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## A study of deterrence

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Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School.

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EJ Laurance

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Teti  
"A Study"

A STUDY OF DETERRENCE

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June 1972

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I

OVERVIEW OF DETERRENCE

1. The King is Dead . . .

The United States is today involved in the poli-  
ties of nearly every nation on the face of the globe. We  
have economic dealings with all. We have soldiers and  
sailors stationed seemingly everywhere. Our foreign aid  
commitments are enormous. Wars between fourth-rate powers  
thousands of miles away ensnarl us inextricably. Our  
State-Department numbers thousands and our defense budget  
is the world's largest. Cries of American imperialism  
are sounded by peoples most Americans have never heard of.  
And through it all we see ourselves as innocents who want  
nothing from anyone else. How can this be? Perhaps the  
leaders know something the people don't, yet even they  
seem unable to create a coherent foreign policy. Why  
does the richest and most powerful nation on earth stand  
in the international arena a confused and muddled child?

This situation achieves paradox as one remembers  
that since the very beginning of her national existence  
the United States has sought to avoid foreign political  
involvement.<sup>1</sup> ~~It~~ She has always wanted commercial inter-  
course but strictly without political alliance or

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<sup>1</sup>See Felix Gilbert, The Beginning of American  
Foreign Policy: To the Farewell Address (New York:  
1963).

responsibility. In previous days the young and relatively weak Republic was able to achieve these objectives due to her own geographical position and the fortunate structure of the international system following the Napoleonic Wars. While the Americans naively attributed their success to a moral superiority of their political system, the power structure of the 19th century developed in such a manner as to indulge the Republic's existence. The international system was a balance of rival powers with Great Britain the fulcrum. It was only the coincidence of British and American interests that allowed the Republic her innocent security.<sup>2</sup> But through growth, childhood ends.

With growth of American power came growth in her foreign interests and a series of ventures into the international political arena. The first was her enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine after the Civil War. But America soon found such ventures as the Spanish-American War brought with them international commitments and this she did not want. She developed a pattern therefore of reluctance to become involved in the community of nations. If involvement was unavoidable, as in World War I, she would sally forth as to a crusade, but the minute the conflict ended would retreat behind her oceans determined never again to become "entangled." She did not want and would not accept a long-term international role.

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<sup>2</sup>George Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York: 1956).

This pattern, however, was not to endure. The great wars were to destroy the international system from which the United States had so long derived her security. First, the technological revolution in weaponry, which vastly increased the cost of war in both human and material destruction, also rendered America vulnerable to attack from abroad as she had never been before.<sup>3</sup> Second, Great Britain, leader of the international system, fulcrum of the balance, fell.

Great empires do not fall in a day. It is difficult to determine when the British Empire ceased to be the effective leader of the international system. During the First World War the British themselves must have realized their dependence on the United States. During the period of the League of Nations, Britain and other European countries looked to the United States for assistance. However, in the years following 1914 the United States had attempted to avoid political commitment. Even her entrance into World War I, surrounded as it was with great moral fervor, was repudiated at the war's end. The American record for the decades between the World Wars was one of avoidance, moralism, and parochialism. Even at the end of the Second World War the Americans seemed to have retained a belief in the return of normalcy. However in 1945 the international system lay in ruins.

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<sup>3</sup>Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (New York: 1959).

The fall of Great Britain as the leader of the world had consequences for the United States. The King was dead! Someone would have to take his place--immediately! There was created not only a power vacuum, but a leadership vacuum. The responsibility that had for so long been shouldered by Britain now fell to a young nation with little experience in diplomacy and less enthusiasm for its intrigues.

*Handwritten notes:*  
 The fall of Britain  
 led to the rise of the US  
 as a world power  
 in the 1940s and 50s

The America being offered the scepter was an adolescent nation with a folklore of idealism and naivete which projected the realities of the external world in terms of American desires.<sup>4</sup> The American nation forced into a position of world leadership and responsibility assumed the task not with the clarity and energy so characteristic of her spirit engaging domestic challenges. Rather, the Americans assumed their responsibility as a burden and attended it with half-truths, deceptions, and the general doggish behavior characteristic of a defeated nation. Only the unsettling presence of the Soviet Union as the single other force left standing on the field moved the Americans to accept the responsibility of power. That the generation of policy makers of the late forties and fifties overextended the resources of the United States and overcommitted the nation is not surprising given the tradition of

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 Intervention  
 1945 - 1950  
 American

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<sup>4</sup>Henry May, The End of American Innocence (Chicago: 1962).



isolationism and the shock of enforced commitment.

## 2. The American Burden

Many factors in the history and culture of the nation made the new leadership role more difficult for the United States. Among these factors were: her political institutions and the belief systems underlying them, the lack of operational foreign policy objectives, the demands of the domestic sector for larger resource allocations, and experiences of extremism, hysteria, and poor leadership in periods of national crisis.

The demands of international leadership put a strain upon American institutions because the folklore of the American political tradition enshrined limited government and weak executive authority. With each great crisis this sacred tenet had to be laid aside while centralization of power in the federal executive took place. After the crisis passed most, but not all, of the power reverted to the states or people. However the lack of a clear apportioning of power among the three branches of the federal and between federal and state governments has made long-term planning and immediate action difficult. One congressional committee has noted of the confusion:

Recent international events have reemphasized the importance of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of our Government in matters affecting national security. Disputes between Congress and the President over the proper exercise of the war powers can only weaken the United States during times of crisis . . . .

A proper apportioning of the war powers proved to be the most complex and perplexing problem with which the subcommittee has yet to be concerned. The issue is rooted in the constitutional system devised by the Founding Fathers in Philadelphia almost 200 years ago; at the same time, it is an issue which has great importance for the safety and survival of our Nation in the nuclear age.<sup>5</sup>

The separation of power among different branches answering to different constituents does not constitute the only institutional problem for American leadership. The frequency of scheduled elections often brings the machinery of government to virtual standstill for several months or reduces the credibility of the administration in power.

It is the democratic dogma itself which renders the American executive weak and the electoral process so disruptive of foreign policy leadership. Democracy in America may, or may not be a political-cultural reality. It is an article of faith, however. The majority of the people believe in the existence of democracy and in their rights and privileges as free men. Rather early in the Republic's existence democracy became defined in terms of the Jacksonian persuasion. Equality was generalized to include leadership and the idea that government was within the capability of all men. Most Americans believe they can understand the complexities

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<sup>5</sup>Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives. 91st Congress, Second Session. Congress, The President, and the War Powers (U. S. Government Printing Office: 1970).

of foreign policy. But, understand or not they believe that the people have a right to know what is going on in foreign affairs and ultimately a right to pass judgment on the decisions of the policy makers. This belief system, the existence of an amazingly free press and mass media, and frequent elections have given American public opinion great political power. In the United States foreign policy is carried on under the glare of public exposure. The result is that those in power, wishing to remain there, produce pious, sentimental, unrealistic, and often untrue statements based on what they think the people want to hear. Those out of power, wishing to get in, reply with a constant barrage of vitriolic rhetoric, equally unrealistic and untrue, based on what they think the people want. The result is the goals of policy are compromised--and often lost track of altogether in the political fray. Occasionally the government resorts to duplicity, saying one thing while doing another.

*subject*

*1.6.?*

While this is not an unusual practice throughout the world, in the United States the discovery of a "credibility gap" can lead to a paralysis of leadership and loss of popular confidence in government. The last years of the Johnson administration perfectly exemplify this. The dilemma of democracy is that its real value lies not in efficiency but in freedom while world leadership requires efficient, decisive action.

The burden of world leadership is also an economic burden. Resources spent on defense and foreign aid cannot

then be used in other areas which yield greater social value at home. "How many hospitals is one new aircraft carrier worth?" This kind of question from the "loyal" opposition, being loaded, is difficult to answer. Yet the people wait for the reply. Defense spending is decidedly unpopular in the United States. In recent years we have experienced the emergence of anti-war, anti-defense movements. While differing in appeal and approach these movements largely agree that the defense efforts of the United States are contrary to the national interest. Some argue that resources used in defense are more immediately needed in the cities; others argue that there is no threat except that which the United States creates; and still others look for the conspiracies of a "complex." This idea of a profit motive as a prime determinant of foreign and defense policy goes back at least to the Spanish-American War. Then the quest for the China trade was seen as the real reason for America's annexation of the Philippines and the construction of the Great White Fleet. During the First World War the munitions makers were the culprits. Their desire to sell arms was the "real" reason for the great carnage. The Second World War brought a more sophisticated cynicism. The war profiteer with his cost-plus contract was a favorite target of the polemicists. The Korean War was explained as a "cure" for an economic depression. The popularity of this reverse yellow journalism is an instance of the problems of modern American foreign and

ND. Office - c. 1972

defense policy.<sup>6</sup> This anti-defense posture arose periodically in the past, generally after an American venture into world politics. In large part it generated the isolationism recurrent in American history. The critics of defense spending fell silent as the crisis ended and defense spending ceased. Today, however, the crisis does not end. World leadership is not a sporadic activity. The period of the Cold War has been a period of neither war nor peace. The American people, who are quite good at getting "up" for a particular confrontation, do not adjust well to chronic crisis. Today, therefore, while defense is ever more expensive, the people are ever less tolerant of it. There are so many areas where spending would be positive. Domestic poverty, crime, drug abuse, cancer, urban development, ecology all have a positive appeal.

Thus the elected officials, executive and legislative, are challenged by the dilemma of meeting ever more expensive defense requests in the face of an ever more disapproving constituency. The result is to attempt to achieve adequate defense cheaply. This generally has meant funding those weapons systems

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consider this  
other variable  
mainly  
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for police  
to put  
budget  
- 2.3 Chav*

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<sup>6</sup>The literature on the economics of defense is vast. Of recent vintage see Richard J. Barnet, The Economy of Death (New York: 1970), Leonard Lewen, Report from Iron Mountain (New York: 1967), Seymour Melman, Spent on Capitalism (New York: 1970), Tristram Coffin, The Armed Society (Baltimore: 1964), Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State (New York: 1962), and Adam Yarmelinsky, The Military Establishment (New York: 1971).

delivering the greatest punch at least expense. It has also meant that defense strategy has been determined by economic stringency rather than national interest or military logic. Thus we have played down the maintenance of viable conventional forces, which are expensive and unpopular, and substituted nuclear capability, in turn triggering the nuclear arms race. Whether this is in our national or world best interest is certainly debatable. [To make the nuclear scepter more palatable-- and to give it some semblance of rationality we have developed as the cornerstone of our defense posture the concept of deterrence.] But economy, not long-term best interest has been the primary concern.

*may be  
misleading*

Defense planning therefore becomes an ad hoc result of budgetary considerations coupled with political-administrative compromises and partisan politics. Under these conditions the difficulty of obtaining a rational defense or foreign policy becomes clear. Completing the circle, the lack of leadership has meant that Americans have been unclear as to their vital or national interests and their role in the world. Thus long-range objectives have been absent from policy decisions giving American policy its ad hoc defensive and essentially weak nature.

*Foreign policy*

### 3. Ad Hoc Macro Strategy

Operating as a major power in the international system (INS) in this second half of the twentieth century

is a complex and highly dangerous enterprise. It is the unfortunate circumstance that the previously discussed difficulties inherent in the American system are compounded by the present nature of the INS. That the combination has not yet proved fatal to all should inspire one with great respect for the men who have thus far successfully struggled under the burden.

The INS is a "system" in the technical sense in that (1) it is composed of separate but interrelated elements (nations) that (2) have observable relationships which exist over time.<sup>7</sup> The position of any nation in the system is determined by its power. Power in this situation offers not only to military power, but many other factors such as influence, alliances, economic base, resources, quality of leadership, strength of executive office, quality of population, standard of living, etc. The extent of a nation's sovereignty, i.e. the range of freedom it has in moving toward its perceived interests, is a function of its position in the system. Thus to a great extent position determines action and reaction. It would be as erroneous to assume complete conformity to the above principles as it would be to dismiss any regularity or systemic behavior.

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 7-11-60  
 1-3-61  
 2-2-61  
 4-1-61

The current structure of the INS may be

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<sup>7</sup> Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Relations (New York: 1960).

described as loosely bi-polar with the United States and the USSR occupying the polar positions of superpowers. Grouped around these two are their allies. Finally there are more or less independent clusters of nations whose power is largely potential.

The system is governed by the interplay of the self-interests of the component actors, a situation not unlike the Madisonian model. Overriding this conflict of self-interests is the generalized survival interest of the entire system. This interest demands the avoidance of spasmodic nuclear war. All actions and reactions of the great powers are weighed against this objective. Spasmodic nuclear war is to be avoided because the weapons of mass destruction and countervalue employment strategies would render no gain, no victors. That the avoidance of nuclear war is a norm of the INS was demonstrated by the options chosen by both the United States and the USSR in Cuba, by the United States in Korea and Vietnam, and by the United States and USSR in the Middle East.

The INS can provide a sense of security as long as the range and scope of disputes among the great powers is "managed." That is, as long as conflict is not allowed to escalate to the point of so threatening the vital interests of a major power that the employment of nuclear weapons becomes a feasible option. In order to avoid that point each nation must understand what the other perceives to be its vital interests. And all must



act rationally and predictably in action and reaction. Opposition may be determined, but must also be managed. States must know "how far they can push" or when to threaten and when to withdraw. The leaders of various blocs in the system must be particularly adept at this kind of "game." The United States is an insecure element in this system for several historic and political reasons. Her rejection of international involvement in the past has given her a lack of experience in the field. We are not very adept at the game. Furthermore the quixotic nature of our politics prevents our having a clear set of perceived vital interests for the other side to respect and avoid. Our actions therefore are unpredictable and even seemingly irrational. An ad hoc foreign policy provides no guidelines by which the other side may rationally plan. The Korean conflict resulted from exactly this kind of miscalculation. *- predicted*

Nowhere is the ad hoc nature of our macro-strategy more apparent than in our adoption of the deterrence concept as the cornerstone of our foreign and defense policy.

Deterrence is the ability to influence someone not to do something. Positively, it is persuasion. Negatively, it is threat. Deterrence has become the major element in strategic planning since 1945. It existed prior to 1945. However, with the development of nuclear weapons, deterrence has become the most stable element in an extremely unstable

environment.<sup>8</sup> It is important to note at the onset that deterrence is not a thing or a stage to be achieved, rather it is an on-going process. It is dynamic and relative. A stable deterrent is one which relates to time and to a specific situational context. Thus even in the definitional stage deterrence policy must be formulated in terms of specific events and characteristics. Those include: the current power structure of the international system, the state of weapon technology, and the perception of each important actor of its own interests, objectives, and power and of its adversary's interests, objectives, and power. New political adherents, shifts in the international balance of power, changes in leadership, and many other factors may affect the viability of a deterrence strategy.

Essentially deterrence is political in that it attempts to influence or control another actor. One usually thinks of deterrence in negative terms, that is, it usually seeks to prevent a given act. Prevention of an act requires power, hence the study of deterrence is a form of power analysis. Power may be overt or covert, real or potential as long as it can perform the act of influence it is an object of consideration.

Though power is the substance behind deterrence its actual use in armed conflict means that deterrence

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<sup>8</sup>George H. Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima (New York: 1966).

has failed. While deterrence depends upon the existence or perceived existence of power in order to function as part of a nation's strategy, the extent that the power is ever used it becomes dysfunctional. Thus in deterrence the application of power is limited to threat.

Threat analysis constitutes a large part of the study of deterrence. The threat must be credible, and must be able to influence the other actor by fear of punishment for a given act or by fear of failure in a given undertaking. Glenn Snyder refers to this as deterrence by denial and punishment.<sup>9</sup>

Much information must be compiled before a calculated deterrence policy can be reached. First, there must be a statement of one's own national interests, including a list of national priorities, i.e. what interests must be protected at what costs and what objectives may be pursued at what costs. Second, there must be an inventory of national power in both absolute and relative terms; i.e. What do we have? and what would we be willing to use in a given situation? In other words list number two must be correlated with list number one. This correlation is similar to "cost-benefit analysis" and is extremely difficult. Is the seizure of an American fishing boat worth a thermonuclear exchange, a limited conventional war, a diplomatic crisis, an economic

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<sup>9</sup>Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (Princeton: 1959).

boycott, or merely a note of protest? Was the placement of Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962 worth a protest note or war?

This is only one-third of the picture. Any deterrence policy will also be influenced by a calculation of the adversary's military and economic interests, its power, and its cost-benefit analysis. What were the Russian missiles in Cuba worth to the Russians? A protest note from the American embassy? Surely. A thermonuclear exchange? No.

The third piece of the puzzle is perhaps the most crucial. It is also the most vulnerable to miscalculation. This may be called the adversary's perception of our threat credibility. In other words what do they think we think? or What did the Russians believe their missiles in Cuba <sup>were</sup> worth to the Americans? Were they worth a thermonuclear exchange to us? This is the crux of threat credibility. The adversary must believe that we will carry out our threats. If we were to threaten a thermonuclear response to a fishing boat seizure the adversary would be unlikely to believe it. The credibility of the threat would be low and thus it would not function as a deterrent. While it may be possible to bluff in this game, doing so and getting caught reduces the credibility and deterrent value of all future threats. It also increases the danger of future miscalculation by the adversary and the necessity of our having to carry out the threat which means deterrence

*Handwritten note:* perceived by them

has failed.

Deterrence depends on expected behavior. Each nation must know what to expect from the other. It is here that the United States becomes an unstable element in the INS. Other nations do not know what to expect from us. An ad hoc foreign policy makes prediction nearly impossible. Often our reactions come as complete surprises to our allies and adversaries alike. Surprise is not an advantage except in war, and it is war we are trying to avoid.

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 J. P.

