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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**AN EXAMINATION OF THE COLLATERAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL DAMAGE
OF DRONE WARFARE IN THE FATA REGION
OF PAKISTAN**

by

Judson J. Dengler

September 2013

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Fathali Moghaddam
David Brannan

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**AN EXAMINATION OF THE COLLATERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
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PAKISTAN**

Judson J. Dengler
Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge, United States Secret Service
M.S., University of Baltimore, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2013**

Author: Judson J. Dengler

Approved by: Fathali Moghaddam
Thesis Advisor

David Brannan
Second Reader

Mohammed Hafez, PhD
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This research will examine the collateral psychological and political damage of the United States drone warfare program on Pakistani society in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), to determine if this is an effective proactive homeland defense tactic. The use of drone aircraft by the United States government has increased worldwide since this evolving technology was first utilized in 2001. Each drone strike impacts militants, noncombatants, and ordinary civilians. The potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties may overshadow the tactical gain of even successful drone strikes by inspiring radicalization, and creating recruiting opportunities for militants.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
LeT	Lashkar-e-Tayiba
NIE	National Intelligence Estimation
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis examines the impact of drone warfare in the FATA region of Pakistan and the impact it has on society. It will focus on the collateral psychological and political damage within the FATA region when drone strikes occur. Each drone strike impacts militants, non-combatants among the general population, and innocent civilians. The potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties may overshadow the tactical gain by inspiring radicalization and recruitment of militants. The operational successes and failures of this program will be assessed to make policy recommendations about future drone use.

B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The purpose of this research will be to analyze the collateral psychological and political damage of drone warfare on the Pakistani population, and use these findings to make policy recommendations about future drone use. It will begin with an overall tactical assessment of the program's successes and failures from the standpoint of the U.S. military. The collateral psychological and political impact will then be assessed through the theoretical lens of such frameworks as displaced aggression, honor and shame, learned helplessness, narcissistic rage, and love of death. Are these feelings and behaviors inflamed by drone tactics, and does this diminish the value of drone warfare? The proposed results of this research are recommendations on how to best leverage drones, while minimizing the negative collateral psychological and political impact.

By researching U.S. drone warfare in Pakistan, I will analyze this tactic as an effective proactive strategy that defends U.S. interests abroad, and prevents future threats from reaching the homeland. Little attention has been given to the long-term collateral psychological and political impact that drone strikes have had on the overall stability of the region, and whether the drone campaign is truly diminishing the capabilities of al-Qaeda or the Taliban. The flow of radicals waiting to take the place of those killed by drones seems to be endless, and should make us question whether drone strikes are an

effective method of fighting militant groups. There is evidence that drone strikes inspire recruitment, retaliation, and further radicalization of the population but these behaviors may have occurred independent of the drone program. I will seek to determine if the value of drone strikes in protecting American lives outweighs the negative reactions in the Islamic world that retaliate against U.S. interests. The strong influence of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in FATA makes neutral and reliable sources of information difficult to find in this region.

Analysis of this topic is necessary, because drone technology will be with us throughout the foreseeable future, and will remain an attractive military and foreign policy option. Research from a psychological and political perspective is an original method to determine the effectiveness of this new and continually evolving technology. Some officials in the U.S. State Department and National Security Council state that many of the drone strikes against low-level targets are counterproductive, because these militants are easily replaceable and not worth the civilian casualties that destabilize the Pakistani government. Many question whether the U.S. can kill its way out of the problem without sufficient regard for military or diplomatic repercussions in the region.

This research will assess the policy challenge of U.S. drone warfare to determine its strengths and weaknesses as it is currently being employed. Can this policy be improved based on the study of the collateral psychological and political damage drone strikes inflict on the people of FATA? In the conclusion, this thesis will make recommendations to strengthen drone warfare by focusing on the tactical advantage it provides, and devising strategies to minimize the negative affect on the Pakistani people. It provides decision makers a framework of when to leverage drones and what situations are not conducive to drone strikes when their negative potential outweighs potential tactical gain.

1. Description of Method

a. Sample

This research studies both the U.S. drone warfare program in Pakistan and the collateral psychological and political impact it has had on the local people. It will

begin with a review of the overall tactical successes and failures of the drone warfare policy that has been leveraged by the U.S. military and intelligence community, to counter al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the region. Then the specific impact on the Pakistani people, predominantly in the FATA region, will be analyzed from a psychological and political framework. Using the tactical assessment as a foundation, the collateral psychological and political damage will then be utilized to make policy recommendations on how to improve drone warfare.

In order to determine how to improve drone warfare policy, it is imperative to understand the current use of drones. We cannot improve existing policy without understanding it, and examining its results. What are the pros and cons of leveraging drones from a tactical perspective? Is this program successful in targeting al-Qaeda and Taliban militants? The study of drone warfare will provide a foundation from which to assess the impact of drones on the Pakistani people and make policy recommendations on how to best utilize drones.

Analyzing the collateral psychological and political affects of drone strikes on the Pakistani people is a unique way to determine the effectiveness of drone warfare. To date, little psychological or political research has been conducted on this relatively new and rapidly evolving technology. There continues to be a great deal of debate as to whether drone strikes are eliminating militancy in the region or just creating and inspiring retaliation, recruitment, and further radicalization. Study of the Pakistani population may go a long way in determining the answer to this question and give U.S. decision makers key information on how to improve drone policy.

b. Data Sources

Locating sources of data for this thesis will be challenging because the drone warfare program is classified, and the U.S. does not officially comment on operations or policy. Since most drone strikes occur in the FATA region of Pakistan, obtaining accurate and unbiased reporting is difficult, if not impossible, because of the

heavy influence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Statistics and facts are easily manipulated by the different competing sides because reliable and neutral sources are not able to access the region.

Scholarly sources will be utilized to analyze the tactical effectiveness of drone warfare. A small group of academics have begun reviewing U.S. drone strategy as world scrutiny has increased in recent years. Andrew Foust has provided multiple journal articles for this research and Williams (2010) provides valuable analysis. The collateral psychological and political damage analysis will also be based on scholarly sources. Topics such as displaced aggression, honor and shame, learned helplessness, narcissistic rage, and love of death have been researched extensively, and will be utilized to assess the impact of drones on the Pakistani people. The Pew Research Center and New America Foundation poll show negative feelings toward the U.S. and its drone program, which may be indicative of these sentiments among FATA residents and Pakistanis. Newspaper articles will provide specific information about recent drone strikes including pieces by Ken Dilanian of the Los Angeles Times. Sources such as these will be the basis of individual case studies of particular drone strikes and a depiction of the resulting impact.

The New America Foundation, and in particular Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, has been researching drone warfare in the FATA region over the last few years. New America Foundation provides relevant and non-partisan statistics used by many academics that are also studying drone warfare and will provide the majority of the statistical analysis for this research. This includes a public opinion poll of FATA residents about political issues relative to U.S. operations in the region. New America Foundation also maintains a current data base tracking U.S. drone strikes and their impact in FATA.

2. Type and Mode of Analysis

This research will utilize qualitative research to determine the collateral psychological and political damage of drone warfare on the Pakistani people, and how to use these findings to improve future leveraging of drones to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

This process will begin with an assessment of U.S. drone warfare in the FATA region of Pakistan. It will review the tactical successes and failures of the program to determine if drone strikes are having an overall negative or positive effect on militancy in the region. What about drones has worked, what has not worked and what still needs to be studied? This area will also analyze who is being targeted and why. Do certain militants need to be targeted more or less aggressively? Is the intrusion into Pakistan, potential for collateral damage and risk to non-combatants justified?

The emphasis will then be directed to the collateral psychological and political impact of drones on the Pakistani people. Do drone strikes further the radicalization, recruitment, and retaliation of militants, or does this strategy actually deter and even eliminate militancy in the region? Topics such as love of death, narcissistic rage, learned helplessness, and displaced aggression will be reviewed to determine their relevance within the Pakistani population as a result of U.S. drone strategy. Do the tactical successes of drone strikes outweigh the potential for negative collateral psychological or political factors?

The goal of this research is to conduct an evaluation of the collateral psychological and political damage of drone warfare that yields policy recommendations for decision makers. Policy recommendations will seek to address the following questions: How can drone policy be changed to more effectively target militants and minimize the negative impact on non-combatants, or is the current policy the best possible use of drones? When is the appropriate time to leverage a drone strike? What is the optimal situation to leverage a drone strike against an appropriate target? What facts and circumstances must be considered to ensure the drone strike is worth the potential consequences?

a. Output

The ultimate output of this analysis will be policy recommendations based on the collateral psychological and political damage of U.S. drone warfare in Pakistan. A comprehensive tactical review of current drone policy, based on its strengths and weaknesses, will precede the psychological and political analysis to provide a solid foundation for evaluation. Drone technology is rapidly being utilized and improved to fight militants worldwide. This thesis will examine current drone strategy using a psychological and political framework to improve policy by determining the optimal situation to leverage a drone strike and improve tactics to minimize collateral damage.

3. Policy Analysis

a. Problem and Alternative Solutions

Since 9/11, drone technology has been increasingly utilized by the U.S. military and intelligence community to target Taliban and al-Qaeda militants. Critics of drone policy claim that it inspires retaliation, radicalization, and recruitment of militants, while proponents argue that drones strikes are an ethical self-defense strategy. Using a psychological and political framework, this thesis will analyze current drone policy to determine the optimal situations of when to leverage drone strikes and how to minimize collateral damage.

Following is a list of alternative solutions:

- Continue or escalate current drone policy, without regard to collateral psychological and political analysis. “Kill your way to success” believing a successfully targeted militant, regardless of value, justifies collateral damage and non-combatant casualties.
- Revise current drone policy based on psychological and political factors to determine when to leverage drones and how to best ensure minimal collateral damage and casualties.
- Seek greater Pakistani involvement in the program to ultimately have them involved in targeting and operations. Some researchers have advocated the program being a completely Pakistani operation since the majority of targets are within their nation.

- Declassify the program so the U.S. government can be more open about the program in order to gain the support of the Pakistani people. The U.S. could then discuss the efforts they undertake to minimize collateral impact and make their case for targeting specific militants.
- The U.S. could abandon the drone program all together and resort to non-lethal measures to proactively defend its interests in the region.

b. Tentative Solution

The most obvious criteria to judge success would be how many civilians or non-combatants are killed or injured during a drone strike. How much collateral damage can be attributed to an individual strike? A more difficult criterion to assess may be why the militant was targeted. Was the militant a high-value target, and was the potential risk of a drone strike justified? The problem with these methods is that the U.S. drone warfare program is classified and officials will not officially comment on policy or operations. Also, the FATA region of Pakistan is dominated by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, accurate reporting is nearly impossible. Another area to judge existing policy is by looking at the violence levels of militants following a drone strike. The problem with this method is that many other variables may influence a militant's desire to launch an attack.

In light of collateral psychological and political factors that probably inspire retaliation, recruitment, and radicalization, U.S. drone policy should target mid- to high-level militants. Why put non-combatants and civilians at risk to target an easily replaceable militant who lacks command and control capability? Drones should remain a tactic in the region and not a predominate policy. Killing all militants will only go so far in ending violence and bringing stability to the region. Pakistani cooperation is vital to the long-term effectiveness of this program. Drones have a place in the proactive defense of the homeland, we need to determine when drones can be utilized to their maximum potential to ensure success and mitigate potential risk to the innocent.

C. PARAMETERS AND LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH

The primary focus of this research will examine the collateral psychological and political impact of U.S. drone warfare in the FATA region of Pakistan, in order to determine if this strategy is effective in proactively defending the U.S. homeland and our

interests worldwide. It will conclude with recommendations to policy makers about how to improve this tactic as the U.S. begins to contemplate further deployment of this developing technology to combat emerging asymmetric militant warfare and insurgency. This will be a starting point from which to evaluate the impact that each drone strike has on the people in the affected region, including civilians, non-combatants, and the militants that are targeted. The research will identify the collateral psychological and political factors associated with drone strikes, but does not examine the legality or morality of such tactics. This thesis will not yield the absolute solution to how to effectively leverage drones against militants without inspiring further radicalization or recruitment that reduces the overall value of drone warfare. The intention of this research is to stimulate discussion about the collateral psychological and political impact that drones have in FATA, and the significance of these factors when homeland security policy-makers contemplate future drone campaigns.

D. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will begin with a literature review of drone warfare in FATA and the collateral psychological and political impact it has on the region. The researcher will remain objective and not let existing perspectives and findings bias data collection. The literature review (Chapter II) will serve as an analytic tool and be the basis for future chapters. The purpose of this literature review will be to provide well-rounded sources of information to enable the researcher to begin questioning and comparing data. It will also provide the researcher with theoretical sampling.

Chapter III of this thesis will address the political, social, and cultural significance of Pakistan, with emphasis on FATA. The research will detail the importance of phenomena within this region that has made it the home and training ground of radicalization which threatens our nation. Chapter III will also illustrate how these factors can be enflamed and lead to further radicalization and recruitment by militant groups due to drone strikes in FATA.

Chapter IV will review the U.S. drone warfare program featuring recent developments. This discussion will note the conflicting findings of this research as it pertains to the success of the drone program in FATA. Three case studies are reviewed to

highlight specific incidents pertaining to the impact of drone strikes in FATA. It concludes with research conducted by the Pew Research Center and New America Foundation which further details significant drone statistics and Pakistani feeling about the strikes.

Chapter V will begin with a conclusion about the impact of drone strikes on the people of FATA. It will specifically address the collateral psychological and political impact, and the relevance to homeland security. Policy recommendations will be made based on the findings of this research which will propose improvements to the current U.S. drone program. A multi-discipline working group is briefly discussed to enhance oversight and accountability.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

“Very frankly, it’s the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership.”¹

–Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta on drone strikes in Pakistan

The use of drone aircraft by the United States government against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Pakistan’s tribal regions began in 2001, during Operation Enduring Freedom. American intelligence agencies consider the Pashtun tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan or FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) as “the most dangerous region on earth” and one of the greatest threats to domestic security.² Despite the distance of this emergent and evolving threat in FATA, it still poses a significant danger to U.S. interests domestically and abroad. Since 2009, the drone program has been used more extensively by the Obama administration. A study conducted by the New America Foundation claims that drone strikes in northwest Pakistan conducted from 2004 through early 2010 killed between 830 and 1210 individuals, of whom approximately 550 to 850 were described as militants.³

As the frequency of drone strikes increases, scrutiny of the program has also grown. Many researchers claim that the attacks are unpopular in Pakistan because of unnecessary collateral damage and civilian casualties. A 2009 New America Foundation poll of FATA residents found that 48 percent felt that drone strikes largely killed civilians and only 16 percent felt that drones accurately target militants.⁴ Some scholars find that these factors serve as recruiting tools for extremist groups and inspire retaliatory attacks

1.. Noah Shachtman, “CIA Chief: Drones ‘Only Game in Town’ for Stopping al-Qaeda | Danger Room | Wired.com,” *Danger Room*, Accessed January 15, 2013, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/cia-chief-drones-only-game-in-town-for-stopping-al-qaeda/>.

2. Brian Glyn Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 10 (2010): 871.

3. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedeman. “The Year of the Drone An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2010,” *New America Foundation - Counterterrorism*. NewAmerica.Net (2010): 1, <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf>.

4. Peter Bergen and Patrick C. Doherty, “Public Opinion in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions,” *New America Foundation* (September 28, 2010): 3.

against the U.S. or local governments, which further destabilize the region. Afzal finds that drone strikes give radicals ammunition to recruit those on the margin of becoming terrorists, and that the havoc that drones wreak on Pakistan, converts non-radicals. Most overlooked, is that drone strikes infuriate the moderate and liberal segments of Pakistani society that are traditionally more sympathetic to the U.S.⁵ Proponents state that the program is a necessary self-defense strategy that uses reasonable force, and attempts to minimize consequences to the civilian population. Brooks argues that drones kill civilians at no higher rate, and almost certainly at a lower rate, than most other forms of warfare. Drones permit far greater precision in targeting.⁶ Some research indicates that certain Pakistani groups welcome the use of drones. Taj believes the people of Waziristan are suffering under a brutal occupation by the Taliban and al-Qaeda and therefore welcome drone strikes. This is especially true considering the collateral damage resulting from the Pakistani military's long-range artillery bombardment and air strikes.⁷

Understanding the impact of this tactic on the people of FATA, is essential to the analysis of this evolving technology. A psychological and political examination of Pakistani society, who lives in the affected areas, will provide a better understanding of the effectiveness of drone warfare as a proactive homeland defense strategy. There are some studies which evaluate the tactical successes and failures of drone warfare. In 2010, New America Foundation, featuring Peter Bergen, conducted the first comprehensive public opinion survey covering sensitive political issues in FATA. Both New America Foundation and Long War Journal maintain current statistics pertaining to drone strikes. As will be demonstrated in this research, data emanating from this region of Pakistan can be easily manipulated for political gain. Most research judges drone warfare based on the number of killed militants versus the number of innocent civilians killed. This study will go beyond statistics to look at the impact on innocent civilians, non-combatants and

5. Madiha Afzal, "Drone Strikes and Anti-Americanism in Pakistan," The Brookings Institution, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/02/07-drones-anti-americanism-pakistan-afzal>.

