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THESIS

THE CULTURAL ANTECEDENTS OF U.S. MILITARY PLANNING

by

Jeanne Marlene Miller

March 1984

Thesis Advisor:

Frank M. Teti

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styles of strategic thought from over-reliance on quantitative methods to a more balanced approach is conducted.

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The Cultural Antecedents of U.S. Military Planning

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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March 1984

ABSTRACT

The American military planning system is examined to determine what concepts, habits, skills, arts, instruments, and institutions of the U.S. national culture are relevant to the development of military plans and policy. A supporting line of inquiry examines the juxtaposition of the history of military planning with the American value system, and explores the evolution of the American planning system through the years. A review of recent styles of strategic thought from over-reliance on quantitative methods to a more balanced approach is conducted.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the American military planning system to determine what concepts, habits, skills, arts, instruments, and institutions of the U.S. national culture are relevant to the development of military plans and policy. What about the American character and culture must a planner understand to produce viable and acceptable long-range plans?¹

A supporting component of this inquiry examines how the American military planning system has evolved through the years. How and why did the original design of the system differ from existing European and classical systems; what aspects of the American historical experience contributed to the system's evolution, and how successful has the system been?

Several major assumptions are crucial to this study. The first is that U.S. military policy is an integral part of U.S. foreign policy. In the American system of government the various aspects of foreign policy are inter-twined so

¹The word "American" as used here and throughout the thesis refers to the people and culture of the United States, the colonial culture on the North American continent which later became part of the United States, and occasionally to the government of the United States.

that it is difficult to separate economic policy from diplomatic policy and diplomatic policy from military policy. American traditions do not allow the independent pursuit of goals by solely military means. Despite the fact that U.S. military policy is well integrated into a greater foreign policy, however, it is possible to view the primarily military aspects of foreign policy as a definable subset.²

A second major assumption is that foreign policy, and therefore military policy, is based on a limited number of specific principles or interests which form both the foundation of the government and its best guarantee of survival.³ These basic interests are euphemistically referred to as "national interests." A related assumption is that each government determines its own national interests, using its own system and methods, and since the character of a government is determined by the values and character of the

²The degree to which military policy has been considered part of foreign policy has fluctuated through the years. At times it has been almost fully integrated; at times merely an instrument. The degree of integration has depended on the administration in power.

³In the American system planners ostensibly produce plans designed to implement pre-determined policy. Some students of technology and policy would postulate that the reverse is often true in modern military planning; plans are based on technological capabilities and policies are tailored to fit the plans.

culture in which it is grounded, the best way to understand a government's national interests is to develop an understanding of the underlying culture.

The final assumption is that although a planning system would ideally be designed to produce plans in the most effective manner, most contemporary planning systems are more the product of evolution than design. They may have originated in a formal structure designed to meet the needs of the time, but as the system and environment within which they existed evolved so did they, and not always in parallel.

The American style of military planning is derived from a unique historical experience. The creation of a new nation as an experiment in liberal democracy, and the geographic isolation, resource wealth, and adaptive nature of its population, produced a way of doing things which required significant modifications to the European mold into which it had been poured.

From this unique base the American military planning system evolved slowly for the first century and a half of its existence. The nation's continued isolation from involvement in world affairs promoted a complacency and lack of perceived need for change. Only as a result of major armed conflicts did the planning system undergo significant modification.

Since World War II, the stresses of rapidly changing technology and world commitments have kept the military planning system in constant, relatively rapid, evolution. The most significant restructuring in the history of the system occurred with the National Security Act of 1947 and the development of NSC-68 in 1949, and after thirty-five years of continual change both the structure and philosophy of the American Military planning system are still in flux.

II. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER

A. IS THERE A U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST?

In 1934 American historian Charles Beard published a book entitled The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy, which was designed to trace the European origins and American development of the concept of national interest. [Ref. 1] This book provided the best, or at least the most comprehensive, study of U.S. national interests since the publication of the Federalist Papers in the late eighteenth century. Beard, however, was a historian, and while he provided an excellent view of the development of policies in support of U.S. national interests, he did not provide a definition of exactly what a national interest is and how it is determined.

Since Beard's time most attempts to deal with the concept of national interest have been made by practical scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan, who have dealt with policy application rather than concept definition, and by members of the scientific school of political science.

The latter have made efforts to "tame" this elusive philosophical idea by quantifying it rather than by defining it.⁴

On the other hand, since the middle of the nineteenth century there has been a strong U.S. tradition of popular use of the undefined and often deliberately vague term "national interest" either as a political cloak for the reinforcement of traditional behavior, (as in the resurgence of strong isolationism in the twenties and thirties) [Ref. 2], or as a means of rendering palatable to the voting public actions that might otherwise be unacceptable (as in the successful efforts by sugar and general trade interests to promote the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands as a strategic necessity.) [Ref.3]⁵

Very few political thinkers have emerged in the last two centuries of American life who have been brave enough (or foolish enough) to deal with an attempt to actually define

⁴According to this school quantifying something is an accepted, or even preferred, method of defining it.

⁵David B. Truman, in his book The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, (Knopf, 1951, p. 50), points out that the assumption that there is any interest of the nation as a whole is close to the popular dogmas of democratic government based on the notion that if people are free and have access to "the facts" they will all want the same thing in any political situation. It is most useful as a promotional device.

the concept of "national interest" rather than merely treating its application or quantification. Walter Lippmann addressed a concept which he called "public interest", referring to "...how, and by whom, the interest of an invisible community over a long span of time is represented in the practical work of governing a modern state.", and defined as "...what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently." [Ref.4]

Lippmann's "public interest" may come as close as possible to defining "national interest", and to providing a basis for determining the content of U.S. national interests. His definition, however, is most useful by its philosophical nature in illustrating the difficulties inherent in an attempt to structure policy based on "national interest." Three basic steps exist: (1) deciding upon an appropriate philosophical definition of "national interests", (2) developing a theory of the operation of that definition, and (3) building and implementing a policy designed to apply that theory.

No one had accomplished the first step until Lippmann in 1955, which may be the reason why historical attempts to develop theories and policies based on U.S. national interests have been so disjointed and confused -- so ad hoc. The United States has tended to develop its foreign policy

more on the basis of the opportunities of the moment than on any sort of national consideration of probable long-term consequences. U.S. foreign policy activity since 1943 in particular, but beginning even before that in the expansionism of the late nineteenth century, has been a process of acquiring new global interests a few at a time in a sort of "layering effect", until now there seem to be U.S. national interests in every corner of the globe.⁶

B. EXPLORING THE AMERICAN CHARACTER

Beyond efforts to apply a definition to the phrase "national interest" remains the fact that it is not a concept the meaning of which can be derived by dictionary definition alone. Rather, it must be viewed in the context of a specific nation (state) before it acquires validity. The uniqueness of the creation and development of the American character and nation makes an exploration of these factors

⁶Louis J. Halle, in Dream and Reality; Aspects of American Foreign Policy (Harper and Brothers, 1959), attributes much of the seemingly unorganized nature of U.S. foreign policy on the world stage for a generation after 1898 to the fact that American isolation from most world political affairs for nearly a century had produced a body of officials and decision-makers with no practical experience in international affairs.

especially important to an understanding of the determination and, even more directly, the pursuit of U.S. national interests.⁷

French writer and thinker R. L. Bruckberger, in his book Image of America, addresses the creation of the American character and nation as follows:

"Strange and explosive were the fusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity with the ferocity of human greed; of the humblest hopes for bed and board with the most grandiose dreams; of the love of glory with the taste for seclusion; of the vision of goldfreighted rivers with the irresistible call of virgin lands where one may enjoy the freedom of being an honest man. Of this fusion American was made." [Ref.5]

A British student of American history, D. W. Brogan, finds that, when compared to European development, "The American historical experience has been totally different. It has been the product of profound faith in man's possibilities and of repeated historical justification of that faith." [Ref.6]

Both these views plus the views of a number of other thoughtful writers and scholars lend credence to the idea that the American character is founded in a synthesis of a

⁷The French, Dutch, and Spanish colonial cultures in North America and the African influence in slaveholding areas were largely subsumed by the English influence, and formed a basis for regional diversity rather than nation-wide impact. The disenfranchisement and sub-humanization of the original inhabitants of the continent also effectively eliminated any significant impact they might have had on the development of a national character.

belief in the perfectibility of man with the fortuitous availability of a vast and rich geographical stage upon which to play out that promise virtually unopposed.⁸

The early colonists with the strongest influence on what was to become the American character were the English Puritans who settled the "Brave New World" of New England. These heirs to both the strong English tradition of political rights and the mystical traditions of European puritanism found themselves in a virtually untouched, and, therefore uncontaminated, Utopia wherein they could exercise their beliefs and prove the workability of their version of God's plan for man on earth.

These beliefs contained themes only then becoming acceptable to the formal governments of the European states, themselves comparatively recent offspring of the strictly structured feudal societies of the Middle Ages struggling with the question of legitimacy of the state and the philosophical basis for sovereignty. The Puritans had no problem with the concept of legitimacy, for they saw the state as simply one of the structural manifestations of God's sovereignty through man on earth.

⁸The multiplicity of opinions and theories cited in following pages merely expand on these two core circumstances; they are the true bases of the original American character.

Because the state was part of God's structure, they therefore saw no distinction between metaphysical and political freedom. Since God created man free, with the ability to reason and think, it would be both wrong and an offense against God to deny man his freedom in any domain, including the political. [Ref.7] This emphasis on reasoning man as part of God's will and the consequent metaphysic of promise for perfectibility led to a belief in and a respect for the primacy of the person, which through the years matured into a very American brand of aggressive individualism.⁹

The first Puritan settlers arrived with their institutions and their philosophy already highly developed; they simply implanted a pre-existing society in new soil.¹⁰ This placement of a fully developed belief system led by the

⁹Max Lerner, in his America as a Civilization; Life and Thought in the United States Today (Simon and Schuster, 1957) cites this metaphysic of promise as a crucial element in American civilization.