Within this framework of deterrence there are still many questions to be answered before one arrives at a specific deterrence policy. The literature in the field of deterrence theory usually divides deterrence into types, finite vs. minimum deterrence, counter force vs. counter value, deliberate, selective, and controlled response, mutual doomsday strategy, and the like. I would rather speak to the scope of deterrence. What level or degree of threat do you wish to issue? Put another way, how much do you threaten to destroy in order to deter? This concept of scope of deterrence is meant to carry on the idea of process and relativity in the strategic context. The scope of the threat must fit the context. It must be a function of the value of the objective, the cost or risk of the engagement, and the analysis of the adversary's vital needs and intentions as well as his capabilities. Deterrence, then, is a strategy, a plan, or design to attain or

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prevent another from attaining, certain objectives. It is a plan which must constantly change, which is subject to feedback from many sources. Even if we assume for a moment that our threats are credible, i.e. that the adversary believes us, we must still decide what level of threat to present. Up to the present time we have deterred by use of nuclear threat. This is effective in major confrontations. That level of threat is inappropriate and therefore useless in minor confrontations. We have avoided nuclear war, but we did not deter North Korea or North Vietnam from carrying out their objectives.

#### 4. Counter Value

- Americans tend to believe in answers. They seek total solutions to problems and rarely have they been disappointed. Success is an essential component of the national epistemology. With the advent of the Cold War that has changed.

The constant fear and frustration of the Cold War, especially since the Soviet's achievement of nuclear parity, has led many Americans to grasp at simple, half-way solutions. The maintenance of a credible, rational deterrent is taxing on both the resources and the collective mind of the Republic. In seeking a less complex and less expensive solution to the problem of deterrence some Americans have found comfort in the "counter value strategy." While seemingly stable, and relatively inexpensive the counter value strategy

constitutes a dangerous option.

Generally a counter value strategy may be defined as a plan of action which calls for the destruction of elements valued by the enemy, e.g. cities, people, etc. In this situation destruction would be ordered without regard to military significance or long-term national objectives. Herman Kahn has called this a spasmodic war. It could begin with a city trade-off and continue with great rapidity until all the cities, on both sides, are destroyed. Counter value springs from emotional depths, from desires of vengeance, and from anger. The counter value strategist looks at those things the enemy values as hostages. The existence of these hostages is therefore a guarantee of security. And the threat of their destruction is a deterrent.

There are several variations of general counter value theory. Surely the most extreme is the doomsday concept. The logic, intent, and results are the same if one employs a general counter value strategy or a more specific, specialized doomsday strategy. The difference is that the latter is an automatic and instant response whereas the former begins with a deliberate decision to inflict pain or to seek vengeance and then increases the tempo of destruction. Both strategies accept the destructive limit of nuclear weapons technology without question or control. The limit of the weapons will be the limit of the war, national interests notwithstanding. Counter value

strategies in general or doomsday in particular do not attempt to relate the type and level of destruction to the objectives of the state. Human reason seems to abdicate to the force of sheer energy.

A second variant of the general counter value strategy is the LOW concept (launch on warning). Essentially this strategy attempts to deter an adversary from launching a first strike by planning to launch instantly in the event that enemy missiles are detected by radar. The current apprehension over the Soviet SS-9 missile with ever decreasing CEP and with a MIRV configuration has led many responsible American leaders to seriously consider the LOW strategy. Men like Senators Fulbright, Symington, and Albert Gore have advanced this argument. In March 1969 Senator Fulbright stated:

It would seem to me the assurance, the knowledge, that these ICBM's, even part of them, would be released immediately . . . even without asking the computer what to do, would be the greatest deterrence in the world.<sup>10</sup>

For Senator Fulbright, like many other Americans, the LOW strategy is very appealing "because it appears to offer an inexpensive way of sidestepping the problem of technological change and of ignoring the growing strength of the Soviet missile forces."<sup>11</sup> This appeal

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<sup>10</sup> Authorization for Military Procurement: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate March 1970, "The Proposal to Launch on Warning," Paul W. Wafawitz, p. 2278. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.



is, however, superficial and misleading. It is an attempt to escape complexity and settle the issue once and for all. The problem of committing the nation to this option is that counter value strategies are extremely dangerous. (1) Their over-reactive nature weakens the credibility of the deterrent and thus they are provocative. (2) They do not take into account changes in weapons technology which could deny hostages to one side. For example, it is not inconceivable that a damage limiting force be developed by either side in the next two decades. (3) Counter value strategies do not account for accidents or for limited nuclear war. Once a conflict begins and cities are "exchanged" at the cost of tens of millions of lives, the conflict would be difficult to control in terms of deescalation or even conditional surrender. (4) The counter value strategy rapidly and unnecessarily increases the cost and intensity of a conflict. If one begins with city exchange where can one go except to larger cities and more of them? Whereas, if one begins with military targets one has more decision room in the escalation ladder.

Eventually the American nation must face the hazards of the nuclear age. There are no safe harbors and few final answers. The constant flow of technical and social-political change will render our plans, weapon systems, and hopes obsolete ever more quickly. We cannot stop time to gain needed rest or perspective even by resorting to thermonuclear power. All we can do is

*And...*

destroy, destroy ourselves, our adversaries, and the greater part of the human race. Deterrence as sheer terror will not deter. Defense planning in the United States must accept and work around the isolationist tradition of American history and the quixotic character of democracy if a rational confrontation and management of the Cold War is to continue.

## II

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY  
STRATEGIC PLANNING1. The Rapid American Demobilization

The end of the Second World War found the American people war-weary and anxious to get back to a kind of normalcy. As after many past periods of great effort the people looked forward to a period when less would be expected of them and when the demands of history would be taken up by someone else. Concepts like balance of power and international stability were too abstract for the average American of 1945. He had fought his war, paid his taxes, done his duty. Now he wanted the boys home and an end to high taxes and Spartan planning. These attitudes were a very real force in the United States and they contributed to decisions that would have momentous and tragic consequences.

It is one thesis of this study that the United States contributed to the post-war international instability with its demobilization policies and its reluctance to assume a leadership role. It will also be argued that the United States escalated the dangers inherent in the Cold War situation first by over-estimating the power of the Soviets in the late 1940's

and then by totally committing American security to nuclear weaponry in the 1950's. Because the United States assumed that it <sup>was in a position to</sup> could not check Soviet power using conventional force it resorted to nuclear force. The field of competition was thus shifted by the United States and Soviets had to follow. This does not mean that the Soviets would not have developed an atomic bomb or an H-bomb. It does mean that the degree of dependence the USSR had to place upon nuclear weapons influenced the arms race and that total American reliance upon nuclear weapons influenced the Soviets to move in the same direction. There is a good deal of evidence that the leadership of the USSR did not want to rely totally upon nuclear weapons. While Marshal Malenovskii supported Khrushchev's position in the troop reductions in 1960 (1,200,000 from a total of 3,628,000) he cautioned against over-reliance upon nuclear missile systems.<sup>1</sup>

The third thesis of this study is that American strategic policy has been formed not by the demands of the international situation but by domestic political concerns. To demonstrate this the interface of domestic attitudes and desires on strategic considerations will be analyzed throughout the study.

American post-war demobilization, the greatest

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<sup>1</sup>V. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs: 1963), p. 15. Also see Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore: 1966).

in the military history, was carried out without any regard for the strategic needs of the future.<sup>2</sup> The strength of the American military forces in 1945 was twelve and one-half million men. One year later, July 1946, these forces had been reduced to one-quarter of that figure and by July of 1947 to one-eighth of their peak strength.<sup>3</sup>

Not true - See Hunt. as to what most SW as strat. needs of future

Table #1

Military Manpower by Service<sup>4</sup>

	<u>July '45</u>	<u>July '47</u>	<u>July '48</u>	<u>'49</u>
Army	8,267,958	991,285	554,030	
Navy	3,385,817	498,661	419,162	
Air Force-	2,282,259	305,825	387,730	419,347

These figures would support the hypothesis that even in the face of growing Soviet pressure the United States reduced its general purpose forces and that when the United States did adopt the policy of containment it relied upon the Air Force and presumably the delivery of nuclear weapons. This reliance upon air power is surprising given the findings of the post-war Strategic

<sup>2</sup>Testimony of General George Marshall, Senate Doc. No. 90, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Demobilization of the Army, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>United States Defense Policies Since World War II (Government Printing Office: 1956), p. 4. hereafted cited as U. S. Defense Policies, date.

<sup>4</sup>Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Comptroller, Progress Reports and Statistics, pp. 22.2, Nov. 28, 1956. Also cited in U. S. Defense Policies, Appendix A, Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service.

Bombing Survey that city attacks had not substantially affected the course of German war production, nor had they produced significant or lasting debilitation. This would seem to suggest that air power alone could not win a major war. Indeed the survey was quite clear on this point. In the conclusion of the Japanese survey they noted:

. . . Atomic weapons will not have eliminated the need for ground troops, for surface vessels, for air weapons, or for the full coordination among them . . . but will have changed the context in which they are employed . . . .<sup>5</sup>

Strange, then, that a few years later the United States would place nearly total reliance upon air power for her national security.

The demobilization of the U. S. Army and Navy created a political vacuum in Europe. Britain and France were militarily and economically exhausted from the war; Germany, Italy, and Austria were in ruins and under occupation. The major political force on the continent of Europe was, then, the Soviet Army which faced no appreciable counter force between it and the channel. The dangers of this situation are tempered if one accepts the observation by most leading Soviet experts that the Soviet Union has tended to rank low on a risk-taking continuum. Soviet attitudes appear to be defensive and

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<sup>5</sup> United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Survey Report European War (Government Printing Office: 1945). Also see United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Survey Report Japanese War (Government Printing Office: 1945), p. 30.

cautious and Soviet expansive moves are rarely made in the anticipation of firm opposition. One scholar has found:

The general impression conveyed by the literature is that the USSR has tended to avoid major foreign policy risks. Ranked on a continuum from risk-taking to risk-avoiding poles, the leading and influential area experts consulted judged the Soviet risk-taking propensity to be low rather than high.

Soviet Risk-Taking Propensity as  
Judged by Area Experts<sup>6</sup>

				Aspaturian	
				R. Lowenthal	
				Salisbury	
				Towster	
				Kennan	
			Goodman	A. Dallin	
			D. Dallin	Crankshaw	Shuman
		Borkenau	Mosley	Shulman	Bauer
	Brzezinski		Wolfe	Barghoorn	Leites
No one	Karpovich		Schwartz	Mackintosh	Ulam

Risk-taking ----->Risk-avoiding

The problem has been one of recognizing the threat, determining enemy intentions and capabilities. To over-estimate can be as deadly as to under-estimate. In a recent book Adam B. Ulam has argued that the United States miscalculated the power of the USSR in 1945 and made needless concessions on the basis of those false estimates. He argues "that at the moment of German capitulation, the United States had more men under arms than the USSR."<sup>7</sup> He also pointed out that Soviet armed strength was reduced to 2.8

<sup>6</sup>Jan F. Triska, Patterns and Level of Risk in Soviet Foreign Policy-Making, 1945-1963, U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, 1966, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup>Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II (New York: 1971), p. 7.

million men in 1948. The fact Professor Ulam omits is that American forces in 1948 were approximately half of those of the Soviets. Also the Soviet military organization structure permits more combat divisions per man than the American counter-type. Finally the Soviets had a vast reservoir of reserves which could have been mobilized rapidly. Mobilization in the United States would have been a politically difficult action. Nonetheless Professor Ulam's point of American over-estimations of the threat stands.

## 2. Threat Perception

In March 1946 Churchill made his Iron Curtain speech at Independence, Missouri, and the American nation suddenly found a new threat: Russian imperialism. The Soviet Union apparently knew that the Truman administration had its hands tied domestically. The American people did not want to support a large military establishment and yet they were becoming uneasy about relations with the Soviets. The Soviets for their part applied pressure in one place, then another. This was done carefully, continually testing and probing, yet not quite provoking the American people to unity and action. In the Spring of 1948 a significant Soviet challenge occurred--the blockade of Berlin.

The significance of the Berlin crisis for this study is two-fold. First, it was an overt Soviet challenge that gave substance to the Iron Curtain metaphor.



Second, the American reaction to this challenge was limited, defensive, and nuclear. In the Spring of 1948 the Soviets began a series of harassments that climaxed with a complete blockade of Berlin. The move was aimed at pressuring the United States and its allies out of the city. American planners believed that if the Soviets accomplished this they would then attempt to move the allies out of all of West Germany. The strategic and political implications of such actions were vast. With the loss of Berlin and then Germany the balance of power in Europe would be tipped significantly in the Soviets' favor. There could have been no power in NATO without a German army and western Europe would be hostage to the Soviet Union.

*Evidence*

*B of P  
N/A*

No attempt to gain surface access to Berlin was made. One reason for this was the weakness of the American and allied armies in Europe. Thus the Soviets were able to take a low-risk situation and exert considerable pressure. The American reaction was measured. An airlift was inaugurated which successfully supplied the city. The Soviets did not interfere for at the same time the United States moved two B-29 Air groups to Great Britain. That these planes were capable of delivering nuclear bombs over Soviet cities was made known to Soviet leaders.<sup>8</sup> It was no longer a low-risk

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<sup>8</sup>U. S. Defense Policies 1946-1956, op. cit., p.

situation.

Most interesting for this analysis are the following facts:

1. The Americans were forced into action by the growing boldness of the Soviet Union.
2. The American reaction was limited and defensive.
3. When the United States committed itself to action it made no attempt to respond in kind (e.g., general purpose forces) but resorted to what amounted to nuclear blackmail.

The movement of the two B-29 Air groups was understandable given the American desire to "contain" the Soviets in the face of lack of domestic support for substantial military spending. However this move may have been the beginning of the nuclear weapons race. If the United States could have responded in terms of conventional forces, the Soviet forces would have maintained their political value. The Soviets would probably have still had to back down but not under the pressure of the nuclear threat. Not able or willing to play the game with conventional forces we impelled the Soviet Union to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons. This does not mean the Soviets would not have developed a nuclear and thermonuclear capacity. The argument here is one of degree. The character of the threat has great influence in defense planning. The American threat as perceived by the Soviets was nuclear

strike capability against Soviet cities, hence the Soviets had to counter in kind.

### 3. NSC-20

Historically American strategic thought has been influenced by the nation's geographical position. Our experience had been that the United States had always had time to mobilize its resources when war was imminent. Hence the need to maintain a large military force was not as great as in Europe.

The recognition of the existence of a constant long-term foreign threat suggested the necessity of a large permanent military establishment. This was not palatable to the American people who opposed both the concept and the cost. NSC-20 was a recognition that the United States would therefore have to plan on strategies of deterrence rather than strategies of mobilization. This policy paper was written in late 1947 or early 1948. George Kennan is considered to have been its author. It was not merely a watershed in terms of American strategic thought, it was also a candid appraisal of the reality of the Grand Alliance. The war had been the only source of unity between the United States and the Soviet Union and by 1947 with the common enemy defeated the Soviets could be expected to revert to their historic behavior patterns. The only way to deal with Soviet or Russian imperialism was from a position of power. In July 1947 Kennan wrote:

The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be one of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies . . . . Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points . . . .<sup>9</sup>

This paper was a justification of the containment policy. It was a product of the Department of State. Little consideration however seems to have been given to the means of this containment. In fact the military manpower of the United States was being reduced as was shown in table on page 25.

If NSC-20 was a recognition of the threat it was also an acknowledgment of the condition of Europe. Britain and France were exhausted in military and economic terms. Other nations in Europe were in similar or worse condition. Yet Europe was still valuable to both the Soviet Union and the United States. Perhaps sensing the power vacuum and not wanting to lose Western Europe, the United States undertook commitments to preserve the integrity of European nations. The Truman Doctrine was to fill the void created by the decline of British power in Greece and to check Soviet advances in Turkey. The European Recovery Plan or Marshall Plan was designed to build up the economic power of Europe so that eventually

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<sup>9</sup>"The Sources of Soviet Conduct" 25 Foreign Affairs (July 1947), 575-76. This is the famous Mr. X article which contains the substance of NSC-20. Also see Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: 1961), Chapter II.

Europe could support the military establishment necessary to balance Soviet power. Finally the idea of collective security was accepted by the United States as a means of combining and coordinating the potential power of the Atlantic community against the Soviet Union. The result was NATO.<sup>10</sup>

#### 4. Ask the Right Questions

As one surveys the literature of the Cold War one is struck by the fact that American policy makers seldom ask the right questions. Their interest seems to be focused upon the immediate, their solutions ad hoc.

George Ball pointed out in 1966 that

Americans are indeed a pragmatic people and pragmatism . . . characterizes many of their government's approaches to foreign policy, which often takes the course of least resistance . . . . It is easy and tempting, to become absorbed in the operational aspects of foreign policy and ignore the longer term implications . . . .<sup>11</sup>

The policy makers apparently never asked: How can we contain? How can we deter? If we rely upon nuclear weapons what will be the result? If we do this for five years what can we expect the Soviets to do? Then what will we do? Questions imply logical thought and logic did not lie at the heart of defense planning. American defense policy was, instead, the product of domestic politics and bureaucratic and inter-service

<sup>10</sup>See Paul V. Hammond, The Cold War Years American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (New York: 1969), Chapter 2.