6. Rosa Brooks, "What's Not Wrong With Drones?" *Foreign Policy*, September 05, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/whats_not_wrong_with_drones.

7. Farhat Taj, "Drone Attacks: Challenging Some Fabrications," *Daily Times*, January 02, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\01\02\story_2-1-2010_pg3_5.

militants. Are innocent civilians and non-combatants becoming radicalized due to drone strikes? What causes these reactions? Who are the militants we target and does their value to the militant group justify such an extreme measure?

In order to understand the people of FATA, research will include social and cultural background information about the people of this region. Based on their history, is drone warfare the correct tactic to deal with militancy? The psychological characteristics which develop as a result of the social and cultural norms of FATA will also be discussed. Specific social, cultural and psychological factors need to be considered when employing drones as a proactive defense tactic. Statistical analysis of drone effectiveness is necessary but psychological and political evaluation will provide valuable insight that helps win the hearts and minds of FATA communities, which will ultimately make the U.S. homeland safer. This research is an examination which will identify the critical implications of the collateral psychological and political factors within FATA that impact future drone warfare operations.

A. CHALLENGES FACING PAKISTAN

“When a child is killed in one of these villages, that village is lost for 100 years. These places run on revenge.”⁸

–Pakistani Diplomat

1. Background of FATA

When discussing the evolution of FATA, Lievan finds that in the early 1900s, the tribes of the Pakistani frontier were considered by the British to be too heavily armed, too independent-minded, and too inaccessible in their steep and entangled mountains to be placed under regular administration (Figures 1 and 2). The British introduced a system of indirect rule, which was inherited by the Pakistani central government, and remains in effect today within the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The goal was to manage tribes, not govern. However, due to Taliban insurgency, this practice has largely collapsed. The population of FATA is overwhelmingly Pathan (Pashtun) and Sunni Muslim. FATA covers 10,500 square miles (Figures 1–3) and has a population of

⁸. Thomas H. Johnson, “*On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan*,” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (2007): 124.

over 3.5 million, with a 30 percent male literacy rate, and a three percent female literacy rate. These issues can be attributed to FATA's unique government and also to its inaccessibility, intense conservatism and xenophobia of the people. These people do not want to be governed by the Pakistani state as it currently exists.⁹



Figure 1. Map of Pakistan (From Magellan Geographix, 1997)

⁹. Anatol Lievan, *Pakistan*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011) 382–385.



Figure 2. Map of FATA (From Long War Journal, 2010)

Lievan identifies the very basis of the difficulty the United States, Pakistan, or any nation, will have when trying to formulate an effective policy to deal with FATA. These people have been managed, not subjugated to government, and do not want this tradition to change. Following Afghan jihad against the Soviets in 1979, the tribal areas of Pakistan became a safe haven of the Afghan mujahideen. More than 3 million Pathan refugees fled into Pakistan from Afghanistan.¹⁰ This influx created a radical element which will make change more difficult, although there is no indication of a desire for reform. Any type of social or military action, regardless of intent, will be subject to cynicism and possibly hostility due to Taliban manipulation of the population.

Researchers Johnson and Mason find that United States policymakers have failed to understand the savage, cruel, and peculiar kind of mountain warfare, frequently driven by religious zealotry on the tribal side that is singularly unforgiving of tactical error, momentary inattention, or cultural ignorance in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.

10. Ibid., 428.

In 2007, the National Intelligence Estimation (NIE) corroborated the widely held belief of the intelligence community that al-Qaeda (aided by the funding of Saudi Arabian Wahhabists) had rebuilt its command structure in the region. Recruiting and training of operatives for attacks on Western targets also occurs in this area. Since retreating from Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban and most of its senior leadership, has found sanctuary in the predominantly Pashtun FATA region. It was presumed that Osama Bin Laden was sheltered in tribal regions of Pakistan before being killed by U.S. forces in Abbottabad in 2011. The Taliban and Islamic extremist insurgent elements who operate on both sides of the border are also Pashtun. Johnson and Mason feel that the United States counterterrorism community has failed to appreciate this cultural dynamic. Complicating matters is the belief that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate has assisted the Taliban and extremist insurgents in using the border, in particular FATA, as a safe haven for conducting cross border operations. The Taliban and associated groups have regularly used violence against tribal Pashtun leadership to subvert traditional governance and spread extremism across the Pashtun belt.¹¹

It is believed the Pashtun moved into the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region 1,000 years ago (Figure 3). With over 25 million members, they are one of the world's largest tribal organizations. Pashtun can be placed into five major groupings consisting of about 350 tribes. Relationships between them dating back hundreds of years are complex and complicated by feuds, disputes, ancient alliances, and political marriages. The Waziris are considered to be the most conservative and easily angered Pashtun tribe. They pride themselves as never having paid taxes to a sovereign nation or having their veiled lands conquered.¹² The Pashtun cherish their archaic tribal culture as freedom and travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan as necessary. They essentially do not recognize

¹¹. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign Until the Burst of Fire Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring) (2008) 41–42, 58.

¹². *Ibid.*, 50–51.

the Durand Line which the British established as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Illiteracy and poverty are common and women no have rights in their society. Most children do not attend school.¹³




Figure 3. Major Ethnic Groups of Pakistan (From Pakistan Paedia, 2006)

Johnson and Mason also find the Pashtun to be the classic insurgent group. Historically, the rural Pashtun have avoided subjugation and integration by larger nations. They quote an elderly Pashtun tribesman as saying, “We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood...we will never be content with a master.” Pashtun identify with family ties and commitments. Any nationalistic emotions are filtered through these relationships, which consist of family, extended family, tribes, and clans. Bonds get more intense as the group gets smaller. In times of crisis, Pashtun look to these groups for support, rarely will they seek government assistance. Social, political and economic needs are contained within these groups, which keeps government institutions from gaining a foothold. This is a key reason why no foreign entity has ever reconciled the Pashtun under external rule.¹⁴

13. Anatol Lievan, *Pakistan* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011) 382–384.

14. *Ibid.*, 50–52.

Pashtunwali, literally translated, means ways of the Pashtun, is the keystone to Pashtun identity and social culture from birth to death. A Pashtun adheres to Pashtunwali to maintain his identity and honor. Despite Pashtunwali being profoundly at odds with Western values, Johnson and Mason stress it is crucial for U.S. policymakers to understand its core principles to address the challenges of Pashtun society. Pashtunwali is the dominant force in tribal regions and Pashtuns accept no other law but their own. It imposes strict obligations on the Pashtun people based on freedom, honor, revenge and chivalry. The Pashtun have no interest on a new alien system being imposed on them by outsiders like the United States.¹⁵

Johnson and Mason have illustrated multiple reasons for the difficulty the United States, or any nation, has had in trying to effect foreign policy or assistance in this region. Despite the best of intentions, Pashtunwali is not accepting of outside intervention. The Pashtun people prefer their system over Western values. Considering Pashtunwali, military action and foreign policy initiatives aimed at FATA are very complicated and the United States must fully comprehend Pashtunwali in order to effectively operate in the region. This is especially true considering the strong influence of the Taliban and the influx of Islamist extremists, both of whom are predominantly Pashtun. Pashtunwali values such as freedom, honor and revenge may not be accepting of military tactics by an outsider, especially considering the potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties. Even what the United States considers a successful operation, may do damage to tribal affairs that ultimately enrages Pashtuns who must act against the foreign oppressor because to regain honor and achieve revenge. Unfortunately, the United States may have to proactively intervene in Pakistan if the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence) has aided extremists who operate in FATA and seek to attack the homeland and our interests abroad.

¹⁵. Ibid., 59–61.

a. Education and Radicalization

Johnson describes how militant groups have seized upon a deprived population and used them to further their operations in Afghanistan. Lack of control and oversight by Pakistani authorities in FATA has opened the door to exploitation by radical elements. Madrassahs assist in further radicalization of the young population that lacks education and jobs. During the 1980s, millions of Pashtun Afghans fled to Pakistan to escape the atrocities of the Soviet military campaigns. Most of these refugees settled in the camps that had sprung up in the border area provinces. These camps, which represent over 40 percent of the estimated Afghan population in Pakistan and the thousands of madrassahs located in the FATA, have offered the Taliban an almost infinite supply of recruits. Many poorly educated, unemployed Afghan youth, who have grown up in the border region's refugee camps, have gravitated to the militant madrassahs. Hundreds of these madrassahs basically function as radicalization academies that eventually feed recruits to Taliban commanders.¹⁶ It appears that Pakistan's use of militants in furtherance of foreign policy has grown out of their control, and circumvented the normal evolution of Pashtun tribal leadership. Considering the number of militant groups operating in and around FATA, this problem will not go away without external pressure. The United States doesn't have a choice but to remain engaged in the area to protect assets in Afghanistan and to prevent threats developed in FATA from being a reality in the homeland. Until Pakistan is willing and able to effectively deal with the militancy in FATA that it created, and prevent militancy from posing a threat outside of the region, the U.S. needs to be able to decisively and proactively act in self-defense.

Fair's research in 2008, studied the families of 141 slain militants in Pakistan. She contradicts Johnson's findings by stating the majority of literature suggests that Pakistan's militants are not overwhelmingly poor or uneducated, and questions the role of madrassahs as the means of indoctrination and radicalization. While madrassahs may play a valuable role in recruiting suicide and sectarian terrorists, Fair underscores the role of family, friends, mosque and public schools in militant development. Post 9/11

¹⁶ Johnson, "On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan," 112.

policy agendas endorsed social aid and education as the way to curb terrorism but there was little evidence to support these views according to Fair. She finds that militants are well educated by Pakistani standards, with about one quarter of those surveyed spending time in madrassah. Considering the education level, Fair found high unemployment levels which were most disturbing to her. This research also found the importance of household dynamics and how the input of family members weighs on the decision to pursue radicalization.¹⁷ Lieven supports Fair's view on the role of madrassahs by noting that the majority of Pakistani terrorists have attended government schools and quite often have a degree of higher education which reflects the basis for Islamism in the urban lower middle classes rather than the impoverished masses. While a number of Taliban fighters have madrassah educations, this is due to the lack of government schools in the tribal regions. These communities would support the Taliban with or without madrassahs. Concentrating on the role of madrassahs is a mistake of Western policy makers. It reflects the tendency to look at Islamist groups and their strategies as instruments which can be isolated and eliminated as opposed to a deep rooted phenomenon of Islamic society.¹⁸

The contradictions that Fair and Lieven discuss show the need for further study into the role of the madrassah in the recruitment and radicalization of militants in FATA. While madrassahs are present in the region and a part of Islamic culture, there does not seem to be consensus on their legitimacy in educating and developing Islamic youth. Before we make negative assumptions about education in a region lacking in academic opportunity, we must be sure of the value of madrassah and how it impacts FATA communities. This is especially true in this study, considering the potential for drone warfare instigating more recruitment and radicalization within FATA. Madrassahs may be the beneficiaries of an enraged population, who seek a more militant and religious education as a result of drone attacks.

In 2004, Fair concluded that the on-going conflict with India over Kashmir was the main motivator for Pakistanis to join militant organizations, but noted indications

¹⁷. C. Christine Fair, "Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 1 (January 2008): 50, 60–63.

¹⁸. Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011) 159–160.

that anti-American sentiment may soon be pervasive. These Kashmir-centric groups are allowed to operate with immunity and impunity from the Pakistani government. Most of their efforts are leveraged in India-controlled Kashmir or India proper, and have received the support of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence), and Pakistani military. Prior to 9/11, many in Pakistan had grown weary of the government's support of al-Qaeda and the Taliban because of the damage done to civil society. After 9/11, the Pakistanis publicly committed to the war on terror, but critics feel they were successful only to the degree they enforced their own counter militancy policy. Militant groups are utilized in a reserve capacity for covert use by the Pakistani government to bolster the military and support foreign policy. Pakistan still maintains relations with these militant groups, but does so covertly to avoid response from the U.S., India, or other nations. Rising antagonism toward the United States, manipulated by radical elements, has resulted in more opportunity for Imams to recruit for madrassahs, and to then select indoctrinated youth for military training. Recruiting is conducted by al-Qaeda informally, through relationships with local groups, and not through a broad and explicit infrastructure. Few in Pakistan believe that the recruitment and training could continue without the passive and active support of Pakistani intelligence and military communities.¹⁹

Expanding on Pakistan's India-centric military, Singh believes this practice has further destabilized the nation. She notes the use of insurgent and terrorist groups by Pakistan in the Mumbai attacks in 2008. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence) has been accused for years of playing a "double game" by acting as a front-line U.S. ally in the fight against terror, while supporting selected terrorist groups.²⁰ According to Singh, Pakistan continues to prioritize spending on its conventional military, rather than economic development and social services. It is

¹⁹C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for al-Qaeda and Other Organizations," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27 (2004): 490–498.

²⁰ Sebastien Rotella, "Pakistan and the Mumbai Attacks: The Untold Story," *ProPublica*, <http://www.propublica.org/article/pakistan-and-the-mumbai-attacks-the-untold-story>.

estimated that at least 70 percent of Pakistan's military is on the Indian border, which leaves counter-insurgency operations understaffed with emphasis on ineffective ground operations and airstrikes.²¹

Ultimately, it is Pakistan's choice to determine their national security threats, and how to mitigate these vulnerabilities. The United States, or any nation, will have great difficulty in attempting to persuade Pakistan to re-focus on militancy within its borders. This is especially true considering the role the military and intelligence communities have played in supporting and utilizing radicals to further Pakistan's foreign policy agenda. Without the committed support of Pakistan, the U.S. will not be able solve Pakistan's domestic problems which have become an international threat.

b. The Accidental Guerilla in FATA

Kilcullen describes the Accidental Guerilla Syndrome as occurring when al-Qaeda moves into remote areas, creates alliances with local traditional communities, exports violence that prompts a Western intervention, and then exploits the backlash against that intervention in order to generate support for its takfiri agenda. Kilcullen uses the term Takfiri terrorist to define those who use terrorism to advance their ideology. al-Qaeda gains the majority of its support from backlash rather than general popular support. Takfiri groups opportunistically exploit existing breakdowns in rule of law, poor governance, or pre-existing conflict. The terrorist infection is a part of a broader societal breakdown, state weakness, and humanitarian crisis. Takfiri groups may also seek an agreement or loose pact with the government like al-Qaeda did with Pakistan in the 1980s. These groups will also establish training camps, indoctrination centers and recruiting bases in furtherance of their ideology. Takfiri groups integrate into the community through a combination of cooptation and violence. They marry into tribes, arbitrate local disputes, and put money into the local economy. Those who oppose takfiri

²¹. Anita Singh, *A Talibanized Pakistan? Recommendations For Canada's Permanent Representative To NATO*, Dalhousie University Halifax NS, Canada, 2010, 12–13.

efforts may be bribed or murdered. Inevitably the takfiri group grows from a regional influence to a national issue and then begins to impact surrounding nations.²²

As the takfiri movement grows, external forces begin to take action against the extremist presence. This can include local action by the national government, regional action by neighboring states, or a wider global response. There are many forms of intervention available, choosing the right method which minimizes local backlash is critical. During this intervention phase, the presence of outsiders causes the local groups to fuse together, closing ranks against the external threat. During high-profile, violent, or foreign based intervention, it can increase local support for takfiri terrorists who portray themselves as defenders of the people against outside influence. The outsiders' intervention can cause grievances, alienation, and a desire for revenge when local people are killed or dishonored. Local people in tribal societies will always side with the closer, rather than the more distant relatives, external actors, and with similar religious groups rather than different faiths. Local populations become accidental guerillas when they fight with extremist forces not in support of takfiri beliefs, but also because they oppose outside intervention in their affairs when they rally in support of their tribal interests, or the heavy-handed tactics of the outside forces. The more similar the takfiri group makes itself to the local population, and the more it portrays itself as the defender of the local population, the stronger the extremist group becomes.²³

Kilcullen finds that very few fighters take part in violence for religious or political reasons, let alone because of takfiri ideology. Apart from a tiny minority of extremists, most fighters (around 70 percent, based on motivation surveys) participated in violence defensively, out of a sense of threat, and because they had no alternative but to fight to the death to protect their communities in a terrifying and brutal environment.²⁴ Effective counterinsurgency is based on securing the people. Population centers need to be secured 24 hours a day, otherwise takfiri elements will continually infiltrate the area

²². David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 34–36.

