the personality (bad character) or in a mental limitation which may prevent the person from fully understand the standards. In either case the successful mission accomplishment of the team may be endangered by this group member. Another aspect is that the group cohesiveness may be jeopardized by this noncompliant. Second, a person may very well comprehend all the values and believe strongly in them but may not be capable of living up to them. In this case the person himself is aware of the discrepancy between his or her beliefs and the degree he or she is able to adhere to them. This may cause the fear of reprimands or in an extreme case social isolation ("...they take actions against you...").

He also mentioned that values change over time when different positions are considered right or wrong. The change may occur precipitously and in a dramatic fashion. An example is the view of the military of DUI (driving under influence). For a long time it was generally viewed as a manifestation of

foolishness but not worth to be considered for disciplinary action. Relatively quickly this attitude changed and DUI became a matter capable of ending a career. Today it will "...end your military career quicker than you know. And that is command driven from the very top of the Army all the way down to the lowest levels.". The problem is with rapid changes that people are often not able to change their entrenched beliefs with the same speed, thus they maintain their previous behavior and change only slowly. This exposes them to the danger that their behavior is no longer acceptable under the new value system. As a consequence they get punished. In a more severe situation a person may not even be aware of a change in the values. In this case the individual will be punished for a behavior he or she still assumes to be appropriate. Not to adjust timely or not to tune in at all may create a fear because unacceptable behavior has negative consequences which everybody tries to avoid.

He described another aspect of changes in the value system which may relate to fear. This is especially true for the groups of officers and NCOs. During the Vietnam area "...we have been a kind of a wild, rude Army...". The duties in Vietnam and the hard training requirements fostered the development of a wild and rude Army culture. This was tolerated during the war but became subject to increasing public scrutiny when the war was over. The culture became questionable. Since then a dramatic change has taken place.

Basically, it was a move back to the standards of conduct that had been in force before the war but had been neglected somewhat during wartime ("Around 1980...the Army really started to bring things around...started hammering people for not being true to the oath and the value system that was in place...started to get rid of people..."). The top driven reinforcement of the values embedded in the oath forced the officers and NCOs to review their behavior and rapidly adjust to the new (and in this case the old) conditions. This was especially hard for people who lived under the Vietnam value system for a long time. Thus, a great deal of fear was created and people were dismissed because of misconduct. And even today the strong reenforcement of the rules of conduct places fear on many people because failures to comply with the rules may end the career. At this point the reasons for fear become more complex because the strong reinforcement is perceived as a means for the personnel departments to find soldiers with disciplinary actions in their files. These bad marks are then used as a criterion to terminate the contract of this soldier early. This particular procedure has to be viewed in the light of the current downsizing process where personnel departments are forced to cut. And the first to cut are the people who have made mistakes.

The XO was raised in the north of Los Angeles. He mentioned that Los Angeles has a lot of areas he avoids visiting. He was afraid of the random violence that increase

in some areas ("...the black culture and the lower levels of our society in general have a lot of problems with gangs and random violence...people become often victims of that random violence..."). He stressed that he is not prejudiced against black people but in Los Angeles a lot of random violence occurs in regions that are predominantly black. He told the story of a person who walked through a violent neighborhood wearing a red backpack. At that time gangs identified themselves by wearing certain clothes and colors. In this area red was considered the enemy's color. A gang member approach the man from the back, shot him into his head, and killed him ("Random violence is definitely a great fear in the U.S.", "...people getting killed for absolutely no reason, just because they were existing in the wrong place at the wrong time.").

The childhood of the XO was overshadowed by frictions between his parents which finally lead to their divorce. In a first statement he mentioned that he experienced no fear during that time. He said his parents bothered him, at most. Shortly after that he admitted that he feared the temper of his father ("...when he [father] was frustrated, he [father] got kind of short and brutal...a small kid compared to a guy [father] who is three feet taller than you, weighs a lot more and is intimidating to a degree, slamming doors...that scares a kid..."). His reaction to his father's outbursts of temper was avoidance ("...stay out of his way..."). Later he found



out that his father was an alcoholic, a fact that explained his temper to a certain degree. This situation has strong bearing on the XO's current feelings and concerns. The unpleasant pictures shape his view about his marriage and his children. He wants to avoid all the situations he had to live through and the bad attitudes of his father serve as a permanent warning ("I have a fear...I am getting married in four month...and I have a fear to this day...of failure in the marriage. I'm wondering if I blow it the way he did. I fear having children because I don't want...put them through the type of growing up that I did...I don't want to be like my father.").

A point of concern, in his terminology not a real fear to him, is the stress put on a family by the military duties ("I've seen it to be very stressful on people's relationships, a lot of relationships go down, get dissolved due to the stress put on them from the military due to military missions."). He mentioned that his fiance accuses him constantly for putting her in second place. He described her as very demanding. They often have problems scheduling events, because they interfere with his military schedule. His explanation is that he swore an oath and that he will carry out his obligations as truthfully as possible. Everything else has to be arranged around his military mission. Nevertheless, he recognized that this may be a constant source for problems between him and his family in the future. Interesting was his

next comment where he stated that he does not put his military career "...over her...". If it would be"... a question of life and death..." he would be there for her. But in all other cases he would carry out his military duty as he is supposed to do. It seemed to me that he was still in a dilemma and he had not resolved the question sufficiently for himself. Thus, he was still vacillating which stance to take finally.

Next he talked about his relationship to the CO and superiors in general. He viewed the CO as the role model for everything he expects himself to accomplish. A CO has to be competent, intelligent, of an unquestionable integrity, the one who sets the example. The XO tries to live up to this view because he believes that is what his CO expects him to achieve. A good reason to strive for these goals is the evaluation that has to be written by the CO. The XO seemed to be concerned about the evaluation. Interestingly, his honest concern seemed to be his capability to reach the standards he believes the CO accepts as sufficient. On the other hand, it seemed to me that these standards were not clearly defined. The XO himself seemed to have very high expectations which, in turn, place a great burden on him, because high standards are difficult to attain. And this dilemma creates the fear about the evaluation and leads to a much more formal and rigid appearance of the XO than he would display usually ("I personally, I am more fearful than I need to be of my superiors.", "The commander is the commander, he is the guy

who evaluates you, he is always watching you, he is always judging you, watching your performance.").

At the same time he assured me that his relationship with the CO was very good ("...I feel he really trusts me and allows me to assist him in running the company. I feel, he also has an implicit confidence in me to lead the company in his absence...I feel more like a peer with him and not like he is the CO and I'm the XO."). The XO liked to work in this company. He felt that he and his work were accepted and so he was deliberately devoting a great amount of time to his job ("...he treats me like his right hand man which I really appreciate..."). Another aspect which made the XO feel comfortable in his work environment was that "He is not a real formal type of CO." The XO appreciated the open communication between him, the First Sergeant, and the CO. This was considered the basis for a truthful and harmonious work relationship as well as the key to successful mission accomplishment. Nevertheless, necessary formal and respectful distances remained. The XO mentioned another point which helped him improving on his self esteem. The CO viewed him as his right hand and invited him to share responsibility for the company with him ("I'm the Commander of the company and you are the second leader of the company. And now let's lead the company together."). The XO felt honored by this responsibility and was eager to fully satisfy the CO's expectations. This paragraph described very positive aspects.

The XO lived in a pleasant environment and had apparently not experienced any fear that was related to communication or his relationship to his CO. From these data I can draw the following conclusions using a type of inverse method: First, the presence of good and open communication provides the basis for a harmonious work atmosphere and makes the XO work as hard as he can to contribute to the success of the company. The conclusion can be drawn that the absence of good and open communication could lead to problems. As the XO stated it, "...if communication is down, there is nothing left but failure. You are going to fail, it's just a matter of time.". Workers may feel unsure about the goals and they may not feel free to approach the superior to ask for clarification. Furthermore, their enthusiasm and contributions may decrease over time. This can leave subordinates in a fearful situation. Their uncertainty increases as to how to behave and what is expected from them. Usually people don't like a particular level of uncertainty. They try to avoid it by seeking information and clarification. If this avenue is blocked by a superior who does not communicate very well the subordinates are left in an uncertain and possibly fearful environment. Second, the positive relationship between the CO and the XO provided for a harmonious work atmosphere and effective output. Furthermore, the XO was dedicated to the company because he was given great responsibility and recognition by the CO. He felt integrated in the command structure and given

a challenging share of the work. Using the same approach as above, I can conclude that the absence of a good relationship or the presence of a highly disturbed relationship may create an extremely undesirable situation for the subordinate. Again this may create fear in the subordinate for various reasons. The communication may be insufficient and the subordinate is unsure about the expectations placed on him. He may be unaware of tasks he is supposed to perform or the specific way the tasks are to be performed. The team feeling deteriorates and may leave people with a feeling of isolation.

With respect to information the XO mentioned that he views data as the basis to make intelligent decisions. The status of having too little information is of some concern to him. He prefers to have sufficient data to prepare precise decisions. A lack of data creates a feeling of uncertainty and the fear of making an improper decision. To have too much data is of no concern to him. He analyzes the available data and selects the facts which deem him appropriate to consider. Then he makes the decision. He mentioned that the time factor plays an important role in decision making. If a decision has to be made by a certain time the process of data gathering has to be stopped early enough to allow for analysis and final conclusions. He acknowledged that this put him frequently in the position of not having sufficient data to make the most accurate decision. This leaves him with a unsatisfactory feeling but on the other hand "...if the decision has to be

made by twelve o'clock it will be made at that time regardless of the information I have....if it is too little you do the best you can. You take a calculated risk."

The confrontation of military and society was our next subject. The XO mentioned that he fears people reactions when they become aware that he is in the military. He mentioned the example of troops coming back from their Vietnam assignments and were treated poorly by citizens ("...they were serving their country and they come off the plane and people call them baby killer and spit on them."). His specific fear was rooted in judgements made about himself and his job by civilians. He didn't fear reprisals or physical violence but was scared about possible psychological distress ("...you must have no life,...no good to think for yourself, that's why you are in the military."). The reason for this type of judgements seems that "...there are a lot of people in the society who disagree with what the military does. We don't allow homosexuals, we are discriminatory in a lot of ways. We don't pay people a lot of money. We ask people to put their lives on the line without question. We treat people badly in some way." He described a consequence flowing from this judgements. In his view the majority of the women does not want to get involved with military people. The Army seems to have a specifically bad image. He acknowledged that some women "...really get off on the military guys and the military thing...", but mentioned also that the majority has negative

stereotypes about the military. Furthermore, he thought that this is more a problem of the lower ranks. Officers rarely encountered this type of rejection because they enjoy a more favorable judgement.

He commented on the term "competition" very positively. He viewed competition as "necessary and challenging (...I enjoy a clean competitive game...)". With respect to the downsizing process he considered competition vital for the survival of a strong Army. He believed that only the best will make it to the top positions and will remain in the system. This will provide for a professional and highly qualified organization that will be ready to face future challenges. On the other hand he mentioned that he fears to loose a game. Thus, the new conditions impose immense pressure on him to execute his job without failure, because "...when you make one mistake you are done, no rebound.". Another aspect he mentioned was that people develop a "...check the block..." mentality. Everybody is primarily concerned to reach his crucial steppingstones along the career path on time. Required training programs and positions are just checked off. People don't focus on their current responsibilities as much as they should but are always planning their next career step. This decreases their effectiveness in their current billet, but the fear of not having checked off all requirements for higher billets is a major driving force for a person to be future oriented rather than concentrate on their present assignment (...they get so

promotion driven that they forget to be a good commander today.").

Finally, I tried to find out how he perceived the fact that the CO frequently corrects the rough drafts he submits (the CO asked me in the previous interview to check on this point). Discrete questions didn't lead to the core of the problem. Even direct questions revealed no negative perception of that phenomenon. The XO stated clearly that in his view it is the fundamental right of the CO to change everything that he finally signs. I could not detect any indication of fear with respect to this issue. His answers seemed to reflect his honest opinion.

After we finished this session I made an observation which may be important to explain the good relationship between CO and XO. The CO's spouse arrived about 5:30 pm to pick him up. She had their little son with her. She seemed to be familiar with the environment and moved straight into the CO's office. The child played around, until he suddenly noticed that the XO was in his office. The XO himself interrupted his current work and started playing with the child. The CO's wife joined the two and they talked for a while. It appeared to me that the families knew each other and had a good relationship. The work environment was not a disturbing or distorting factor with respect to the behavior of the CO, XO, and CO's wife. They seemed to behave the same way they would usually do.



## I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

During these interviews the CO and the XO primarily talked about personal fears. The following fears the CO mentioned are attributable to the circle A of my model (fear inherent in the CO): (1) The fear of getting angry (sometimes uncontrolled) and then making inappropriate statements. He recalled that he has a temper and that he sometimes has problems to control it. Later he regrets his comments, but the danger of having said something which may affect his career is still there. (2) His fear of moral decay in the society. Like in the first interview he related this to the question where to raise his son to give him a safe childhood and an good education. In the same context he mentioned the increasing violence. He believed, that ethical values are eroding more and more and even the schools are no longer safe places for the kids. Furthermore, he was very worried about the overall safety of his family. He expressed concern that he probably could not be present in a case where his help would be needed. He acknowledged logically that omnipresence is impossible, but, nevertheless, he felt constantly uncomfortable about the safety of his family. (3) With reference to the work in the company the CO was afraid that the XO may misinterpret the guidance regarding the writing style. The CO was often changing rough drafts submitted by the XO. He handed the papers back, but he was not sure whether he explained the corrections sufficiently to the XO. The XO, in turn, never

responded to the changes or asked for further clarification. Thus, there seem to be a tension between them that may need attention. The CO felt the XO should have approached him already about that matter. Furthermore, he presumed that nobody could bear such a permanent correction without any reaction. But, as noted, the XO reported, that he felt absolutely comfortable with the situation. He acknowledged the ultimate right of the CO to change everything he likes before he signs it. Thus, no problem exists for the XO.

The next fear is attributable to the area C (fear inherent in the situation). The CO mentioned again the fear, that somebody may make a wrong decision while he is absent. A degree of uncertainty remains, because not everything can be totally controlled. This seems to be an important factor, because it was reported twice. The significance is based on the negative consequences which may arise for the superior. In the light of the downsizing environment and the high competition it can be fatal to be held responsible for such a mistake. The most feared effect is any negative comment in the personal records, because this may quickly be used to retire an officer early. Especially the CO mentioned several times: "...one mistake and you are out.". I view this fear as a strong determinant to explain behavior like the high emphasis on correct paper work and paper handling.

The CO talked about two fears which are related to area I (inherent in the CO and in the situation). First, he expressed

his concern that his investigations, which he had to do to decide legal cases in his company, had affected many people. These people sometimes had only a peripheral link with the core matter. But they had to be heard for certain reasons. He was not sure how third parties might respond to the inquiry. It could be that totally innocent people might be brought in relation with the issue under investigation just because of the inquiry. He felt responsible for these people and tried to limit his investigations to the necessary minimum. On the other hand, the cases were often so difficult and complex, that a greater volume of information was needed for a clear picture. This left him with an uncomfortable feeling. Second, he mentioned the fear of making a decision based on not enough information. This situation obviously includes the high danger of making a faulty decision. The XO mentioned the same fear. Two different situations were discussed which helped me to assign the fear to areas I (for the CO) and area III (for the XO). One is, that the circumstances do not permit the collection of the sufficient amount of data. There may be time constraint or the access may be impossible. In this situation they would know that there is more information in existence, but they would not be able to utilize it for their decision making process. The second case would be individual negligence. The investigator just doesn't collect the available data and thus bases the decision on insufficient information. In this case too, he may be aware of his failure

and, as a consequence, has to live with the fear of probably having made a faulty decision.

The XO talked about some fears which can be assigned to area B (inherent in the subordinate). It was interesting that he described his childhood in some detail and specifically his fear of his father's temper. With the support of a psychologist it might have been possible to analyze the impact of this fear on his current behavior. Furthermore, we might have been able to explain some of his current fears in with regard to this early experiences. But from my experience and my management training background I am not educated to examine this issue in a professional manner. If this topic will be researched in more detail it would be beneficial to form a work group with different specialists (e.g. psychologists). I will talk in more detail about this matter in the recommendations. The next two fears seem to be related to each other. One is the fear of failing to live up to group standards. The second fear he mentioned emphasized this point in a specific manner. He described his fear of not living in conformity with the values set fourth by the officers oath. He considered the oath an important guideline for his behavior. It was imperative for him to try as hard as possible to fulfill this oath in every aspect of his military life. This attitude is consistent with all his comments about military duties and especially the officers behavior. My personal observations regarding his conduct and my impression, obtained

during the interviews, support this statement. The XO mentioned a similar fear of violence as the CO. The XO's fear is shaped by his experience in Los Angeles and the random violence prevalent in some districts. The fear has the same results as with the CO. Both officers tried to avoid regions which were known for a certain degree of violence. The underlying concern in both cases was their own safety and the safety of their relatives. Next, the XO mentioned the fear of getting a bad evaluation. This fear is closely related to the fear of failure. Again, in the light of the downsizing process, any failure has the potential of ending a career early. Thus, everybody is trying hard to avoid any mistake. The last fear that is related to area B is the fear of "losing a game". The XO considered himself a very competitive person and it seems that competition is a basic element of his character. He likes a "clean competitive game" in the best meaning of the word. It is an honest endeavor to utilize all his energy to achieve personal and military goals. It is a matter of personal honor to win and it is very unsatisfying for him to be the second. This has great bearing on his military performance. Each task is carried out under the assumption to reach a hundred percent accomplishment and nothing less.

The XO mentioned three fears that can be assigned to area C (fear that is originated in the situation). One is the fear of rapid changes in the value system, intensified by the fear

that he may not even be aware of the change at all. The Army has undergone some drastic adjustments after the Vietnam war to eliminate behavioral deviations which were developed during that time. It seems, that the society demanded a return to peacetime standards and the Army responded to that demand. The recollection was coupled with drastic actions against those people who did not change immediately (including legal actions and dismissal). The XO feared that a similar change (on a smaller scale perhaps) could occur today and he eventually would not recognize it. As a possible consequence, he would make mistakes which could be held against him. It seems that this is another version of the fear of failure which is based on the fear of getting discharged. These fears and their underlying assumptions seem mainly to be related to the increased competition which arose due to the downsizing process. Fierce fights for the top rating positions are coupled with the fear that the slightest mistake has the potential to end the career early. The officers are confronted with harsh selection processes and they are not completely sure of the criteria. Uncertainty increases and the officers develop behavior that may be suitable to ensure their survival. This behavior is shaped by fear and can be counterproductive and less efficient. The last fear the XO mentioned was the fear that he might get a CO who is primarily career oriented. He viewed the current CO as clearly mission oriented rather than pursuing his career. But the fear seem to

be of a latent nature. To make career and to make it past the 20 year retirement line, it is required that officers have had certain crucial assignments. The Commander and XO positions on various levels are essential stepping stones on the way up. A widespread behavior seem to be, that career oriented officers just "check the block" when they have those assignments. They try to stay out of trouble and are basically preparing themselves already for the next higher assignment. The XO was very concerned to meet those people, because he assumed that the work climate in such a company could be unsatisfactory. I got the impression that he also feared that his work load would increase in such a case. This would automatically mean, that his probability to make a mistake would also increase. And again we are back to the feared Army procedures, that everybody with bad evaluations or any other bad marks in his files may be the first one to be chosen for early retirement.

During this interviews I got the strong impression that many fears are traceable to the current force reduction efforts. Only a relatively small number of very good officers will be kept in the Army. The selection process involves probably mechanisms that are apt to create high degrees of uncertainty. These, in turn, seem to stimulate various fears. The basic fear seem to be what exactly the criteria for survival or dismissal are. Myths seem to grow, intensifying the skepticism. Concerns about the future of the families increase the problem.

#### J. SECOND ITERATION OF THE MODEL

The second set of interviews brought new evidence for the model. Several types of fear were explored and could be explained by the model. Findings focused on the areas A,B,C and the overlap zones I and III. No examples were presented for the zones II and IV. The model proved to be useful and I will use it for the third set of interviews without changes.

My intention for the next set of interviews is to concentrate on the military sector and leave the civilian domain. This step will bring the interview process closer to the ultimate focal point, the relationship between the CO and the XO.

My intention during the final set of interviews is to focus the attention on the relationship of the superior and the subordinate. The previous session had a broader scope and allowed for a more widespread exploration of different types of fear. To keep the interviewees focused I will use a more structured approach for the interview. During the previous interviews I provided only rough guidelines and allowed the officers to choose any fear related topic they wanted to talk about. This time a more rigid set of question will serve the purpose to examine the unique fears that may exist between the CO and his XO.



#### K. THIRD TYPE OF THE FEAR MODEL

For the third set of interviews I intended to narrow the focus down to the military environment. During the first and second set of interviews I had left the officers the options to link their comments either to the civilian or the military environment. We explored in detail some of their personal fears and touched already on some military aspects. Following my original intentions outlined in the methodology section I excluded this time the civilian segment and focused the discussion on military aspects. The continuous increase in focus serves the purpose to have the interviewees gradually prepared to talk during the last set of interviews more easily about the main target point: their own relationship between each other and probable fears involved in it. Again I prepared a list of terms the officers could use as a guideline but I did not restrict them in any way if they wanted to talk about another topic and the fears related to that specific subject. The following terms were displayed at a blackboard:

- Job
- Role
- Organizational Structure
- Procedures
- Work Style
- Tasks
- Reward System
- Relationships

- Leadership
- Climate, Culture, Atmosphere

During the preparation for this interviews I recognized that the CO was under severe stress. It was hard to get him on the phone at all and even harder to schedule an appointment. Finally, he had to admit that he couldn't make time available that particular week. Problems with soldiers in the company and additional tasks he had to do for his superiors kept him busy. He was already working overtime to stay on schedule with his assignments and asked me to reschedule our meeting. Fortunately, the XO was available and we agreed to change the sequence for the last four interviews completely. To have the XO first now and the CO second may have a favorable effect on the interview process, especially during the last two sessions. Now I will get the information from the subordinate first and can arrange precise questions for the CO to examine whether his answers correspond with the view of the XO. This wasn't important as long as we explored fear on a broader basis, but will be a more suitable approach when we get focused on the two person relationship. My approach will allow me to interview the subordinate first who is affected by the leadership. During the interview with the CO, who is the "originator or source" of the leadership, I will try to find out how or to what extent his explanations and perceptions are congruent with or diverse from the XO's answers.