<sup>11</sup>Quoted in Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink (New York: 1967), p. 11.

competition for power and resources. Some of the most momentous decisions ever made by the United States government, decisions that may well affect the history of man on this planet, were made not using the best information and minds but were products of petty domestic political campaigns and equally petty inter-service quarrels.<sup>12</sup>

Louis Johnson was Secretary of Defense in 1949. He is best remembered for the "remainder method" of defense budgeting. During this period the defense budget had a low priority. When all of the other demands for resources were met the remainder was divided among the military services. Little thought apparently was given to strategic needs. And little future planning in terms of hardware or strategic plans was possible with this approach to the defense budget. Issues of national and international security were left to be by-products of domestic policies. It was a time when no one seemed to be concerned with national priorities. Each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was attempting to get as much for his service as possible notwithstanding national need. Of course the services assumed their need was national need. Paul Hammond reports that the JCS were "left to make their own assumptions about national objectives

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<sup>12</sup>See the case studies in Warner R. Schilling, Paul V. Hammond, and Glenn Snyder's Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: 1961) and Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation (New York: 1967).


and policies . . . ."<sup>13</sup> An example of the inability (or unwillingness) of the military chiefs to engage in long-term planning and ask some of the hard questions, like what kind of war?, was the B-36 vs. "Super-Carrier" controversy. This was a conflict between the Air Force and the Navy for appropriations. The Air Force wanted funding for the B-36, a long-range heavy bomber designed for major thermonuclear war. The Navy wanted appropriations to build a super-carrier force to handle medium-range bombing and tactical and strategic conflicts. The appropriations went to the Air Force. The real issue was one of roles and missions of the several services. Each had its little domain and each protected its own interests. Because of the unwillingness of the political leadership to confront the real "costs" of the Cold War and the desire for "cheap" defense, the Air Force was put in a privileged position. American defense posture would rest with the Air Force, lessons of the past, and forecasts of the future notwithstanding.<sup>14</sup> The B-36 vs. Super-Carrier controversy sparked a bitter debate which resulted in a congressional investigation. The investigation vindicated the procurement aspects of the B-36 and concluded that the theoretical disagreements between the Air Force and Naval Air were so deep that

B-36 vs  
Carrier

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<sup>13</sup>Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: 1961), p. 245.

<sup>14</sup>The Strategic Bombing Survey conclusions are to be noted as is the *Appendix*.

they would have to be settled "when tested during some future war."<sup>15</sup> The awful thing about this last statement is one does not know if the committee was incredibly stupid, or naive or engaging in satanic humor. 

Another example of the lack of long-term planning during this period was the Universal Military Training (UMT) issue. By 1948 it was clear that the United States would have overseas commitments; that these commitments could increase the possibilities of war; and that a future war, limited or unlimited, would require large numbers of men. The political reality was likewise clear; the average American neither accepted nor understood the demands of the Cold War; the professional politician conceived it political suicide to make demands of higher draft quotas and defense budgets. The United States would therefore have to meet its overseas commitments without making demands upon the populace. At a meeting of the National Security Council, General Marshall was quoted as saying that the United States "was playing with fire while we had nothing with which to put it out."<sup>16</sup> Given the need for trained men and the unwillingness of the policy

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<sup>15</sup>U. S. Defense Policies, op. cit., p. 23. Also see "Investigation of the B-36 Bomber Program," Report of the House Committee on Armed Services, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949.

<sup>16</sup>Walter Millis (Editor), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: 1951), p. 373. Also see Chapter 11 on UMT.



makers to force the issue with the electorate another ad hoc measure was considered. Universal Military Training would provide the nation with its large pool of trained manpower and at the same time not be as costly as a large standing army.

In theory America's future defense needs could be met by having a small professional volunteer army backed up by a "ready reserve" which would only be called up in a national crisis. Again with the aid of hindsight one can see that the call-up of several hundred thousand men would have taken from two to six weeks. Transportation of these men (in the late '40's) would have been quite a problem. How many divisions could be placed in Europe before the Russians reached the channel? Would the Soviet planners not be able to construct a time table whereby they could get to the channel before sizable numbers of Americans arrived? Finally was this not an attempt to go back to the previous strategy of mobilization?<sup>17</sup>

Eventually UMT was rejected. The appropriations for the Air Force were increased, with the hope that this would be the first step toward increasing the Air Force to 70 Air groups.

By July of 1948 the defense planners had no choice. They had to plan on the use of the atomic

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<sup>17</sup>See The Compton Committee Report, Report of the President's Advisory Committee on Universal Military Training, May 29, 1947 (Government Printing Office).

bomb in future American wars.<sup>18</sup> The nation was committed to a range of actions and reactions which the majority of the people never understood. Future paths were predetermined and few national leaders made any attempt to examine the vast implications of those acts.

##### 5. NSC-68

In mid-year 1949 a document which has been described as "the first comprehensive statement of a national strategy"<sup>19</sup> was developed by a State Department group. The military, still involved with the B-36 controversy, took no part in the drafting of this policy paper. NSC-68 built upon the foundations of NSC-20. - It recognized the Soviet threat and acknowledged that the United States would have to deal with the Soviets from a position of power. Beyond this, the paper was written under the influence of two major events in the international power balance: the Soviet development of atomic weaponry several years ahead of American expectations, and the "loss" of the Chinese mainland to the Chinese Communists. Concerning the new balance of power and potential power, the paper conceived four options open to American defense planners:

1. A status-quo policy wherein the United States

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<sup>18</sup>The Forrestal Diaries, op. cit., pp. 461-62.

<sup>19</sup>Statement attributed to Sen. Henry Jackson, "How Shall We Forge a Strategy for Survival," address National War College, Washington, D. C., April 16, 1959, cited in Hammond, The Common Defense, p. 452.

would not challenge the Soviet bloc and would acquiesce in the gradual expansion of Soviet influence.

2. A retreat to a fortress America which would concentrate on defending North and South America leaving Western Europe and the developing countries of Asia to their own efforts.

3. Pre-emptive war. A strike on Soviet nuclear and support facilities before the Soviets would have the potential to destroy the United States.

4. Collective security and containment of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China.

The first three options were rejected. The slow erosion of the American position in the world was not acceptable to the generation who had just defeated Hitler. The fortress America concept, though having romantic roots deep in our history, was rendered obsolete by weapons technology. Pre-emptive war was rejected for two reasons; the obvious ethical and the military. In 1949 the Soviet Army could have overrun Europe and the United States would not have been able to prevent it even if we had used our only trump card, atomic weaponry.<sup>20</sup>

We were left with the collective security option which over-committed the United States. It made allies of governments whose practices were in complete

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A very  
pessimistic  
view of US  
For. Pol.

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<sup>20</sup>For a military view on this, see General Nathan P. Twining, Neither Liberty nor Safety (New York: 1966), pp. 49-50.

opposition to American values and it cast the United States in a reactor role repeatedly upholding the status quo and seemingly opposing the revolution of rising expectations.

6. The Korean War

The Korean War stands as an example of the dangers of miscommunication among nations. If miscalculation is to be avoided nations must clearly understand each other's vital interests. After twenty years one can look back and see "clear" signals to the Soviet Union that the United States had ceased to consider South Korea a vital interest. The Acheson and MacArthur statements and the withdrawal of American troops led the Soviets to this erroneous conclusion. The Americans had meant no such thing. The Soviet Union, however, seeing an apparent political vacuum in an area contiguous to the Soviet bloc, sponsored the North Koreans in invading their southern neighbors.<sup>21</sup> No one was more surprised than the USSR when the United States came to South Korea's defense.

*Overlooked*

If the war was based on a miscalculation of American interests there was little doubt as to Soviet interest after June 25, 1950. American policy makers saw the invasion of South Korea as a thrust at Japan

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<sup>21</sup>Nathan Leites argues that the Bolshevik must exploit any opportunity to expand the power of the movement. Hence it would be natural for the Soviets to move into the Korean vacuum. See his A Study of Bolshevism (New York: 1953).

and the entire American position in Asia. President Truman noted that

Communism was acting in Korea [sic] just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt that if Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores . . . . If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war. Just as similar incidents had brought on the second World War.<sup>22</sup>

The Soviets had felt that they could expand their sphere of influence unchallenged and were unprepared to take the risk that the surprising American reaction involved. As the Americans intervened in strength the security of the North Korean regime was put in danger. The Soviets were not willing to field Soviet troops against the American forces but at the same time could not afford a military-diplomatic defeat in Korea. The result was a proxy war fought by the Chinese.<sup>23</sup> The Americans believed that they could not let these events go unchallenged without risking bolder acts by the Soviet Union and weakening the credibility of the American commitment to NATO. The result was a prolonged war.

The "managing" of the Korean conflict should be of central importance to us as it provides some guideposts to future defense planning. There are at least

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<sup>22</sup>Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: 1956), p. 333 quoted in Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: 1963), p. 40.

<sup>23</sup>J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: 1963), pp. 42-50.

three major problems revealed by the Korean experience:

- (1) The military problem of conducting a limited war.
- (2) The problem of maintaining popular commitment to such a war.
- (3) The necessity of clear goals for both of the above.

The Korean War was a surprise to both sides. Once hostilities began, however, neither side could afford to back down. Nor could either side afford to let the conflict assume global dimensions. The decision was made to keep the war limited.<sup>24</sup> "Limited" came to mean geographical limitation, e.g., to not let the field of conflict spread beyond the Korean peninsula, and weapons limitation, e.g., to not use nuclear weapons. In the case of nuclear weapons their use was also denied by the feeling that Korea might well be the beginning of the third world war with Korea as a trap to exhaust the American atomic stockpile. Also the Joint Chiefs of

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<sup>24</sup>The literature on limited war is voluminous. Among the articles of interest for this study are: General Maxwell Taylor, "On Limited War," Army Information Digest, June 1958, also "Improved Our Capabilities for Limited War," Army Information Digest, Feb. 1959, Eric Larrabee, "Korea: The Military Lesson," Harper's, Nov. 1950, Raymond Arons, "Can War in the Atomic Age Be Limited?" Confluence, July 1956, and also "A Half Century of Limited War?" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, April 1956, Bernard Brodie, "Unlimited Weapons and Limited War," The Reporter, Nov. 18, 1954, T. N. Dupuy, "Can America Fight a Limited War?" Onbis, Spring 1961. Also "War without Victory," Military Review, March 1956, and Thomas Schelling, "Bargaining, Communication and Limited War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1957. The best book on the subject is still Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: 1963).

Staff felt there were few suitable targets for nuclear weapons in Korea. Finally, the United States was under great pressure from its allies not to cross the nuclear threshold.

The geographical limitation placed on the war gave the enemy sanctuaries from which he could operate and to which he could flee. This no doubt prolonged the war. Further, the Truman administration went to great pains to communicate to the Chinese that there would be no attack (air or land) on Chinese soil. This was meant to forestall Chinese entry into the conflict. Unfortunately, as hindsight reveals, it had been this very fear that had kept the Chinese from entering the war. Once the Chinese were assured they had comparatively little to lose they joined the conflict. In a very real sense the administration's effort to limit the conflict backfired. On the other hand issuing a credible threat might have saved lives, shortened the war, and improved America's strategic position in Asia.<sup>25</sup>

There are many elements of national power. Among the most important is the commitment of the people to a government or policy goal. The Korean War experience detracted from American power in that its frustration brought disunity to the nation and cast doubt upon the leadership. There were several reasons for this reaction. The American character has not had

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<sup>25</sup>Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, op. cit., p. 49. Also see Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, op. cit., Chapter 9.

much experience in half-way measures. Quick total solutions, absolute victories over natural and human enemies are very much part of the American experience. By 1945 unconditional surrender had become the only solution of war the American people could accept or understand. The concept of limited war for limited objectives had played no role in the American experience. Confused and changing objectives also led to frustration of the American people. First Korea was not essential to our security. Then it was. Then we were going to liberate all of the Korean peninsula, then we were only going to fight to preserve the status quo. Fighting a limited war is difficult for a democratic political system; confusion about the limited goals makes it nearly impossible. A minority congressional report in 1951 noted:

We believe that a policy of victory must be announced to the American people in order to restore unity and confidence. It is too much to expect that our people will accept a limited war. Our policy must be to win.<sup>26</sup>

The question of how one limits war and how a democratic political system can carry on this kind of war comes down to the problem of knowing what you are fighting for! Clear goals help define the parameters of the conflict, the weapons systems to be employed, and the strategies to be used. If one is fighting to

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<sup>26</sup>Military Situation in the Far East. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, part 5. Also quoted Halperin, Limited War, op. cit., p. 46.



win the allegiances of the people clearly indiscriminate air bombardment is unsuitable. Or if one is fighting to discourage local aggression, one should not jump into negotiations as soon as the other side becomes pressured. Brodie considers the halting of the American offensive at the moment the Communists indicated interest in opening armistice negotiations as our "cardinal error" of the Korean War. However I would suggest there was another error; the total unpreparedness of the American people for limited war. What disregard the leaders must have had for the people when they permitted myths of nuclear security when such dependence would reap greater and greater insecurity! One author sums up the significance of the Korean War by noting, "The lesson of Korea is that it happened." He further notes:

A nation that does not prepare for all the forms of war should then renounce the use of war in national policy. A people that does not prepare to fight should be morally prepared to surrender. To fail to prepare soldiers and citizens for limited, bloody ground action, and then to engage in it, is folly verging on the criminal.<sup>27</sup> (Italics mine)

7. NSC-162--The New Look...

NSC-162 in 1953 was the beginning of a complete reevaluation of American foreign and defense policy. The frustrations of the Korean War had convinced the policy-makers that the American people were tired of foreign ventures and desired a kind of modern normalcy.

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<sup>27</sup>T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: 1963), p. 656. This is by far the best study of the Korean conflict.

However the Eisenhower administration recognized the continuing Soviet threat. Hence the problem was essentially the same as it had been in the Truman years, i.e., how to achieve both economy and security. Eisenhower's "New Look" policy-makers viewed the threat as dual.

There was the obvious military power of the Soviet bloc, but there was also the economic problem associated with long-term defense efforts. The Eisenhower administration considered the Cold War to involve competition between the American and Russian economic systems. The President was very concerned about the "long haul" economic effects of the defense effort. He wanted an even, well-planned effort that would avoid inflation on one hand and depression on the other.

In April 1953 the President said: "This policy . . . will be based on the sounder theory that a very real danger not only exists this year but may continue to exist for years to come . . . ."28 The President believed that "Communist guns, in this sense, have been aiming at an economic target no less than a military target."29 American security policy thus involved both economic and military considerations. One could observe that this was a new excuse for the old desire to obtain security without the costs of maintaining a sufficient military force.

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<sup>28</sup>White House press release, April 30, 1953, quoted in U. S. Defense Policy, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>29</sup>Hammond, The Common Defense, op. cit., p. 666.

Cuts were made in general purpose forces. In fiscal year 1953 the total expenditure for defense was \$51,330 million, in fiscal year 1954 that figure had been cut to \$47,872 million, and by 1955 the total expenditure for defense was \$42,039 million.<sup>30</sup> The expenditure for the three services is interesting:<sup>31</sup>

	<u>In Millions</u>				
	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>
Air Force	\$15,085	\$15,668	\$16,407	\$16,749	\$18,363
Army	16,242	12,910	8,899	8,702	9,063
Navy	11,375	11,293	9,733	9,744	10,309

The Air Force was obviously being featured in the new defense budgets.

Another factor became a primary policy influence at this time. This factor was the development of an American nuclear stockpile and means of delivery. The Eisenhower administration was prepared to accept the very imbalance NSC-68 had warned against.

NSC-68 had assumed that stability would be re-established in the future, after the Soviet Union had acquired an atomic air capability and the west had acquired substantial conventional ground troops. The New Look assumed that the stability was inherent in the existing situation in which the Soviets backed one and the west backed the other.<sup>32</sup>

As one can see NSC-162 did not envision the Soviets

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<sup>30</sup>U. S. Defense Policies 1957, op. cit., Appendix G, p. 121.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Hemmond, The Common Defense, op. cit., p. 69.

developing a sufficient nuclear capacity to check the credibility of the American deterrent. This was its greatest blunder and from the perspective of defense planning its most unforgivable mistake. ) *crucial*

For a short time the Americans would enjoy nuclear superiority. Foreign policy which must rest upon defense policy and actual power could proclaim that the United States would react to overt aggression by the USSR with massive and instant retaliation at the time and place of our choosing. In short nuclear fire power was to be relied upon more and more as a substitute for troops armed with conventional weapons.<sup>33</sup> Not everyone agreed with this policy. General Twining said in 1958, "I believe we have to build our overall force with the objective of being able to meet any contingency with priorities based on enemy capabilities and not on enemy intentions."<sup>34</sup> (Italics mine) Yet in 1958 the Soviet Army consisted of 175 divisions in being and could mobilize 300 divisions within a month. The United States on the other hand had Army combat units deployed as follows:

Europe: Five divisions, three separate regiments, two separate battle groups

Korea: Two divisions

Japan: Logistic support units

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<sup>33</sup>U. S. Defense Policies 1958, p. 15.

<sup>34</sup>Department of Defense news release No. 1049-58, October 21, 1958.

Hawaii: One division

United States: Strategic Army Force

STRAF: Seven divisions

plus scattered units in the Canal Zone, Alaska, and Formosa.<sup>35</sup> Given that Soviet divisions are three to five thousand men smaller than their American counterparts a comparison of total manpower would be of value. The Department of the Army assumed the total Soviet ground forces to number 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  million men. The American Army numbered 808,900.<sup>36</sup>

The New Look placed near total dependence for American security on nuclear weapons, thus forcing the Soviets to develop countermeasures against these weapons. In a sense a nuclear arms race was stimulated by the American desire to save money! But more important the international system developed a tolerance for terror. And terror is an unstable currency.

An American contribution to modern strategic thought was the so-called "trip-wire" strategy. In the mid-fifties the Soviets were building their own nuclear arsenals and the NATO allies began to ask how many American cities the United States would exchange for European security. In order to prove to the Russians and the Europeans that the United States was firm in its commitments it developed "trip wire." It was obvious the twenty or twenty-five NATO divisions could

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<sup>35</sup>U. S. Defense Policies 1958, op. cit., p. 251.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 4 and 71.

not stop 175 Soviet divisions in the event of war. However the Americans noted that the ten or twenty American divisions in Europe would have to be destroyed by the Soviets in any drive on Europe, and since American public opinion would never accept that loss the United States government would have to go to war. Thus the American ground force in Europe was a large rear-guard whose destruction would trip the wire that would set off a nuclear exchange!

