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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

NATO AND POST-COLD WAR
GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS (1990-1997)

by

Sorin Lungu

June 1998

Thesis Co-Advisors:

David Yost
Donald Abenheim

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**NATO AND POST-COLD WAR GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
(1990-1997)**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

In 1990, at the end of the East-West conflict, a new actor with a different status and attitude appeared in the European political arena: the united Germany. The evolving European system poses special challenges for Germany and the United States, raising questions about their ability to influence the course of events. In fact, German-American relations during the 1990-1997 period played a central role in satisfying the post-Cold War needs of Bonn and Washington. In the new European state system, the new *Ostpolitik*, European integration, and a continued German-American security connection within the Atlantic Alliance are the defining elements. This thesis examines some of the implications of NATO's new cooperative relations with former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe and of the construction process of the European Security and Defense Identity for the international system and for the shared interests and policies (and national power) of Germany and the United States. It also analyzes how these developments might affect the future European security architecture and the transatlantic relationship.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the end of the East-West conflict, after Germany's unification in 1990, the accumulated weight of German power—unguided by any clear sense of direction—was pressing against transatlantic and West European institutions that were themselves in flux and that may yet prove inadequate to guide the European political order toward the new century. Questions about the adequacy of the transatlantic and West European political compacts raised the danger that the new Germany would embark on a European policy insufficiently enveloped and sustained by its traditional institutional contexts.

Furthermore, the present emerging European system poses a special challenge also to the United States. If the Americans hope to keep in step with the evolution of the European order and influence it constructively and farsightedly, they must redefine the “double containment policy”—in both its Russian and German dimensions—that guided their actions during the Cold War. If the United States fails to meet this challenge, it should not expect to retain its diplomatic leverage in Europe.

At the same time, the Germans require a supportive transatlantic and West European context for their exertions. They should not be induced to embark on an autonomous European policy, however indirectly or inadvertently. Nor is there any indication that they wish to do so.

In this context, this thesis aims to advance understanding of how German-American relations during the 1990-1997 period played a central role in satisfying the post-Cold War needs of Bonn and Washington. In the new European state system, the new *Ostpolitik*, European integration, and a continued German-American security connection within the Atlantic Alliance are the defining elements. Taking into account the fact that in the past Germany had so little political and diplomatic leeway in choosing among conflicting foreign policies, this thesis also assesses the influence of the new German foreign and security policies (developed after the unification in 1990) for the emerging European state system.

Finally, the thesis examines the way in which Germans themselves resisted the temptation to affirm their political identity through reflexive opposition or unquestioning allegiance to American policies, and the process that made the Americans recognize that the new Federal Republic of Germany has become a more influential regional power and that even an ally cannot determine the interests of its partner on the partner's behalf. These elements support the analysis of a relationship, which represents so much for America, for Europe, and for Germany.

The findings might be summarized as follows: There can be no doubt that the continuities of the Cold War are gone and that a fundamentally new German-American relationship emerged after the transition period of 1990-1992. The old concept of leadership, in which problems, resources and choices were often clear and implied German deference to American decisions, is no longer efficient. Thus, the new German-American relationship requires a more realistic assessment of needs and resources, including the recognition that burden-sharing is essential, and, perhaps, that uncertainties about outcomes need to be communicated to publics before action is taken.

However, Germany's commitment to European integration and the Franco-German couple is essential for the country's security, and stabilization to the East is of great importance as well (the complementarity shown by Germany and the U.S. during the process of NATO enlargement proved this well).

NATO remains the key institution in the German strategy. Germany can not afford to decide between Paris and Washington, and it might become increasingly difficult for Bonn to balance the Franco-American couple. In this setting, with the unification of Europe a medium or long-term perspective, with the prospects for a coherent EU military policy—or even a functioning ESDI—uncertain at best, with an increasing European military dependence on the Americans, and with German defense budgets under great pressure, Germany might in the near future give priority to its American partner. The German-American duo might then become even more prominent and assume a *de facto* leading role in developing and implementing NATO's priorities and policies (toward both Western and Eastern Europe), at the expense of the French and the British.

The Alliance's multiple missions must therefore be carefully reconsidered. The resiliency of NATO can be only partly understood in the light of its role as a continued insurance policy against Russian backsliding—that is, its traditional collective defense mission.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. NATO AND POST-COLD WAR GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The strategic, political, and economic developments of the last decade, although important in their own right, were only manifestations of deeper historical trends in the post-Second World War era. For underneath the technical disputes about military strategy and economics, and underlying the conflicts that corroded the transatlantic compact and slowed the progress of West European integration, there was a powerful current of socioeconomic, political, and psychological forces, which exerted a steady pull on the governments of Western Europe and the United States. These forces were the combined result of the changing nature of the state and the new ways in which states interact in the modern state system.

With the end of the East-West conflict, the emerging state system in Europe and in the world at large is a peculiar amalgam of past and present, moving toward an uncertain future. It might be described as multidimensional, contradictory, and in transition. It is infused with forces of economic and technological modernity and the social values that attend them, but also beset by historical memories, aspirations, and attitudes that are obsolescent and yet resilient, bending to atavistic inclinations.

In this context, after unification, the pre-1989 accumulated weight of German power—unguided by any clear sense of direction—was pressing against transatlantic and

West European institutions that were themselves in flux and that may yet prove inadequate to guide the European political order toward the new century. The combined inadequacy of the transatlantic and West European political compacts raised the danger that the new Germany would embark on a European policy insufficiently enveloped and sustained by its traditional institutional contexts. As the historic post-Second World War constraints on German foreign policy changed, whether and how these institutions could continue to provide a supportive and mutually acceptable framework for the energies of the new German diplomacy came into question.

The present emerging European system poses a special challenge also to the United States. If the Americans hope to keep in step with the evolution of the European order and influence it constructively and farsightedly, they must redefine the “double containment policy”—in both its Russian and German dimensions—that guided their actions during the Cold War. If the United States fails to meet this challenge, it should not expect to retain its diplomatic leverage in Europe.

At the same time, the Germans require a supportive transatlantic and West European context for their exertions. They should not be induced to embark on an autonomous European policy, however indirectly or inadvertently. Nor is there any indication that they wish to do so. The Federal Republic of Germany has always been highly sensitive to its singularity within the North Atlantic Alliance in political as well as military and strategic matters, and a *Sonderweg* was imposed to Bonn within NATO from the beginning. The singularity of the Germans’ historic position in Europe might be

considered burdensome enough without being compounded by their continuing singularity in the Alliance.

In this context, this thesis aims to advance understanding on how German-American relations during the 1990-1997 period played a central role in fulfilling the post-Cold War needs of Bonn and Washington. In the new European state system, the new *Ostpolitik*, European integration, and a continued German-American security connection are the defining elements. Taking into account the fact that in the past Germany had so little political leeway and diplomatic maneuverability in choosing among conflicting foreign policies, this thesis also assesses the influence of the new German foreign and security policies (developed after the unification) for the post-1989 emerging European state system.

Finally, the thesis examines the way in which Germans themselves resisted the temptation to affirm their political identity through reflexive opposition or unquestioning allegiance to American policies, and the process that made the Americans recognize that the new Federal Republic of Germany has become a regional superpower and that even an ally cannot determine the interests of its partner on the partner's behalf. These elements complete the analysis of a relationship that represents so much for America, for Europe, and for Germany.

The exploration of the above mentioned topics is necessary because it raises important issues about how we should think about NATO and its future. The dual mission of the Alliance must be carefully reconsidered. The resiliency of NATO can be

only partly understood in the light of its role as a continued insurance policy against Russian backsliding, or because of its collective defense mission.

Equally important is the role to be played by the united Germany. Fundamental to the Western community was the diffuse reciprocal agreement between Bonn and the Allies, led by the United States, concerning German reunification. In exchange for the allied guarantee of equality and of promoting of its eventual unification, Germany integrated into the West. Germany has now reunited as a democratic state, and has therefore attained the unification that wedded it so loyally to the West. The indication is therefore that a strong Western community has arisen.

However, such indicators might be premature. The united Germany is questioning anew its rightful place in post-Cold War Europe and reassessing its national interests. How much effort the new Germany will devote to sustaining the community-building institutions that brought it to this point remains to be seen. Germany's role is now less clear than ever. Assuming that community-building does remain valid for the recasting of NATO and transatlantic relations, whose community-building scheme will be applied to incorporate the former East bloc? These are central questions that require an answers in the coming years.

B. CHAPTER OUTLINE

The second chapter concentrates on the German-American relationship during the 1990-1992 period, an era of cooperation and coordination between two close allies in the new post-Cold War environment. Both Bonn and Washington needed to start redefining, at that specific moment, how to manage equality and relinquish responsibility.

The third chapter focuses on German and American attitudes in 1990-1997 toward the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and NATO's internal adaptation, examining the rationales and reactions of the two countries concerning the major decisions taken regarding these developments. The role of France in this process is carefully examined. The final remarks emphasize that, in 1995-1997, it became more difficult for Germany to address its Franco-American priorities. And, with the real unification of Europe a long-term perspective, in the immediate future, Bonn (and Berlin) might give higher priority to the Americans.

The fourth chapter traces the influence of German and American policies toward (a) NATO's cooperation with former Central and Eastern European (CEE) adversaries and (b) the European security architecture in the 1990-1997 period. It also examines some of the rationales that led to the 1997 Madrid decisions in the process of NATO's enlargement. The answer to the questions concerning "why" and "who" in the enlargement process is to be found in the strong influence of the German-American security relationship on NATO's decision-making process.

The fifth and final chapter sums up the conclusions. The thesis concludes that after the Cold War a fundamentally new German-American relationship emerged. The two countries now have a security partnership in which they are more equal in their mutual dependence. Furthermore, with the unification of Europe a medium or long-term perspective and with the prospects for a coherent EU military policy uncertain at best, Germany might in the near future give priority to its American partner, to the regret of the French.

II. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War, beginning with the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, a global alliance system was at the center of American strategic thought. The relationship with Europe was perceived as an important element of the security architecture that was to be developed. However, the world changed dramatically in 1989-1991 through four separate but connected events: the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s; the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989; the unification of Germany in October 1990; and the failure of the attempted coup in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

In this context, the European Community (EC) itself became a different player in the international arena, owing in part to its transformation into the European Union (EU) with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993. For the EU countries, security was no longer as pressing and imperative, and other priorities could receive more attention. Moreover, relationships that proved to be very efficient and predictable during the Cold War period (such as the West German-American relationship) witnessed unforeseeable developments.

Throughout the history of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949-1989, its foreign policy aims remained remarkably constant: security, reunification, and political

rehabilitation and economic reconstruction in the context of the Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. As the political, strategic and economic configurations of power changed, so did the mix of restraints and opportunities confronting West German foreign policies. Necessities became coupled with possibilities. Thus, three distinct phases emerged in the Cold War period, during which the complementarities and contradictions in West German foreign policy were shaped in significantly different ways.¹

In the first phase, the formative years from 1949 to the late 1950s, the Cold War contest between the two power blocs, the historical burdens of the past, and the Federal Republic's lack of sovereignty presented it with the most severe restraints and led to fundamental contradictions between West German foreign policy goals in the West and the East.

In the second phase, from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, an additional set of contradictions was placed on West German policy, leading to a fragmentation of its previously coherent Western policy. The Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the United States and sought to legitimize rather than alter the European status quo, while de Gaulle was determined to gain a global role for a Europe led by France, even at the expense of Atlantic unity. This forced Bonn to choose between its central security

¹ For an analysis of West German foreign policy in 1949-1989 see, for example, Peter R. Merkl, *German Foreign Policies, West & East: On the Treshold of a New European Era* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1974), Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993), Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., *West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), and Edwina S. Campbell, *Germany's Past & Europe's Future: The Challenges of West German Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989).

interests in NATO and its central economic interests and political aspirations in Western Europe. These choices carried with them important ramifications for Germany's Eastern policy as well.

In the third phase, the 1970s and 1980s, three elements affected West German foreign policy goals. First, the elements of international power and its overall configurations changed considerably, diminishing the relative power of the Americans and making for a much more complicated global and European environment. This setting required fewer clear-cut choices from West German foreign policy makers.

Second, Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, the centerpiece of the efforts of East-West détente, obtained a more active role for West German foreign policy. It had become an integral part of NATO security policy and West German policy because it reflected the dual principles of NATO's 1967 Harmel Report: deterrence coupled with political negotiations.

Third, although the emerging primacy of economic and monetary matters and the ramifications of global economic interdependence increased the Federal Republic's political leverage, they further complicated German-American relations in this period. This relationship was already burdened by conflicting assessments of the meaning of détente, the infirmities and ambiguities of Washington's security and arms control policies, and mutual recriminations over diplomatic style as well as political substance.²

² See Garton Ash, chapter II (*Ostpolitik*) and Merkl, chapter III (German Foreign Policies).

Despite the above mentioned elements, for forty years (1949-1989) the relationship between West Germany and the United States was a pivotal element of the Western security system. During the Cold War the two countries worked together to shape the basic elements of a common political, economic and military system. With the beginning of the 1990s, two of the foundations of the close German-American relationship collapsed. The common Soviet threat disappeared and Germany was reunited, thus becoming an actor with a different status and attitude, and distinct interests in the European political arena.

Given their intrinsic importance, developments in German-American relations immediately after the end of the Cold War (1990-1992) deserve closer scrutiny. This chapter argues that during this period, certain factors made the two countries adopt different approaches on issues concerning the interests and actions of the Western Alliance system, and that disagreements led to a change in the bilateral relationship and new terms for political cooperation and coordination.

B. THE NEW GERMANY, THE NEW AMERICA AND THEIR SEARCH FOR NEW IDENTITIES

“Germany, suddenly united, is facing immense difficulties not only in completing its own unification but also defining its new European and global role.”³ In the process

³ Richard W. Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 27.

of unification, the United States offered the necessary leadership for implementing Chancellor Kohl's vision. President Bush's early decision to commit America to German unity permitted the "German chancellor to follow his instincts, assured of the backing of Germany's most powerful ally."⁴ At the same time, "Bush pressed Kohl to close off any attempts to compromise Germany's position in NATO"⁵ and in return the U.S. "adopted German ideas about handling the status of East Germany."⁶

The centrality of Germany to Europe supports the judgement that "the character of the new German state that emerged—fully sovereign and unequivocally anchored in Western institutions—will determine in large part the shape of the new Europe."⁷ Thus, Germany's unification was a moment of triumph and also one of doubt for the new country and its allies.

At the same time the united Germany is a different creature from West Germany. It has different boundaries, different neighbors, different priorities, different policies, and a different weight. Furthermore it is fully sovereign, and thus has to pursue policies that will be different from West Germany. It will also develop a greater consciousness of its own independent role and interests than West Germany had. As the Federal Republic of Germany, it might have the same official name as the former West Germany, but it is not the same identity.⁸

⁴ Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 367.

⁵ Alexander Moens, "American diplomacy and German unification," *Survival*, vol. XXX (November/December 1991), p. 543.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Rice and Zelikow, p. 366.

⁸ Smyser, p. 31.

The new Germany started to see that its priorities differed in some ways from those of the leader of the victorious Western coalition, the United States. An active contribution in helping to reshape the “New World Order”⁹ seemed to be a delicate and important task for the new political entity, because there were at least two areas in which the German government wanted to pursue a path at variance with that followed by the United States.

One area was economics. After unification, Germany and its financial capital, Frankfurt, seemed to have real prospects to become the true financial center of Europe. Thus, the *Bundesbank* could enhance its position as the most powerful player in European monetary matters and might have more influence over global monetary rates than it did before 1990. That is of immense importance for the entire world. The strict economic criteria imposed on the European Union (EU) countries in order to meet the 1997-1999 convergence requirements of the impending European Monetary Union (EMU) may well define either the *Deutsche Mark* or the *euro* as the most stable currency in the world. In 1993, referring to the *euro* by its earlier name of ECU (European currency unit), Richard Smyser offered the following judgement:

⁹ The meaning of the concept is the one specifically used by the Bush administration.

Such a stable currency, pledged against periodic devaluation, will attract investors and producers. If the U.S. dollar were to continue to lose value, raw material producers might well demand that their commodity prices be denominated in marks or Ecus instead of dollars, or at least in some basket of currencies including marks or a European currency. This would give united Germany and Europe considerable authority to manage the flow of global goods and to attract the kinds of investments that now often go to the dollar.¹⁰

This could significantly affect U.S. economic interests by introducing a powerful *deflationary* force in the global monetary system. Stability-oriented German (and European) policies could make it impossible for the Americans to manage their currency as freely as in the past. It would also require to the U.S. to review some of its monetary policies, to reduce the risk of devaluation in the face of an alternative global currency.¹¹

Another area was diplomacy. Throughout the postwar period West Germany's security policy was shaped by a unique set of factors: national partition, the burdens of German history, doubts about German democracy, and the reality of being a front line state confronted with overwhelming Soviet power.¹² NATO and the extended American nuclear deterrent guaranteed West Germany's security in the 1949-1989 period, supported the West German effort to achieve Western European political and economic integration, and were considered essential to the eventual unification of the two Germanys. Chancellor Kohl stated in 1988 that: "the western alliance is part of our

¹⁰ Richard W. Smyser, "The Global Economic Effects of German Unification," in Gary L. Geipel, ed., *Germany in a New Era* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1993), p. 271.

¹¹ Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?*, p. 33.

¹² Ronald Asmus, "The Future of German Strategic Thinking," in Gary L. Geipel, ed., *Germany in a New Era* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1993), p. 142.

Staatsraison” and that NATO represented the “cornerstone of [West German] security policy.”¹³

Traditionally an “importer” of security and a beneficiary of Western collective defense, the new Germany further believed that “security” means not only military force but also diplomatic instruments. Faced with the question of whether it is now the moment to “become an exporter of Western political values, economic influence, and security,”¹⁴ it tried to move the Western Alliance toward flexible diplomatic arrangements,¹⁵ which were considered supplements at least of some of the military structures, even though Germany wanted the established structures such as NATO and the EU to remain in place. In this context, the German preference for a set of “interlocking institutions” has become a key component of NATO’s lexicon, reflecting the need for complementarity of those institutions.¹⁶

A motivation for the German actions could be found in James Sperling’s remarks:

...[T]he sources of cohesion in the Alliance have undergone a subtle but significant change. NATO member states, to be sure, share common interests, but the Germans argue that common values are the glue that holds the alliance together. For the Germans, the American role in Europe

¹³ Helmuth Kohl, “Die Streitkräfte als wichtiges Instrument der Sicherheitspolitik,” 13 December 1988, in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Bulletin*, 175 (16 December 1988), p. 1550-1551. As quoted in James Sperling, “German Security Policy,” in *German Unification: Process and Outcome*, in Donald M. Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 263-264.

¹⁴ Asmus, p. 142.

¹⁵ Such as: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the new EU-WEU links specified in the Maastricht Treaty, and the new role of the CSCE in providing the basis for a pan-European security system.

¹⁶ See North Atlantic Council Communiqué, 19 December 1991.

has evolved into the explicit role of night watchman. The necessity of NATO for the success of the EC-WEU in forging a European defense identity or the CSCE in providing the basis of a pan-European security system has forced the Germans to argue against the [American supported] proposition that NATO, EC-WEU, and the CSCE have conflicting purposes or conflicting logics. Hence, the Germans, adopted the slogan 'sowohl-als-auch' (this as well as that) and the emphatic rejection of 'entweder-oder' (either this or that) in their discussions of the future institutional constellation of the future European security order.¹⁷

These attitudes, emphasizing powerful new German roles and missions, received immediate reactions, especially in the West. France and Britain questioned whether Germany should have so much influence in shaping Europe.¹⁸ The Americans showed ambivalence: they wanted a strong and united Germany, but they reacted with considerable suspicion and even alarm to German policies that did not follow the postwar pattern.

A good illustration is the American reaction to the post-1989 redimensioned Franco-German relationship. At the core of the new Europe, the Paris-Bonn axis could influence decisively major options and trends. France, like Germany, has been primarily a continental power, although it has historically played a much more global role than Germany. France has long resisted and resented American dominance in Europe. It also has its own nuclear force, a separate military identity, and its own agenda regarding the European Security and Defense Identity. Thus, in the new environment, the Americans

¹⁷ James Sperling, "German Security Policy," in Donald M. Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds., *German Unification: Process and Outcome* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 264.

¹⁸ See, for example, for Britain: Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years: 1979-1990* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), and for France: Patrick Mc Carthy, ed., *France-Germany, 1983-1993* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993).

considered that revived Franco-German cooperation might threaten the dominant U.S. position in Europe.¹⁹

The United States perceived that Germany, focusing on Europe's problems and trying to establish a continental security system, might need France more than it needs America, at least with regard to European construction. The Paris-Bonn (and later Paris-Berlin) connection could provide a political and strategic core for Europe itself. Depending on its practical implementation, such a development could go to the heart of the future organization of the continent and to the heart of the American role in Europe and even to the American position in the world.