L. FIFTH INTERVIEW: THIRD INTERVIEW WITH XO

We met in the conference room of the company in Fort Ord. When I arrived the company was currently attending an inspection. The only man left in the buildings was the XO. It was very quiet and we expected no interruptions. The XO seemed to very relaxed due to this pleasant atmosphere and after he had finished an incoming phone call he shut his office door and we commenced the interview.

First, I tried to find out whether the XO preferred a very rigid and structured work environment (e.g. strong guidance, detailed information, meticulous task description, tight controls) or if he was favoring more freedom and room for maneuvers (e.g. creativity, more self control, only broad guidance, goals without ordered details how to exactly achieve them). My intention was to examine to which extent (if at all) a certain degree of freedom may cause fear. I suspected, inspired by the Philipp Wiesehöfer [Ref. 2] article, that people wish to find a certain extent of structure and regulations in their work environment. They feel safer when they have orientation in some way. The absence of any regulatory network may cause fear because the responsibility of the individual for being creative increases proportional to the degree the regulations decrease. The intensity of the expected or required network for people to feel comfortable depends on the individual. Wiesehöfer makes the point that a high degree of uncertainty coupled with high requirements for

individual responsibility and creativity may cause the fear of failure. Furthermore, he argues that people are confronted with the conflict whether their capabilities are sufficient to fill the vacuum with meaningful actions. Finally, he makes the point that a high degree of doubt exists in the individual whether their chosen course of action will be acceptable for others with regard to ethical, religious, social or economic standards or views.

The XO mentioned that he likes to be "...somewhere in the middle.". His point was that different situations require different approaches. When a training program has to be carried out, the only way to do it correctly is to adhere strictly to existing rules and regulations. On the other hand, there are many tasks where he preferred that only a goal or mission is given to him. It would be his own responsibility to figure out the optimal way to achieve this goal. He stated that he dislikes most when in the latter situation everything is dictated to him. He also admitted that people have different personalities. Some people "...have a natural drive to produce things, to accomplish things,...other people...muddle around. They would not produce anything or achieve anything unless someone is there providing a structure and an environment for them to follow in order to be successful.". For himself he was convinced that he could handle any situation ("...I can handle that...I have the faculties about me and the ability to learn enough that I get

everything done I need to. I am not scared of something like that." ). As an appendum the XO admitted that his opinion and his confidence was based on the fact that he was operating in a structured environment, the Army. I got the impression that it was too hard for him to imagine himself being in a vacuum type situation where he had to figure out everything by himself and set standards and regulations by himself and for himself. He was accustomed to the highly regulated military milieu. When he uses the term freedom of choice he always views it within the context of an existing military structure. He could not imagine a very high or the ultimate degree of freedom. He seemed to view this type of freedom limited by a goal or a mission that was already provided by somebody else, mainly some superior. He was thinking within a given structure and he enjoyed any freedom within these boundaries but he could not imagine to be responsible for creating these boundaries or anything outside of them.

With respect to the points culture, climate and atmosphere he expressed strong concern that they may lead to problems within a unit. He mentioned that "...there is a lot of racism...and sexism in this country..." and the armed forces of the U.S. have different races in their units as well as men and women. His fear was that the interaction between these groups might become so stressful that "...it can bring a unit to a halt as far as its effectiveness and its ability to accomplish its mission is concerned...". Everybody "...has to

be sensitive to cultural issues...you need to make sure that the work climate is open and fair and that communication is very open...". To limit the possibility for negative situations to occur he gives every new soldier his home phone number. His soldiers are advised to call him at any time and under all circumstances when they are in trouble or they feel that they need help. He considered this action one contribution to make sure that the climate and the work atmosphere in the company is as pleasant as possible. As an example how the climate could be affected negatively he mentioned a case of sexual harassment that happened recently. The consequence was that some soldiers approached the XO requesting transfers because they did not like to stay in the company any longer ("...that really affects the climate of the office...people are coming to the office...they are fearful of being threatened...They are fearful of the supervisor, because the supervisor is the one doing it [the harassment])."

Another way of creating fear in people would be if the CO "...is a tyrant.". The XO mentioned that the subordinates would feel intimidated by this leadership style ("...where the commander...calls people names and is condescending...he belittles them."). To be a hard and demanding CO is not a problem for the XO but he requested a fair, intelligent, and people oriented leadership style ("...there are ways to be a responsible and hard commander without slamming people."). As an example for appropriate leadership behavior he mentioned

that criticism should be done in private whereas praise should be done "...in front of everybody...".

Overall, the XO reported that he had not experienced an absolutely bad work environment in his career. He considered himself adaptable to new circumstances, flexible, and tolerant. My impression was that he loved his job as an officer and thus was willing to tolerate negative circumstances to a relatively high magnitude. On the other hand, I also got the impression that he would fight for the welfare of his subordinates as well as for his own in a case where the CO would display very negative behavior. The XO's concern seemed to be very much the well being of the entire company. To achieve this he believes that every little element has to be treated carefully and respectfully.

Next he talked about the differences in working styles. In his opinion everybody has a distinct working style. Furthermore, he acknowledged that each organization develops a characteristic working style over time. These two may not be identical or even similar. The greater the differences between the individual and the organizational mode and the greater the forces on the individual to adjust to the organization's style, the bigger the problems. He stated his strong concern that resistance and ineffectiveness could be two possible outcomes. In both cases the climate and the culture would be adversely affected. The XO mentioned, that great attention of all supervisors with respect to these issues is essential for

the overall performance of the unit. Either negligence in recognizing different working styles or inability to tolerate or integrate those into the organizational style to a certain extent would lead to a reduction in effectiveness as well as efficiency ("...as a commander you need to look at people's styles, how do they best produce. Everybody is different...You need...to push people to be as productive as possible. As long as they are not hurting anybody else, you let them do whatever they want.", "Everyone got his own style, how they would like to work. And I think it is important that, it's a concern of mine, to make sure that , as much as possible, you are trying to accommodate people's desires to work in whatever fashion they desire, as long as...what they want does not harm other people."). He did not talk about a specific fear with respect to this problem. On the other hand, he clearly recognized that failure in addressing the work style issue properly could result in severe problems for a unit. In this context it is hard for the researcher and the interviewee to distinguish exactly when a problem may result in concern or when the border line is crossed towards fear. I got the impression that, especially in the military environment, individuals are (1) much more reluctant to use the term fear or (2) they label phenomena differently. This may be attributable to their education, which emphasizes that a soldier (1) may have fear, but he is not supposed show it and (2) he should be able to



control it. This is particularly true for officers and NCOs in leadership positions.

The leadership style of COs in general was our subsequent issue. The XO explained again that every CO shapes his unit through his personal style. Usually every single aspect of the unit would be influenced by the characteristics and values of the CO. For the XO it was important to fit himself into the CO's leadership style. The reason for exercising careful restraint in pursuing his own personality and trying to achieve a high degree of parallelism with the CO's style was very striking and simple: "...because obviously he rates you. There is a fear there, if you don't conduct yourself in a way he believes an officer should conduct himself, that he rates you badly." Interesting was the statement the XO added immediately which unveiled his dilemma: "You may say as my commander: you need to be this way as an officer. But if I believe strongly, I should not be that way as an officer, there is a give and take. Is it more important to me to get your approval in my ratings or is it more important to me to have my approval of myself?". The XO never had a commander who forced him to compromise his own beliefs, but he viewed this situation, should it ever occur, as very stressful and loaded with fear.

Next he highlighted a disturbing aspect of leadership he had experienced in a previous assignment as a platoon leader. His former CO "...dumped..." more work onto his XO than seemed

appropriate to most of the officers and NCOs in that company. The CO was seemingly incapable of carrying out his responsibilities due to lack in experience and knowledge. He tried to hush up his deficiencies by delegating work to the people who deemed him capable to handle the job. My interview partner related two problem areas to that type of behavior. First, very quickly everybody was aware of the CO's shortages. The respect for the superior decreased drastically. Second, the subordinates were concerned, and some afraid, that a CO like him would not be able to provide the expected and necessary guidance. Uncertainty increased and as a consequence the fear of failure increased. The CO proved extremely incapability of guiding and supervising his personnel. The soldiers learned rapidly that their CO often expected them to do their jobs differently than they actually did. Their questions for proper and timely guidance were never answered, but the expectations of the CO remained. Thus, the fear increased, because the discrepancy between the CO's expectations and the actual performance of the subordinates was not eliminated or reduced.

The XO briefly described the attitude he believes a good superior should have. "A good supervisor will tell you what your task is, but he will not necessarily tell you how to do the task...". He expects the CO to define undoubtedly what success is. Proper guidance and a certain degree of freedom in executing the mission deemed the XO to be crucial to establish

a relationship that is low on fear and tense and high on trust and certainty.

He elaborated more on the importance of trust as a counterpole to fear. If a leader has no trust in his employee's capabilities, the subordinate may develop the feeling that "...he doesn't even trust me...I am not trusted anyway, I probably can't get this done. This person has no confidence in me." The fact that a superior has little or no trust and confidence in his subordinates has the potential to make the subordinates presume they are actually not capable of executing the task successfully. This may then in fact decrease their performance what in turn would be considered the already expected evidence for the incompetence of the subordinate. This is a vicious circle which can in most cases only be broken by the superior. If he trusts his subordinates he enables them to develop confidence in their own capabilities which will lead to improved performance. In the latter environment the element of fear will be reduced to a minimum.

In addition to the thoughts discussed previously I asked the XO if it would inspire fear in him if he knew that his CO had strong deficiencies. The answer was very impulsively: "...if I knew my commander was an idiot? Yes...he has a great influence on the lives of 90 to 120 men. If he is a moron he can screw up the lives of 120 men like that [at this moment the XO snapped his fingers]". The fear is based on two facts.

First, the XO fears that his own life may be more at risk than it would be under normal circumstances (a responsible commander in charge). Second, he fears that his influence on his subordinates may be limited by the actions of the CO. This would probably expose his men to a greater danger than he would ever have exposed them to. The XO held the opinion that a lot of superiors should not be in the position they are currently in. He viewed their competence insufficient to have responsibility over the lives of so many people ("...and because of that [their deficiencies] they put a lot of people at risk. They are supposed to be performing at a certain level and they are not.").

He mentioned again the fear of not being able to meet expectations. He described the following situation to highlight the problem: "Yesterday morning. There was a captain who was here and being Ranger qualified people have an expectation, I guess, well, if you are Ranger qualified, you must be high speed, you must be perfect. And that's not the case. I'm proficient in a number of tasks but I am unproficient...in far more tasks than I am proficient in...There is this expectation put on us and this is intimidating, because if you do something and you fail, the first thing people tell me is: Oh, the Ranger could not do it." "When you blow it, all eyes are on you." The exaggerated expectations are unwarranted in most cases and put a lot of pressure on the affected person ("There is a degree of fear in


being an officer..."). The person may become more nervous than usually which would effect their performance negatively. The failure would then be viewed as the already expected outcome. Again we have the vicious circle that I have described above. The external expectation has to be adjusted to eliminate the fear and enable the Ranger to perform as they have been trained. Otherwise, the external pressure has to be judged as the source for the fear and subsequently as a source for the failures.

With respect to one of my research questions, I solicited his opinion regarding the following statement: "Fear can be completely eliminated in a peacetime work environment". His quick and unambiguous answer was: "That's impossible." In another statement he remarked: "...fear is always there...". He was sure that the entire elimination of fear is impossible. In his opinion particular facets of fear are more or less continuously present. Some consciously others unconsciously. In other cases, as he mentioned, fear would be stimulated by the novelty of the situations. With respect to the military environment he specified some fears to clarify his position.

- (1) The fear of failure,
- (2) the fear of not being capable of achieving the goal (not being physically ready for a road march),
- (3) the fear, that somebody else may make a mistake, and
- (4) the fear that a superior may be present in a moment when a mistake occurs.

Next I asked him whether fear could be eliminated by applying the appropriate leadership styles. For example, would involvement of the subordinates in the decision making process or providing sufficient information to all participants of an operation help to eliminate all fear? Again, he had a clear opinion and replied: "False for the usual military, because leaders like that are few and far between...However, with the right leaders and the right environment, a good climate and atmosphere, a great deal of fear can be replaced by confidence...Instead of making them fearful, you can... promote their proficiency levels to the point that, even there is still a degree of fear, they know, that they can do anything that they have to do. But often, we are not given the adequate amount of time, resources, ammunition, assets, and conduct training...to get soldiers to have a minimum sense of fear." He favored for example the conduct of live firing exercises to get the soldiers accustomed to the real combat situation from the beginning. Otherwise, he stated, they would be trained in an environment which is very different to what they had to expect in combat. The fear level could be gradually lowered through training that is designed to match the combat situation as close as possible. The effect he was trying to approximate would be that these soldiers would have a much lower fear level when they had to jump out of an airplane to go into a real combat situation. I started to draw a graph at the blackboard to depict what we just discussed

(Figure 5). Right after I finished a rough outline the XO took



(1) Under usual circumstances people don't operate in the hatched area. A "life-saving" fear level prevents them from doing life threatening things.

(2) In unusual circumstances, the fear level may drop below this line and allow people to act in a way they would usually not act. The driving forces for this behavior are: Love, dedication, friendship, heroism, endangered relatives, being cornered.

Figure 5 The Impact of Training and Leadership on the Level of Fear of an Individual Soldier

a marker and added his thoughts graphically. Together we fine tuned the graph which, besides other factors, reflects the XO's opinion, that fear can never be reduced to zero. The picture shows schematically the impact of (1) training with and without live firing (based on my theory and the XO's expertise), (2) successful and unsuccessful training, and (3) appropriate or inappropriate leadership on the level of fear in different situations. In the first section a training environment is assumed. Fear will be reduced over time, because the soldier becomes skilled and builds up knowledge about weapons, procedures, and tactics. Furthermore, he continuously gains more confidence in his own abilities. Finally, he eventually becomes integrated into his peer group. The level of fear decreases with a steeper slope when live firing is employed as a training method. The small middle part represents the transit from the training conditions to the combat situation. Troops are leaving the familiar environment and approaching the unknown. They may have theoretical background about what is going to be happen soon, but the degree of uncertainty and novelty is very high. Consequently, the fear level would increase dramatically. It seems valid to assume that the apex will be at a higher level than at point zero of the picture (begin of training). The endpoint of this section symbolizes the entry of the soldier into the actual combat operation. The third segment embraces the entire combat period. Any forecasting in this area is every difficult if



possible at all. Thus, the shape of the four graphs represent a highly theoretical framework. My intention is to delineate the different impacts training and leadership may have on the level of fear. The combat situation itself is outside the scope of my study, but I would like to present the general trends I encountered during my research. One is that the curves with live firing training reduce the fear level at a quicker rate. During the transit phase this doesn't seem to be an advantage any more. The uncertainty and the novelty seem to have such a high impact that the difference between the curves is marginal. The most interesting detail is the horizontal line representing fear of death. The XO stated clearly, that in his opinion this basic fear level will always be existing and can never be further reduced. He also provided the obvious exemptions to this case. In extreme situations people are able to overcome this life saving barrier and do things they usually would never do. He described the case of a Sergeant who received the Congressional Medal of Honor. In the Vietnam war this soldier exposed himself to enemy fire several times to protect his platoon during evacuation. Under normal circumstances nobody would show such a behavior, because the danger of getting killed is close to hundred percent. But the situation and probably the attitude and the value system of the soldier culminated in a way that he overcame his life-saving fear level, went below it, and acted in a way that is recognized as heroic. He survived this action. A recent

example for the same phenomenon is the person who tried to rescue an animal from a burning house. As the newspaper reported the person successfully saved the animal but died from the burns he or she suffered. An unusual and strong driving force must have allowed the person to go below the fear of death line and enter the burning building. Unfortunately, in this case the outcome was fatal. The hypothetical trends during the combat phase which depict unsuccessful training and the combination of unsuccessful training and inappropriate leadership show that the fear level might be increasing under these circumstances. The downward slopes of the other curves correlate positively with the XO's statements during the interviews.

The involvement of the XO in the development of the graph was remarkable. The drawing was just meant to support my summary of the previous discussion. I was surprised when he stood up and actively took a part in the advancement of my rough draft. He made valuable comments and we continued the interview in front of the blackboard. It was an exciting experience to see how an interview partner changed from a basically passive and responsive to a highly active mode.

#### **M. SIXTH INTERVIEW: THIRD INTERVIEW WITH CO**

When I arrived at the company for our third interview, the CO was giving a safety briefing. I was advised that it would take a few more minutes until he would be available. When we

met in the company's conference room about 10 minutes later, he seemed to be stressed. It took some more minutes to get him off his daily routine and adjusted to the new situation. He relaxed slowly while we were talking about private issues. He told me that the pressure had been high during the past two weeks and he would like to have some time off to reenergize.

He started talking about a new attitude towards risk he had developed since our first interview ("...it opened my eyes to some new risks."). The company had some cases of sexual harassment. It was the first time that he had to investigate an issue like this in depth. He discovered the sensibility of the subject as well as a dangerous potential he was not aware of before. The Army regulations concerning sexual harassment had been drastically tightened over time. He was not totally aware of the change and admitted that some of his actions, under very rigid interpretation, could have been construed as harassment. His actions had never been perceived by anybody to be wrong. Moreover, he viewed his past behavior as in tune with existing regulations and, more importantly, the value system. He mentioned the example where he was talking with pregnant female soldiers. His wife recently had given birth to a baby and so he was familiar with the biological and medical circumstances. He was uncertain whether his comments during the conversation with the soldiers could be construed as harassment. His fear was that he probably "...had been at risk and not even known it.". With regard to

the findings he reviewed his own attitude and behavior. He found that he hadn't done anything wrong. The point he wanted to make was, "...that something that I do and I perceive for being right can be perceived totally differently by others." As a consequence he developed a much more cautious behavior to avoid any impression of improper conduct. Furthermore, he held a meeting and talked to his entire staff. He asked everybody to speak up if he or she felt any resentment of his action, so that the point could be clarified. From the leadership perspective this was as a very open, risky, but responsible approach. The session satisfied all concerns and no questions were left unanswered. This specific action is in harmony with Deming's point number eight "Drive out fear". The CO tried to establish an open, trustful, and communicative atmosphere in which everybody would feel comfortable speaking about his concerns. He himself opened the session by stating the problems and admitting his own degree of involvement. It was risky, because he made himself vulnerable at that moment. But it seems, that the trustworthy presentation achieved a positive effect. The people developed confidence, because he was honest with them, and thus used the opportunity to present their topics frankly. The outcome was an overall consensus and the elimination of suspicion.

In the same context he mentioned a fear that occurred when he reviewed previous actions in the light of new knowledge ("...the more I learn about the system...the more times I look

back...[I realize]...how stupid I was."). Some of his actions during the past couple of years had the potential to end his career had they been reviewed strictly with regard to the Army regulations. Due to lack of knowledge and experience at that time he was absolutely unaware that his performance was probably improper.

Then he mentioned that there is a fear about rumors. He described the story of another, higher ranked, officer. This officer "...befriended one of the lower enlisted soldiers in one of the company's, a female...and just gave her a few rides...". Both were single; nothing serious or improper happened; but people started talking. When the CO informed the other officer about the rumor, "...he felt like punched in the stomach...that his career was over, that he is going to get a poor efficiency rating...and it was all because of what people perceive.". Army regulations strictly forbid any relationships between superiors and subordinates within the same unit. "...this revealed to me how much the people in the senior command are walking in a mine field." "The Army today is a - one strike and you are out - system." "The more I learn the more I realize how many risks are out there."

A change in his behavior flows from this fear. For example, it was his previous attitude to finish jobs as quick as possible; if possible the same day. He did the best he could to bring the results as close as possible to 100% correctness and accuracy, but had some minor flaws in it.

Today, he uses all the suspension time available to research every issue thoroughly to improve his results even more. Decisions are now based on the maximum information he is able to gather given a certain time frame. Jobs are now handed in the very last day, no work is done quicker than required. This is a safety device he built in for himself, because today just one mistake can be the reason for dismissal (The point that personnel departments seem to wait for people to make a mistake to have a reason for early retirement, has already been discussed several times). Thus, since he realized how many hazards are out there and since the rules of the game have been tightened, he is less willing to take personal risks when administrative matters are concerned. He pointed out clearly that he would not pursue this attitude during combat. Nevertheless, the fact is, that fear can result in a less efficient performance. More information is collected than probably needed to make a good decision. Additionally, time is spent (if not wasted) which could be used more wisely for solving other (and probably more relevant or pressing) problems. The actions of the organization are perceived as intimidating and (1) forces the individual to focus primarily on his or her own safety and survival and (2) detracts attention and energy away from certain problem areas ("...if something is not time sensitive, I would take a lot more time to make sure that I am making the right decision.").

I asked his opinion regarding procedures and guidelines in the Army. My specific question was whether he felt comfortable with the regulations and whether he considered them appropriate for his tasks. His answer was a clear "I haven't found too many faults.". But he criticized "...how you are supposed to find about them from experience instead of being trained about them.". He had been to different schools during his career, but "...all those schools are focused on tactics.". He was missing a specific training program for company commanders to get this group prepared for the vast and diverse administrative work load they are facing in their daily military life. But usually (if at all) "...a company commander, may be, goes to a one or two day course and then, basically, learns the majority on the job.". The fear of not being trained sufficiently is a subcomponent of the fear of failure. This, in turn, is a subcomponent of the fear of getting a bad evaluation which, ultimately, leads to the fear of getting dismissed as a consequence of low rating scores. This is an example where fears can be displayed in a sequential relationship. Furthermore, we see that fear is often a very complex system and that different fears have bearings on each other. Just to take a look at the ultimate outcome (fear of getting fired) may not explain the complexity neither the basic underlying antecedents.