## 1. The End of the Eisenhower Strategy

As late as 1959 the Eisenhower administration was still relying upon nuclear weapons as a means to save money and maintain a credible deterrent. This policy was, however, coming under increasing criticism from those aware of the strategic "mix" of Soviet forces. Even with the announced reductions the Soviets were credited with 175 divisions (not all at full strength). Estimates of manpower in ground forces ranged from 2,350,000 to 2,500,000. It was believed that the Soviets could mobilize 125 divisions within thirty days.<sup>1</sup> American ground strength at this time was 861,964 men in the Army organized in 14 divisions and 175,571 in the Marine Corps.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Navy was considered the second most powerful in the world. The role and mission of the Soviet Navy was more limited than the American Navy. The Soviets emphasized submarines and coastal defenses. While the United States credited the Soviets with 400 to 600 submarines little American effort seems to have been directed at the ASW category.

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<sup>1</sup>United States Defense Policies in 1959, Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service (USGPO, Washington: 1960), p. 5. Hereafter cited United States Defense Policies (year).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 123.

*as perceived by all JCS*

The most threatening element in the Soviet military forces in 1959 was the Air Force. In 1959-60 the Soviet Air Force was estimated to comprise about 700,000 men and 20,000 to 25,000 aircraft (naval air included). In May 1959 the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force, General Thomas D. White, wrote:

In my opinion, the most serious and immediate threat to the free world has been and continues to be strong Soviet air power . . . . They now possess a formidable bomber force, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and a modern air defense system.<sup>3</sup>

In January 1960 General White noted: "The Soviet aerospace threat, in particular is increasingly pressing, diversified, sophisticated, and ominous. The Soviet Air Force is the USSR's most dangerous weapon."<sup>4</sup>

No longer was the analysis of the Soviet threat concerned with land forces in Europe. The Soviets had by 1959-60 developed offensive air power. With both the developing Soviet Air Force and the new ballistic missile the USSR for the first time could strike a deadly blow to the American heartland. As the Soviet offensive air power continued to develop the credibility of massive retaliation began to decline.

As in the late forties when the Americans recognized the reality of the Cold War, they were faced with a

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<sup>3</sup>Department of Defense News Release, No. 599-59, p. 9, quoted in United States Defense Policies 1959.

<sup>4</sup>House Defense Appropriations Hearings for FY 61, Part 2, pp. 207-28, quoted in United States Defense Policies 1959.



choice as to how they would respond to the Soviet threat. This time however the Soviet threat was direct and nuclear. The Americans were faced with a dilemma. How could they maintain a deterrent force with the Soviets approaching nuclear parity and at the same time not commit the energies, resources, and manpower of the nation to large general purpose forces? In the late forties the Americans had "checked" the Soviet advance with a nuclear shield. By the mid-fifties, however, the Soviets had a nuclear force sufficient to give the Americans pause.<sup>5</sup> The situation of the Soviets having both superiority in conventional forces and equality or sufficiency in nuclear forces began to worry many of the NATO allies. Could the Americans act in the event of a Russian attack in Europe? Would the Americans react knowing that they were putting up American cities as hostages? Would could the Americans do if the Russians launched a limited or non-nuclear attack? Would every small strategic probe now threaten to become the crack

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<sup>5</sup>Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush in Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) use the phrase strategic parity rather than sufficiency. They define strategic parity as a "condition in which the Soviet strategic forces are sufficient to deprive even a more powerful American strategic force of its political usefulness" (p. 177).

For strategic attitudes during this period see Bernard Brodie's "How War Became Absurd," Harper's Magazine, October 1955, pp. 33-37; "Nuclear Weapons and Changing Strategic Outlooks," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, XIII, February 1957, pp. 56-61. Also see Sir John Slessar, "A New Strategy for the West," Orbis, September 1958, pp. 320-336.

of doom? One European commentator wrote:

Our [NATO's] present policy, which Mr. Dulles has labelled 'massive retaliation,' seems to be becoming too drastic and inflexible for these objectives. Increasingly we are getting into a position where, in effect, we shall be forced to threaten, and if necessary initiate, the destruction of civilization in the event of any measure of aggression too powerful for our small conventional forces to combat.<sup>6</sup>

Not only was the American position dangerous but it was inflexible in that it did not offer different options as the situation changed. Admiral Buzzard pointed out:

But since the Russians are now developing the power to strike back massively at America, massive retaliation is in danger of being interpreted as bluff in the case of medium aggression, for the Communists might well expect the United States to shrink from action which is becoming increasingly akin to suicide . . . . Thus massive retaliation leaves much room for Communist exploiting and misunderstanding . . . .<sup>7</sup>

There was another question which troubled the NATO allies. Given that both the United States and the USSR had nuclear weapons and given that the Americans actually did defend Europe during a Russian advance the question remains, what kind of defense? One contemporary European scholar discussing the American and Soviet hydrogen bomb tests in the early 1950's observed that these tests had aroused two contradictory reactions.

They undermined allied confidence in the effectiveness of the American deterrent and

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<sup>6</sup>Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, "The H Bomb: Massive Retaliation or Graduated Deterrence," International Affairs, April 1956, p. 148.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

simultaneously, they heightened fears lest the United States should defend Europe after all and thereby reduce it to a radioactive wasteland.<sup>8</sup>

In 1959-60 especially during the Presidential campaign the American tendency to overestimate Soviet military power became a public issue. The so-called missile gap began with the success of Soviet aerospace activities and was kept alive in the western press by Mr. Khrushchev. In a speech to press representatives on November 14, 1959, Khrushchev said:

We do not want to scare anyone, but we can tell the truth--in saying that we have now stockpiled so many missiles and so many atomic and hydrogen devices, that, if we were attacked, we could wipe all our probable enemies off the face of the earth . . . . In one year a plant that we visited produced 250 missiles with hydrogen warheads on the assembly line.<sup>9</sup>

That the American policy makers did believe in the existence of a missile gap in 1959-60 is reflected in the manner in which the administration chose to respond to its critics. Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates speaking before the House Appropriations hearings argued that the existence or non-existence of a missile gap was unimportant. What was important was the "deterrence gap." He defined deterrence gap as "that situation when your total deterrent force ceases to be sufficient to deter a potential enemy,

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<sup>8</sup>Wolf Mendl, Deterrence and Persuasion: French Nuclear Armament in the Context of National Policy, 1945-1969 (London: 1970), p. 99.

<sup>9</sup>New York Times, November 16, 1959. Also quoted in United States Defense Policies 1959.

as contrasted with simply a numerical comparison of a single weapon."<sup>10</sup>

At a time when the Americans could have claimed absolute strategic nuclear superiority they were on the defensive. As one study pointed out:

Remarkably some United States leaders began publicly to speak of nuclear war as mutual annihilation even before the Soviet leaders explicitly claimed [that] capacity . . . .<sup>11</sup>

What we had, then, in the closing years of the Eisenhower administration was a set of strategic policies and perceptions which were adjustments to the Soviet advances in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The sheer existence of sufficiency on the Soviet side detracted from the credibility of the American deterrent.

2. Multiple Options

The need for a flexible response grew out of the Soviet success in nuclear weapons development. The search for options involved many considerations:

- 1. (The most important) being the damage level a Soviet first or second strike could inflict on the United States.
- 2. The diplomatic and political byproducts of that situation.
- 3. The desire to contain the USSR and China.
- 4. The need to deter the Soviet Union from launching a surprise first strike against the United States.

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<sup>10</sup>United States Defense Policies 1959, p. 14.

<sup>11</sup>Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

States. 5. The maintenance of the system of collective security. 6. The accomplishment of these things without resort to a premature war or surrender and under the social-economic-political constraints of the American public.

The search for multiple options was designed to afford the American policy makers greater flexibility, safety, and credibility in the conduct of national security affairs. Specifically the policy makers would have greater control and influence in the conduct of national security affairs if they had several options other than massive retaliation. Multiple options would give the policy maker maximum control over the intensity of a given conflict. Rather than drawing a line and automatically reacting if your adversary crosses it, the existence of other viable options makes it possible to control the conflict at every stage of political and military development. At one point in time a Soviet advance across western Europe could constitute a threat to the national existence of the United States to the extent that a tactical nuclear strike would be a proper response. At another point in time this might not be true. There are many variables that could and should affect an American decision to react to Soviet aggression. Being committed to one strategy for any reason structures the reaction process in such a way that the past rules the present with no regard for the future.

Conflict control also refers to the type of conflict. At times both super powers may desire to conduct a covert (rather than overt) conflict where resources are expended but prestige is not. One or both of the super powers may conduct proxy wars. Or they may attempt to limit the war to a given geographical area, or to a given number of men involved, or to certain weapons or tactics. The most important limitation is, of course, the nuclear threshold.<sup>12</sup>

Multiple options afford control over weapon types and employment strategies. Even after one crosses the nuclear threshold there is a large range of nuclear weapons and an almost endless range of employment strategies. These include tactical vs. strategic weapons, e.g. low vs. high yield. Clean bombs vs. dirty, short vs. long half-life of residue radiation. Also air burst vs. ground or water burst also give the attackers a measure of control in terms of number or types of casualties. No such control is possible unless the nation possesses multiple options.

The element of control afforded by multiple options is also observed in the targeting policy of a super power.<sup>13</sup> In a situation of nuclear parity or sufficiency, targeting

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<sup>12</sup>Herman Kahn's term; see On Escalation (New York: Praeger, 1965).

<sup>13</sup>The distinction between super power and nuclear power is important here. A nuclear power, France being a good example, possessing limited number of weapons and a very limited absorption capacity, would be forced to countervalue target. A super power, with greater weaponry and greater absorption capacity has wider options.

policy tends to be reciprocal. To automatically target and strike the enemy cities thus involves a conscious trade of your cities for his. To launch a spasm war would invite a similar attack on one's self. As long as nuclear war is a possibility there will be a requirement for rationality. The target lists both super powers keep must reflect that rationality. They must reflect the element of control both sides maintain over the awesome power of modern weaponry.

Once the nuclear threshold were crossed targeting could be limited to military targets located away from urban centers. Planners of both super powers could assist each other by placing potential military targets in such a manner that they could be destroyed without involving population centers. If a war continued beyond a few salvo's by which all counterforce targets that could be destroyed were destroyed, urban targets could become the next field of conflict. Kahn has a city targeting threshold in his taxonomy.<sup>14</sup> He notes:

The example of strategic city bombing in World War II is so firmly held in many people's minds as 'proper' action that they cannot visualize a large strategic war in which cities are not priority objectives.

Nuclear war may be of short duration, hence cities in themselves are of little military value. If they were attacked Kahn believes it would be a calculated process. His taxonomy is as follows:

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<sup>14</sup>Kahn, On Escalation, op. cit., pp. 49-51.

- Rung 38 Unmodified counterforce attack
- Civilian central wars (violation of the no-cities threshold)
- Rung 39 Slow motion counter city war
- Rung 40 Countervalue salvo
- Rung 41 Augmented disarming attack counterforce and collateral countervalue damage
- Rung 42 Civilian devastation attack
- Rung 43 All-out but controlled war
- Rung 44 Spasm war

Kahn argues, and other strategists agree, <sup>like</sup> that even with city targeting, reason would require a selective deliberate act and counter act. Here again the level of destruction would be controlled with decision time between salvo's for cost benefit analysis on continuing or negotiating.

Given nuclear parity with both sides possessing multiple options in nuclear and conventional weapons the city-sparing strategies are by far the most rational.

Arthur Lee Burns has observed:

No system of mutual deterrence can ensure us absolutely against the nuclear holocaust, so from now on that will remain a more or less remote possibility. We ought to prepare to maximize the possibilities of people surviving it.<sup>15</sup>

However Professor Burns defends city-sparing on ethical rather than rational grounds. The city-sparing strategy will be discussed at length later on. However related items deserve noting here.

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<sup>15</sup>Arthur Lee Burns, Ethics and Deterrence: A Nuclear Balance without Hostage Cities? Adelphi Paper No. 69, July 1970, p. 27.



The growing vulnerability of land-based missiles along with the mutual assured destructive capacity of the super powers will make sea-based deterrence a more rational and economical option for the future. Targeting policy could exclude populated areas since they would not have threatening weapons in or near them. The subsurface naval forces may well provide deterrence plus insurance of population survival should deterrence fail.<sup>16</sup> Possible forecasts will be discussed in greater depth later on.

Thus far we have been describing the benefits which would result from a multiple option strategy. The focus has been on the increased ability to control conflict by possessing different weapons and strategies of employment. More must be said about the specific benefits of general purpose forces.

Agreeing that deterrence is an influence process one can agree with Glenn Snyder that deterrence can influence either by threat of punishment or threat of failure in the undertaking.<sup>17</sup> The utility value of punishment or terror in a nuclear parity situation is both diminished

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<sup>16</sup> For a discussion on the growing power of the subsurface Navy see Paul Cohen, "The Erosion of Surface Naval Power," Foreign Affairs, January 1971, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 330-41. For an analysis of the reliability of land-based missiles vs. sea-based, see George H. Quester, "Missiles in Cuba, 1970," Foreign Affairs, April 1971, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 493-506.

<sup>17</sup> This concept of deterrence or denial and punishment will be used through this paper. Its most complete formulation may be found in Glenn Snyder's Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

and dangerous. As this came to be recognized in the early 60's, the denial aspect, which promises greater credibility and flexibility, found favor with policy makers of the Kennedy administration. In 1962, John T. McNaughton, a high Defense Department official, said of this new doctrine of flexibility:

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... Our armed forces can be used or not used, as the case may be, in a controlled and deliberate way, subject at all times to the direction of the highest civilian authority. Such flexibility means that we will not be faced with 'all or nothing' decisions. Though we will be capable of an all-out attack, we will have a much wider choice, so that we can pick the strategy which is best for us and not just worst for the enemy. And perhaps most important, we will have a way to stop the war before all the destruction of which the sides are capable has been wrought.<sup>18</sup>

In order to decrease our reliance upon nuclear weapons the Kennedy administration increased the number of combat-ready Army divisions from 11 to 16 and increased the Marine Corps by 15,000 men. Sealift and airlift capabilities were also increased. The number of attack carriers in service was increased to seventeen. The Special Forces units added a counterinsurgency force to the administration's strategic mix. Indeed a 20 percent increase in the U. S. defense budget must have alarmed Moscow.<sup>19</sup> The prize was Europe. The American strategy of denial essentially meant that the United States and its NATO allies

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<sup>18</sup>Michael Brower, "Nuclear Strategy of the Kennedy Administration," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 1962, pp. 34-41.

<sup>19</sup>Andrew J. Pierre, "Political-Military Power: America Down, Russia Up," Foreign Policy, No. 4, Fall 1971, pp. 163-187.

would be able to prevent any Soviet victory in a Western European thrust.

In his first defense message to Congress President Kennedy proposed that we do the following:

- A. Strengthen capacity to meet limited and guerilla warfare
- B. Expand research on non-nuclear weapons
- C. Increase flexibility of conventional forces by improving our capacity to move forces in sizable numbers on short notice and support them
- D. Increase non-nuclear capacity for fighter aircraft. [It was believed in 1961 that manned aircraft would be needed during the 1965-75 "missile era for various limited war missions."]<sup>20</sup>

Thus the United States Government during the Kennedy administration decided to increase the number of personnel in the general purpose forces, to stimulate non-nuclear weapons development, to expand airlift and sealift capability, to acquire a counterinsurgency force, and to do all things necessary to deny the Soviets an easy victory in Europe and some parts of Asia. As Secretary McNamara said before the Armed Services Committee,

What is being proposed at this time is not a reversal of our existing national policy but

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<sup>20</sup>United States Defense Policies 1961, pp. 26-27.

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an increase in our non-nuclear capabilities to provide a greater degree of versatility to our limited war forces.<sup>21</sup>

### 3. Limited War and Conflict Management

The capability to engage the Soviet Union in a limited war was a central goal of the Kennedy administration. Realizing that conflicts of the Cold War would continue, the planners and policy makers sought to manage conflict rather than abolish it. Being men of high ideals, they did not dismiss the ending of human conflict lightly, however they were realists faced with the full responsibility of decision.<sup>22</sup> Therefore they chose the probability of war over the possibility of eternal peace. They further chose limited war over total war as a better means of controlling and preserving the human condition.

The strategic importance of limited war in a situation of super power nuclear sufficiency is clear. The means of achieving it are less so. Beginning in the mid-fifties debates over the definition, nature, and possibility of limited war occupied many of the academic

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>22</sup>The account of the Cuban missile crisis by Robert Kennedy clearly reflects this high idealism and moralistic view of international law.

strategists.<sup>23</sup> If a war between the Soviet Union and the United States occurred how could it be limited? If one side or the other began to lose would it choose defeat rather than use its nuclear arsenal? Once a war began would the winning side settle for conditional surrender or would it push for total victory? If so what option would the losing side have? In the mid-fifties the Korean War was held to be a prime example of a limited war.

Bernard Brodie wrote:

A limited war does not necessarily mean war without victory, but the terms must be short of unconditional surrender and give the vanquished a chance to negotiate on a reasonable basis. It is amazing how we spontaneously acted on these propositions in Korea . . . .<sup>24</sup>

- A limited war involves limited objectives, a geographical limitation of the field of conflict, and a limitation as to weapons used. Hanson Baldwin has noted that "a limited war must be limited first and fundamentally by

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<sup>23</sup>Examples of the thinking of this period are to be found in Rear Admiral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard et al, On Limiting Atomic War (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956); Robert Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Security (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). Bernard Brodie reviewed this book in "More about Limited War," World Politics, October 1957, pp. 112-122. Also see Bernard Brodie, "Unlimited Weapons and Limited War," The Reporter, November 18, 1954, pp. 16-21. For the military view on limited war see Colonel T. N. Dupuy, "War without Victory," Military Review, March 1956, pp. 28-32 and/or Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Peripheral Strategy . . . Littoral Tactics . . . Limited War," Army Combat Forces Journal, Vol. 5, September 1954, pp. 36-39, and Major General James M. Gavin, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses," Harper's Magazine, April 1954, pp. 54-60.