In this setting, the first signs that the German-American relationship might be on a different trend gained visibility. Thus, the search for the appropriate terms for the new cooperation—accepted in both countries by the publics as well by the governments—had begun.²⁰

Most Americans welcomed the end of the Cold War because it represented the end the division of Europe. Nonetheless, the U.S. Congress and the American public embraced a cautious attitude regarding the commitments to be made to Eastern Europe or to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It was obvious that the Americans were not prepared to extend the same type of commitments that they had made to

¹⁹ See, for example, Philip H. Gordon, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1995).

²⁰ See Christoph Bertram, "US-German Relations in a World at Sea," *Daedalus* 121 (Fall 1992), pp. 120-123.

Western Europe, but envisaged engaging in “limited operations.” This attitude was especially obvious during the crisis that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. The United States expected major European actions before American forces were committed on a large and definitive scale; thus the American discussion was dominated by speeches about what America’s allies should do, even when the U.S. itself was prepared to do very little.²¹

The Western victory in the Cold War gave the debates in 1990-1992 about economic policies and about the role of the government a new dimension. America turned its focus inward, beset by domestic issues and associated worries and priorities. It was a period characterized by political, economic, and social change. The future of U.S. foreign policy was added to the debate and, in this context, the concept of a “peace dividend” did not prove to be as significant as had been hoped.²²

Furthermore, America started to look for rationales to cut its overseas commitments. Proposals to disengage from Cold War security commitments and to exercise greater restraint in intervening or assuming obligations overseas²³ made the West Europeans fear that isolationism might become the dominant trend in U.S. foreign policy. George F. Kennan recalled John Quincy Adams’s words that: “America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well wisher to the freedom and

²¹ Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?*, pp. 39-48.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

²³ See, for example, Ronald Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”²⁴ Many analysts were inclined to believe that the U.S. might go ”back to the womb.”²⁵

Moreover, it seemed that the U.S. might turn its attention to the Americas or to the Asia-Pacific region to the detriment of Europe. Traditionally, the Western debate on European security was centered on NATO and carried out as a dialogue between North America and Western Europe. But this relationship, based on the security requirements of a divided Europe, looked like it was losing its relevance. Under domestic pressures and, thus, not only because the Cold War was over, issues of economic security were increasingly seen in Washington as being as important as issues of military security. The Asia-Pacific region also represented an area of economic dynamism, with markets experiencing rapid rates of growth.²⁶ As Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated later, “Western Europe is no longer the dominant area of the world.”²⁷

A more important factor in defining new U.S. priorities was that the American government and people started to realize that the United States depended on foreign resources and foreign markets. This realization was complemented with the perspective

²⁴ John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, address on July 4, 1823, cited in George F. Kennan, “On American Principles,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995), p. 118.

²⁵ The title of an incisive article written by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “Back to the Womb: Isolationism’s Renewed Threat,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 40 (July/August 1995), pp. 2-8.

²⁶ For a complete analysis of the impact of the possible U.S. orientation toward Pacific on the transatlantic relationship, see Robert O’Brien, “Manifest Destiny and the Pacific Century: Europe as No. 3,” in Jarod Wiener, ed., *The Transatlantic Relationship* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 95-127.

²⁷ *The Guardian*, 18 October 1993.

that “[t]he United States now needs allies and friends even when it does not have enemies.”²⁸ A precise balance of the moral and strategic elements of U.S. foreign policy and the definition of the national interest were required as an essential guide to American policy.²⁹ Thus, in the post-Cold War environment the “moral” justification for continuing U.S. international involvement has finally been put in the proper context:

The United States no longer pretends that moral principle is the primary driving force behind the country’s security policy. Rather, it is recognized that economics and politics require the maintenance of a large military establishment and the occasional use of force. As energy and other forms of economic interdependence grew, the American standard of living was tied more closely than ever to the country’s ability to influence the developments abroad by power politics. This often demands that the United States associate with regimes that do not share America’s democratic values... International politics does not permit the United States the luxury of ideological purity.³⁰

It might be concluded that, at the end of the Cold War, at least three principal American strategic interests in the world were evident:

1. To maintain the U.S. as the premier global power;
 2. To prevent the emergence of a political-military hegemonic power in Eurasia;
- and,

²⁸ Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?*, p. 47.

²⁹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone Rockefeller Center, 1994), pp. 810-812.

³⁰ Lawrence J. Korb, “The United States,” in Douglas J. Murray & Paul R. Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 32.

3. To protect concrete American interests in the Third World, which are primarily in the Persian Gulf and Central America.³¹

Given these elements, one of the important questions at the beginning of the 1990s for Germany was whether the U.S. government could find the proper balance between domestic and foreign commitments, and whether the Americans could formulate effective policies to deal with their allies during the search for a proper balance.

When the Americans supported the reunification of Germany in 1989, they fully expected that a new united Germany would support American foreign policy and help maintain the Western alliance system as “partners in leadership.”³² Bonn and Washington wanted to work together to adapt the political security system that both countries had helped to build in the Cold War environment. Although the two countries wanted common security, they operate in different areas, at different levels, and in different ways. They look at the world from very different locations and historical perspectives.

Germany’s new identity went beyond new borders. It looked more self-confident, stronger, richer, and potentially more influential. Germany’s new stature—in terms of equality and independence—looked as if it might be difficult for the U.S. to accept. America seemed more ambivalent, less ready to make new commitments, more anxious

³¹ See Samuel P. Huntington, “America’s changing strategic interests,” *Survival*, vol. XXXIII (January/February 1991), pp. 3-17.

³² See President’s Bush speech, “Proposals for a Free and Peaceful Europe” delivered in May 1989 and reprinted by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, *Current Policy*, no. 1, 179, June 1989.

to remain at home, and yet, paradoxically, more global in its interests and concerns. The United States was discovering that, since unification, its relationship with Germany could be complex and unpredictable. As Christoph Bertram wrote in 1992:

Today, Germany and the United States can no longer take for granted the basis they built over forty years. In the United States, a new administration, Democratic or Republican, whatever its intentions, is likely to see Germany more as a commercial competitor than a partner in leadership. In Germany, with the fragmenting of its party system and the economic uncertainties stemming from unification, not to speak of other social tensions, a change of government in 1994 is at least conceivable. With a new team at the helm, less instinctively pro-American and pro-European than that led in the past ten years by Helmut Kohl, there is some prospect of new directions being taken. Changes that in the past occurred in a known environment, will happen in an unknown one.³³

Under these circumstances, an evaluation of some aspects of their political cooperation and coordination in 1990-1992 might provide answers for questions that seemed to be, at that moment in time, fundamental for U.S.-German relations:³⁴

- Was the U.S. prepared to accept a German government that shared its basic interests but might pursue different policies?
- Could the post-Second World War intimacy remain even if the nature of the mutual military and diplomatic dependence had changed?
- Would Germany—with a new status and redefined interests—still accept a tone of superiority from the U.S. government?

³³ Bertram, p. 126.

³⁴ Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?*, p. 50.

C. POLITICAL COOPERATION AND DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES

With the disappearance of the division of Germany, the new political entity obtained new neighbors and took greater responsibility for its relations with Central and Eastern European countries. While the purpose of its policy of *détente* in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was to lessen mistrust and to provide security guarantees regarding the *status quo*, the new task was to develop close cooperative ties with these states that would enable them to make progress towards democracy and free-market economic arrangements.

The *Ostpolitik* pursued during the period from late 1960s to the late 1980s had as its

...long-term goal the reunification of Germany...[and]...it was also designed to advance the coming of a European peace order by way of full recognition of the sovereignty and frontiers of existing East European states, including paradoxically, the German Democratic Republic [GDR], and to bring to these countries economic and political reform.³⁵

Despite its limitations, there is no doubt that West Germany's *Ostpolitik* created an atmosphere that encouraged *détente* (*Entspannung*) in Europe and, in general, it legitimized and brought some benefits to the Eastern European regimes, and, thus, remained popular in West Germany.³⁶ In this setting, when German unification became

³⁵ It was also characterized by contradictions: its practitioners tended to become so deeply involved in promoting the latter objective, more difficult to achieve, that they tended to neglect and even forget the former. See Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 120.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

again a political issue (1989-1990), German security experts such as Helga Haftendorn argued as follows:

Germany's interest with regard to the states of Central and Eastern Europe is of a political, military, and economic nature. It would like the process of democratization and liberalization to continue and the countries to develop stable political structures. Military priorities dictate a reduction of the existing arms arsenals in the region and the prevention of military conflicts between and within these states.³⁷

Taking into account the difficulties of fully integrating the former GDR, market-oriented economies in CEE might offer export markets for German goods, investment possibilities for German capital, and supplies of necessary raw materials for German industry. The markets seemed ideally suited for penetration, but that would require political stability. This became an imperative solution because:

Many of the problems confronting Germany in the mid-1990s are the consequence of an unprecedented legal-institutional merger of two highly disparate institutional societies [the former FRG and GDR]. Mass expectations concerning the anticipated benefits of unification have proved unrealistic, at least in the short run. Exacerbating domestic problems of integration are destabilizing external economic factors and political upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe.³⁸

³⁷ Helga Haftendorn, "Gulliver in the Center of Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities for Action," in Bertel Heurlin, ed., *Germany and Europe in the Nineties* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 107.

³⁸ Donald M. Hancock, "Economic and Political Performance: Patterns and Prospects," in Donald M. Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds., *German Unification: Process and Outcome* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 245. The domestic social and political constraints caused by the reunification process make Germany consider that it is in its fundamental interest to stabilize its Eastern perimeter and prevent tremors in its own political and social systems that could be caused by a new influx of refugees, a further penetration of organized crime, or the spread of ethnic conflict and civil war.

In this setting, in order to cope with these simultaneous demands on the country's economic and social resources, Germany's leaders considered that support for democratic reforms was of vital German (and European) interest, and the stabilization of Germany's immediate Central European hinterland became an urgent task. A strategy to extend Western institutions eastward—at least to the Visegrad states—was justified in economic and geostrategic terms. As Josef Joffe concluded, Germany considered itself at “the forefront of those who would attach the Central European quartet to the EU and NATO while taking care not to do so too blatantly for fear of alienating Russia.”³⁹ The new realities of Europe transformed the unacceptable *Drang nach Osten* into *Zwang nach Osten*,⁴⁰ as a key for successful mediation between Germany and the CEE states.

In this context, Germany took the initiative in organizing aid for the CIS, the arrangement linking most of the states of the former Soviet Union, and for the separate states within the CIS. It had also given more aid than any other Western country to Russia and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. Between 1989 and the end of 1992 it supplied \$50 billion, compared with \$9 billion from the U.S.⁴¹ Germany pressed for

³⁹ Josef Joffe, “No Threats, No Temptations: German Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” in Bertel Heurlin, ed., *Germany and Europe in the Nineties* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 270. Germany could seek to bring CEE into the EU and NATO orbit and, failing that, into its own. But it might pursue a “Greater Central-European Co-Prosperity Sphere” with prudence, taking care not to alienate Russia or to stimulate Western suspicions.

⁴⁰ See Gregory F. Treverton, *America, Germany and the Future of Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 199-205.

⁴¹ The trend remained the same in 1993: Germany alone transferred another \$20 billion to Russia, compared with less than \$4 billion from the U.S. See David Haglund, “Germany's Central European Conundrum,” *European Security*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 30.

Russian membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), pledged its share for a fund to stabilize the ruble, and asked the other Western governments to help during the G-7 meeting in January 1992 and at the Munich G-7 summit in July 1992. German diplomats and trade officials pushed hard to ease restrictions on technology exports to the former communist states.⁴²

Disagreement with the Americans came from the U.S. priorities at that moment in Europe. The American government perceived some of the same problems that Germany saw to its East, but the end of the Cold War meant for it that the global balance of power would not turn on Europe as it had since 1945. For the United States, Europe was only a part of the world, even though it was (and remains) the part that Germany regards as the main arena for its own interests. And if there was an American concern about Europe at that moment, it was no longer about Russia or about Eastern Europe.

Instead, the Americans were concerned about the main direction that Western Europe would take. They feared that the attempt to build European institutions based on opposition to the United States might in the end wreck both European unity and Atlantic cohesion. A separate West European path in political, military, and economic affairs, announced by the dispute “between the concepts of Richelieu and the ideas of Wilson—between foreign policy as a balancing of interests and diplomacy as an affirmation of an underlying harmony,”⁴³ was not a welcome perspective in Washington.

⁴² Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift*, p. 55.

⁴³ Kissinger, p. 822.

However, America has been much more willing than other states to concede that Germany has a leading role in world affairs. The U.S. government supported Germany's permanent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, although France and Great Britain initially opposed it. The Americans thought that such involvement would support U.S. as well as German interests, but Washington has often found Bonn, its political class and German public opinion, less ready to act than Americans would prefer.⁴⁴ It was the heritage of over 40 years in which "German politicians have been extremely sensitive to avoid the impression of being nationalistic, 'imperialistic' or in any way following the footsteps of the hegemonic power ambitions of Germany's terrible past."⁴⁵

The work of global political cooperation, including the selective use of force, has not waited for Bonn and Washington to sort out their disagreements. The most pronounced differences between the two countries arose with respect to the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and the Yugoslav crisis of 1991-1992.

⁴⁴ Especially regarding German involvement in new military missions, "the culture of reticence" was still dominant among the political elite and general public. See, for example, Ronald Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion after the Wall 1990-1993* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1994), pp. 61-65.

⁴⁵ Ekkehart Krippendorf, "Germany as a World/European Power," in Bertel Heurlin, ed., *Germany and Europe in the Nineties* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 71.

D. THE GULF WAR AND THE 1991-1992 YUGOSLAV CRISIS

The Gulf crisis that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990—which coincided historically with the German unification—showed that the Germany of 1990-1992 was not inclined to undertake global obligations and that it might even hesitate about some European obligations. Germany's reaction to the conflict was profoundly marked by the legacy of the post-Second World War period. Given the fact that several treaties were not ratified⁴⁶ and that the Soviet military withdrawal from Germany was not confirmed in legal terms, the German government did not send combat forces to the Gulf despite U.S. requests for at least some support⁴⁷, although it did send minesweepers to the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁸

This attitude was justified by reports of Soviet warnings that the deployment of German forces in the Gulf would jeopardize Supreme Soviet ratification of German unity

⁴⁶ Such as the CFE Treaty, the German Unification Treaty and the CSCE Final Act.

⁴⁷ On 30 August 1990, the Bush administration publicly requested that other countries share the financial burdens that resulted from the need to support countries affected by the economic sanctions and from the military presence in the Gulf. On the same day, President Bush called Chancellor Kohl and asked for German support without specifying its nature. Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Germany and the Iraq Conflict," from Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, eds., *Western Europe and the Gulf: A study of West European reactions to the Gulf war carried out under the auspices of the Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union* (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union), p. 43.

⁴⁸ On 16 August 1990 Germany ordered five mine countermeasures vessels and two supply ships to a NATO naval base on Crete to assist in the protection of shipping lanes on the Southern Flank. In early February 1991, a group consisting of two German destroyers, two frigates, and two supply ships augmented NATO's naval presence in the Mediterranean. In March 1991, the German minesweeping detachment was transferred from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf to participate in clearing mined shipping lanes. Finally it was authorized by the German government to participate in multinational coordination activities under the European banner of the WEU. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

and might delay the departure of Soviet troops from Germany.⁴⁹ It was also meant not to send any signals that might strengthen the position of the hard line opposition in Moscow. Bonn's concerns were correctly perceived by Germany's allies, in particular the United States.⁵⁰

Despite the fact that U.S. officials had not explicitly asked Germany to participate in the forces assembled under General Norman Schwarzkopf's command in the Gulf, there were voices in Washington⁵¹ and inside the North Atlantic Alliance⁵² that expressed irritation and criticized the slowness of the German reaction and the evident intentions of the German government to remain uninvolved⁵³ in a situation that the American political elite believed should concern others as much as itself.

Two other important issues that caused disturbances in Germany's relations with the U.S. were the question of assisting Turkey against a possible Iraqi attack, and, above all the *Scud* missiles fired at Israel by the Iraqis.

First, the American military establishment was extremely worried by the delay of several weeks in the German contribution to the ACE Mobile Force in Turkey, despite a

⁴⁹ Catherine Kelleher and Cathleen Fischer, "Germany," in Douglas J. Murray & Paul R. Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 163-164.

⁵⁰ Kaiser and Becher, p. 39.

⁵¹ Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?*, p. 61.

⁵² Kaiser and Becher, p. 43.

⁵³ Joffe, p. 260.

specific Turkish request in the NATO Defense Planning Committee⁵⁴, because the delay hinted that Bonn might not honor its NATO commitment to Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack.⁵⁵ In this case German diplomacy missed an opportunity to demonstrate open solidarity with an ally that was of major strategic importance for NATO during the Cold War. Moreover, the debate within Germany and abroad on Bonn's behavior in the Turkish case had a much bigger impact on German strategic thinking than appeared at the first sight.

...[It] unleashed not only external criticism but also internal reaction to avoid the danger of Germany's isolation. It strengthened the position of those political forces who argued in favour of a responsible contribution by the unified Germany to multilateral approaches in the field of security and international order.⁵⁶

The debate about the future of German "out of area" operations in the context of constitutional limitations received a strong impetus and it also revealed ambivalent attitudes about Germany that still existed in the U.S.

⁵⁴ 20 December 1990.

⁵⁵ See for example Thomas Kielinger and Max Otte, "Germany: The Pressured Power," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1993).

⁵⁶ Kaiser and Becher, p. 50.

While some Americans argued that Germany had now out-grown the Hitler legacy and could participate in global operations like any other country, others still invoked that legacy and used a tone of moral superiority in arguing either for or against German involvement. The tone as much as the substance of the American debate left many Germans both confused and angry, and they especially resented being accused of neglecting their loyalty to the United States by failing to send military forces after Americans had long told Germans that they should abandon their militarist tradition.⁵⁷

Second, the case of the Iraqi missiles caused a lot of trouble for the German government. The perception of a German historical guilt and Genscher's visit to Israel on 24-25 January 1991 "exposed the inherent weakness of a policy of non-involvement while it had to face strong accusations concerning Germany's responsibility for the Iraqi arms build up."⁵⁸ It was in a sense the price to be paid for a diplomatic attitude under which "passivity" in the international arena turned a handsome profit. Through "conciliation rather than confrontation, and trade rather than war"⁵⁹ the Federal Republic tried to offend no one and to be friends with all during the 1970s and 1980s: with Iran and Iraq, Israel and the Arabs, the USA and the USSR.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?*, p. 62.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁵⁹ Joffe, p. 260.

⁶⁰ For a complete perspective, it should be recalled that this attitude was an expression of the 'harmonization need' (*Harmonisierungsbedürfnis*). Considered one of the hallmarks of the FRG's foreign policy, it "may to some extent be characteristic of all modern, liberal industrial states, and particular of those 'trading states'—such as Germany and Japan—whose prosperity depends to an unusual degree on keeping good relations with a wide range of trading partners." Garton Ash, p. 40.

As Richard Smyser has pointed out, it was a moment when, because of the German sales of equipment for military purposes to Iraq⁶¹, "there would have been a major crisis in German American relations if any Iraqi Scud missile had hit Israel with a chemical warhead that might have been manufactured with German machinery."⁶²

The Yugoslav crisis during 1991 and 1992 raised a different set of problems between Bonn and Washington. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, because it happened in Europe and not in the Middle East, received, at least in its initial phase, contrasting reactions from the two governments. These reactions illustrated how the U.S. and Germany might respond differently to European and non-European matters and also raised questions about the extent to which the U.S. would be prepared to engage in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

In 1991 an open split developed between Washington and Bonn. Germany openly supported the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In early September 1991, Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared: "The hour of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia approaches with each missile fired by ... cannons and tanks. We cannot witness these events without

⁶¹ Later revelations indicated that German exporters had also supplied Iraq with centrifuges that could have been used by the Iraqi government for uranium enrichment and that could have helped Iraq to develop and produce atomic bombs. They also suggested that German firms might have sold rocket parts and equipment to Iraq.

⁶² Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?*, p. 63.

taking action.”⁶³ It was a strong sign that Germany was prepared to recognize Slovenia and Croatia if they declared independence.

This happened after Secretary of State James Baker, despite being informed of analyses indicating that the country was about to disintegrate, made a visit in June 1991 to Belgrade to win assurances that none of the constituent republics would pursue actions that would jeopardize Yugoslav unity. The speech that he made on this occasion committed the U.S. to Yugoslav unity, at a moment when it was obvious to every one that the constituent republics were seething with revolt.⁶⁴

At the end of 1991, against the advice of Secretary Baker and of the retiring UN Secretary General Xavier Perez de Cuellar, and despite the hard lobbying of the American government, Germany pressed the EC to recognize the two states.⁶⁵ This decision brought forth the old arguments about Germany being too “assertive” and even aggressive. “When German diplomats met with others to present their views, American

⁶³ Geoffrey Edwards, “European Responses to the Yugoslav crisis: An Interim Assessment” in Reinhardt Rummel, ed., *Toward Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 178.