In the context of feeling he has not been trained sufficiently for the administrative functions he also

mentioned the heavy work load. The problems which flow from the work load are those of delegation and supervision. To authorize people to handle particular documents and oversee certain areas of responsibility involves risk. These personnel act in his name and, finally, forward papers to him which he has to sign. Under usual circumstances he would have time to review the papers to make sure they are correct before he signs them. But current circumstances are different. The work load is extremely high and cases may have big impact on the soldier's future life (medical problems, legal problems) likewise time constraints are a major determinant in many processes (the soldiers contracts are going to be terminated). "When I am extremely busy, I take the risk of not fully reading the paper and I sign it. And this is an example of where it is a land mine that can be sitting on your desk. An you don't even know it. You sign it and one or two month later, you are relieved or you are out...because you signed a document that was improper.". This is a condition which stimulates fear in him. He realized that he has to live with this fear, because he has no influence on the conditions.

The CO made the following statement: "I like to consider uncertainty as a challenge not as a handicap." What this uncertainty really means is the freedom he enjoys as CO of this company. As a contrast, he described a company he was heading recently where everything was meticulously regimented. He did not enjoy that environment very much. Now his superior



gives him just broad guidelines and expects appropriate actions. The CO has large latitude to choose his courses of action in order to attain the goals. He viewed that as a pleasant climate and worked hard to build a trustful relationship with his superiors. It seemed that he was successful. Then he used the same approach to guide his company. The XO mentioned that he received only broad guidelines from the CO and he enjoyed it also. This atmosphere enhances positive work attitudes and improves motivation. This leadership style may be the reason why the XO reported that his relationship with the CO was not a basis for fear.

He underscored the same point by stating that he prefers a balance between risk (associated with fear) and reward (associated with freedom of choice, latitude in decision making, broad goals rather than regimented orders, etc.).

Next the CO talked about peer pressure and how fear can arise from it ("...there is pressure on subordinate to conform."). He began with the statement, that peer pressure is not a problem for himself. His competitive attitude and his strong self-confidence allow him to pursue his own goals and live his own character without heavy interferences with other group members. But other people are less stable and lack his degree of self-assurance and self-awareness. They try to assimilate to group norms and standards to an unhealthy extent. He mentioned that some individuals chose their church, sport activities and private orientation with regard to the

preferences of their superiors ("...there is pressure by superior officers on subordinates to conform to their lifestyle."). He presumed that the explanation could be twofold: First, it could be the fear of not being accepted as a full group member. This may preclude the individual from information sources or may result in the denial of group benefits. The second reason seemed to be a well-known old story. To pursue own goals or to display non-conformity raises the fear that this behavior might have negative bearings on the next evaluation or Fitrep. Thus, these individuals trade off their personality for the chance to influence their ratings positively. The CO made clear that he was displaying a very individually-oriented life style. Furthermore, he kept his personal activities and did not adjust them to the preferences of anybody. Surprisingly, he experienced positive reactions from his superiors, but sometimes contemptuous inquiries from his peers. Finally, he mentioned that peer pressure had been only moderate and did not affect him. I will close this paragraph with another quotation which shows what effects the fear of nonconformity may generate: "...and there are many officers, I would say 60% or more of the officers in the Army, who believe, if you are not married and entirely focused on your job, then you are somewhat less than a good officer. And that is probably a byproduct of the severe competition."

He considered the next point a concern or a doubt rather than an explicit fear. The issue relates to communication. He expressed concern about whether he was communicating appropriately with his troops. The CO discovered recently that it was increasingly harder for him to communicate with his subordinates effectively. Many messages were subject to interpretation. The desired or intended outcome was not achieved in all cases. He found out that the distortion of his original messages was related to his wording. The subordinates were less and less capable of reading and understanding his orders and transforming them into correct and unequivocal actions. He recognized that he had shifted to a terminology which correlated with his level of education ("...I had spent a lot of time away from the soldiers [in training programs and staff positions]. And now I'm coming back to them..."). Over time his level increased and the distance to his subordinates increased. It became increasingly difficult to fully understand his expressions. When he became aware of the problem he immediately tried to adjust his level downwards but sometimes it remains a problem ("...and I can't think of the words that will make them understand."). He knew that an effective leader needs to communicate effectively and is thus concerned to find the appropriate level.

## N. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

During the interview with the CO I found that the interview process itself had an impact on him. He mentioned the first time that he had become more reflective on himself and watched his environment more critical since then. He became aware of new facets of his life which he didn't recognize before. Furthermore, I got the impression that he had discussed several topics with the XO. The CO mentioned that he had started to involve the XO more in the decision making process. Additionally, he had delegated more work to him. Partially, this change may be attributable to the Hawthorne effect. Furthermore, it may influence my research in the way that both candidates have been improving their relationship over time. Thus, it may be much harder during the fourth set of interviews to detect specific fears that are rooted in their relationship. Both mentioned already that they did not experience any major problems with regard to their relationship and that they respect each other. With probable further improvements they may have ironed out even more obstacles and are now moving towards a more harmonious relationship.

The XO elaborated on the impossibility of eliminating fear. He emphasized that, in his view, a minimum level of fear always exists. Fear does not drop below the life saving level (I named it fear of death line in Figure 5) under regular conditions. Only under unique circumstances may individuals be

driven to act in a much more dangerous way than usual. For example, these may be a high level of anxiety, love for somebody who is in danger and needs help, or some life threatening danger for the individual himself. In those cases people may forgo their own safety and take high risks to provide help for others. Examples for those driving forces are listed in Figure 5.

During this interviews I recognized a trend towards more samples for the circle C (fear originated in the situation). The majority of findings during the previous interviews were fears attributable to the circles A and B, which represent the fears inherent in the individuals. One possible reason could be that the spectrum in the first two sets of interviews included the private or civilian portion of the life, whereas during the third set of interviews the officers were restricted to the military environment. Using my model, there seems to be evidence that personal fears are more related to the private spectrum of life than to the work environment. On the other hand, fear originated in the situation seems to be more attributable to the work place. But there is one point that must be taken into consideration. The interviewees mentioned that their training and education provided for either fear control and management mechanisms or they were told that it is improper for an officer to show fear at all. Under these premises it is amazing how many fears they actually admitted. Moreover, both officers showed no

inhibition to use the word fear. Another explanation could relate to the length of the interview process. We went through several weeks of intense discussions and the only topic was fear. It could be that they became accustomed to the issue and conceded to the theme as a natural phenomenon of life. I will try to investigate this point in more detail during the last interview.

The CO explained in detail the fear that previous mistakes may hunt him still today (fear is attributable to circle A). In the past he judged most of his behavior proper and acceptable. Today, with greater knowledge and experience his view about his own actions changed. Based on accumulated information he takes on a more critical stance towards his previous performance.

In this context he mentioned that the typical Army training attitude is apt to inspire some fear (can be assigned to circle C). Only a limited variety of basic skills, abilities and knowledge is provided by training programs. It is assumed that the job incumbent continues the learning process to improve his performance. But, at the same time, an error free performance is expected from every incumbent. This discrepancy seems to leave a lot of individuals with a fear of failure, which is high at the beginning of their tenure and which decreases over time, given that learning on the job takes place.

Another fear that is originated in the situation (circle C) is the fear that rumors, true or not, may have a negative impact on the career. The fearful aspect is that the individual usually is unaware of the gossiping and thus, is not in a position to intervene. The Army seems to be a society governed by strict rules and a distinct culture (the way we do things here), which cover essentially each facet of military and private life. Especially younger and unexperienced soldiers can fall victim to rumors, if their behavior is not in strict compliance with written or unwritten Army regulations. Moreover, if people try to pursue their own personality or life style, they are likely to be targeted by their superiors. Along those lines is the fear of peer pressure. The Army culture is often strictly enforced. Conformity is demanded and noncompliance tolerated only marginally. Each group has its own mechanisms and techniques to enforce standards. They may be official or unofficial. In one example, the CO described an officer, who was dismissed because he lived with a woman without being married to her. The dismissal was not accomplished directly, because no Army paragraph is applicable to this situation. But due to the moral standards in that particular group, the officer was excluded from getting a CO assignment. This limited his career and finally lead to his dismissal. Barring is a method available to field grade officers in certain positions (e.g. battalion commander).

A finding that could be assigned to area I is the CO's concern about effective communication with subordinates. I did not include it in the list of fears, because the CO stated clearly, that it was a concern, but, by no means, a fear. He became aware of increased difficulties in the communication when subordinates requested more and more detailed explanations after orders had been issued. They simply did not understand what he was trying to tell them. The problem was the level of language the CO had acquired over time due to various training programs and occupied staff positions. He had changed his communication style away from the troops. Even though he realized the problem and took actions to adjust his style appropriately, he was not entirely sure about his success. The fear comes in, because he exactly knows that faulty communication may have disastrous consequences. This is especially true in light of the vast amount of his soldier's legal and medical problems that the company had to deal with. And again, finally the consequences may have negative bearing on his own evaluation.

The XO mentioned several fears that are originated in particular situations (circle C). A remarkable stance is his fear of getting an incompetent or tyrannic CO (he made clear that this is a hypothetical thought and not true for the current CO). He described a variety of scenarios that would inspire fear in him. First, a tyrannic CO would affect the company's culture, climate, and atmosphere negatively. People



would not feel happy and comfortable, work satisfaction would decrease. This stress would automatically lead to the second concern, the decrease of the company's effectiveness. Third, an unexperienced CO would not be able to provide the company with appropriate guidance. The XO was used to have great latitude in his work field and favored COs who led through broad goals rather than meticulous orders. Finally, the XO was afraid that an incompetent CO might not be capable of overseeing military operations correctly. This could lead to more casualties than necessary. The XO seemed to be an officer with great respect for the lives of his subordinate, particularly in combat. He viewed the responsibility for his men as one of the top priorities of his duties. Beyond the point, that the company's effectiveness is diminished, or that the number of casualties in combat might increase, the XO was afraid that the consequences initiated by an unacceptable CO could have negative effects on his own evaluation. If the CO could not lead the company effectively and the overall performance would decrease significantly, the XO presumed that everybody would be affected through negative ratings.

A remarkable fear is stimulated by the vicious circle that starts with the lack of trust and confidence of the superior in his subordinates. As a consequence the subordinate loses his self confidence. Without the mental support from the boss a factor of high uncertainty is added to the work environment. The question is why the boss does withdraw his trust? The

subordinate, if not an outstanding performer with strong self assurance, may doubt his own abilities. The performance may decrease what, in turn, may be viewed as the forecasted and expected outcome. This can be viewed from the superior as the evidence that his lack of trust is justified in retrospect. The XO's fear is that this circle, once established, is very hard to break. The way back to normal levels of mutual trust and confidence is arduous.

The following fear is related to area III. This case demonstrates the difficulty of assigning fears appropriately. The assignment may change when the interview partner provides new material or describes a subject differently. In this case the XO described a fear from a different perspective. In the second interview he mentioned the fear of getting evaluated. Last time, I assigned this fear to circle B. In the third interview the XO came back to that point and elaborated on it. He described his pattern of behavior that arises from this fear and the underlying assumptions. He presumed that every CO has certain expectations of his XO. The XO is eager to reveal these expectations and subsequently to adjust his behavior accordingly. He considered himself flexible and adaptable to a high degree. The fit between the CO's expectations and his behavior should then ensure positive ratings. The interesting aspect of this assimilation process is the possible loss of personality. The contradiction that struck me was that the XO displayed quite honorable characteristics (and I still believe

he is honorable) and at the same time admitted that he would adapt his behavior for good evaluations. We could not clarify this point sufficiently, because the degree of adaptation could not be explained clearly. I see the problem that this is a very subjective matter and the degrees of change are not easily described. So it will remain an unsolved problem.

#### O. THIRD ITERATION OF THE MODEL

My intention during the final set of interviews is to focus the attention on the relationship of the superior and the subordinate. The previous sessions had a broader scope and allowed for a more widespread exploration of different types of fear. To keep the interviewees focused I will use a more structured approach for the interview. During the previous interviews I provided only rough guidelines and allowed the officers to choose any fear related topic they wanted to address. This time a more rigid set of question will serve the purpose to examine the unique fears that may exist between the CO and his XO.

The third interviews provided different insight what fears exist. Evidence was found for different circle and areas. For the first time, I experienced problems in assigning a fear to a certain area or circle. But the model proved flexible enough to capture both types of fear. Still no evidence was found for the area IV. I will use the model for the fourth set of interviews without changes.

#### P. FOURTH TYPE OF THE FEAR MODEL

This set of interviews is the heart piece of the entire process. The previous interviews served the purpose to set the stage for these sessions. My intention is now to confront the officers with specific questions regarding their relationship from a leadership perspective. Assuming that it is hard to find an ideal relationship (without any problems), I will attempt to detect areas where deficiencies, faults, misunderstanding, misinterpretation, different perceptions, inappropriate leadership practice, offenses, or any other imperfection may have created fear. From the preceding interviews I already obtained the impression that it will be difficult to detect those weaknesses, because the relationship between the two officers seems to be extraordinarily positive. Both of them stated several times very clearly that their combined performance, and thus all their actions or non actions, has to be beneficial and constructive for the company (and finally for the Army) in the first place. They emphasized over and over again their commitment for their country, their dedication for the Army, and their determination to fulfill all obligations of their oaths. I haven't found any contradiction in the various statements and so we can assume that these ethical values are indeed the integral essence of their characters.

To cover a variety of topics, to touch on many different aspects of their daily military life, and to have a flexible

instrument available which would allow me to switch subjects quickly, I decided on the structured interview as the appropriate research technique.

**Q. SEVENTH INTERVIEW: FOURTH INTERVIEW WITH XO**

This interview was scheduled in the late afternoon and the XO seemed to be exhausted from a long work day. We took a couple of minutes to relax and talked about private topics before we got into the subject.

Question: Do you recall a negative situation that you don't want to happen again? Answer: His answer was a very quick and distinct no. He explained his view on situations in general as follows. "...in any situation, whether it is good or bad, there is something to be learned from it."

Question: Do you have a clear job description? Answer: "No. There is nothing published...XO is a very fluid position. Basically, what you are doing is to support your commander...". Surprisingly for me he added: "...the CO allowed a very large degree of flexibility...and let me write my own job description.". He appreciated this degree of latitude and gave himself a fairly extensive job description. In hindsight, he realized, it worked out well. He never attempted to abuse the freedom given to him, because "...with the dynamics between the two of us..." it was clear that everybody was working with high dedication towards a common

goal. This goal was symbolized by efficient and error free output for the entire company.

Question: Are the time frames for task accomplishment realistically? Answer: He expressed concern, that the higher commands often attach rigid time constraints on tasks. The lower echelons often face the problem of insufficient time to prepare the decision carefully. But this does not stimulate fear in him, it rather makes him angry about the rigidity of his higher superiors. In the company he has adequate time and is usually "...ahead of the ball game."

Question: How is delegation of tasks handled in the company? Answer: "He has never really delegated much to me. I made up my own job description and I put myself into the matters of the company." It seemed to me that the triumvirate (CO, XO, First Sergeant) consisted of three very strong characters. All three had seemingly clear visions about their specific tasks. Surprisingly, without detailed introduction by the CO. "We keep each other aware of what is happening, but we don't tell each other necessarily what to do." The system relies heavily on the competence of each single player. Integrating mechanisms exist in form of one scheduled meeting per week ("...where we discuss problems at hand...") and a continuous information flow between this three key people on a fairly informal basis (oral or written communication). The XO's opinion about the necessity of information flow is vividly depicted in the following statement: "The last thing

you want is to have your commander be asked some questions by somebody down in the battalion and he is like: I don't know".

The XO views the CO as facilitator and integrator who usually appears only on the scene in cases when (1) vital information has to be distributed, (2) introductions of new features have to be presented and discussed or (3) necessary corrections, announced by the top, have to be implemented. The XO felt comfortable with the methods the CO applied to keep everybody informed. This was not even a matter of concern.

Question: How are changes implemented in the company?

Answer: The XO focused on changes within the company. Whenever he or the First Sergeant feel that something has to be changed, they present their recommendations to the CO, explaining in detail their approach. Pros and cons are discussed and the CO will make the final decision, which is accepted by all parties. As long as the decision is based on logical arguments, no problem will arise. This is the experience of the XO in the current company. He mentioned, that he would have problems accepting decisions not based on facts or logic. This would be contrary to his working style and would stimulate dissatisfaction.

Question: Do you get the credit for your share of the company's work or does the CO book all the credit for himself?

Answer: The XO felt that he got the share of credit he deserved. "The CO is real good in making sure that I get the credit I deserve."

Question: Have you experienced a situation where you felt lonely or helpless? Answer: The XO described the recent case of a soldier who sexually harassed a subordinate. When the soldier had to leave the company the XO, as the senior rater, had not enough time to evaluate him (there were more reasons which the XO did not explain). He was not able to rate this person as would have liked (...the fitness report was not reflective of his true actions...). He felt kind of helpless, because he could do nothing about the fact that this soldier would get away with his behavior. Furthermore, he believed that this soldier would be a permanent danger for future subordinates.

Question: Have you ever been insulted by your CO? Have you ever felt that you were treated incorrectly? Answer: The XO mentioned that he never felt insulted by his current CO. This relationship is so open and trustful, that he could not conceive any offending action from the CO. But the XO recalled a situation where he felt his integrity and credibility questioned by the battalion commander. On his way to the battalion he had once given a female soldier, who had a foot surgery recently, a ride in his car. For him it was a matter of courtesy. He emphasized that he had done, and actually did several times, the same for male soldiers. This time he recognized that somebody in an office started a rumor, when he picked her up to give her a ride back to the company ("...somebody somewhere down in the office said that she had



called me by my first name. And that was totally untrue. Some insinuating comments...that probably something inappropriate was happening between her and me."). The dramatic escalation in this scenario happened when "...later that same day the battalion commander had gotten wind of this accusation." He approached the company commander and asked for clarification. Both commanders backed the XO and accepted that it was a proper action. But the XO felt insulted, because both investigated the case, following the rumor. The XO believed that they should have left "...the rumor right where it was.". In his opinion both commanders showed a lack of trust for him. They knew his performance, his value system, his beliefs, and, moreover, that was going to get married in the near future. He felt they should have paid more attention to his character and immediately considered the accusation as unfounded or irrelevant. The way the battalion commander handled the investigation, even if it was only a brief inquiry, seemed to the XO to show a lack of trust. He seemed very agitated when he presented this case to me. Everything that touches on his honor obviously seems to have a very big impact on him. Moreover, I got the impression that the matter was still not entirely settled for him ("...unless I have given them concrete proof of something or concrete indication of something I don't go and somebody something like that if I really trust him.", "...I felt my chain of command owed me more."). His reaction was absolutely in alignment with his

attitude. He went to see the battalion commander the same day and asked him: "Do I still have your confidence?" He was satisfied with the positive answer but was still angry when he learned that the battalion commander had asked all people in that specific office about the case. The XO was irritated because now everybody knew "...that he was checking up on me."

Question: Have you ever felt any barriers between you and your CO? Answer: He related barriers to trust and confidence. He viewed a basic level of those properties as a prerequisite for every hierarchical military relationship. He explained in detail that his respect would never drop below a certain level. The functional respect, for the rank or the position, would not vanish completely. Even if the incumbent would display unacceptable behavior or performance, the XO would never deny him the functional respect. On the other hand he clearly mentioned that "...respect, trust, confidence beyond that is earned." Barriers are virtually non existing in his relationship with the CO at Fort Ord. Their work atmosphere is filled with trust and confidence and thus, both respect each other on this basis.

Question: What type of power does the CO primarily use (legitimate, expert, reward, referent, coercive power)? Answer: "...all of them. There are times where you need to be the forceful, the coercive, there are times when you want to use the reward, ...there are times when you need to be authoritative...". "...a good leader will possess all of these

traits or be familiar with all of these leadership styles and...use the appropriate style in a given situation.". For the XO it is very important not to pursue just one style all the time. He judges his own and the leadership quality of his superiors by their capability to choose the appropriate style. He was convinced that the unbalanced employment of one style without regard to situational circumstances would be a definite indication for leadership in an unmatured stage. The XO explained next that he and the CO often have different leadership style. But these differences never lead to any crucial confrontation or problems in handling a situation. When differences occurred the XO usually held a harder and more vigorous position. He also considered the CO to be more concerned with extensive data gathering before making a decision than he was ("We both have different leadership styles...sometimes we have the same reaction to a given problem, other times we are different. And...when we are different, I am more hard...and he is more like a negotiator."). Each of them respects the others techniques and their goal is still to find the optimal solution to any upcoming issue. Their attitudes are very supportive and both seem to cultivate their behavior in this learning environment.

Question: What motivates you to do your job like you do it? Answer: "Commitment. General MacArthur said: duty, honor, country. He said that in a famous speech at Westpoint...". "The biggest thing that motivates me daily is serving the

country.". Furthermore, he was seeking a high degree of proficiency in each assignment and he wanted to be looked at as a successful leader. One of his goals was to be efficient in the execution of his mission and so "...to assist our government in the role of a military officer.". He seemed to be highly motivated and I could not detect any demotivating factors in his military life. He had a pragmatic approach towards problems; they were generally assumed to be challenging rather than demotivating or frustrating.

Last, I asked him to make a summarizing statement about the interview process. He stated that the topic was interesting for him. The discussion had made him think more seriously about an issue that he took for granted. He also learned that fear had more facets than he had known before. Finally, he emphasized once more his opinion, that fear is something that should never get control over the individual. Everybody should recognize fear and ultimately learn how to control it.