<sup>24</sup>Bernard Brodie, "Unlimited Weapons and Unlimited War," The Reporter, November 18, 1954, p. 9.

the objectives, intentions, and will of the participants."<sup>25</sup>  
 Writing in a general but prophetic view, Baldwin also pointed out:

A war of fuzzy, ill-defined or unlimited aims encourages unlimited measures. The fundamental requirement to keep war limited is to know what you are fighting for, to define the price you are willing to pay for the objectives . . . .<sup>26</sup>

Yet the central question facing the American administration was how to secure limited means. The very old, and very American question of cheap defense was as real in 1960 as it had been in 1947. Neither the Americans nor the allies were willing to maintain sufficient conventional troops to stop a Soviet advance in Europe without recourse to "limited or tactical nuclear weapons." The Europeans understood this. Writing in 1956 Raymond Aron points out:

In a non-atomic war the West will have lost before it has begun to fight. At a very minimum the West will be forced to accept the occupation by the Soviet armies of immense territories and to engage in interminable hostilities . . . a kind of war which would be no less disastrous for civilization than an atomic war.<sup>27</sup>

In 1959 Vice Admiral Brown, former Commander of the Sixth Fleet, stated before the National Press Club in Washington: "I have no faith in the so-called controlled use of atomic weapons no matter how small, when both sides have the power to destroy the world."<sup>28</sup> While Aron believes that Europe

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<sup>25</sup>Hanson W. Baldwin, "Limited War," The Atlantic, May 1959, p. 37.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Raymond Aron, "Can War in the Atomic Age Be Limited," Confluence, July 1956, pp. 100-101.

<sup>28</sup> . . . .

could only be defended with nuclear weapons, Hanson Baldwin pointed out that ". . . in European target systems (sic) are too intermixed: civilian and military, area and point, tactical and strategic; . . . the battlefield is too small and not sufficiently defined by natural barriers." He states categorically: "A limited war in western Europe is impossible; the use of nuclear weapons in this area would invoke catastrophe."<sup>29</sup>

That the United States could settle for something less than unconditional surrender was attested to by Korea and later Vietnam. That geographical limitations could be observed was also made clear. Though nuclear weapons were not used, they continued to be the major doubt in the emerging concept of limited war.

The major problem in limited war was that the United States would not or could not maintain the forces necessary to fight and expect to win a limited war without recourse to nuclear weapons. General Maxwell Taylor, speaking in 1958, suggested a five-point program to meet the challenge of limited war:

1. Modernization of appropriate equipment
2. Improved strategic mobility of limited war forces
3. Pre-planned use of air- and sealift forces
4. Expanded joint planning and training
5. Publicizing limited war strength<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>30</sup>Maxwell Taylor, "Improving Our Capabilities for Limited War," Army Information Digest, February 1959, p. 7.

It is interesting that General Taylor did not ask for the one thing his program really needed--men.

For their part the Soviets rejected the concept of limited war. In a note to Eisenhower, N. A. Bulganin pointed out:

One of the arguments, offered by the military western circles to justify their demands for the expansion of military preparation, is the so called theory of 'local wars.' It is necessary to stress most emphatically that this 'theory' is not only unsound from a military point of view, but that it is politically very dangerous. In the past . . . global wars began as 'local' wars. Can anyone seriously count on the possibility to 'localize' wars in our times, when there are in the world opposing military groups which comprise dozens of states in different parts of the world, while the action of present weapons has no geographic limits?<sup>31</sup>

Soviet military literature has tended to dismiss the possibility of limited war. Their attitude as exemplified by Bulganin's letter is that war between the super powers cannot be limited.

. . . It would be criminal frivolity on the part of the American leaders if they were seriously expecting that once they had unleashed a war against the socialist states it could be kept within certain bounds. If there is a clash between the two giants--the Soviet Union and the United States--that possess powerful economies and big stocks of nuclear weapons, neither side, of course will want to concede defeat before resorting to the use of all the weapons, including the most devastating ones.<sup>32</sup>

There is obviously a distinction between what Soviet spokesmen say and what they believe or practice

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<sup>31</sup>Translated by Leon Goure, "Soviet Commentary on the Doctrine of Limited War," Rand Corporation (Santa Monica: 1958), p. 10.

<sup>32</sup>Quoted in Soviet Military Strategy, ed. by V. D. Sokolovskii, first edition (A Rand Corporation research study, Englewood Cliffs: 1963).



with respect to limited war. The Soviet insistence on the impossibility of limiting "local wars" serves a deterrent function. The second edition of the Sokolovskii book continued to express doubt of the utility of a counterforce strategy, but their attitude is seen as an effort to "reinforce the credibility of the Soviet deterrent posture."<sup>33</sup> And Soviet support for the wars of national liberation and limited action in Korea and Vietnam suggests an awareness of the danger of an all or nothing approach.<sup>34</sup> The Soviet insistence that the use of even tactical nuclear weapons is the point at which limited war will become uncontrolled is perhaps aimed at the resolve of the west. Moscow knows full well that NATO forces must depend upon tactical nuclear firepower in order to stop a potential advance from the east.

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In many respects the Soviet attitude denying limited war is similar to the pre-Kennedy American attitude: They evidently "hoped to strengthen deterrence by emphasizing an unqualified Soviet nuclear response."<sup>35</sup> This position is similar to the instant and massive retaliation doctrine associated with John Foster Dulles. It is as dangerous and irrational from the perspective of Soviet interests as it was from American interests. One authority has concluded:

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<sup>33</sup>Thomas W. Wolfe, "Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1964, p. 479.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 481.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

Today, however, there are signs that the Soviet position on local and limited war is undergoing change. A good deal of inconsistency characterizes Soviet treatment of the subject, and no unified doctrine of limited war applying to Soviet forces has emerged. Nevertheless, more attention is being given to the possibility of local wars, and there seems to be some effort, particularly in military journals, to treat the subject of escalation in a less arbitrary way.<sup>36</sup>

A few years later the same scholar would write the Soviets had (by 1967) recognized the need to prepare for operations below the level of general nuclear war and had taken the first steps toward becoming a "globally mobile military power."<sup>37</sup> With the growth of power comes an awareness and a fear and then a respect. The Soviets may be moving along that path as did the Americans before them. They may discover that limited war is the lesser of the evils facing policy makers today.

Q: were these preparations designed for confl - / us? or were they made on detente to next. US?

#### 4. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Watershed

In analyzing the Cuban missile crisis the first question one would ask is why did we have a crisis in the first place? Most scholars agree that the Soviets hoped to cheaply redress a situation of strategic imbalance. One answer is that the Soviets hoped to deflect pressure from domestic sources, which were demanding a larger share of the GNP and from the international socialist leadership, which was demanding more vigorous action against the capitalist West. The Soviets were gambling

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Quest for More Globally Mobile Military Power (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967), p. v.

that the United States would not or could not react until the missiles were operational. In answering the question of why we had a missile crisis one theme is constant. The credibility of the American deterrent had declined. One scholar put it this way: "The Russians stationed missiles in Cuba because they thought they might be permitted to do so . . . they did not believe our threat."<sup>38</sup> Noting the American reluctance to back up words with force the same scholar argues that "the Russians did not miscalculate in Cuba; they drew reasonable conclusions from our behavior."<sup>39</sup> The Bay of Pigs episode may have signalled a lack of resolve as well as a breakdown in administrative machinery. The readjustment of the American commitment to Laos, as well as the lack of firmness when the Soviets objected to the proposed fifth annual meeting of the West German Senate in West Berlin may have detracted from the credibility of the American threat.<sup>40</sup>

Yet the Cuban missile crisis was a watershed in American defense policy. It was the first major military confrontation between the two super powers. It was one of the few times the United States pledged publicly to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. It was an ultimatum backed by both the conventional and nuclear forces of the United States.

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<sup>38</sup>James L. Payne, The American Threat (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 46.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., pp. 48-56.

Many scholars have argued that Cuba was a turning point in Soviet acceptance of strategic inferiority. After Cuba the Soviets are said to have set about the business of redressing their strategic inferiority with a vengeance. Yet the evidence does not wholly support that argument. For example the defense expenditures of the USSR after the Cuban missile crisis do not reflect a constant upward progression until after 1967. Note the defense expenditures of the United States and USSR from 1960 to 1970:<sup>41</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>In Millions of Dollars</u>	
	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
1960	45,380	27,000
1961	47,808	35,800
1962	52,381	38,700
1963	52,295	40,200
1964	51,213	38,400
1965	51,827	37,000
1966	63,572	38,700
1967	75,465	41,900
1968	80,732	48,200
1969	81,444	51,100
1970	76,507	53,900

The figures for ICBM/SLBM deployment reflect a similar pattern. The deployment rates of the United States and USSR from 1961 to 1971 are shown on the following page:<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>Taken from The Military Balance 1971-72 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 62.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

Deployment Rates of ICBM/SLBM, 1961-71

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
<u>USA</u>											
ICBM	63	294	424	834	854	904	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054
SLBM	46	144	224	416	496	592	656	656	656	656	656
<u>USSR</u>											
ICBM	50	75	100	200	270	300	460	800	1,050	1,300	1,510
SLBM	0	?	100	120	120	125	130	130	160	280	440

The figures reflect the American defense program in the early years of the Kennedy administration. They do not reflect a constant Soviet drive for parity or superiority in strategic missiles until 1967-68. In 1963-64 the Soviets increased their ICBM force by 70 and in 1965-66 by 30. In 1967 they increased their force by 160 and the next year they nearly doubled it, from 460 to 800 missiles. Throughout the ten-year period their SLBM forces were nearly constant, 100 in 1963 and 130 in 1968. Not until 1969 did they begin to deploy significant numbers of sea-based missiles.

Did they have the R+D to do so?

Since 1969 the USSR has surpassed the United States in ICBM's deployed, and in 1971 the Soviet Union surpassed the total American missile force.<sup>43</sup> Yet both nations have long passed the point where sheer numbers have real strategic meaning. Now other factors such as CEP, MRIV, and survivability must be included in any power calculus. Yet the fact remains that the relative positions of the super powers have significantly changed since the Cuban missile crisis.

The development of the crisis is attributable to the decline of the credibility of the American deterrent and the related issue of the miscalculations of the Soviet leaders as to the resolve of the American leadership and the capability of the American national security structure to act in a crisis. The question of the result of the crisis involves strategic parity between the two super

Is this behavior a function of

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

powers. The last question to be asked is what had the Soviets hoped to gain?

The Soviets do not take offensive risk lightly. The expert literature generally assumes Soviet avoidance of major foreign policy risks.<sup>44</sup> On one hand the Soviets were encouraged to take risks by the ambivalent attitude of the United States in the Bay of Pigs, in Laos, in Berlin. On the other hand Soviet analysts must have been troubled by the "Monroe Doctrine mentality" the Americans had toward the hemisphere and more specifically by the defense program of the Kennedy administration.<sup>45</sup> In the end they must have concluded that the Americans could not or would not act until the missiles became operational. One scholar has argued that the Soviets believe the Americans to have a "high tolerance threshold which inspires the Soviets' nibbling tactics." This, he argues, has shaped the post-war USSR strategy of chipping away at United States interests without confronting the United States with a massive challenge.<sup>46</sup>

It is said that Mr. Khrushchev believed President Kennedy to be absorbed in the forthcoming Congressional

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<sup>44</sup>Jon F. Triska, Studies in Deterrence XIII Pattern and Level of Risk in Soviet Foreign Policy Making, 1945-1963 (China Lake: U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, October 1966), p. 65.

<sup>45</sup>See Payne, The American Threat, op. cit., Chapters 2 and 3.

<sup>46</sup>John R. Thomas, "Limited War in Soviet Strategic Thinking," Research Analysis Corporation (McLean, Virginia: Strategic Studies Division, November 1965), p. 22.

elections and hence unwilling to fight for Cuba.<sup>47</sup> There also remains that enigmatic statement Khrushchev made to Robert Frost when he said the Americans were "too generous to fight."<sup>48</sup> Yet when the President delivered his ultimatum; when he threatened to attack the Russians' homeland; and when the Soviets received evidence from their own intelligence that military power was being prepared, they backed down.<sup>49</sup>

Some scholars have argued that the Soviets were faced with a dilemma in 1962. The Kennedy administration had indicated its plans to expand American military power, both strategic and general purpose. The Soviets were then in a position of strategic inferiority. How in the face of American strategic supremacy could the Soviets assume a military posture adequate to support Soviet policy objectives?<sup>50</sup> Soviet interest was in central Europe. The question was how to gain influence. Horelick and Rush argue:

In Berlin, the Soviet leaders were unwilling to press ahead because the United States was insufficiently intimidated. In Cuba, they hoped to acquire additional means of intimidation and thereby lessen the likelihood of a dangerous

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<sup>47</sup>Edward Weintol and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink (New York: 1967), p. 57.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 56. Also note John R. Thomas' study, op. cit., which argues that the Soviets tend to be apprehensive over the possibility of the Americans overreacting "by adopting a narrowly 'military' approach to war."

<sup>50</sup>Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: 1965), p. 153.



American response to measures the USSR might take against Berlin.<sup>51</sup>

Carl Linden argues that Khrushchev hoped to redress Soviet strategic inferiority by placing missiles in Cuba. Linden agrees that the missiles provided Khrushchev with "a powerful negotiating lever" especially with regard to Berlin. The Cuban venture was an attempt to secure "cheap and quick" military-political power. It failed. However some time after its failure a series of increases in the Soviet military budget began that continued well into the seventies.<sup>52</sup> This failure reversed the consumer-oriented budget policies of Khrushchev when he admitted that enormous resources would be required to maintain the Soviet position in the world.<sup>53</sup>

Most scholars thus far agree that the Cuban missile crisis was an attempt to redress Soviet strategic inferiority, to gain power and influence to force a settlement over Berlin by checking any dangerous American response. Most of the authorities on the subject agree the crisis resulted from a Soviet miscalculation of the young American President, of the resolve of the American government, and of the decision making process

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>52</sup>Linden, op. cit., p. 157. Also see Strategic Survey 1971 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972).

<sup>53</sup>Wolf, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, op. cit., p. 43.

in the United States.<sup>54</sup>

Another answer to the question of what the Soviets were seeking in Cuba is provided by Adam B. Ulam. The Soviets' main interest has been and will continue to be Europe, especially Germany. The continued American presence in Berlin was to the Soviet point of view unnatural and embarrassing. Moreover the continual growth of West Germany in economic and military power foreshadowed that time when the United States would give nuclear weapons to its most powerful continental ally or when the Germans would be able to produce nuclear weapons independently of America or NATO. In either case Soviet security was threatened from the Soviet point of view. Ulam argues that the Soviets were attempting to gain leverage to force the United States to agree upon a limitation of nuclear weapons. "Perhaps the road to barring nuclear weapons in Germany and China might lead through Havana."<sup>55</sup> Professor Ulam's thesis is provocative although he admits that many students have expressed reservations on his interpretation of the missile crisis.<sup>56</sup>

Notwithstanding what the Russians sought in Cuba

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<sup>54</sup>J. M. MacKintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). Weintol and Bartlett, Facing the Brink, op. cit. James L. Payne, The American Threat, op. cit., and Thomas Wolf cited above.

<sup>55</sup>Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II (New York: 1971), p. 314.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 325, footnote 15.

most scholars agree the Cuban missile crisis proved at last that the American deterrent strategy of massive retaliation was outdated and dangerous. The Soviet move to sufficiency had changed the balance of power. The NATO allies were also affected by the new balance. They were concerned about the viability of the American nuclear shield and at the same time concerned with nuclear strategy as it might apply to a European battleground. The Americans for their part overreacted to the psychological pressure of the Cold War. They soon overestimated Soviet power, underestimated their own, and hence elevated Soviet political power beyond in-being military realities. One thing was made clear however. The Soviets had now forced the Americans to rethink the strategic plans. The Soviet move to sufficiency destroyed massive retaliation. For their part the Soviets' action in Cuba confirmed the defense objectives of the Kennedy administration. Within a few days of the beginning of the crisis a massive movement of general purpose forces converged toward the southeast part of the United States. The Navy had 180 ships involved in the Cuban operation, the Army had 8 divisions prepared for movement to Florida, the strategic forces were dispersed and/or on airborne alert. "Multiple options with a vengeance stood ready by the President's hand."<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: 1964), pp. 271-273.