⁶⁴ When the Yugoslav crisis erupted in 1991, both the U.S. National Security Adviser, General Brent Scowcroft, and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, were old hands who had served in Belgrade (Eagleburger as ambassador) and who later enjoyed consultant relationships with Yugoslav authorities and Yugoslav companies. Some observers argue that this may have been one of the reasons why the U.S. government, publicly embarrassed by the EC decision of December 1991 and with several of its officials accused of financially motivated partisanship, pulled back and let the Europeans--especially the Germans--take the lead in trying to deal with the crisis. See, for example, Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?*, p. 64.

⁶⁵ From this moment the U.S. ceased to support Yugoslav integrity and recognized the independence of the separate republics, joining the Europeans in April 1992 in also recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it generally abstained (at least until 1993) from any attempts to solve or guide developments in the former Yugoslavia.

newspapers reported that the Germans were exerting 'pressure tactics' and that they were 'demanding' that others follow their wishes."⁶⁶

In conclusion: to the Germans the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis was a reminder that genuine threats menace the new Europe and that it might not be feasible to rely on the U.S. as often as in the past. Washington, despite its support for Bonn in crucial moments, hinted clearly that Germany could not always count on that kind of support. Washington officials probably kept in mind for a period the image of their defeat when the EC supported Germany against the American advice.

E. FINAL REMARKS

During the 1990-1992 period, the German-American relationship offered an interesting perspective on post-Cold War era cooperation and coordination between two close allies. The German success of reunification was tempered by the sudden awareness that others now expect precisely what the Germans are least able to offer at this particular time. The American relief regarding the end of the Cold War was overshadowed by the fact that old associates are no longer reliable to the same extent as during that confrontation. In the new environment, the two governments have not defined and understood their remaining common interests.

⁶⁶ Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?*, p. 66.

From being a junior partner, Germany has suddenly become a full partner. Its circle of influence and power in Eastern and Western Europe has given Germany an authority that has made some of its policies more important than America's.⁶⁷

The United States and Germany had not yet learned, at that specific moment, how to manage equality. The American government still believed that Germany would and even must agree with the United States on all major questions and that Germany would support Washington's views. It still regarded Bonn as a junior partner. The German government, for its part, showed that it was more ready to take a separate path, but in a way, it still regarded itself as a junior partner, although a more independent one.

The Americans were not prepared to relinquish responsibility; the Germans were not yet prepared to accept it. However, it seemed to be evident that neither Washington nor Bonn wanted a crisis in German-American relations. In this respect NATO remained the organization that strongly supported the transatlantic partnership. The Germans have consistently assigned NATO a prominent role in the post-Cold War European security architecture. The Alliance remained attractive to the Germans during the 1990-1992 period because it provided them with a number of positive externalities.

⁶⁷ This pushed the U.S. to try to limit German power in the new Europe, by encouraging German involvement in NATO and European international organizations, while at the same time working with the U.K., France and other countries to constrain German influence in those organizations.

First, the stability afforded by the alliance 'reach(es) beyond the immediate circle of its member states' and contributes to the stability of the reforming nations of Eastern and Central Europe. Second, NATO and the NACC provide an institutional mechanism to integrate all the nations of Europe into a pan-European security system, reinforcing (and possibly usurping) the role of the CSCE. Third, the challenges in NATO strategy promise a more secure Germany with a lessened exposure to nuclear war. Fourth, NATO serves as a hedge against neo-isolationism in the United States.⁶⁸

Thus, the most important challenge in the German-American relationship at the end of the Cold War was to avoid a *de facto* division of labor, in which the Americans would focus on crises in the Gulf and elsewhere, while Germany would deal with the CEE countries and Russia. "This would progressively marginalize the United States in Europe and would erode American support for continued engagement in Europe."⁶⁹

In this setting, in the post-Cold War environment, Americans, like Europeans, wonder how the transatlantic link should now evolve. One must therefore examine the role and the attitudes of Americans regarding the "old continent", as one examines the attitudes of Europeans. Analyzing the developments in the German-American relationship in the 1990-1997 period could provide answers for the following questions:

- How did the fundamental changes that have attended German reunification affect the German-American relationship?

⁶⁸ Sperling, p. 265.

⁶⁹ Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany and America: partners in leadership?" *Survival*, vol. XXXIII, no. 6, (November/December 1991), p. 564.

- What have been the implications for the international system, for German and American power, and for their shared interests and policies?
- How might these developments affect the post-1989 emerging European security architecture and the future of the transatlantic relationship?

Furthermore, in the years ahead traditional relationships could change. Europe might not feel the previous need for American protection, and America might be tempted to follow an isolationist policy. In this context, Germany could insist on the political influence to which its military and economic power entitle it and might not be so psychologically dependent on American military or French political support. Thus, it might decide to become a more autonomous actor.

In this respect the German and American attitudes towards the following important issues on NATO's agenda deserve to be explored:

- NATO and the ESDI (including NATO's internal adaptation), and
- NATO and cooperation with former CEE adversaries (the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the process of enlargement).

III. GERMAN-AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY AND NATO'S INTERNAL ADAPTATION

A. INTRODUCTION

Among the myriad of complex issues raised by the end of the Cold War in Europe, the most confusing and frustrating by far have concerned the elaboration of an institutional security system consistent with the continent's evolving strategic environment. Before the great changes in Europe began in 1989, things looked rather simple. Not only was the Atlantic Alliance the keystone of Western Europe's security and defense posture, but it was also the mechanism through which the Western powers determined a common policy in the East-West dialogue. Most of all, however, NATO was a working decision-making body representing a nucleus of Western European and North American states combined under the leadership of the United States.

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the successful reunification of Germany, and the sweeping democratization of Eastern Europe, the Europeans found themselves being pulled in different directions by states whose interests often worked at cross-purposes to each other. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the demise of the bipolar system threatened to lift the lid of a Pandora's box of intra-European politics. Thus, a relatively tense and uncertain situation was reflected in the debates between the advocates of a revitalized NATO, on one side, and the proponents of a new European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), on the other. To the British historian Michael

Howard it was clear that "with the evaporation of the threat that called it into existence NATO is falling apart, and the rift between the Anglo-Saxon Atlanticists and European continentalists grows steadily wider."⁷⁰

B. HISTORIC LEGACY

The historical legacy of this debate could be summarized as follows. The integration of Western Europe benefited in the post-war period from U.S. leadership and protection. Since the Second World War the U.S. had generally supported the need for increased cooperation among European states, including in the area of security. This support was the result of conclusions about the latent dangers of European *disunity*. In this respect, it had become an accepted truth in the U.S. that Europe's nationalistic fragmentation was at the root of the continent's repeated wars.

The first attempt to construct a European Defense Community (EDC) was a response to U.S. insistence, following the outbreak of the Korean War, for West Germany to be rearmed so as to supply military manpower to meet the Soviet threat, thus reducing the necessity for large-scale U.S. forces in Europe (1950-1954). The collapse of this initiative left two lasting legacies: first, the weak Western European Union (WEU), with most of its security functions deliberately transferred to NATO; second, the sense that Western Europe could approach political union only indirectly, starting with economic and energy policies.

⁷⁰ Michael Howard, "Europe's Phoney Warlords," *The Times*, 29 July 1992.

The Fouchet plans, and the French and German challenges to “Anglo-Saxon” dominance of the Atlantic Alliance in 1958-1963, left behind a further layer of inhibitions and institutions. In 1963 the Franco-German treaty of cooperation (Elysée Treaty) attempted to institutionalize a bilateral dialogue between Bonn and Paris in the area of defense. But all these projects were ill-fated, the EDC and the Fouchet plans being stillborn, and the last premature.

At the moment when President Kennedy used the expression “European pillar” (1962), calling upon Western Europe to share more equitably the “burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations,”⁷¹ the notion of a European defense identity—as opposed to the concept of the defense of Europe—lacked political currency, substance, and stated purpose. Furthermore, in the early 1960's, the U.S. sought *de facto* to increase resource contributions from its European allies as *individual nations*. Far from sponsoring collective European burden-sharing, the Americans merely asked for greater contributions from each *individual* ally.⁷²

The seventies witnessed the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, and the numerous resolutions of the European Parliament and several

⁷¹ Although the pillar metaphor is widely thought to have been contained in President's Kennedy speech, there is no explicit reference to it in the text. See "The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership," *Department of State Bulletin* 47 (23 July 1962), pp. 131-133.

⁷² The U.S. took the position that the Europeans must do more as they emerged from the devastation of the war and re-established strong (and) competitive economies. Especially in the Congress, there seemed to be no justification for the U.S. to continue to bear defense burden as it had in the early 1950's. See Charles Barry, "ESDI: Toward a Bi-Polar Alliance?," in Charles Barry, ed., *Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 73.

Community reports (from 1973), which began to call for the extension of the cooperative concept to defense and security policies. In the language of one of those documents: "In practice, cooperation in the field of foreign policy can hardly ever be separated from defense and security policy."⁷³ In sum, by the late 1970s Europe's defense identity began to acquire political visibility, without having gained any corresponding substance.

In the same period, as was the case with the ill-fated EDC, the U.S. was both supportive and mildly wary of European efforts to coalesce institutionally, first in the EUROGROUP initiatives in 1968 and, in a more direct challenge to U.S. dominance in the armaments marketplace, in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in 1976.⁷⁴

The 1980s, in the context of a new, more assertive, American foreign policy and a parallel worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations, witnessed three new initiatives to assert Europe's distinctiveness in security and defense policy. First, the French socialist government ultimately succeeded in revitalizing the long-dormant Elysée Treaty by creating the Franco-German brigade. Moreover, it formalized its bilateral defense relations with Spain and Italy. Second, owing again to a French initiative, the WEU was reactivated in 1984, not as a decision-making body but as a forum where seven (and later ten) European countries might discuss defense and security problems among

⁷³ European Parliament, *Session Documents 1973-74*, doc. 12-73, p. 3. As quoted in Michael Fortman and David G. Haglund, "Europe, NATO and the ESDI debate: In Quest for Identity," in David G. Haglund, ed., *From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security after the Cold War* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 26. However, Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome has still not been modified.

⁷⁴ See *NATO Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), pp. 20-22.

themselves.⁷⁵ Third, the debate on security and defense was deepened in the European Community. With the signature and ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, the EC became formally linked to the EPC. Furthermore, the Community recognized that it had a legitimate role in the area of defense industrial cooperation.⁷⁶

As new concepts of a distinct European identity grew in the 1980's, the U.S. was reassured by the Rome Declaration and Hague Platform⁷⁷ documents that the WEU would become the European pillar only within and consistent with the NATO alliance. In addition, the Americans did not see the potential for a challenge to NATO's exclusive role, for other two reasons. First, the Soviet threat guaranteed continuing dependence on the strategic U.S. connection. Second, "the U.S. saw little evidence that the new identity would have much substance for the foreseeable future."⁷⁸

It can be concluded that until the end of the Cold War the concept of ESDI was defined, for a variety of reasons, as a process for the development of some sort of convergence of West European security interests within NATO.

⁷⁵ With the October 27, 1984, Rome Declaration the WEU was reorganized as a "light" structure comprising: (1) a council, which meets regularly at the ministerial and ambassadorial level; (2) a staff and several working groups, which assist the council; and, (3) a parliamentary assembly that gathers four times a year.

⁷⁶ See David Owen, "Disarmament, Détente and Deterrence," *European Affairs 1* (Summer 1987), pp. 12-13.

⁷⁷ 27 October 1987.

⁷⁸ Barry, p. 73.

The most prominent of those reasons were to balance American predominance, to better promote a policy of détente vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and to tie Germany--supposedly vacillating between East and West--not only into an Atlantic, but also into a tight political European framework. It was a primarily political concept developed by West European member states in their search for greater convergence of identity of interests while not changing the basic political and military structure of the Alliance and Europe.⁷⁹

In this context, at the end of the decade, with the notion of a European defense identity taking shape, not as an isolated concept but as a necessary complement to Western Europe's desirable political and economic union, more countries became progressively more attracted to it. In addition, Europe's security environment was about to change drastically, and West Europeans felt emboldened to express their beliefs in the emergence of a new, more autonomous, security system for the continent.

In this environment, the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole and specifically the American government had to recognize and adapt to the presence of this increasingly popular concept of European security. The post-1989 years witnessed an effort to define the ESDI on the basis of the European Union (EU) and the WEU. This has included the definition of a new type of relations between NATO and the WEU and, thus, three countries became strongly involved in this process: France, Germany, and the United States.

⁷⁹ Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: A German Analysis," in Ch. Barry, *Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 37.

To understand ESDI's true character, and further the German and American attitudes towards it, it is essential to examine, at a minimum, the following principal manifestations⁸⁰--which are all intergovernmental:

- The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the WEU, and the Eurocorps;
- NATO's 1994 Brussels Summit and the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) Concept; and,
- The 1995-1997 Developments.

C. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY

Since the London Declaration in July 1990, the Alliance has repeatedly called upon the allies "to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members." Furthermore, it has welcomed the "efforts of the EC to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognized the significance of the progress made by the EC countries towards the goal of a political union, including the development of a common defense and security policy."⁸¹

The Europeans took the initiative and, thus, the Treaty on European Union, finalized at the European Council meeting in Maastricht on 9-10 December 1991 and signed on 7 February 1992, declared as one of its first objectives "the implementation of a

⁸⁰ A complete analysis would include also the debate concerning the common defense policy and the cooperation in the field of the armaments industries.

⁸¹ "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 5-6 July 1990," *NATO Review* 38 (August 1990), pp. 32-33.

common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time led to common defence."⁸² The Treaty further requested WEU (which it referred to as "an integral part of the development of the Union") "to elaborate and implement decisions on actions of the Union which have defense implications."⁸³

In two "Declarations" attached to the Treaty, the nine nations that were then WEU members stated their aim "to develop the WEU as the defense component of the European Union and as [a] means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance."⁸⁴ Simultaneously, states which were members of the European Union and not, at that time, members of the WEU⁸⁵ were invited to accede to the WEU⁸⁶ and the WEU proposed that other European member-states of NATO⁸⁷ become associate members of the WEU in a way that would give them the possibility of "participating fully" in its activities.⁸⁸

⁸² Article B, Title I of *Treaty on European Union*, Maastricht, 7 February 1992. Available [On line]: [<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title1.htm>]. [10 February 1998]. The signing took place some eight weeks later because of the need to consolidate and translate the text properly.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ *Treaty on European Union*, Final Act, Declaration on Western European Union, Declaration I, par. 1. Available [On line]: [<http://europa.eu.in/en/record/mt/final.htm>]. [10 February 1998].

⁸⁵ Greece, Denmark, and Ireland.

⁸⁶ *Treaty on European Union*, Declaration II.

⁸⁷ Turkey, Norway, and Iceland.

⁸⁸ *Treaty on European Union*, Declaration II.

The Maastricht Treaty was the outcome of fierce debates and battles within and among states, and the section dealing with the CFSP, which is riddled with ambiguous language and concepts, reflected the lack of consensus on Europe's future role. It was clear that the twelve had not taken a significant qualitative step towards a common, integrated European policy on foreign and security matters. But the important contribution of the Treaty has been that the member countries of the Union started to work together in a tighter and more coordinated framework on CFSP matters.

At the same time it may be well that Maastricht has marked a crucial shift in Western defense, from U.S. leadership within an integrated Atlantic Alliance towards an integrated West European pillar within NATO and towards an independent ESDI dimension.⁸⁹ Thus, it is important to understand the motivations of the main protagonists (especially Germany and France) and the American perspective on this important event. In the negotiations, as during many previous attempts to define Western Europe's international identity, "France and Britain represented initially opposing positions, with the U.S. an outsider and Germany attempting to hold close to France without losing touch with the others."⁹⁰

Specifically, the French retained their traditional suspicion of NATO, the integrated military structure and the institutionalized U.S. leadership within it. The Federal Republic of Germany shared not only the Atlanticism of some European capitals

⁸⁹ However, only the broadest outlines of such a pillar were defined at Maastricht.

(such as London and The Hague), but also the French pro-European declaratory policy. Bonn wanted to reassure all its allies that "Germany was anchored firmly in the western community, as the process of unification was completed, as Soviet acquiescence was gained and as new links with the former socialist states were made."⁹¹ In the German perception, a closer EU legitimized the pursuit of German aims in Central and Eastern Europe.⁹² Neither the French nor the German government had an entirely coherent position throughout the interconnected negotiations of 1990-1991.

At the same time, from the German viewpoint, certain factors promoted the development and implementation of an ESDI. First, in the context of German unification, strengthening and enlarging cooperation within a West European structure⁹³ would lock Germany into tight security framework. Second, the future direction of U.S. policy towards Europe after the end of the Cold War did not appear to be outlined clearly.⁹⁴ Europeans wanted to be prepared for a possible American withdrawal from

⁹⁰ Anand Menon, Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "A common European defence?," *Survival*, vol. 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 104.

⁹¹ A. Menon, A. Forster and W. Wallace, p. 105.

⁹² If a decision was to be forced, Paris was more important to Bonn than London, because France was the preferred (if difficult) partner with which Germany had worked closely for more than 30 years. However, Washington was as important as Paris, because the United States offered a special relationship for global economic cooperation, as well as for European security. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-112.

⁹³ This was seen, at that time, as the only real alternative to NATO.

⁹⁴ Some speculated that the United States might adopt a Pacific orientation or domestic policy as its priority. For a complete analysis of the impact of the possible U.S. orientation toward the Pacific on the transatlantic relationship, see Robert O'Brien, "Manifest Destiny and the Pacific Century: Europe as No. 3," in Jarod Wiener, ed., *The Transatlantic Relationship* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 95-127.

Europe. Third, Russia remained Germany's main security concern in Europe. Russia's view of NATO was always more critical than its view of the EU and ESDI. In the new European context, Western Europe could aim at balancing Russian and Western (implicitly German) interests.⁹⁵

In this context, the Maastricht Treaty "has been approved by an overwhelming majority in the *Bundestag*, and no major political party has voiced substantial objections against a further strengthening of the EU, even in the field of foreign [, security and defense] policy."⁹⁶ The belief that a Germany more integrated into Europe could balance also the Euro-Atlantic disputes—especially by continuing its role as a mediator between France and the U.S.—was prominent in Germany's post-Cold War political arena.

The United States position had similar inconsistencies. Repeated support for a stronger West European role within the Atlantic Alliance was matched by warnings about the adverse impact of moves towards a European caucus on America's European commitment. Bilateral tours of prominent U.S. officials cautioned European governments against any practical steps towards a separate European Defense identity. The U.S. administration communicated its views more directly to a WEU ministerial meeting in February 1991, through the so-called "Bartholomew Telegram," laying down U.S. preconditions for a European Defense Identity--although some officials were evidently embarrassed by such a peremptory intervention in the European debate.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Schmidt, pp. 38-40.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁹⁷ Menon, Forster and Wallace, p. 105.

Preceding the Maastricht Treaty provisions, the most significant of the Franco-German initiatives on the European defense identity was the Kohl-Mitterrand proposal of October 14, 1991. Its purpose was to develop the existing Franco-German brigade into a complete European army corps.⁹⁸ The Eurocorps plan reflected the willingness of France and Germany to move ahead of their partners in the EC, with the hope of subsequently drawing those partners in their wake. This proposal was a direct challenge to the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps⁹⁹ and stimulated a debate about the WEU's role between NATO and the EU.¹⁰⁰

The NATO summit in Rome on 7-8 November 1991 brought some of these disagreements to a head. The U.S. was irritated by the different signals coming from European capitals. President Bush was reported to have said, "if your ultimate goal is to provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today."¹⁰¹ Furthermore, some U.S. officials arrived "enraged" by apparent French encouragement

⁹⁸ The original proposal was, in fact, no more than a two-line footnote at the end of a long letter on political union, but it soon took on larger proportions. The text can be found reprinted in *Europa Archiv*, vol.46, no. 22 (1991), pp. 571-574. The text called for expanding the joint brigade into "the basis for a European corps, to which the armed forces of other WEU member-states could be added."

⁹⁹ The ministerial meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee on 28-29 May 1991 agreed on and announced a NATO command structure review, which involved the creation of the multinational Rapid Reaction Corps for ACE, under British command. This multinational corps brought together British, Dutch, Belgian, and German troops.

¹⁰⁰ Britain wanted agreement on a statement setting the future role of the WEU and its links with the EU before the Maastricht summit; France wanted the *grandes lignes* alone to be outlined. Germany was generally supportive of the French position.