²³. Ibid., 37–38.

²⁴. Ibid., 127.

and co-opt, or intimidate, the local population. The population cannot be won over until it knows that they are consistently protected from the enemy.²⁵ In counterinsurgency, the population is the prize. Protecting and controlling it are the key activity.²⁶

2. Pakistani Military and Intelligence

The Project Pakistan Report notes the significance that the Pakistani Army continues to be a dominant political actor in the creation of defense policy and has a decisive say in foreign policy and internal affairs. Frequent Pakistani military interventions have left democracy weak and government institutions subject to manipulation by the Army and intelligence organizations. This report finds that the Army has used terrorist tactics against India, and continues to strategically nurture radical groups within Pakistan. These relationships have also allowed for the military to be influenced by the jihadi doctrine of those they train and help organize. The Army enjoys economic status and entrenched political interest which helps keep it relevant and give it authority.²⁷

In April of 2011, President Obama highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Pakistani military in FATA to keep insurgents from returning to areas that had been cleared of militants. While the military has been successful in clearing and holding the areas of militants, its counterinsurgency policy that deals with rehabilitation and de-radicalizing has failed. Much of this stems from the fact that local authorities are hesitant to cooperate with the Army, because they fear retaliation and retribution from the Taliban once the Army leaves. Basically, the Army lacks resources and capacity to conduct hold and build operations in the areas cleared of militants. The problems of the Pakistan include: delineating between “good” and “bad” militants, weakening militants by dividing them, choosing not to fight militancy at the ideological level, and believing that certain militant groups may have a tactical or operational value. It appears that Pakistani authorities, both

²⁵. Ibid., 94.

²⁶. Ibid., 73.

²⁷. Smruti S Pattanaik, Ashok K Behuria, Sumita Kumar, Sushant Sareen, P. K. Upadhyay, Medha Bisht, Shamshad A Khan, Babjee Pothuraju, Amit Julka, and Anwasha Ray Chaudhuri, *Pakistan Project Report: Pakistan on the Edge* (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2012), 89–92.

civilian and military, have yet to develop a clearly identified strategy for dealing with insurgency in FATA.²⁸ There seems to be little motivation for Pakistan to eliminate the “good” militants because Pakistan believes they may have a use for them despite the damage and instability they cause within their borders.

Fair finds varying support for militancy in the Pakistani military, intelligence community, and public. As a result, Pakistan will probably be unwilling to surrender the use of militancy as a means of foreign policy and deal with this emerging threat to the region and Pakistan. The Army and intelligence agencies segment militants into groups over which they maintain varying degrees of control. There are indications that Pakistan may not be able to degrade or eliminate some groups that now target the state. Fair traces the Pakistani use of irregular warfare back to 1947 when Pakistan became an independent state. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan again used Islamist militants as a tool of foreign policy. The mujahideen was created by Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others, as a massive, Pakistan-based, anti-Soviet jihad. Most recently, nuclear proliferation by both Pakistan and India has seemed to encourage the use of asymmetrical tactics by Pakistan against India.²⁹ Johnson and Mason find that successive Pakistani governments have promoted Islamic radicalism to curb Pashtun and Baluch nationalistic movements and provide “strategic depth” in Afghanistan in the event of a conflict with India.³⁰

The research of Fair and the Project Pakistan Report shows the inability and apparent unwillingness of Pakistani authorities to deal with insurgency in their nation, which will inevitably pose a threat to the United States. Fair’s research demonstrates that Pakistan has extensively used militancy and insurgency to further its foreign policy throughout their existence. She suggests that Pakistan is unwilling and in some cases unable to control the militant groups they have created. The Project Pakistan Report, and the work of Johnson and Mason, both illustrate that Pakistan is using terror tactics against

²⁸. Ibid., 101–113.

²⁹. C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan,” *Asia Policy* 11 (January 11, 2011): 106–137.

³⁰. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency,” *Orbis* (Winter 2007): 82.

U.S. ally India, which creates further instability in the region. The U.S. must have a tactic available to protect itself and its allies until Pakistan can demonstrate that they are capable of securing and building areas cleared of militants. This research also shows the U.S. needs to maintain a proactive posture in this region to prevent developing threats from reaching the homeland and our vital interests abroad. It does not appear that we have a consistent, trusted, and valued partner in Pakistan. The U.S. must be able to defend itself until Pakistan is able to mitigate the threat within its borders, and stop using terrorist organizations to further its foreign policy. The Pakistani government may be content with their current relationship with militant groups, and willing to accept some terrorist attacks domestically. As long as Pakistan occasionally gives the U.S. the appearance of trying to control militant groups within its borders, Pakistan keeps a valuable ally for use against India, and maintains influence in the Afghan border region.

Johnson stresses the importance that Pakistan has on the Afghanistan theatre of U.S. operations. Afghan officials in the past two years have made progressively stronger comments linking Pakistan to the Taliban insurgency by claiming that Pakistan provides a reliable, safe, and fertile recruiting, training, and fund-raising haven just across the border. FATA has among the highest rates of illiteracy, violence and poverty in Pakistan and yet receives little aid from Islamabad. These conditions have helped breed extremism in the region. FATA has never been “federally administered,” as it has always been dominated by Pashtun tribes. The lack of federal control and sense of lawlessness has made it easier for the Taliban and al-Qaeda to exploit. With high unemployment rates and under-developed infrastructure, drug smuggling and weapons trafficking are common. FATA is also home to thousands of militant madrassas that provide an unlimited supply of young radicalized recruits to Taliban commanders.³¹

During the Afghan’s anti-Soviet jihad of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Pakistani government deconstructed tribal leadership in FATA in order to promote radical Islamist mullahs who could promote and recruit for the Afghan mujahideen. While many Pashtun supported their Afghan brothers in their fight against the Soviet

³¹. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” 109–112.

occupier, it also permanently radicalized FATA and opened the door for other jihadi radicals such as Osama bin Laden. The momentum of radicalization, the failure to restrict the Taliban, and the presence of foreign jihadis in FATA has prevented the traditional Pashtun leadership from returning to power once the Soviets were defeated.³²

Currently, it is estimated there are 150 militant groups operating around FATA, with 116 based in FATA operating under Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.³³ Led by Baitullah Mesud, a Taliban commander from South Waziristan, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan consisted of several Pashtun militant groups that operated in the tribal areas. Originally, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan functioned as a support network for the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda, but became its own actor after Pakistan and General Musharraf sided with the United States' anti-terror campaign. As a result, the Pakistan Taliban remains a significant threat to the internal security of the nation.³⁴ It is believed Mehsud died in a U.S. drone strike in August 2009.³⁵

B. DRONE OPERATIONS

“A lot of people wonder whether we can keep trying to kill our way out of this problem. There are people who are really questioning where does all of this end?”³⁶

–Unidentified U.S. intelligence official discussing drone warfare in Pakistan

1. The Case for Drone Warfare

Drones have the extraordinary ability to travel where soldiers cannot and are operated remotely, far from the battlefield, which does not put pilots in jeopardy.

³². Ibid., 117–118.

³³. Mona Kanwal Sheikh, Farzana Shaikh, and Gareth Price, *DIIS Report 2012: 12 Pakistan: Regional Rivalries, Local Impacts* (Copenhagen: Chatham House, 2012), 33.

³⁴. *Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry Into the Facts and Circumstances of the Assassination of Former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto*, New York: United Nations, April 10, 2010, 49.

³⁵. Declan Walsh, “Air Strike Kills Taliban Leader Baitullah Mehsud,” *The Guardian*, August 7, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/07/baitullah-mehsud-dead-taliban-pakistan>.

³⁶. Ken Dilanian, “CIA Cuts Off Drone Strikes in Pakistan; The Undeclared Halt in Targeting Militants Aims to Repair Ties Strained by Deadly Incidents, Officials Say,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 24, 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/23/world/la-fg-pakistan-cia-drone-20111224>.

According to former officials and sources familiar with drone technology, CIA strikes are directed from agency headquarters in suburban Washington, DC. Drone operators have immediate, easy access to sources of information from across the intelligence community and the military. Drones can loiter over their target for hours, using cameras and sometimes voice-recognition software, to identify targets. In some cases, drone operators have more information at their disposal than ground troops. According to a former CIA official who worked on the program, the CIA assesses each target and calculates collateral damage before any strike. Another source familiar with the technology, said that operators have the benefit of multiple feeds, from live video to sensor reports, as well as visual contacts in areas where U.S. or allied forces are on the ground.³⁷

Harris identifies the tactical advantage drones provide to the intelligence community and the U.S. military. Drones offer lethal force that is far more precise than traditional bombing campaigns of the past. U.S. lives are not jeopardized conducting drone operations and drones provide the opportunity to access the most remote regions of FATA. Harris also details the great lengths the CIA goes to in order to minimize collateral damage. Drones combined with various audio and visual sensors, and connectivity with ground forces, further enhance the accuracy and efficiency of the program.

In May of 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta stated that the drone campaign is “the only game in town” to disrupt or confront al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.³⁸ Considering the Pakistani’s inability to deal with militants in their country, and the danger they present to the U.S., I would concur with Panetta’s statement. Williams continues to make a compelling case for drone strikes by stating the operational and logistical impact drone strikes have had on the militants in Pakistan. Of particular note was Williams’ belief that senior militants were being replaced with inexperienced mid-level leaders. I agree with the short-term effects of drone strikes but I question how substantial these strikes are beyond the elimination of the targeted individual. How valuable are the targeted

³⁷. Shane Harris, “Are Drone Strikes Murder?” *NationalJournal.com*, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/magazine/are-drone-strikes-murder--20100109>.

³⁸. Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign,” 877.

individuals if they are easily replaced? More research needs to be conducted on the targets of drones to determine if they need to be lethally targeted. This is probably not realistic considering the covert nature of the program and the propaganda of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the Pakistani government.

C. Christine Fair, an Assistant Professor in Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, wrote that drawing the conclusion that drone strikes produce more terrorists than they eliminate, would be a good argument if the data from which this conclusion was drawn were not bogus. She states the only publicly available data on drone attacks in Pakistan comes from the Pakistani Taliban via the Pakistani press and that "high-level Pakistani officials have conceded to me that very few civilians have been killed by drones, and their innocence is often debatable."³⁹ Opponents to drone warfare also conflate drone strikes in Pakistan with air strikes in Afghanistan, which lumps together two very different theatres of operation.⁴⁰ Fair makes a great point about the source of information in this remote and volatile region. Accurate and credible reporting from this region has the potential to be flawed, and future research of this topic needs to be cognizant of this. Priest and Arkin further discuss the Pakistani government in their book, "Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State." They find that the Pakistani government publicly criticizes drones, but it is merely domestic posturing to hide their collusion with the U.S. This position is then bolstered by recent examples of this behavior by Pakistani officials.⁴¹ I agree with Priest and Arkin's position, especially after the examples they provide of Pakistani and American officials seeming acceptance of this relationship. It may be a short term agreement that does nothing to truly solve the issues that plague this region.

Zelin finds that drone strikes have eliminated many top al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and killed hundreds of mid-level fighters. The losses have caused these militant

³⁹. Thomas J. Billitteri, "Drone Warfare Are Strikes by Unmanned Aircraft Ethical?" *CQ Researcher* 20, no. 28 (August 6, 2010): 659.

⁴⁰. C. Christine Fair, "Drone Wars." *Foreign Policy*, May 28, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/28/drone_wars.

⁴¹. Dana Priest and William R. Arkin, *Top Secret America The Rise of the New American Security State* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2011), 219–220.

groups to bolster their operational security which has resulted in al-Qaeda's ability to operate in Pakistan being severely degraded. Zelin concludes that frequent drone strikes in northwest Pakistan have degraded al-Qaeda's ability to properly train militants. Prior to drone warfare, al-Qaeda could spend a month or more training an operative in bomb making. Currently, such training lasts as little as a few days and may have a direct impact on al-Qaeda operations. As an example, Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber of 2010, only received five days of training from TTP in the tribal areas. Shahzad's plot was thwarted when he was spotted acting suspiciously and his bomb malfunctioned. If Shahzad had been properly trained, he may have successfully detonated his device in a crowded and busy Times Square. Interestingly, Shahzad claimed that increased drone strikes in the tribal areas were a motivating factor to him. Zelin also found that al-Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiri was also reportedly frustrated over the drone strikes in the tribal areas, leading him to plan an attack on the CEO of Lockheed Martin that was never carried out.⁴²

Zelin identifies multiple reasons for supporting the use of drones including the elimination of top militant leaders and mid-level fighters. The loss of these militants will have an operational impact but the effect is multiplied because these groups are now diverting resources to their own security instead of planning future attacks. The Shahzad case is an example of the positive effect of drones being utilized as a proactive self-defense tactic because it can be argued that it has diminished the training capacity of al-Qaeda which inevitable reduces the vulnerability of the homeland. While Shazad claims he was motivated by drone attacks, other factors may have contributed to his attempted bombing of Times Square. We should be cautious about blaming drones for increased terrorist attacks, domestically and abroad, due to intervening variables influencing behavior, even after a direct statement from the attacker.

Williams is one of the few researchers who contend that Pakistani tribesmen in FATA have accepted drone strikes against the Taliban. Local tribesmen claim to have

⁴². Aaron Y. Zelin, "Dodging the Drones: How Militants Have Responded to the Covert U.S. Campaign," *Foreign Policy* (August 31, 2012), http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/31/dodging_the_drones_how_militants_have_responded_to_the_covert_us_campaign.

been terrorized and misruled by the Taliban in recent years. Referencing the Pakistani newspaper “News,” Williams finds that hatred of the Pakistani Taliban is at an all-time high and so is disappointment about the ability of the Pakistani army to stop the Taliban.⁴³ These findings would contradict the beliefs of many scholars who believe that drone strikes serve as a recruiting tool for radicals and inspire retaliation against the U.S. or local government. In “The Year of Drone Misinformation,” Farhat Taj also challenges the widely held belief of the research community that drone strikes are unpopular and the source of mass casualties. Taj, a researcher from the University of Oslo and Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy in Pakistan, is a native of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border and has lived there most of her life. Taj respectfully questions the leading think tanks from the West that conclude drone strikes are unpopular and the statistics they use to support their arguments.⁴⁴ Taj’s argument was solid and well put together. Overall very believable but there is not much support coming from Western scholars. I believe there is more support for this position, and it should be utilized to further support Taj’s claims.

2. The Case Against Drone Warfare

University of Arizona researchers Hudson, Owens, and Flannes state there are five distinct, yet overlapping, forms of blowback from the use of drones in counter-terror operations: the purposeful retaliation against the United States, the creation of new insurgents, complications in the Afghan-Pakistan theatre, further destabilization of Pakistan and the deterioration of U.S. and Pakistani relations.⁴⁵ The authors, who are members of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts (SISMEC), capture the main arguments against drone warfare. Most of the literature I reviewed seems to fall into one of the five categories listed above. There is an abundance of scholarly sources which support the findings of these researchers. Definitive statistical

⁴³. Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign,” 877–879, 887.

⁴⁴. Taj Farhat, “The Year of the Drone Misinformation,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 21, no. 3 (2010): 529–535.

⁴⁵. Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, and Matt Flannes, “Drone Warfare: Blowback From the New American Way of War,” *Middle East Policy* XVIII, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 122–131.

support of the negative aspects of drone warfare is difficult to assess due to intervening factors in this volatile region. Many factors can influence the criteria established by Hudson, Owens, and Flannes.

In his discussion about the history of the CIA's covert drone warfare program, University of Massachusetts—Dartmouth history faculty member Brian Glyn Williams adds to the case against drone warfare. He finds the collateral damage of drone strikes gives the media and religious leaders an opportunity to rally anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and the Islamic world in general.⁴⁶ This article highlights the ability of radicals to easily use drone strikes, regardless if successful or not, to their advantage to manipulate the views of the local population. This view was supported by multiple other materials I reviewed. Writing for the German based Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Jaeger and Siddique discuss an example of retaliation by the Taliban which is attributed to drone strikes.⁴⁷ This is typical of many examples of the Taliban or al-Qaeda directly stating their attack against the local government or U.S. was in response to drone policy in the region.

In his Georgetown University Master's thesis, Luke Olney evaluates the long-term effectiveness of drone warfare. He supports the previously mentioned findings with particular emphasis on drones inspiring further radicalization, increased recruitment opportunities and further destabilization of local governments. However, he does note that drones may have some short-term success in disrupting militant groups.⁴⁸ This seems to be a reoccurring theme in much of the readings I have conducted. Most researchers support the short-term advantage of drone strikes because they eliminate the target but drones have only been used extensively over the last ten years and questions exist about their effectiveness over time. The elimination of the militant is positive. But at what point does this victory become outweighed by the long-term effects of the killing?