5. The Quest for a Credible Strategy

The Cuban missile crisis confirmed many theories about conflict management in the nuclear age. First it clearly affirmed the need for consistency. The great powers must make clear to each other their perceptions of vital interests. It is only through this kind of expected behavior that the rational operation of the international system can proceed. If a super power is unsure of a given set of objectives it may invite expansionist action by the other, wherein commitment, prestige, and position become invested with a value greater than the original objective. Of course the super powers can back down as the Soviets did in Cuba, but it is a dangerous situation that forces a super power to reverse its position.<sup>58</sup>

A second lesson related to the need for consistency has to do with the credibility of the deterrent. When the United States indicates a given set of vital interests and further indicates a willingness to fight to preserve those interests, that statement must be believed! The value of protecting the credibility of the American deterrent cannot be overstressed. The United States or any super power must be certain that

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<sup>58</sup>Weintol and Bartlett make reference to a post mortem critique written by Walt Rostow and Paul Nitze in 1963 of the missile crisis where they discussed the Soviets' ability to probe and then advance or withdraw. "Advance and withdrawals are mutually consistent policies in the Kremlin."

its interests do not exceed its capabilities. But if interests are defined and if the policy is consistent with the realities of power in the international system, the opposing super power should be deterred. If it is not deterred conflict is likely and direct nuclear confrontation is possible. to whom

The Cuban missile crisis also brought home the value of multiple options. There will be miscalculations and very probably conflicts between American and Russian interests. The ultimate interests of both nations (or blocs) will be best served by limiting those conflicts in terms of weapons systems, geographical areas, and cost-risk factors. Had the President been forced to take more drastic action in Cuba, a landing by 100,000 American troops would have been preferable to the use of nuclear weapons. 17

Finally the crisis brought home the fact that nuclear war is still a very real possibility. The Soviet Union having achieved sufficiency was then demanding that some of the operational rules of the international system be changed. The most obvious of these changes was that the United States could no longer depend upon its nuclear arsenal to redress its inferiority in general purpose forces; and that the nuclear shield of the Atlantic alliance was no longer credible. It was in this new strategic situation of Soviet nuclear sufficiency that the Kennedy administration attempted to find a new set of options. This was to be no easy shift from one policy to another. In less than a year McNamara, Enthoven, and Kennedy

himself would announce three different defense strategies for the United States:

On June 6, 1962, Secretary McNamara said in his Ann Arbor speech that current American strategic planning envisaged attacks on enemy forces rather than on their civilian populations, i.e. a counterforce strategy.<sup>59</sup>

On February 10, 1962, Alain Enthoven announced that the American approach to strategic planning " . . . is based on options, deliberation, flexibility and control," i.e. flexible response.<sup>60</sup>

During the Cuban missile crisis President Kennedy said that if one nuclear missile were launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere, that would be regarded as "an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union," i.e. massive retaliation.<sup>61</sup>

Thus three distinct strategies were officially announced in less than nine months. The search for a new strategy did not begin with the Cuban missile crisis. True, the events of those thirteen autumn days in 1962 brought into sharp focus the need for new strategic concepts, but the inadequacy of American strategic policy went to the very core of the Kennedy national security

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<sup>59</sup>Neville Brown, Nuclear War: The Impending Strategic Deadlock (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 118.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

program. Kennedy fully realized that among the NATO allies and members of the Warsaw Pact there was developing a disbelief that any American President could or would risk Chicago or Los Angeles for the defense of Paris or Berlin. In his address of July 1961 during the Berlin crisis the President

stressed the necessity of the U. S. developing alternatives between humiliation and total nuclear war that would enable it to defend its allies throughout the world without bringing on extensive damage to the U. S. homeland.<sup>62</sup>

Given the full implications of the Soviet move to parity it is not surprising that the European allies doubted that the United States could "develop those alternatives" which could defend the NATO allies and not devastate the United States. A logical solution to this dilemma was offered by Robert McNamara. In a speech at Ann Arbor which was said to be "a watered down version of what he had said the previous month to the NATO council in Athens" McNamara publicly described his city-sparing strategy.<sup>63</sup>

After describing the history of the NATO alliance McNamara directly confronted the issue. He said:

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<sup>62</sup>Morton H. Halperin, Studies in Deterrence IX Deterrence and Local War (China Lake: U. S. Naval Ordnance Testing Station, 1963).

<sup>63</sup>Michael Brower, "McNamara's Strategy: Controlled Thermonuclear War," New Republic, July 30, 1962, p. 11.

It has been argued that the increasing vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack makes us less willing as a partner in the defense of Europe and hence less effective in deterring such an attack.<sup>64</sup>

McNamara also surfaced the issue of independent national nuclear forces and pointed out that only a common integrated defense could safeguard the alliance. He argued that there were four central elements to be considered in a discussion of nuclear strategy:

First, the alliance has overall nuclear strength adequate to any challenge confronting it. Second, this strength not only minimizes the likelihood of major nuclear war but makes possible a strategy designed to preserve the fabric of our society if war should occur (italics mine). Third, damage to the civil societies of the alliance resulting from nuclear war could be very grave. Fourth, improved non-nuclear forces, well within alliance resources, could enhance deterrence of any aggressive moves short of direct, all out attack on Western Europe.<sup>65</sup>

The second item is the point of interest to the student of deterrence. The idea is that a strategy could be devised to preserve the fabric of our society if war should occur. The way to achieve this objective is, according to McNamara, to return to the precepts of war as they existed before the era of total war.

The United States has come to the conclusion that, to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that

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<sup>64</sup>Department of State Bulletin, "Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community," by Robert S. McNamara, July 9, 1962, p. 66. (This is a reprint of the Ann Arbor address where McNamara outlines his city-sparing strategy.)

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.



more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.<sup>66</sup>

The position McNamara sets forth is rational. Given the ability of either side to destroy the major urban centers of the opponent the advantage of such attack is cancelled out. Should war occur nuclear weapons could be used against military targets. A large invulnerable reserve of arms would insure that the adversary would not be tempted to attack cities. Or, to use McNamara's words: ". . . we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities."<sup>67</sup>

McNamara's proposed solution to the strategic dilemma was not accepted by many interested parties or really fully accepted by the Secretary himself. General Andre Beaufre wrote:

This extremely subtle solution has the advantage of being logical. Its chief disadvantage is to announce that the initial response will only be a shot across the bow, so that certain actions might be undertaken by the enemy with limited initial risk: thus nuclear deterrence loses a large part of its value. Another disadvantage is that in this atmosphere of declared caution the threat of 'certain destruction' does not seem very plausible as soon as every one knows it will not hinder an equally destructive response.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Andre Beaufre, NATO and Europe (New York: 1966), p. 69.

There were other arguments against the no-cities target system. First, there are few natural geographical barriers to help keep a nuclear war limited in Europe. Second, cities are in many cases located near military targets. Third, command and control over nuclear forces in a nuclear war may be disrupted. Fourth, and most important, the other side might not "play ball."<sup>69</sup>

A key element in the utility of the city-sparing strategy is the willingness and/or ability of the Soviets to conduct a limited nuclear war with the United States. In surveying the literature one finds a distinction between limited conventional and limited nuclear war.<sup>70</sup> A limited conventional war in Europe would give considerable advantage to the Soviets due to their massive conventional strength. The following tables illustrate the comparative non-nuclear force levels between the Warsaw Pact and NATO nations:

Ground Formations (in division equivalents)

Northern and Central Europe

<u>Category</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>Of Which USSR</u>
Armored	8	28	19
Infantry, Mechanized and Airborne	16	37	22

<sup>69</sup>Brower, New Republic, op. cit., pp. 12-14.

<sup>70</sup>See Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: 1958), Chapter 5; and Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: 1963), Chapter 6.

<u>Category</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>Of Which USSR</u>
	<u>Southern Europe</u>		
Armored Infantry, etc.	7 30	9 21	3 4

Manpower Comparisons (in thousands)

<u>Northern and Central Europe</u>			
Combat and Direct Support Troops	580	960	588
<u>Southern Europe</u>			
Combat and Direct Support Troops	525	385	90 <sup>71</sup>

The mobilization capacity of the Warsaw Pact is much greater than that of NATO. It has been estimated that the thirty-one Soviet divisions in Central Europe could be increased to seventy in less than thirty days. Also support and logistic situations are favorable to the Pact. The American airlift assumes a secure air environment and ability to land without attack. In view of the shallow operational depth of Central Europe and the Soviet short-range rockets SS-3 and SS-4, the C-5A airlift force would seem to lose a good deal of its military significance. The Soviet anticipated rate of advance across Europe in the event of a war is sixty kilometers per day. At that rate they would be at the Channel in less than a week. The allied airports would be targeted and the sea-lift would arrive too late. Hence the only option open

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<sup>71</sup>Figures from The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971), pp. 76-77.

to the Americans according to the Soviet Union is a nuclear response.

An equipment comparison gives more support to the theory that Soviets would seek a rapid conquest of Western Europe and the Americans would be forced to resort to nuclear weapons. The comparison of main battle tanks is particularly revealing:

	<u>Northern and Central Europe</u>		
	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	(Of Which <u>USSR</u> )
Tanks	5,500	16,000	10,000
	<u>in Southern Europe</u>		
Tanks	2,250	5,700	1,600 <sup>72</sup>

At the present time NATO is estimated to have 7,000 nuclear warheads. These range from artillery and short-range missiles to aircraft delivered KT Range weapons. The Soviet Union has control of a "limited" nuclear warhead stockpile which numbers about 3,500.<sup>73</sup>

In the Soviet view a European war would inevitably become a nuclear war because the Americans would have no other acceptable option. Current Soviet strategic thinking on a European strategy may be described as "counter center." The objective of this strategic doctrine is to "either seize the enemy's territory or devastate his rear" (in

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

Soviet terminology a nation's political and economic foundation).<sup>74</sup> The Soviets always discuss a European war in the context of a world war. In view of the strong American response in Korea the Soviets are relatively certain the Americans would fight for Europe. The relative asymmetry between the United States and the USSR tactical nuclear missile postures suggests that a limited nuclear war could not long remain limited in terms of weapons employed.

"The postures are asymmetrical in both range and numbers of delivery vehicles and in the yields of nuclear weapons . . . ."

If both sides are to play by the same rules, they must have the same equipment. Until then, if the Americans, because of possible conventional force inferiority stemming from rapid-mobilization capabilities of the Soviets, initiated the use of nuclear weapons at the lowest levels, the Soviets would have to respond almost automatically at a higher level because they do not possess matching yields at the same level.<sup>75</sup>

Ironically the American experience in the Korean and Southeast Asian conflicts may have convinced the Soviets that American military policy is not absolutely committed to unconditional surrender. That experience suggests that the United States can accept limited victory or even defeat.

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<sup>74</sup>John R. Thomas, "Limited Nuclear War in Soviet Strategic Thinking," op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

Despite what the Soviets say about limited nuclear war certain facts remain. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have an assured destruction capacity. Both hold hostage cities of the other. While some defensive measures could save lives on both sides neither super power has attempted to limit possible damage. Any significant damage limiting attempt would stimulate great offensive countermeasures by the opposition.

The clash of interests and ideologies which has divided the super powers will not soon end. The tactics of the Cold War may change but the general opposition of the two cultures and the possession of the means of mutual annihilation will continue to be major facts of life in the international system. Conflict will not suddenly end but it can be managed. The odds for survival improve as both super powers recognize the necessity of that management.

#### IV. Components of American Defense Planning

##### 1. Introduction

In analyzing the entire range of American defense planning one finds three distinct, though related, sets of questions. The first set deals with the basic assumptions of defense planning. These include the concept of rational decision making among national options and assumptions about the international environment in which defense planning must operate. The second set of questions deals with the concept of national interest. These questions relate to the goals and objectives of foreign and defense policy. Few areas of policy analysis are as important and yet as intellectually fuzzy as questions dealing with the national interest. The last set of questions deals with the concept of power or capabilities analysis. These questions are concerned with evaluating a state's potential for action or reaction. The discussion of variables for determining national power must consider both pre-nuclear and nuclear conditions.

##### 2. Assumptions of Strategic Planning

Defense planning in general and strategic planning in particular must proceed upon assumptions of rationality of the various national actors. It is assumed that national actors will act according to their own perceived self-interests consistent with the existing power situation. That is, they will define their respective goals

or "interests," rank them in terms of importance, cost, and risk, and then formulate policies that will maximize achievement and minimize cost.<sup>1</sup> At the same time the national actors will construct a similar calculus for their potential adversaries in order to anticipate when and where conflicts may occur and the possible and probable intensity of these conflicts.

Every historian is aware that nations do not always appear to act rationally. One scholar has suggested three possible models of national decision making in crisis.

(1) The rational process outlined above, (2) policy as the product bargaining among the elite, (3) policy as the product of institutional pressure and/or values.<sup>2</sup> I would

suggest the application of the concept of "value-rational behavior" to clarify this phenomenon. All behavior is based on values whether they be the values of an elite, a society, or a single man. Whatever their source once the values are articulated if the behavior carried out to achieve those values is rational, the policy itself is said to be rational. The key to appearing rational is to act as others expect. This element of expected behavior is vital to the conduct of nuclear age international relations.

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<sup>1</sup>Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKeon, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), Chapter 7.

<sup>2</sup>Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, September 1969. For discussion of the Allison article see Davis B. Bobrow, International Relations: New Approaches (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 37-48.



The models of policy as products of elite bargaining and institutional influence are therefore not necessarily non-rational. In the process of <sup>bargaining</sup> ~~forming~~ goals are evaluated, possibilities for success are examined. Vested interests may enter the calculations but if one is aware of these interests one can anticipate the goals and hence the policy. Similarly, the institutional values of the great powers may be determined. One can construct an "operational code" and thus anticipate policy.<sup>3</sup> Though policy may be influenced by competition among components of the elite and/or by the institutional structure in a given nation it may still be rational.

Rationality as here used is meant to denote an evaluative process rather than a normative judgment. If a nation's goals are consistent with vital needs and relative power the goals are considered rational. If a policy moves toward maximizing the goals at minimizing cost the policy is said to be rational.

It is expected that war as a national policy will be employed only to achieve some goal. The utility of war in goal achievement has changed in the modern era. War for profit has become unprofitable. One noted economist put it this way: "A world that has understood

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<sup>3</sup>See Nathan Leiter, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe: Free Press, 1953) and Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951). While the Leiter approach is based upon analysis of Soviet ideology there are studies based upon context analysis of elite articulation. For example, J. David Singer, Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: A Content Analysis of Elite Articulations (China Lake: U. S. Naval Ordnance Testing Station, 1964).

Keynes and post-Keynesian economics has no need to conquer territory for the sake of national economic gain."<sup>4</sup> Nuclear weapons have even further decreased the utility of military power. Knorr suggests the following formula:

$$U = V - C = (V_1 + V_2 + \dots + V_N) - (C_1 + C_2 + \dots + C_N)$$

Where U is the Utility a nation may derive from military power; V, the Value of the foreign policy objectives; and C, the Costs involved, "utility depends upon the difference between aggregate values and aggregate costs."<sup>5</sup> Given the economics of warfare it is usually in the interests of the super powers to attempt to gain their objective short of direct confrontation let alone by resorting to war. In order to conduct such complex policies it is necessary that nuclear powers anticipate the actions and reactions of potential adversary states. This Anticipatory planning among nuclear powers must assume rationality.

Defense planning also assumes that a state's power defines its position in the international system. Position refers to the range of options open to a nation in a given situation. The greater the power the more freedom a nation has in securing the objectives it deems vital. Where there is a potential conflict over a given set of objectives the nation with a clear preponderance of power will strive for the objective, while a nation with no chance of success

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<sup>4</sup>Klaus Knorr, On the Use of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 26.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

will not normally take on the venture. This is, however, a very simplistic example. For one thing power is local, that is, it does not exist in absolute aggregates but rather must be capable of being focused at a given place and time. Also, an objective is rarely of equal value to competing states. Usually one state will be willing to spend or risk more than another even if the latter state has more aggregate power. It is when there exists a symmetry of power and desires that conflicts develop into wars.

Given the importance of power in international relations, the measurement and evaluation of power becomes a critical factor in policy making. The question of what constitutes power in the international system is not simple. The more specific question as to what constitutes power in a given conflict situation is even more difficult. In some situations power may be measured in terms of megatons of nuclear energy, missiles on target, or numbers of armed men. In other situations GNP, geography, administrative or political control or even ideas and belief systems are vital factors in the power calculus.

? Another assumption of defense planning is that contemporary international relations is a systematic process; that there exists an international system. Essentially this assumes that there are few random elements in the international system; that cause and effect relationships may be observed or inferred. These assumptions are ultimately based upon the concept of

rationality discussed earlier.

The international system may be said to be rational in terms of being goal oriented and power directed. However, the different perception of interests and evaluation of power position transforms this relatively simple model into a very complex reality. The constantly changing situations in the international system add still more difficulty.

This element of change in the conduct of international relations constitutes a very important characteristic of the international system. An infinite number of events occur to change relationships among the national actions. These events range from technological inventions to the rise and fall of political elites, to successful or unsuccessful crop harvests.

Another important characteristic of the international system is the element of interdependence. Given the structure of the system no single nation is totally independent. Unintentionally, acts of one state may affect other states. The more powerful the national actor the greater the influence of its actions will be. It is an ironic situation of the twentieth century that the most powerful states find themselves constrained by their own power.

The international system herein described depends upon a constant, objective, communications network capable of transmitting information about the goals and probable courses of action of the various national actors.

This communications process involves both formal and informal sectors of the governments involved. The process and its concomitant assumptions about expected behavior constitute the "operational code" of modern national defense systems attempting to manage international crises. One scholar summarized the process in the following way:

A stable deterrence relationship demands a sophisticated and continuing exchange of signals and a reliability of expectations, as well as some approximate qualitative and quantitative parity in weapons systems and military technology. As accurate an image as possible of the other nation's operational code can help stabilize the deterrent relationship. The more accurately each perceives the other, the less likely either is to develop the 'wrong' weapon systems, to stockpile an inappropriate quantity of hardware, or to deploy men or material in a manner that is provocative rather than deterrent.<sup>6</sup>

The second set of questions relevant to defense planning involved the concept of power. We now turn to an examination of that concept.

### 3. The Concept of Power

The evaluation of the national power of possible adversaries has become a means for defining defense objectives. Since 1961 the American defense budget has begun with an analysis of the external threat. The most salient aspect of threat analysis is that it is based upon what the potential adversary can do rather than on what he may intend to do. One reason for this reliance in threat analysis is simply that it is easier to measure

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<sup>6</sup>Thomas W. Milburn in the foreword to J. David Singer, Studies in Deterrence VII Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: A Content Analysis of Elite Articulation.

capability than intent. Klaus Knorr has written:

. . . there are fairly accurate indices of some determinants of military potential. The size and structure of population, or the capacity for producing fuel and steel, or the dependence of nations on foreign food supplies and industrial materials . . . .<sup>7</sup>

To determine power capabilities is to significantly reduce the area of uncertainty as to what a nation will or will not do. In any state, capabilities influence the definition of goals. Hence the analysis of power may give indications of probable policy decisions. On the other hand possessing the capability to do a certain thing does not necessarily mean a state will use that potential. The Americans had a nuclear monopoly in the early fifties. They did not exploit it. Other nations have possessed advantages which they did not press. However, to plan using capabilities or potential as the sole criterion is to envision the worst possible contingency. One is assuming that intentions will be pushed to the very limit of national power. Worst case planning can give one a limited and paranoid view of the world, contributing to unnecessary hostility, and enormous defense expenditures. Ideally, of course, planning should proceed in terms of both enemy intentions and capabilities.