¹⁰Henry Steele Commager, in The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880's (Yale, 1950) notes that this importation of pre-existing institutions prevailed not only with the Puritans but with the other European colonial settlers. According to him one of the most significant aspects of the development of the American character as a new entity was the fact that while through the years these institutions suffered only minor modifications, the modification of social structure was profound, and the psychological modification was revolutionary.

second or third generation to a sense of "givenness"; an idea that values were a gift from the past and that society was pre-formed and set in place, and therefore ready for operation without exploration or modification. [Ref.8]

This sense of "givenness" evolved over the years into a belief in "absolutes"; the idea that there was a straightforward, pre-existing answer to every question. Any problem could be addressed quickly and as a whole without intervening complications or concern about extraneous factors.¹¹ The "givenness" of issues, however, did not mean that a potential outcome could not be improved. The overwhelming success of America's early colonists in conquering their environment and making their society work reinforced a strong sense of optimism. This optimism, when tied to their belief in givenness, developed into a sense of destiny; a belief that their endeavors succeeded because it was meant to be so, and that any endeavor which they undertook could be justified in and of itself.

This sense of destiny was exercised on a personal level by the evolution of a sense of entrepreneurshship and a belief

¹¹Impatience is an American Characteristic stems from this lack of acceptance of anything that is not easily catagorized and quantified. Americans tend not to be concerned with why things work, but only with how they work. They have developed an antipathy to discussing the theory of an issue since its structure is presumed to be a pre-formed and essentially immutable.

that personal achievement was the best measure of success in a society where the traditional measures of status such as class or birth were little used. On a community, and later a national level, the senses of optimism and destiny grew into a "crusader spirit" exemplified by an unsophisticated belief in the ability to change things for the better by inserting oneself into whatever situation was judged to be lacking by American standards¹²

Since there was an absence of an automatically accepted earthly authority over society, combined with a strongly individual approach to success, "majority rule" and populism became substitutes for the missing societal "authority figure." The basic premise of these systems was that as the

¹²Because of this American belief in the rightness of American values and positions, sense of mission, and a belief in the straight-forward nature of the world's problems, Americans traditionally have seen nothing contradictory in applying American solutions to non-American problems. They have not consciously rejected the validity of other solutions; they simply have not recognized the fact that valid alternative solutions might exist. As a matter of fact, they would not have been able to comprehend these other solutions if they had recognized them because of the overwhelming sense of the "rightness" of things American. Henry Steele Commager in The American Mind says of the 19th Century American "he did not so much disparage other peoples and countries as ignore them." Louis J. Halle, in Dreams and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy (Harper, 1959) notes that while Americans may be characterized to some extent by a "crusader spirit," the public finds it easy to separate in its mind enthusiasm for a cause from sacrifice for that cause. The relatively short timeframe of U.S. adventures in pre-World War I imperialism, (to be discussed later), is evidence of this trait.

beliefs of any one man had a value equal to those of any other, the sum of the values of the largest number of men must equal the highest societal value.¹³

The American belief in absolutes applied to political as well as philosophical values, so anything that was not "right" (i.e. of the majority) must be "wrong." This concept of the rightness of the majority became the substitute for traditional legitimacy, and it led to a pervasive desire to conform to the majority opinion and an intolerance and even unwillingness to consider the possible validity of dissenting opinion.¹⁴

¹³Ironically enough, it was the philosopher David Hume, an inspiration and source of much of the reasoning of the American nation's founding fathers, who pointed out what would later prove to be (and is still proving to be) one of the greatest weaknesses of the American democratic structure. "The private interest of everyone is different; and though the public interest in itself were always one and the same, yet it becomes the source of as great dissensions by reason of the different opinions of particular persons concerning it." ("Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part II, Section VIII" in Theory of Politics, edited by Frederick Watkins, Nelson, 1951) Alexis de Tocqueville believed that the carrying of this personal belief in majority rule into the formal government structure would eventually doom the United States because of what he saw as the incompatibility of the democratic process with the effective conduct of foreign relations. (Louis J. Halle, Dream and Reality, Harper, 1959)

¹⁴There is here an interesting paradox in that while Americans are great "joiners" of organizations, evidently finding great comfort in the community identity, they still ostensibly espouse the creed of individualism and freedom of conscious as being of highest value.

Belief in the collective nature of authority created a situation in which statesmen and community leaders could not depend simply upon the logic or rationality of a policy or approach to gain the support necessary for its application. Instead, they were required to find a way to convince the largest number of people possible of the "rightness" of a policy or approach in American terms, and so the process of convincing became even more important than the issue itself.

This situation held true in New England from the earliest settlement, but did not become prevalent in the Middle Atlantic or southern areas until the broadening of the franchise in the early 19th Century. Prior to that time, leadership and policy-making powers in those areas were vested in a respected elite of lawyers and businessmen whose personal reputations were authority enough for the limited number of politically aware voters.

An additional factor in the development of this system of community values was the physical nature of the challenge the colonists were called upon to meet. However well-developed the political and religious systems of the settlers, they were still faced with the task of creating a livable environment from a wilderness. This task required a degree of cooperation and interdependence which lent itself to the development of trust of fellow community members and

friendliness and open concern for other accepted members of the society.

As a consequence, Americans developed less of a sense of personal privacy and more of a willingness to become involved in the affairs of other members of the community. They developed a tendency to open-handed generosity not only as a preference but as a duty in support of the community. In return, they expected both gratitude and an acceptance of their right to expect reciprocity. [Ref. 9] They also developed an intolerance of dissenters and of anyone who was perceived as impeding the progress of the community.

Progress and growth held special values to Americans because they were essential to the continued health of the society. Community self-sufficiency was a necessity, and the concentration of thoughts, emotions, and resources on one's own community left little time or energy to worry about external concerns. Every community needed to be "bigger and better" in order to attract its share of human and economic resources. Pictures were painted in shades of overstatement, and the aforementioned American optimism and sense of identity with the "rightness" of surroundings led to a strong element of parochialism in the value system.

This parochialism and booster spirit contributed to another American characteristic: the tendency to talk about beliefs without defining them, based on the assumption that

other participants in the conversation held the same beliefs and understand implicit meanings. [Ref.10] It is a characteristic related to the earlier idea of the "givenness" of the American value system and institutional legitimacy, and is reflected in the fact that American political values consist of much dogma and little supporting theory.

American historian Frederick Jackson Turner saw most of the same characteristics in the American character as did the proponents of the "Puritan influence" school, but he attributed these characteristics not to any unique political/religious values of the Puritans in a new land, but rather to the influence of the frontier phenomenon on the European colonists.

"Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these origins into life and shape them to meet changing conditions...All people show development...But in the case of the United States we have a different phenomenon...This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating the American character...The result is that to the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to affect great ends; that restless nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom--these are traits called out elsewhere because of the existence of the frontier." [Ref.11]

Proponents of the Turner school believe that those aspects unique to the American character developed primarily

after the early 18th Century with the indiscriminate extension of the eastern seaboard's European colonial culture into the great, and initially isolated, inland valleys where new rules for survival applied. The accidental mixture of a variety of European subcultures and the geographical and psychological challenges of the frontier combined to create a new and truly American man by cultural evolution rather than by transformation of Puritan Englishmen and other Europeans into Americans.¹⁵

Whatever the source (or sources) of the uniquely American character, it was already well established by the visit to the United States in 1831 of the perceptive Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville. He noted such characteristics as the sovereignty of the people and its effect on the political

¹⁵Louis J. Halle, in Dream and Reality (Harper, 1959) emphasizes the difference in self-identity between those colonists living on the eastern seaboard and those in the trans-Appalachian interior. Seaboard inhabitants were educated as Europeans and felt close ties to that continent. Inhabitants of trans-Appalachian lived in a world whose horizons were limited to the immediate area. They were schooled as woodsmen and subsistence farmers, and their primary identity was with a specific community or region rather than a broader European civilization. Vernon L. Parrington, in Main Currents in American Thought, Vol. I (Harcourt Brace, 1954) noted that American ideals and institutions emerged in large part from the silent revolution which, during the mid-18th Century, differentiated the American from the transplanted colonial. This change resulted from an amalgam of the older English stock with other races, and the subjection of this new product on a great scale to the influence of diffused landholding.

system, the "tyranny of the majority," the strange habit of people relying on "ready-made" opinions supplied by the majority rather than indulging in independent thought, American addiction to practical as opposed to theoretical science, and the stability of general principles juxtaposed with the flexibility and freedom of action available to individuals. [Ref. 12] He also noted that the American thinking process produced ideas that were all "either extremely minute and clear or extremely general and vague." [Ref. 13]

To the American of de Tocqueville's time and the following century the moral superiority of America was axiomatic. [Ref. 14] The cultural belief in the self-justified and inner-directed nature of American society and institutions contributed to a predominant feature of American political life that might be identified as a "policy," but is actually so pervasive as to be a cultural characteristic: isolationism. Although the government policy of isolationism stemmed from a combination of geography and the availability of most resources necessary for independent development, the American character, with its lack of need for extra-community inputs and its unsophisticated optimism and belief in the

essential goodness of individual man, welcomed the ability to remain removed from the "unnecessary" and negative European power struggles.¹⁶

At the conclusion of his book Image of America, R.L. Bruckberger, another European, (although this time a contemporary one), addressed a letter to Americans, in which he stated:

"You have your country, you are always happiest when you are at home and among compatriots...Your country is vast enough, rich enough, roomy enough to put you all at your ease. You go on the principle that 'God helps those who stay at home' and you sincerely believe that this is the key to peace. At the same time you deploy your troops, your planes, and your battleships all over the world, and now and then you use them. You accept this as temporarily unavoidable...Deep in your hearts you look back with nostalgia at the day when America had no world responsibilities. Since you are not imperialists, having all you need at home, you long for the return of a day which for you was so peaceful. But you may as well make up your mind that that day will never come again." [Ref. 15]

U.S. national interests, then, are articulated in the context of a mainstream national character consisting of: (1) a sense of the "givenness" of institutions and philosophy and the simple and straight-forward nature of issues; (2) a self-centered and inner-directed culture, with a parochial view of the "rightness" of things identified with oneself; (3) a

¹⁶The luxury of isolation from power struggles and significant external threats to national security permitted the development of an anti-war tradition understandable in a people whose normal unhampered pursuit of profits, careers, and happiness made them shrink from anything that might cut these short. (Max Lerner, America as a Civilization, Simon and Schuster, 1957)

belief in the essential goodness of man (in particular the individual), and a resulting optimism and refusal to accept the validity of arbitrary limitations; and (4) a tendency to do nothing by halves and to be unwilling to accept a passive role when involvement becomes necessary. Max Lerner lists certain traits which commentators tend to attribute to Americans in all ages as: (1) a tendency to join in (voluntary) associations, (2) a belief in democracy, (3) a belief in equality and individual freedom, (4) "direct action" in disregard of law, and (5) stress on local government, practicality, prosperity, and material well-being. [Ref. 16] He contends, however, that there is actually no single pattern that can be called "the American character," particularly in today's complex environment of rapid change.¹⁷

¹⁷The issue of regional and ethnic diversity in the U.S. is of increasing importance, but the federal structure of national government and the earlier-mentioned "tyranny of the majority" drastically reduce the impact of regional or ethnic minorities on the mainstream national culture as regards its impact on the development of national policy. This may be changing with the increased awareness of the power of the vote shown by some minorities in recent years. However, by the time a minority group is able to organize a significant power bloc to exercise its power in the mainstream culture, it has usually lost most of its unique philosophical features and moved toward the mainstream as part of its own evolution to power.