¹⁰¹ Robert Mauthner and Lionel Barber, "Bush calls on Europe to clarify role in NATO," *Financial Times*, 8 November 1991.

for the "development of alternative structures to NATO, interpreting this as a sign that Paris hoped and believed that the United States would soon leave Europe."¹⁰²

The German delegation at the summit was relatively silent. This silence reflected the inherent tensions in Bonn's position; it wanted to retain a central role for the United States and NATO, while at the same time it wanted to cooperate with France in plans for a stronger European defense identity.¹⁰³ At the summit, Chancellor Kohl had

[S]toutly defended the Franco-German proposals, hinting that Washington had been kept fully informed about these plans from an early stage, and affirmed his commitment both to the continuance of NATO and to the evolution of a common European security policy.¹⁰⁴

The attitudes of the Europeans discussed above throw light on some of the obstacles that have hampered progress towards ESDI. First, any positive development towards ESDI inevitably raises difficult questions concerning the responsibilities of Europe's existing security institutions.

Before Europe can establish itself as an effective actor in international politics, the respective roles of the EU, the WEU, and NATO should be clarified. This argument would be inevitably linked with the possible risk of "regionalization" of European security, in the context of the simultaneous processes of "deepening" and "widening" the

¹⁰² Information from European participants at the NATO summit, as presented in A. Menon, A. Forster and W. Wallace, p. 111.

¹⁰³ The Franco-German letter of 14 October 1991 had specifically identified political and economic relations with the former members of the Warsaw Pact as a priority area for the CFSP of the EU.

¹⁰⁴ A. Menon, A. Forster and W. Wallace, p. 112.

EU-that is, strengthening the EU's supranational institutions and an ESDI and CFSP while enlarging the EU. Last, but not least, the problem of resource allocation for the establishment of the autonomous defense structure would be another issue to be solved by the Europeans.

In this context, the WEU is playing the role of a *passe-partout* in European security and defense affairs: it could be considered both the possible defense arm of the EU and the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. Taking into account the fact that the WEU does not possess many assets that could be used as a framework for developing an ESDI, its role in crisis management and peace operations deserves analysis.

D. WEU AND THE EUROCORPS

With the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU has become an integral part of the West European integration process. The WEU has been designated the EU's organization of choice to formulate and implement defense and military aspects of policy. Although the WEU maintains its independent legal basis (the 1948 Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954) for the Union's CFSP to be effective, close cooperation between the EU and WEU is indispensable: this might eventually result in the amalgamation of both organizations.

Only six months after the Maastricht Treaty had been signed, WEU member states adopted the Petersberg Declaration (19 June 1992)¹⁰⁵, which clarified the WEU's role in

¹⁰⁵ At Petersberg some reduction in the inefficient duplication of European defense agencies was within sight, with agreement to examine "the role and functions of a possible European Armaments Agency," to

conflict prevention and crisis management. The ministers of foreign affairs of the WEU member countries agreed that, besides making a contribution to collective defense in accordance with the treaties of Brussels and Washington, military units of the member states of the WEU could be deployed for "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."¹⁰⁶

Deployment could take place on the basis of a mandate from the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. In order to implement the decisions, a Planning Cell was set up in early 1993 in the WEU headquarters in Brussels.¹⁰⁷ "With these Petersberg tasks the WEU was a step ahead of NATO since peace enforcing could be carried out by the WEU, but not by NATO."¹⁰⁸

The new Franco-German "Eurocorps" which was announced on 22 May 1992¹⁰⁹ would be excellent for carrying out the Petersberg tasks. This new army concept was consistent with the decision of the Alliance Strategic Concept that

merge the IEPG into an enlarged WEU, and to transfer some or all of the EUROGROUP's remaining functions as well.

¹⁰⁶ WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration. Bonn, 19 June 1992, chapter 2, sect. 4.

¹⁰⁷ About 40 officers perform currently at the Planning Cell.

¹⁰⁸ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus* (London and Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1997), p. 56.

¹⁰⁹ At the May 1992 Franco-German summit in La Rochelle, the Common Defense and Security Council decided on the implementation of the measures necessary for the creation of the Eurocorps. The corps' missions were also officially announced: (1) the defense of Western Europe in the context of Article 5 of the NATO and WEU treaties; (2) peacekeeping and peacemaking; and (3) humanitarian tasks. See "Summit of the French-German Defense and Security Council on 22 May 1992 in La Rochelle," press release provided by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington, D.C., 26 May 1992.

[I]ntegrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defense Identity, will also increasingly have a similar role to play in enhancing the allies' ability to work together in the common defense.¹¹⁰

The United States was at best ambivalent toward the Eurocorps proposal. The Pentagon (often more relaxed toward European initiatives than the State Department) was generally supportive of the Franco-German initiative.¹¹¹ The Administration generally saw it as needless at best and at worst potentially damaging to the North Atlantic Alliance.¹¹²

One of the most difficult and controversial aspects of the corps has been its relationship with NATO and its integrated commands, a question that produced differences not only between the corps' Franco-German sponsors and their allies, but between the French and the Germans themselves. Whereas Germany (all of whose troops are assigned to NATO anyway) wanted a close NATO link, France (whose forces are not integrated in the commands) had reservations. NATO leaders such as SACEUR John Galvin argued that independent European structures would create force redundancies,

¹¹⁰ North Atlantic Council (Heads of State and Government), *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*. Rome, 7-8 November 1991, par. 52.

¹¹¹ Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney called the proposal "basically sound." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, suggested that European units like the corps would be "politically and militarily well equipped to deal with interregional crises, humanitarian missions and peacekeeping." NATO SACEUR John Galvin, while expressing some misgivings about command structures, urged Congress to support the Eurocorps because "we want the Europeans to grow stronger without loosening their Atlantic ties." See Scott A. Harris and James B. Steinberg, *European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Relations*, MR-276 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1993) and *The Franco-German Corps and the Future of European Security: Implications for U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute Policy Consensus Report, June 1992).

¹¹² Ibid.

cause confusion in command structures, and complicate military planning.¹¹³ Germany was caught in a familiar position of trying to placate both Washington and Paris and often found itself making somewhat contradictory promises to both sides on the "priority" of the corps' forces.¹¹⁴ This was one of the many instances of Germany trying to find middle ground between the French and American positions.

From the French perspective the Eurocorps would represent the first step toward truly independent European capacities for scenarios in which the U.S. would be unable or unwilling to act, and function as a means to influence more heavily the decisions of the U.S. when it did act.¹¹⁵ The corps would be the basis for a future European army with autonomous capabilities for defense within Europe, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks, and force projection abroad.¹¹⁶ It should also be recalled that numerous French leaders (for instance, Mitterrand and Rocard) have claimed to be uncertain whether the Americans would remain in Europe and whether they would be as prepared in the future to provide leadership in dealing with European security challenges as they had been during the Cold War.

¹¹³ See William Drozdiak, "France, Germany Unveil Corps as a Step Toward European Defense," *Washington Post*, 23 May 1992.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, the German agreement at La Rochelle that the new units would be given assigned "as a priority" to the Eurocorps, and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's assurance to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Lisbon one week later that NATO would have first rights. ("Das erste Zugriffsrecht hat die NATO," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 May 1992).

¹¹⁵ Gordon, p. 44.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

The German conception emphasized the Eurocorps' role in organizing a better European contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and in drawing France closer to NATO. German officials repeatedly stated that they could not imagine the Eurocorps ever acting without the United States and often described it as a "second best" solution to full Euro-Atlantic integration. As one German diplomat put it: "We would have preferred that France simply reintegrate within NATO and that NATO serve as West's primary security organization. But the French aren't willing to do that, so we took the next best thing."¹¹⁷

Another opinion was that

Creating common instruments (such as the Eurocorps) without ensuring a common foreign, security, and defense policy that such instruments would have to serve, is not without risk. It could well lead to disappointment when it becomes clear that common instruments could not be used in a given situation where no commonality in interest does exist.¹¹⁸

Despite these risks and constraints (including the CFE Treaty) multinationality became an increasingly important concept for the Germans.¹¹⁹ It was to be used to tie as many units as possible into the defense of the national territory and to "broadcast the

¹¹⁷ Interviews conducted by Philip Gordon with a German diplomat in Washington, D.C., May 1992. As quoted in Gordon, p. 44.

¹¹⁸ Holger M. Mey, "View from Germany: A European Security and Defense Identity--What Role for the United States?," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 14, no. 3 (July-September 1995), p. 313. A typical example could be different perceptions by France and Germany regarding operations in the former French colonies in Africa.

¹¹⁹ Germany immediately joined the ARRC (1991) and also developed other similar military bilateral arrangements with the Netherlands, Denmark and the United States.

message that [Germany] was not aiming at solo initiatives in Europe."¹²⁰ Moreover, the acceptance of a military unit with international peacekeeping and peacemaking as declared missions represented a new commitment to play an international security role and to do so in the multilateral context.¹²¹ However, as Guillaume Parmentier has pointed out,

Germany remains marked by an extremely territorial conception of its defence, as reflected by its strong resistance to France's discreet requests aimed at encouraging the Eurocorps to move towards greater flexibility and inter-army capabilities and hence to its adaptation to selective light operations.¹²²

Initially, several West European governments were skeptical about the benefits of the Eurocorps, which could be seen as an unproductive duplication of military cooperation that was already taking place in NATO. Much of the doubt was taken away by the so-called SACEUR agreement of January 1993, which stipulated that the Eurocorps would be deployed within NATO in case of war in Europe, and that it could be also used by NATO for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.¹²³ In practice this

¹²⁰ de Wijk, p. 44.

¹²¹ This was one of the major requests of the Bush administration Germany immediately after the breakdown of the Berlin Wall.

¹²² The word "projection" is not in the Germans' military vocabulary. See Guillaume Parmentier, "Painstaking Adaptation to the New Europe: French and German Defence Policies in 1997," France and Japan in a Changing Security Environment, 23-24 June 1997, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, *Cahiers de L'IFRI*, no. 21., p. 28.

¹²³ See Karl Feldmayer, "Einbindung des deutsch-französischen Korps in das atlantische Bündnis," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 December 1992.

implied that the French troops of the Eurocorps would be subordinated to the SACEUR in a case of Article 5 engagement (i.e., in the case of war).¹²⁴

Owing to its limited operational military capabilities, the Eurocorps today primarily serves as a political signal and will perhaps, in due course, offer an institutional model for closer military cooperation between WEU member states. In the long run, considered as a contribution to the development of an ESDI, it could create—as many American officials fear and as many French officials explicitly seek—a European "caucus" that would make it difficult for the United States to influence European decisions once they are taken.

E. THE 1994 BRUSSELS SUMMIT AND CJTF

At the same time, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was escalating, and it was impossible for the West Europeans to find an effective answer on their own. NATO's position was not much better. After the 1991 Rome summit the Alliance "seemed to lapse into permanent confusion"¹²⁵ as to which course to follow. The years 1992 and 1993 witnessed some steps towards NATO's adaptation to the new challenges.¹²⁶ The

¹²⁴ The Eurocorps represents the first French acceptance of multinational military integration since 1966, allows for the first peaceful permanent stationing ever of German soldiers on French soil, and provides a legal means for the continued presence of French troops in Germany.

¹²⁵ de Wijk, p. 71.

¹²⁶ In June and December 1992, NATO declared its willingness to engage in peacekeeping missions under UN and CSCE mandates, and 1993 witnessed strong preparations for the important initiatives to be announced in October 1993 in Travemunde.

profound differences of opinion among the allies were about practical action outside the treaty area and Article 5; countries such as Germany, Denmark and Belgium articulated reservations. "This was expressed in the difficulty which these countries had in recognizing that the Alliance was playing an increasingly visible role in former Yugoslavia."¹²⁷

In this context, the German Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, sounded an alarm at the end of 1993. He called for reform of NATO since "we cannot just confine ourselves to reconfirming the Alliance's basic mission in the past."¹²⁸ This was followed by a plea for an Alliance that could undertake an active role outside the treaty area, and for "force and command structures" which reflected this.

Moreover, this function would require closer co-operation within the NACC and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The WEU would have to take on the defense aspects of this policy and, in conformity with the Maastricht Treaty, develop into the European pillar of NATO.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ de Wijk, p. 72. For Germany there was also a political constitutional taboo on the deployment of forces outside the NATO area, although this did not mean that Germany did not see a role for NATO outside the treaty area. It was not until July 1994 that the Constitutional court in Karlsruhe clarified the restrictions in the Basic Law about possible German participation in military operations other than self-defense against external aggression and indicated that the Federal Parliament may approve German participation in internationally sanctioned "collective security" operations.

¹²⁸ Volker Ruehe, "Adapting the Alliance in the Face of Great Challenges," *NATO Review*, December 1993, pp. 3-5.

¹²⁹ de Wijk, p. 72.

In May 1993 Senators Bob Dole and Richard Lugar voiced their discontent with President Clinton's NATO policies, putting pressure on the administration to find a solution to the impasse. At the Spring Session of the North Atlantic Assembly they complained about NATO's impotence and failure to take action in former Yugoslavia:

The inability of NATO to act effectively is bound to raise grave doubts among both the American people and the Congress about whether the enormous yearly investment we make in NATO is reaping sufficient benefits.¹³⁰

In this context, President Clinton advanced in June 1993 the proposal of organizing a NATO summit later in the year. "The summit was intended to confirm the continuing relevance of NATO as a European security organization and the American commitment to Europe."¹³¹

The important steps in preparation for the summit were the "brainstorming sessions" of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) during July-September 1993 and the informal meeting of ministers of defense which took place in Travemunde at the invitation of the German defense minister from 19 to 21 October 1993.

During the "brainstorming sessions," among other issues, the relationship between NATO and the WEU was of particular concern. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the new U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador

¹³⁰ North Atlantic Assembly, *European and Transatlantic Security in a Revolutionary Age*, Sect. 27. As quoted in de Wijk, p. 73.

¹³¹ de Wijk, p. 73.

Robert Hunter, had insisted that "there must be separable but not separate capabilities," but it was not very clear what the Americans meant by it. A second American proposal concerned an increase in the effectiveness of NATO in crisis management in Europe and, thus, an adjustment of the command and force structures would be required in order to make NATO a more efficient instrument for dealing with "Bosnia type" crises. Finally, the Americans insisted on a greater European role in crisis management outside the NATO area. This implied that the NATO command structure would become more European and that it could also be used for carrying out missions under the flag of the WEU.¹³²

At Travemunde, Les Aspin, the American Secretary of Defense, presented the U.S. proposal to make the force and command structures better suited for out-of-area operations. This proposal was known as "the combined joint task force concept" (CJTF)¹³³ and "has been developed in secret in consultation with SACEUR and was intended for carrying out peacekeeping and other operations by NATO and WEU."¹³⁴ The basic assumption was that the integrated command structure was still at the moment completely geared to Article 5 operations but was, in principle, flexible enough to carry out other missions.

¹³² Ibid., p. 74.

¹³³ Combined and joint indicated multinational, multiservice operations in one operational unit executed by several countries' forces.

¹³⁴ de Wijk, p. 76.

The idea was that SACEUR would commission the Major Subordinate Commanders to form central staff within their headquarters to carry out these operations.¹³⁵ In the event of a crisis the CJTF would be activated and supplemented with specialized personnel. The CJTF would hold periodical exercises, especially in the field of peacekeeping. Finally, the CJTF should form the basis for the "separable but not separate" forces of a European security and defense identity.¹³⁶

With these preparations among others, the summit took place on 10 and 11 January 1994 in Brussels. The heads of states and government approved three important documents of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the CJTF concept on the first day. Besides the approval of these documents several decisions were taken which would significantly influence NATO's agenda in the coming years.

First, it was decided that active support should be given to the development of the ESDI as a European pillar within NATO. In the statement, support was given to the WEU, as the embodiment of the European pillar within NATO. An important contribution was the commitment that NATO was

¹³⁵ AFNORTHWEST, AFCENT and AFSOUTH.

¹³⁶ de Wijk, p. 76.

... ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities that could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security.¹³⁷

This approach could avoid a costly duplication of military capacities within the WEU.

Second, the decision to develop further functions outside the NATO area was taken. This required immediately the revision of the "command and force structures," with a view to better co-operation with the WEU and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The ambassadors were commissioned, with the advice of the Military Authorities,

to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping as well as to improve co-operation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defense Identity. As part of the process we endorse the CJTF concept as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.¹³⁸

The conspicuous interest of Germany in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe, led Bonn to support the effort to create CJTFs, because CJTFs might give the WEU an increased role in possible operations in the region.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ North Atlantic Council (Heads of State and Government), *Declaration*, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, Sect. 6.

¹³⁸ *Brussels Declaration*, Sect. 9.

¹³⁹ Schmidt., pp. 52-55.

This idea is emphasized also in the *1994 German White Paper on Defense*:

...In the future, it [the WEU] will be able to fall back on NATO structures and forces. This will render Europe capable of taking strategic action and at the same time prevent the building of dual structures that no one is able and willing to afford¹⁴⁰.... This new command structure must also be assured for European ends. The WEU must have the opportunity to use these headquarters.¹⁴¹

It can be concluded that, in January 1994, NATO leaders approved an initiative to give the Alliance's decades-old integrated military structure strikingly different capabilities for the future. Because the range of the decisions taken was much greater than was the case in Rome, the Brussels summit could be described as "without doubt the most important NATO meeting held in recent decades."¹⁴²

F. THE 1995-1997 DEVELOPMENTS

The 1994 Brussels summit established the CJTF concept as the key instrument for updating the Alliance's military structures in order to deal more efficiently with non-Article 5 missions and to support ESDI's development. Although the term CJTF denotes a multinational, multiservice task force, the heart of the concept entails creating in advance a combined structure with staff, procedures and planning, so that a group of

¹⁴⁰ *White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, 1994* (Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn), chapter 4, sect. 426, p. 54.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Sect. 438, p. 57.

¹⁴² de Wijk, p. 80.

countries responding to a non-Article 5 crisis could use assets according to the particular need.¹⁴³

“U.S. defense officials conceived CJTF as a means both to further adapt NATO’s military structure to post-Cold War missions and to support ESDI by making NATO assets available to a WEU military operation.”¹⁴⁴ CJTF intervention would essentially take place either under NATO command, if the U.S. were a major player, or under that of the WEU for distinctly European operations. Overall, it would allow for more effective sharing of global military burdens between the United States and Europe and pave the way for the WEU to conduct missions in which the Americans had little or no direct interest or involvement.¹⁴⁵

However, efforts to implement CJTF have been the object of considerable frustration. Significant differences emerged between the U.S. and France on how to set up both NATO- and WEU-led CJTFs. “Whereas the US wanted to use CJTF to give NATO’s IMS [International Military Staff] the flexibility to respond to non-Article 5 missions, the French argued that the IMS is inherently unsuited for those type of

¹⁴³ For a detailed analysis of the CJTF, see Charles Barry, “Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice,” in Philip H. Gordon, ed., *NATO’s Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), pp. 203-220.

¹⁴⁴ Robert Grant, “France’s New Relationship with NATO,” in Philip H. Gordon, ed., *NATO’s Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), p. 62.

¹⁴⁵ In addition, it could accommodate participation by forces from non-NATO countries, especially CEE countries, in the framework of PFP cooperation.

missions.”¹⁴⁶ The French in particular resisted extending the existing American-led major NATO commands--especially Allied Command Europe--to non-Article 5 missions. They worried that this extension would effectively mean American political control over the mission. As a consequence they leaned heavily in the direction of European structures for non-Article 5 missions. For its part the U.S. was particularly concerned about the use of NATO assets in European-led CJTF missions in which the Americans did not participate.¹⁴⁷

The French position toward NATO began to change under the leadership of President Jacques Chirac. On 5 December 1995, France announced its decision to return to the Military Committee (MC), from which it had withdrawn in 1966, and to participate in deliberations about NATO reform. France’s decision, which represented a reorientation in its relations with the Alliance, “was warmly welcomed by the German leaders and the German defense community.”¹⁴⁸ Despite the *rapprochement* with the Alliance, the French have continued their efforts to merge the WEU into the EU. The

¹⁴⁶ Grant, p. 63.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65. The American position in 1995 reflected views at the time when, in the context of the Yugoslav crisis, in Republican circles particularly, voices (such as Newt Gingrich, the Speaker of the House of Representatives) were arguing that European problems require European solutions, certainly when American interests were not at issue in the crisis.

¹⁴⁸ Parmentier, p. 30.

Germans supported them. Chancellor Kohl in particular wanted to push forward the “proud and symbolic European phalanx.”¹⁴⁹

Thus, when the French and the Germans met with other European ministers at a seminar at Freiburg, on 27 February 1996, they “arrived at a compromise alternative to Germany’s early proposals for the extension of majority voting to CFSP deliberations of the European Council.”¹⁵⁰ The adopted proposal for “constructive abstention”¹⁵¹ should provide, in the medium term, the framework under which the WEU could merge into the EU. But, taking into account the strictly Atlanticist conceptions of the German military and those of the majority of the German diplomats and politicians in politico-military matters,¹⁵² each Franco-German initiative must be “corrected” by a gesture toward NATO. On 19 March 1996, Werner Hoyer, Parliamentary State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, signaled immediately the extent to which the French and German conceptions on European defense still diverge:

¹⁴⁹ *International Security Review 1997*, published by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (Whitehall, London, 1997), p. 5.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁵¹ The proposal envisaged that: (1) No EU member state will be obliged to provide national forces for multinational European military and police actions against its will; (2) Any member state that felt unable to take part in such multinational European action will be unable to hinder the others. The abstaining country will be expected to show solidarity with other EU states through political support for this majority-approved European action and by means of financial contributions through the EU budget. In the meantime the Council of Ministers should have the competence to decide on CFSP actions which the WEU is to carry out on behalf of the EU. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁵² Parmentier, p. 30.