46. Williams, "The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign," 887.

47. David A. Jaeger and Zahra Siddique, "Are Drones Effective in Afghanistan and Pakistan? On the Dynamics of Violence Between the United States and the Taliban," The Institute for the Study of Labor. Discussion Paper 6262 (December 2011): 1.

48. Luke A. Olney, "Lethal Targeting Abroad: Exploring Long-Term Effectiveness of Armed Drone Strikes in Overseas Contingency Operations," (Master's thesis, Georgetown University, 2011), 37.

Support of the argument that drones have a negative political and diplomatic impact is made by Anne L. Oblinger in her 2011 Georgetown University thesis depicting the moral, legal, and diplomatic implications of drone warfare. Her thesis discusses the cultural and religious motivations behind terrorist activities which will be useful in a socio-cultural examination of this topic. She notes that despite their precision, drones still create many diplomatic hurdles for the U.S.⁴⁹ This is another example of research which states that despite their tactical success, negative consequences still exist when leveraging drones.

The majority of the literature indicates that there is a strong possibility of drone strikes having a negative overall influence in the FATA. Researchers from the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, Plaw, Fricker, and Williams, find that civilian casualties, real or perceived, will be the primary instigator. No matter how precise drone strikes are executed or how much technology improves, Pakistani press and society will be prone to believe that high percentages of civilians are being targeted. While the U.S. keeps details of the program somewhat secure, this practice allows the targeted groups to report the details of drone strikes to their advantage.⁵⁰ There are numerous examples available of the collateral damage and devastation that drones inflict on the local community. Even if the strike successfully hits the intended target, statistics can be manipulated by the Taliban or Pakistani government.

Investigative journalist Porter Gareth criticizes drone strikes because they are based on “scant evidence” in his article for *The Washington Report for Middle East Affairs*. He finds that the U.S. is targeting militant groups rather than al-Qaeda planning global terrorism.⁵¹ This was one of the few pieces of information which discussed who

49. Anne L. Oblinger, “The Moral, Legal, and Diplomatic Implications of Drone Warfare in Pakistan,” (Master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2011), 95–96.

50. Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Brian Glyn Williams, “Practice Makes Perfect? The Changing Civilian Toll of CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5, no. 5–6 (December 2011): 51, 64.

51. Porter Gareth, “Report Shows Drone Strikes Based on Scant Evidence,” *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 29, no. 9 (December 2010): 34–35.

was being targeted by drone strikes and I found it particularly valuable. There should be more such information available, or forthcoming, because who is being targeted is critical to evaluating drone warfare.

Ken Dilanian, of the Los Angeles Times, finds that the U.S. drone program has killed dozens of al-Qaeda operatives and hundreds of low-level militants but it has also infuriated many Pakistanis. Some officials in the State Department and National Security Council say these strikes are counterproductive because they only kill easily replaceable militants and the civilian casualties, which the U.S. disputes, destabilize the government of President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan. The number of drone strikes has grown since 2008 and now includes targeting of individuals based on a “pattern of life” that suggests involvement with insurgents. A former senior U.S. intelligence official stated that the CIA maintains a list of the top 20 targets and has at times had difficulty finding high-value militants to add to the list. Are lower-level militants being targeted just to fill the list? This official is among those urging the CIA to reconsider its approach because the agency cannot kill all Islamic militants and drones alone will not solve the challenge presented in the region. One former senior State Department official stated that drone strikes probably give motivation to those that fight us. Dilanian offers that it is impossible to independently assess the accuracy or effectiveness of the strikes because the program is classified, the Obama administration refuses to release information about the program and Pakistan has barred access to FATA from Western journalists or humanitarian agencies.⁵²

This is one of Dilanian’s many pieces documenting drone warfare in Pakistan. Considering the sources of information he uses for this article, it appears that many in the military and intelligence community are beginning to realize the potential negative aspects of this tactic. He also identifies why it is so difficult to accurately and independently report on the impact of drone strikes and how data can be easily manipulated by the U.S., Pakistan, and militants.

⁵². Ken Dilanian, “CIA Cuts Off Drone Strikes in Pakistan; The Undeclared Halt in Targeting Militants Aims to Repair Ties Strained by Deadly Incidents, Officials Say,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 24, 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/23/world/la-fg-pakistan-cia-drone-20111224>.

3. Statistical Analysis

a. New America Foundation Database

The New America Foundation database reflects the aggregation of credible news reports about U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan. The media outlets that New America relies upon are the three major international wire services (Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France Presse), the leading Pakistani newspapers (Dawn, Express Times, The News, The Daily Times), leading South Asian and Middle Eastern TV networks (Geo TV and Al Jazeera), and Western media outlets with extensive reporting capabilities in Pakistan (CNN, New York Times, Washington Post, LA Times, BBC, The Guardian, Telegraph). The New America Foundation makes no independent claims about the veracity of casualty reports provided by these organizations. The purpose of this database is to provide as much information as possible about the covert U.S. drone program in Pakistan.

The Obama administration dramatically increased the frequency of the drone strikes, in comparison to the Bush Administration, with the peak number of drone attacks occurring in 2010, but the ratio of civilians killed in drone strikes fell to just over two percent. Despite the record 122 strikes in 2010, an average of 0.3 civilians were killed per strike, the lowest civilian death rate per strike until 2012, which saw only 0.1 civilians killed per attack in the first eight months of the year. According to data collected as of the summer of 2011, only one out of every seven drone strikes killed a militant leader. Under President Bush, about one-third of the militants killed were identified as leaders, but under President Obama, just 13 percent have been militant leaders. Drone strikes dropped sharply in 2011, as the relationship between the United States and Pakistan deteriorated. During the first half of 2012, the rate of strikes continued to fall and the civilian death ratio was close to zero. Since the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan began in 2004, 84 to 85 percent of those killed were reported to be militants; six to eight percent were reported to be civilians and seven to nine percent remain “unknown.”⁵³

⁵³. No author, *The Year of the Drone—An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013*, New America Foundation, n.d., <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones>.

b. New America Foundation Public Opinion Poll

The New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow conducted the first comprehensive public opinion survey covering sensitive political issues in FATA. This survey was conducted from June 30 to July 20, 2010, and consisted of face-to-face interviews of 1,000 FATA residents age 18 or older across 120 villages or sampling points in all seven tribal Agencies of FATA. The respondents were 99 percent Pashtun, and 87 percent Sunni. Among their findings were that nearly nine out of ten opposed the U.S. following al-Qaeda and the Taliban into FATA and most would prefer that the Pakistani military fight these forces in FATA. Seventy-six percent are opposed to U.S. drone strikes, 16 percent believe they accurately target militants and just under half believed that drones predominantly kill civilians. The majority of FATA residents reject the presence of the Taliban or al-Qaeda in their region. Their top priorities included lack of jobs which was closely followed by lack of schools, good roads and security, poor health care and corruption of local official officials.⁵⁴

C. COLLATERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL DAMAGE

“Hopelessness, deprivation, envy, and humiliation, make death and paradise seem more appealing.”

—An elderly resident of Jenin⁵⁵

Avner uses psychoanalysis, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, anthropology, and Islamic studies to understand Islamic terror. His research discusses the religion and culture of Islam, the psychology of Islam, the Muslim family and Muslim society from which many terrorists originate. Avner finds that terror can originate with emotions such as rage, hatred, fear and surprisingly, love and longing.⁵⁶

⁵⁴.No author, “Public Opinion in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions,” New America Foundation (September 28, 2010), <http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/FATApoll.pdf>.

⁵⁵. Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 38.

⁵⁶. Avner Falk, *Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motives* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), IX.

1. Honor and Shame

Shame is an excessively painful feeling and is prevalent in Muslim culture. Shame, loss of honor, loss of face, and humiliation are unbearable feelings. Hamady found that shame was the worst and most painful feeling for an Arab. Preserving one's honor and the honor of their tribe or clan is crucial. Any injury, real or imagined, causes unbearable shame that must be repaired through acts of revenge against those that damaged your honor.⁵⁷ The importance of pride, honor and dignity is critical in Muslim culture. "Everything must be done to erase one's humiliations and to regain one's honor."⁵⁸ For Muslims who feel they have been shamed or humiliated, the only way to repair these feelings is by humiliating those that inflicted shame and humiliation on them.⁵⁹

Avner's research identifies multiple psychological factors which may explain the existing anger within segments of the Muslim community. Honor and shame is a tremendous motivator in Islam and may provide a solid predisposition for action against the offending party to regain one's honor. Maintaining your honor or the honor of your tribe is of high importance to the Pashtun tribesmen of FATA. Once this has been violated, retaliation is obligated against those that have humiliated you.

Stern reveals that the real or perceived national humiliation of the Palestinian people by Israeli policies gives rise to desperation and uncontrollable rage. Citing Mark Jurgensmeyer, Stern notes that suicide bombers are attempting to "dehumiliate" the deeply humiliated and traumatized. Through their actions, suicide bombers belittle their enemies and provide themselves with a sense of power. Repeated, small humiliations add up to a feeling of nearly unbearable despair and frustration, which can result in atrocities

57. Avner Falk, *Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motives* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), IX. 176–178.

58. *Ibid.*, 65.

59. *Ibid.*, 66–69.

being committed in the belief that attacking the oppressor restores dignity.⁶⁰ A skilled terrorist leader can strengthen and utilize feelings of betrayal and the desire for revenge.⁶¹

Stern shows the extent to which a Muslim will go to in order to restore their honor after being humiliated. The uncontrollable rage may not be proportionate when measured by Western standards. Even small humiliations will build to the point of suicide attacks to repair the loss of dignity. The hopelessness and aggravation many may feel in FATA should not be overlooked or diminished. Charismatic militant leaders can manipulate shame to motivate groups to action against whom they perceive has wronged their group.

The most important psychoanalytic idea for understanding terrorism, according to Avner, is Heinz Kohut's notion of narcissistic rage, "The need for revenge, for righting a wrong, for undoing a hurt by whatever means, and a deeply anchored, unrelenting compulsion in the pursuit of all these aims, which gives no rest to those that have suffered a narcissistic injury. These are the characteristic features of narcissistic rage in all its forms and which set it apart from other kinds of aggression." This boundless rage, together with unconscious factors and the traditional Muslim family dynamic may explain Islamic terrorism, including suicidal versions.⁶² Kohut's finding that narcissistic rage is the most important psychoanalytic factor for understanding is significant. The narcissistic aspect depicts how personal the hostility is and rage shows the intensity of the emotion which drives terrorists. Narcissistic rage allows the militant to pursue those that they perceive have wronged them by using extreme measures to regain their honor.

The fundamentalist Muslim family structure may also lay a foundation for future radicalization. Muslim women are often abused by males in their family, including fathers, brothers, or husbands.⁶³ Wife abuse and child abuse are connected. Abused and traumatized wives do not make good enough mothers who can traumatize, abuse, and enrage their child to get back at her male abusers. This child's rage can later be displaced

60. Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 32, 54, 62.

61. *Ibid.*, 236.

62. Avner Falk, *Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motives* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 105.

63. *Ibid.*, 144–146.

from their mother to their future wife or even the United States or Israel. Physical and mental abuse, along with shaming by the father, can also further the rage and humiliation suffered by Muslim children.⁶⁴ Unconscious longings for the love of a mother and father can displace murderous rage from the parents to the perceived oppressor.⁶⁵ Additionally, the physical and emotional abuse of the Muslim boy causes him to harbor murderous narcissistic rage at his parents, which seeks release through displacement.⁶⁶ The dysfunction in some Muslim homes may develop a child who is already traumatized, humiliated and angry. Further exposure to honor, shame and humiliation in Islamic culture, as the child matures, may increase the likelihood that they will become radicalized.

a. Displacement of Aggression

Miller, Pedersen, Earleywine, and Pollock, explain the concept of triggered displaced aggression as an inappropriate retaliatory aggressive response to a provocation by an innocent that may reflect the displacement of anger from the initial provocateur. An example would be a man kicking his sleeping dog as he returned home from a bad day at work. It is noteworthy because it shows the restraint of the individual from the stronger initial provocation and then is exposed during the second triggering incident. The strength of the aggressive response exceeds the sum of both the first and second provoking incidents and is incommensurate with the overall level of provocation.⁶⁷

With regard to displacement, Moghaddam identifies displacement of aggression as a technique used by militant group leaders to channel aggression toward targets outside of their group. These outside groups are not responsible for the negative feelings and too weak to retaliate when attacked. The less similar the outside group, the

⁶⁴. Avner Falk, *Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motives* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 144–146.

⁶⁵. *Ibid.*, 153.

⁶⁶. *Ibid.*, 169.

⁶⁷. Norman Miller, William C. Pedersen, Mitchell Earleywine, and Vicki E. Pollock, “A Theoretical Model of Triggered Displaced Aggression,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 7, no. 1 (2003), 75–76.

more likely it will be targeted through displaced aggression. Within groups, displacement of aggression is associated with increased cohesion, conformity, obedience and giving rise to a more aggressive style of leadership. By identifying an external target as a threat, group members are more tightly tied together inside. Displacement of aggression is a perpetual cycle as group leaders attempt to direct negative sentiments toward targets outside of the group. Freud felt that the dark side of cohesive groups was their ability to use displacement of aggression against dissimilar targets outside of the group.⁶⁸

The concept of triggered displaced aggression may show how honor and shame is utilized by radical militants in FATA, to inspire and recruit Pashtun tribesmen to jihad against an outgroup, such as Western nations. Anger builds in a Muslim as they are victimized and humiliated throughout their life. al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters appeal to their Pashtun Muslim brothers to fight the foreign aggressor. Although Muslim suffering may not be directly attributable to the U.S. or her allies, radicals can exploit a religious bond with the Pashtun to create a cohesive and violent ingroup.

When dealing with group dynamics, Moghaddam states that the external threat leads to internal group cohesion, and enhances support for more aggressive, assertive leadership. There are many examples of aggressive, single-minded political leaders who rise to power because of an external threat but fade away when the threat fades or during the transition to peace. An example is U.S. president George W. Bush, because he was re-elected utilizing a “rally behind the leader” mentality during the post 9/11 campaign of 2004.⁶⁹ These same principles can be applied to terror groups, which operate in FATA. Charismatic al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been able to rally the support of local populations to oppose U.S. policy and influence. Having identified the U.S. and her allies as the outgroup enemy has made it easier for militants to utilize more aggressive tactics to free themselves of domination. The Pashtun are already opposed to outside intervention and their manipulation by militants gives them the ability to organize and fight back.

⁶⁸. Fathali M. Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2008), 55–57.

⁶⁹. Fathali M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 36.

The Pakistani government has also utilized displaced aggression in its traditional focus on the threat posed by neighboring India. In this continuous struggle, the Pakistanis have enlisted the assistance of militant groups to stage operations in India and in Kashmir. The strategy of using radical groups and nurturing them as a strategic tool has contributed to radicalism in Pakistani society. Also, Pakistan's India centric military doctrine failed to address growing militancy in FATA.⁷⁰

Jones identifies Pakistan as a key node for militant groups allied with al-Qaeda, but not formal members. This allows groups to remain independent and pursue their own goals but work with al-Qaeda for specific operations or training purposes when necessary. This includes Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who is largely confined to South Asia, but has attempted attacks in Europe and the U.S. Other Pakistan-based groups include Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT), who traditionally operates in India and Kashmir but has expanded interest to the West, and the Islamic Jihad Union, who has also conducted attacks against the West.⁷¹ Pakistan's use of some militant groups as a tool of foreign policy in India and Kashmir dates back to 1947 and has contributed to the nation's culture of militancy. In the 1970s, Pakistan provided modest assistance to Islamist militants in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet invasion, Pakistan increased these efforts in the 1980s. Since then, Pakistan has continued to support militant groups as a tool of foreign and domestic policy. Pakistan has long used Islam to strengthen its identity which has evolved into a strategic commitment to jihadi ideology. As late as mid-2011, Pakistan still supported the Afghan Taliban and other groups to balance India's growing influence in Afghanistan. In India, Pakistan supported groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayiba to liberate India controlled Kashmir.⁷²

Pakistan's constant preoccupation with India has actively or residually displaced aggression from India to the West as Pakistan continues to utilize militant groups as facilitators of foreign and domestic policy. Groups that Pakistan has allowed to

⁷⁰. Smruti S Pattanaik, Ashok K Behuria, Sumita Kumar, Sushant Sareen, P K Upadhayay, Medha Bisht, Shamshad A Khan, Babjee Pothuraju, Amit Julka, and Anwasha Ray Chaudhuri, *Pakistan Project Report: Pakistan on the Edge* (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2012), 90, 101.

⁷¹. Seth Jones, "The Terrorist Threat From Pakistan," *Survival* 53 no. 4 (2011): 73–74.