**R. EIGHTH INTERVIEW: FOURTH INTERVIEW WITH CO**

Question: What is your leadership philosophy? Answer: He started with a twofold explanation: First, he made clear, that "The best way to lead a company is to set an example." He wanted to demonstrate to his subordinates the appropriate behavior. His actions were meant to be the standards and the focal point of orientation for his soldiers. Second, he

cautioned, that it is also important to be aware of how the subordinates perceive those examples. In his view, any example is of little value in the leadership process, if there exists a noticeable discrepancy between the superiors intended, and actually shown, behavior and the perception of this behavior by the subordinates. To be effective, the superior must detect and eliminate those differences.

His next point was that he viewed a respectful distance essential in a military hierarchy. He was very strict at this point and the quotations underscore his stance: "I don't allow anybody in the company to use first names, even when they are of equal level...When people approach me and want to become my friend, I don't allow that to happen. Not inside the company." His reason was that it was crucial for him to maintain the neutral position of an unbiased evaluator. Nobody should get a chance to take any advantage of a closer relationship with him. His goal was to avoid even the slightest impression of favoritism. It was much easier for him to lead with some distance. None of his actions, whether rewarding or punishing people, were ever subject to widespread dispute. Thus, he easily avoided the problem of being perceived biased by his subordinates.

To be accepted as a "...no nonsense person..." is another fundamental aspect of his leadership theory. He placed emphasis on specific details and procedures which he viewed important and was lax on others which he viewed peripheral.

His intention was to increase the soldiers capabilities to distinguish between significant and less important elements. Furthermore, he wanted all soldiers to know exactly where he put his main emphasis, so that they could pay close attention to these points. He gave the following examples: He did not want the troops being called to attention when he arrived at the company if the actual work would be interrupted. On the other hand, there were a lot Army regulations and procedures which had to be followed strictly to ensure correct and effective performance. He expected everybody to adhere to those standards and comply with those rules. He was very strict in enforcing those particular regulations and the subordinates seemed to be aware of his attitude ("They have to know that, if they violate the rules, you will enforce the rules.").

Next he talked about his way to issue orders: "...I allow them the maximum freedom of maneuver to accomplish their job. I don't tell anybody in this company how to do things. I tell them what results I want. And this is very important, I think, for me being perceived as a good leader." He stressed that he avoided micromanaging, because it decreases effectiveness and has a negative impact on the pride of the subordinates. He believed that the leader gains more respect by effectively utilizing the available resources towards the articulated goals. Objectives have to be clearly and exhaustively described to allow subordinate to chose appropriate actions to

achieve them ("I usually use a lot of words to describe the result...This is what I want the product to look like."). To maintain some control over crucial processes and to provide guidance and help, he asked for submission of rough drafts for selected projects. The ideas were discussed, necessary corrections made and explained, so that the subordinate was in a position to continue the work intelligently. These dialogues fostered the relationship between him and his soldiers and made sure that both sides were at the same level of information and understanding about the project. It was interesting to see how he differentiated between tasks which he would pay more attention to and others. Everything that stayed within the company, where he was the approving authority, was of less concern to him. In this cases he allowed people more leeway in accomplishing their tasks. Everything that came explicitly from his boss or that would leave the company, he kept an eye on to make sure that the appropriate product was submitted. This behavior seemed to be consistent with the before-mentioned fear of failure. In an earlier interview he admitted his fear, that every mistake, which would be recognized by his superiors, could have a negative effect on his evaluation. Thus, his behavior seemed partially be based on his perception of good leadership style and partially on his fear of failure. It is not possible at this point to distinguish what was the major driving force.

Surprisingly, he admitted freely that he viewed fear as an appropriate management tool. To illustrate his opinion, he started out with the description of a pattern he used frequently. If an enlisted soldier did not perform to standard, he had the First Sergeant come to his office and then he called the enlisted person in. Next he would explain the failure to the soldier: "...you failed to provide me with what I wanted. Let me tell you one more time what I want...". He talked "...in a matter of fact way, never raising my voice..." and dismissed him. "The soldier will be under immense pressure, because he knows that his real boss is right there. He is going to know what will happen later...". The First Sergeant, as the first rater for all enlisted personnel, would thus be made aware of the mistake. The CO had discovered earlier, that the First Sergeant used to call these soldiers into his office shortly after the CO had dismissed them. He would then use very harsh words to demand a higher level of performance. Furthermore, he would also explain clearly the possible consequences for the soldier. The CO purposely applied this double confrontation method. His intention was, to demonstrate the soldier the significance of his misbehavior. To get the soldier's full attention, he deliberately puts him in a fearful situation. He described a different scenario, where he informed a senior enlisted soldier about failures. Even though he first explained the mistakes objectively, he subsequently resorted to explanations



which were apt to stimulate fear: "...if I was going to give you your evaluation today...this is how I would rate you...this is what your points would be and you would not get promoted today.". He believed, that this was a good and successful method to educate subordinates. I asked him, if could think of any other technique, one without fear, to achieve the same results. He was convinced, that his method was appropriate in certain cases and he saw no need to apply any other. If a soldier would fail to improve performance, the CO would move on and use a written counseling statement, which lists all the misconduct, as the next step. This statement would go to the soldier's file and could have significant impact on his career. The CO mentioned, that he used this statement regardless of the rank of the soldier. He was very strict in applying these techniques which made him highly predictable for his subordinates. On the other hand, his strictness was intended, and actually seemed, to stimulate fear in the soldiers. I felt, he created an atmosphere where a mixture of compliance and loyalty were the driving forces for performance.

"I think it is important, that I never show anxiety, weakness, stress, anger. It is very important, I think, to my position, that I maintain an even keel." He mentioned, that he preferred a very calm and factual appearance when dealing with his subordinates ("...I am not good in yelling at people..."). This is consistent with my own observations. His interaction

with company personnel was polite and factual and he was patient in explaining problems. The reason behind this behavior was his belief, that he had to demonstrate, that he was always in control of himself, calm but also correct, strict, demanding, and enforcing. Partially, this was already part of his character. He added the rest to complete the image, he thought would match the expectations of his soldiers best. He was also convinced that this was the most suitable way for him to act as a CO.

Question: Do you evoke fear to make people comply? Answer:  
"We use that a lot with the legal cases. The chapter cases [discharge], the court-martials, the rapists, the DUI [driving under influence] cases, and the drug users. We use fear a lot and in a few cases I have raised my voice and slammed my hands on my desk.", "...they have already screwed up their lives and screwed up their careers to a point, they can't be damaged any more. You can no longer appeal to their fear of failure. They already are a failure...it's a fine line between threat and instilling fear to get their attention.". He told me, how he handled a soldier who had attempted to strangle his wife. This soldier was very inattentive to him when they started the investigation. To get the persons attention, the CO told him "...you know as well as I know what I can do and what I can't do. But let me remind you of a couple of things you might not know what I can do...". The CO would list actions available to him to restrict the freedom of the soldier dramatically in

order to discipline him. So far, this was within the usual procedure of illustrating to the person the variety of applicable and possible actions. But in addition, the CO referred to some details regarding another investigation. He assumed, the soldier would not expect, that he had this information. This comment did not fail to generate the desired result. The soldier was shocked and fearful. His attention went up and he was cooperative. The CO believed that it is sometimes necessary and useful to stimulate fear by painting dramatic pictures. To show people the maximum penalty they may get like discharge with no medical or retirement benefits, seemed to be an appropriate instrument for him to get people's attention or "...to upset their self confidence...". Without hesitation he applied this technique especially to people who are impudent, unruly, or rebellious ("I have used fear before to gain attention. Also to make people remember things."). With regard to his last quotation, he mentioned the following example. He chose a very dramatic approach to make the routinely administered safety briefing more interesting and to improve people's memory and retention. He created a letter, which he read to the company during a formation. The letter described the story of a soldier (married with a two year old daughter) who was driving under alcohol and caused an accident. He himself and two teenagers were killed. The parents of the teenagers were sending this letter to the company commander, telling him that they were suing the widow

of this soldier. The crucial point was, that the soldier had not only caused three fatalities, but that he also ruined his family, because of the pending lawsuit. The CO's intention was to stimulate concern in his soldiers for (1) the people who had been killed, (2) the daughter who lost her father, (3) the widow who lost her husband, (4) the other family who lost their kids, and (5) the family who had to suffer from the pending lawsuit. He created what he called a worst case scenario, to stimulate a vivid and long lasting memory. After the CO had read the letter to the company, he told them it was a fake and what his intentions were ("This is all a lie. I just made this letter and it is fake. But I could just as easily change the names on this. The names could be yours."). Then he left the formation before anybody was able to comment on this action. The soldiers were very angry and upset that day, because they felt fooled, but the story was alive for a long time. The fear of provoking a similar situation kept the discussion going. The CO used a negative stimulus in an attempt to facilitate learning. It would be interesting to check with the soldiers, to what extent he was successful and how they perceived his action.

Question: Have you ever used fear to guide the XO or the First Sergeant? Answer: "Yes. Not the First Sergeant. It's hard to rattle his cage.". He admitted to have used fear in a specific case with the XO. The incident was identical to the one the XO had reported before. The XO had given a female

soldier, who had a surgery, a ride to the battalion and back to the company. This had lead to some rumor about improper conduct. The rumor created the impression that the XO might have a relationship with a subordinate. The CO reported that the battalion commander approached him with the order to investigate this issue. He called the XO into his office and "...without any warning..." confronted him with the problem. Even though he spoke with a moderate voice and just stated the facts, the XO was shocked. And this was the CO's intention. The XO quickly realized that his senior rater, the battalion commander, had started an informal investigation. He could easily imagine the possible link to his next evaluation and thus was getting afraid. After this harsh introduction, the CO spent nearly an hour "...explaining to him that even though his actions were innocent people perceived otherwise.". He used fear to underscore the importance of the issue and to demonstrate to the XO the various consequences of his behavior. He also tried to make him think about behavioral changes so that he would fit better this specific military mould and thus, would be not in danger any more. I asked the CO, if he could think of a different method to communicate this issue to the XO. He replied, that he considered his way appropriate and effective. He was convinced that the use of fear under certain conditions is justifiable ("...the reason why I used fear for that is because .. he did not realize that people's perceptions sometimes can have a larger impact on

your career and your person than...What the implied threat was, is, that if the senior rater is asking questions about you and this female, he is upset with you. And he is going to rate you accordingly...I wanted to stimulate more and that is why I put the little threat in there. And it was not my threat. It was the threat to his professionalism and his career...All of a sudden his self-esteem and his competence is at stake. It really get's his attention when you do that."). An important factor, to explain the CO's positive attitude towards the use of fear as an educational element may be, that he was educated the same way. He reported a situation where he was a young Lieutenant and "...made some dumb mistakes...". His CO then used the same technique to make him aware of mistakes and consequences. Moreover, "...he did not speak to me for a week...". Thus, the use of fear was experienced by him intensively and had the blessing of his superiors. The method was considered appropriate, and today he is just applying those methods he learned over time. He never had the feeling of doing something wrong.

Question: Do you think, is it possible to eliminate fear completely from the work place and use a leadership style without any element of fear? Answer: "It's contrary to military discipline, I think.", "...I don't have the time...and I don't think it is appropriate.", "...I don't lead through coercion and I don't lead through mentoring either...it varies with the situation.", "...I don't think a

leader could be an effective leader, if he did not use some sort of negative reinforcement along with the positive.". In the military, the word counseling is used for a negative written statement that goes to the soldier's file. We found, that the word mentoring is a more appropriate description to characterize a guiding and supporting leadership style. It is interesting to see, that the time element is of importance for the CO. A leadership style that goes towards coaching was considered too time consuming. He had so many duties and was so under pressure that he did not have time available for this type of leadership. He also believed that negative reinforcement should be a constant element in the military leadership process. He combined discipline automatically with some type of punishment. It would be interesting to see, whether this attitude is limited to him or if it is a general trend in the Army. Furthermore, one could hypothesize, that the element of fear is taught in Army schools, and thus considered appropriate or even necessary for military leaders.

Question: If you realize that your subordinates are afraid of you, how would you respond? Answer: He mentioned that he would try to defuse the fear, if their behavior would be counterproductive. He described the situation where he got the impression that the XO was afraid of him. He viewed the XO's position crucial to the company's success and immediately approached the XO. He explained to him his view of an effective XO and added: "...to me the XO is more than the

administrator of the company. He is another set of eyes. A set of eyes that I need to look at me and my job performance...At any point in time you may pick up or perceive from subordinates or however, that I'm doing something wrong, it is your duty to come and tell me.", "I am not perfect. I want you to help me to succeed.". This explanations relaxed the XO to a certain degree and helped both persons to understand each other better. Most important for the CO was the fact that the XO was gaining more self confidence and established a permanent communication to him. In another scenario, the CO described a soldier who did not perform to standard and who caused problems. The CO was investigating this person about misconduct. As a reaction, this soldier avoided contact with him and thus eliminated a line of communication which the CO needed to do his job. "He was afraid of me to the point where he approached my wife when I wasn't here...and he asked her in a pleading tone, don't let your husband end my career." In this case the CO did not try to restore the communication, but chose a drastic action: he transferred the subordinate and solved the problem this way. In general, the CO would defuse fear, if it would be supportive for the company's performance. Otherwise, he would allow the fear to continue. I got the impression, he did not care about fear, as long as it would not interfere with the overall atmosphere in the company.

Question: What type of power do you use (legitimate, reward, referent, expert, coercive)? Answer: He preferred the



referent and the expert power. He favored leading by example to gain the respect of his subordinates. Those examples embraced the military and civilian life, so that a homogeneous picture of his character was displayed. He believed that frictions between military and civilian life, in terms of his basic characteristics, would be detected easily and could deteriorate the basis of respect. He did not use coercive power very often, because he considered himself "...not very good at that.". But on the other hand, he used the harsh leadership style of the First Sergeant purposely, to make up for his own deficiency ("...he is also good at yelling at people...so I use all his positive leadership traits to my advantage."). His comments seemed to be consistent with his earlier statements. I recognized him as a very quiet person with a low voice. He appeared to be patient and balanced every time I met him. In a smart approach, he used the First Sergeant as a complementary component to have all different powers available and play with them according to the situation. It seemed to be a nearly perfect role discrimination between them (I remember the same pattern from the companies I have served in). The First Sergeant is the tough and loud guy and the CO is the smart, quiet, and overlooking manager. Nevertheless, the CO is the one who finally enforces regulations strictly and has the ultimate power to affect the career of every soldier directly. The subordinates have a clear picture of these two superiors.

Moreover, they are made aware of the available instruments (regulations, rewards, punishments, etc) and can exactly anticipate reactions to certain events (e.g. outstanding performance will result in positive reward and negative performance will be punished). The element of fear exists in this scenario in terms of the fear of failure and the merciless enforcement of the consequences. The CO strongly believed that his open interaction and the ongoing confrontation of the subordinates with their achievements (good or bad) prevented him from being viewed as the bad, authoritarian guy, "...because then it becomes their fear of failure and not the fear of my authority and that I might give them a bad rating.". The soldiers would recognize, that "...I'm only voicing their failures.".

Question: How do you motivate the XO? Answer: "That goes back to our competition and the personal pride. If I really want to get his attention, I question his competence. I don't do it directly, I do it indirectly. If I really want him to show more performance, I compete with him." Both seemed to compete physically and on the mental level. The CO mentioned a situation where he wanted safety regulations posted in a way so that every soldier could see and read them easily. The current arrangement was considered inappropriate. He instructed the XO to improve the display of the papers. When the XO asked for the standards as a guideline for him, the CO replied; "Do you want me to do your job?". Two aspects of this

conversation are interesting to me. The first one is, that the CO really did not explain in detail, how somebody had to perform a job. He was consistent with his prior statements, by just asking for a result regardless of the way to achieve it. On the other hand, not to provide the standards (Standards were not explicitly distributed throughout the battalion. Each company set it's own standards.) challenged the XO to come up with a solution, which he thought would be a good company standard. The CO kept the XO in a permanent search for the appropriate standard, which required constant observation of the CO and paying close attention to the ongoing communication to find out what a good standard would be. The XO liked challenges and his solution to this problem resulted in a much higher standard than the CO had expected. From the interviews with the XO it was not clear to me whether such a challenge would contain any fear, which would serve as a driving force for his performance. He always emphasized that he viewed challenge as a positive stimulus. If that is true, the CO found a good way of leading this specific XO.

Question: Do you believe that fear can be eliminated from the work place ? Answer: "It shouldn' t be.". He gave an interesting explanation why he thought, fear should prevail in the work place. "...I align fear with competition. It's parallel. It's not quite the same. It's a stimulus...To me, taking all the fear away from work means, everybody is the same. I don't need to try, because nothing will happen to me

if I fail...To me, not everybody can succeed.". For the CO, fear is a motivator to increase performance. He explained that he doesn't have to apply fear intentionally. The permanent feedback, which the subordinates get from him, would allow them to assess their position on the rating scale continuously. The soldiers at the lower end would be motivated by the fear of failure and the associated fear of getting a bad rating to improve their performance. His earlier statement, that he views fear close to competition, may shed some light on his attitude. He did not seem to make a clear distinction between fear and competition. These two terms seemed to be intertwined or substitutable for him. This made it hard for me to tell clearly when he was actually talking about fear in the sense of my definition. Nevertheless, the interesting observation was that somebody used these two terms quasi synonymous.

In another statement, he related fear to the need hierarchy of Maslow. He used this hierarchy to explain his theory, that people in different levels of the pyramid feel different fears. Moreover, his action would instill different fears in them. To illustrate his thoughts, he gave two examples. A person on the top of the pyramid (self actualization) would, if threatened, feel the fear of losing status, rank, money, position in society, etc. A person on the lowest level is, in the eyes of the CO, already so way down and so desperate, that he would not be able to instill much

additional fear in them. Thus, the higher a person on the scale, the more sensitive he is to fear. The CO would chose different approaches to instill a fear, suitable for the particular person, to achieve performance improvements. He also made clear that he used fear only for 10% of his people ("...for ten percent of the soldiers you have to get into their face and say: I do not think you have been listening to the training we have been giving you. If you fail to qualify...you will conduct extra training for such and such number of days..."). He mentioned in another example how he used fear in a very matter-of-fact way: "Most of the negative I do, I do with the platoon sergeants. I tell them: You can't write. How do you expect to be promoted to Sergeant First Class, if you can't write?..It is definitely negative reinforcement. I embarrass them. I embarrass their professional pride and their competence." For the other 90% he used rewards and positive reinforcement of various kinds ("...you make me succeed, so you will succeed."). He could not imagine any other ways to get the 10% low performer to higher degrees of performance than applying some kind of fear.

Finally, the CO admitted another fear, his fear of looking bad in front of his First Sergeant. These persons are usually very experienced soldiers, much older than the COs, and selected for this assignment. The competence and knowledge is high and the CO was frightened to look dumb by asking foolish questions or showing lack of knowledge. Thus, every time, he

had to discuss a subject with his First Sergeant, he went to another sergeant first and talked to him about the issue. He discussed the matter in detail with this man and built up his own knowledge, so that he was prepared, when he went into the discussion with the First Sergeant.

#### S. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

One of the most striking findings was the extraordinary harmonious atmosphere between the two officers. Both emphasized repeatedly their positive relationship and deliberately offered a plenitude of evidence as documentation. None of the examples were contradictory, so we can assume that the statements were true and honest.

Some key elements for this unique situations can be found in their characters, attitudes, and preferences. Both share the commonality for exceptional interests. The CO likes snow boarding, mountain biking, and windsurfing whereas the XO's "...ultimate thing..." is frisbi. These sport activities are far beyond what would be considered appropriate or officer like in the Army. Both are not engaged in golf or tennis, activities with the highest degree of acceptance in the Army officer corps. Thus, both pursue their personal preferences and incur the risk of running counter to the stream. Till now their stance is very successful. This seem to be based on the favorable combination of their unusual personal interests and their successful military performance. Furthermore, both

display an extraordinary dedication for their country and their mission, seemingly two factors which are highly recognized by their superiors. This combination may stabilize and protect their niche within the organization and allow them to pursue their own way of doing business. Moreover, this generates a unifying continuum for their relationship. This two people share basic values and have thus a solid common ground to base their respectful relationship on.

Their mutual understanding and courteous interaction are the basis for their fruitful work. Private and personal congruence in fundamental areas does not conflict with military requirements or obligations. In an harmonious atmosphere like this we would not expect to find distinctive or strong fears. This is typically the situation where we would expect effectiveness and efficiency combined with high work satisfaction. With regard to Deming's point "Drive out fear" we can state, that his requirements have been realized to a high degree in this relationship.

#### **T. FINAL ITERATION OF THE FEAR MODEL**

The model proved through the interview sessions it's capability and flexibility to capture various manifestations of fear. For the final meeting I will keep the model unchanged. One intention will be to find evidence for area IV, the only area without any finding so far.

#### U. FINAL MEETING

This was the first time since the introductory meeting that I had both officers together in a meeting. My intentions were to give them feedback on our previous interview sessions and to engage into a discussion about leadership and fear. The feedback had to be kept in a more general style, because I wanted to maintain their integrity and not discuss sensitive information in front of each other. I anticipated a lively discussion, because both officers had strong characters and solid opinions. But I was also aware, that they probably would not argue too forcefully against each other, because of their superior-subordinate relationship. In particular, I expected that the XO would be very careful and respectful in debating with his CO. I hoped that the CO would make some statements to which the XO could respond.

The arrangement of the meeting was very difficult because both were preparing for the change of command. The CO was to leave in the middle of December and the XO would take over. Expectations and requirements from higher levels of the echelon increased dramatically during the last two weeks of November. Especially the CO was required to finish certain jobs like evaluations before he could leave. This hectic environment shaped the timing of our meeting and finally had an impact on the meeting itself. When I arrived at the company building both officers were very active and mentioned that it would take some time before we could start the discussion.