We clearly reject the [French] ideas that would end [up by] replacing NATO's integrated command structure and [we] will speak out against every measure that could give the impression of driving a wedge into the transatlantic relationship.¹⁵³

Inside the Alliance the differences between the Americans and the French concerning the implementation of the CJTF concept were overcome.¹⁵⁴ The NAC was designated to steer CJTF operations politically and the operation itself would be guided by the newly established Capabilities Co-ordination Cell, under the MC and within the IMS. Despite some notable unanswered questions,¹⁵⁵ the acceptance of the political CJTF could be considered as an important element in the restructuring of NATO's integrated military structure.¹⁵⁶ German officials were supportive of this process and remained sincerely attached to a form of Europeanization of NATO, but the reflex of resisting strong U.S. pressure maintained their "dual-track" approach in the Franco-American debate. They looked forward with optimism to the important June 1996 NAC, which was to be held in Berlin. In the words of Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister:

¹⁵³ *International Security Review 1997*, p. 7. The remarks were made in the context of the French statements in January 1996 that requested: the changing of the term "European pillar" to "ESDI," that a European Deputy SACEUR should lead all European operations, and the creation of a single military structure for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. See de Wijk, pp. 122-125.

¹⁵⁴ These included differences of opinion concerning political control over military forces and the forums that would steer the CJTF operations.

¹⁵⁵ These included the role that the NATO Major Commanders, SACLANT and SACEUR, would be able to play in CJTF operations, the conditions under which the WEU could make use of CJTF and NATO assets and which headquarters would receive CJTF nuclei.

¹⁵⁶ de Wijk, pp. 126-128.

Therefore [they] welcome the fact that the links between NATO and the WEU have increasingly been strengthened on the basis of the agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. NATO will support the WEU in developing its operational capabilities, but this must not lead to a duplication of structures and bureaucratic procedures if only for reasons of efficiency and cost. The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) is the key to this. Here, too, Berlin must set the course for the future.¹⁵⁷

The decisions taken by the ministerial NATO Council on 3 June 1996 concerned basic political requirements for the adaptation of the Alliance. The final communiqué contained three important points, under which the Allies agreed to several practical arrangements in support of ESDI, but avoided dispositions that might have led to a split within the Alliance. It is important to mention that during the negotiations concerning the “most European” communiqué of all NAC meetings, “none of the member states had clear-cut ideas about the European Security and Defense Identity and the precise relationship between the European Union, the WEU and NATO.”¹⁵⁸

The first of these concerned the maintenance of the Alliance’s military effectiveness, both for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. These tasks should be carried out by a single multinational command structure in which the European element would predominate and which would facilitate participation by the PFP partners and other non-NATO countries. The CJTF element should be the key concept in this. The second basic principle was the maintenance of the transatlantic link. NATO should

¹⁵⁷ Klaus Kinkel, “Prospects for the Berlin Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in June,” *NATO Review*, Webedition, no. 3 (May 1996), pp. 8-12. Available [On line]: [<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9603-2.htm>]. [10 January 1998].

¹⁵⁸ de Wijk, p. 132. A small step was taken on 6 June 1996 when the WEU-NATO Security Agreement came into force and classified NATO documents were made available to the WEU.

remain the principal forum for transatlantic consultations and the instrument through which common interests were promoted. The third point was the promotion of the ESDI.¹⁵⁹

From the American viewpoint, the 1996 Berlin NAC meeting concluded that, in the words of Walter Slocombe, the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

In the future, part of NATO's peacetime responsibilities must include preparing for such assistance, in planning, exercises, training and staffing, for WEU-led operations. All of this should be done within the Alliance and within its military command structure, not as a separate (including de facto separate) parallel structure, or by elements that are 'European only, American clean.' It is essential from the U.S. point of view not to foster a bifurcated NATO, in which de facto if not explicitly, there are two systems, one for the U.S. and Article 5, and one for Europe and non-Article 5 operations.¹⁶⁰

Thus, at the June 1996 Berlin meeting of NATO foreign ministers, successful steps were taken to develop a model for accommodating the intra-European and transatlantic aspects of Europe's defense identity. Some differences were papered over regarding how independently European forces might operate from NATO oversight while using Alliance resources; and much would depend upon how agreed-upon arrangements function in practice.

Despite some divergent positions, it can be appreciated that the June 1996 Berlin NAC meeting was

¹⁵⁹ See North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 3 June 1996, par. 5-9.

¹⁶⁰ Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Remarks to the Atlantic Council, 14 June 1996. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

A turning point in the debate on NATO's internal adaptation, because it reconciled the Alliance-wide desire for more flexible, mobile forces that could be deployed for the full range of Alliance missions--from collective defence to crisis management and peace-keeping--with the aspiration of those Allies in the European Union to develop a tangible, credible European Security and Defence Identity.¹⁶¹

A few days later, on 13 June 1996, the ministers of defense of the NATO member countries met in Brussels for the spring meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. During the discussions, the Germans pressed for strong political guidelines concerning the reform of NATO's command structure, while the Americans reportedly felt that too many concessions had already been made to support the WEU. The U.S. also opposed a proposal to direct planning specifically toward the WEU's Petersberg tasks.¹⁶² Despite the fact that Germany felt that CJTF "would provide, if properly used by the Europeans, sufficient opportunity for the expression of European identity on the military level,"¹⁶³ the Germans considered, together with the French, that "the Berlin signal well and truly represented the founding act of European identity within NATO."¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Admiral Norman W. Ray, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, Speech at the Assemblée Nationale, 23 January 1997. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

¹⁶² de Wijk, pp. 132-133.

¹⁶³ Parmentier, p. 32.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. See also North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session, Final Communiqué, 13 June 1996, par. 5-7.

The year 1997 witnessed wide conceptual differences between the French and the Germans in pushing forward the merger of the WEU within the EU, a condition *sine qua non* for realizing a genuine ESDI. First, the debate concerning the acceptance of the concept of a “lead-nation” capable of playing a key reconnaissance role in the conduct of an operation, ended with a last minute *rapprochement* on the conceptual plane at the May 1997 WEU ministerial meeting in Paris, supposedly due to the experience of Bosnia. Second, their different conceptions of the necessary degree of national sovereignty to be abandoned for achieving an effective decision-making body in the EU that would implement the projected CFSP, led to a fragile compromise.

Third, within the framework of the EU, following the February 1996 Franco-German initiative, the EU member countries succeeded in updating at the Amsterdam Summit¹⁶⁵ Article J-4 of the Treaty of Maastricht in connection with the Common Foreign and Security Policy operations.¹⁶⁶ But, because the adopted guidelines did not receive unanimous agreement among the EU partners--the German and French conceptions in particular were widely different--a more significant achievement at the

¹⁶⁵ Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997.

¹⁶⁶ The key words for these operations are: “reinforced co-operation,” “replacement of the veto by abstention,” and “constructive abstention.” Thus, the Treaty does allow for a form of “constructive abstention,” whereby a state could abstain from a vote, allowing the decision to go ahead but without having to implement it. See *The Treaty of Amsterdam*, 2 October 1997, Article 1-Amendments to the Treaty of Maastricht, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title V of the Treaty on European Union). Available [On line]: [<http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/amsteroc/en/treaty/treaty.htm>]. [10 February 1998].

summit in the field of the ESDI was not realized.¹⁶⁷ It could be concluded that 1997 was a year of minimum progress in the institutional development of the ESDI.

On the American side, in 1996-1997 the only major concern was the AFSOUTH debate. The Americans attempted to delay the discussion about the subject because this topic, combined with the "Deputy SACEUR" one,¹⁶⁸ could lead to adjustments in the European position within the Atlantic Alliance and undermine American leadership. William Perry, then Secretary of Defense, stated that "the presence of the American Sixth Fleet was a determining factor in the regional balance of power. He also considered American leadership crucial as he thought this region to have the highest risk of crises."¹⁶⁹ Focused on the process of NATO enlargement, the U.S. tried to maintain a *status quo* in the American-European defense relationship and, thus, to avoid any source of further tension.

The German position during 1997 toward the Southern flank debate might be described as follows:

¹⁶⁷ Parmentier, pp. 32-34. The changes made in Amsterdam were limited to the setting up of a foreign policy planning and analysis unit at the EU Council of Ministers; the appointment as a High Representative of an EU bureaucrat (the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers), rather than a prominent politician, as some member states wanted; and closer cooperation--but no merger--between the EU and the WEU. Majority voting, it was agreed, would be used only in the "implementation" phases of foreign policy, whereas strategic choices would still have to be agreed unanimously.

¹⁶⁸ France and the United Kingdom wanted a permanent ruling creating a Deputy SACEUR, who, in addition to his function as "second in command," would also become the strategic operations commander or co-ordinator for WEU-led operations. Germany too moved gradually towards this position, which was adopted by the Alliance, in rather general terms.

¹⁶⁹ de Wijk, p. 136. After all, in the U.S. opinion, differences between Greece and Turkey could complicate the designation of a European commander for the southern region.

In the quarrel which began in the summer of 1997 [in fact, in the summer of 1996] between the French and the Americans over the nationality of the commander of the Southern region, the Germans have supported France strongly and openly by very firm public declarations (e.g. Mr. Ruhe in Oslo on 25 September 1996), probably because they felt that a visible Europeanisation of NATO would reassure the Russians that NATO enlargement would not come at their expense. As a matter of fact, as soon as Russia accepted the *fait accompli* of NATO enlargement ... at the Helsinki summit in March 1997, the Germans retreated and came up with proposals for a division of responsibilities in the Southern region which is far to say were impossible for the French to accept.¹⁷⁰

In September 1997, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann of the German Army, said,

The European nations in the region concerned do not support the French proposal. France is not speaking in behalf of Europe. The Mediterranean is NATO's most endangered region. From a NATO point of view, at this time, it is good to have American command in AFSOUTH.¹⁷¹

G. FINAL REMARKS

In theory, in the post-Cold War period, the United States had always been supportive of European efforts to develop a CFSP and an ESDI to help implement it, as called for at Maastricht. Yet seen from the European perspective, the efforts of the United States had not always seemed to match the rhetoric. As the Soviet threat disappeared, and the West Europeans, for the first time in the post-Second World War

¹⁷⁰ Parmentier, p. 30.

¹⁷¹ He added that statistically Europeans do contribute much to the AFSOUTH forces: about 70% of land forces and 60% of air assets. "In purely mathematical terms, there is some justification [for France's argument, but] you have to look at the Mediterranean." Deutsche Presse Agentur, 30 September 1997. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

period, began to feel that they might be able to meet more of their own immediate security needs without direct assistance from the U.S., the Americans appeared to be ambivalent at best (if not openly hostile) toward the efforts of the European members of NATO to develop their own security identity.¹⁷² "The tension between the European desire for greater independence and the American desire to avoid creation of a competition for NATO became a source of considerable frustration among Allies."¹⁷³

On the one hand, there was no U.S. interest to contribute to the creation of a possible competitor to NATO. On the other hand, the construction of an ESDI was seen, legitimately, to be primarily a European concern. This was to be translated in a period of two years (1990-1992) in which the debate on ESDI was reduced to a cycle:

European proposals would be put forward with very little input from Washington; the U.S. would then react negatively to the elements of the concept it did not like, while saying nothing about the elements if found acceptable. Underlying this Washington approach was also a subtle suspicion among many on both sides of the Atlantic that, left to their own devices, the Europeans would never be able to agree on any alternative to acting within NATO.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² As Gunther van Well, the insightful former German Ambassador to the United States pointed out, "the U.S. has always followed a two-track policy that combines principled support for European unity with insistence that the military and economic position of the United States in Europe must remain so strong that its influence would not diminish in the face of further steps toward European integration." As quoted in Jonathan Dean, *Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p. 284.

¹⁷³ Nelson S. Drew, "From Berlin to Bosnia: NATO in transition, 1989-1994," *Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship*, in Charles Barry, ed., (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 11.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

In November 1992 a new Administration was elected on the theme of change and responding to domestic concerns. A fundamental shift in the U.S. position on ESDI took place for two reasons. First, the U.S. wanted to continue NATO's evolution toward becoming an instrument that could address security concerns such as the Yugoslav crisis. Second, the new administration intended to influence NATO less directly and in a more detached manner than the previous one.

It is important to mention that the 1994 Brussels summit communiqué "contained 28 references to ESDI, the WEU and related concepts such as CFSP and the Eurocorps."¹⁷⁵ On this occasion, the United States accepted Europe's goal of establishing ESDI within NATO and separable from NATO, depending on the circumstances; and in fact the United States would help develop the ESDI through the new concept: the CJTF. It is nonetheless important to underline that cautionary phrases such as: "separable but not separate," "transparency and complementarity," "not in competition with NATO," and "does not dilute NATO" remain (and are endorsed by all the allies) in the official documents of NATO.

After 1994, the U.S. was still ambivalent with regard to a more prominent European role in the spheres of security and defense:

¹⁷⁵ Barry, p. 76.

On the one hand greater European responsibility was welcomed because it allowed the Americans to concentrate on their global commitments. On the other hand, the Americans in NATO did not wish to be confronted with irreversible European positions as result of common foreign and security policy within the European Union.¹⁷⁶

There continues to be a tendency in the U.S. to see a choice between defense structures dominated by NATO and those organized around the EU and/or the WEU, and at least part of the present satisfaction in the U.S. with the state of the transatlantic relationship can be attributed to an unstated view that NATO has “won” the competition, at least for now.

After the 1994 summit, European-U.S. relations were evolving toward a more balanced partnership because Europe was growing increasingly stronger, more integrated, and more independent. ESDI is a deliberately vague concept reflecting the intent of NATO's European members to develop a collective identity in security and defense matters. It is intended not only to reflect the importance of NATO but also to provide a separate identity and complementarity to national defense policies.

In addition to its impact on the U.S. role in Europe, ESDI could deeply affect EU cohesion. Thus, the United States wants an ESDI that will not result in the U.S. facing *fait accompli* positions at NATO consultative meetings. In sum, the Americans recognized and accepted the reality of ESDI and are committed to furthering it within the context of a broader NATO structure.

¹⁷⁶ de Wijk, p. 122.

Germany's special interests regarding ESDI are twofold: on the one hand, there is a rather strong institutional interest in maintaining and developing the overall EU framework. On the other hand, some special interests¹⁷⁷ de-emphasize the role of the ESDI concept. Thus, Germany has a stake in balancing its European and Atlantic ambitions, and in continuing its role as a mediator between France and the U.S. in their traditional disputes.

Bonn's priorities in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe encouraged Germany to try to involve as many EU and NATO countries as possible in the region. In this respect, NATO provided the best multilateral instrument in the military field. Therefore, Germany is interested in engaging as many institutions as possible in this region. This is the reason for Bonn's strong inclination to give the ESDI (WEU) a role in the region, too, although its real capabilities to play an efficient role are limited. Furthermore, for a number of historical and societal reasons, Germany tended to take the role of international organizations, institutions, and alliances as a boundary condition, a factor that sets limits to national policies. At the same time, Bonn strives to modify these boundaries by changing the policies of these international institutions in specific desired directions.

From the German perspective, in the post-Cold War period the evolution of the WEU and the creation of an ESDI were pursued while taking into account the following

¹⁷⁷ Due to the tremendous burdens it carries with regard to its unification and to Central and Eastern Europe, Germany no longer has sufficient financial means to promote and finance the ESDI.

factors. First, despite the disagreements of the 1990-1992 years, the transatlantic relationship, and in particular the close German-U.S. ties, were not jeopardized. Since the military component of this relationship is most visible and best realized within NATO, Germany always had certain reservations with regard to the creation of a "purely" European defense. Thus, it was in the German security interest to ensure that both alliances (i.e., NATO and the WEU) would remain fully congruent and compatible rather than move toward conflict with one other and that this fact would be reflected in both form and structure.

Second, the development of a CFSP of the EU will take many years, but is nevertheless a precondition for the creation of an ESDI. Thus, the United States should give up its reservations and remind the Europeans, if they want to build the WEU as the European pillar of NATO, what this "means in terms of a defense burden and a more responsible role for defending common Western interests outside the traditional NATO treaty area."¹⁷⁸

Third, in 1995-1997 it became very difficult for Germany to balance the Franco-American relationship. On one hand, Germany needs France for Chancellor Kohl's vision of a united Europe. On the other, Germany also needs the U.S., because "[o]nly the United States can provide a number of indispensable contributions to German and

¹⁷⁸ Mey, p. 315.

European security; the alliance with the United States serves the fundamental foreign and security policy interests of Germany.”¹⁷⁹

Germany clearly could not afford to decide between the U.S. and France. But there are factors that hamper progress towards an ESDI, such as the lack of European political will to spend the resources necessary to acquire the assets that would diminish dependence on American capabilities, the risk of a “regionalization” of European security, and the conspicuous lack of consensus among West European countries on what sort of role Europe should play as a unitary actor on the world stage. The unifying, centripetal forces affecting the development of an ESDI are few and seem rather weak, whereas the centrifugal forces are numerous.¹⁸⁰ All those factors might lead to the thought “that a common [European] security and defense policy would pose a threat to NATO.”¹⁸¹

In this context, with the unification of Europe to remain a long-term vision for the time being, Germany might give highest priority to the Americans. This decision could mean for the Germans “to have a fair chance to accomplish all three national interests in

¹⁷⁹ Holger Mey, “German-American Relations: The Case for a Preference,” *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 14, (1995), p. 208.

¹⁸⁰ Opposition to a common European defense force, although far less than the proportion supporting this key aspect of European integration, remained in Germany *higher* than in Britain or France in 1995 (28% versus 25% and 15%, respectively just as in 1993). The proportion of Germans opposing such defense integration had, moreover, increased from 25% to 28% between 1993 and 1995. See U.S. Information Agency, *The New European Security Architecture: Public Assess the Building Block of European Security* (Washington, D.C.: USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, September, 1995), p. 31.

¹⁸¹ Daniel Nelson, “Germany and the balance between threats and capacities in Europe,” *International Politics*, vol. 34, no. 1 (March 1997), p. 67.

parallel: a strategic alliance between the United States and Europe, West European integration, and all-European security.”¹⁸²

The post-Cold War period showed that America has become a nation more like others, the only remaining superpower but actually less influential with its allies than it used to be. The United States will need friends and markets even when it does not have enemies. Finally, the U.S. feared a separate West European path in political, military, and economic affairs. In this context, a united Europe could play a new and more important role in the transatlantic relationship, and it may be able to function as a more powerful partner of the U.S. in the international arena. However, the gap in U.S.-European military capabilities, evident also before the end of the Cold War, continues to widen¹⁸³ and this trend contributes to the increased European dependence on advanced U.S. military assets, such as airlift, sealift, and communications, command, control, computers and intelligence (C4I).

In this setting, Germany could play an active and constructive role in shaping the European unification process while ensuring that the transatlantic link remains intact. As Chancellor Kohl stated in his speech to the French Senate in November 1993, "Europe

¹⁸² Mey, "German-American Relations: The Case for a Preference," p. 209.

¹⁸³ See the statements of Norman W. Ray, "The Transformation of NATO: Challenges and Prospects," (Address to the AFCEA Europe Symposium: "Technet Europe '96," 17 October 1996); Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, "Speaking Notes for the Secretary General for his Afternoon Remarks," (SACLANT Seminar, Lisbon, Portugal, 4-5 May 1997); and General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, "The Imperative of Allied Defence Collaboration: The Case for MEADS," (Address to the Members of the United States Congress and Senate, 23 June 1997, Washington, D.C.). Texts furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

needs the United States-but the United States needs a Europe which takes more responsibility for itself and for international security."¹⁸⁴

Nevertheless, at the Cold War's end, Western societies must do more to define positive perspectives, for that is the only way that CEE can be permanently Westernized. The political and social cohesion and economic health of the EU and its CEE partners must be considered among the most important determinants of the future of security in Europe. Thus, NATO's new role in cooperating with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region deserves a closer look. Moreover, considering the outcome of the 1997 Madrid NATO summit concerning the Alliance's enlargement, and the traditional special German interest in *Mittleuropa*, analyzing the German and American attitudes toward cooperation with former CEE adversaries might advance understanding of why the two countries could remain pivotal partners in efficiently addressing Europe's security dilemmas.

¹⁸⁴ As quoted in Helmut Willman, "*The European Corps-Political Dimension and Military Aims*," *RUSI Journal*, vol. 139, August 1994, p. 33.