According to Montesquieu, the moral causes shaping national character include religion, legal standards, history, ideals, customs, and manners; the art of the wise legislator is to frame laws that suit the spirit of the people. [Ref. 17] Policy-makers must use these same considerations in developing foreign policy, but the various aspects of an "American national character" with which these policy-makers deal is only one of the two inputs into the determination of national interests, upon which foreign policy and, hence, military planning is based. The other is an element common to the national interests of all states; that is, the preservation of the state itself by any (self-defined) legitimate means to perpetuate the values of the system.¹⁸

C. THE GROWTH OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

The American revolution was not a great philosophical watershed, or even the heroic struggle of a down-trodden and mistreated colonial society so often portrayed by politicians in Independence Day speeches and in American History texts published before the 1930's. It was, rather, a conservative revolution in which the colonists, who already

¹⁸Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in "Foreign Policy and the American Character," (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No.1, Fall 1983) says that the minimal motive for foreign policy is the same for all states; the protection of national integrity and interest.

thought of themselves as Americans, fought to preserve an existing system of self-rule from the imposition of British controls, basing their arguments in part on a statement of the rights of man as embodied in the philosophy of the French Enlightenment. This statement, the Declaration of Independence, was by nature technical, legalistic, and conservative, reflecting its creation by lawyers and by businessmen-politicians.¹⁹ (Although the philosophy of the preamble was derived from the Enlightenment, the remainder of the document was English doctrine reformulated to address the existing problem. [Ref. 13]²⁰

¹⁹The tendency to the creation of national policy by non-statesmen, in essence amateurs, was born of necessity due to the lack of a previous need for men skilled in national and international affairs and fostered by the usual American inclination to experiment and distrust of the "expert." (Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind, Yale, 1950) This birth in pragmatism has developed into a national disposition to believe that government is a business rather than a skilled profession, and businessmen and lawyers brought in from the outside can adequately staff a foreign office. (Louis J. Halle, Dream and Reality, Harper, 1959)

²⁰Gary Wills, in Explaining America; The Federalist (Penguin 1982), says that America's first entirely developed art was political literature.

Thus the revolution engendered no great philosophical debate or intellectual crisis, but was a step forward in the evolution of a maturing political (rather than philosophical) system. Its relatively easy success reinforced both the continuity of existing values and institutions and the American tendency to empiricism and legalism rather than metaphysical debate.²¹ The continuity of institutional experience was damaged in some areas by the departure, during and after the revolution, of a number of loyalists, many of whom were community leaders and prosperous members of the business and land-holding classes. This was a blow, but not a crippling one, and community recovery was rapid in most cases.

With this pragmatic beginning the representatives of the various colonies committed the collective resources of their constituents to the establishment of a new authority to replace the improperly conducted government of George III, his Parliament and Ministers. It is the very essence of what later became the United States of America, however, that

²¹Some scholars assign more importance to a seminal "American" philosophy than is reflected here. Vernon L. Parrington, in Main Currents of American Thought, Vol. I (Harcourt Brace, 1954) finds great significance in the clash between a liberal political philosophy and a reactionary theology, and Henry Steele Commager in The American Mind (Yale, 1950) assigns primary importance to an inheritance of European Puritanism, rationalism, and idealism, each of which was naturalized.

these men gathered not as representatives of any new nation or representatives of the inhabitants of protesting colonies of British North America as a whole, but as representatives of thirteen separate entities, with the firm purpose of representing primarily the interests of what were to be sovereign states tied only secondarily (and sometimes reluctantly) in a confederation designed to promote the collective good. It took eleven years for the states to recognize that a simple confederation would not function well enough to accomplish the desired goals, and that a more binding, federal structure was needed.

Even with the creation of a Constitution and a federated republic, the idea of a "national" identity did not appeal to many citizens, who continued to identify themselves primarily with their own state. The word "national" does not appear in the Constitution, largely because of fears of the drafters that the image of a pre-emptive and coercive national government would hamper ratification efforts. [Ref. 19] John Jay and Alexander Hamilton used the device of the Federalist Papers to promote discussion of the concept of the new United States of America, to be formed by the Constitution as a separately identifiable nation-state; an entity composed, certainly, of diverse communities of interest, but empowered and formed to represent the interests of the whole. George Washington was also a Federalist, and his Farewell Address,

at the end of his second term as President, strongly emphasized the benefits of identification as a nation (or country in his terminology) in which every component part benefited from the union of the whole.

The sentimental appeal of a statement by the "father of the country," who was greatly respected by most of his contemporaries, as well as later generations of Americans, may have drawn attention to the issue, but the first articulation of U.S. national interests had already been made--and to some extent integrated in policy-- by Alexander Hamilton. American historian Charles A. Beard found in Hamilton's work the elements of what were to be identified as U.S. national interests until the end of 19th Century.

"...national interest, as formulated by Hamilton, the principal author of measures and policy in Washington's administration, had a positive and definite content; it meant a consolidation of commercial, manufacturing, financial, and agricultural interests at home, the promotion of trade in all parts of the world by the engines of diplomacy, the defense of that trade by a powerful navy, the supremacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and the use of military and naval strength in the rivalry of nations to secure economic advantages for citizens of the United States." [Ref. 20]

Throughout American history, the disagreement among political parties over national interests has been almost exclusively over means rather than ends -- over practical methods of securing objectives rather than over ultimate values or even the priority of these values. [Ref. 21] The

rise of agrarian interests under Jefferson and his successors, and the serious divisiveness which eventually led to the Civil War, did not involve questioning of the basic values set forth in the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. Validity of the principles set forth by the Founding Fathers was never questioned, since proponents of both manufacturing and agrarian interests and spokesmen of both slave-holding and free states cited the same sources in presenting apparently divergent views.²² (The drafters' wisdom in providing a broad base for national development led to the opportunity for, and practice of, interpreting these documents to suit current needs, and the American tendency to adapt existing theories rather than create new systems of thought has made reference to these documents, in particular

²²One of the most familiar themes of American history is the supposed early conflict between the "Hamiltonians"--proponents of centralization and merchant/industrial interests -- and "Jeffersonians"--proponents of decentralization and agrarian interests. There is convincing evidence for the opposing theory presented by Richard Hofstad in The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (Knopf, 1948), who postulates that Jefferson was not an anti-Federalist but merely an opportunist (like Hamilton) who felt that the U.S. best future lay in the agrarian area, and that Jackson, Jefferson's philosophical/political heir, was basically an aspiring capitalist.

The Constitution, an accepted call to authority based on the assignment of some sort of mystical foresight to the drafters.)²³

Throughout the first century of the nation's existence, the basic interests as formulated by Hamilton were pursued by various means through the many vicissitudes of national political development, continental territorial expansion and civil war. With the exception of a few incidents with Barbary pirates, and the implicit threat of the use of naval force in the opening Asian markets, the United States remained predominantly a continental power, with armed forces designed for hemispheric defense and protection (plus promotion in some cases) of trade interests. U.S. participation in the War of 1812, naval activity in the Mediterranean, and the Navy's opening of Japanese and Chinese markets-- and keeping them open to free trade-- all had economic roots and justifications.²⁴

²³Gary Wills, in Explaining American: The Federalist (Penguin, 1982) said of the actual perceptibility of the Founding Fathers, "The Constitution they created has survived not because of their predictions but in spite of them."

²⁴Although with independence the idea of a continental destiny became a principal ingredient in the development of American nationalism, by the 1800's men of broader vision had already begun to promote an attitude which, while perhaps not evidence of a belief in broader destiny, was at least indicative of an awareness of broader interests. Thomas Hart Benton saw that "The trade of the Pacific Ocean, of the western coast of North America, and of Eastern Asia, will all take its track...The American road to India will also become

No thought was given to any moral obligation to interfere in domestic or international quarrels to provide other peoples with benefits of the American system of values and politics, or to use economic or political power as a weapon of disapproval against governments whose theories and principles were unacceptable to the U.S. government. As late as 1882, Secretary of State Frelinghauysen denied any U.S. national interest in "doing good" for its own sake in his instructions to the American representative in Chile concerning a possible war between that country and Peru.