For many years the analysis of national power has been central to the study of international politics. However there is a distinction between traditional and contemporary criteria of national power. The traditional

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<sup>7</sup>Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 49.

elements of national power include:

(1) Geography; including the size, accessibility of the territory, climatic conditions, position with regard to powerful neighbors and barriers to transportation and communications.

(2) Population; quantity and quality. The quality of a population refers to its utility as a potential power source. Are the people organized? Are they capable of sustained effort? Do they possess technological and scientific skills?

(3) Economic support base including natural resources, industrial plant, distribution and communication facilities, and financial and commercial stability.

(4) Military power; including size of the forces, equipment, morale, training, and leadership.

(5) Political-administrative control system. This includes the ability to inspire the mass of the people in a national effort; the ability to make and execute decisions; and the ability to maintain effective communication and control over all sectors of the political system.

The nuclear age has altered the relative value of several of the traditional elements of national power. For example, geography is still an important factor in terms of size and climate, etc., but a new dimension has been added called "absorbtion capacity." That is sheer geographical size as related to the ability of a nation to absorb one or more nuclear strikes. In order to

possess a credible second strike a nation must be able to survive a massive first strike. Nations of limited geographical size have a great disadvantage in this respect. Japan, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, or Israel simply could not absorb the numbers of thermonuclear explosions that the United States, USSR, Canada, China, or other continental nations could. Other geographical factors such as distribution of population, prevailing climate patterns, and soil characteristics could also have an importance in nuclear war which they did not have previously.

While population continues to be a source of national power the character of democratic political systems and the influence of the mass media have modified the value of this factor. In recent American experiences popular dissent even by distant minorities has constrained the American political leadership and actually weakened the power position of the nation. One foreign observer has noted:

Whilst the freedom to demonstrate--even for defeatism in foreign policy--is clearly one of the strengths of a free society it is also one of its weaknesses so far as power politics is concerned.<sup>8</sup>

The foreign observer went on to point out that free speech is a vital component in a democratic system; that in the long run it alone can regulate domestic politics. But free speech " . . . is not necessarily a prime strength in the conduct of foreign policy in the short term, especially

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<sup>8</sup> Edmund Ions, "Dissent in America: The Constraints on Foreign Policy," Conflict Studies, No. 18, 1971, p. 1.



against adversaries who are not checked by opinion at home."<sup>9</sup>

A population must be committed in order to be a contribution to national power. The American experience in both Korea and Vietnam suggests the inability of the American public to sustain commitment to a long, limited war. Hence the Americans' potential for engaging in limited war is somewhat diminished as are the options of the President. A potential adversary knowing this can exploit it.

The economic base also continues to be a vital element in the calculus of national power. In fighting a limited but protracted war or in maintaining a power position in a Cold War arms race, the economic strength could be decisive. However the difference in American defense policy in the nuclear age is that we can no longer depend upon a strategy of mobilization. In past wars the United States was largely unprepared but was able to mobilize after the conflict began. Given the nature of modern weapons systems the strategy of mobilization has been replaced by the strategy of deterrence. The problem is to have an economic system that can maintain a deterrent posture for the long haul.<sup>10</sup>

The other elements of national power are essentially the same as they were before the nuclear age. Science and technology have long been important factors, though in the nuclear age the rate and scope of

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>10</sup>This was a major concern of the Eisenhower administration and a justification for the New Look strategy. See Samuel F. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) Chapter 6.

technological change is increasing. Leadership and political-administrative control continue to be vital though the modern age seems to demand greater speed in political decision making.

The final component of defense planning to be discussed here is national interest. We turn now to that rather enigmatic subject.

#### 4. Goals of American National Security Policy: The National Interest

Perhaps the most difficult and yet important aspect in American defense planning is the determination of national goals. What are we for or against? What determines our "interests" and what makes them vital? How can we understand the process of valuation? Be they explicit or hidden, simple or complex the United States Government does choose values, makes them into objectives and the sum total of these objectives at any given time may be called the National Interest.

For many years scholars have been attempting to define the national or public interest. Most of these efforts have failed because a philosophical, sociological, or historical analysis of goals cannot produce an operational definition of the national interest.

Whenever one argues for an operational definition of the national interest there is a danger that this position will degenerate into the realist-idealist debate. The realists arguing that only power or "hard data" can be considered and the idealists maintaining that the essence

of the American national interest is its commitment to certain transcendent ideas. Therefore we seek an operational definition that will include both concerns. In order to do this it may be necessary to approach the problem not in terms of values but of needs.

Several contemporary social scientists have made important contributions to the general study of values by attempting to define and structure human needs. Clyde Kluckholm has argued that there are three levels of human needs: the physiological, the social, and the individual. In the field of psychology David McClelland has suggested four basic needs: protection and support, expression and regulation for effect, mastery of external world, self-direction and control. However one of the most important schema for the study of values has been developed by Abraham H. Maslow.<sup>11</sup> Essentially Maslow has attempted to construct what he calls a needs hierarchy. The hierarchy has five levels: Level one is the survival need. This refers to the need or instinct for physical self-preservation. Level two is the safety or security need. This is protection from natural or man-made threat. Level three is the social need for belongingness or love. Level four is the need for esteem, to have others think well of you. Level five refers to the need for growth and self-actualization. While most of these theories

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<sup>11</sup>Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York: Von Nostrand, 1968).

refer to individual or group action in the valuation process they may provide insight for the process of national-interest valuation.

National security policies are means for achieving necessary or desirable ends. The implementation of any strategy requires expenditure of vast sums of money and at times lives, involves grave risks and at times great efforts. Thus a strategy involves an expenditure of values, hence strategic decisions are essentially experiences in judging the relative importance of certain values. We must presume that some values are more important than others. Hence we would spend fifty or seventy billion dollars on defense because we feel we need security more than we need the other opportunities foregone by the defense expenditure. The question then becomes one of determining the relative importance of needs. What is the criterion for making such a determination? I would argue that Maslow's needs hierarchy approach can be modified to be relevant to the national interest valuation process.

Let us look at the basic needs of the United States. Surely the most basic is to exist, to continue to exist. Hence one of the first needs and thus objectives of national security policy is the prevention of a nuclear attack upon the United States. A second need or objective is the protection of the "vital interests" of the United States. The word vital is here used to convey a range of interests upon which the existence and character of American society

depends. A third need level or category would be the maintenance of American global interests which may be defined as interests which are deemed important to the economic-political condition in the United States but which are of a lower range of importance than the "vital" interests. Thus far we have three sets of security needs or goals:

- (1) Prevention of nuclear attack upon the American nation
- (2) Protection of American vital interests, e.g. population, territory, economic and political systems, the value system, and the military and military support power base
- (3) Maintenance of the global interests of the United States, e.g. strategic balance, alliance structure, international trade structure, etc.

The parallel with Maslow's need hierarchy is fairly clear. His Level 1, survival, can be equated with our category 1 prevention of nuclear attack upon the United States. His level 2, safety and security, parallels our category 2 protection of American vital interests. His levels 3 and 4, belongingness and esteem, are social needs and can be equated with desirable relations among nations as in our category 3 maintenance of the global interests of the United States. Maslow's last category, need for growth and self-actualization, is not perceived by the United States to be primarily a function of military policy. The United States does not need physical growth or

self-actualization through conquest. Our military policy is conceived to be defensive in nature. We currently view self-actualization to lie in the realm of domestic self-fulfillment and life-enrichment.

In order to use these goal sets in a systematic analysis we must further define and rank them. If policy objectives are to have an operational utility they must be ranked and priorities must be established. What follows is a tentative ranking of the central goals of American national security policy:

#### Goals of American National Security Policy

I.	1.	Prevention of Spasm Nuclear War	(Pv SNW)
	2.	Prevention of Countervalue Attack	(Pv C-VA)
	3.	Prevention of Counterforce Attack	(Pv C-FA)
II.	4.	Protection of American Population	(Pt-pop.)
	5.	Protection of American Territory	(Pt-tor.)
	6.	Protection of American Political and Economic System	(Pt-p)
	7.	Protection of American Value System	(Pt-val)
	8.	Protection of American Military and Support	(Pt-mil)
III.	9.	Maintenance of NATO Alliance	(M-NATO)
	10.	Maintenance of Hemispheric Security	(M-H.sec.)
	11.	Maintenance of Middle East Balance of Power	(M-M.E. bal)
	12.	Maintenance of Balance of Power in Asia	(M-As. bal)
	13.	Maintenance of Security in Africa and India	(M-Af.I. sec)

Table I

As one descends the scale in table I the relative worth of the goals declines. Hence, one would be willing to modify or trade-off lesser goals for more important ones. However all goals are negotiable to a point. Given contingencies may call for trade-offs. For example, while the choice between the protection of NATO allies and the protection of American population seems at first clear, American lives have been spent to protect NATO allies in the past and might in the future. It is a matter of degree. Some American territory and/or population might be traded-off in order to secure greater safety for the rest of the nation. A policy maker might have to decide, for instance, between a limited nuclear exchange costing 20 million lives and a total nuclear war costing 180 million lives or more. Hence even vital goals are negotiable in the nuclear age.

##### 5. Deterrence as an Influence Process

Deterrence is the ability to influence someone not to do something. Positively it is persuasion. Negatively it is threat. Glenn Snyder has defined deterrence as a "species of political power," having the "capacity to induce others to do things or not to do things which they would not otherwise do or refrain from doing."<sup>12</sup> John R. Raser has noted: "At its simplest, deterrence is a means of controlling other's behavior by the threat of punishment. It is a

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<sup>12</sup>Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, No. 2, June 1960, p. 163.

ubiquitous phenomenon which obviously works."<sup>13</sup> Ithier de Sola Pool rejects the obvious value of deterrence based on threat. He agrees that deterrence is "a special case of influence" but argues that deterrence theory should either be "congruent with existing theories of influence or should specify the reason for its divergence." This scholar also cites that "most psychological experiments seem to show fear to be a relatively ineffectual force for persuasion."<sup>14</sup>

Thomas W. Milburn argues for both a negative deterrence and "at the same time determining positively through increasing the pay-off (and the likelihood of success to them) for every step in other directions . . . ." He further maintains that this would seem in accord with learning and decision theory.<sup>15</sup> The point here is that deterrence is a very complex process. In the recent past in the field of national security affairs deterrence has depended upon threat. However, evidence from other fields suggests the possibility of more positive options as the international situation changes.

Since 1945 nuclear deterrence has become a major element in strategic planning. Nuclear deterrence depends

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<sup>13</sup>John R. Raser, "Deterrence Research: Past Progress and Future Needs" (China Lake: U. S. Naval Ordnance Testing Station, Contract No. N60530-11242).

<sup>14</sup>Ithier de Sola Pool, Studies in Deterrence (Project Michelson); Deterrence as an Influence Process (China Lake: U. S. Naval Ordnance Testing Station, 1965), p. 3.

<sup>15</sup>Thomas W. Milburn, "What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. III, No. 2, pp. 138-144. Also see Milburn's Studies in Deterrence (Project Michelson), Design for the Study of Deterrent Process (China Lake: U. S. Naval Ordnance Testing Station, 1964).



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exclusively upon fear. Notwithstanding the evidence from psychology and learning theory the development of nuclear deterrence has become the basis of stability in an extremely unstable environment. One of the destabilizing elements of the contemporary international system has been technological change. Ironically it has not been the technology of nuclear weapons which has brought about instability in the nuclear balance. Rather it has been the development of intercontinental delivery systems.<sup>16</sup>

Deterrence is not a thing or a stage to be achieved, rather it is an on-going communications process. It is dynamic and relative with respect to actors and situational context. It is subject to changing global conditions, technological developments, breakthroughs in weapons systems, shifts in the economic base of the nation which must support the defense program, and changes in the political-administrative leadership which must direct it.

Among nation states deterrence is essentially a political process in that it is an attempt to influence or control another actor. It is assumed to be goal-rational. It is usually negative terms, that is, it seeks to prevent a given act. Prevention of an act requires power, hence the study of deterrence is a form of power analysis. Though power is the substance behind deterrence its actual use in armed conflict means that

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<sup>16</sup>Arnold M. Kuzmack, "Technological Change and Stable Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 309-317.

deterrence has failed. Thus in deterrence the application of power is limited to threat.

Threat analysis therefore constitutes a large part of the study of deterrence. The threat must be credible, and must be able to influence the other actor by fear of punishment for a given act or by fear of failure in a given undertaking. Glenn Snyder refers to this as deterrence by denial and punishment.

In military affairs deterrence by denial is accomplished by having military forces which can block the enemy's military forces from making territorial gains. Deterrence by punishment grants him the gain but deters by posing the prospect of war costs greater than the value of the gain.<sup>17</sup>

Elsewhere Snyder distinguishes deterrence from defense.

He writes:

The central Theoretical Problem in the field of National Security Policy is to clarify and distinguish between the two central concepts of deterrence and defense. Essentially, deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain. Defense means reducing our own prospective costs and risks in the event deterrence fails. Deterrence works on enemy intentions . . . . Defense reduces the enemy's capability to damage or deprive us.<sup>18</sup>

Snyder would agree with the broader definition of deterrence. He argues that "deterrence is a function of the total cost-gain expectations of the party to be deterred . . . ." <sup>19</sup> Several scholars have constructed

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<sup>17</sup>Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power," op. cit., p. 163.

<sup>18</sup>Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 3.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

models of the deterrence process. These models are in the form of a rational calculus comparing goals, objectives, and costs. Snyder argues that the potential cost of enemy acts may be divided into two sets: intrinsic or end values and power or instrumental values. He concludes:

. . . the total value of a response . . . is the sum of the power values and intrinsic values which can be saved or gained by the response, minus the power values and intrinsic values lost as the result of war casualties and damage.<sup>20</sup>

In any situation there is a wide range of deterrent strategies from which a policy maker may choose. The range of his options is a function of power, position, weapons system, domestic support, and a host of other things. To be sure, his choice should be conditioned as Snyder and others point out by the value of the objectives and the cost and risk of acting or not acting. Yet there are other considerations that may also play an important part in the decision. Power is local and one state may have more total power but not have it at the right place at the right time. Or a military commitment to secure one objective could leave one in a weakened position to defend a more valuable objective elsewhere. A deterrence calculus which approaches the state of becoming a general theory is dangerous and doomed to failure because the variables and the context of national security change so quickly. All one can do to make intelligible what would

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 31-33. Also see Clinton F. Fink, "More Calculations about Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IX, No. 1, pp. 55-65.

otherwise be intellectual chaos is to first, assume nations act according to their perceptions of their self-interest and second, attempt to understand their operational code, power position, national needs and objectives. Deterrence strategy, then, is determined not by the analysts but by the environment in which that policy develops. That environment includes the domestic sector of each actor as well as the international sector as a whole.

## 6. Strategic Options

In view of the political realities of the American democratic process, the nature of the Cold War, the attitude of the American public toward the military, and the development of nuclear weapons systems, there are currently three general sets of strategies available to American defense planners. These are denial, punishment, and mixed strategies. The denial strategies are built around the use of large conventional forces. There is some dispute as to whether or not these forces may be armed with limited tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet literature argues that the employment of such weapons would escalate the conflict out of the conventional range. The American strategists disagree. I will assume that denial forces could employ nuclear weapons in such a manner so as to deny the objective to a would-be aggressor and yet not attempt to punish him by destroying his homeland.

The punishment strategies rely almost entirely upon thermonuclear weapons to punish acts of aggression

by inflicting unacceptable damage on the aggressor's homeland. The most complete statement of the punishment strategies was made by John Foster Dulles in his instant and massive retaliation doctrine. Before the Soviets achieved nuclear sufficiency the central problem of defense planning had been one of selecting an appropriate target system to insure deterrence. The concept used to measure the effectiveness of a deterrence system has been the assured destruction capacity (hereafter A.D.C.). The A.D.C. has been defined by Secretary McNamara as the "ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor--even after absorbing a surprise attack."<sup>21</sup> The criteria as to what constitutes sufficient assured destruction capacity is admittedly subjective. How much destruction is sufficient to deter? In World War II the Soviets suffered 10% population destruction without surrendering. Currently it is assumed that the capacity to destroy 30% of the Soviet population and 50% of their industry is sufficient to deter them from launching a nuclear strike on the United States.

Mixed strategies are attempts to employ either or both denial and punishment tactics as the situation warrants. These require both conventional and nuclear forces and a flexible attitude on the part of policy makers. There is always a danger that a mixed strategy will lose

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<sup>21</sup>Statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara on FY 1969 Program and Budget (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 56-59.

its limited and controlled character under the pressure of war and the demand for victory.

The choice of which set of strategies is employed in the pursuit of national security has startling consequences in American foreign and domestic policy. For example if the United States were committed to a denial strategy a Soviet move into Western Europe would need to be countered by a large land force using conventional weapons and requiring sustained air and sealift and other support facilities. In order for this force to be of sufficient size so as to deny the Soviets their objective the United States would have to maintain a much larger standing army than at any time since 1945. Also larger numbers of American troops would need to be garrisoned in Europe. The domestic effects of these policies would include larger defense budgets, continuing balance of payment deficits, and a hose of other problems.

If on the other hand a punishment strategy were chosen a Soviet move into Western Europe would be countered by a massive nuclear strike against Soviet targets. This in turn would invite a nuclear strike on the American homeland. The constraints facing the policy maker in the first instance are mainly economic and political, in the second national survival.

For many social, political, and economic reasons (which have been discussed in part I of this paper) American policy makers since the end of World War II have selected punishment strategies. This was feasible,

credible, and relatively economical during the period of American atomic and nuclear superiority 1945-55. The punishment strategies were however provocative, spurring an arms race which brought the Soviets to clear nuclear parity in 1969.<sup>22</sup> As noted in cases of medium aggression or before, with parity, punishment credibility declines. The threat of massive nuclear retaliation failed to deter North Korea or North Vietnam and only at the brink of holocaust deterred the Russians from placing missiles in Cuba. It has become clear to all that too great a reliance on punishment strategy is no longer acceptable.