IV. POST-COLD WAR GERMAN-AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD COOPERATION WITH FORMER CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ADVERSARIES

A. INTRODUCTION

Since its formation between 1949-1950¹⁸⁵, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has achieved two fundamental results. First, it “won” the Cold War without firing a shot. It proved also to be the most important aspect of a Western policy of containment of Soviet expansion that culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the communist governments of Eastern Europe. Second, NATO provided the necessary security framework for the economic and political integration of Western Europe, which fostered European Union institutions strong enough to rule out war among states that had been fighting one another for over a millennium.

As the communist regimes of Eastern Europe began to collapse, NATO governments, led by the United States and Germany, undertook rapid steps, while avoiding measures that might alarm the declining Soviet Union, to deal with the desires of the new democratic governments of Eastern Europe for some degree of security assurance in a confusing new situation. Their objective was also to improve long-term chances for democratic government in the former Warsaw Pact states by transmitting to

¹⁸⁵ On the origins of NATO see, for example, Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981) and Robert S. Jordan, with Michael W. Bloome, *Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).

their armed forces and civilian leaders essential concepts from Western practice. This situation has increasingly obliged NATO to struggle with the problem of achieving its ultimate political objective, as stated in the 1967 Harmel Report: “to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.”¹⁸⁶

Moreover, despite the fact that NATO is an intergovernmental organization in which national views must be reconciled, Germany and the United States played a decisive role in expressing the Alliance’s determination to construct a stable political order in Europe as a whole. In this process, two of the keys to stability in Europe are considered to be the Western relationship to Russia and the internal development of Europe’s society.

German actions have been embedded in multilateral frameworks, and have followed a strategy of diversification, balance and compensation. In the absence of a strategic threat, united Germany has acted as “a civilian power,” avoiding as far as possible the ways of a traditional great power and hence the use of force.¹⁸⁷ Conventional European (through institutions such as the EU, the WEU, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE) and NATO diplomacy monopolized quite successfully the mediation between Germany and the Central and Eastern European states.

For some Americans, the new environment brought an implicit warning in the transatlantic bargain, namely that the U.S. might abandon its interest in European

¹⁸⁶ North Atlantic Council, Harmel Report, 13-14 December 1967, par. 9.

security. Such warnings were based on a complete misjudgment of Europe's unique role as a key strategic region for North American security. Europe continued to play a vital role in the U.S. security calculus. The Americans need to stay in Europe: "every security problem which touches on the military great power Russia, every crisis which has even the remotest nuclear dimension, and every conflict which threatens escalation on NATO territory thus will force the United States to become engaged."¹⁸⁸

It should be noted that the U.S. has a special interest in close German-American relations. It seems clear that partnership with the strongest nation in the heart of Europe serves U.S. interests in influencing European affairs. "Europe, and in addition Germany, provide a strategic base for the United States from which it can pursue its national and common interests in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia, as well as in the Near and Middle East."¹⁸⁹

In this context, the Alliance launched in 1990 its new policy of "cooperation with former adversaries,"¹⁹⁰ a phrase that announced two new roles for the Allies.¹⁹¹ "To pursue the development of co-operative structures of security for a Europe whole and

¹⁸⁷ The German domestic debate over security policy is predominantly characterized by an almost total neglect of military power as an instrument of foreign policy.

¹⁸⁸ Michael Rühle and Nick Williams, "View from NATO: Why NATO Will Survive," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 16 (1997), p. 113.

¹⁸⁹ Mey, "View from Germany: German-American Relations: The Case for a Preference," p. 209.

¹⁹⁰ See the 5-6 July 1990 London Declaration and the 7-8 November 1991 Strategic Concept.

free,”¹⁹² NATO has established four new institutions: Partnership for Peace (PFP); the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; the NATO-Ukraine Commission; and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in May 1997.

This set of institutions tried to address at least two of the most important issues of European security in the post-Cold War environment: first, to what extent Russia and the other CEE states will take part in a set of Western political, economic and military institutions led by the U.S., Germany, the U.K. and France; second, how military power might be readied or employed to influence political developments in or near Europe, especially where the interests of the great powers are not in conflict. In this context, German and American attitudes towards NATO’s cooperation with former CEE adversaries clearly deserve closer scrutiny.

Given that “NATO also provides a unique institutional framework for the Europeans to affect American policies”¹⁹³ and that “liberal democracies successfully influence each other, in the framework of international institutions by using norms and

¹⁹¹ The cooperation with former adversaries (and, increasingly, other non-NATO countries) will ensure complementarity with the OSCE in the Euro-Atlantic region and support an “open-ended” process of NATO enlargement.

¹⁹² North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7-8 November 1991, par. 19.

¹⁹³ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia Press University, 1996), p. 396.

joint decision-making procedures as well as transnational policies,¹⁹⁴ this analysis could provide a better understanding of the two countries' particular interests in establishing a new "concert of Europe" and of some of the rationales that led to the process of NATO's enlargement.

Moreover, analyzing the German and American strategic decisions and actions in the development of this process might throw light on a larger question: whether this new set of institutions is an effective answer to the Old Continent's security concerns or only "a diversion from the specific policy issues arising in the eastern half of Europe" and "from direct discussion of the vital interests, regional policies and needed military readiness of the governments in the Euro-Atlantic community."¹⁹⁵ To achieve the mentioned above goals, it is necessary to examine, at a minimum, the following topics:¹⁹⁶

- The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
- The Partnership for Peace; and,
- The process of NATO enlargement.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," in Philip H. Gordon, ed., *NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), p. 88.

¹⁹⁶ A complete analysis would include also the German and American attitudes toward Russia and Ukraine.

B. NACC AND EAPC

In the post-Cold War period NATO has changed in at least three important aspects: NATO-sponsored cooperative institutions have been established to include the former members of the Warsaw Pact and other non-NATO countries, beginning with the creation of the NACC; it has acknowledged that political, economic and even environmental concerns are gaining greater importance, while the military missions of the Alliance have become more complex; and NATO has redefined its military missions.

The NATO London Declaration of July 1990 cited the need for the establishment of a closer relationship with the CEE nations. In terms of concrete proposals, it suggested “military contacts” between NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders, “regular diplomatic liaison” between NATO and the states of the Warsaw Pact, and a joint declaration by the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact affirming that they were “no longer adversaries.”¹⁹⁷

In April 1991 the U.S. reaffirmed its support for the positive developments in CEE, but implied that countries in this region should not expect membership in NATO and/or explicit security guarantees:

¹⁹⁷ North Atlantic Council, London Declaration, July 5-6, 1990, par. 6-8. This declaration was made in Paris in November 1990, less than eight months before the Warsaw Pact was formally disbanded in July 1991.

European security is indivisible. The United States is committed to supporting the process of democracy, as well as the independence and sovereignty of Central-East European countries.... Formal military alliances and guarantees are not the sole measures of national security, nor the only means of filling perceived political and security vacuums.¹⁹⁸

At the June 1991 Copenhagen NATO meeting, the Alliance proposed the "further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships" with the former Warsaw Pact nations, including the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁹ During the debates for adopting the final communiqué of the meeting, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher "in particular believed that deepening the contacts between NATO and Central and Eastern Europe was implicit recognition of NATO's role as [a] stabilizing factor in Europe."²⁰⁰

In October 1991 Genscher and his American counterpart James Baker presented an initiative to put the CEE countries at ease by "strengthening and deepening co-operation"²⁰¹ in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Thus, the November 1991 Rome Declaration proposed the creation of such a body.²⁰² Consequently, on December 20, 1991, the NATO ministers of foreign affairs met with their counterparts from the former Warsaw Pact in Brussels for the first session of the NACC.

¹⁹⁸ Paul Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Remarks at the Conference on "Future of European Security," Prague, Czechoslovakia, 25 April 1991, pp. 3-4. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

¹⁹⁹ *New York Times*, 7 June 1991.

²⁰⁰ de Wijk, p. 31.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² After the summit the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, including the Baltic states, were invited to a meeting with the NATO ministers of foreign affairs to formally commence the new initiative.

The first meeting of the NACC was itself of enough symbolic significance to ensure its place in NATO's history despite a certain lack of substance. Moreover, occurring on the very day when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, it was somewhat overshadowed by this event.²⁰³

During this first session, both Genscher and Baker described the NACC as a new pillar of the emerging European security order. It was intended to play specific and unique functions.²⁰⁴ Among them it would serve as a forum for consultation with the "liaison states" on issues such as civilian control over the military and the conversion of defense industries to civilian purposes; it might also serve as a forum for negotiating further conventional arms control and confidence and security building measures; and it was suggested that the NACC could play a peace-making role in Nagorno-Karabakh and other contested areas in the former Soviet Union and CEE.²⁰⁵

James Sperling concluded that, after the Copenhagen and Rome North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings, visible change occurred in the Alliance's fundamental tasks:

²⁰³ de Wijk, p. 63.

²⁰⁴ The initiative provided for annual meetings at ministerial level in the NACC, periodic meetings with the ambassadors, extra meetings "as circumstances warrant," and regular meetings with the Military Committee and other NATO committees. The meetings would concentrate on matters of NATO expertise, such as defense planning and civil-military relations. See North Atlantic Council, *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*. Rome, 7-8 November 1991, Sect. 9-12.

²⁰⁵ See North Atlantic Council, *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, p. 21; James A. Baker, III, "US Commitment to Strengthening Euro-Atlantic Cooperation," *US Department of State Dispatch*, 2 (23 December 1991), p. 903; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, 27 (12 March 1992), p. 264; Robert Mauthner, "NATO, CIS peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh," *Financial Times*, 11 March 1992; Edward Mortimer, "Europe's Security Surplus," *Financial Times*, 4 March 1992.

... military principles are reinforced by an up-dated and reformulated Harmel doctrine, which was the prior touchstone of alliance policy. The dyad of détente and defense has been replaced with a triad of dialogue, cooperation, and collective defense capability within the alliance and the triad of dialogue, partnership, and cooperation among the member states of the NACC.²⁰⁶

At the same time, NATO “sought to offer the former communist states some surrogate connection, just enough to keep them happy, but not too much, so as not to raise their expectations.”²⁰⁷ Touted as “a most ingenious invention,” and “with no particular thinking behind it,”²⁰⁸ NACC was similar in its procedures and methods of operation to the OSCE, reflecting in a way the Genscherist belief “that strengthening the CSCE was a way to increase stability in Central and Eastern Europe, a vital German interest.”²⁰⁹

In this setting, in order to achieve its post-1989 security objectives—to create a pan-European security system that integrates Germany into Europe as an equal if not a leading state; to accelerate the demilitarization of the European area in order to create an environment favoring German economic interests, a development that would increase German leverage with the other European states and minimize Germany’s historically dictated disadvantage in the military realm; to retain an American political-military

²⁰⁶ Sperling, p. 265.

²⁰⁷ Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s enlargement: anatomy of a decision,” *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 4 (October 1997), p. 701.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ de Wijk, p. 31.

presence in Europe as insurance against the failure of a demilitarized pan-European security structure; and, to ensure the integration of the republics of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in that pan-European order—Germany pursued a pragmatic policy to secure its immediate *Vorposten*.

Thus, Germany advocated the necessity of Western help for the CEE countries (especially for the Visegrad states-Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics) in order to obtain the guarantees that they felt they needed for their own security and a stable domestic development. Germany's prime interest was to establish a stable security space between its eastern border and the Russian frontier.²¹⁰ In this context, it also sought to engage the CEE states in European structures.²¹¹ NATO was intended to become, in the words of then Foreign Minister Genscher, "a transatlantic security bridge for the whole of Europe, for the democracies of Eastern and Western Europe."²¹²

These actions and statements were components of a strategy consistent with a foreign and security policy which, since German unification, "has been designed to deepen the traditional *Westbindung* (Western integration) and simultaneously widen the

²¹⁰ Haftdorn, p. 99.

²¹¹ Bilateral treaties have been signed between Germany and the former countries of the Warsaw Pact in the early 1990s with the intent to commit the German government to advocate EU membership for the countries involved.

²¹² Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Eine Vision für das ganze Europa," *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, 14 (February 1991), p. 92. As quoted in Sperling, p. 266.

Euro-Atlantic structures to the East.”²¹³ From a German perspective it was natural to pursue such policies because, as Christoph Boer stated:

In the long term, no country will be able to derive greater benefits from intensified cooperation with the East than Germany....And as no country is so directly affected by the threat of instability as Germany, no country must do as much to reconstruct the East as Germany. Germany's interests and responsibilities demand this in equal measure.²¹⁴

In the German domestic political arena, relations with CEE and Russia in particular were perceived by public opinion in 1992 as the country's top vital interest.²¹⁵ Despite broad support in some decision-making circles for pro-East policies, “the lack of strategic thinking of the political class becomes increasingly obvious. Unfortunately, the academic community provides also little help in this respect.”²¹⁶ Overall German policies before Maastricht and the collapse of the Soviet Union were prudent responses to outside challenges. After the above mentioned events took place, however, “a more

²¹³ Karl-Heinz Kamp and Peter Weilemann, “Germany and the Enlargement of NATO,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, *Occasional Papers in European Studies* (OP-97/23, September 1997), p. 1.

²¹⁴ Christoph Boehr, “At the End of the Post-War Order in Europe: In Search of a New Coherence of Interests and Responsibilities,” *Aussenpolitik* (vol. 46, no. 2), p. 5. Available [On line]: [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/au_pol/boehr.htm]. [30 January 1990].

²¹⁵ Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Public Opinion and Security Policy in 1994* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1995), pp. 7-9.

²¹⁶ Holger M. Mey, “New Members—New Mission: The *Real* Issues Behind the New NATO Debate,” *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 13, no. 2 (April/June 1994), p. 224.

fundamental debate on European order and [the] German role within it began to emerge.”²¹⁷

It might be concluded that, at the moment when NACC was created,

A continuation of the postwar strategy of self-containment, which had complemented the American security strategy of double-containment and has had the (retrospectively beneficial) consequence of producing foreign and security policies that reflexively expressed German interests in the language of Europe or the Atlantic Alliance. Germany has offered to entrap itself in integrative and constraining political and military structures, despite a legitimate claim to European leadership by virtue of geography, demography, economic capacity, and latent military power.²¹⁸

From the American perspective the creation of the NACC was part of a larger strategy involving diplomacy and economics, in order to maintain a political-military equilibrium in Eurasia. It was in the U.S. strategic interest to promote a balanced configuration of power in this part of the world, presumably following from at least three specific interests:

- (i) To prevent the total disintegration of the Soviet Union and, that failing, to promote the emergence of stable, democratic, and prosperous successor states;
- (ii) To prevent the reimposition of Soviet or Russian military or political control in Eastern Europe, which presumably can best be

²¹⁷ Hartmut Mayer, “German concepts on a European order,” *International Affairs* (vol. 73, no. 4, October 1997), p. 724. Ideas and arguments about the new role of Germany in international affairs in the post-1989 setting were exchanged in various political circles and foundations, in universities, think tanks (such as the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung) and in the quality media (most importantly the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Die Zeit* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*). However, compared to Washington, with its open competition among institutes, lobbies and political consultants, the practical influence of the German international affairs community on government policy was and continues to be limited.

²¹⁸ Sperling, p. 276.

achieved by NATO guaranteeing the national independence, territorial integrity, political democracy and diplomatic neutrality of the former Soviet-bloc states; [and,]...

- (iv) To encourage stability in Central and Eastern Europe by strengthening the new democracies.²¹⁹

The 8 June 1992 (Oslo) and the 18 December 1992 (Brussels) NACC meetings of foreign ministers proved to be turning points for the NACC because they “cleared the way for active co-operation between NATO and the partners in the field of peace-keeping.”²²⁰ The NACC work plan for 1993 included the following activities:

Consultations on peacekeeping and related matters, starting in a brainstorming format at ambassadorial level, followed by ad-hoc meetings of political-military experts, as agreed by ambassadors, leading to cooperation among interested NACC members in preparation for peace-keeping activities, including: joint-sessions on planning of peace-keeping training, and consideration of possible joint peace-keeping exercises.²²¹

According to de Wijk, “The first brainstorming session of the ambassadors took place on 26 January 1993 on the basis of a German-American non-paper.”²²² As a result

²¹⁹ Huntington, p.13.

²²⁰ de Wijk, p. 67.

²²¹ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, *Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1993*, Brussels, 18 December 1992, p. 2.

²²² de Wijk, p. 68.

of these activities, in February 1993 the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping was founded.²²³

The U.S. in particular believed that, starting from this group, the NACC could form the nucleus of a new security system. A structure needed to be developed which would enable the partners to take part in an operational “framework,” with NATO acting as a catalyst behind this development. “The Americans directed their endeavors mainly towards involving the Russians in all questions concerning European security in order to avoid a new division of Europe.”²²⁴ The German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, argued for a more operational role for the NACC.²²⁵ “There was consensus within NATO that intensification of co-operation with the Central and Eastern European countries could promote stability and security in the whole of Europe.”²²⁶

Under these circumstances, the NACC activities (1992-1997) consisted in fact mainly of meetings—workshops, conferences, seminars, colloquiums, etc. The initial agenda was repeatedly expanded in annual agreed work plans²²⁷, and eventually

²²³ Ibid. The work of this group progressed rapidly and as a result it prepared a series of reports in the next years. See, for example, the NACC meeting in Athens on 11 June 1993.

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 69.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 70. The German position coincided with the French one and this was to lead to the “Pact of Stability” (known also as the “Balladur Plan”) which aimed to resolve points of difference between CEE countries by means of regional consultative forums, so that stability would be increased.

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 72.

²²⁷ This was also a result of the fact that since mid-1993 it was clear that the Central European states were no longer satisfied with the tactics of “*prevarication*” pursued by a mechanism of postponing decisions, in which NACC, at that moment, had great chances of being transformed. Eyal, p. 702.

encompassed topics such as peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, defense budgets and economic planning, air defense, military procurement, disarmament technologies, materiel and technical standardization, and communications and information systems operability.²²⁸

Cooperation within the NACC was aimed increasingly at crisis control, and with the successful development of the PFP after December 1994, the Americans had “already maintained that the NACC had fulfilled its function, namely the demolition of barriers between East and West.”²²⁹ From the German perspective, complementarity between the NACC and PFP was required in order to promote the salient features of German security and defense policy, as stated in the *1994 German White Paper on Defense*:

As far as Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, Germany’s policy is thus characterized by three key terms: stabilization through cooperation and integration. These three factors of a forward-looking approach to stability are indivisible elements of a convincing overall concept. The transfer of stability will benefit everyone. Stability in and for Europe is the future crucial task of the Euro-Atlantic community.²³⁰

In the new context, the center of gravity was shifting to topics such as peacekeeping, arms control verification, scientific and environmental cooperation, and the conversion of defense industries, and to an enterprise designed to be more inclusive

²²⁸ See *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, October 1995).

²²⁹ de Wijk, p. 87.

²³⁰ *White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, 1994*, chapter 3, par. 313, p. 42.

than the NACC and to encompass activities in addition to meetings--the PFP.²³¹ Thus, a new institution was required. The NACC was replaced in May 1997 by an organization including all PFP and NACC participants—the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, a new forum that would “combine the activities of NATO’s aging Cooperation Council (NACC) and the PFP Program.”²³²

Warren Christopher, then U.S. Secretary of State, first proposed the EAPC on 6 September 1996.

We should involve our Partners in the planning as well in the execution of NATO missions. We should give them a stronger voice by forming an Atlantic Partnership Council. In all these ways, NATO gives us a foundation to build our New Atlantic Community—one in which all of Europe and North America work together to build lasting security, one that succeeds where all past efforts have failed.²³³

A few weeks later, during the informal meeting of the NATO ministers of defense (on 25-26 September 1996, at Bergen, Norway), the German minister of defense suggested a merger of the NACC and PFP, and also suggested the aim of an enhanced PFP in order to minimize the distance between NATO members and non-members.²³⁴ Thus, from the German and American perspective, this council “would be a body for

²³¹ See Robert Weaver, “NACC’s Five Years of Strengthening Cooperation,” *NATO Review*, vol. 45 (May/June 1997), pp. 24-26.

²³² Kamp and Weilemann, p. 12.

²³³ Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speech in Stuttgart, 6 September 1996. Text from USIS Wireless File.

consultations between NATO and the OSCE members,”²³⁵ and, thus, at the NAC meeting in December 1996, the Allies “agreed to work with the partners on the initiative to establish APC.”²³⁶

Upon its establishment on 30 May 1997, in Sintra, Portugal, the EAPC adopted the NACC work plan as its own, with a view to replacing it with an even more extensive agenda of topics for consultations. The EAPC’s founders, the NACC members and the PFP partners, declared that its establishment would be a “qualitative step forward in raising to a new level the dynamic and multifaceted political and military cooperation” already achieved in NACC and PFP, and that it would “make a strong contribution to cooperative approaches to security and form an enduring part of the European security architecture.”²³⁷

Germany insisted that the concrete tasks and purposes of such a forum be clarified. At least two aspects require clarification from the German perspective.