"The President wishes in no manner to dictate or make any authoritative utterance to either Peru or Chile as to the merits of the controversy existing between these republics...Were the United States to assume an attitude of dictation toward the South American republics, even for the purpose of preventing war, the greatest of evils, or even to preserve the autonomy of nations, it must be prepared by army and navy to enforce its mandate, and to this end tax our people for the exclusive benefit of foreign nations." [Ref. 22]

The first significant interference in the affairs of another nation, on the premise of "moral obligation," occurred in 1894 when the United States stumbled into a quarrel over Samoa, where Britain and Germany on one side and traditional authorities on the other were perceived to be threatening the

²⁴(cont)the European track to that region. The European merchant, as well as the American, will fly across our continent on a straight line to China." (Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Lands: The American West as Symbol and Myth, Random House, 1957, p. 28)

well-being of the native population. The U.S. became involved when a naval officer, without instructions, seized the naval base at Pago Pago with the idea of protecting U.S. trade interests, but resident missionaries pleading the cause of the natives brought about deeper involvement.²⁵

The trend to acceptance of moral obligation as an interest strengthened, however, as Americans became more aware of their strength as a nation and less preoccupied with internal affairs. During the Spanish-American War the concept was a concomitant of commerce and national defense as a valid national interest.²⁶ Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing in Interest of America in Sea Power in 1898 espoused the theory that in the spread of civilization the British Empire and the American Empire had obligations to increase the "world sum of happiness," stating:

"If a plea of the world's welfare seems suspiciously like a cloak for national interest, let the latter be accepted frankly as the adequate motive which it assuredly is. Let us not shrink from pitting a broad self-interest against the narrow self-interest to which some opponents of imperialism would restrict us."

²⁵Even in this instance President Cleveland, applying hindsight, stated that "our situation in this matter was inconsistent with the mission and traditions of our government, in violation of the principles we profess, and in all its phases' mischievous and vexatious." (Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest, Quadrangle Books, 1966, p. 251)

²⁶Beard holds that moral obligation never came to be viewed as an actual national interest, but was only a supplementary value.

President McKinley purportedly received a "message from God," instructing him in his responsibility for saving the Philippines from seizure by European powers or from anarchy, and for civilizing, Christianizing, and uplifting them. Senator Platt received a similar message from the voters in his state. For McKinley, the obligation applied only to involvement in those situations where fate placed the destiny of weaker nations in the strong, capable hands of the United States. In later years, Theodore Roosevelt believed in the responsibility for aggressive pursuit of honor, justice, and righteousness wherever a need was perceived and by whatever means was necessary, and he made such pursuit official policy.

During the administration of William Howard Taft and the era of "dollar diplomacy," the more traditional protection of commerce theme gained re-acceptance as the primary (but not exclusive) national interest, but with the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912 the moral obligation aspect of foreign policy re-gained ascendancy. (It re-gained ascendancy as a justification for policies, that is. In many cases it was used to cloak the continuation of commercial interests. President Wilson was absolutely sincere; Congress a little less so.)

The great culture shock of World War I, and the failure of Wilson's grand ideas for world cooperation through a

League of Nations, were causes for a rising sentiment for American "withdrawal" from world affairs (in other than the economic sphere) in the Twenties and Thirties.²⁷ Isolationists pointed out that the U.S. had nothing to gain and much to lose by becoming involved in the endless power struggles in Europe and world-wide implications of these quarrels. The U.S. was powerful enough to prevent intervention by other powers in its territories and interests and should not be concerned about the rest of the world except as an outlet for trade. (The rest of the world here refers to areas other than the Western Hemisphere, Hawaii, and the other Pacific territories and protectorates.) Internationalists, on the other hand, felt that U.S. interests were involved in European quarrels because of the potential impact on the U.S. The disagreement was over means, not ends; all but the most rabid isolationists

²⁷See Walter Lippmann's The Public Philosophy for an thoughtful discussion of the immense impact on American culture of World War I and the immediate post-war period. America's transition to maturity as a member of the world community of nations began in the watershed decade of the 1890's. Commager cites several major cultural transitions then in force: (1) from a primarily agricultural to primarily urban and industrial economy; (2) from the politics, economy, and morals of the 18th Century to a more modern society with a changed population, institutions, economy, and technology; (3) from self-containment to involvement in "Old World" problems; and (4) from a

recognized the necessity of maintaining trade relations with the rest of the world, and rational internationalists admitted that our worldwide interests were primarily commercial.

The U.S. failure to become involved in World War II for two years after fighting had begun was evidence of the extent to which "moral obligation" had fallen as a focus of national interest. It took persuasion by the Japanese Empire to convince the American people to become directly involved. Until Pearl Harbor the war was seen by most Americans (and by their less astute representatives) as simply another, more intense European quarrel. Little public attention focused on activity in Asia. Not until there was substantial, publicly

27 (cont) chauvanistic consciousness of unique characteristics and destiny to an attempt to accomodate traditional institutions and habits of thought to new and alien conditions. (Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind, Yale, 1950) The two generations after the 1890's lived in a time of transition from certainty to uncertainty, faith to doubt, security to insecurity, and order to disorder. Louis J. Halle holds that the modern history of American foreign policy began in 1898. (Dream and Reality, Harper and Brothers 1959) The U.S. engagement in overseas imperialism was so abrupt and immediate and so little prepared that thinking could not adjust itself. In their naivete Americans failed to grasp the fact that most nations are not bound by pledges and agreements as they are, and upon Wilson's inability to reform the world after World War I there was a swing back to popular sentiment for isolationism without an understanding of why it was doomed to fail.

recognized loss of American lives and property was the country willing to war for a vital interest.²⁸

After World War II the U.S. was forced into an unfamiliar role as the only economically healthy major nation in a war-devastated world. The mantle of world leadership devolved upon it, and it again "felt a call" to a role as protector of free governments and institutions.

Since 1945, the U.S. has managed to juggle the three traditionally accepted national interests abroad: Hamilton's protection of commerce and promotion of national defense, and the late 19th Century addition of the "moral obligation" of a great power to see to the health of the world. These three interests (or perhaps it is more accurate to say these three aspects of the U.S. national interest) can obviously be protected and promoted only by a government with credible power and a credible willingness to use that power. Although military forces are only one of the three aspects of a government's power on the world scene, (the others being economic power and political or moral persuasion), they are almost always treated separately for planning and policy-making purposes in the American system, because of its unique

²⁸The phrase "publicly recognized" must be stressed. American sailors and merchant seamen had been losing their lives in the North Atlantic for some time, but for political reasons this had been kept quiet.

evolution. The history of the impact of the American culture and perception of interests on military planning provide clues to the modern American military planner in his search for an effective and viable system.

III. DEVELOPING THE MILITARY PLANNING SYSTEM - 1775-1945

A. AMERICAN MILITARY PHILOSOPHY

In 1981 Colin Gray completed a study of nuclear strategy and national style, taking as his thesis the following.

"It is hypothesized here that there is a discernable American strategic culture: that culture, referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force derives from perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization...and from all of the many distinctively American experiences...that determine an American national style is derivative from the idea of American strategic culture, suggesting that there is a distinctively American way in strategic matters." [Ref. 23]

Although Gray referred specifically to style in nuclear strategy, the statement applies as well to the development of a uniquely American military planning system.²⁹ In a democracy like the United States, where a military caste never developed, the tendency to draw members from the society at large, combined with the American tradition of civilian control of the military, guaranteed the development of a planning system reflecting the values of the society much more than might be true in other states. The dramatic

²⁹This is not surprising if one accepts earlier arguments that a military planning system exists to support the military aspect of foreign policy. Nuclear strategy is also a sub-set of foreign policy, in some senses separate from and in other senses over-lapping the subset of military policy.

changes in the role of the military since World War II may dilute this argument, but it was obvious for the first 170 years of the nation's history.

There is a unique American style of military strategy. Conventional wisdom assigns to it the following characteristics: (1) with few exceptions Americans tended not to think seriously about military strategy before World War II; (2) from World War II through 1968 American military strategy was characterized by dependence on an ideology or fetish -- anti-communism through 1960, systems analysis from 1961 through 1968; (3) the general American public does not have a developed sense of when the country is threatened, and policy-makers themselves have divergent opinions on threat issues; (4) Americans consider peace the normal pattern of relations between states; (5) Americans are reluctant to think in terms of military power during peacetime; (6) Americans tend to turn war into a crusade; (7) since the 1930's the American execution and direction of war has placed a disproportionate emphasis on technology; and (8) the American approach to strategy tends to deal in terms of shibboleths and absolutes. [Ref. 24]³⁰

³⁰Ken Booth, in his article "American Strategy: the Myths Revisited" (in Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright, eds., American Thinking About Peace and War, Barnes and Noble, 1978) argues that this "conventional wisdom" is not valid. While most of Mr. Booth's specific arguments are not particularly

Each of these characteristics can be traced to a specific aspect of the general American character postulated earlier. When these values are applied to the development of military doctrine, they create a system where the sole function of military force in war is to achieve victory. There is no place for political use of the military in war, and the management of victory is a problem for the politician. The American doctrine of war is rooted in the beliefs that: (1) civilian supremacy excludes the military from partaking in political judgements; (2) the physical self-containment of the United States makes ambitions for territorial gain inappropriate; and (3) the establishment of "spheres of influence" and power politics for commercial and financial advantage is wrong. [Ref. 25]³¹

³⁰(cont)convincing, he does make the following valuable points: (1) many of the characteristics labeled as peculiar to Americans are actually common to a number of Western societies, (2) we lack an American perspective and tend to see things Eurocentrically; (3) many of the important features of the "American way of war" are not explained by reference to cultural characteristics but by a concatenation of accidental factors; and (4) unquestioned acceptance of any "conventional wisdom" is bad and even dangerous.

³¹American military activities in the Caribbean and the Philippines in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were justified as humanitarian acts rather than power politics. This was more likely self-deception than deliberate misrepresentation.

The leadership style of the American military man operating within this strategic environment tends to be managerial rather than strategic. He tends to believe that there is always a simple, clear, unambiguous strategy for every occasion, and to assume that a military planner can discern this strategy. [Ref. 26] Throughout the history of the American military planning system to World War II, these beliefs caused no irreparable damage, and in the last four decades they have evolved into a more sophisticated world view. Until the middle of the 20th century, however, American views on war and the resultant military planning system were not much modified from their origins.³²

B. ORIGINS AND EARLY GROWTH - 1775-1814

It is not surprising that the British Army stationed in North America in 1775 were rather scornful of the "threat" presented by the military forces of the rebellious colonies. What is surprising is that the thirteen state militias and the newly created Continental Army accomplished anything of note against the seasoned British and mercenary troops.