⁷². *Ibid.*, 81–82.

strategically exist for use in India, Kashmir, and Afghanistan, have opened the door for like-minded groups. This has resulted in further recruitment and radicalization as militant groups now use Pakistan as a base for training and operations in Afghanistan and against the West.

2. Historical Trauma

Wurmser finds that severe historical trauma exists in the cultural memory of a people, and is transmitted through generations, mostly in the form of survivor guilt and shame that must be expiated. He believes that these factors lead directly to the background of terrorism. Suicide bombers are created in a society that abuses its children and teaches blind obedience to authority. While the trauma is based on history, the culture still continually re-creates new trauma. The rage created from constant shaming is deflected onto an outside enemy, who has values antithetical to those the group values and honors. Wurmser also notes a deep sense of humiliation deficiency.

From a psychoanalytic view, Wurmser views a shame-oriented superego, rooted in severe emotional or physical trauma, just as an important factor to consider as poverty, social injustice, or religious fanaticism. The shamed part of self is projected onto the victim and it needs to be tortured and destroyed as a symbol of one's own victimhood and weakness. On the other side, a harsh superego projects absolute authority onto terror groups, their leaders and above all "God," which leads to terrorism arising from the externalization of the inner conflict with the superego. This inner resentment includes family, group, and large community. The history of terrorism is based on resentment and shame, and how it is exploited for profit and power.⁷³

Wurmser sees religion as a promising union with an inspirational authority. It also provides redemption from guilt brought on by inner aggression, omnipotence of responsibility, and shame over one's actual or perceived weakness. These dynamics are based on culture and historical resentment, which are influenced by family and childhood, and emerge as inner victimhood. Feelings of shame overcome guilt, and

⁷³. Leon Wurmser, "Psychoanalytic Reflections On 9/11, Terrorism, and Genocidal Prejudice: Roots and Sequels," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 52 (2004): 924.

external humiliations unleash strong aggression against whoever is perceived to be the cause of this shame. Terrorist acts, especially suicide, can be considered acts of redemption. A necessary part of this is the defensive dehumanization of the victim which will deprive them of their unique value based on factors such as race, religion or class.⁷⁴

Wurmser illustrates a cycle of trauma, guilt, humiliation, and shame that exists in a people and is passed by generations. The trauma is a part of their history yet each generation renews these feelings by creating new trauma. A society that abuses its children and can be rallied by strict and intolerant obedience to radical leaders, is ripe to be manipulated to terrorism. Using religion, Islamic leaders provide inspiration and redemption from the shame and humiliation one feels about their perceived weakness. Family and childhood resentment leads to strong aggression against whoever is thought to be the source of their shame which can be shaped by radical Islamic leaders. These cycles of trauma may make Pashtun tribesmen susceptible to radicalization efforts of inspirational Islamic leaders who seek to rally them against the West.

Stern identifies how the leaders of an alienated religious group in Arkansas create a story about an imminent danger posed to the “in-group” which fosters their identity, dehumanizes the enemy and creates a “killer” mentality that is capable of murdering large numbers of innocent people. She finds that terrorists frequently claim to be protecting the in-group from impure outsiders. Using alienation and anomie, leaders can construct a group identity based on knowing what these lost souls need and want in their lives.⁷⁵ Sociologists argue that the first requirement for mobilizing an oppressed group is the identification of a common enemy. Religion is the ideal motivator of violence because it gives people identity and a distinction between “them” and “us.”⁷⁶

74. Ibid., 925.

75. Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 9, 30–31.

76. Ibid., 159.

a. Globalization and Identity

Globalization has made the identification of a common enemy for Muslim groups easier, because the threat to their identity is closer. Political, economic, social and psychological factors have combined to create circumstances where Muslims, especially fundamentalist Muslims, feel collectively threatened. This threat is distressing psychologically, and associated with collective feelings of shame, frustration, and anxiety. Looking inward, Muslims seek to create and support a society that is in harmony with a positive view of their lifestyle. However, Muslims must inevitably look outward and interact with the western world to survive, which can be hostile. At the heart of this deeply emotional threat to their Muslim ingroup, are Zionism and American Imperialism. Muslim leaders can manipulate the Israeli and American threat to eliminate democratic movements in Muslim society. A key facilitator of this identity crisis is the perceived threat of immediate aggressive military action by the U.S. and its allies to take Muslim territories. Additionally, the expansion of U.S. culture, values, and ideals, has been especially attractive to the younger generation of Muslims and another catalyst of a Muslim identity crisis. The threat to Muslim identity presented by globalization has also altered the sense of control they experience because their way of life is being threatened. Groups whose identity is being threatened often react irrationally and destructively. The need to humble and humiliate the U.S. arises from the threat to the collective Muslim identity and a deeper fear of becoming extinct.⁷⁷

Stern depicts the potential violence an alienated religious group can inflict upon its perceived outgroup. She finds religion to be the ideal motivator of people to violence. Dehumanization tactics are also used to legitimize the killing of large groups. Wurmser has demonstrated how these ingroups can be organized and Stern shows the danger of an ingroup who is protecting itself from the impure outgroup. Islamic leaders construct the ingroup based on meeting the needs of the alienated while being motivated based on the identification of a common enemy. Stern shows the possible level of

77. Fathali M. Moghaddam, *How Globalization Spurs Terrorism The Lopsided Benefits of "One World," and Why That Fuels Violence* (Westport, Connecticut: Prager Security International, 2008), 109–124.

violence an alienated society such as a radicalized Pashtun will go to in order to restore its honor by retaliating against the outgroup which in this case would be the U.S.

b. Relative Deprivation

In his analysis of relative deprivation, Moghaddam discusses Runcilman's research of the attitudes toward inequality by focusing on the relation between the inequalities of a society and the feelings of acquiescence or resentment which may occur. According to materialist theories, disadvantaged groups will acquiesce rather than harbor feelings of resentment. However, materialist theories do accept that under certain situations group-based inequalities do lead to feelings of resentment. Relative deprivation theory may play a key role in determining one outcome over another. For example, in the U.S. a car is a necessity, one that even the poor need to have; but in many non-Western societies a car is considered a luxury. Within the framework of relative deprivation, our sense of deprivation is relative to the societal situation and how we perceive it.⁷⁸

Citing Runciman, Moghaddam uses the term egoistic deprivation to describe an individual who feels "relatively deprived because of his own position as member of a group," and the term fraternalistic deprivation to describe a person who feels "relatively deprived because of the group's position in society." There is evidence that suggests that fraternal, or group relative deprivation, is associated with participation, or at least support of, collective action. Additionally, there is support for the theory that fraternal deprivation is associated with stronger prejudices against target outgroups. Fraternal deprivation among Muslims in India was found to be the best predictor of negative attitudes toward Hindus. It can be presumed that feelings of collective deprivation (fraternalistic) are associated with experiences of more intense frustration, with the possibility of various forms of aggression against outgroups as a possible result.⁷⁹

⁷⁸. Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context*, 115–117.

⁷⁹. *Ibid.*, 117.

Relative deprivation is a key factor when discussing issues such as poverty and education in FATA. Not everyone in FATA may feel deprived, some may acquiesce and accept their situation. Others may feel deprived yet unwilling or unable to act against the outgroup. If they do act, it remains to be seen which outgroup will be the target of their aggression. The deprived could view the Pakistani government, America and her allies, or foreign militants as an outgroup and target of their aggression.

One of the strongest claims to human social behavior is similarity attraction. It suggests through considerable research that people are more positively disposed toward people who are similar to them. With regard to immigrant receiving societies, similarity attraction influences the choice immigrants make when they move to an adopted land and also impacts the level of acceptance the adopted land makes in receiving the immigrant. Both the immigrant and adopted land assume mutual compatibility, based on personality traits and skills. The relationship between immigrant and adopted land will improve over time as compatibility increases. Evidence also exists which demonstrates that people are more positively disposed toward ingroup rather than outgroup members. It is easier to empathize with people who share our group characteristics. This model also works in the business world based on the attractiveness of the organization, attractiveness of the individual and increased similarity between the two based on socialization and conforming to norms.⁸⁰

Similarity attraction may shed light as to why Pashtun tribesmen have been accepting, in at least a small way, to radical Islamist mullahs that the Pakistani government has imposed on them. Pashtun may feel more in common with al-Qaeda and the Taliban than a foreign occupier such as the U.S. and its allies. It may also account for why FATA is not officially regulated by the Pakistani government and why the Pashtun resent interference from outside entities regardless if it is the U.S. or Pakistan. With no interaction with the U.S. in FATA, Pashtun are only exposed to the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements which further develops a more radicalized relationship and creates animosity

⁸⁰. Ibid., 136–137.

and hostility towards outgroups, such as the U.S. This creates the perfect opportunity for enhanced group cohesion among the Pashtun and militants which may also drive more aggressive leadership by al-Qaeda and the Taliban

D. CONCLUSION

The Pashtun are a society based on honor and shame. They are fiercely independent and have, historically, resisted subjugation and intervention throughout their history. It is in their nature to resist governance by the Pakistani government and to resent U.S. drone strikes as a violation of their sovereignty. Through Pashtunwali, they have accepted, or have been coerced into sheltering, radical militants who have come to FATA from Afghanistan or other Islamic nations to train and recruit the local population for jihad. Drone strikes have created more fighters willing to fight with Takfiri elements as the accidental guerilla syndrome plays out in FATA. Many of these militant groups operate with some level of support within the Pakistani government. Regardless of how successful U.S. drone strikes are in targeting militants, minimizing collateral damage, or civilian casualties, the Pashtun will see drones as humiliating and seek revenge against the U.S. or its allies. Militant groups aligned with the Taliban or al-Qaeda have manipulated these emotions to recruit and inspire further radicalization. This desire for revenge combined with factors such as narcissistic rage and displaced aggression creates a motivated threat to the U.S. domestically and abroad.

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III. FATA AND PAKISTAN

“Every tribesman has a blood feud with his neighbor. Every man’s hand is against the other, and all against the stranger.”

–Winston Churchill on Pakistan’s tribal regions⁸¹

A. THE REGION AND PEOPLE

The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is 1,640 miles long, much of which is so remote and mountainous it is virtually inaccessible. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan run north to south along the northern section of the border and is home to 3.2 to 4.0 million people. It consists of seven provinces: North and South Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur in the north. Since retreating from Afghanistan in 2001, thousands of Taliban fighters, including the entire intact senior leadership, have found sanctuary here. Both the fleeing Taliban and the residents are overwhelmingly Sunni Pashtun.⁸² This region serves the needs of the Taliban well. They have easy ingress and egress to Afghanistan among their Pashtun brothers. The remoteness of the region makes it the ideal place to carryout insurgency operations in either country.

Traditionally, FATA has been considered a loose political system of tribal autonomy with Islamabad having no legal jurisdiction beyond 100 meters to the right and left of the few paved roads which exist in the tribal regions. However, the Pakistani government has subverted Pashtun leadership in FATA and utilized extremists to take control over the districts since the early 1970s. This practice dramatically increased during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Pashtun have demonstrated to be susceptible to religious insurgencies while resisting external government control. Unfortunately since 2001, international efforts in the region have featured the central Pakistani government intervening which is precisely the wrong strategy to employ here.

81. Seth G. Jones, “The Terrorist Threat From Pakistan,” *Survival* 53, 4 (2011): 72.

82. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, No Sign Until the Burst of Fire—Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border, “*International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring) (2008), 42.

Insurgency is the Pashtun answer to government intrusion. Over millennia, legal codes, forms of governance, and conflict resolution strategy, have been developed in FATA. The Pashtun prefer their own methods over alien external ones. Despite poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, maternal and infant mortality, and human longevity rates near the worst in the world, when not under external pressure, most Pashtun are peaceful subsistence farmers. Revolution in these areas is more about culture and religion, not economic factors.⁸³

Since 2001, the Taliban has targeted Waziri tribal leaders who resisted Taliban domination through assassination and intimidation. Between 2005 and 2006, over 200 tribal elders were murdered by Taliban agents in FATA. Further “Talibanization” of FATA has included the targeting of video stores, girls’ schools and other locations judged to immoral. Extremists are also promoting radical ideologies and challenges to government authority. With the collaboration of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence), FATA has become a base of command and control, fundraising, recruiting, training, and insurgency operations in Afghanistan, for militant groups such as the Taliban.⁸⁴

Since the 1970s, the use of militants in FATA by the Pakistani government has provided a foundation of militancy that exists today. Taliban leaders have been able to reside in FATA because of their Pashtun heritage, and the Pashtun resentment of outside interference. The intrusion of the central Pakistani government and western nations engaged in the war on terror has driven the Taliban and FATA society together. Even peaceful farmers would most likely side with the Taliban over the Pakistani military or Western forces. If for no other reason than fear of Taliban reprisal, most Pashtun have aligned themselves with the militants who inhabit FATA.

Pashtunwali demands that a man have an exaggerated sense of personal honor. Justice is wrapped in a Pashtun’s maintenance of honor and independence from external authority. Action must be taken to regain honor, even if it breaks state laws. It may take generations to avenge the wrong but retribution will be the focus of the family’s life until

⁸³.Ibid., 53–55.

⁸⁴.Ibid., 57.

honor is regained. Pashtunwali creates a conservative social dynamic in which large-scale warfare and social change only occur under religious leadership such as a charismatic mullah like the Taliban's Mullah Omar. It also dictates hospitality, protection and refuge to all who require it. This applies to anyone coming to their home including strangers. The provider must give shelter, food, drink, clothing and protection to the seeker even at the cost of their own life. This may explain the acceptance of the Taliban and why bin Laden was found in Pakistan. Freedom, honor, revenge and chivalry have defeated every effort to subjugate the Pashtun with a codified and centralized rule of law. The West continues to ignore Pashtunwali, while the Taliban and al-Qaeda use it for recruitment, shelter, and radicalization.⁸⁵

In FATA, the Pashtunwali traditions of revolt and war are stronger than in other areas of the country, and encompass outside invasion and government in general. There is also more emphasis on the greater role of religion and the tribal nature in FATA than in other regions. These beliefs form clan solidarity and collective revenge.⁸⁶ Pashtunwali gives militant groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban fertile recruiting grounds and the opportunity to expand operations and training in FATA. Pashtun society is very much driven by honor, revenge and resentment of outsiders. Militant organizations, with varying levels of support from Pakistani authorities, have been able to leverage enough support of the Pashtun to continue to thrive in this region.

1. Home of the Accidental Guerilla

“The FATA, indeed, is the ancestral home of the accidental guerilla and the place where the syndrome is visible in its purest and most classic form.”⁸⁷ al-Qaeda's presence in the region dates back about 30 years, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which drew up to 25,000 Arabs to fight with the mujahideen. The Arab takfiri presence in FATA has been nearly constant since then. During the same time period, the Taliban, which originated in refugee camps in or near FATA, grew through tribal connections and

⁸⁵. Ibid., 62–64.

⁸⁶. Anatol Lievan, *Pakistan* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 385.

⁸⁷. Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 233.

the support of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani intelligence service) and established a strong presence in the same areas. This led to foreign takfiri elements such as Chechens, Uzbeks, and Uighurs, burrowing into FATA society, which damaged the structure of the tribes which were already weakened by war and population movement. These extremists co-opted some members of the local community through guest status of Pashtunwali and religious identity and intimidated others while creating a safe haven for their activities. Religious leaders are able to exploit the external threat to assume greater leadership roles and political prominence which allows them to circumvent tribal rule and government authority.⁸⁸ The West, led by the U.S., has urged the Pakistani government to take action in FATA. In some ways, Pakistani efforts to control or eliminate militancy has increased and spread the influence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.⁸⁹

Traditional approaches in counterinsurgency are enemy focused, aimed at hunting and killing key enemy personnel. Protecting and winning over the population are secondary which is a key reason why the Pakistani army has done so poorly against insurgents. Population centered counterinsurgency operations produce results quicker and are more effective than targeting insurgents directly.⁹⁰ Population centric approaches gain the trust and support of local people by protecting them not just killing insurgents. This does not always mean less fighting, in the short-term it may mean more as security forces struggle to gain influence from militants at the grass root level. Directly targeting the enemy will marginalize them but providing security and order will re-create the necessary leverage to stabilize the region.⁹¹ In counterinsurgency terms, clearing an enemy safe haven does not mean destroying the enemy in it. Destroying the enemy is strictly secondary, if necessary at all. What is important, is rescuing the civilian population from enemy control and intimidation. It may be possible to reconcile the accidental guerilla from insurgency as opposed to the irreconcilable extremists. In Iraq,

88. Ibid., 79.

89. Ibid., 235–238.

90. Ibid., 241.

91. Ibid., 129–130.

Kilcullen references insurgency operations lifting the fear from populations that terrorists had intimidated and exploited in order to win them over and work with them to clear out remaining cells.⁹²

B. PAKISTAN AND RADICALIZATION

“It is the headquarters of al-Qaeda senior leadership”⁹³

–General David Petraeus on Pakistan’s border region

Pakistan’s rivalry and insecurity with its neighbors Afghanistan and India, explain why Pakistan has made a strong military a priority over democratic institutions and the pursuit of socio-economic development. There is also a heavy Saudi and Wahhabi influence to counter the influence of Shiite Iran. The invasions of Afghanistan, first by the Soviets in 1979, and then by U.S.-led forces in 2001, were major entry points for militancy with a high involvement of foreign intervention and impact. During the late 1970s, Pakistan, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia, supported the Afghan mujahedeen with money, training, and manpower. Pakistan also provided a training ground and was a central arena for militant religio-political movements, local insurgent groups, proxy movements and other ideological organizations on the behalf of Afghanistan. During the 1980s, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was a hub for foreign militants who wanted to contribute to Afghan jihad or organizing jihad in their own country.⁹⁴

The invasion of Afghanistan by U.S.-led forces in 2001 put Pakistan between its two historic allies, the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s solution has been to play a double game that publicly supports the U.S. and covertly backing the Afghan Taliban. At the same time, Pakistan became the target of Taliban factions such Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which accused Pakistan of betraying its historic alliance with the Afghan Taliban and siding with invading forces. After the invasion began, thousands of Afghan

⁹². Ibid., 145.