First, the specific relationship between EAPC and the enhanced PFP remains unclear, as does the impact of EAPC on OSCE, which basically covers the same ground. Another question has to do with the impact of a proliferation of decision-making bodies on NATO’s decision making.²³⁸

²³⁴ de Wijk, p. 137.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, Brussels, 10 December 1996, par. 9.

²³⁷ Chairman’s Summary of the meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997, par. 3.

²³⁸ Kamp and Weilemann, p. 12.

The EAPC is to be guided by the principles of inclusiveness and self-differentiation.²³⁹ It will offer options for cooperation to Partners that aspire to NATO membership but that were not selected for the “first round” of enlargement and, in a formal sense, it is dependent on the NAC. At the same time it may illustrate the disadvantages of decision-making by consensus, which include the general risk of paralysis. The EAPC “is guided by the desire to soothe the disappointment of the unsuccessful applicants for membership by creating a whole range of different offers.”²⁴⁰

In this setting, because PFP and the process of NATO enlargement represent essential elements in the Western effort to extend the pattern of peace and prosperity achieved by NATO in Europe during the Cold War to a larger area, they deserve closer scrutiny.

C. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

A variety of factors, which included persistent demands by the East Europeans to join the Alliance²⁴¹, the unstable situation in Russia, developments in the Yugoslav crisis,

²³⁹ Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 30 May 1997, par. 4.

²⁴⁰ Kamp and Weileman, p. 12.

²⁴¹ In late April 1993, at the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., President Clinton met one-on-one with a series of CEE leaders, including the highly regarded leaders of Poland and the Czech Republic, Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel. Each delivered the same message to Clinton: their top priority was NATO membership.

as well as personnel changes (especially in the U.S. administration), contributed to the American and German actions in 1993 which envisaged “the birth of a new concept designed to meet the security concerns”²⁴² of the CEE countries and the filling of the security void which had been created in the heart of the continent. Thus, two significant initiatives dominated from that moment NATO’s and Europe’s security agenda: the PFP and NATO’s enlargement.

At the June 1993 meeting of NAC foreign ministers in Athens, Greece, Warren Christopher said that expanding NATO’s membership was “not now on the agenda.”²⁴³ On 21 September 1993, Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s National Security Adviser, gave a major foreign policy speech in which he argued that “the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement—enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.” And he added, “At the NATO summit that [the] president called for this January [1994], we will seek to update NATO, so that there continues behind the enlargement of market democracies an essential collective security.”²⁴⁴

Thus, during the summer and fall of 1993, the Pentagon, the State Department and the National Security Council (NSC) collaborated in Washington regarding the launching

²⁴² de Wijk, p. 74.

²⁴³ James M. Goldgeier, “NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision,” *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter 1998), p. 87.

²⁴⁴ Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” Lecture at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Washington, D.C., *U.S. Policy Information and Text*, no. 97 (23 October 1993), pp. 6-12.

of a proposal that would develop and increase military ties between NATO and its former adversaries.²⁴⁵ In September 1993, during the preparations for the announced summit the Americans proposed a solution in the form of a "Partnership for Peace." "Rapid enlargement was not part of the plan; neither was strengthening of the NACC. This would be seen by the Central and Eastern Europeans as an implausible attempt to postpone their membership debate."²⁴⁶

Officials at the Pentagon unanimously favored the PFP idea. From their standpoint it "did not make sense to talk about expansion until after NATO had established the type of military-to-military relationships that would enable new countries to integrate effectively into the Alliance."²⁴⁷ The State Department suggested making the PFP "the centerpiece of our NATO position,"²⁴⁸ while opposing any decision on enlargement.

On 18 October 1993, at the White House, after a meeting with his main foreign policy advisers, President Clinton endorsed the reached consensus that "at the January summit, the alliance should formally present the PFP, and he should announce NATO's

²⁴⁵ Goldgeier, p. 86.

²⁴⁶ de Wijk, p. 74.

²⁴⁷ Goldgeier, pp. 87-88. The PFP proposal was developed largely through the efforts of Gen. Shalikashvili and his staff, first as SACEUR and then as chairman of the JCS. Shalikashvili and Les Aspin, then Secretary of Defense, opposed expansion and, in particular, feared diluting the effectiveness of NATO. The Pentagon appeared to support a sequential approach toward enlargement: countries would participate in the PFP for a number of years and then the Alliance might start addressing the issue of expansion.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 90.

intention eventually to expand.”²⁴⁹ The decision to develop the PFP was, for the moment, the Clinton administration’s NATO outreach policy.

In this context, at the informal meeting of the NATO defense ministers (19-21 October 1993, Travemunde-Germany), Les Aspin, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, presented for the first time a detailed proposal for PFP.²⁵⁰ He sought to gain Alliance endorsement for the new project, and emphasized that NATO would not enlarge soon.²⁵¹

From the American perspective the PFP was intended to create the possibility of reacting quickly to potential crises in Europe by means of political consultations based on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.²⁵² It would also be an agreement between the 16 NATO countries and each “partner for peace,” and it was meant to offer the possibility of made-to-measure cooperation. It was also sometimes presented as an activity within the NACC, instead of a new form of cooperation.²⁵³ Last, but not least, “the partnership was

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 91. Among Clinton’s top foreign-policy advisers, Lake sought to push ahead with expansion, Aspin and Shalikashvili sought to delay consideration of expansion and instead supported the PFP, and Christopher fell somewhere in between, open to gradual expansion but concerned about Russia’s reaction.

²⁵⁰ de Wijk, p. 75.

²⁵¹ Goldgeier, pp. 91-92.

²⁵² The launching of the PFP program was also coupled with an increased U.S. involvement in the handling of the war in the former Yugoslavia, which ultimately led to a major U.S. and NATO engagement in the region.

²⁵³ de Wijk, pp. 74-75.

deliberately designed to enable member states to put off questions of formal enlargement and of NATO's ultimate disposition in post-Cold War Europe."²⁵⁴

At Travemunde, German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, representing a younger generation of Christian Democratic leaders, and one of the first advocates of NATO's enlargement,²⁵⁵ received the U.S. initiative positively. The Germans eagerly embraced the PFP, even though their interpretation of its significance differed from that held by the Americans. In a sense it "may come to represent for [the new] *Ostpolitik* what flexible response once did for collective defence: an agreement to disagree."²⁵⁶ Ruehe also "maintained that it must be made quite clear that this was not to be regarded as a surrogate NATO membership."²⁵⁷ At the same time leaders in Bonn understood that this

²⁵⁴ Charles A. Kupchan, "Strategic Visions," *World Policy Journal* (vol. XI, no. 3, Fall 1994), p. 113. Whether the PFP should focus on each partner's individual relationship to NATO or evolve as a broader multilateral undertaking in which partners would also build new ties with each other triggered US interagency debate during the planning process. The DOD, in contrast to the NSC and the State Department, was initially intent on restricting the PFP to a series of bilateral agreements between individual states and NATO. The Pentagon was seeking to ensure that NATO would retain complete control over the evolution of the PFP and feared that institutionalizing a multilateral framework might jeopardize this objective. All agencies eventually agreed that the PFP should be a multilateral undertaking. However, the Pentagon's concerns continue to be reflected in the PFP's focus on developing security cooperation primarily between NATO and individual partners.

²⁵⁵ His early public remarks about NATO enlargement created quite a stir. Ruehe's Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture in London, on 26 March 1993, is usually cited in this regard: Volker Ruehe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," *Survival*, vol. XXXV (Summer 1993), pp. 129-137.

²⁵⁶ David Haglund, "Germany's Central European Conundrum," *European Security*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 35.

²⁵⁷ de Wijk, p. 75.

initiative, despite its weaknesses,²⁵⁸ was better than either “participating in central Europe’s local alliances,”²⁵⁹ or reaching a deal with Moscow in order to keep the CEE region under control.²⁶⁰

Under these circumstances, at the Brussels NATO summit (10-11 January 1994) the heads of state and government approved three PFP documents on the first day, namely an invitation to countries wishing to take part in the program, a “framework document” in which the framework of the PFP was sketched, and a “classified ‘Intra Alliance Understanding’ with the interpretation of the allies of the PFP.”²⁶¹ The PFP would function under the NAC; and Partners were invited to participate in NATO’s political and military institutions so far as these concerned PFP activities.²⁶²

During the next few years the PFP won recognition as “without doubt a diplomatic invention of the first order.”²⁶³ Some of its most important aspects were as follows: the 16+1 formula allowed each Partner to determine the nature and depth of the

²⁵⁸ The weaknesses included the following points: no relationship was established with NACC; PFP’s focus on military cooperation implied inadequate opportunities for broad-based political cooperation; PFP was insufficiently focused on intra-regional military cooperation; there was continuing ambiguity within NATO about how and to what degree to include Russia in partnership activities; and, PFP enabled NATO to put off difficult decisions about its future.

²⁵⁹ Eyal, p. 703.

²⁶⁰ William E. Odom, “NATO’s Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong,” *The National Interest* (Spring 1995), p. 41.

²⁶¹ de Wijk, p. 79.

²⁶² Partnership for Peace, *Framework Document*, Brussels, 11 January 1994, Sect. 3.

²⁶³ de Wijk, p. 82.

cooperation, which meant there was a certain amount of self-differentiation;²⁶⁴ it made it clear to the CEE countries that NATO was concerned about their internal stability and security, without giving them a formal guarantee of security and without Moscow being able to accuse NATO of enticing these countries into the Western camp.²⁶⁵

The activities of the PFP were to be coordinated with those of the NACC, so that maximum effectiveness and minimal duplication of the NACC work plan might be achieved.²⁶⁶ PFP activities in the fields of crisis control and military planning, especially the planning of exercises, would have to be coordinated via the newly established Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons, which was to function under the NAC.

By the end of 1994, with the introduction of the Planning and Review Process (PARP) for the interested Partners, the emphasis within the PFP shifted from peacekeeping exercises to planning.²⁶⁷ A Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary-General was established and became the most active PFP forum.²⁶⁸ The NACC and the PFP were formally complementary. The PFP concentrated on practical defense-related and military cooperation activities, while

²⁶⁴ This differed greatly from the NACC, whose work plan applied to every one.

²⁶⁵ After all, PFP applied to the Russian Federation too.

²⁶⁶ In practice it was at first unclear how the relationship between NACC and PFP should evolve.

²⁶⁷ The PARP was introduced in January 1995. It was based on a two-year planning cycle and was intended to increase interoperability between the partners. Cooperation was limited to humanitarian aid, search and rescue, and peacekeeping.

the NACC was the forum for broad consultations on security issues, including security-related economic issues.²⁶⁹ Furthermore, the activities of the NACC and the PFP were being increasingly combined.

Despite the fact that “the PFP was very successful in bringing NATO and the Central and Eastern European countries closer together in the short term,”²⁷⁰ the PFP aroused ambivalent feelings in some partners, especially the Czech Republic and Poland.²⁷¹ “On the one hand NATO seemed to have given the impression that the accession to NATO was imminent; on the other the PFP could be interpreted as an activity aimed at shelving membership.”²⁷²

The East Europeans nonetheless welcomed the fact that, unlike the procedures in NACC, the PFP plan envisaged from the start a process of self-differentiation, since cooperation agreements were signed between NATO and individual countries. But there were suspicions about its long-term implications; it was feared that NATO might not honor the expectations regarding accession that had been raised in these dedicated PFP

²⁶⁸ This could meet, depending on the subject, in various combinations: the 16, the 16+1, the 16+several partners, or in a full NACC combination. Later it merged with the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping and formed the PMSC Ad Hoc Group.

²⁶⁹ See North Atlantic Cooperation Council, *Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1994/1995*, Brussels, 2 December 1994.

²⁷⁰ de Wijk, p. 88.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

members.²⁷³ Worried about potential embarrassment, before the January 1994 NATO summit to be held in Brussels, the U.S. administration dispatched senior officials to all CEE capitals in order to explain this concept.²⁷⁴

The result was a subtle shift in emphasis: having been created as an instrument for avoiding a discussion about NATO's enlargement, PFP was suddenly presented as a structure which 'neither promises NATO membership, nor precludes this membership'. And once PFP was in full swing, the same concept was presented as *the* road to NATO membership. Interestingly, however, it was not PFP which dictated either the pace of NATO's enlargement or the timing of the process; PFP remained the necessary smoke-screen for an essentially political debate which was conducted within the alliance.²⁷⁵

For Germany, the PFP was an excellent opportunity to work for the integration of the CEE countries into both NATO and the EU, not only to ensure security in the heart of Europe, "but also in order to spare the Germans themselves any new historic choices between East and West."²⁷⁶ Moreover, as a supplement to NATO's PFP, Germany established close ties of military cooperation with its CEE neighbors on a bilateral and, in

²⁷³ Goldgeier, p. 92.

²⁷⁴ This came as a reaction to President Lech Walesa's threats, which commanded attention in the West, to reject the PFP agreement. Just prior to his trip to Brussels, Clinton sent Polish-born General Shalikashvili, Czech-born U.S. ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, and Hungarian-born State Department adviser Charles Gati to explain the administration's policy and to quell criticism stemming from this region prior to the summit.

²⁷⁵ Eyal, pp. 702-703.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 703.

some cases, trilateral basis.²⁷⁷ “Germany’s noises were heard, particularly in Washington, where the argument on NATO initially proceeded on a different route, only to reach the same conclusion.”²⁷⁸

Finally, with the decision on enlargement ready to be taken at the July 1997 summit meeting in Madrid, the Alliance was preparing solutions to prevent the emergence of new “dividing lines” in Europe after enlargement. In order to give the cooperation with “non-Allies” a new and more profound meaning, NATO’s September 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement* announced that PFP would become a more significant institution for strengthening security in Europe after NATO enlargement.²⁷⁹

After a similar statement by NATO’s Defense Ministers in June 1996²⁸⁰, in April 1997 U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen underscored the need for the enhancement of the PFP, highlighting the central question of its purposes, including the types of “military contingencies” for which it should be prepared.²⁸¹ Thus, several

²⁷⁷ The Visegrad countries, the Baltic States and Slovenia were in particular offered military personnel exchange programs and military training and education programs, in addition to arms transfer arrangements. For example, the 1996 German defense budget allocated about 11 million-DM for such undertakings. See Kamp and Weilemann, p. 5.

²⁷⁸ Eyal, p. 704.

²⁷⁹ See *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 1995), par. 34 and 36.

²⁸⁰ See North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers session, 13 June 1996, par. 22.

²⁸¹ See Prepared Statement by William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 23 April 1997, p. 8.

measures to enhance PFP were announced in May 1997 at Sintra and approved in July at the NATO summit in Madrid.²⁸²

Thus, while there will inevitably be a distinction between Allies protected by Article 5 and partner countries that do not enjoy this type of commitment, even in an enhanced PFP, NATO allies--the U.S. and Germany in particular--might give the PFP significantly greater substance and different form in the future.²⁸³ This is a necessary step, because otherwise the decline of the PFP into a marginal role would be inevitable and its role as an instrument for reducing the security differences between Allies and Partners the might be compromised.²⁸⁴

D. THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Although Henry Kissinger and Ronald Asmus, among others, advocated NATO enlargement as early as 1991- 1992,²⁸⁵ the Clinton administration initially took up the policy of the Bush administration. "The latter was marked by the prevalent view that an enlargement of NATO to include eastern Central European countries, would be a

²⁸² See NATO Press Release, "The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Program," Madrid, 8 July 1997.

²⁸³ At a minimum, according to some experts, "peace enforcement" should be added to the list of specified PFP activities. See, for example, Vernon Penner, "Partnership for Peace," *Strategic Forum*, no. 97 (December 1996), Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

²⁸⁴ For a comprehensive analysis see Michael Ruehle and Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace after NATO Enlargement," *European Security*, vol. 5 (Winter 1996).

²⁸⁵ Asmus, "Germany and America: Partners in Leadership?," p. 563; and Henry Kissinger, "The Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 March 1992.

provocation for Moscow and was thus out of the question.”²⁸⁶ President Clinton initially followed this example, and thus the new administration began to discuss the problem in earnest in the autumn of 1993.²⁸⁷

The Clinton administration was divided over this issue. National Security Council (NSC) adviser Anthony Lake was most receptive to enlargement. Partly because the defense budget and the U.S. military presence in Europe had declined, the Pentagon opposed enlargement. Furthermore, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin considered that until the end of the century Russia would not become a military threat to other CEE countries. Although no one in the State Department called for the early accession of new NATO members, Secretary of State Warren Christopher favored the view stressed that the Alliance was open to new members if they fulfilled certain criteria. But then he accepted the arguments presented by Strobe Talbott in October 1993²⁸⁸, which basically promoted the view that NATO’s expansion toward CEE would create new dividing lines in Europe, and fuel fears that the Alliance wanted to contain and isolate Russia.²⁸⁹ The Clinton Administration therefore came to the conclusion that a carefully weighed compromise

²⁸⁶ Peter Rudolf, “The USA and NATO Enlargement,” *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 47, no. 4 (1996), p. 1. Available [On line]: [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/au_pol/47_4/rudolf.htm]. [20 January 1998]. Admittedly, this was not stated publicly; the Bush administration maintained silence on the issue.

²⁸⁷ Goldgeier, pp. 87-88.

²⁸⁸ Then Special Adviser to the President on the successor states of the Soviet Union and a close friend of President Clinton.

²⁸⁹ Rudolf, p.1.

had to be found between consideration for Russia's position and the desire of CEE states to join NATO; and this compromise was the PFP.

Criticism of the PFP by, among others, still prominent voices such as Kissinger and Brezinski, pressure from the "Polish-American Congress," and the fact that the Republican-led Congress discovered that the issue of NATO enlargement was a welcome vehicle for criticizing the administration's "Russia-first" policy pushed President Clinton to accelerate efforts to define the concept of NATO enlargement.²⁹⁰

After President Clinton's remarks in July 1994 in Warsaw²⁹¹ and the involvement of Richard Holbrooke²⁹² in the enlargement debate in September 1994, the administration emphasized that the demand for a contribution to collective defense and for interoperability with NATO armed forces were criteria for early NATO membership. In addition, the acceding countries had to introduce democracy and establish a market economy and be willing to accept consensus decision-making in NATO. There would be no rigid timetables; all applications for membership would be individually examined.²⁹³

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁹¹ For President Clinton's exchange with reporters in Warsaw after meeting with President Lech Walesa in July 1994, see William J. Clinton, *Public Papers* (1994), p. 1206.

²⁹² Talbott encouraged Christopher to bring Holbrooke back from his post as ambassador to Germany to be Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in summer 1994, both to fix the Bosnia policy and to work on NATO enlargement. Goldgeier, p. 96.

²⁹³ Speech by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry during the *Wehrkundetagung* conference in Munich, in *U.S. Policy Information and Texts*, 12 (2 July 1995), pp. 10-14.

On the German side, despite the fact that Defense Minister Ruhe repeatedly called for a discussion of NATO enlargement in the spring of 1993, the main concern was that moving quickly to expand the Alliance would trigger a backlash in Russia that would endanger European security. As German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel argued: "We cannot risk reviving East-West strategic rivalry. It would be tragic if reassuring some countries, we alarmed others."²⁹⁴ "Chancellor Kohl, as always the stickler for political correctness, sometimes hinted that he supported the idea and sometimes regarded it as 'premature', depending on whom he was speaking to."²⁹⁵ The German government was not pushing for the rapid expansion of the Alliance.

In this setting, in the run-up to the December 1994 ministerial meeting of the NAC, the U.S. proposed a six-to-eight-month study of enlargement. Germany, along with France, argued successfully in favor of a longer study and played a leading role in modifying the American proposal.²⁹⁶ NATO subsequently decided to study the questions of "why" and "how" before tackling the questions of "who" and "when." Thus, the answers to the first two questions were set out in the Alliance's September 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement*--a document that laid out seven rationales for enlargement.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁴ Klaus Kinkel, "NATO Requires a Bold But Balanced Response to the East," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 October 1993.

²⁹⁵ Eyal, p. 704.

²⁹⁶ Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Enlargement," in Philip H. Gordon, ed., *NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), p. 127.

²⁹⁷ See *Study on NATO Enlargement*, par. 3.

The study reflected the summer 1995 debate on the long-term effects of NATO enlargement inside the U.S. administration. The administration hoped that the enlargement would have two effects: the consolidation of the new democracies and the prevention of big-power rivalries and spheres of influence in Europe.²⁹⁸ Talbott, now Deputy Secretary of State, considered that the prospect of NATO membership might push reforms further in CEE and that various border and minority conflicts might receive a peaceful settlement.²⁹⁹

Holbrooke tended to reflect the geopolitical perspective.³⁰⁰ The U.S. engagement would be necessary also in the future in order to assure stability and a balanced relationship between the CEE countries and to prevent the resurgence of historic rivalries. The possible spread of unrest and destruction from this region to Western Europe raised serious security concerns. Furthermore, the uncertainty there had repeatedly triggered aggressive behavior by the two big nations on the flanks of Central Europe, Germany and Russia.³⁰¹

At least parts of the Administration, therefore, stick to the traditional logic which contends that Europe is threatened by old security dilemmas and

²⁹⁸ Warren Christopher, "America's Leadership, America's Opportunity," *Foreign Policy*, vol. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 6-27.