When we finally started, we were interrupted several times and one of the officers had to leave. I got the impression that both were willing to give me this last chance to gather data for my thesis, but on the other hand their thoughts were somewhere else. After 30 minutes people were crowding in front of the CO's office waiting for signatures or guidance. He had to leave and a few minutes later the XO had to leave also.

One interesting point was a sudden and not anticipated change in the attitude of the battalion commander (BC) ("...something is aggravating him..."). Since a couple of days he showed a different behavior and both officers were trying to find out what the possible reasons could be. They suspected that the reasons were related to the departure of the CO, but they were not sure. Currently they were in a stage of uncertainty, not knowing whether they were targeted directly or not. The CO gave a simple example for the new behavior of the BC. The CO submitted on a constant basis a preselected volume of information to the BC. In the past, the BC was pleased with the amount, the accuracy, and the value of those data. Suddenly, the same process made him angry and the CO was told: "Get out of my office. Don't waste my time.". The CO offered a possible explanation: "He [the BC] finally came to realize that I'm leaving. And so, he is being hard on me to get all the business finished before I leave. And he is being hard on him [the XO], so he can establish a different kind of relationship with the XO, because he is going to be the

commander when I leave." The CO mentioned, that every time a commander changes, there is a break in the relationship between the new CO and the BC. This has to be reestablished, which includes the fact that "...you have to jockey for position, figure out how each other thinks, and it's different.". Another factor which may account for the BC's different attitude is that the company was to be closed down two month later. The XO would be the final CO and he would be in office for only two month. The mission of this company, to assist soldiers in their transition from the military to the civilian environment, was nearly completed. The major force reduction programs at Fort Ord were basically completed and the number of soldiers left was too small to justify the existence of the company any longer. I got the impression that the BC lost the interest in this company, because with the departure of the CO, most of the work was finished. The XO's duty seemed to be more focused on the termination of the company.

The perception of the officers is another example, how they dealt with uncertainty. It didn't seem to create fear. They were just worried what was going on, and they were interested to identify the underlying reasons. I got the impression that they strove for clarification to get rid of an unnerving uncertainty rather than to overcome a fear. They did not use the word fear at all in their description of the

situation. They just mentioned that they were unsure about the circumstances.

Another point worth mentioning is that the relationship between CO and XO didn't seem to be effected negatively by these events. Both radiated a high level of agreement over the phenomenon and felt targeted commonly. They viewed it as a common problem and were searching collectively for explanations.

Next I presented briefly Deming's TQM philosophy, including his 14 points. I solicited their comments on point number eight "Drive out fear". The XO mentioned that he had experienced company climates where the CO put emphasis on "...giving it [the job] your best shot...". He was aware that the fear of failure could paralyze people and decrease performance substantially. Even though he was never exposed to TQL theories before, his thoughts were along the same lines with TQM.

The CO made an interesting comment about using fear in leadership. "You use fear sometimes to motivate the knucklehead type soldiers who don't understand anything else.". He preferred the positive motivation to make soldiers perform well, but, if necessary, he was willing to use fear to convince people to accomplish a task in a certain way. He did not perceive the use of fear as something negative. In his view it was one available tool for him as a leader. He also mentioned that it was one he used least frequently.

I asked the XO whether he viewed fear as a useful management tool. "Depends on the people you are dealing with. Some people are intelligent and you don't need that...It's an option in any situation...The most experienced leader know how to employ that.". He mentioned three factors which characterize the use of fear: (1) the situation, (2) the person/group you are dealing with, and (3) the leader and his leadership abilities. The XO stated, that, depending on a single factor or any combination of them, the use of fear would be legitimate. He also made clear that he preferred to start with a trust building leadership style. In his view, a person's abilities should be explored and tested first, and the performance measured against those abilities. If the performance was below the person's capabilities or below any basic standard, he would use some type of escalating procedure to motivate the individual. This procedure would include fear or threat, if necessary. The dominant driving force behind his and the CO's thoughts was the accomplishment of their mission. I got the impression that accomplishment has a very high priority and the various tools (positive or negative motivator) were employed consequently to achieve the goals. When the aforementioned factors were positive, positive motivator would be used. When they were unfavorable, negative motivator including fear and threat were used. Both seemed to have very pragmatic attitudes towards leading their units. On the other hand, three other factors seemed to influence their

attitudes. First, the time pressure and the work load for them was apparently very high, which did not allow for very sophisticated leadership practices. Second, the turnover in their company was extremely high. This was part of their mission and not avoidable. But it limited the development of personal relationships and forced the superiors to employ rigid leadership methods sometimes to accomplish their mission. Third, they had to deal with soldiers who were bound to leave the Army. The interest and the willingness of those people to comply with orders in a highly motivated fashion was limited. Thus, the uniqueness of this situation contributed to the positive attitude of the two officers towards the employment of fear as a leadership tool. Nevertheless, their basic tendency was already favoring fear under certain conditions.

The XO mentioned finally, that he viewed a flexible leadership style the most effective. This style would include the entire spectrum of positive and negative reinforcements which would be chosen by the leader in accordance with the situation and the people he had to deal with. ("...there are soldiers who need very little guidance, they just do the right things, they do their jobs...Other guys, you have to give them painstaking details, because they are stupid or they don't care. A leader who uses one set of leadership principles all the time is going to find himself in trouble...If you have a leader who is flexible, who can see the techniques that must

be used with each of the people under his command, than he will be much more successful").

## VII. DATA ANALYSIS

### A. OBSERVED PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERVIEWEES

For the interpretation and a better understanding of the presented material, it is helpful to have some information available about the personalities of the two officers. They shared many traits, habits, attitudes, and behaviors, but there were also some remarkable differences. They had the following characteristics in common:

- Open and honest in the presentation of the data.
- Highly specialized infantry officers with Ranger qualification.
- Very knowledgeable about their current jobs.
- Eloquent in discussions and monologues.
- Extremely focused and concentrated during the interviews. The CO remembered in the last meeting exactly what he had said during previous sessions.
- Extraordinary high work ethic. They worked overtime whenever necessary (as was very often the case). Their attitude was, that an officer has to work as long the mission requires his presence.
- Dedicated to the company, the battalion, the division, the Army, and their country. They stressed frequently, that they loved to serve their country. This was apparently one vital source of motivation for both.
- Both officers were facing major changes in the very next future. The CO was to be transferred very soon and the XO had to take over the company. The XO himself was ending his military career a few month later. His last assignment was the dismissal of the company. The "power curves" of both officers were still displaying a steep upward slope. Their deeply internalized work ethics required that they

worked "at a 150% level" till the very last day of their duties.

- Both emphasized over the entire time period again and again their willingness to cooperate for the benefit of the project. They were eager to provide all information necessary, or requested, and they were also eager to explore the subject in depth. Both mentioned an increasing degree of self interest, which may explain their high degree of involvement (XO assisted in the development of figure 4).
- Interest in sport activities which were either risky or outside prevalent military acceptance parameters. The CO was enjoying every type of ski activities and mountain biking. The XO loved to play frisbee and bike riding.
- Strict compliance with military regulations, procedures, and orders. They enforced adherence rigorously.

The CO was married with a young child. The XO was planning his marriage right after his military career. Both discussed family issues very often and exchanged view points on various subjects like education or areas where to live and raise a family. Both had plenty of topics to discuss when they were off duty and did so frequently. Thus, their relationship was not restricted to their daily military routine.

There were also some apparent differences. The CO impressed me, because he was extremely calm and of balanced nature. He never raised his voice, unless he did it on purpose. In that instance, he controlled his appearance and motions perfectly and performed like an actor on stage. We had situations in the interviews, where he underscored his comments by slamming his hands on the table or even jumping up. But he explained repeatedly, that he would use this behavior only in rare instances. The XO was much more



energetic and spontaneous. His voice was usually louder and more forceful. This corresponded perfectly with his overall military attitude. He was a perfectionist, who put extreme emphasis on military courtesy and forms. He viewed this as a prerequisite for successful military performance. The CO had a slightly different attitude towards forms. He was not as strict as his XO in enforcing them. He put more weight on the successful operation itself rather than whether it was achieved under absolutely correct formal conditions. This discrepancy led to some minor problems between them, but the CO mentioned that he never stopped the XO. This point contrasts a little bit with the strict compliance with military regulations, but the CO admitted that he was "slightly more lenient in this regard than the XO".

Overall, there were no significant disparities. Their highly congruent military attitudes and their honest motivation to serve their country were the major determinants in their behavioral spectrum. An interesting difference was, that both officers (this little homogeneous group) favored and pursued sport activities, which were not aligned with "generally accepted" behavior for Army officers. Both differed from "Army standards" and were thus outsiders in this respect.

#### **B. ANALYSIS OF EXPRESSED FEARS**

During the entire interview process consisting of a series of 8 in-depth and lengthy interviews the two officers spoke 70

times about their various types of fear. These expressed fears are presented in appendices A through D in various arrangements for ease of viewing.

Appendix A displays all expressed fears in chronological order and assigns a number to each fear.

Appendix B displays the fears in descending order of personal importance. I assigned importance factors (high, medium, low) to each fear according to how the CO and XO felt about each fear. All the fears are listed in descending order of importance, beginning with the fears expressed by the CO and continuing with those expressed by the XO.

Appendix C shows the fears which have been expressed more than once. They are arranged in descending order of frequency.

Appendix D relates all fears to the fear model. Each fear has been assigned to a particular circle (A, B, or C) or area (I, II, III, or IV) of the model.

The total number of expressed fears was 70, the number of different fears was 51. The total number of 70 fears was nearly equally distributed between the two officers: the CO discussed 34 points and the XO 36. Some fears were repeatedly reported, a fact which is reflected in the Appendices in the column labeled "Frequency". Sometimes the fears reoccurred in the same context, sometimes they were used in a different framework.

For the analysis I focused on the most significant fears. As selection criteria I chose two factors. First, the

Frequency of report (Frequency of occurrence) must be two or higher. Second, the Personal Importance must be medium or high. To be included in the analysis, a fear has to meet both criteria simultaneously. A graphic display of all fears (by their chronological number from Appendix A) in relation to their Frequency of report (Frequency of occurrence) and their Personal Importance is provided in Figures 6a and 6b. I am particularly interested in those fears expressed two or more times and that have a degree of Personal Importance (PI) of medium or high. The boxes area contain those fears which meet both criteria at the same time.

The following two examples example how to read Figures 6a and 6b. First example: for the CO, the fear "Getting Physically Injured" is displayed in Figure 6a as fear 01 with a frequency of 1 and a PI of low. This falls outside the area indicating fears considered important as defined by the interviewer for the purpose of this analysis. Second example: by contrast, the CO's fear "Personal failure" occurs three times (05, 62, 69) and has each time a PI of high. The number 05 (frequency 1) fall outside the box. The numbers 62 (frequency 2) and 69 (frequency 3) fall within the box, thus the "Fear of failure" fulfills the requirements of being important for the analysis.

Figure 6a The Most Significant Fears Expressed by the CO





Figure 7a The Most Significant Fears Expressed by the X0



Appendix C displays the total number of ten fears that fulfill the two selection criteria and have thus been selected to serve as the basis for further analysis. An abbreviated form of Appendix C is provided for convenience.

Expressed fears in descending order of frequency

The abbreviated labeling of the columns is as follows:

Ex = Expressed by CO or XO

No = Chronological number of the expressed fear

Freq = Frequency of report (number of occurrences)

| Ex | Description of fear                                  | No                               | Freq |
|----|--|----------------------------------|------|
| XO | Not meeting expectations/ Not living up to standards | 15,18<br>38,40<br>41,42<br>47,58 | 8x   |
| XO | Getting negative evaluations                         | 24,48<br>54                      | 3x   |
| CO | Making wrong decisions                               | 03,06<br>34                      | 3x   |
| CO | Personal failure/Failure in executing his tasks      | 05,62<br>69                      | 3x   |
| CO | Getting punished for mistakes, the subordinates make | 10,37                            | 2x   |

|    |  |       |    |
|----|--|-------|----|
| CO | Looking foolish in front of other soldiers           | 08,70 | 2x |
| XO | Making wrong decisions                               | 17,23 | 2x |
| XO | Personal failure                                     | 16,51 | 2x |
| XO | CO an idiot/CO incapable of leading the unit         | 56,57 | 2x |
| XO | Failure in the marriage or in educating the children | 45,46 | 2x |

These significant fears will be analyzed as follows: Fears the CO and XO had in common, fears the CO and the XO had not in common, fears related to the workplace, fears not related to the workplace, and fears that stand out.

Fears the CO and the XO have in common.

The following two fears were reported by both officers:

- Fear of personal failure
- Fear of making wrong decisions

Both fears seem to have their roots in the downsizing environment. The fear of personal failure relates to the fact that failures of any kind are apt to put the individual on the termination list or may result in negative evaluations. The danger that even small mistakes or failures may result in severe negative consequences stimulates a permanent fear. The

fear of making wrong decisions can be explained basically the same way. The CO stated that "This is a zero defect Army" and referred to the possibility that wrong decisions have the dangerous potential of affecting the career negatively. In accordance with the downsizing efforts, tighter selecting criteria for the promotion boards have been established. One criterion is presumed to be "zero mistakes". Mistakes seem to place the soldier in an unfavorable position on the board. Everybody below a certain position will not be promoted. Not being promoted twice almost results in early retirement. Thus, as long as the reduction process is pursued under those conditions, the soldiers live in the permanent fear that a mistake may end their careers early.

Fears the CO and the XO do not have in common

The following list displays the significant fears of the CO which he does not have in common with the XO:

- Fear of getting punished for mistakes the subordinates make
- Fear of looking foolish in front of other soldiers

With regard to the CO's position and the responsibilities assigned to him, it appears reasonable for me that he expressed the fear of getting punished for mistakes his subordinates make. The concept that the military leader is entirely responsible for all activities in his unit can inspire that particular fear. Under this concept, a mistake of a subordinate has the same effect as if the mistake was made



by the CO. This, in turn, is the same as a personal failure, which inspires the fear mentioned above.

The fear of looking foolish in front of other soldiers seem to be related to the fact that the CO wants to keep a perfect superior appearance. He even developed a special technique to avoid lapses in front of his First Sergeant. He discussed each topic prior to the conversation with the First Sergeant with one other enlisted soldier to prepare himself. It seems he fears that any damage to his perfect superior image may undermine his authority.

The following list displays the significant fears of the XO which he does not have in common with the CO:

- Fear of not meeting expectations/Fear of not living up to standards
- Fear of getting negative evaluations
- Fear of having an idiot CO or a CO incapable of leading the unit
- Fear of failure in the marriage or in educating the children

The observation that stands out is the attitude of the XO towards meeting the ethical standards of the officer's oath and the expectations placed upon him. He expressed the fear of failing to comply with the standards eight times, which is the highest recorded value for frequency of occurrence. This demonstrates clearly that this is an area of major concern to him. The ethical values of the officer's oath are the fundamental basis for his behavior and work attitude. He wants

to satisfy those values to the highest extent possible. Moreover, to serve his country by serving in the Army is his personal contribution to the democratic system of the United States. In order to make a highly valuable contribution he strives constantly for a high level of perfection. He pursues an honorable system, but it poses apparently a lot of stress upon him, which ultimately stimulates the fear of failing to comply with the standards.

The reasons for the fear of getting negative evaluation seem to be closely related to his value system. A negative evaluation would be contrary to his constant endeavors to improve upon his performance and indicate a failure in achieving his high goals. A remarkable aspect is for me the fact that the XO expressed that fear even though he was in the process of leaving the Army soon. He did not need an evaluation for further career advancements in the military. Nevertheless, it appears that his high ethical value system requires a constantly high performance.

The fear of getting an idiot CO was a highly hypothetical discussion and the XO emphasized that he was currently very happy with the CO. This fear was generated by the possibility that an incompetent CO might take over command and endanger the lives of the soldiers. The fear originates in the XO's strong feeling of responsibility for his subordinates.

The fear of failure in the marriage or in educating the children clearly reflects his own childhood experience. The

negative memory of his own education and the unpleasant family life shape his wishes to provide his children a better atmosphere to grow up and to be a better husband to his wife.

#### Fears related to the workplace

Out of the ten fears nine are related to the workplace. Only the XO's fear of failure in the marriage or in educating the children is related to the private environment. This indicates that the workplace somehow produces a relatively high fear potential or can be viewed as the origin of significant fears. An explanation can be found in the pressure and the uncertainty the downsizing procedures place on the soldiers. The following fears are directly or indirectly related to the downsizing environment:

- Making wrong decisions
- Personal failure
- Getting punished for mistakes the subordinates make
- Not meeting expectations
- Getting negative evaluations

From the table above (the abbreviation of Appendix C) we can see that seven out of ten fears are related to the downsizing environment. This is a significant proportion that clearly identifies the source for the fears as being the uncertainty embedded in the current reduction program.

#### Fears not related to the workplace

The only fear that is related to another environment than the work environment is the XO's fear of failure in the marriage or in educating the children. The origin of this fear is his unpleasant childhood experience as discussed above. The CO expressed not one significant fear that is not related to the workplace.

#### Fears that stand out

The fear that stands out is the XO's fear of not meeting expectations. The Frequency value is eight and thus the highest one recorded. This demonstrates clearly the extreme importance this fear has to the XO. He mentioned frequently that, with regard to the execution of his job, strict adherence to the value system is a "conditio sine qua non" for him. To strive permanently for such a perfect level of performance inheres the potential for failures which, in turn, can stimulate the fear of those failures.

Another point that stands out is the total number of expressed fears: 70. Even the reduced number of different fears (51) appears still to be high. From those data it would appear that these two people are far from the optimal situation described and required by Deming's TQL philosophy. To clarify this point, it is necessary to distinguish between Deming's request to eliminate the "fear of speaking up" and the entire array of fears which may be present in a workplace. TQL concentrates on a single type of fear, while my research

is geared towards discovering all possible fears present in an individual worker. The TQL theory implies that the "fear of speaking up" is rooted in bad management practices originated in the activities which govern the operation of an organization. The fears I have detected may also originate someplace else.

#### C. EXPRESSED FEARS IN RELATION TO THE FEAR MODEL

In Appendix D, I present the 70 fears and their relation to the fear model. I added a column, labeled "model", which reflects the assignment of all 70 fears to one circle or area of the fear model which I introduced in the chapter methodology. The model allows for interesting findings, which I will present in this paragraph. The following list summarizes the results numerically.

##### Expressed fears in relation to the fear model

The abbreviated labeling in the columns is as follows:

Model = Circle or area of the fear model

CO = Number of fears expressed by the CO which relate to a particular circle or area of the fear model

XO = Number of fears expressed by the XO which relate to a particular circle or area of the fear model

| Model | CO | XO | Total |
|-------|----|----|-------|
| A     | 18 |    | 18    |
| B     |    | 23 | 23    |
| C     | 11 | 9  | 20    |
| I     | 5  |    | 5     |
| II    |    |    | 0     |
| III   |    | 4  | 4     |
| IV    |    |    | 0     |
| Total | 34 | 36 | 70    |

The XO reported 23 fears which originated in himself, five more than the CO. This higher number seem to be related to the XO's fear of not living up to expectations which he mentioned eight times. The repetition of this important fear may be the reason for the high number of reports for circle B.

The numbers of entries for the circle C (fear inherent in the situation) is nearly equally distributed between both officers. The difference is only two entries, which is insignificant.

If we compare the entries for all three circles we see that the numbers of entries for each circle are very close. We got 18 for A, 23 for B, and 20 for C. Thus, most of the fears

reported by the individuals allowed for a clear assignment to just one origin. They were either originated in the person himself or the situation. In each case, it was possible to distinguish clearly.

The numbers of entries for the overlap areas are very low. For the areas I and III and they are five and four respectively.

Tying the previous findings for the circles and the two overlap areas I and III together, the following interpretations can be made:

First: Both officers assign distinct origins to their fears.

Both officers are individuals with strong characters. They are confident about their skills and abilities, they are competent in their professions, and they take on new assignments more as a challenge than a threat. Their abilities to distinguish relatively clearly between their own strengths and weaknesses and problems originated somewhere else (in the situation) allow them to assign the origin of fears clearly to their own person or to outside circumstances. They seem to know with a high degree of certainty, whether the problem is originated in themselves or whether the reason is originated in another person, a regulation, a procedure, or any other type of situation outside themselves or their direct control. This ability to distinguish objectively reduces the number of fears assigned to areas of overlap. Those areas represent

fears which have dual origins. The low numbers in the overlap areas and the high number of entries in the circles indicate, that this two interviewees are highly professional in their jobs and have both a strong ability to identify the sources of problems which stimulate their fears.

Second: The relationship between the CO and the XO appears to be harmonious and to a high degree free of fears.

During the interview process I didn't find any fears attributable to the areas II and IV. These areas reflect fears which are inherent in the CO and the XO. Area IV also includes the fear originated in the situation, but for simplicity I exclude that particular factor for this part of the analysis. For now it is important that the overlap areas II and IV include the fears inherent in both individuals. None of the two officers expressed a fear which displayed the characteristics of those two areas. A variety of factors can be employed to interpret this phenomenon: First, no major, unsolved conflicts exist between those two people. Second, their characters are similar to a high degree. Third, their individual interests and active engagement in conflict solving is high. Fourth, their conflict solving skills are well developed. Fifth, both favor open communication.

The reasons why no fears for areas II and IV were expressed, can be examined by taking a closer look at their characters, attitudes, and work styles. Their most important



asset is their extremely high dedication to their country and their jobs. This is the major reason for their remarkably motivation and is also reflected in their positive work ethics. They work overtime whenever it seems necessary. Their focus is clearly on their mission and the related tasks. Both persons confront upcoming tasks and problems immediately. They address each issue in an objective and factual way with the clear determination of finding the most appropriate solution as soon as possible. Both seemed to be willing and able to work through conflicts and solve disagreements for the benefit of the entire company. Nothing is swept under the carpet or delayed more than necessary. This work style avoids the accumulation of long-term problems.