⁹³. Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan* (Arlington, VA: Rand National Security Research Division, 2010), xi, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf.

⁹⁴. Mona Kanwal Sheikh, Farzana Shaikh, and Gareth Price. *DIIS Report 2012: 12 Pakistan: Regional Rivalries, Local Impacts* (Copenhagen: Chatham House, 2012) 8, 11, 12.

Taliban, al-Qaeda members escaped to Pakistan looking for refuge, where they continue the fight in Afghanistan. This included foreign affiliates of al-Qaeda consisting of Uzbeks, Chechens, and Tajiks. These groups gradually settled in FATA.⁹⁵

Pakistan has a long history of using Islamist militants as proxies. The scale, scope and territorial range of such jihad expanded in the late 1980s, when Pakistan became an overt nuclear power. Some within the Pakistani government believed that this strategy would cause India, also a nuclear power, to act cautiously in responding to militant attacks in disputed Kashmir. Pakistan exemplified the “stability-instability paradox” by believing nuclear weapons decreased the possibility of nuclear war between nuclear states such as India and Pakistan, but at the same time increases the possibility of minor or limited war. With the development of covert, and then overt, nuclear capabilities, Pakistan could support militant groups with limited fear of retaliation.⁹⁶

Fear of India, especially a nuclear India, has been the driving force behind Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The “Islamic Bomb” reflects Pakistan’s pride in their role as the leading Muslim country when dealing with other Muslim countries over nuclear issues. Wikileaks documents the chief concern of U.S. diplomats as being the potential for terrorist sympathizers to get control of radioactive materials to be used as a dirty bomb.⁹⁷

Prior to 9/11, Pakistan’s militant groups could be grouped according to sect, theatre of operations or ethnicity. There were militant groups that traditionally focused on Kashmir but in recent years their operations have extended beyond Kashmir. This includes Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) and various Deobandi groups (revivalist Sunni Islamists) that have moved into India and continue operations in Pakistan. Some target U.S., NATO and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.⁹⁸ This expansion demonstrates the problem that Pakistan has created for the U.S. as Kashmiri groups now pose a threat to

⁹⁵. Ibid., 13.

⁹⁶. Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, 19–21.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf.

⁹⁷. Lievan, *Pakistan*, 198–200.

⁹⁸. Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, 23,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf.

the U.S. These groups were created, or allowed to exist, because of the dispute over Kashmir and the continuation of an India-centric military focus. Pakistan continues to further foreign policy and military objectives by utilizing some militant groups that destabilize the region.

There are now indications that Pakistani intelligence officers and the military are afraid of the creature they helped create in Lashkar-e-Tayiba. They acknowledge possible sympathizers within their ranks, and realize the horrible consequences if Lashkar-e-Tayiba were to join with the Taliban and sectarians in a revolt in Pakistan. Pakistan is also fearful that, if they attempt to suppress Lashkar-e-Tayiba, the group will launch successful terrorist attacks in the West, which would be disastrous for Pakistan's international standing. It is believed that the Pakistani Taliban sponsored the Times Square plot in 2010. Lashkar-e-Tayiba maintains contacts with al-Qaeda and assisted their members in escaping from Afghanistan and provided them shelter. Lashkar-e-Tayiba is a jihadi organization whose primary goal is Indian controlled Kashmir but its members have been implicated in terror plots in Europe, North America and Australia. Although no Lashkar-e-Tayiba leaders have been identified as a part of these operations. They have also participated in actions within Pakistan, which their leaders have opposed. Sunni Islamic extremism is a net with nodes, not a hierarchal organization.⁹⁹

All groups and militants within this net hate the U.S., Israel, India, and Russia, finding different targets at different times. Despite Lashkar-e-Tayiba's focus on India, no ideological barrier prevents it from acting against the West. In the jihadi world, militants come together for an operation, break apart, and then form different groups for a new plot. Lashkar-e-Tayiba's most successful operation was the Mumbai attacks in 2008. While Lashkar-e-Tayiba's targeting of Westerners earned it praise from international militants, it would have been pointless and wreckless for the Pakistani government to have coordinated this incident. Lievan discussed this incident with Pakistani experts and retired officers, who seem to believe that the Pakistani high command was not involved in ordering the attack on Mumbai. However, there is also sentiment that the operation

99. Lievan, "Pakistan," 195–196.

could not have been planned without Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence) officers knowing about it, or being involved in some capacity.¹⁰⁰

Since 2001, Pakistan has had a mixed performance when evaluating its ability to counter-domestic insurgency. These efforts consist of the regular army, a paramilitary Frontier Corps and the Frontier Constabulary for security along the border. Both the Frontier Corps and army lack counterinsurgency training and the proper equipment to deal with a mobile war against militants. They both had difficulty conducting operations, including clearing and holding territory. Pakistan has been more prepared for conventional conflict with India, not a population-centric approach to countering insurgency, which has sometimes alienated it from local inhabitants. The government has not been unable to provide the necessary development, aid and assistance to the people in order to gain their support for government and military operations. The lack of relief has made the army's reliance on "scorched-earth" policies unpopular throughout Pakistan.¹⁰¹

The difficulties in Pakistan are as attributable to political will, as to the limited capability of the government. Pakistan continues to distinguish between militant groups who operate in FATA and NWFP (North West Frontier Province) and use the tribal areas for training proxy groups destined for Afghanistan, Kashmir, India, and other areas. Pakistan has refused to target some militant groups. Elements in the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence), Frontier Corps and military have continued to support some of these organizations. Support of these groups, and their religious, political, and financial networks, has undermined the government's ability to establish law and order. Pakistani operations have failed to capture or kill militant leaders. Additionally, the Pakistani army and the government have not been successful in mobilizing the country against the militant threat. Without the population's support of military operations, it will be difficult to have a sustained commitment to "holding"

100. Ibid., 196–197.

101. Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, 36–39, 81–83, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf.

territory and rebuilding conflict-affected regions. There are over three million internally displaced persons seeking shelter and assistance across Pakistan, which is likely to inflame longstanding ethnic and sectarian issues in Pakistan.¹⁰²

1. Pakistani Government Support for Militants

Pakistani support of militant groups can be traced back to its independence in 1947, when it utilized Lashkars, or tribal forces, in an unsuccessful attempt to seize Kashmir. This resulted in the first Indian - Pakistani conventional war, which ended in the United Nations imposing demarcated areas to Pakistan and India. During Operation Gibraltar in 1965, Pakistan used approximately 30,000 infiltrators in Indian administered Kashmir to create bases and conduct sabotage in the attempt to facilitate conventional troops being introduced into the conflict. Prior to launching operation Gibraltar, Pakistan concluded that Kashmir possessed key elements that made it vulnerable to guerrilla tactics. This included a worthy cause, challenging terrain, a resolute and warlike people in the Pakistanis, a sympathetic local population, the ready availability of weapons and equipment, and greater leadership and discipline of the guerillas. Operation Gibraltar was successful in starting the second conventional Indian- Pakistani war, which ended in a stalemate.¹⁰³

Pakistani assistance of Islamist groups in Afghanistan began at least five years prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979. These efforts intensified after the Soviet invasion in conjunction with U.S. and Saudi assistance. As the Soviet presence grew, Pakistan employed religious groups including Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami, to establish Pakistani based militant groups that could operate in Afghanistan. The success of the mujahideen in repelling the Soviets from Afghanistan led Pakistan to believe that if militants could defeat nuclear power Russia, the same tactics could defeat India

102. Ibid., 83–84.

103. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, 7–10,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf.

administered Kashmir. Many mujahideen veterans from Afghanistan were redeployed following the Soviet withdrawal to the Kashmir front, and used to establish training bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁴

There are at least three different types of Pakistani militant groups that receive government support. First, are groups like Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Mullah Mohammad Omar's Taliban, which were cultivated as state assets, and remain as such. A second group comprises militant organizations, which have a history of state patronage, and have long served in Afghanistan and India. After Pakistan supported the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, these groups turned on the government and launched attacks against the army, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence), Pakistan's civilian leadership, and President Musharraf. Some Deobandi militant groups aligned with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Pakistan has chosen not to eliminate these groups that have targeted the state. The strategy seems to be to target the individual and deter the group from future attacks in Pakistan. The group may be allowed to survive, because it could be valuable to Pakistan in the future. The third group consists of militants like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, who in some cases, the government has supported and then negotiated peace deals. Some of these groups have been targeted when they posed too much of a threat to the state. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has utilized charismatic leaders who effectively exploit local grievances and coerce the local population through intimidation and assassination. This occurs in regions where there is little state authority, or where Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has active state assistance. The power of these groups is expanded through violence, or the threat of violence, while providing basic services where state influence is weak. Pakistan has used varying methods to deal with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leaders which include military options but they have also been willing to negotiate peace deals on terms favorable to the militants.¹⁰⁵

Pakistan's willingness to use militant groups to facilitate foreign policy and national defense, may have fulfilled its short-term goals, but it seems that it is now causing more instability than it solves. Pakistan does not appear to have the desire or

104. Ibid., 11–12.

105. Ibid., 120–121.

ability to fully control these groups who threaten Pakistan, whether they care to realize it or not, and the West. The groups in FATA have the ability and motivation to strike the U.S. homeland and its assets and allies abroad. There is a need for the U.S. to have the ability to proactively intervene in FATA to defend itself and Western allies from the evolving asymmetric threat that emanates from this region.

Madrassahs compensated to an extent for the weak state of Pakistani public education but a small number of madrassahs adhering to Wahhabism and other ultraconservative schools of Islam veered away from their educational missions and toward political Islam. This trend was exacerbated first by the Islamic resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and secondly by the dispute over Kashmir by India and Pakistan. Even though this new brand of Islam differed significantly from the open, inclusive Sufism inspired variety practiced in Pakistan, politicians found the Islamists and their political parties useful pawns in their struggles for power in Islamabad.¹⁰⁶

After 9/11, more Pakistani youth began turning to religious groups to address their grievances. This is due at least in part because of the religious group's persistent attack on the credibility of civilian institutions and leadership. Imams, religious leadership of a given mosque, may target parents to send their children to particular madrassahs for indoctrination. Once ensconced at the madrassah, the student may be recruited by affiliated tanzeems (militant groups) and designated to go to a specific camp for military training. Another method to attract potential militant manpower involves inviting specific speakers to address congregations at a mosque. The speaker may address various aspects of the Indian conflict and abuses in Kashmir. Smaller meetings are subsequently arranged on related topics. This allows the organization to continue whittling down the potential pool of recruits both through supply-side and demand-side evaluations. Religious revivalism such as this could increase the base of potential sympathizers of Islamist and militant organizations who could in turn be recruited by tanzeems. Further, this trend has created an environment that is likely more favorable for the operations of such organizations. Within this environment several recent events and

¹⁰⁶. Steve Breyman and Aneel Salman, "Reaping the Whirlwind: Pakistani Counterinsurgency Campaigns, 2004–2010," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Journal* 34, no. 65 (Summer 2010), 4.

U.S. actions have motivated a deep sense of injustice and created deep anti-U.S. sentiment. This includes the ongoing Israeli occupation, the wide-ranging perception that Israel acts with the support of the United States and the failure to obtain a secure Palestinian state. The belief that the United States buttresses the Gulf state monarchies, and provides unstinting support to the Pakistani Army, has also engendered cynicism and antipathy toward the United States and its claim to support democracy among wide segments of the civilian polity.¹⁰⁷

Considering that public schools educate about seventy percent of Pakistan's full-time students, compared to three percent or less for madrassahs, public schools probably deserve more scrutiny than they receive at present. Moreover, surveys of students in public, private, and religious schools demonstrate that while madrassah students are more likely to support jihad and outright war with India, public school students also show propensity towards the same attitudes.

Fair's survey also suggests the household as a new focus of attention. The vast majority of the households knew of their family member's decision to pursue militancy, and many within the household actively refused to grant permission. More research is needed to understand the dynamics of household decision making, and how families may be mobilized to discourage such actions by family members.¹⁰⁸

Radicalization and recruitment of militants in FATA is not just limited to madrassah students. The base of future militants exists not only in madrassahs, but also in public schools, private schools, and among the uneducated. These feelings, which predispose a Pashtun toward radicalization, are a part of Pashtunwali, and are manipulated by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, while the Pakistani government views it as a convenient and strategic force multiplier. Focusing on family interaction and structure, may give a true and clear view of the path to militancy.

107. C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for al-Qaeda and Other Organizations," 492-494.

108. Fair, "Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?" 62.

C. SENTIMENT OF THE POPULATION

“Kill one enemy, make ten.”¹⁰⁹

–Pashtun saying

1. New American Foundation Poll

Based on the results of the 2010 public opinion poll of FATA residents by New America Foundation, 76 percent are against U.S. drone strikes in FATA (Figure 4). Much of this sentiment may have to do with 48 percent of FATA residents believing that drones largely kill civilians and 33 percent believing drones kill both civilians and militants (Figure 5). Only 16 percent felt that drones accurately targeted militants (Figure 5). If the people have FATA do not know the accuracy of drones then this program will not have the support of the people. Seventy-seven percent felt that the real purpose of the U.S. war on terrorism was to divide the Muslim world to ensure U.S. domination (Figure 6). FATA residents are not aware of the purpose of U.S. drone strikes and believe we are killing innocent civilians to ensure our domination. Until we change these basic ideas, drone warfare will not be understood or supported in FATA.

It is not surprising that 87 percent of FATA residents opposed U.S. military action against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Figure 7). This is consistent with Pashtunwali and the resistance to outside intervention. However, 69 percent supported Pakistani military intervention against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Figure 8). Outside intervention by the Pakistani military assisting FATA would be against Pashtunwali, but probably less so than accepting western military assistance. In contrast to these findings, Taj specifically references the people of Waziristan suffering from the collateral damage inflicted by the Pakistani army’s use of long range artillery and air strikes, which are not as accurate as drone strikes.¹¹⁰ Suicide bombings were often or sometimes justified against the U.S. military by 59 percent of FATA residents (Figure 9). Eighty-three percent felt that suicide bombings were never or rarely justified against Pakistani military and police (Figure 10).

109. Johnson and Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency,” 87–88.

110. Farhat Taj, “Drone Attacks: Challenging Some Fabrications,”
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\01\02\story_2-1-2010_pg3_5.

The support for suicide bombings against U.S. forces would indicate the FATA residents supporting defending themselves against the aggression of an outsider. Honor and revenge of Pashtunwali would require Pashtun to act against the U.S.

Figure 11 illustrates that most FATA residents believe the U.S. is the biggest threat to their safety. When considering who was most responsible for violence in FATA, 40 percent blamed the U.S., followed by traditional enemy India receiving 13 percent of the blame (Figure 12). These findings are consistent with the views of FATA residents that drone strikes mostly target civilians in furtherance of U.S. domination and destruction of the Muslim world. Militant groups combined only received 22 percent of fault for violence in FATA. A solid majority of FATA residents oppose the presence of Taliban and al-Qaeda groups in FATA as depicted in Figure 13. This indicates that FATA residents may not truly support militancy as initially believed. There may be alternatives to militancy for FATA residents which need to be researched to end the seemingly endless flow of militants that al-Qaeda and the Taliban generate.




Figure 4. Residents who support or oppose drone attacks inside FATA (From Thorp, 2010).




Figure 5. FATA residents who think U.S. drone attacks kill civilians or militants (From Thorp, 2010).




Figure 6. Opinions regarding the real purpose of U.S.-led war on terrorism (From Thorp, 2010).