³²It is irrelevant to address a peacetime American military planning system in the years before World War II. The military was "not used for political purposes" and therefore its only justification was in wartime. This factor prevented the establishment of a viable system for peacetime planning.

The Crown's unwillingness to bear the cost of stationing regular troops in America until the 1750's had led to a tradition of the "citizen soldier" who mobilized only in response to a direct threat, and this in turn had created a tradition of the diffusion of military power. When the various colonies mobilized their militia in response to the Continental Congress's call, they did so on an individual basis, retaining control over the actions of their own troops and maintaining the old system of short enlistments that had always served well enough in the past. Although the pan-colonial Continental Army was a more stable and professional group, it was still an army of citizen soldiers led primarily by statesmen officers.

The new American nation's first concept about war was the importance of a "breakaway" from the European power system, where war was presumed to be merely an episode of the greater power struggle. [Ref. 27] In addition, most Americans opposed large standing armies, seeing in them a threat to liberty, democracy and popular government, economic prosperity, and peace.³³ Elbridge Gerry articulated these fears in June 1784 when he stated "[S]tanding armies in time

³³Most Americans of the time were heirs of or were themselves members of groups who in Europe had suffered as a result of the system of standing armies. They were the "have nots" who had not reaped the more obvious benefits of the power system.

of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people [and] generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism." [Ref. 28] There was more generally a fear of the uses to which politicians might put a standing force than a fear of the force itself.

In response to these concerns, the Continental Congress disbanded the Continental Army, (all but 700 men had been released immediately upon cessation of hostilities), retaining on active service only 25 privates to guard stores at Ft. Pitt, 55 privates to guard West Point and other magazines, and a proportional number of officers, none to be above the rank of Captain. The responsibility for guarding the frontier was given to the various state militias. Since there was no immediate external threat, the nation would depend upon its citizen soldiers and statesmen military leaders when needed. The distances involved in any external threat would theoretically give time for mobilization.³⁴

³⁴In 1783 General Washington had submitted a memorandum entitled "Sentiments on Peace Establishment" to a committee of Congress. In it he recommended: (1) a regular standing force; (2) a well organized militia regularized across the states; (3) establishment of a system of arsenals and stores; and (4) academies for the instruction of the military arts. There is no record that his comments were ever considered by the Congress, which continued to deal with military planning as it had in the past; by ignoring it. (Dale O. Smith, U.S. Military Doctrine: A Study and Appraisal, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1955)

The framers of the Constitution envisioned a military system based on the same presumptions as the existing system. The liberal philosophy of the Founding Fathers did not furnish a guide to considerations of war, peace and international relations. Liberalism does not understand and is hostile to military institutions and military functions, and this liberalism dominated American political thinking through the first half of the 20th century. [Ref. 29] No separate military officer class was envisioned, as a citizen's responsibilities included military service, and civilian leaders would also be military leaders.³⁵ (Even the Commander-in-Chief was to be a civilian.)

The possible need for a standing army in wartime was addressed, but in the final draft of the Constitution there is no reference to a regular army.³⁶ Congress is empowered "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a navy." This difference in phraseology in reference to an army and a navy is important. While a standing army was seen

³⁵This principle has been strictly adhered to through the present. Americans like military heroes who are citizens first and soldiers second.

³⁶When Elbridge Gerry proposed a clause to the Constitution to limit any standing army to 5000 men, General Washington replied that he would pose no objection if the clause were amended to prohibit an enemy from invading the U.S. with more than 3000 men. (Dale O. Smith, U.S. Military Doctrine: A Study and Appraisal, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1955)

as unnecessary and a potential domestic threat because of the possibility of involvement in civil affairs, the necessity for a standing navy to guarantee against invasion and interference with commercial interests was reluctantly conceded. Appropriations for land forces were allowed, although they were limited to two years, in recognition of the need for a frontier force. Even this measure was highly controversial, and some delegates refused to sign the document because of their opposition.

The desirability of civilian control of the military was never questioned. It had as its role the responsibility of ensuring that military policies and agencies were subordinated to other national traditions, values, customs, policies, and institutions. In balance, it also ensured that the military had access to resources, and conferred on it political legitimacy. The question was not whether to institute civilian control, but what form that control should take. George Mason articulated one of the major concerns in his statement "The purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands." [Ref.30] Consequently, the Constitution was written so as to split these powers. The President was given administrative and operational control,

and Congress was given control over money and the sole power to declare war.³⁷

Samuel Huntington documented three patterns of organization available to a system of civilian control of the military. In his "balanced" pattern, the President is responsible for political policy and the general supervision of the military establishment; below him a Secretary serves as a basic policy-maker, and immediately below the Secretary there is a split between military command and civilian administration. (This pattern maximizes military professionalism and civilian control.)

A "coordinate" pattern separates the military and administrative functions immediately below the President. (This pattern undermines civilian control, politicizes the military, and encourages the President to intervene in military planning and command where he has no expertise.) In the "vertical" pattern authority goes from the President to a Secretary to the military, with the administrative bureaus under the military. (This pattern forces the military chief

³⁷Because of the legacy of fear of an overly strong executive branch, prior to 1781 Congress had directly supervised the military by committee; The Board of War and Ordnance. There was little supervision exercised between 1781 and 1787. (Allan R. Millett, "The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective" Mershon Center Position Papers in the Policy Sciences, No. 4 April 1979, Mershon Center of the Ohio State University.)

to sacrifice higher level for broader scope.) [Ref. 31] The U.S. Constitutional system pushes the establishment in the direction of a coordinated or vertical pattern. Civilian control of the military has evolved more than most aspects of the military system of the United States, but is is still firmly entrenched as a "first principle."³⁸

The first time the United States was required to decide on the external use of its military forces involved the question of whether to declare support for the French revolution. Thomas Jefferson argued for involvement on an ideological basis, but Alexander Hamilton and the leaders of the then-dominant Federalist Party opted for non-involvement based on the fragility of the new nation and the inappropriateness of involvement in European quarrels. Despite an official policy of non-involvement there was a great deal of sympathy for the French cause. This was the first evidence of the conflict between idealism and realism that was to be so characteristic of the Americans before the second half of the 20th Century.³⁹

³⁸Huntington's The Soldier and the State, (Harvard University Press, 1957) contains an excellent exposition on civilian control of the military in the United States; how it has developed, and its strengths and weaknesses.

³⁹Edmund Jones refers to an attitude of "vigilant ambivalence"; a philosophical uncertainty coupled with unwillingness to risk the consequences of making the wrong

The decision to avoid involvement in European quarrels was really the only possible course for the new nation, given its increasingly obvious lack of any credible military force. Even the state militias were ineffective for that purpose, so in 1792 Congress passed the Militia Act, designed to regularize practices across the states and improve the system effectiveness.⁴⁰ Unfortunately, this act lacked provisions for financing and enforcement, and Congress found it necessary to increase periodically (however reluctantly) the number of Federal troops.

By 1794 the increasing activity of the Barbary pirates, and an undeclared naval war with France, prompted Congress to pass a Naval Act providing for the construction and manning of six frigates. In 1798 it established the Navy Department as a separate cabinet-level agency of the Executive Branch, to be co-equal with the existing War Department. The organization of each department consisted of a Secretary and a few administrative personnel, and little provision was made

³⁹(cont)choice. ("Vigilant Ambivalence; American Attitudes" in Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright American Thinking About Peace and War, Barnes and Noble, 1978)

⁴⁰In 1787 Congress found it necessary to activate a Federal force of 700 men on three year enlistments to supplement state forces to protect the frontier. (Walter Millis, Arms and Men, Rutgers University Press, 1957)

for input by active duty military leaders; there was no real planning function.⁴¹

Until World War II, Presidential attention to military affairs was episodic and fixed by diplomatic crises rather than long-range military planning. (Congress stayed more consistantly involved only because of the yearly budget process, but there was seldom any long-range planning involvement by that body, either.) At the beginning of the 19th Century Europe had embarked on another war, and President Jefferson was forced to deal with the possibility of U.S. involvement. He hoped to avoid involvement in the wars by ignoring them. Fortunately for him, and for the nation, a professional and competent U.S. Navy existed, (having gained experience in the struggles with Barbary pirates), and it was able to cope with initial U.S. involvement in the world-wide power struggle while the President and the nation absorbed the fact that non-involvement was no longer possible.

It would have been best if U.S. involvement could have been limited to naval action, but the presence of British forces in contested areas, the danger of invasion, and ire

⁴¹Allan R. Millett contends that these departments were created primarily as part of the emerging system of party politics and patronage. ("The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military," Mershon Center Position Papers in the Policy Sciences, No. 4, April 1979, Mershon Center of the Ohio State University.)

aroused by apparent "slights" to the young nation's dignity made it possible and even necessary to mobilize land forces.⁴² Congress authorized an increase in active forces to 35,000 men, but few signed up, and the states had varying degrees of success, none very impressive, mobilizing their militia. It was obvious that the concept of a citizen's military responsibility to his country was largely unaccepted. No special provisions were made for coping with the increased demands on logistics and planning systems. It was also obvious from the U.S. failure in most aspects of the land war that there were serious weaknesses in the U.S. military system.

In response to these apparent weaknesses Congress reorganized the War Department in 1813, adding an embryonic staff consisting of an adjutant general, a quartermaster general, a commissary general of ordnance, a paymaster, an assistant topographical engineer, and assistants for each of these positions. This act was the first serious attempt at removing military functions from the direct day-to-day supervision of the Congress, and as such it constituted the germ of a separate U.S. military planning system

⁴²There was some popular sentiment for the invasion of Canada by U.S. forces, and an abortive attempt was made. It failed because of the serious weaknesses of the disjointed militia system. (Dale O. Smith, U.S. Military Doctrine: a Study and Appraisal, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1955)

C. A NATION APART - 1815-1869

The Navy's part in the War of 1812 had been more successful than the Army's largely due to a pre-existing unitary command structure and experienced officers and crews. Even here, however, it was apparent that modification of the system to allow for inputs at the policy-making level by active duty professionals was desirable, and in 1815 the Secretary of the Navy was provided with a Board of Naval Commissioners. Patterned after Britain's Naval Board, it consisted of three senior line officers collectively responsible, under the Secretary, for construction, maintenance, supply, and similar functions in support of the operating forces. The collective nature of this board and its failure to delineate individual responsibilities, however, led to a system wherein the active duty members were charged with the direction of the civil administrative functions and the civilian Secretary was responsible for military policy matters. [Ref. 32]⁴³

⁴³Samuel Huntington contends that this was actually a logical distribution of responsibilities because of the relatively more technical expertise required by the administrative functions, and the fact that professional military officers were more likely to be technically and scientifically skilled than a civilian political appointee. (The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University Press, 1957)

Even with this re-organization of the War and Navy Departments as a result of the lessons of the War of 1812, there was no single professional military head of either service until 1821, when the position of Commanding General of the Army was created to provide for unity of command and direction of military functions. To emphasize his military authority, the Commanding General reported directly to the President as Commander-in-Chief, while the members of the staff were responsible to the Secretary. This arrangement led to frequent power struggles over jurisdiction between the Commanding General and the members of the staff, and the Commanding General and the Secretary.