Another remarkable factor is their concern for their subordinates. Both agreed that their common focus was to provide optimal service and assistance for the soldiers in transit to their civilian destinations. The amount of paperwork and red tape was quite unusual for these two Rangers who were trained to serve in combat units. Nevertheless, both quickly acquired the new skills necessary to handle the uncommon assignments properly.

All these factors combined provide for a solid basis for their work in the company. In addition, they are open for interpersonal communication and invite their subordinates to cooperate in a system which is geared towards creative problem solving. This is especially true for the interaction of CO,

XO, and First Sergeant. Ryan and Oestreich [Ref. 15] mentioned that open communication is a crucial prerequisite for the elimination of fear in the workplace. This status of open communication is present in the interaction of the CO and XO. For example, the CO asked the XO frequently to submit suggestions for improvements whenever he might encounter problems in the company. The CO went on to include his own person into his offer, inviting the XO for criticism about the CO's behavior. This proves that the CO knows how to apply the concept of open communication in an effort to arrive at a fearless work atmosphere. From the XO's comments we know that the CO responded in general positively to his suggestions. No case has been reported where the XO fell victim to the "kill the messenger" syndrome. The personalities, characters, work style, and specifically the interaction of these two officers provide the ground for a harmonious work atmosphere. Competence, mutual trust and acceptance, respect for each other and other individuals, and dedication for the common mission are vital ingredients for harmonious and fearless workplace. Those elements are present in this company to a high degree. This is the reason why CO and XO are not fearful of each other and thus, why no fears have been reported, which related to the overlap areas II and IV.

#### D. VARIATIONS IN TERMINOLOGY

Both officers admitted a variety of fears. In most of their descriptions they used the word fear without hesitation. But at some points they refused to use the word fear at all. Two variants or substitutes were used most frequently for the word fear to characterize a particular situation, behavior or individual feeling: the first group consisted of the words concern, worry, doubt, or problem. The meanings of those words are close to the meaning of the term fear, but they are less intensive. The other group was comprised of the terms mission, objective, goal, challenge, competition, or problem. Those terms are neutral and have no direct link to the word fear. One question was, why they used other terms for situations usually considered or apt to stimulate fear? Another question was if it was their intention to disguise that they were fearful in that particular situation?

For example, they were talking about challenges rather than threats. The CO as well as the XO characterized new orders or changes of old directions as a positive stimulus. Even a high frequency of changes or a high degree of difficulty included did not lead to a negative attitude. Their professional attitude and their pride of their skills, abilities and knowledge determines their positive attitude towards new situations. The CO described a case where he forced the XO to improve the display of the safety regulations in the company buildings. He asked for improvements without

clearly specifying the end product or the desired way to achieve the result. When the XO requested more guidance, the CO asked him: "Do you want me to do your job?" Lack of guidance is generally considered to be apt to create fear in a worker, because the degree of uncertainty is increasing. But the XO viewed the CO's requirement as a challenge, rather than a threat. The high degree of uncertainty did not scare him. In his opinion, he would be safe, if he gave it "...his best shot." He expected the CO to accept his results, if he offered a thoughtful and thoroughly carried out solution, or to specify clearly the desired corrections or modifications. In this instance, the solution was of much higher quality than the CO had expected.

The next two examples are closely related to each other. Both officers mentioned their concerns about insufficient communication. They were also concerned about having too little information to prepare decisions. Communication problems of various types are generally considered a possible source for fear and dissatisfaction. To be disconnected from major information flows or to be dependent on preselected or filtered data can create feelings of uncertainty, helplessness, or isolation. If information is considered a vital part of their daily lives and thus an important determinant for success or failure, those feelings can stimulate fear. Both officers were reluctant to use the term fear in this context. They viewed information problems as a

challenge. They saw themselves in the position to solve the problem in one of two possible ways: first, they would try to regain access to the information source or to get the needed information through different channels. Second, if the previous methods did not yield any acceptable results, they would just work with the information at hand. They recognized, that their decisions might be less accurate under such conditions. Both stressed they would not feel any kind of fear. They would be, at most, concerned about the deficiency and would try hard to overcome it as soon as possible. They viewed this problem as "kind of usual" in the world; something they have to live with and to cope with.

I want to apply two different approaches in an attempt to explain this differences in terminology, the substitution of neutral terms for the emotion loaded word fear. Both ideas will be explained in the next two paragraphs.

The first approach: These observations can be explained by looking at the relationship between the intensity of the stimulus, the level of fear sensed by the individual, and the subject, which evokes fear. The intensity of the stimulus reflects the strength of the impact, the stimulus has on the person. The level of fear sensed by the individual describes the minimum intensity, a stimulus must have to evoke fear in a particular individual. Moreover, it displays the increase in fear, if the intensity of the stimulus escalates. People differ from each other with respect to their individual

emotional sensitivity. They will respond differently to the same stimuli. One person may be scared very soon, while another person will display no signs of fear at all in the same situation. Subjects which evoke fear are the description of the various mental themes an individual has developed over time, and their capabilities to initiate a fearful response in that particular person. One person may be scared by the high traffic intensity in cities, while another individual enjoys driving in overcrowded streets. Uncertainty may be a serious fear stimulus for somebody who has experienced dangerous situations related to uncertainty in the past. Uncertainty may be a neutral or even positive (challenging?) stimulus for somebody else. The subject and the level of fear, can be positive as well as negative. For a certain set of conditions people react differently. This means, that for a given subject, under a given stimulus intensity, one person may experience a positive feeling like excitement, joy, or pleasure. An example would be horseback riding. The first person may be scared to death, sitting on a horse, which moves fast. Another person enjoys this situation as very exciting. The "individual fear construct" reflects the individual level of fearful response to a given intensity of a stimulus in a certain subject area. With regard to the two officers this would mean, that they probably need very intensive stimuli to react with fearful emotions. Their thresholds may have been raised to relatively high levels through the training programs

and their specific experiences in the Army. Their individual perceptions of their competence and their self confidence may give them very strong feelings of security with respect of their abilities to execute their tasks successfully. In this case, every stimuli below this threshold would not be viewed as a fear stimuli. The officers would perceive the stimuli as something neutral and respond accordingly. Certain subjects don't seem to stimulate fear in this two individuals. Again, I assume that their training programs and their past experiences provided a very comprehensive basis of knowledge to draw from. Both have developed a high variety of response patterns applicable to upcoming situations. They are trained to use their knowledge to confront problems and challenges and generate thorough solutions. The combination of available knowledge, their feelings "we can do it", and their positive attitude towards new situations seems to be one reason why they don't experience fear so early. The following quotation supports my idea. The CO stated: "I like to consider uncertainty as a challenge not as a handicap." He enjoyed the freedom he had as CO and experimented with his ideas and his knowledge to solve problems. His successes, in turn, encouraged him in continuing to pursue this attitude.

The second approach: This is a hypothesis and may lead to further research in this field. Based on the interview data gathered during the third interview sessions, I assume that the Army educates their soldiers not to show fear in front of

other soldiers. This is especially true for superiors when subordinates are present. Both interviewees mentioned that they were trained to control their fears. Fear management was an important element in their Ranger training programs. For situations where the fear control mechanism might not work sufficiently they were told to suppress that fear. The idea behind this instruction was the assumption that if the leader shows fear, the subordinates could easily be seized by fear. This effect was assumed to be cumulative and may finally result in panic, because the troops lose confidence in their leaders. Thus, the appearance of a leader has to be fearless all the time when he is with his troops. This theory was stated very drastically by General Patton in his principles for military leadership [Ref. 6]. Modern leadership theories favor the position that leaders should be more open and even share weaknesses, perhaps including his fears, with their subordinates. Today it is considered crucial for leadership success that the relationship between superior and subordinate is based on elements like mutual trust and understanding and open communication. A future research question might be to what extent "Patton's Rule" is still shaping today's Army officer's education?



#### E. THE ROLE OF FEAR IN MANAGEMENT

In their book "Driving Fear out of the Workplace", Ryan and Oestreich made the remarkable observation, that managers view fear as an appropriate management tool. The utilization of fear is considered helpful in supporting production and performance improvements. Those managers hold the opinion, that the individual worker could be driven towards higher production goals by applying the correct "fear evoking method" and administer it in exact doses [Ref. 15:p. xv]. This attitude is in sharp contrast to Deming's requirement to eliminate fear from the workplace. His theory is supported by the research of Ryan and Oestreich, who proved the negative impact of fear on factors like productivity, satisfaction, quality, and overall performance. One of their research question was, whether people believed that fear would have positive aspects. The vast majority of responses were negative. Some people agreed in general, but limited the usefulness to self-imposed fear. In this case, fear could be a positive motivator. Summarizing can be said, that an overwhelming agreement was, that "...externally imposed fear is a negative force with destructive long-term consequences." [Ref. 15:p. 68].

In the fourth interview, as well as in the final meeting, the CO admitted that he used fear in guiding his subordinates. He made clear that the general application of fear as a management tool was unacceptable for him and that he would use

positive reinforcements in 90% of all cases. He favored positive management tools like rewards to guide soldiers. But he made the observation, that in certain situations and for certain soldiers (the ca. 10%, "...who don't understand anything else.") the use of fear was appropriate. It was his opinion that, in those situations, the use of fear had been the only promising method to accomplish his goals. He provided a variety of examples, where he described in detail his techniques (see fourth interview and final meeting). He also offered exact reasons why he used fear under specific circumstances. He never used fear for its own sake. Under each condition he had a specific goal in mind, and applied fear techniques purposefully and well staged. Some of his goals were:

- to get people's attention,
- to educate subordinates,
- to make individuals remember things better,
- to emphasize the importance of an issue,
- to demonstrate possible (negative) consequences,
- to discipline subordinates, and
- to motivate the "knucklehead type soldier".

His intentions were always positive and that made him believe that the application of fear was justifiable and legitimate. Apparently, he never experienced any notable set-backs that may have made him review his opinion. Even my question, whether he could imagine any other approaches to substitute

for fear in the future, did not yield a shift in thinking. In his belief system, the limited use of fear seems to be generally legitimized. It would be an interesting future research question to find out if the use of fear is widely accepted practice in the Army culture (possibly preserved through training, education, generally acceptable behavior codes, etc.).

Even though the CO favored positive reinforcements for the majority of his soldiers and was successful in applying it, this approach did not seem to work for a particular group of soldiers. It seems that the general requirement of Deming's point number eight "Drive out fear" has some limitations in its real world application which should be investigated more thoroughly in the future. In this environment the idea worked for ca. 90% of the soldiers, which is a remarkably high number. The comment of the CO that the negative reinforcements had to be used for the remaining 10%, "...who don't understand anything else", indicates those limitations. In the researched environment, obedience and strict compliance with rules and regulations were vital requirements to sustain the required level of law and order in the company. The system was built upon those requirements and derived its strength from them. Thus, the tolerance level for noncompliers was extremely low. The leaders were forced by their missions, their superiors and by regulations to assure compliance of their troops. The tools which were made available to them to attain this goal included

a variety of positive and negative reinforcements. The application of the negative instruments was necessary in some instances to achieve the mission. It seems that the preservation of law and order is of such high priority in the Army that the use of negative management tools including fear is viewed as appropriate.

**F. DOES THE CO'S LEADERSHIP STYLE FOSTER A FEARLESS SUPERIOR - SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP?**

I extracted from the interview information which related to the CO's leadership style. The focus of the following analysis will be on the question how the leadership style affects the relationship of the CO and the XO. The data may allow some analysis for the company as well, but this portion is excluded from my analysis. The subsequent list displays the findings:

- CO created an atmosphere of mutual trust through open communication, extensive information flow upwards and downwards, and open door policy.
- He conveyed the company's mission: We assist soldiers in their transit process from the military to the civilian life.
- He stated goals and objectives like: provide maximum administrative support to the soldiers or do all the paperwork correct the first time.
- CO communicated his requirements: correct military attitude and behavior, strict adherence to all regulations and procedures.
- He allowed ample freedom for organizing work and arranging work flows.

- He encouraged innovation and process improvements.
- He gave a "fair second chance" when a mistake was made.
- CO solicited criticism about his own behavior from the XO.

These actions created an atmosphere in which the XO felt comfortable to work. The XO mentioned frequently that the CO's leadership style did not stimulate any fear in him. The CO created a culture where the XO exactly understood the company's mission and could derive his own tasks and duties. The CO specified the common goals and invited the XO to participate to a high degree in leading the company ("...let us lead this company as a team."). The XO felt free to experiment and to provide inputs for changes or improvements. The overall organizational setting is characterized by the clarity of the mission as well as the subsequent goals and objectives, involvement of subordinates in the improvement of the work process, and the freedom to experiment within the Army limitations (regulations and procedures). This leadership style clearly eliminates fear and is the basis for beneficial team endeavors. This behavior of the CO is in line with Aguayo's view of a fearless workplace: "Management may not be able to eliminate all fear from the lives of it's employees but it can eliminate the sources of fear built into the management structures [Ref. 3:p. 189]. A comment of the CO is worth mentioning at this point. He was aware of the five different types of power (referent, position, reward, coercive, expert) and different leadership styles. He stated

that he preferred to choose the leadership style in accordance with the requirements for a particular situation. He did not apply one style all the time. He favored the referent and the expert power, because he viewed those as the most effective ones. In certain instances he would resort to position, reward, and coercive power, if the circumstances required it. This was limited to situations where law and order or the discipline had been violated and needed to be enforced strictly.

**G. THE INFLUENCE OF THE DOWNSIZING ENVIRONMENT ON THE INTERVIEWEES**

The downsizing endeavor of the US government had an impact on the two officers. Both mentioned the fear of getting on the termination list. The procedures of the personnel departments to reduce the armed forces was perceived as too drastic. The "zero defect Army", as the CO named it, creates a lot of uncertainty and fear in the individual soldiers. They fear that the slightest mistake has the potential to bring them on the termination list, which would result in an early retirement. This procedure can, under some conditions, include financial losses. The officers adjusted their behavior to get as close as possible to the "zero defect company" and avoid any mistake. Even the XO, who was in the process of leaving the Army soon, mentioned that he felt affected by the climate of the downsizing environment. The data base (2 officers) is

too small to generalize these findings for the entire Army or all services. It may be an interesting future research topic to study the impact of the downsizing on the individual soldiers on a broader basis.

#### H. NINTH INTERVIEW: THE VIEW OF DAVID WILLARD, PH. D., CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST

During the interview process I felt that it might be interesting and beneficial for the study to have the data analyzed from a psychological point of view. My approach is almost entirely based on my managerial and behavioral knowledge. As pointed out in the chapter about the conceptual basis of fear, psychology is a major element necessary for the comprehensive understanding and explanation of different fears. In an attempt to integrate the psychological part to some extent into this study, I asked Dr. David Willard, former Chief of Psychology Services of Fort Ord, to review the interview data and record whatever appeared interesting or surprising to him. Willard was a "neutral observer" of the data who didn't know the two officers personally. Later I conducted an interview with him. In this paragraph I present the major findings from this interview session.

In his introductory statement Willard stated that, based on the data, he felt he knew the XO very well but the CO less well. From a psychological standpoint, the data provided by the XO were much more descriptive of his own person and his

personality than those of the CO. The CO talked much more about his military related fears and concerns whereas the XO included more data about his private life.

From Willard's commentaries, I selected several points for presentation here.

His first comment was about the fact that the CO attempted twice to use the researcher for investigations. He was as surprised as I was, when the CO asked me to clarify two problems for him. Willard stated that this was an unusual case for him.:

It was interesting that the CO would use the researcher to his advantage. For example, the CO had asked the XO to offer suggestions for improvements in the CO's behavior and his way of doing business. The XO was never forthcoming with comments. The CO requested the researcher to investigate this for him. In another instance the CO made many corrections to papers the XO had submitted to him. The XO never responded to this. The CO was wondering how the XO felt about these corrections. He asked the interviewer to try to find out how the XO felt about this matter.

My analysis showed that the downsizing endeavors of the Army have some impact on the two officers. Their fear of failure seemed to be increased, because failures have a much higher harmful potential under those conditions than ever before. Willard made two comments on that issue and goes actually beyond my findings and interpretation. His comments underscore the dimension, the downsizing may have on these two officers. He goes on to presume that similar effects may be observed with other military personnel and even in the other services:



I was surprised at how frequently the fear of downsizing and possible loss of career were mentioned throughout the interviews by both the CO and the XO. Considering the chain of command, I wonder how this influences the performance and morale of the NCOs and enlisted men in this company, and perhaps the entire Army and other branches of the military.

As the Army undergoes the process of downsizing, it does sound as if considerable fear is unavoidably created. For example, both the CO and XO repeatedly expressed fears pertaining to their careers. The CO expressed a considerable concern that paperwork had to be submitted with no errors. The fear was expressed that even one bad mark against an officer could be reason to have his career terminated. These fears doubtless reflect the current situation within the Army, i.e., the downsizing. Nonetheless there seem to be fears "from above" which cause subordinates to approach their work with a large element of uncertainty. Once again, I would wonder about the effect this has on job performance and on morale. I also wonder if the Army is providing adequate guidance about how to perform ones job in the face of very real threats to careers. An important issue for me is whether or not the Army is perhaps risking losing high quality soldiers by failing to provide reassurance and guidance where it might be possible for the Army to do so.

In another comment Willard related the atypical high awareness of the decision-making process which the two officers mentioned to the downsizing environment and ultimately to their fears of failure:

I was surprised that these two officers were aware of the decision-making process to such a high degree. Each officer, but particularly the XO, seemed quite concerned with having the proper amount of data before making decisions, and both were concerned that their decision-making result in decisions that were fair to the soldiers in question. Decision making clearly requires reviewing data and an active decision-making process, but it also requires an intuitive step. These officers seemed less inclined toward use of intuition. Perhaps because they were aware that they might be called upon to justify any given decision, both officers had formulated their own method for making each decision based on presentable data. This would serve the purpose of protecting the individual soldier's career (about whom the decision was being made).

It also protected the officers career in that they endeavored to ensure correct decisions. Downsizing of the military may again be a factor. These officers felt they could not make a mistake in their decisions, and they seemed to feel that to do so would be a threat to their own career.

This observation is very similar to my findings. Willard goes one step further in asking what effect this increased fear level might have on job performance and morale. The performance of these two officers didn't seem to be affected negatively. Both reported constantly high dedication and willingness to perform well. I relate this to their extremely strong characters. Different persons, with weaker characters, could yield reductions in performance under such fearful conditions.

I recognized an interesting development in Willard's opinion about the XO. His view of the XO changed while he was reading the interviews, based on the presentation of new data. While he started out with the opinion that the XO seemed to be a fearful person, which was contrary to my opinion, his final statement revealed the same finding. We both formed the impression that the XO was somebody who became increasingly interested in discussing the fear topic rather than being a fearful man:

In reading from the first interview, it sounded as if he was afraid, i.e., he states in general that people know fear on a daily basis. I wondered what effect this might have on his work? On his self esteem? Is he getting enough guidance? Reassurance? However, as I continued to read the XO's interviews, I formed the opinion that the XO is not a fearful man, but rather someone willing to discuss fear, but who is not particularly affected by fear.

Willard made a similar observation as I did with regard to the willingness of both officers to present their thoughts to a "stranger":

Both officers were quite open about aspects of their personal lives. The CO talked about the importance of his family relative to the military and his career. The XO talked about being engaged and shared the feelings his fiancée has about his involvement in the military. Also both officers were quite open about their working relationship with each other, and both clearly respected and worked well with each other. It seemed as if both officers found that the interview provided an opportunity to discuss important topics, and it surprised me that they would do so to someone who would be putting their "thoughts" on paper.

Willard and I agreed that the introductory meeting was very helpful to establish trustful relationships between the two interviewees and me. We also discussed the fact that the researcher was an international student and I asked him to comment on that. He mentioned that the topic was not particularly sensitive in a national or military sense. Thus, the differences in nationality didn't seem to have much impact on the research and especially on the interpersonal relationships. Mr. Willard assumed that this difference might have been a positive stimulus for the two officers making the interview process more interesting for them.

An interesting remark was related to the XO's fear of the public reaction when somebody discovered that he was in the military. Willard was skeptical about this comment:

I was surprised that the XO stated that he fears public reaction. He apparently believes that the public looks unfavorably upon men in the Army and seems to base this belief on how the public reacted to soldiers during and

after the Vietnam war. I am of the opinion that this belief is no longer valid. For one thing, the Vietnam war, which was so very unpopular, ended twenty years ago. Young people have grown up with no memory of that war. Additionally, the events in the Gulf War appear to have renewed a sense of pride on the part of the civilian population toward the Army in particular, and the military in general.

This point will remain unclear, but, despite Willard's doubts, it is my impression that the fear of the XO was substantiated by real occurrences. Moreover, it seems to me that even if the young generation was brought up without direct influence of the war, there are still many aged people around who may carry hostile or animosity feelings or attitudes with them. The XO may fear the confrontation with this type of individual.

Willard expressed a contrary opinion regarding the XO's statement that fear can never be reduced to zero. He commented that fear can be eliminated. Willard has been with the Army for a long time and knows the training environment as well as the combat situation. He mentioned that

...according to the interview, the XO seemed of the opinion that fear can never be reduced to zero. This attitude surprised me. The XO appeared to take pride in being an Army Ranger, and as a psychologist, I would expect that a person trained as a Ranger would also be taught that proper training can eliminate certain types of fear. Indeed it would seem a highly desirable goal of certain military training to "fine tune" soldiers such that they would approach situations free of fear, i.e., situations normally conducive to the production of fear.

From my point of view his statement that fear can be entirely eliminated through proper training methods is surprising. I got the impression from the literature study that individuals may learn to control fear to a certain extent, but that the

entire elimination is not possible, not even through special training methods. This is another instance which supports my suggestion that future research might be conducted as a joint venture between students in the field of management and psychology.