Figure 7. FATA residents who support or oppose U.S. military action against al-Qaeda and Taliban (From Thorp, 2010).




Figure 8. FATA residents who support or oppose Pakistani military action against al-Qaeda and Taliban (From Thorp, 2010).




Figure 9. Justification of suicide bombings against U.S. military (From Thorp, 2010).




Figure 10. Justification of suicide bombings against Pakistani military and police (From Thorp, 2010).




Figure 11. Countries or groups who pose the greatest threat to personal safety (From Thorp, 2010).




Figure 12. Countries most responsible for violence occurring inside FATA today (From Thorp, 2010).




Figure 13. FATA residents who support or oppose the presence of fighters inside FATA (From Thorp, 2010).

2. Pew Research Center

The Pew Research Center conducted a face-to-face survey of 1,206 Pakistani adults from March 28 to April 13, 2012. The survey is representative of 82 percent of Pakistan. FATA and other regions were excluded due to security reasons. It found that the number of Pakistanis who consider the U.S. an enemy has continued to rise. Seventy-four percent now consider the U.S. enemy, up from 69 percent in 2012 and 64 percent three years ago. Only 17 percent support U.S. drone strikes against leaders of extremist groups, even if they are conducted with Pakistani government. In 2009, 53 percent of Pakistanis supported the use of its own military to target extremists in FATA and neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Today, 32 percent favor such measures.¹¹¹

The number of Pakistanis who view the U.S. as the enemy continues to rise steadily and the drone warfare program receives little support. Despite the aide the U.S.

¹¹¹. No author, "Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.," *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/27/pakistani-public-opinion-ever-more-critical-of-u-s/>.

provides to Pakistan, it is clear there are issues with our policies in this nation. The anti-Americanism that is revealed must in some way be drawn from drone strikes. The findings of the Pew Center Research are similar to the findings of the Public Opinion in Pakistan's Tribal Regions poll conducted by New America Foundation with the exception of Figure 13. In the Pew Center Research which did not include FATA residents, the majority of the population does not favor the use of Pakistani forces to fight militancy. In the New America Foundation poll which polled FATA residents only, 69 percent supported the use of the Pakistani military. The fact that New America Foundation only interviewed FATA residents and the Pew Research Center did not interview FATA residents may explain why so many in FATA supported the use of the military. FATA residents, who live under al-Qaeda and Taliban oppression, are desperate for assistance and would prefer the military over militants.

D. CONCLUSION

The militancy that exists in FATA today was created by the Pakistani government in the 1970s. al-Qaeda and Taliban linked militant groups today operate in Pakistan, especially the tribal regions, while the government is either incapable or unwilling to eliminate these groups. Pakistan has used militant groups to deal with traditional border rival India and maintain influence in Afghanistan. It is likely Pakistan prefers to allow militant groups to exist for use in asymmetrical warfare or to further foreign policy initiatives. Many of these groups have been able to find refuge in the tribal regions. U.S. drone strikes within FATA are humiliating in Pashtunwali and must be avenged by the Pashtun. Charismatic militant leaders are able to recruit Pashtun tribesmen who are driven by the values of an exaggerated sense of honor, revenge and the rejection of outsiders. Drones may also provide motivation for the continuance of the existing accidental guerilla syndrome which has plagued FATA by giving Pashtun tribesmen incentive to fight with takfiri elements. The relationship between militants and Pashtun explains the animosity and resentment FATA residents have for the U.S., its ally Israel and drone warfare.

IV. DRONE WARFARE

“There’s a risk of driving (al-Qaeda and its allies) farther and farther into Pakistan, into cities. There’s a danger of weakening the government we want to bolster.”¹¹²

–Daniel Byman

A. CONFLICTING RESULTS

Drones offer advanced surveillance capabilities because of their visual sensors, long flight times, and flexibility to rapidly move to new areas. The ability to weaponize these surveillance platforms makes them tremendously valuable to U.S. officials, who need to take immediate lethal action based on surveillance. While drone use in Pakistan has been credited with substantial political and social blowback in the form of anti-Americanism, there is no publicly available study of the strategic effects of drone campaigns. Empirical data suggests drone strikes are correlated with decreasing militant violence, though there is no data to support the argument that strikes cause decreases in violence. Data indicates that drone strikes are correlated with a reduction in militant violence, but it cannot be determined if this is long-term. These decreases appear to only temporarily interrupt militant operations because soon after the number of drone strikes decreases, militant violence increases. There are no comprehensive measures for efficacy of drone strikes. The few empirical studies available do not contain enough data for broad conclusions.¹¹³ In reviewing the history of this tactic, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of drone warfare as a proactive self-defense measure. For every successful drone strike, there are drawbacks which may decrease the value of future drone operations by enflaming local populations and creating resentment toward the West. In the end, we must ask if the successful targeting of militants is worth the potential collateral issues which may not be immediately apparent.

112. Greg Miller, “U.S. Missile Strikes Said to Take Heavy Toll on al-Qaeda,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 22, 2009.

113. Andrew Foust and Ashley S. Boyle, “The Strategic Context of Lethal Drones A Framework For Discussion,” *American Security Project Perspective* (August 16, 2012): 7.

The CIA has particularly utilized armed drone strikes as a reliable method for limited strikes against high-value targets in otherwise inaccessible places. This includes Pakistan where officials have quietly accepted their use. Collecting data on drone strikes is difficult and the program is classified to various degrees within the U.S. government. Different aspects have been leaked to reporters but there is no way to accurately confirm that these accounts reflect the actual process by which drone strikes are decided and carried out. Analysis is limited because researchers are forced to gather information from other sources. FATA is considered off-limits to foreigners. Most public data available about drone strikes comes from government sources, either Pakistan or the U.S., which introduces unavoidable bias in reporting. Governments such as the U.S. and Pakistan do not provide official tallies of drone strikes or even the locations of where they occur. The public is forced to rely on unverifiable media accounts.¹¹⁴ Poor security prevents media organizations from accessing the “lawless Taliban-controlled area” such as Waziristan. Militants themselves manipulate the scenes of drone strikes to provide messages to Taliban or al-Qaeda affiliated media persons and Pakistani officials sympathetic to the terrorists.¹¹⁵ The U.S. may benefit from transparency about its drone warfare program. Without independent and unbiased news accounts, the world’s opinion is shaped by the Pakistani government and local reports which may be manipulated by the militants.

1. Limited Options and Response

Without decisive Pakistani military action, America has decided the best way to protect its interests in the region is through drone strikes. The Taliban has admitted that they have been adversely affected by drone strikes but they insist they will win the war in the end. Drone strikes prompt changes in militant behavior and cause militants to change locations quickly. It is difficult to get independent assessment of the attacks in North Waziristan where the majority have occurred. Most who live there are too afraid to speak out about the subject. Interviews of residents found sentiment supporting drones because

¹¹⁴. Andrew Foust, “Understanding the Strategic and Tactical Considerations of Drone Strikes,” *American Security Project Perspective* (January 2013): 2–4.

¹¹⁵. Taj Farhat, “The Year of the Drone Misinformation,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 21, no. 3 (2010): 530.

they target the right people. Those who disapproved stated it was because drones target the innocent. One resident preferred drones because the Pakistani army does not respect the honor of their men and women. Many North Waziristan residents stated that foreign fighters were being targeted by drones including Arabs, Uzbeks and Tajiks.¹¹⁶

In 2010, 90 percent of drone strikes occurred in North Waziristan because the Pakistani army is either unwilling or unable to clear out insurgent groups. The military has intervened in the six other agencies of FATA but not North Waziristan which is a base of the Haqqani network, al-Qaeda, foreign fighters and local Taliban militants. Pakistan views these groups as a hedge against Indian influence in the region and the Haqqani network has long been considered an asset of Pakistani military intelligence.¹¹⁷ Issues such as these, need to be resolved between the U.S. and Pakistan. The U.S. is currently utilizing drones to address a problem within Pakistan that poses a threat to the U.S. homeland. The optimal solution to militancy within Pakistan is for them to handle the situation and not rely on the U.S.

Peter Bergin categorizes drone strikes as the least bad option for the U.S. in Pakistan. We cannot send ground troops in for fear of starting a war with Pakistan. Drones are a safe way for the U.S. to pursue al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders without a really massive negative reaction from Islamabad. However, he notes that Pakistan has tempered their anger over drone strikes at times because they realize the strategic necessity for the U.S. to target Taliban leaders like Baitalluh Mehsud, who is believed to have masterminded the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. He believes drone strikes are a tactic and not a strategy to deal with insurgency in Pakistan. Drones should be used with political and economic development in the areas producing militants. Bergin also mentioned the importance of militant surrender, laying down their arms, and signing peace deals as opposed to lethal drone strikes.¹¹⁸ Bergin's

¹¹⁶. Aleem Maqpool, "America's Secret Drone War in Pakistan," *BBC*, July 22, 2010, sec. South Asia, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10728844>.

¹¹⁷. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, "Washington's Phantom War," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67939/peter-bergen-and-katherine-tiedemann/washingtons-phantom-war>.

¹¹⁸. No author, "Changing Opinion On Drone Strikes In Pakistan" <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113971877>.

comments endorse the theory that drones need to be utilized within a comprehensive counterinsurgency program. There must be viable options available for the U.S. to utilize in addition to or in place of drone strikes. Lethal targeting of militants in a foreign country is not a sustainable strategy that will lead to stability in the region.

A Taliban spokesman noted that short term problems of drone strikes include martyrdom and realignment in ranks but their command and control system is very strong. The new blood inspires courage and power. There are many residents of the tribal areas that believe U.S. drone strikes are successfully being used as propaganda tools by the militants. Pakistani journalist and militant expert Rahimullah Yusufzai asks how many “common militants” or people must die to kill militant leaders such as Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri?¹¹⁹ These comments illustrate the damage that collateral damage and civilian casualties can have on the people of FATA. For every drone strike that occurs in FATA, the impact is felt by the entire community. Whether the target is considered high-value or low-value, drone strikes can adversely affect the local population, which may create future militants or strengthen radicalization.

In February of 2011, senior Pakistani officials asked the Obama administration to put new restraints on a targeted-killing program that the government in Islamabad has secretly authorized for years. The CIA is increasingly killing “mere foot soldiers,” a senior Pakistani official said, adding that the issue has come up in discussions in Washington involving President Asif Ali Zardari. The official said Pakistan has pressed the Americans “to find better targets, do it more sparingly and be a little less gung-ho.” Experts who track the strikes closely said a program that began with intermittent lethal attacks on al-Qaeda leaders has evolved into a campaign that seems primarily focused on lower-level fighters. Peter Bergen, a director at the New America Foundation, said data on the strikes indicate that 94 percent of those killed are lower-level militants. He found it hard to make the case for that many militants being able to threaten the U.S. in some way

¹¹⁹. Aleem Maqpool, “America’s Secret Drone War in Pakistan,” *BBC*, July 22, 2010, sec. South Asia, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10728844>.

and added that targeted killings are about leaders not blanket dispensation.¹²⁰ Considering the potential collateral damage that drones can create, they should be utilized for high-value targets only. If a low-level militant has no command and control value, is the drone strike worth the collateral damage or civilian casualties it may cause? The U.S. should have a strategy to deal with low-level militants rather than killing them, the effects may be counterproductive to regional stability.

During the summer of 2011, the White House put new restrictions on CIA drone strikes in the wake of concerns that the program was primarily targeting lower-level militants while provoking anger in Pakistan. Since then, according to an independent analysis, the strikes have yielded a significant increase in the percentage of people killed whom the government considers “high-value targets” but the program is still killing mainly rank-and-file fighters. The changes grew out of an internal Obama administration debate in the wake of a March 17 drone attack that the government of Pakistan condemned as a mistake, saying it killed more than 40 civilians. The U.S. says the attack killed “a large group of heavily armed men ... all of whom acted in a manner consistent with al-Qaeda-linked militants.” Dennis C. Blair, who was ousted in 2010 as President Obama’s director of national intelligence, has criticized such strikes, saying there is little point in killing easily replaceable foot soldiers if the cost is public outrage in Pakistan. Similar concerns have been expressed within the administration.¹²¹

2. Categories and Impact

The CIA classifies its drone strikes into two categories. In one type, known as “personality strikes,” the agency tracks and targets a specific person who has been placed on a “kill list” because he has been deemed a threat to the United States. The other type, known as “signature strikes,” is the one primarily affected by the new rules. In those attacks, the CIA watches a group of suspected militants through drone surveillance video

¹²⁰. Greg Miller, “Increased U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Killing Few High-value Militants,” *The Washington Post*, February 21, 2011, sec. Nation, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html>.

¹²¹. Ken Dilanian, “U.S. Put New Restrictions on CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 7, 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/07/world/la-fg-cia-drones-20111108>.

and other means until officials are satisfied that the targets are plotting or carrying out attacks against U.S. troops or American interests, officials have said. The names of those militants are not necessarily known. On numerous occasions, senior militant figures on target lists were killed in signature strikes, U.S. officials say, and their identities were discovered only afterward.¹²² Authorizing a lethal drone strike is difficult to do, based merely on a group's behavior. The U.S. must limit these types of operations and ensure that they are accurately targeting high-value militants. Otherwise, the U.S. may be targeting low-value militants, which is not worth the risk of collateral damage or civilian casualties.

In early 2012, then White House counterterrorism advisor John Brennan stated that "the core al-Qaeda leadership is a shadow of its former self," based on documents seized in bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad. Bin Laden was struggling to attract new recruits when he was killed and had acknowledged "disaster after disaster" and even urged his leaders to flee the tribal regions and go to places "away from aircraft photography and bombardment." Brennan claimed that the "precision" of drones has limited collateral damage and civilian deaths would be much higher if conventional military force were used. Targeted strikes "can be a wise choice" because they eliminate the need for "large, intrusive military deployments [that] risk playing into al-Qaeda's strategy of trying to draw us into long, costly wars that drain us financially, inflame anti-American resentment and inspire the next generation of terrorists."¹²³ Drones provide access into areas where Pakistani forces will not go and U.S. forces cannot go. When utilized, drones are more accurate than Pakistani army operations.¹²⁴ Intelligence and technology improvements now allow U.S. officials to forgo an opportunity to kill a senior militant to get a clearer shot with less potential for collateral damage or casualties. The fear of never getting the chance to target a militant is less of a concern.¹²⁵

122. Ibid.

123. "John Brennan, White House Counterterrorism Chief, Defends Drone Strikes [UPDATE]," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/30/john-brennan-drone-strikes_n_1464989.html.

124. No author, Drones, Remote Targeting and the Promise of Law 1, <http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/12908026>.

125. Ken Dilanian, "CIA Drones May Be Avoiding Pakistani Civilians," Los Angeles Times, February 22, 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/22/world/la-fg-drone-strikes-20110222>.

Even former CIA officials who describe the drone program as essential said they have noted how infrequently they recognized the names of those killed during the barrage of strikes in the past year. The CIA declined to comment on a program that the agency refuses to acknowledge publicly but U.S. officials familiar with drone operations said the strikes are hitting important al-Qaeda operatives and are critical to keeping the United States safe. “This effort has evolved because our intelligence has improved greatly over the years, and we’re able to identify not just senior terrorists, but also al-Qaeda foot soldiers, who are planning attacks on our homeland and our troops in Afghanistan,” said a U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the classified program, “We would be remiss if we didn’t go after people who have American blood on their hands,” the official said.¹²⁶ While being precise and providing extended reach to the U.S., drones cannot be overly relied upon by decision makers to target militant foot soldiers. The U.S. needs to reach agreements with Pakistan to develop a strategy to effectively deal with a low-level militant rather than a lethal drone strike and the possibility of collateral damage and civilian deaths.

While the U.S. may feel it is targeting militants in self-defense, the impact is inevitably felt in FATA. Drone warfare does not hold territory which allows militants to return.¹²⁷ After the strike, life resumes in the region. The militant may be eliminated but the group adapts and survives. “You have to hold the ground permanently after cleaning up the militants rather than leaving the footprints of boots,” says a senior security official, citing military operations in Swat, Bajaur, South Waziristan, and other areas, as well as the army’s commitment to help victims of the country’s devastating floods.¹²⁸ A dead terrorist does not allow for intelligence gathering and creates more martyrs.¹²⁹ There is no opportunity to interview the dead militant and recover evidence such as cell phones or

126. Greg Miller, “Increased U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Killing Few High-value Militants,” *The Washington Post*, February 21, 2011, sec. Nation, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html>.

127. No author, “Exploring Technology, Effectiveness, Consequences of Drone Warfare | PBS NewsHour | January 23, 2013,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june13/drones_01-23.html.

128. Owais Tohid, “U.S. Drones Are Pounding Pakistan’s North Waziristan. Here’s Why,” *Christian Science Monitor*, September 16, 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0916/U.S.-drones-are-pounding-Pakistan-s-North-Waziristan.-Here-s-why>.