These power struggles were exacerbated by the increasing politicization of most Federal agencies during the era of Jacksonian democracy. While during the early years of the 19th Century technical competence, (although not necessarily military competence), had been the primary officer qualifications, during the Jacksonian era militant enthusiasm took its place. The system whereby senior officers selected candidates for appointment to the Military Academy was replaced by a system of political patronage appointments, and political appointment to senior military rank in time of war or mobilization became common. Such developments were not conducive to the development of professional planning and plan execution, and it says much for the leaders of the Army

and Navy field forces during the Mexican American War that they were able to comport themselves rather well with little support or guidance from their seniors in Washington.⁴⁴

In 1842 the Navy Department underwent a major reorganization. Congress abolished the Board of Naval Commissioners, replacing it with a bureau system which substituted individual for collective responsibility, creating a separate bureau for each major logistical function and holding each bureau chief accountable for his technical specialty.[Ref. 33] Five bureaus were created: (1) Yards and Docks; (2) Construction, Equipment, and Repair; (3) Provisions and Clothing; (4) Ordnance and Hydrography; and (5) Medicine and Surgery. Each bureau was directed by a senior military officer with appropriate technical expertise, and these bureau chiefs served as a "staff" to the Secretary in the administration of Navy shore activities. The Secretary retained responsibility for the operational activities of the fleet, and no formal provision was made for him to receive advice from senior officers on operational matters.

⁴⁴Not all politicians of the time lost sight of non-political goals. As Secretary of War John C. Calhoun rationalized the Army supply and procurement system, vitalized an inspector-general position, and overhauled the department's accounting system. His attempts to professionalize military education and policy development, however, were frustrated by Congress.

The 1840's war with Mexico was short and relatively straightforward, serving as a valuable exercise in mobilization and large scale military operations. Its very success was dangerous, however, leading to a degree of complacency and a perpetuation of the belief that there was no need for specific long-term planning procedures, and that a war could be fought and won with the existing organizational and command structure.⁴⁵ Thus at the outbreak of the Civil War neither the Army or the Navy were organized or staffed to cope with a major conflict. The Army in particular started the war with a major operational handicap caused by the loss of a number of professional officers to the Confederate Army, including some whose value as both senior strategists and experienced field commanders was a sore loss.

The war erupted in confusion. No war plans existed, certainly none designed to cope with a fragmented country and a fragmented military force and logistics system. In addition, at the beginning of the war there were few

⁴⁵Two extremely important factors that the more optimistic analysts either failed to note or discounted as irrelevant were that the war was of short duration, and was fought predominantly by regular troops with experience in the Indian wars led by regular officers trained in their profession at the Military Academy.

competent officers in positions of responsibility in the War and Navy Departments because of the politicization of the system over the previous decades, and the increased parochialism of bureau and staff "specialists" who often spent entire careers in one narrow field rather than developing a more generalized view of the needs of the service. [Ref. 34] Because seniority was the primary criterion for advancement and there was no mandatory retirement, the senior ranks were filled with older, more conservative, and sometimes physically infirm officers. Mobilization filled the ranks with politically appointed generals and colonels with little if any military experience.

A need for experienced and competent officers to advise the Secretaries and the President in operational matters became apparent early in the war. The Army's Commanding General fulfilled such a function in regard to land forces, but the Navy lacked such a position. The post of Assistant Secretary was created to deal with strategy and operations, and a retired Navy Captain was assigned to the position. He became the Navy's chief strategist, with direct access to the President. He had no operational authority, however. In addition, in 1862 the number of bureaus was increased from five to eight, and during the course of the war a number of ad hoc temporary boards were established.

The unpreparedness for major conflict and consequent disorganized management of early years of the war caused severe problems of corruption and incompetence, particularly in the logistics arena. Attempts at professional planning were undermined by political involvement, especially on the part of Congress. A special Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War was established whose members, apparently harkening to earlier traditions of statesmen as military leaders, seemed certain that their capabilities as military strategists were at least the equal of the generals.

As a result of the lack of an institutionalized planning system to cope with the stresses of mobilization, the war was fought on a month-to-month, or at least year-to-year, basis. No provisions were made for the post-war period, based on the presumption that the huge wartime armies and logistics system would simply melt back into society and the country could return to a simple peacetime existence uncomplicated by military needs beyond frontier forces and naval patrols. With the exception of a few troops for "occupation" purposes, this is what happened. The wartime administration and ad hoc boards were dissolved, in 1869 the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy was abolished, and the professional military went back to their remote outposts and stations, removed from the public eye.

The military and naval forces of the U.S. were largely isolated from government activities and their fellow citizens from 1865 to the end of the century. The only time they were remembered was during a period of minor concern over the Cuban revolt of 1868, hastily reconsidered thoughts of war with Spain sparked by the arrest and execution by Spanish authorities in 1873 of U.S. seamen serving as crew of a ship chartered by Cuban rebels,⁴⁶ and peripherally during the naval build-up of the 1880's and 1890's. The earlier (pre-Civil War) division of the officer corps into technical specialties divided the military and built bridges with civilian counterparts, and discouraged the creation of a single set of criteria by which an American military officer could gauge his professionalism. Although there were significant examples of military thought, writing, and societies from 1832-1846, (a period referred to by Samuel Huntington as the American Military Enlightenment), these activities constituted an awareness only, with little connected institutional reform.

⁴⁶John A.S.Grenville and George Berkeley Young, in Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 (Yale University Press, 1966) indicate that the lack of preparedness for dealing with even a minor power such as Spain convinced policy-makers of the need to deal with the situation by diplomatic means, and probably sparked some early concern for Naval reform.

D. ENTERING THE WORLD STAGE - 1870-1918

By the post-Civil War period this had changed. According to Sir John Hackett:

"The years between 1860 and World War I saw the emergence of a distinctive American professional military ethic, with the American officer regarding himself as a member no longer of a fighting profession only, to which anybody might belong, but as a member of a learned profession whose students are students for life." [Ref.35]

This creation of a professional identity led to an emphasis on the importance of developing a doctrine of war for American forces. In the United States, military policy depended on civilian statesmanship. It was the function of the civilian policy-maker to determine the ends of national policy and to allocate resources. It was the job of the military to apply its share of these resources to the achievement of assigned goals. Most importantly, the determination of national goals had to precede decisions on strategy.

Because of the lack of civilian guidance on strategy, the U.S. military began to create a professional system and strategy, on its own. Studies were made of the European military establishments. A number of professional societies and journals were established emphasizing the military rather than the technical aspects of professionalism. The Army

established advanced professional schools, and in June 1874 Congress passed the Marine Schools Act to improve maritime training and preparedness.⁴⁷

The most significant institutional reforms of the period were the establishment of the Naval War College in 1884 and the slightly later establishment of the Army War College in 1903. The original function of these institutions was to provide a forum for professional thought and the development of military strategy. There was serious opposition to the War Colleges from both civilian and military policy-makers, who felt that the establishment of military strategy-making bodies was an encroachment on what must remain a civilian preserve. Despite this opposition, and the planning vacuum from a lack of civilian guidance in the form of articulated goals, the War Colleges not only survived, but became the sources of the country's first real war plans and, upon the outbreak of war with Spain in 1898, the Navy War College planning documents formed the basis for U.S. actions.

While the military was developing its own internal professional planning system, Congress and the public became aware of the need for and desirability of an improved naval

⁴⁷These reforms were not unopposed in Congress. Members argued that military professional training should be confined to the Military and Naval Academies. (John A.S.Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917, Yale University Press, 1966)

establishment. For the first hundred years of the nation's existence the basic naval strategy was based upon the assumption that the need for naval forces in any war involving the U.S. against a foreign power would begin with a foreign aggressor coming to sack U.S. coastal cities and occupy key coastal areas. The Strategy designed to cope with this had consisted of stationing a few warships, mostly small monitors, at each major port, and augmenting them by fixed coastal batteries. Several high seas cruisers were to be available to interrupt the sea communications and logistics of the enemy. The development of new techniques such as steam, long-range rockets, explosive shells, and armor-plated steel made a change in tactics necessary. In future the fleet would have to operate as a concentrated unit, seeking and destroying the opposition on the high seas rather than being dispersed to small, vulnerable outposts. This would require major changes in the composition of the fleet.

Awareness of a need for change in defensive tactics may have been the element which prompted most concern for reform among naval thinkers, but Congressional debates on the issue of the composition and use of the fleet were also based on the broadening of U.S. involvement in world trade. The publication in 1890 of Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 sparked popular enthusiasm for the idea of the responsibility of a mercantile power to

extend its influence, and one of the first steps in the fulfillment of that responsibility was the creation of a powerful navy capable of both world-wide commerce protection and credible power projection.

In 1890 Navy Secretary Benjamin F. Tracy created a Naval Policy Board of six senior active duty officers to coordinate the Navy's part in the debate over strategy and fleet composition, and that same year the Board issued a report advocating a large battleship fleet.⁴⁸ This combination of naval and Congressional sentiments for change in fleet composition and a resulting change in tactics formed the basis for a much-needed fleet modernization program, and contributed to American successes in the later war with Spain.