One fear of the CO was related to a currently "hot topic" in the armed forces: sexual harassment. The analysis of Willard supports my opinion that the perception of behavior can be very different from the actual conduct. In this case the actual behavior appeared to be proper, but, in the light of the current aftermath of the tailhook scandal, the CO's discussion with his female subordinates bear the dangerous potential that somebody may construe them as sexual harassment. The lack of guidance seemed to be one reason for the fear of the CO. Willard made the following comment:

At the risk of overusing the word "surprised," I was quite surprised that the CO expressed fear that some of his past actions in working with his female soldiers might, in today's environment, be construed as sexual harassment. Judging from the information provided by the CO, and forming an opinion of the CO from this information, which I acknowledge is a bit of a risky thing to do, the CO does not sound like someone who would engage in behavior that could constitute sexual harassment. Therefore in what appears to be a recurring theme, I wonder if the CO is concerned with perception rather than actual behavior. That is, that some actions from the CO's past might be construed as sexual harassment and thereby create a problem for the CO vis'a'vis his career.

Willard discovered a risky contradiction in the CO's attitude. The CO was concerned about his career and mentioned the highly competitive environment in the Army. Nevertheless,

he refused to participate in "career enhancing activities" like golf or tennis. Rather he pursued his own sporting activities like mountain biking or running, which are not on the list of the "socializing activities" which are favored by many of the officers, especially the higher ranked officers.

The CO stated that he chose not to join in activities that might enhance his career, such as playing golf with his superior officers. In light of his considerable concern about protecting his career in a highly competitive Army environment, it seemed to me that he might be taking "the biggest risk" by not joining in. However, his choosing not to be a joiner is consistent with his stated concerns with balancing his military career with his family life.

In another comment, Willard referred to the fear of the CO of looking foolish in front of his First Sergeant. Based on a long military career and experiences with different First Sergeants, Willard related the CO's fear to a personality issue.

It surprised me that the CO was afraid of the 1st Sgt, and that he would admit it. The CO sounded like an experienced Army officer and part of his job is to be the "Commanding Officer" for the 1st Sgt as well as for the rest of the company. He has all the legal military authority over the 1st Sgt. Yet he acknowledged being fearful of him. I could only presume that the CO's fear might be based on personality styles, and that the 1st Sgt's more forceful personality was difficult for the CO to deal with. Additionally, the 1st Sgt may chose to affect a strong dominant personality as a means of maintaining control not only over the men but indirectly, over the officers as well. It is speculative, but this could be somewhat of a source of pride among 1st sergeants in general.

We both agreed that the admission of this fear was the most striking fact. This detail caught Willard's interest more than mine. In his opinion, those fears are usually very secret

fears and not easily shared with outsiders. The admission yields a high level of confidence and trust between the CO and the researcher. The fact that the fear was mentioned at the end of the interview process supports this opinion. The fact that this fear exists opens a new field of research. It may be suspected that a particular relationship exists between COs and their First Sergeants which may deserve more attention with respect to the element of fear in this relationship.

We talked a lot about the value of fear as a positive motivator. Mr. Willard's opinion was definitely clear about this point: in military management fear is not a positive motivator. The destructive forces of fear outweigh the possible positive effects. Fear stimulates compliance rather than dedication. He was surprised that the CO used fear in a "staged fashion". Willard's concern was again what effect this behavior might have on the overall morale of the company.

During much of the interviews with the CO he described his methods of relating to his XO and to the men as being fairly easy going. He seemed to take pride in this. Yet at one point he described a scene in which he was quite harsh with one enlisted man and told him, "if I was going to give you your evaluation today...this is how I would rate you...this is what your points would be and you would not get promoted today." Clearly the CO was using fear as a motivator in this case. His method included having the 1st Sgt present. The CO knew that the 1st Sgt would then take any individual "spoken to" by the CO and proceed to be even harder on the EM than the CO had been. I felt such a method was using fear in a fashion that might demoralize the individual and perhaps use fear in a fashion that could have some demoralizing effect on the entire company. Putting it differently, I wonder what effect it would have on the CO if his Brigade Commander used such tactics with him. At another point in the interview the CO discussed talking for an hour with the XO basically reprimanding him

for an incident. Once again, the CO was using fear as a motivator, and I question the value of doing so, even though the CO cited an incident earlier in his own career in which such a tactic had been used with himself.

Finally, I asked Willard's opinion whether he views fear as an appropriate management tool under certain conditions, in certain instances, or for certain people? His immediate answer was yes. He went on to explain that every situation is comprised of various components such as the management objectives or the type of task to be accomplished. Additionally, each situation has certain constraints and is defined by a variety of parameters such as time or location factors. Finally, individuals responsible for actually doing a task will differ from each other, sometimes substantially. He stated that under particular arrangements of those conditions, fear would be one, if not the only, appropriate management tool. For example, an important and clearly defined task has to be finished by a given deadline and a person cannot be positively motivated to meet that time limit. In that instance the use of fear in order to obtain compliance would be acceptable for him.

He presented an example based on his experience working with patients in an inpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. Discipline in this program was crucial for the conduct of the programs and subsequently for their successful application. Patients who violated the rules were first asked to comply with the regulations. If compliance could not be



achieved this way, a stricter counseling procedure was used to explain the reasons for compliance and the consequences in the case of further non-compliance. If a patient would not adjust his behavior accordingly, he would be informed that he would be dismissed if he violated the rules one more time. Any future violation would then automatically result in a dismissal. This escalation included a threat, in extreme, cases of calling the police to ensure that the individual would leave the hospital grounds. Individuals who required such extreme use of "force" often do not respond to positive reinforcements and will only respond to the use of fear tactic, in this case the use of police. This was not hypothetical in that Willard found it necessary to employ this tactic. The point is, certain situations may require the use of fear (in this case for the protection of other patients) and certain individuals will only respond to the use of fear as a motivator, such as individuals who care little for the opinions of others. In his experience, the use of threat or fear is sometimes the only way to accomplish the desired goal. Finally, he made clear that for perhaps 99% of all people the positive reinforcement would bring the desired results. But the remaining 1% sometimes only respond to fear.

The interview with Dr. Willard showed that he analyzed the data sometimes differently from me. Nevertheless, we agreed on many findings and interpretations. The major value of his contribution was the presentation of different perspectives.

He opened different avenues to look at the data and brought in his experience as Army psychologist. I found his comments very helpful and enriching. My intention to include psychological aspects of the fear analysis in my study was fulfilled to a satisfying degree. The reader and potential future researcher may wish to include psychological assistance in the conduct of his or her study to a much higher degree than I did.

## VIII. CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I present my conclusions for the three research questions. The three research questions will be answered in relation to the analyzed interview data.

### A. THE FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION: DO THE TWO OFFICERS FEEL ANY FEARS AND IF SO, WHAT ARE THEY?

Yes, the two officers expressed a variety of fears.

This part of the thesis is the descriptive portion intended to discover and list the largest possible number of expressed fears which might have any relationship to or influence on the persons and their workplaces. I recorded 70 instances where the officers talked about their fears. The CO addressed 34 different types of fear and the XO 36. Several fears were reported more than once, the total number of different fears is 51. The types of fear covered the private life as well as the military environment. Some were related to the private environment others to current activities in the workplace. The spectrum was wide and multi layered, demonstrating clearly that fear is a very complex construct.

With respect to Deming's requirement "Drive out fear" the interview data show that "the fear of speaking up" was not prevalent in this particular workplace. Both officers were

apparently not afraid to air their concerns or make suggestions. They were professional, competent, and had a high level of self confidence. Their pride and their dedication were the major driving forces for their activities. When the XO assumed duties, the CO invited him instantaneously to check the company and the way the company did it's business. The CO encouraged the XO to submit suggestions for changes and improvements. The CO's action is perfectly in line with the TQL philosophy. The XO felt free to report mistakes, deficiencies, inefficiencies, or unclear regulations to the CO with the request for clarification or change. Moreover, he enjoyed being in a position to provide the CO with suggestions which targeted the improvement of the overall company performance. The open leadership style of the CO seemed to empower the XO. For example, when the CO introduced the XO to his new assignment, he addressed their relationship by saying that they both had significant positions in this company and that the best results would be achieved if both would lead the company as a team. He wanted the XO to look critical at the company and even at the CO. The CO asked the XO, at the beginning of their relationship, to check the behavior and the activities of the CO to detect weaknesses and bring them to the CO's attention. This behavior provided a solid and trustful common ground for a fearless atmosphere in the sense of Deming's TQL philosophy.

**B. THE SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION: IS IT POSSIBLE TO ELIMINATE FEAR ENTIRELY FROM THE MILITARY WORKPLACE?**

The results of my study allow me to draw two conclusions regarding the question, whether fear can be eliminated entirely. One is closely related to Deming's point number eight and the other has a broader scope, including the workplace and the private environment as well as the personalities of the superior and the subordinate.

First conclusion: The fear of not speaking up was not prevelant in the relationship between the CO and the XO; the XO felt free to approach the CO without the fear of repercussions. Thus, it is possible to reduce this particular fear in the workplace substantially.

At this point, I'd like to refer the reader again to reference 18 (The Army Officer as Performance Manager). The battalion commander mentioned in that document created a work environment which was considered relatively "fearless" by the subordinates. This documentation is good evidence of "what is possible".

Deming requires in his point number eight "Drive out fear" that the fear of speaking up in the workplace has to be eliminated entirely to improve performance, enhance productivity, increase job satisfaction, and have the workers consider themselves an integral part of the whole organization, whose inputs and suggestions are appreciated by management. Deming chose a very sharp focus on one specific

fear. He described the negative consequences if this fear is prevalent in the work environment: "The economic loss of fear is appalling." [Ref. 4:p. 72]. Productivity goes down, the failure rate increases, the cost for rework escalates, job satisfaction decreases, the employee's identification with the company and it's goals diminishes, and a vast amount of energy is sidetracked into defense strategies rather than used for the production process itself or the improvement of processes, to name a few factors. Deming as well as Ryan and Oestreich suggest management styles to overcome this fear and create a fearless work atmosphere, like open communication, solicitation of proposals and suggestions for changes and improvements, reward systems for reporting defects and faulty procedures, frequent interaction of managers and workers, and coaching subordinate leaders, to give a few examples.

In the company in Fort Ord I found all of those factors in the relationship between the CO and the XO. The CO applied managerial tools which add to the positive climate in this particular workplace.

Second conclusion: It seems that the entire elimination of fear in the workplace is not practicable.

The individual workers carry fears with them which are completely seperated from the work environment, but which have a potential to restrain their abilities and capablities in the workplace. For example, the fear about the safety of the family may distract the worker from the actual work and lead

to failures or inefficiencies. That fear can probably not be eliminated from the workplace by means usually available to managers or peers. I assume that supervisors frequently are not even aware of the existence of those fears. Thus, even if we were able to eliminate all fears which are under the control of management, a residual capacity of "private fears" remains in the individual and restricts his or her performance.

My study had a much broader scope than the research of Ryan and Oestreich. Their investigation was based precisely on Deming's requirement of eliminating the fear of not speaking up in the workplace. I incorporated in my study a wider range and complexity of the construct of fear. The interviewees were asked to talk about a wide variety of fears, their possible origins, causes, and relationships. Beyond my intention to identify and list the fears, that were related to the two officers and/or present in their workplace, I tried to find an answer to the question, whether those fears could possibly be eliminated from the workplace. Each interviewee reported six fears which were not directly related to the work environment but had their origin in the private environment. The existence of those fears have a dominant impact on my second conclusion.

C. THE THIRD RESEARCH QUESTION: DO THE INTERVIEWED OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT FEAR IS AN APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT TOOL?

The answer to this question is a no, but...!

Both officers reported that they favored positive reinforcements to lead the majority of their soldiers. The CO mentioned that this technique yields positive results in 95 out of 100 instances. Willard supported those data and offered an even more favorable ratio. In his opinion, 99 out of 100 persons respond positively to positive reinforcements. For the remaining percentages, the two officers as well as Willard agreed that negative reinforcements, including the application of fear and threat, are the appropriate management tools. All interviewees stated clearly, that they would use positive reinforcements first to achieve the desired results. If the soldier did not respond to that technique and law and order or discipline are endangered by the soldiers behavior, they would resort to negative reinforcements. Thus, two conditions must be present for the three interviewees to switch from positive to negative reinforcements: first, the application of positive methods was unsuccessful, and second, law and order or discipline are at risk. Furthermore, the negative approach is needed only for a very small number of individuals.

Included in the term discipline is the correctness of carrying out orders properly. All three interviewees commented, that they would use escalating enforcement methods, which include threat and fear, to accomplish compliance with



standards and regulations. If an individual demonstrated apparent disobedience, he or she would be treated with the same methods as mentioned above.

## IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following comments reflect my accumulated experience related to this study and are intended to assist future researchers in designing and conducting their projects. Moreover, I will outline some questions which came to mind during the study. These may serve as a basis for further research.

The introductory meeting was of crucial importance for the success of the data gathering. We established an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding. The interviewees were familiar with the topic before we started the actual work. The meeting gave them some lead time for mental preparation and avoided the danger of misunderstandings or confrontation. When we started the interviews the two officers were very eager to contribute to the success of the study by providing a maximum of input. I suggest using a similar approach whenever a longitudinal interview program like this is required.

The interview method proved to be an appropriate tool for this particular study. The topic was covered sufficiently and the data gathered allowed an intensive analysis. Nevertheless, the extent to which information will be provided by interviewees is highly dependent on the relationship between the interviewer and his interviewees. I could establish a

positive relationship which supported my endeavor of data collection. I recommend that researchers devote sufficient time and energy to ensure that the interview atmosphere is characterized by trust and sympathy.

One of my intentions to conduct this in depth study was to create a basis for future research projects. During my interviews and the following analysis a variety of questions arose which could not be answered by my data and which might stimulate other researchers to continue this work. In this chapter I will briefly present my thoughts to introduce possible areas of further research:

1. I selected the in-depth, repeated interview of one pair of officers to explore the question of fear in the workplace. While broad generalization and conclusions can not be drawn from studying one particular subordinate-superior dyad, such an approach leads to a deeper understanding of the dynamics involved. Another, more convenient, approach would be to use a larger sample size and administer a questionnaire to check if my findings are also valid for a larger population like a brigade, a division, or an army.

2. I am a Navy officer and I found it exciting to conduct the study in the Army environment. From my almost 20 years of service I remember, that the various services have different cultures, which influence the general leadership approaches in each service. Thus, another direction for research would be to explore the element of fear in different services and compare

the outcomes. The two specific questions, which came to mind during my study, were: Does one culture favor the development of fear more than another? To which extent do the cultures require the individuals to suppress their fears?

3. The sample for my study was comprised of two male officers. This is only one possible combination for a superior - subordinate pair. Further studies may investigate other combinations involving females and/or members of minority groups. The point of interest could be whether other combinations of individuals yield different fear patterns. The same study may also be extended to the question what impact the sociological background or the heritage may have on the development of fears.

4. I chose the company level for my study. This is a level of responsibility in the middle section of the military hierarchy. I was wondering whether people on other levels of the hierarchy have different fears or whether the fear intensity may change. In particular, it may be interesting to explore whether a relationship exists between the position of an individual in the need hierarchy of Maslow and the fears they experience or the intensity of the fears they experience.

APPENDIX A: EXPRESSED FEARS LISTED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF  
EXPRESSION

The list summarizes all fears, expressed by the officers during the interviews. They are listed in chronological order. Every time, a fear was reported, an entry in the list was made. Thus, the same fear may appear several times.

For purposes of later analysis I have added three columns. In the first column, labeled "expressed", it is specified who mentioned this fear. The possible entries are XO or CO. The second column, labeled "frequency", reflects how often a fear was reported. The numbers are cumulative for each type of fear. In the third column, labeled "PI" (Personal Importance), an entry for the degree of personal importance is made. Each expression of fear is recorded and each has it's unique level of importance for the individual. This classification system includes the element of subjective assessment. The importance was not always explicitly stated by the particular officer, but indicators like raised voice, impulsive gestures, or excitement, signaled to me that the fear was of some significance to him. Whenever I could reasonably assume, that the reported fear seemed of importance for the interviewee, I registered that impression. The ranking system I used for classification consisted of three categories. I assigned the

letter H (high) for a fear which seemed to be of great importance, the letter M (medium) for one which seemed to be of some importance, and the letter L (low) for a fear that appeared to be of less or little importance.

Expressed fears listed in chronological order of expression

The abbreviated labeling of the columns is as follows:

No = Chronological order in which fears were expressed

Expr = Expressed by CO or XO

Freq = Frequency of report (number of occurrences)

PI = Personal importance (H,M,L)

| No | Description of fear  | Expr | Freq | PI |
|----|--|------|------|----|
| 01 | Getting physically injured                                     | CO   | 1    | L  |
| 02 | Admitting to have fear   | CO   | 1    | L  |
| 03 | Selecting the correct course of action. Making wrong decisions | CO   | 1    | H  |
| 04 | To receive negative evaluation                                 | CO   | 1    | H  |
| 05 | Personal failure   | CO   | 1    | H  |
| 06 | Making wrong decisions   | CO   | 2    | H  |
| 07 | Give presentations to high ranked audiences                    | CO   | 1    | H  |

|    |  |    |   |   |
|----|--|----|---|---|
| 08 | Looking foolish in front of subordinates or other soldiers                           | CO | 1 | L |
| 09 | Implementing necessary changes, when doubtful of own abilities                       | CO | 1 | L |
| 10 | Getting punished for mistakes, the subordinates make                                 | CO | 1 | H |
| 11 | Interference of military and private environment                                     | CO | 1 | L |
| 12 | The unknown  | XO | 1 | H |
| 13 | The inability to assess what might happen after death                                | XO | 1 | H |
| 14 | Expectations placed on him by others   | XO | 1 | M |
| 15 | Not meeting expectations and being looked at as less of a man, or less of an officer | XO | 1 | M |
| 16 | Personal failure   | XO | 1 | H |
| 17 | Making wrong decisions   | XO | 1 | H |
| 18 | Failure to comply with group norms and values  | XO | 2 | L |
| 19 | Looking foolish in front of subordinates or other soldiers                           | XO | 1 | L |

|    |  |    |   |   |
|----|--|----|---|---|
| 20 | Getting punished for mistakes subordinates make                                | XO | 1 | H |
| 21 | Negative myths about future situations like training programs                  | XO | 1 | M |
| 22 | Somebody else may screw up his life. Fear of getting a faulty packed parachute | XO | 1 | H |
| 23 | Making wrong decisions. Executing tasks in an unprofessional manner            | XO | 2 | H |
| 24 | Negative consequences in the case of wrong decisions (negative evaluation)     | XO | 1 | H |
| 25 | Failing in the handling of excessive and unfamiliar paperwork                  | XO | 1 | M |
| 26 | Getting on the termination list  | XO | 1 | H |
| 27 | Uncontrolled actions due to anger, fury, or irritation                         | CO | 1 | L |
| 28 | Misinterpretation of his statements by other people                            | CO | 1 | L |
| 29 | Moral decay in the US society  | CO | 1 | L |
| 30 | Impact of aids on the society  | CO | 1 | L |



|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 31 | Increase of gang-related violence and violence in schools   | CO | 1 | M |
| 32 | Any type of threat or danger for his family. His limited ability to provide a safe environment for the family | CO | 1 | M |
| 33 | Getting beaten up (only during high school)   | CO | 1 | H |
| 34 | Being forced to make decisions based on too little information. Making wrong decisions                        | CO | 3 | H |
| 35 | Affecting many people's lives through thorough investigations   | CO | 1 | L |
| 36 | Upsetting people, because his decision was incorrect in their minds   | CO | 1 | L |
| 37 | Getting punished for mistakes, the subordinates make (in his absence)   | CO | 2 | H |
| 38 | Not living up to group standards  | XO | 3 | M |
| 39 | Not contributing sufficiently to group performance  | XO | 1 | H |

|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 40 | Not living up to the values of the military, the values of the officer's oath | XO | 4 | H |
| 41 | Not realizing changes in the value system (related to 40)                     | XO | 5 | H |
| 42 | Getting dismissed due to misconduct (related to 40 and 41)                    | XO | 6 | H |
| 43 | Increase in random violence in some areas                                     | XO | 1 | M |
| 44 | Temper of his father (only during childhood)                                  | XO | 1 | L |
| 45 | Failure in the marriage   | XO | 1 | M |
| 46 | Failure in educating his children correctly (related to 45)                   | XO | 2 | M |
| 47 | Not living up to the expectations, he believes, the CO has of him             | XO | 7 | H |
| 48 | Negative evaluation (as a consequence of 47)                                  | XO | 2 | H |
| 49 | Forced to make decisions based on too little information                      | XO | 1 | L |

|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 50 | Psychological distress, as a consequence of people's reactions, when they recognize, he is in the military  | XO | 1 | L |
| 51 | To loose in a competition. Downsizing creates a highly competitive Army environment. Related to the fear of failure.                                    | XO | 2 | H |
| 52 | Stressful interaction between culturally different groups hampers effectiveness and mission accomplishment of unit                                      | XO | 1 | L |
| 53 | CO is a tyrant (hypothetical, because actual relationship is ok)  | XO | 1 | M |
| 54 | Getting negative evaluations, if conduct is not appropriate   | XO | 3 | H |
| 55 | Fear of failing to execute tasks as desired by CO   | XO | 1 | M |
| 56 | CO is not capable of leading the unit and providing appropriate guidance. This will lead to feelings like uncertainty, helplessness, or dissatisfaction | XO | 1 | M |

|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 57 | CO is an idiot or moron (related to 56)   | XO | 2 | M |
| 58 | Not being able to meet expectations   | XO | 8 | M |
| 59 | Whether comments of biological or medical nature in a discussion with females could be construed as sexual harassment | CO | 1 | M |
| 60 | Probable improper behavior and inappropriate performance in the past  | CO | 1 | M |
| 61 | Rumors about his person   | CO | 1 | M |
| 62 | Personal failure  | CO | 2 | H |
| 63 | Not being trained sufficiently to perform correctly in a job  | CO | 1 | H |
| 64 | Failure in the execution of duties as a consequence of 63   | CO | 1 | H |
| 65 | Getting a negative evaluation as a consequence of 64  | CO | 1 | H |
| 66 | Getting dismissed as a consequence of 65  | CO | 1 | H |

|    |  |    |   |   |
|----|--|----|---|---|
| 67 | Signing papers under time pressure or extremely high work load. Not enough time for effective checks | CO | 1 | M |
| 68 | Pressure from superiors and peers to conform to certain group norms which he does not accept         | CO | 1 | L |
| 69 | Failure in executing his tasks   | CO | 3 | H |
| 70 | Looking bad in front of the First Sergeant   | CO | 2 | M |

APPENDIX B: EXPRESSED FEARS LISTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF APPARENT IMPORTANCE TO THE CO/XO

This list summarizes all fears expressed by the officers during the interviews. The fears are arranged with regard to their apparent personal importance level (see column PI), rather than chronological. I started with the fears of the CO, ranking them from high to low importance. The fears of the XO come next following the same pattern.