129. Hillel Ofek, “The Tortured Logic of Obama’s Drone War,” *The New Atlantis* (Spring 2010): 37.

laptop computers. Once a militant is killed by a U.S. drone strike, they may become a martyr figure to aspiring jihadists. Militants intentionally conduct business in civilian areas to maximize civilian deaths, which can be used to rally anti-American sentiment and recruit future militants. Drone strikes were seen by militants as cowardly, and they sought out locals with violence, based on strong feelings of revenge. Without the holding of territory after a drone strike, the civilian population remains vulnerable to retaliation and retribution. Dislike of drones doesn't infer support of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Many FATA residents are caught between drones and militancy.¹³⁰ Drones impact both residents and militants within FATA. There are some in FATA who are trying to survive militant domination and avoid drone strikes. The U.S. must limit the damage inflicted on non-radicalized residents for fear of creating new militants and fueling anti-western sentiment.

B. CASE STUDIES

“When the drones hit, they don't see children, they don't see anybody. They kill women, children, they kill everybody. . . I am part of the answer . . . I'm avenging the attack.”¹³¹

–Faisal Shahzad, when asked at his trial how he could justify planting a bomb that could kill children in Times Square

1. Mustafa Abu al-Yazid

In June of 2010, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, an Egyptian born founding member of al-Qaeda, was killed in a U.S. drone in North Waziristan. He was described as the group's number three in command, overseeing plots, recruitment, fundraising and internal security. While this is described as a blow to al-Qaeda, there seems to be an endless supply of number threes available as Yazid is at least the eighth number three leader that has died or been jailed since 2001. Reports indicate that Yazid's wife, three daughters and a grandchild died in the drone strike.¹³²

¹³⁰. No author, *Drones, Remote Targeting and the Promise of Law 1*, <http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/12908026>.

¹³¹. Jeffrey Sluka, “Death From Above UAVS and Losing Hearts and Minds,” *Military Review* (June 2011): 75.

¹³². “Drone War Hitting Its Targets - CNN.com,” <http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/06/09/bergen.drone.war/index.html>.

If Yazid was that easily replaceable to al-Qaeda, was he high value enough to warrant killing his entire family with a drone strike? Based on his position in al-Qaeda the strike was justified because of his command and control function. He managed recruitment, fundraising, future plots and internal security. His death will save Western lives but at what cost? Yazid's wife, three daughters and grandchild died for an easily replaceable militant. Drone strikes like this show the need for alternative measures to lethal targeting by drones. The Pakistani government must assist the U.S. in providing less than lethal options for the U.S. to defend itself from threats that originate in this region.

2. Najibullah Zazi

In 2009, Najibullah Zazi and two colleagues traveled to Pakistan to fight with the Taliban. They were recruited by an al-Qaeda facilitator and taken to North Waziristan to meet with several al-Qaeda leaders. Zazi and two of his colleagues were then taken to an al-Qaeda training camp in South Waziristan. Zazi had an "epiphany" during his trips to North and South Waziristan and while in training they agreed to return to the U.S. and conduct martyrdom operations. He received further explosives training in South Waziristan prior to coming to the U.S. The training and recruiting Zazi received in FATA was critical to Zazi's plot. Without the explosives training and technical experience Zazi would have had to rely on the Internet for instructions on how to build the device.¹³³

The case of Zazi and his group, show the seriousness of the threat that is posed to the U.S. from Pakistan. Zazi was recruited and trained in Pakistan for an operation within the U.S. homeland. Earlier in this research, the unwillingness of the Pakistani government to intervene in North Waziristan was discussed. The majority of drone strikes have occurred in this region, because of the inability and unwillingness of the Pakistanis to take action. Zazi is the perfect example of why the U.S. must proactively act to defend itself in FATA.

¹³³. Jones, "The Terrorist Threat From Pakistan," 78.

3. Baitullah Mehsud

In August of 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, commander of the Pakistan Taliban, was killed in a drone strike on his father-in laws's house in South Waziristan. Also killed in the attack were his wife, uncle, in-laws and eight others. Mehsud was responsible for the kidnapping of soldiers, coordinating suicide attacks throughout Pakistan and masterminding the assassination of Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.¹³⁴ Prior to this successful drone strike, a previous drone attempt in July resulted in seventeen deaths and twenty-seven injuries when it is believed the U.S. targeted a militant base run by Mehsud. This was a week after another unsuccessful U.S. drone attempt in which dozens were killed at a Taliban funeral.¹³⁵ Drone strikes are unpopular with the Pakistani people. Militants have even targeted the Pakistani government in the Punjabi heartland. After a March of 2009 attack on a police academy in Lahore, Mehsud stated the attack was "in retaliation for the continued drone strikes by the U.S. in collaboration with Pakistan on our people."¹³⁶

There is little doubt about the threat that Mehsud posed to both the U.S. and Pakistan. What is most discouraging is that the U.S. had to target Mehsud with a drone strike, as opposed to cooperating with the Pakistani government to create a solution to eliminate the threat. This is especially true considering the damage that he had already done within Pakistan and the future destabilization his militant group presented. It is difficult to determine the collateral damage and civilian casualties that were inflicted by previous drone strikes that were unsuccessful in targeting Mehsud. Judging by the locations targeted, surely some of those killed were militants in some capacity but were their deaths worth the anger and resentment felt within FATA? Many of these militants

134. Shane Harris, "Are Drone Strikes Murder?" *NationalJournal.com*, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/magazine/are-drone-strikes-murder--20100109>.

135. Alex Rodriguez, "U.S. Drone Attacks Said to Kill 17 at Taliban Outposts in Pakistan," *Los Angeles Times*, July 4, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/04/world/fg-pakistan-missiles4>.

136. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedeman, "Revenge of the Drones," *New America Foundation* (October 19, 2009). http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/revenge_of_the_drones.

may have been best dealt with through less than lethal tactics. Collaboration with Pakistan could have made the targeting of Mehsud far more efficient with less collateral damage.

C. NEW AMERICA DATABASE

“Nevertheless, every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.”¹³⁷

–David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum

In 2013, there have been six drone strikes in Pakistan (Figure 14). Based on previous years documented, it appears the U.S. may not be as reliant on drone strikes as the number of strikes continues to steadily decline since 2010. This may be due to deteriorating relations with Pakistan. It is hard to attribute the decline to more selective targeting of high-value militant leaders as the Bush administration successfully targeted leaders about one-third of the time, while the Obama administration is at 13 percent. With 48 strikes last year, there were only five confirmed civilian deaths (Table 1 and Figure 15), which represent just two percent of drone casualties (Table 2 and Figure 16). Unknown identity deaths have declined since 2010 and civilian deaths declined notably from 2011 to 2012 (Table 1). In 2012, militant deaths increased with significant decreases in unknown identity deaths and civilian deaths (Table 2 and Figure 16). Table 2 concludes with a total of the average percentages of deaths to militants, unknown individuals and civilians from 2004–2012. The death rate of civilians and unknown persons killed per strike has also dramatically decreased over the last few years (Figure 16). Since 2010, less than one unknown person or civilian were killed in each drone strike. In 2012, 6.2 militants were killed per strike, while only 1 unknown or civilian was killed.¹³⁸

¹³⁷. David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” *The New York Times*, May 17, 2009, sec. Opinion, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html>.

¹³⁸. No author, *The Year of the Drone An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013*. New America Foundation, n.d. <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones>.

The ratio of militant to civilian and unknown casualties was over six to one. Who exactly are these militants and why are they categorized as militants? Many FATA residents are caught between drone strikes and the militants who terrorize FATA. Not everyone is a Mehsud or an al-Qaeda or Taliban leader with command and control functions. Do all of these targeted militants need to be killed or can some be dealt with by less than lethal options with the assistance of the Pakistani government? The U.S. cannot stabilize this region by killing everyone who has some type of militant trait or has associated with a militant group. Many FATA residents are just trying to survive and would not deal with militants if they had safe options readily available. Placed in a non-militant environment, many FATA residents would not have a need to become radicalized and less drone strikes which target reconcilable militants may deter some from seeking militant revenge against the West.




Figure 14. Number of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan (From New America Foundation, 2010).

Table 1. Estimated Total Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013 (From New America Foundation, 2010).

Year	Militant Low	Militant High	Unknown Low	Unknown High	Civilian Low	Civilian High	Total Low	Total High
2013	44	53	3	5	0	0	47	58
2012	197	317	19	31	5	5	221	349
2011	304	488	31	36	56	64	367	600
2010	555	960	38	50	16	21	611	1,028
2009	241	508	44	136	66	80	354	721
2008	157	265	49	54	23	28	229	347
2004–2007	43	76	16	18	95	107	155	200
Total	1,533	2,658	200	330	261	305	1,963	3,293




Figure 15. Types of deaths to civilians and militants (From New America Foundation, 2010).

Types of Deaths per Strike




Figure 16. Types of deaths per strike to militants and civilians (From New America Foundation, 2010)

Statistics valid through February 11, 2013

Table 2. Types of Casualties Per Year (calculated using high and low ends of range) (From New America Foundation 2010).

Year	Militant	Unknown	Civilian
2012	89%	9%	2%
2011	80%	8–18%	1–15%
2010	94%	5–6%	2–3%
2009	69–70%	12–19%	11–19%
2008	80–84%	16–21%	8–10%
2004–7	35–43%	9–10%	54–61%
TOTAL	84–85%	9–13%	14–19%

Statistics valid through February 11, 2013

D. CONCLUSION

The U.S. is capable of precisely targeting militants in the FATA region of Pakistan with drone strikes that have minimal collateral damage or civilian casualties. Drone strikes are being utilized less often than in the past. Drones may create recruiting opportunities and inspire further radicalization of militants but these events may have occurred without drone strikes. When leveraged, drones are accurate. Civilian and unknown identity casualties have decreased. Drones appear to have short-term value by hampering militant operations and planning but the long-term value remains to be seen. Militant organizations in FATA aligned with al-Qaeda and the Taliban seem to survive and adapt to drone strikes despite leaders being eliminated. The case studies showed the human toll and impact of individual drone strikes against militants of various levels. If not leveraged properly, drones have the potential to create more militancy and radicalization than they solve. Drones may be best utilized as a last resort tactic to deal with high-value militants who pose an imminent threat to the U.S. and its interests.

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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

“The Jews love life, so that is what we shall take from them. We are going to win because they love life and we love death.”¹³⁹

–Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah

A. CONCLUSION

The U.S. drone warfare program is a tactic capable of accurately targeting identified militants to proactively defend the U.S. homeland and assets abroad. The threat from al-Qaeda and associated groups which train and thrive in FATA, aided by the Taliban, must be mitigated by the U.S. While there will inevitably be collateral damage and civilian casualties associated with drone strikes, it is a discriminate and proportional attempt to precisely target militants with minimal collateral damage. However, the U.S. must avoid becoming overly reliant on this method. Drones must remain a tactic and not become a policy which dictates foreign relations, the centerpiece of military operations or the favored tool of the intelligence community. Drones are not an effective substitute for securing the local population from militants. Even after successful drone strikes, militants eventually return to the regions they previously dominated because drones alone do not hold territory. Drone strikes will also inflame Pashtun values such as honor and shame which can manifest in the form of narcissistic rage and displaced aggression against U.S. interests and allies such as Israel. Militant leaders can benefit from the anger of Pashtun tribesmen inspired by drone strikes to further radicalize and recruit within FATA and strengthen their organization.

To prevent itself from becoming overly dependent on drone strikes, the U.S. must reserve drones for high-value militants who have a command and control function within their terror organization. It should also be a last resort option. If a militant can be arrested or diplomatically detained, without compromising the safety and security of U.S. interests, it may be more beneficial to pursue non-lethal measures which allow for questioning and further intelligence gathering. The U.S. should avoid targeting easily

139. Falk, *Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motive*, 182.

replaceable low-value militants who lack leadership responsibilities. The potential for losing the hearts and minds of FATA residents outweighs the benefits of targeting lower-value militants.

Drones will be best utilized as a tactic within a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan, because drones alone will not bring stability to any region of the world. After individual drone strikes, the local population must be secured and protected from the militants who force them into jihad or inspire radicalization. Ultimately, these efforts must be carefully coordinated by the Pakistani government as U.S. troops, or troops of any nation including Pakistan, would not be accepted in FATA. With Pakistan's history of supporting militant organizations this does not seem likely. Until Pakistan is willing and able to be a consistent and valued partner in the war on terror, drones will remain a viable last resort option to counter the threat high-value militants in FATA pose to the U.S. What drones will not provide is a solution to instability in the region, and they will risk inspiring future jihadists to rally behind anti-West sentiment.

Currently, the U.S. drone warfare program remains a covert program with little official comment from the government. This has ensured the operational security of the program but allowed U.S. citizens and world opinion to become cynical about its effectiveness and intent. Statistics and graphic images can easily be manipulated to become favorable propaganda for the Taliban or al-Qaeda. It also has allowed people to assume the worst and begin to question the use of drone technology within the U.S. homeland. Whether used in surveillance or weaponized, drones have made the public particularly sensitive to their domestic purpose. Drones are viewed as having little oversight which can lead to government abuse. Now that the potential for abuse is within our borders, the American public is beginning to ask more questions and scrutinize drone use more actively. The U.S. public has privacy concerns over government use of drones, and whether the U.S. government can lawfully target a U.S. citizen overseas, or domestically, with a lethal drone strike. Private citizens are beginning to seek approval to fly their own drones and the U.S. may soon see hostile nations or organizations targeting U.S. assets domestically or abroad with drone technology of their own.

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

“This is the least indiscriminant, least inhumane tool we have. But until there is complete transparency, the public will not believe that.”¹⁴⁰

–C. Christine Fair on drone strikes

Following are policy recommendations:

- Increased transparency of the U.S. drone warfare program. U.S. drone operations and policy pertaining to it must become as public as reasonably possible without compromising the operational security of the program. Transparency will allow drone warfare to gain international legitimacy and acceptance.
- Oversight that provides accountability of the U.S. drone warfare program. A working group should be assembled which brings together the relevant organizations (listed below) to coordinate a comprehensive oversight plan. Oversight and accountability will make the program more effective and also give it more legitimacy when combined with transparency.
- The implementation of drone warfare as a tactic, not a strategy for dealing with militants within a comprehensive counterinsurgency operation. Counterinsurgency should also address economic and political factors in Pakistan. The effectiveness of drone strikes may improve with a greater understanding of the significance of the tribal nature of FATA.
- The local population of FATA needs to be supported by ground based intervention after a drone strike. The value of eliminating militants through drone operations is diminished if the militant is easily replaced and militants return to area following the strike. The role of Pakistan cannot be diminished in this area.

Oversight of drone warfare in the U.S. will be best achieved through a working group consisting of the intelligence community, military, Department of State (DoS), law enforcement community, Department of Justice (DoJ), congressional members and executive branch representation. The U.S. intelligence community would present specific cases to the working group depicting identified militants and the threat they pose. Does the militant pose an imminent and substantial threat that would justify lethal force? The military would advise on what type of support they could reasonably supply against the targeted individual. Can they conduct a capture operation that minimizes the risk of

140. Scott Shane, “C.I.A. Claim of No Civilian Deaths From Drones Is Disputed,” *The New York Times*, August 11, 2011, sec. World/Asia Pacific, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html>.

collateral damage or civilian casualties? Military lawyers would also review the case to determine if lethal force was justified under military rules of engagement. DoS would advise on current conditions in the region and provide diplomatic alternatives to lethal force. Can an agreement be reached with the Pakistani government which allows for the U.S. to take custody of an identified militant? Law enforcement would review the ability to affect an arrest, take custody of the militant or gather further intelligence with the other intelligence agencies. DoJ lawyers would also look at the legality of a lethal strike. Is lethal force justified within a national security perspective? Congressional membership would represent the citizens of the U.S. to ensure measures taken were consistent with our values. This would give the people a voice in the process and facilitate open debate of drone operations. A representative for the office of the president would ensure direct communication with the White House.

The goal of this working group would be to make a timely assessment about how to deal with specific militants who have been identified by the intelligence community. In order to ensure this is done in a timely manner, a “kill list” should be established as high-value militants are identified so a strike can be authorized on short notice. Alternative measures to drone strikes should be considered among working group partners to ensure that this is the best option available at the moment. To keep collateral damage and civilian casualties to a minimum, military and DoJ lawyers should be available for immediate consultation before a drone launches an attack against a militant. When possible the Pakistani government should become a part of this working group without compromising the operational security of the program. Pakistan, and residents of FATA, will more likely to accept lethal targeting in their nation from the Pakistani government than the U.S. Much of the counterinsurgency support, including securing the local population, must also be conducted through the Pakistanis. Participation of the host nation in this process will make drone warfare far more effective.

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