Despite this naval modernization program, the U.S. was not really prepared to go to war with Spain in 1898. Existing warplans were largely impractical, being based on a philosophy unsupportable given resource constraints.⁴⁹ The Army initially attempted to deal with mobilization and planning using the existing organization structure, but by

⁴⁸Despite its apparent success as an advisory body, the Naval Policy Board could not survive the internicene struggles of the bureaus, and it was disestablished in only a few years. (Vincent Davis, The Admiral's Lobby, The University of North Carolina Press, 1967)

⁴⁹See later sections for a discussion of war plans in existence at the time.

1899 it was obvious to Secretary of War Elihu Root that this system could not cope with the requirements of a modern war. In that year he completely restructured the senior policy-making system of the War Department and the Army, abolishing the position of Commanding General and creating the position of Chief of Staff of the Army. The occupant of the position was to serve as the principal military advisor to the President. Secretary Root also took action to abolish direct command access to the president and extend the Chief of Staff's control over the bureaus, eliminating the intra-departmental chaos resulting from bureau power struggles, (which he felt had contributed to Army failures early in the Spanish American War), and also eliminating the conflict over direct access to the President which had existed between the Secretary and the Commanding General. To support the Chief of Staff, in 1903 he created a General Staff designed to be "capable of studying the larger problems of military science and making a systematic preparation of war plans." [Ref. 37]

Navy Secretary John Long was saved from having to take such drastic measures by the existence within the Navy Department of an informal strategy-making forum consisting of Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt and three senior officers. Although they had evidently been meeting informally for some time, on 23 March 1898 they met for the first time as a formally constituted Naval War Board, with

the responsibility of advising the Navy Secretary on questions of strategy.⁵⁰ This body was only formalized as a wartime agency, but its previous peacetime existence lent it the ability to deal with post-war strategy as well as shorter-term wartime planning, unlike previous planning agencies.

The success of the Naval War Board and the recognition, (prompted by the war), of a need for improved staffing led to the issuance in 1900 of General Order 544, creating a General Board tasked with advising the Navy Secretary on "war plans, ship construction, and the operation of the fleet." [Ref.38] This General Board was heir to both the Navy War Board and a group of ad hoc boards which had been created by the Secretaries during the 1880's and 1890's to design long-range plans for the over-all development and orderly expansion of the Navy. (These boards had never been formalized because of strong opposition from bureau chiefs to what they feared as a dilution of their influence.)

In 1903 the first official efforts at peace time joint planning were made with the Creation of the Joint Army and

⁵⁰Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, although the junior, was the dominant member of this board. He recommended that the Secretary abolish the Board and replace it with a single Chief of Staff. His recommendation was not accepted. (John A.S.Grenville and George Berkeley Yount, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917, Yale University Press, 1966)

Navy Board (Joint Board.) Stringent limitations were placed on this body, however, and its early years were not notably successful. It was assigned no staff of its own, it could consider only those matters which the Secretaries specifically put before it, and it could make recommendations only to the services and the Secretaries. Its primary concern was with the internal development of joint war plans and the acquisition of overseas bases.

The earliest formal war plans, created by the Naval War College and used in the Spanish-American War, focused on the Caribbean as the most likely place for a conflict with the primary threat European powers. As early as 1892 the War College had begun studying the strategic implications of a war with Spain, working with the young Office of Naval Intelligence, created in 1882. The early plans postulated that the U.S. could not possibly be defeated unless the enemy were allowed to gain and maintain a strong base in the Western Hemisphere. The main naval battle would be in the Florida Straits, where the U.S. Fleet would both protect the future isthmian canal and prevent Spanish forces from improving their basing situation.

The plan also optimistically projected offensive action against Spain in the Mediterranean, with chartered British colliers providing logistics support. Action in the Far East would be based on Manila. The fighting role was assigned to

the Navy rather than the Army. This was attractive from a diplomatic and sentimental point of view rather than a purely strategic point of view, and it had the added attractiveness of promising fewer American casualties at less cost. Existence of the plan was known only to Secretary Long and chiefs of the Navy Department because of a fear of being seen as "over-prepared."

Although the main threat was seen as Spanish activity in the Western Hemisphere, there was some secondary concern about Japanese expansionism as early as 1893. Planners were faced with a serious dilemma, however; there were not thought to be enough naval forces to deal with concurrent major action in the Caribbean and Far East. Navy war plans of the period before the Spanish American War called for holding Far Eastern logistics facilities on a temporary basis only. When the war did occur, one group of planners, led by Alfred Thayer Mahan, tried to convince the President that the U.S. should hold only the island of Luzon. Another group wanted to annex the entire Philippines, then cede all of it but Luzon to Britain in exchange for the Bahamas, Jamaica, while simultaneously acquiring the Danish West Indies. All plans identified the necessity for maintaining the friendship of

the British if the U.S. position in the Far East was to be tenable.⁵¹ The entire Philippines were annexed because of political rather than strategic considerations.

Post-war planning continued to emphasize European threats to the Western Hemisphere. The Navy's General Board took as its first task the listing of desired bases in the Caribbean, particularly Cuba, and stressed a need to maintain strength there and in Puerto Rico to bracket the unstable countries of Haiti and Santo Domingo. Plans were developed whereby the Navy could seize ports in the area in order to land American forces. Ambitions were still unrealistic, however. A paper published in the spring of 1901 pointed out U.S. limitations even within the hemisphere, proposing that U.S. forces could only assert positive control as far as the mouth of the Orinoco, with doubtful control possible as far as the Amazon. Beyond the Amazon U.S. control was not feasible. [Ref. 40]

Despite this documented study of limitations, and the existence of an unbalanced force of new battleships and too few auxiliaries to support them, in 1903 the General Board drew up war studies for the defense of the Philippines, the seizure of a China base, and an attack on the French in

⁵¹There were occasional warnings from Mahanians that Britain, as the chief economic rival of the U.S., was also the chief threat. The reality of U.S. dependence on British power in the Far East countered this concern..

Indochina, while still contending that the most vital need was to provide for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the Atlantic and Caribbean areas, with Germany now seen as the primary threat. (Even the 1903 war plans for the Far East postulated a European threat; Japan was a secondary concern at this point.) The battleship fleet was therefore concentrated in the Atlantic, and the forces in the Far East were left in an exposed position.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was a water-shed in American military planning. The Japanese threat suddenly became more tangible, and President Theodore Roosevelt commissioned the expansion of war plans dealing with a possible threat to U.S. interests in China. The U.S. position in the Philippines took on new importance, and the Army and Navy began to fight over the relative priority of their position in the islands. As early as 1904 War Plan Orange, postulating a Japanese threat, began to show a more realistic grasp of the Pacific situation, recognizing the fact that the defense of the Philippines would consist of an initial loss of the islands with the exception of the army bastion of Corregidor, and the gradual retaking of the area. (This plan survived basically intact through its last revision in 1938.)

In 1907 President Theodore Roosevelt sent a force of battleships and escorts on an around-the-world cruise to

"show the flag," and to impress upon the Japanese the existence of a formidable U.S. naval power. An unexpected result of the journey of this Great White Fleet was the discovery of a greater than anticipated independence of shore logistics. This prompted a change in strategic thinking on the need for overseas bases and led to the development of an "advance base" concept wherein the first goal of U.S. forces in the event of probable hostilities would be to seize an advance operating base in the area. This type of plan required the cooperation of the Army, and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy thus began its first serious involvement in strategic planning.

Awareness of the potential for world upheaval had directed the attention of policy-makers to a continuing need for the modernization of the military planning system as early as 1909, when Navy Secretary George V.L. Meyers reorganized his department along functional lines. He created four "aides" with functional responsibility cutting across bureau lines to work directly under the Secretary. The executive and administrative responsibilities vested in the Aide for Operations led to an increasing degree of centralization of authority, with this position soon transcending the other three.

By 1913 Germany's position as a serious Atlantic invasion threat was acknowledged by War Plan Black. The threat was

over-estimated, discounting the long logistics line the Germans would have to maintain to reach the western Atlantic or Caribbean. Fear of this unrealistic threat reflected the continued existence of an "Atlanticist" bent in American thinking, and again threw the hard-won balance of Atlantic versus Pacific threat perception out of alignment.

Historically Americans have seldom been reluctant to support a foreign policy that would lead to war, but they have been consistently reluctant to support a military policy that would prepare the nation for war. [Ref. 41] This was not entirely the case in the second decade of the 20th Century, however. President Wilson and his followers were determined that the U.S. should remain aloof from the increasing turmoil in Europe. Significant portions of the American public had begun to sense the potentially negative aspects of world responsibility which came with the acquisition of an "empire," and popular sentiment for strict non-involvement existed throughout the country.⁵²

President Wilson, upon his election in 1912 refused to allow any military preparedness programs, and threatened to abolish all military planning boards as a provocation to war.

⁵²As a nation of immigrants of diverse origins, the United States based part of its justification for non-involvement on the basis that immigrant communities represented both sides of any European conflict. It was therefore impractical to establish support for either side.

When the Navy's General Board attempted to provide him with unsolicited advice he threatened to fire all the members, and only the reputation and diplomatic skill of board chairman Admiral Dewey saved the body from dissolution. After 1913 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy ceased to play any role in military planning, and the individual services' planning bodies were forced to do their work covertly.

By 1915 German policies and the increased obviousness of threat prompted members of Congress to look more favorably on preparedness. The pendulum of public opinion had swung this direction by the 1916 election year, and even President Wilson was forced to weaken his nonalignment stance. American inexperience in strategic thinking was apparent in the selection of preparedness policies, however. As early as the previous Taft administration proposals had been made for the establishment of a high-level inter-departmental planning body reflecting the complexity of modern conflict management. This Council of National Defense was to have included the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the chairmen of the Senate and House Military and Naval committees, and the presidents of the Army and Navy War Colleges. At the time of the initial proposal the State Department had fought against it, fearing that the creation of too powerful a centralized strategy-making body would destroy the safeguards of the "checks-and-balances" of the existing system of diversified

planning agencies. When Congress finally did create a Council of National Defense in 1916, it was concerned largely with economic mobilization rather than general defense strategy. [Ref. 42]

Internally, the Navy Department was strengthening its functional orientation. In 1916 the official position of Chief of Naval Operations was created by Congress. Loyalty to the individual bureau system had not diminished, but the creation of the new position, (a successor to the Aide for Operations), was a victory for that faction within the Navy which saw a need for concentration in a single officer of the authority to direct strategic planning for fleet operations. As written, the bill made the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) responsible for planning and preparing for the use of the fleet in war, but did not grant him the authority to issue operational orders. Bureau chiefs, with their strong pre-existing power structures, guarded their own direct access to the Secretary and Congress and their authority over the respective components of the shore establishment, and the Navy Secretary and CNO became natural allies as the only two centralized authorities in a traditionally decentralized

organization.⁵³ (In 1919 a War Plans Division was created under CNO, but most of his fifteen assistants became involved in administrative rather than planning duties.)