²⁹⁹ Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," *The New York Review of Books*, 10 August 1995, pp. 27-30.

³⁰⁰ Talbot encouraged Christopher to bring Holbrooke back from his post as ambassador to Germany to be Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs in summer 1994, both to fix the Bosnia policy and to work on NATO enlargement. Goldgeier, p. 96.

³⁰¹ Richard Holbrooke, "America, a European Power," in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995), pp. 38-51.

rivalries if the USA fails to assume the leading role there. There is an unspoken underlying conviction that an unstable Europe has negative repercussions on the security and economy of the USA. A continuation of the policy of "benign hegemony," therefore, seems expedient, in which the interests of other countries are incorporated into the definition of [America's] own national interest. From this viewpoint, the enlargement of NATO is primarily attributable to the interest of the USA in a continuation of its role as a European power, not to any desire for the "neo-containment" of Russia.³⁰²

The study allowed the Germans once more to repeat the official rhetoric of the enlargement process. Arguments in favor of near-term enlargement honoring West's moral responsibility to democratic European neighbors were combined with those against early enlargement as a reflection of the debates that took place in the traditional German *classe politique*. Thus, considerations such as projecting stability eastward, not allowing Russia a veto over NATO's security arrangements, fulfilling the West's moral responsibility to democratic European neighbors, and providing a framework for the long-term consolidation of democratization and free-market economic reform and for more effective resolution of minority and border disputes among CEE countries were opposed to the risks of provoking nationalist reactions in Russia and the paralysis of NATO's decision-making abilities, the importation of new instabilities into the Alliance in the form of minority and border disputes, and the drawing of new dividing lines in Europe.³⁰³

³⁰² Rudolf, p. 3.

³⁰³ See Karsten Voigt, *The Enlargement of the Alliance*, Draft Special Report of the Working Group on NATO Enlargement, North Atlantic Assembly, November 1994.

Moreover, the official rhetoric also brought together, as any document of German foreign or security policy that involves the overlapping responsibilities of the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, as well as the pervasive overall responsibility of the Chancellor's Office, the divergent positions among the Kohl-Kinkel-Ruhe *troika*.³⁰⁴

For Germany integration of the CEE countries in Western security structures was the main aim. Thus, the study reflected Germany's request not to regard the geographical enlargement of the security guarantee as an aim of enlargement but as the result of membership³⁰⁵ and Germany's interest in establishing a clear link between integration, stability and peaceful relations.³⁰⁶ This attitude, which represented generally far more grounds for skepticism than support, characterized also the analyses on NATO enlargement published by German experts in Britain and the U.S.³⁰⁷ However, in NATO Europe Germany was probably the strongest proponent of enlargement.

It should be also noted that "the development of American policy with regard to NATO enlargement was strongly influenced by domestic policy aspects,"³⁰⁸ in which

³⁰⁴ Usually the party coalition politics in Germany led to positions characterized by less than total coherence and by mild to serious discord. For a complete analysis of the different profiles of Kohl, Kinkel and Ruhe see Roger Morgan, "Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy," in Bertel Heurlin, ed., *Germany and Europe in the Nineties* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), pp. 152-178.

³⁰⁵ This was an attempt to remove as far as possible Russian fears of enlargement.

³⁰⁶ de Wijk, p. 91. In this way the importance of NATO's internal pacifying function was stressed.

³⁰⁷ See Holger M. Mey, "New Members—New Mission: The *Real* Issues Behind the New NATO Debate," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 13, no. 2 (April/June 1994), Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," *Foreign Policy*, no. 98 (Spring 1995); and Josef Joffe, "Is There Life After Victory? What NATO Can Do," *The National Interest* (Fall 1995).

³⁰⁸ Rudolf, p. 4.

pressure from the Congress played a major role. At least three factors were decisive in shaping the decision to formally invite the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 to begin accession talks with a view to signing protocols of accession in December 1997 and completing the ratification process in “time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999.”³⁰⁹

First, Senator Richard Lugar and others expressed concern about the USA’s leadership role in Europe and the continued existence of NATO. His motto “out of area or out of business” encompassed NATO’s extension and the assumption of new tasks. Second, the surge for “neo-containment” had its influence. The call for NATO enlargement became louder following growing doubts in 1994 about Russia’s willingness to cooperate (especially the difficulties regarding the acceptance of the PFP initiative and the ratification of the SALT II Treaty).³¹⁰ Third, domestic politics and both presidential and congressional elections had their particular input. The Republicans wanted to dissociate themselves from Clinton’s “Russia first” policy and, at the same time, to win votes from the Americans of Polish, Czech and Hungarian origin. The prevention of a “second Yalta” became their favorite slogan, targeting especially “those sixteen states in

³⁰⁹ Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, published at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid, 8 July 1997, par. 6.

³¹⁰ The anti-Russian motive was strongly voiced by the conservative Republican Jesse Helms, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

which 6 to 18 percent of the population are of eastern Central European and Eastern European origin.”³¹¹

Taking into account the plurality of ideas in American political debates and the fact that there is often a high degree of congruence between public opinion and political decisions—not only in the field of foreign policy- but in the U.S. as a whole, the following overview might provide a more accurate picture of the NATO enlargement debate and its final result in the Congress:

Despite the lopsided 82-13 Senate vote in favor of ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Truman administration faced opposition from three elements: isolationists, defense hawks, and liberal internationalists. This political triangle shows signs of forming again, possibly more potently than in 1949.³¹²

On the German side, from the beginning there “has never been much open criticism or strong public opinion against the idea itself.”³¹³ Acknowledging that NATO enlargement serves Germany’s political, strategic, and moral interests, the parliamentary groups of the ruling coalition parties (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social

³¹¹ Rudolf, p. 3. This was reflected, among others, in the new version of the National Security Revitalization Act (H.R. 7) adopted by the House of Representatives in February 1985, which includes (as Title VI) the NATO Expansion Act of 1995; the NATO Participation Act (adopted by the Congress on 2 November 1994); the draft version of the NATO Participation Act Amendments of 1995; and, the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996.

³¹² Jeremy D. Rosner, “NATO Enlargement’s American Hurdle,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75 (July/August 1996), pp. 14-15. In March 1997, Mr. Rosner became the Special Adviser to the President and to the Secretary of State for NATO Enlargement Ratification.

³¹³ Kamp and Weilemann, p. 4.

Union-CDU/CSU Demokratische Union and Free Democratic Party-FDP) in the *Bundestag*, as well as those of the Social Democratic Party-SPD (notwithstanding a dissenting minority of pacifists), strongly supported enlargement. The Green Party Coalition '90 (with a strong anti-NATO history) was deeply split between the anti-NATO faction and the one that has seen enlargement as the lesser evil, while the only opposing party remained the Party of Democratic Socialism-PDS (the heir of the former Socialist Unity Party/Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands-SED).³¹⁴

Thus, "German ratification of NATO enlargement is likely to give raise to little argument and be concluded by the early summer 1998, before parliament goes into recess and the heated phase of the national election campaign begins."³¹⁵

E. FINAL REMARKS

After the 1989 events in CEE, the changing strategic landscape attracted Europe's attention. The Cold War concern about instability at the heart of a partitioned Germany and a divided continent was supplanted by anxiety over potential instability centered along two geographic arcs running along the periphery of the continent. One was the Eastern arc, running from the Baltic Sea in Northern Europe south between Germany and Russia through the Balkans to the Black Sea. The other one was the Southern arc, running

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

through North Africa and the Mediterranean into Turkey and including the Greater Middle East region.³¹⁶

In this context, the NACC was established at the end of 1991 to provide a link between the NATO countries and the former Warsaw Pact states. It was not originally envisaged as an all-European organization with membership that would include neutral and non-aligned nations of Europe.

NACC had a special role in helping to manage the allocation of conventional force reductions among the states of the former Soviet Union. It has also become a forum for exchanging information among the NATO and former WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] countries on many types of security issues, including peacekeeping.³¹⁷

The PFP, “initially designed to postpone the pressing requests of Central and Eastern European countries for NATO membership,”³¹⁸ proved its success as the provider of a tailored menu of options for engagement according to the preferences of each partner and as a unique experiment in peacekeeping (Bosnia). Both NACC (through multilateral channels) and PFP (by developing bilateral activities) laid the political groundwork for possible NATO enlargement.³¹⁹

³¹⁶ On the twin arcs, see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New NATO,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), pp. 28-40.

³¹⁷ James Goodby, “Can Collective Security Work? Reflections on the European Case,” in Chester A. Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, *Manging Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 248.

³¹⁸ Kamp and Weilemann, p. 11.

³¹⁹ Brown, p. 136.

These initiatives proved that German and American interests overlap in Eastern Europe—the two countries wanting this region to remain as stable as possible. “As long as the US aspires to be a European power and extends a security guarantee to key European countries, above all Germany, it will be inevitably concerned about major political and economic developments in Eastern Europe.”³²⁰ Thus, their policies toward the region were closely coordinated and “Germany is destined to become [from the U.S. perspective] the major political and economic actor in the region.”³²¹

After the end of the Cold War, the “US has retained its normative principles—democracy and free-market economics—as well as its claim to global leadership; its methods of implementation have changed.”³²² The Clinton administration is following a strategy of “engagement and enlargement”³²³ that aims at the further integration of states and regions into the democratic and free-market structure of the West. At the same time, it has given up its primary focus on Europe. This focus was the result of the political and military conflict with the Soviet Union and served America’s policy of containment. In the new environment, for the U.S., “[a]lliances have become instruments for achieving certain political goals, and allies are seen as partners in burden-sharing.”³²⁴

³²⁰ Asmus, “Germany and America: Partners in Leadership?,” p. 552.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 553.

³²² Haftendorn, p. 108.

³²³ See *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, The White House, Washington, D.C., February 1996.

³²⁴ Haftendorn, p. 109.

“In this respect the Americans have great expectations for Germany which the present administration views as the most powerful partner in Europe due to its demographic potential, stable political structure and economic power.”³²⁵ Thus, “[i]n the balance between threats and capacities at the crux of security, Germany will increasingly contribute to the capacities of an alliance for common defense while driving the economic engine of Europe.”³²⁶ Moreover, in order to avoid a German-Russian security competition in CEE,³²⁷ the U.S. had to address Germany’s security concerns.³²⁸ These might be considered the essential and decisive points in understanding “who,” “when” and “why” in the process of NATO enlargement.

However, “the appeal by the Central Europeans to erase the line drawn for them in 1945, the need to demonstrate U.S. leadership at the time when others questioned it, the domestic political consensus, and his own Wilsonian orientation toward spreading liberalism combined”³²⁹ were also important factors which encouraged President Clinton to push for NATO’s enlargement toward CEE after mid-1994.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Nelson, p. 73.

³²⁷ And the renationalization of Western defense and security policies.

³²⁸ However, from the American perspective, one of the greatest threats posed to the U.S.-German relationship during 1990-1994 was the possibility that the mood in America might turn hostile toward CEE, at the time when the Germans were still inclined “to work” with Russia.

³²⁹ Goldgeier, p. 101.

With the overcoming of the division of Europe and the regaining of its full sovereignty Germany has returned to the international stage. "Germany is Europe's central power."³³⁰ Thus, Germany increasingly asserted its preferences regarding the future of CEE after 1989 and it tried to define the parameters of its post-Cold War relationship with the Americans. Bonn wanted more economic and political investment in CEE than Washington was ready to allocate. When the U.S. was unable to articulate a strategy for Europe, it looked to Bonn to take the lead.

Germany also needs to cooperate closely with the Americans. In Europe the U.S. continues to represent a factor of stability. U.S. engagement relieves the concerns of some of Germany's neighbors that Germany could strive to attain a hegemonic position in Europe.³³¹ It also makes Germany's leading economic role politically acceptable to other European states. However, this only operates under the condition that the U.S. "balancing function" is not directed against German policy.³³² This might become an issue in German politics in the future.

³³⁰ Boer, p. 4.

³³¹ Nelson, pp. 66-70.

³³² After 1989, it might be argued, the U.S. also tried to limit German power in the new Europe, by encouraging German involvement in NATO and European international organizations, while at the same time working with the U.K., France and other countries in order to limit the degree of German influence over those organizations.

In order to avoid such a perspective, with Bush's invitation to establish a German-American "partnership in leadership"³³³ and Clinton's view that "America has no better friend than Chancellor Kohl,"³³⁴ "Germany, rather than the UK, began to act as America's senior partner. This role found its expression in joint initiatives such as the proposal for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and NATO's Partnership for Peace program."³³⁵

The complementarity shown by Germany and the U.S. during the process of NATO enlargement proved that they have overcome some difficult moments in their relations during 1990-1992. Taking into account the fact that the hallmark of a special relationship is the ability to overcome crises, the two countries proved that they can remain pivotal partners (both to each other and to the international community) as long they are able to refashion in strategic terms their new security "bargain."

In order to accommodate these new requirements, a "layer-cake" that reflected German interests was developed.

³³³ See President's Bush speech, "Proposals for a Free and Peaceful Europe" delivered in May 1989 and reprinted by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, *Current Policy*, no. 1, June 1989, p. 179.

³³⁴ As quoted in Karen Dornfried, *German Foreign Policy: Regional Priorities and Global Debuts*, CRS Report for Congress, 25 October 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1995), p. 23.

³³⁵ Mayer, p. 733.

Germany aimed to create interlinked layers of stability with a fully integrated core Europe at the center, surrounded by a layer of bilateral and multilateral affiliation agreements with eastern Europe, combined with a second layer of strong bilateral and multilateral support for Russia. This order would be secured by a transatlantic layer of relationships with a deepened German-American central axis.³³⁶

The Alliance's decision to enlarge toward CEE, with NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, will not address all the economic, political and social problems that the CEE region is facing. A complementarity between the European Union (EU) and NATO is necessary to solve the delicate problems of European security. Despite the fact that there are countless references to this complementarity in official communiqués, only in the last two to three years has there been an acceptance of this principle in U.S. thinking.

An increased role for the EU in security policy, especially in CEE, is necessary, and the Americans need to develop a better appreciation of this fact.³³⁷ This might be required because, "[t]he strategy of [NATO] enlargement was correct, but its execution was poor," and thus, "with a bit of luck, some of its negative consequences will not be permanent."³³⁸

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ However, this is not a zero-sum game, in which one organization's gain is necessarily another's loss.

³³⁸ Eyal, p. 719.

V. CONCLUSIONS

There can be no doubt that the continuities of the Cold War are gone and that a fundamentally new German-American relationship emerged after the transition period of 1990-1992. The glue of the pre-1989 alliance, the external Soviet threat, had dissipated, and with it the "strategic partnership" and security imperative between Bonn and Washington, and Germany's dependence on the U.S.

In this new setting, the projection of U.S. power is constrained by America's preoccupation with internal affairs and a concomitant effort to devolve power and responsibility to Germany as the leading power in Europe. Germany is considered by the Americans as having the potential, but not yet the political will, to define and pursue its national interests, which had largely been submerged before unification in the dominance of *Moralpolitik* over *Realpolitik*, in a constructive fashion.

In terms of post-1989 German-American relations, admitting that Cold War security imperatives no longer drive the decision-making of any actor in the international system, we might consider the fact that Germany and the U.S. have a security partnership in which they are more equal in their mutual dependence. The old concept of leadership, where problems, resources and choices were often clear and implied German deference to American decisions, is no longer efficient. Thus, the new German-American relationship requires a more realistic assessment of needs and resources, including a recognition that

burden-sharing is essential, and, perhaps, that uncertainties about outcomes need to be communicated to publics before action is taken.

However, Germany's commitment to European integration and the Franco-German couple is essential for the country's security, and stabilization to the East is of great importance as well. Thus, the German architecture for Europe developed in the post-Cold War period includes three primary elements: the self-containment of German military power in order that Germany may use its economic power to influence its European neighbors in pursuit of German policy objectives; the creation of an independent Europe capable of negotiating on a more equal basis with the U.S. on economic issues; and, the continued development of a more positive security situation in Europe, which depends upon the sustained growth of democracy and the free market in the former member states of the Warsaw Pact.

Yet NATO remains the key institution in the German strategy: NATO is considered essential to the creation of European political and security identity; NATO is, furthermore, considered the only credible guarantor of European (and German) security; NATO serves as reinsurance against the potential failure of political and economic liberalization efforts in Eastern Europe, including the Russian Federation; and NATO appears to be the only viable security institution capable of supporting order in the Euro-Atlantic region. In this setting the Germans might be well-advised to persist in refusing to make unambiguous choices between NATO and other European security institutions, partly because there is no compelling reason to make such a choice at this moment and

partly because these institutions are in fact complementary rather than competitive, at least for now.

Institutions offered methods to German politics and ensured that expectations were met and that national behavior could be assessed. They also established deadlines and thereby fostered decision-making. Multilateral institutions brought military, political and economic power into alignment. This is of particular importance considering Germany's "weakness": the U.S. predominance is constrained and subjected to European influence in NATO, and French pressure is counterbalanced in the EU. Germany can thus be expected to continue playing a key role as initiator and participant in various institutional frameworks, at the same time striving to modify their boundaries by changing the policies of these international institutions in specific desired directions.

Germany could not afford to decide between Paris and Washington, and in the years to come it might become more and more difficult for Bonn to balance the Franco-American couple. On one hand, the Franco-German couple, as an alliance of Europe's leading powers, would continue to be a central actor in continental Europe, and could control the speed of movement toward a closer political union. On the other hand, the Germans need to maintain NATO and, above all, the U.S. security tie as the ultimate insurance treaty against the resurgence of a Russian threat. As in the past, the Atlantic anchor and counterweight reassure not only Germany but also its neighbors by removing the sting of the country's power and centrality in the European balance.

However, with the unification of Europe a medium or long-term perspective, with the prospects for a coherent EU military policy—or even a functioning ESDI—uncertain at best, with an increasing European military dependence on the Americans, and with German defense budgets under great pressure, Germany might in the near future give priority to its American partner.

The consequences of this decision might be translated as follows. First, the close German-American coordination and cooperation in the field of relations with the Russian Federation and the other CEE countries, shown during the process of NATO enlargement, would be continued, if not strengthened. Second, a gap could become more evident inside the “Berlin four” group (an informal great-power directorate, which includes the U.S., the U.K., France and Germany, and which has apparently had great influence in NATO since the mid-1950s) in terms of real decision-making. The German-American pole might become prominent and assume a *de facto* leading role in developing and implementing NATO’s priorities and policies, at the expense of the Franco-British pole. As Richard Burt, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs during the Reagan administration, noted in his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 3 May 1995: “British and French attitudes need not drive the American position. Once the United States and Germany have agreed on a course of action, they are sure to follow.”³³⁹

³³⁹ As cited in Peter Rudolf, “The Future of the United States as a European Power: The Case of NATO Enlargement,” *European Security*, vol. 5, no. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 195.

This polarization might be also the consequence of the debate that the Alliance is facing between collective security and collective defense. With the perspective of possibly developing an unreliable system of collective security (as a result, for example, of the recent NATO enlargement and of the possible similarities that could become more evident between EAPC and OSCE, which might undermine the Alliance's cohesion and effectiveness), the major Western powers might seek other instruments to protect their national security interests. Thus, an intensified and strengthened German-American bilateral defense coalition might arise as a normal solution.

To assure the future of the transatlantic relationship--for which France would remain a crucial factor--and as a response to the increasing position held by Germany, the Americans must elaborate a more fully layered partnership with Germany and Europe. This might include bilateral partnerships between the U.S. and individual countries (such as France and Germany) that would have to be complementary to the larger EU-U.S. relationship in a fashion similar to the functioning of the Franco-German partnership in the context of the EU.

The ability and determination of the United States to lead in the post-Cold War period remain open questions. President Clinton has sounded Wilsonian themes such as: "It is time for America to lead a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated communism."³⁴⁰ But it remains uncertain whether the

³⁴⁰ President Bill Clinton quoted in Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 320.

transatlantic security relationship will survive the absence of the Soviet threat, the presence of a united Germany, and the erosion of U.S. Cold War authority. As Mary N. Hampton has asked,

Finally, is community-building in fact possible when unaccompanied by the objective of defense against an external threat? Assuming that community-building does remain valid for the recast NATO and trans-Atlantic relations, whose community-building scheme will be applied to incorporate the former East bloc? These are central questions that must be answered in the coming years.³⁴¹

³⁴¹ Mary N. Hampton, *The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, the Alliance and German Unification* (Westport: Praeger, 1996), p. 150.

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