For purposes of later analysis I have added three columns. In the first column, labeled "expressed", it is specified who mentioned this fear. The possible entries are XO or CO. The second column, labeled "frequency", reflects, how often a fear was reported. The numbers are cumulative for each type of fear. In the third column, labeled "PI", an entry for the degree of personal importance is made. Each fear has it's unique level of importance for the individual. The importance was not always explicitly stated by the particular officer, but indicators like raised voice, impulsive gestures, or excitement, signaled to me, that the fear was of some significance to him. Whenever I could reasonably assume that the reported fear seemed of importance for the interviewee, I registered that impression. The ranking system I used for classification consisted of three categories. I assigned the

letter H (high) for a fear which seemed to be of great importance, the letter M (medium) for one which seemed to be of some importance, and the letter L (low) for a fear that appeared to be of less or little importance.

Expressed fears listed in descending order of importance to the CO

The abbreviated labeling of the columns is as follows:

Expr = Expressed by CO

Freq = Frequency of report (number of occurrences)

PI = Personal importance (H,M,L)

| No | Description of fear  | Expr | Freq | PI |
|----|--|------|------|----|
| 03 | Selecting the correct course of action. Making wrong decisions                         | CO   | 1    | H  |
| 06 | Making wrong decisions   | CO   | 2    | H  |
| 34 | Being forced to make decisions based on too little information. Making wrong decisions | CO   | 3    | H  |
| 04 | To receive negative evaluation   | CO   | 1    | H  |
| 05 | Personal failure   | CO   | 1    | H  |
| 62 | Personal failure   | CO   | 2    | H  |
| 69 | Failure in executing his tasks   | CO   | 3    | H  |

|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 07 | Give presentations to high ranked audiences   | CO | 1 | H |
| 10 | Getting punished for mistakes, the subordinates make  | CO | 1 | H |
| 37 | Getting punished for mistakes, the subordinates make (in his absence)   | CO | 2 | H |
| 33 | Getting beaten up (only during high school)   | CO | 1 | H |
| 63 | Not being trained sufficiently to perform correctly in a job  | CO | 1 | H |
| 64 | Failure in the execution of duties as a consequence of 63   | CO | 1 | H |
| 65 | Getting a negative evaluation as a consequence of 64  | CO | 1 | H |
| 66 | Getting dismissed as a consequence of 65  | CO | 1 | H |
| 31 | Increase of gang-related violence and violence in schools   | CO | 1 | M |
| 32 | Any type of threat or danger for his family. His limited ability to provide a safe environment for the family | CO | 1 | M |



|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 59 | Whether comments of biological or medical nature in a discussion with females could be construed as sexual harassment | CO | 1 | M |
| 60 | Probable improper behavior and inappropriate performance in the past  | CO | 1 | M |
| 61 | Rumors about his person   | CO | 1 | M |
| 67 | Signing papers under time pressure or extremely high work load. Not enough time for effective checks                  | CO | 1 | M |
| 70 | Looking bad in front of the First Sergeant  | CO | 2 | M |
| 01 | Getting physically injured  | CO | 1 | L |
| 02 | Admitting to have fear  | CO | 1 | L |
| 08 | Looking foolish in front of subordinates or other soldiers  | CO | 1 | L |
| 09 | Implementing necessary changes, when doubtful of own abilities  | CO | 1 | L |
| 11 | Interference of military and private environment  | CO | 1 | L |

|    |  |    |   |   |
|----|--|----|---|---|
| 27 | Uncontrolled actions due to anger, fury, or irritation                                       | CO | 1 | L |
| 28 | Misinterpretation of his statements by other people  | CO | 1 | L |
| 29 | Moral decay in the US society  | CO | 1 | L |
| 30 | Impact of aids on the society  | CO | 1 | L |
| 35 | Affecting many people's lives through thorough investigations                                | CO | 1 | L |
| 36 | Upsetting people, because his decision was incorrect in their minds                          | CO | 1 | L |
| 68 | Pressure from superiors and peers to conform to certain group norms which he does not accept | CO | 1 | L |

Expressed fears listed in descending order of importance to the XO

The abbreviated labeling of the columns is as follows:

Expr = Expressed by XO

Freq = Frequency of report (number of occurrences)

PI = Personal importance (H,M,L)

| No | Description of fear  | Expr | Freq | PI |
|----|--|------|------|----|
| 12 | The unknown  | XO   | 1    | H  |
| 13 | The inability to assess what might happen after death  | XO   | 1    | H  |
| 16 | Personal failure   | XO   | 1    | H  |
| 51 | To loose in a competition. Downsizing creates a highly competitive Army environment. Related to the fear of failure. | XO   | 2    | H  |
| 17 | Making wrong decisions   | XO   | 1    | H  |
| 23 | Making wrong decisions. Executing tasks in an unprofessional manner  | XO   | 2    | H  |
| 20 | Getting punished for mistakes subordinates make  | XO   | 1    | H  |

|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 22 | Somebody else may screw up his life.<br>Fear of getting a faulty packed parachute | XO | 1 | H |
| 24 | Negative consequences in the case of wrong decisions (negative evaluation)        | XO | 1 | H |
| 48 | Negative evaluation (as a consequence of 47)                                      | XO | 2 | H |
| 54 | Getting negative evaluations, if conduct is not appropriate                       | XO | 3 | H |
| 26 | Getting on the termination list   | XO | 1 | H |
| 39 | Not contributing sufficiently to group performance                                | XO | 1 | H |
| 40 | Not living up to the values of the military, the values of the officer's oath     | XO | 4 | H |
| 41 | Not realizing changes in the value system (related to 40)                         | XO | 5 | H |
| 42 | Getting dismissed due to misconduct (related to 40 and 41)                        | XO | 6 | H |
| 47 | Not living up to the expectations, he believes, the CO has of him                 | XO | 7 | H |

|    |  |    |   |   |
|----|--|----|---|---|
| 14 | Expectations placed on him by others   | XO | 1 | M |
| 15 | Not meeting expectations and being looked at as less of a man, or less of an officer | XO | 1 | M |
| 21 | Negative myths about future situations like training programs                        | XO | 1 | M |
| 25 | Failing in the handling of excessive and unfamiliar paperwork                        | XO | 1 | M |
| 38 | Not living up to group standards   | XO | 3 | M |
| 43 | Increase in random violence in some areas  | XO | 1 | M |
| 45 | Failure in the marriage  | XO | 1 | M |
| 46 | Failure in educating his children correctly (related to 45)                          | XO | 2 | M |
| 53 | CO is a tyrant (hypothetical, because actual relationship is ok)                     | XO | 1 | M |
| 55 | Fear of failing to execute tasks as desired by CO                                    | XO | 1 | M |

|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 56 | CO is not capable of leading the unit and providing appropriate guidance. This will lead to feelings like uncertainty, helplessness, or dissatisfaction | XO | 1 | M |
| 57 | CO is an idiot or moron (related to 56)   | XO | 2 | M |
| 58 | Not being able to meet expectations   | XO | 8 | M |
| 19 | Looking foolish in front of subordinates or other soldiers  | XO | 1 | L |
| 44 | Temper of his father (only during childhood)  | XO | 1 | L |
| 49 | Forced to make decisions based on too little information  | XO | 1 | L |
| 50 | Psychological distress, as a consequence of people's reactions, when they recognize, he is in the military  | XO | 1 | L |
| 52 | Stressful interaction between culturally different groups hampers effectiveness and mission accomplishment of unit                                      | XO | 1 | L |

|    |  |    |   |   |
|----|--|----|---|---|
| 18 | Failure to comply with group norms<br>and values | XO | 2 | L |
|----|--|----|---|---|

APPENDIX C: EXPRESSED FEARS LISTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF  
FREQUENCY

The following list summarizes particular fears which were expressed two or more times and appeared to be of some importance to the speaker.

For purposes of later analysis I have added three columns. The first column is labeled "expressed" and contains the originator of the fear. In the second column, labeled "number", we find the chronologically assigned number for the fears. Those numbers refer back to Appendix A. The third column, labeled "frequency", reflects the total number of recordings for that particular fear.

Expressed fears in descending order of frequency

The abbreviated labeling of the columns is as follows:

Ex = Expressed by CO or XO

No = Chronological number of the expressed fear

Freq = Frequency of report (number of occurrences)



| Ex | Description of fear                                  | No                               | Freq |
|----|--|----------------------------------|------|
| XO | Not meeting expectations/ Not living up to standards | 15,18<br>38,40<br>41,42<br>47,58 | 8x   |
| XO | Getting negative evaluations                         | 24,48<br>54                      | 3x   |
| CO | Making wrong decisions                               | 03,06<br>34                      | 3x   |
| CO | Personal failure/Failure in executing his tasks      | 05,62<br>69                      | 3x   |
| CO | Getting punished for mistakes, the subordinates make | 10,37                            | 2x   |
| CO | Looking foolish in front of other soldiers           | 08,70                            | 2x   |
| XO | Making wrong decisions                               | 17,23                            | 2x   |
| XO | Personal failure                                     | 16,51                            | 2x   |
| XO | CO an idiot/CO incapable of leading the unit         | 56,57                            | 2x   |
| XO | Failure in the marriage or in educating the children | 45,46                            | 2x   |

APPENDIX D: EXPRESSED FEARS IN RELATION  
TO THE 3-CIRCLE MODEL OF FEAR

The list summarizes all fears, presented by the officers during the interviews. Each expression of fear is assigned to a particular circle or area of the fear model. They are also listed in chronological order. Every time, a fear was reported, an entry in the list was made. Thus, the same fear may appear several times. For purposes of later analysis I have added three columns. In the first column, labeled "expressed", it specifies who mentioned this fear. The possible entries are XO or CO. The second column, labeled "model", reflects the assignment of a fear to a certain circle or area in the fear model. The third column, labeled "frequency", reflects how often a fear is reported.

Expressed fears in relation to the 3-circle model of fear

The abbreviated labeling of the columns is as follows:

Expr = Expressed by CO or XO

Mod = Assignment of a fear to a circle or area in the fear model. The possible entries are A, B, and C for the circles and I, II, III, and IV for the areas.

Freq = Frequency of report (number of occurrences)

| No | Description of fear  | Expr | Mod | Freq |
|----|--|------|-----|------|
| 01 | Getting physically injured                                     | CO   | A   | 1    |
| 02 | Admitting to have fear   | CO   | A   | 1    |
| 03 | Selecting the correct course of action. Making wrong decisions | CO   | A   | 1    |
| 04 | To receive negative evaluation                                 | CO   | A   | 1    |
| 05 | Personal failure   | CO   | A   | 1    |
| 06 | Making wrong decisions   | CO   | A   | 2    |
| 07 | Give presentations to high ranked audiences                    | CO   | C   | 1    |
| 08 | Looking foolish in front of subordinates or other soldiers     | CO   | I   | 1    |
| 09 | Implementing necessary changes, when doubtful of own abilities | CO   | A   | 1    |
| 10 | Getting punished for mistakes, the subordinates make           | CO   | C   | 1    |
| 11 | Interference of military and private environment               | CO   | I   | 1    |
| 12 | The unknown  | XO   | B   | 1    |

|    |  |    |     |   |
|----|--|----|-----|---|
| 13 | The inability to assess what might happen after death                                | XO | B   | 1 |
| 14 | Expectations placed on him by others   | XO | III | 1 |
| 15 | Not meeting expectations and being looked at as less of a man, or less of an officer | XO | III | 1 |
| 16 | Personal failure   | XO | B   | 1 |
| 17 | Making wrong decisions   | XO | B   | 1 |
| 18 | Failure to comply with group norms and values  | XO | B   | 2 |
| 19 | Looking foolish in front of subordinates or other soldiers                           | XO | III | 1 |
| 20 | Getting punished for mistakes subordinates make                                      | XO | C   | 1 |
| 21 | Negative myths about future situations like training programs                        | XO | C   | 1 |
| 22 | Somebody else may screw up his life. Fear of getting a faulty packed parachute       | XO | C   | 1 |
| 23 | Making wrong decisions. Executing tasks in an unprofessional manner                  | XO | B   | 2 |

|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 24 | Negative consequences in the case of wrong decisions (negative evaluation)                                    | XO | B | 1 |
| 25 | Failing in the handling of excessive and unfamiliar paperwork   | XO | B | 1 |
| 26 | Getting on the termination list   | XO | B | 1 |
| 27 | His own uncontrolled actions due to anger, fury, or irritation  | CO | A | 1 |
| 28 | Misinterpretation of his statements by other people   | CO | C | 1 |
| 29 | Moral decay in the US society   | CO | A | 1 |
| 30 | Impact of aids on the society   | CO | A | 1 |
| 31 | Increase of gang-related violence and violence in schools   | CO | A | 1 |
| 32 | Any type of threat or danger for his family. His limited ability to provide a safe environment for the family | CO | A | 1 |
| 33 | Getting beaten up (only during high school)   | CO | A | 1 |

|    |  |    |   |   |
|----|--|----|---|---|
| 34 | Being forced to make decisions based on too little information. Making wrong decisions | CO | I | 3 |
| 35 | Affecting many people's lives through thorough investigations                          | CO | I | 1 |
| 36 | Upsetting people, because his decision was incorrect in their minds                    | CO | I | 1 |
| 37 | Getting punished for mistakes, the subordinates make (in his absence)                  | CO | C | 2 |
| 38 | Not living up to group standards   | XO | B | 3 |
| 39 | Not contributing sufficiently to group performance                                     | XO | B | 1 |
| 40 | Not living up to the values of the military, the values of the officer's oath          | XO | B | 4 |
| 41 | Not realizing changes in the value system (related to 40)                              | XO | C | 5 |
| 42 | Getting dismissed due to misconduct (related to 40 and 41)                             | XO | B | 6 |
| 43 | Increase in random violence in some areas  | XO | B | 1 |

|    |  |    |     |   |
|----|--|----|-----|---|
| 44 | Temper of his father (only during childhood)   | XO | B   | 1 |
| 45 | Failure in the marriage  | XO | B   | 1 |
| 46 | Failure in educating his children correctly (related to 45)  | XO | B   | 2 |
| 47 | Not living up to the expectations, he believes, the CO has of him  | XO | B   | 7 |
| 48 | Negative evaluation (as a consequence of 47)   | XO | B   | 2 |
| 49 | Forced to make decisions based on too little information   | XO | III | 1 |
| 50 | Psychological distress, as a consequence of people's reactions, when they recognize, he is in the military           | XO | C   | 1 |
| 51 | To loose in a competition. Downsizing creates a highly competitive Army environment. Related to the fear of failure. | XO | B   | 2 |

|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 52 | Stressful interaction between culturally different groups hampers effectiveness and mission accomplishment of unit                                      | XO | C | 1 |
| 53 | CO is a tyrant (hypothetical, because actual relationship is ok)  | XO | C | 1 |
| 54 | Getting negative evaluations, if conduct is not appropriate   | XO | B | 3 |
| 55 | Fear of failing to execute tasks as desired by CO   | XO | B | 1 |
| 56 | CO is not capable of leading the unit and providing appropriate guidance. This will lead to feelings like uncertainty, helplessness, or dissatisfaction | XO | C | 1 |
| 57 | CO is an idiot or moron (related to 56)   | XO | C | 2 |
| 58 | Not being able to meet expectations   | XO | B | 8 |
| 59 | Whether comments of biological or medical nature in a discussion with females could be construed as sexual harassment                                   | CO | A | 1 |



|    |  |    |   |   |
|----|--|----|---|---|
| 60 | Probable improper behavior and inappropriate performance in the past                                 | CO | A | 1 |
| 61 | Rumors about his person  | CO | C | 1 |
| 62 | Personal failure   | CO | A | 2 |
| 63 | Not being trained sufficiently to perform correctly in a job   | CO | C | 1 |
| 64 | Failure in the execution of duties as a consequence of 63  | CO | C | 1 |
| 65 | Getting a negative evaluation as a consequence of 64   | CO | C | 1 |
| 66 | Getting dismissed as a consequence of 65   | CO | C | 1 |
| 67 | Signing papers under time pressure or extremely high work load. Not enough time for effective checks | CO | C | 1 |
| 68 | Pressure from superiors and peers to conform to certain group norms which he does not accept         | CO | C | 1 |
| 69 | Failure in executing his tasks   | CO | A | 3 |

|    |   |    |   |   |
|----|---|----|---|---|
| 70 | Looking bad in front of the First<br>Sergeant | CO | A | 2 |
|----|---|----|---|---|

## APPENDIX E: RESUME DAVID L. WILLARD, PH.D.

To give the reader an overview of Mr. Willard's education and professional positions, I provide this short list. It is not a complete resume, but it serves the purpose of introducing Mr. Willard.

### Education

|           |        |  |
|-----------|--------|--|
| 1971      | Ph. D. | Clinical Psychology, University of Alabama                                     |
| 1970      | M. A.  | Clinical Psychology, University of Alabama                                     |
| 1968-1969 |        | Clinical Psychology Internship<br>Letterman Army Medical Center, San Francisco |
| 1966      | B. A.  | Psychology, Mississippi State University                                       |

### Professional Positions

|           |  |   |
|-----------|--|---|
| 1994-1982 |  | Clinical Psychologist, Recovery Center, Monterey, Ca<br>Private Practice, Psychotherapy and Testing<br>Adjunct Associate Professor, Chapman College, Monterey, CA   |
| 1982-1979 |  | Director, Clinical Psychology Internship<br>Chief, Psychology Service<br>Silas B. Hays Army Community Hospital<br>Fort Ord, CA<br>Academic Coordinator,<br>Adjunct Associate Professor, Chapman College, Monterey, CA |
| 1979-1977 |  | Chief, Psychology Service, Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Denver, Colorado   |
| 1976-1972 |  | Staff Psychologist, Silas B. Hays Army Community Hospital, Fort Ord, CA   |
| 1972-1971 |  | Chief, Psychology Service, 24th Evacuation Hospital, Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam   |

Mr. Willard was or still is member of the following organizations:

Member, American Psychological Association  
Diplomate in Clinical Psychology: American Board of Professional Psychology  
Fellow and Diplomate: International Academy of Behavioral Medicine, Counseling, and Psychotherapy  
Member, Council for the International Register of Health Providers in Psychology

#### LIST OF REFERENCES


1. Gray, J.A., *The Psychology of Fear and Stress*, Second Edition, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971.
2. Wiesehöfer, P., "Angst - Grundphänomen des Menschseins" (Fear - Basic Phenomenon in Human Existence), *Materialien zur Politischen Bildung (Material for the Political Education)*, 3, pp. 87-93, 1985.
3. Aguayo, R., *Dr. Deming The American Who Taught the Japanese About Quality*, Simon & Schuster, 1991.
4. Walton, M., *The Deming Management Method*, Perigee Books, 1986.
5. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Oxford University Press, 1963.
6. Williamson, P. B., *Patton's Principles A Handbook For Managers Who Mean It*, Simon & Schuster, 1982.
7. Muchinsky, P. M., *Psychology Applied to Work*, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1993.
8. Vaill, P., *Managing as a Performing Art*, Jossey-Bass., Inc., 1989.
9. *The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology*, 1st ed., The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983.
10. Bass, C. D., *Banishing Fear from Your Life*, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1986.
11. Gibb, J. R., *Trust A New View of Personal and Organizational Development*, Guild of Tutors Press, International College, 1978.
12. Cangemi, J. P., Rice, J., and Kowalski, C. J., "The Development, Decline and Renewal of Trust in an Organization: Some Observations", *Organizational Development Journal*, Winter 1989.
13. Fiedler, F. E., *Leadership and Effective Management*, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1974.

14. Luthans, F., *Organizational Behavior*, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1981.
15. Ryan, K. D. and Oestreich, D. K., *Driving Fear Out of the Workplace*, Jossey-Bass., Inc., 1991.
16. Department of the Navy, Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy, TQL Office, TQLO Publication No. 93-01, *Managing Fear in the Workplace*, by J. G. Suarez, January 1993.
17. Department of the Army, U.S. Army War College, *Leadership in the 1970's*, National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, September 1973.
18. Human Resources Research Organization, Professional Paper 13-74, *The Army Officer as Performance Manager*, by J. P. Frey, August 1974.
19. Buckley, J. W., Buckley, M. H., and Chiang, Hung-Fu, *Research Methodology & Business Decisions*, National Association of Accountants and The Society of Industrial Accountants of Canada, 1976.
20. Lewin, K., *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935.
21. *The Holy Bible*, Penguin Books USA Inc., 1974.
22. Schmidt, W., H., and Tannenbaum, R., "How to Chose a Leadership Pattern", *Harvard Business Review*, pp 95-101, March-April 1958.
23. Brown, D., R., and Harvey, D., F., *An Experimental Approach to Organization Development*, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1992.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center 2  
Cameron Station  
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. Professor Roger D. Evered AS/EV 4  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California 93943-5000

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY  
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101



GAYLORD 5



DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY



3 2768 00019437 7