The solution is not simply to switch to denial strategies. Each set has rather serious flaws.

Pure denial strategies have the following drawbacks:

1. Conventional forces are very expensive to train and maintain, much more expensive than nuclear forces.

2. Conventional forces are also very unpopular. The American nation is intolerant of peacetime drafts and large standing armies. A large professional army itself might constitute a social-political risk. Indeed there are many who doubt that a democracy can long survive as a quasi-garrison state.

3. Denial strategies would require large numbers of American troops abroad. This brings on a host of problems such as balance of payments, garrison incidents, and

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<sup>22</sup>The Military Balance 1971-72, op. cit., p. 56.



the like.

4. Public opinion in a democracy is not likely to support a limited conventional war of long duration. This is at least partially exemplified by the Vietnam experience.

5. Finally, the Soviet and Chinese nuclear capabilities detract from the sufficiency of reliance on conventional force. It stands to reason that in any ultimate conflict the probability is great that nuclear weapons would be used (to avoid defeat) and the conventional forces thereby rendered impotent.

These considerations constitute very significant constraints upon reliance on denial strategies.

On the other hand punishment strategies also have drawbacks:

1. While punishment strategies are less expensive and demand far less in manpower and hence in political capital, they are infinitely more dangerous than denial strategies. Should denial deterrence fail a conventional war might ensue which would be unfortunate, but not catastrophic. On the other hand, if punishment deterrence fails a nuclear war might result with a range of damage extending from the stone age to oblivion.

2. Nuclear deterrence alone does not give the policy maker sufficient flexibility to act in a crisis and once the nuclear threshold is crossed there is even less decision-room for maneuver.

3. Nuclear deterrence does not deter below the

level of a general attack on the United States because the credibility of such a grave threat is open to challenge on lower level conflicts.

4. World public opinion is opposed to the introduction of nuclear weapons into either policy or actual conflict.

5. Crossing the nuclear threshold is provocative, to say the least, and invites horrible retaliation.

### 3. Strategic Options and National Goals

To implement any national strategy the appropriate military forces must be developed and maintained. To a great extent the nature and flexibility of military forces available influences the military options hence the strategic options of a nation. No single strategy or military option can achieve all of our national objectives. Nor can we or any nation afford all of the strategies. Hence there is what Dr. Kissinger called the necessity of choice to determine what goals we will pursue and what means we will use.

In order to rationally choose among the many strategic options we have divided the possibilities into three general areas:

- A. Military options for the implementation of denial strategies
- B. Military options for the implementation of punishment strategies

C. Military options for the implementation of mixed strategies

The listing of options will be treated in terms of force requirement since force levels in existence determine the options.

The options within the denial strategy category are:

1. large general purpose forces (without nuclear weapons) (LGPF)
2. medium general purpose forces (specializing in sealift and airlift capabilities) (MGPF)
3. collective security alliance (without nuclear weapons) (CSA)
4. medium general purpose forces with very limited tactical nuclear weapons (MGPF-N)

The options within the punishment strategy category

are:

1. primary reliance on nuclear weapons deployed with city-sparing strategy, i.e. targeted against enemy military targets, but not those in cities. This strategy gives high priority to keeping civilian destruction at a minimum. (C-S)
2. primary reliance on nuclear weapons deployed with counterforce strategy, i.e. targeting enemy military targets regardless of civilian damage minimal conventional forces (CF)
3. primary reliance on nuclear weapons deployed with countervalue strategy, i.e. targeting

enemy civilian centers and value laden objects.

Minimal conventional forces (CV)

4. reliance on total nuclear weapons deployed as an all-out massive retaliation or spasm nuclear response against the enemy (Spasm)
5. doomsday strategy of automatic release of total destructive capacity upon being attacked. The ultimate weapon, destroying mankind (Doom)

Between these two categories are the mixed strategies which employ both conventional and nuclear weapons. Their primary drawbacks for the United States are political: i.e. they are expensive requiring both conventional forces and a total range from tactical to massive strategic nuclear weapons. The expense is on-going in conventional force maintenance and research and development of new nuclear weapons. The economy can produce it, but the question is one of priorities. Long-term, or "peace-time" defense spending is unpopular and therefore politically difficult. These policies also have the disadvantage of being complex, i.e. of not providing the simple solution the American people long for.

The options in the mixed strategy category are:

1. Deliberate, selective, controlled response (D.S.C.) requires medium conventional forces with sealift and airlift capabilities and a total spectrum of nuclear weapons. This is similar to Kennedy's flexible response.
2. Nuclear sharing force similar to the present

NATO alliance but giving several nations control over nuclear weapons (another similar structure was the MLF, Multi-Lateral Force). There would also be conventional forces with tactical nuclear weapons. (NSF)

In order to facilitate comparison and analysis we have arranged the above military options in order from total reliance on conventional forces (denial strategies) to total reliance on nuclear forces (punishment strategies). This ordering also represents the progressive gravity of the weapons systems.

#### Military Options

1. large general purpose forces	(LGPF)
2. medium general purpose forces (sea and airlift)	(MGPF)
3. collective security alliance	(CSA)
4. medium general purpose forces (with tactical nuclear)	(MGPF-N)
5. deliberate, selective controlled response	(DSC)
6. nuclear sharing force	(NSF)
7. city-sparing strategy	(C-S)
8. counterforce strategy	(C-F)
9. countervalue strategy	(C-V)
10. spasm nuclear response	(spasm)
11. doomsday response	(doom)

Table II

Possible costs in the form of risks increase as

one goes down the scale (1-11). Costs in terms of economic-financial resources and political and social control tend to decrease as one goes down the scale (1-11). Thus an optimum strategy must be the result of trade-offs in which certain levels of cost and risk are balanced in some kind of acceptable policy. Theoretically the mixed strategies (#5 and 6) provide the best method to balance cost and risk and yet provide flexibility and security.

An adequate deterrence strategy be it by denial, punishment or a mixture of both should have certain important policy characteristics. It must be feasible, i.e. it must be technologically and politically possible. These are two very different kinds of feasibility and so must be treated differently. It must be credible, i.e. the enemy must believe you will actually carry out your threat if they carry out their plans or they will not be deterred. Different levels of threat apply to different levels of aggression. Therefore we have designated "credibility major" to refer to major or large-scale aggression and "credibility minor" to be applicable to minor aggression. Thus massive nuclear retaliation might be "credible major" but is not "credible minor." It must be survivable, i.e. your retaliatory weapons must be able to survive a successful enemy first strike. It must be reliable, i.e. the system employed must be able to achieve the destruction planned. It must be flexible, i.e. multiple options exist to allow for appropriate response to enemy action.

It must be economical, i.e. within the cost-range the American public and Congress will tolerate. It must be sufficient, i.e. provide a threat great enough to deter the enemy. And it must be non-provocative, i.e. clearly defensive in nature so as not to itself provoke aggression or escalation.<sup>23</sup> These attributes, while all desirable, vary in importance so may also be ranked:

#### Policy Attributes

Feasible--Technologically	(F-T)
Credible--Major	(C-Maj.)
Credible--Minor	(C-Min.)
Survivable	(Sur)
Reliable	(R)
Flexible	(F)
Feasible--Politically	(F-P)
Economical	(E)
Sufficient	(Suf)
Non-provocative	(N-p)

Table III

While the ranking is somewhat subjective it is believed that it could be defended on logical grounds. However it is also recognized that the ranking does not rest upon hard evidence. Thus far we have described certain key elements in the analysis of deterrence theory. We have defined three general ways to deter, denial, punishment, and mixed strategies.

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<sup>23</sup>Hitch and McKeon, op. cit., pp. 333-357.

We have looked at some of the costs, constraints, and risks involved in any choice. We now come to the point of deciding among them.

One would usually measure the effectiveness of a program by assessing its success in achieving its objective against the cost and risk involved. However at the onset of the present problem we find that many strategic options run counter to the stated goals. For example a total nuclear war, or a purely countervalue strategy, or a doomsday machine produces the very thing we wish to prevent. If one is serious about the objective of saving lives one cannot rationally opt for a spasm nuclear war.

In order to limit the range of strategies the policy maker must consider, we have constructed a matrix which attempts to show the incompatibility of certain strategic options with stated goals. The strategies, from table II, are arranged on the horizontal axis beginning with conventional weapons system strategies and moving on to nuclear and finally total nuclear strategies. They range from one to eleven. Combining the goals in table I and the desired attributes of strategy in table III we have the twenty-three items of the goal/attribute axis of the matrix.

From the matrix it is clear that either extreme of the range of strategic options is not acceptable. While a doomsday machine would be technologically feasible and economical it would be incompatible with the protection or maintenance of American interests. On the



## Incompatibility Matrix

Goals/ Attributes	Strategic Options										
	1. IGPF	2. IGPF	3. CSA	4. MGPF-N	5. DSC	6. NSF	7. CSS	8. CFS	9. CVS	10. Spasm	11. Doom
1. Pv SNW	X	X	X	X							
2. Pv C-VA	X	X	X	X							
3. Pv C-FA	X	X	X	X			X	X			
4. Pt Pop	X	X	X	X					X	X	X
5. Pt Ter	X	X	X						X	X	X
6. Pt P - E	X	X	X						X	X	X
7. Pt Val	X	X	X						X	X	X
8. Pt Mil	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X
9. M NATO	X	X	X					X	X	X	X
10. M H. Sec	X	X	X			X		X	X	X	X
11. M ME Bal	X	X	X					X	X	X	X
12. M As Bal	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X
13. M Af.I. Sec	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
14. F-T											
15. C-Maj.	X	X	X	X							
16. C-Inr.							X	X	X	X	X
17. Sur	X	X	X	X							
18. Rel	X			X		X					
19. Flex	X	X	X						X	X	X
20. F-P	X					X				X	X
21. Econ	X	X	X	X	X	X					
22. Suf	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X
23. N-p						X			X	X	X

X--indicates the strategic option does not aid or actually hinders achievement of the goal.

From the matrix it is clear that either extreme of the range of strategic options is not acceptable. While a doomsday machine would be technologically feasible and economical it would be incompatible with the protection or maintenance of American interests. On the other hand, large general purpose forces while non-provocative are neither politically feasible nor economical nor do they offer any protection against a nuclear enemy. The matrix also reveals that most of the strategies are incompatible with at least some stated national goals. Further we see there are no strategies in perfect accord with all the goals. Assuming that all goals are equal (which they are not) we can choose strategies that are in best general accord with the stated goals. Using this somewhat subjective method we find the following three strategies are the most compatible:

1. Strategy #5: Deliberate, Selective, and Controlled Response strategies
2. Strategy #6: Nuclear Sharing Force or Collective Security and Alliance Systems with limited nuclear weapons
3. Strategy #7: Total Nuclear Force with City-Sparing Employment strategies

It should be emphasized that this matrix has been constructed for heuristic purposes. It is meant to demonstrate the feasibility of employing rational decision making techniques in national security policy. This particular

ranking of goals and judgment of compatibility are tentative and suggestive rather than authoritative. Such a matrix could well be constructed using the "Delphi Technique" of correlating rankings requested from perhaps 100 leading men in the national security field. A more accurate picture of compatibility could also be gained by scaling compatibility from - 1.0  $\rightarrow$   $\frac{1}{7}$  1.0 instead of using either/or markings.

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Note: A method for using the results of the Delphi Technique and elementary decisions theory to find the best strategy is presented in Appendix II.

## Appendix II

What follows is an attempt to develop a methodology to determine the best choice among several strategic options given certain goals. This undertaking is tentative and is not yet backed up with field research. It is presented here as a possible method to be included in the study.

\* \* \* \*

In order to prepare the data for analysis we will divide the national goals into three sets, Prevention, Protection, and Maintenance:

A. Prevention Set

- 4 (1) Spasmodic Nuclear War
- 1 (2) Controlled Nuclear War
- 2 (3) Nuclear City Attack
- 1 (4) Countervalue Salvo

B. Protection Set

- 4 (1) American Population
- 1 (2) American Territory
- 1 (3) Political and Economic System
- 2 (4) Military and Military Support System
- 1 (5) Value System

C. Maintenance Set

- 4 (1) NATO Alliance
- 2 (2) OAS System
- 2 (3) Middle East Balance of Power
- 1 (4) Status Quo in Africa and the Indian Subcontinent
- 2 (5) Asian Balance of Power

We may now calculate preference rankings among the three best strategies as they relate to each of the policy goal sets. Arriving at preference rankings is another step in which the Delphi Technique could be utilized to advantage.

In the following tables strategy #1 is the Nuclear Sharing force; strategy #2 is City-Sparing strategy; strategy #3 is Deliberate, Selective, Controlled Response.

Preference Ranking

Prevention Set

	1	2	3	4
1	3	3	2	2
2	2	2	3	3
3	1	1	1	1

Protection Set

	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	1	1	1	2
2	3	3	3	3	3
3	1	2	2	2	1

		Maintenance Set				
		1	2	3	4	5
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3	3	3	3

Another variable to be considered is the utility value of strategies 1, 2, and 3. Specifically, we are ranking the utility of each strategy in achieving each policy goal. Whereas the preference ranking compared strategies with each other, utility rankings are determinations of the value of each strategy in achieving each goal. The utility value is measured on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0:

Utility Ranking (Scale 0 - 1.00)

		Prevention Set			
		1	2	3	4
1	.6	.6	.2	.2	
2	.8	.8	.9	.99	
3	.7	.7	.5	.9	

		Protection Set				
		1	2	3	4	5
1	.2	.3	.2	.8	.2	
2	.9	.5	.01	.001	.8	
3	.8	.9	.8	.4	.6	

	Maintenance Set				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	.95	.95	.95	.7	.9
2	.8	.3	.2	.3	.2
3	.7	.4	.6	.3	.5

One can also rank the probability of one strategy securing a given goal or objective. These probabilities are given in ranges that are somewhat subjective, however they are also related to solid empirical research in some cases and/or logic in other cases. For the purposes of this demonstration that is sufficient. The probability rankings are as follows. The scale 0.0 - 1.0 is used.

Probability Ranking

	Prevention Set			
	1	2	3	4
1	(.4 - .7)	(.5 - .7)	(.2 - .5)	(.2 - .5)
2	(.8 - .95)	(.6 - .8)	(.9 - .95)	(.7 - .9)
3	(.7 - .85)	(.8 - .9)	(.8 - .9)	(.9 - .95)

	Protection Set				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	(.5 - .7)	(.6 - .8)	(.5 - .6)	(.1 - .2)	(.1 - .2)
2	(.7 - .9)	(.1 - .4)	(.7 - .9)	(.01 - .3)	(.9 - .95)
3	(.9 - .95)	(.9 - .95)	(.9 - .95)	(.5 - .7)	(.5 - .8)

## Maintenance Set

	1	2	3	4	5
1	(.9 - .95)	(.6 - .85)	(.8 - .9)	(.6 - .7)	(.8 - .9)
2	(.7 - .8)	(.5 - .7)	(.7 - .8)	(.4 - .6)	(.5 - .6)
3	(.6 - .8)	(.3 - .5)	(.5 - .6)	(.3 - .5)	(.2 - .3)

Further, in order to complete our ranking process we can construct a bounded expected utility ranking. To do this it is necessary to weight the policy goal sets by their importance. This ranking is the product of utility and probability and forms the basis of the final rankings needed.



Bounded Expected Utility Ranking

Prevention Set (3)

	1(3)	2(1)	3(1)	4(1)	
1	(.24 - .42)	(.30 - .42)	(.04 - .10)	(.04 - .10)	<u>.16 - .28</u>
2	(.64 - .76)	(.48 - .64)	(.81 - .855)	(.69 - .90)	<u>.67 - .79</u>
3	(.49 - .595)	(.56 - .63)	(.40 - .45)	(.81 - .855)	<u>.52 - .60</u>

Protection Set (2)

	1(3)	2(1)	3(1)	4(2)	5(1)	
1	(.10 - .14)	(.18 - .24)	(.10 - .16)	(.08 - .16)	(.02 - .04)	<u>.10 - .15</u>
2	(.63 - .81)	(.05 - .20)	(.007-.009)	(.00001 - .0003 )	(.72 - .76)	<u>.33 - .43</u>
3	(.72 - .76)	(.81 - .855)	(.72 - .76)	(.20 - .28)	(.30 - .48)	<u>.55 - .62</u>

Maintenance Set (1)


	1(3)	2(2)	3(2)	4(1)	5(2)	
1	(.855-.90)	(.57 - .807)	(.76 - .855)	(.42 - .49)	(.72 - .81)	<u>.71 - .81</u>
2	(.56 - .64)	(.15 - .21)	(.14 - .16)	(.12 - .18)	(.10 - .12)	<u>.26 - .31</u>
3	(.42 - .56)	(.12 - .20)	(.30 - .36)	(.09 - .15)	(.10 - .15)	<u>.24 - .33</u>

In each set above the fifth and underlined column represents the weighted bounded expected utility of each strategy within each goal set. For this it was necessary to weight each goal by importance. The weights assigned are in parentheses next to the goal numbers.

The final step is to compare strategies not only within each goal set, as above, but in relation to all three goal sets. This is done by weighting the goal sets as well. These weights appear in parentheses next to the goal set. The result is the weighted bounded expected utility by strategy and goal set:

Strategy 1	.22 - .32
Strategy 2	.52 - .62
Strategy 3	.49 - .55

The choice among these three is made clearer by their graphic representation:



Using the concept of minimax regret it becomes clear that the optimal strategy is #2 or a nuclear force with a city-sparing employment.

It is again to be stressed that the foregoing is merely a demonstration of the contribution certain quantitative techniques can make in rational decision making. I do not present these figures and weights, etc., as authoritative, but simply as heuristic tools.

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