Meanwhile the General Staff and General Board continued to plan in a vacuum, preparing not for World War I but for a war that might follow Germany's victory in Europe. Because of the long-standing American tradition of no alliances, the possibility of cooperation with other forces in a European theater was neglected, and plans were concentrated on the threat of German invasion of the Western Hemisphere, probably coming through beachheads established in Mexico, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. Because the President did not let his strategists share in the formulation of policy, the country was again largely unprepared for entry into World War I when it came. [Ref. 43]

During the war the Army's centralized General Staff system proved incapable of coping with the complexities of modern warfare. In 1918 it underwent significant internal reorganization, and a new Division of Purchasing, Storage, and

⁵³RAADM Bradley Fiske, the Aide for Operations during the Taft administration, was a prime mover in the establishment of the position of CNO. He was also active in other reform activities, and his insistence on trying to advise his superiors when they didn't want to be advised ruined his career. (John A.S.Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917, Yale University Press, 1916)

Traffic was created. The division was ostensibly part of the General Staff, but it actually functioned under the direct control of the Secretary of War, reflecting a perceived need to plan and manage logistics functions separately from the "purely military" functions. In 1919 the Joint Board was significantly reorganized and reactivated, and its apparent success as a joint planning agency led to the creation of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board in 1922.

A study of the years from the close of the Civil War to 1917 leads to the conclusion that the harmonization of strategy and foreign policy was more often a matter of chance than design. [Ref. 39] Excessive regard for political advantage and lack of attention to strategy on the part of civilian policy-makers considerably handicapped American diplomacy. In the absence of guidance, these strategists, who looked at the world from a Mahanian viewpoint, built the strategy and supporting war plans around the only two articulated major foreign policies the United States held; the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Proponents of Mahan's theories believed that all naval plans should originate with these two policies, and that their defense was essential to the national interest. The Army, with its continental tradition, was more closely tied to the Monroe Doctrine and the protection of the hemisphere, but the Navy viewed both as absolute interests. (Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, Princeton University Press, 1973)

E. INTERLUDE BETWEEN WARS - 1919-1940

The lessons of World War I in regard to planning, organization, and management of military forces had little lingering impact after the war. Wartime forces were demobilized and sent home, and regulars returned to their physically remote outposts. The only major industry retaining significant interest in the peace-time military establishment was the ship-building industry.⁵⁵ Attempts to retain some degree of readiness resulted in the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, which defined the primary peacetime mission of the regular Army as the training of the National Guard and Organized Reserves, and established the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Funding constraints soon crippled these programs.

By 1924 funds had been cut so drastically that the Navy was forced to institute a policy allocating material funds to repair and maintenance only, shelving all building, modernization, and alteration plans. Both services had to curtail operations severely, and since no money was available for exercises, plans were again based on theory and

⁵⁵Stephen E. Ambrose notes the significance to military preparedness of the fact that in the U.S. military power over industry is derivative, having no control over actual production. (The Military and American Society, The Free Press, 1972) Proponents of the concept of a "military-industrial complex" would argue that this lack of direct control is irrelevant, especially since World War II.

speculation rather than firm capabilities. Logistics systems, which were in reality almost non-existent, were "assumed" for planning purposes.⁵⁶

Any lessons about the value of coordination between military and diplomatic policy makers seem to have been lost. There was no agency for coordination between the State Department and the Departments of War and Navy between the end of the war and 1938, when a State-War-Navy conference on Latin America concerns and hemispheric defense led to the creation of the Standing Liaison Committee, consisting of the service chiefs and the Under Secretary of State. In addition, for the first time the services were embroiled in serious internal disputes over the allocation of scarce resources. These disputes stemmed from the appearance during the war of air power as a significant consideration. Traditionalists who saw air power as merely a supplement to existing forces and air power advocates who saw it as a

⁵⁶Walter Millis states that until the end of 1937 at least, Army and Navy planning proceeded in a vacuum, with the Joint Board "color" plans upon which threat assessment and strategy were based consisting mainly of theoretical plans for largely non-existent forces. (Arms and the State, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958)

revolutionary strategic and tactical change engaged in philosophical and political battles which damaged their public credibility and unity.⁵⁷

Despite the usual post-war American withdrawal into hemispheric isolationism in the 1920's and 1930's, by the end of the latter decade it had become obvious that non-involvement in the new war in Europe would not be practical much longer. During the three years from Munich to Pearl Harbor, public opinion, carefully fostered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, became more sympathetic to actions in aid of Allied forces. Military opinion seemed to lag behind general public opinion in willingness to support hostile actions by a supposedly neutral power, but there was good reason for this. Military planners and policy-makers were well aware of the deplorable state of U.S. readiness.

Not until 1937 could President Roosevelt convince Congress to increase allocations for naval building programs and other defense programs, (in the Fiscal Year 39 budget.) In the meantime, war plan revisions began to identify Japan as a primary threat but, in recognition of stretched

⁵⁷Army air power advocates had more success than did their Navy counterparts. The Air Corps Act of 1926 gave Army aviators almost virtual autonomy in organization and planning, but the creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1921 kept Naval aviators firmly within the existing bureau system and subject to the budgeting priorities of the "battleship Navy" proponents who occupied senior positions.

resources planned for an initial loss of the Philippines and a withdrawal to an Alaska/Hawaii/Panama defense line and Asiatic basing for the fleet. In 1937 the Director of the Navy War Plans Division, Captain Ingersoll, was sent to London for "secret informal conversations" during which the possibility of a Pacific war was discussed, and concern expressed by the British about having to deplete their Asiatic forces to cope with a German threat. War Plan Orange (Japanese threat) was revised to assume British cooperation if an offensive against Japan became necessary. This was the beginning of Anglo-American strategic and tactical naval cooperation, representing a major break with traditional U.S. isolationist policy, and there was some disapproval in Congress when the rumor of Captain Ingersoll's visit surfaced in mid-1938. [Ref. 44] By this time, Congress had become well convinced of the potential threat, however, and the continuation of "informal conversations" was allowed. At the same time Army planners began to change their plan orientation from a passive, tactical approach to a broader-based strategic concept of preventive defense. In 1940 the U.S. and Canada established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense to deal with matters of common interest.

F. A NEW WAY OF WAR - 1941-1945

Civilian control of the military had always been an unquestioned part of the American system. In previous wars

this concept had included the involvement, even in wartime, of senior civilian policy-makers in most aspects of military operations, excluding only battlefield tactics. (Congressional investigations sometimes even dealt with this aspect, although only as an after-the-fact examination rather than as policy guidance.)

Samuel Huntington found three key aspects of American civil-military relations in World War II which differed from previous wars: (1) concerning major decisions of policy and strategy, the military ran the war; (2) the military apparently ran the war just the way the American people and statesmen wanted it run; and (3) on the domestic front, control over economic mobilization was shared between military and civilian agencies. [Ref. 45] Although in theory the diplomats and statesmen would provide the framework for contingency planning and thus produce "military requirements," the reality of World War II was that once military operations had begun the civilian policy-makers turned over all operational planning to the military.⁵⁸

⁵⁸There are a variety of theories why this occurred, among which are the idea that the increased complexity of technology convinced civilian policy-makers to leave war planning to the "experts," or, more pessimistically, the idea that civilian policy-makers, many of whom were elected or politically appointed officials, were quite willing to let military decision-makers take the risk of making a "wrong"

President Franklin Roosevelt, although ostensibly a "civilian policy-maker" actually identified himself in his military role of Commander-in-Chief in connection with war planning. In 1939 he reorganized the Executive Office of the President, creating a "paper" Office of Emergency Management, and strengthened and reinforced his direct line to the military. He also transferred several strategic and joint planning agencies to the Executive Office of the President, and established a War Resources Board to review existing planning programs.⁵⁹ His strong and often pre-emptive actions sometimes overwhelmed Congress and the military establishment. In 1940 he activated the National Guard, stationed the Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor, and began substantial military assistance to the Allies, In 1941 he established the Lend-Lease program, mobilized the Philippine armed forces, and began an undeclared ASW war against German

⁵⁸(cont)judgement. Actually, it was probably just the culmination of the long-standing trend of strengthening executive branch involvement and weakening legislative branch involvement in foreign affairs.

⁵⁹The board made five principal findings: (1) that there be a minimum number of agencies; (2) that they be staffed by selected capable executive personnel; (3) that the status quo of priorities among agencies be maintained; (4) that the powers of the agencies be covered by statutes or Executive Orders; and (5) that there be a system of coordination among the agencies, but that the President rather than some "super-agency" act as final arbiter. These recommendations were never really formally implemented, although in practice they were followed. (Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon: Politics, Profits and Plunder, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967)

submarines in the Atlantic. Throughout the war he remained closely involved in military strategic planning. His involvement was endorsed by Congress, which gave him authority with the First War Powers Act (December 18, 1941) to create, abolish, and reorganize executive agencies for the duration of the war. On March 27, 1942 the Second War Powers Act authorized him to requisition and allocate materials and facilities and enforce priorities.⁶⁰

On September 11, 1941 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy issued a "Joint Board Estimate of Over-all Production Requirements" in which the major national objectives of the United States were identified as follows:

"...preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of the further extension of Japanese territorial dominion; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty.

[Ref. 46]

⁶⁰This second War Powers Act did not pass without some debate, and the Senate created a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Force, (called the Truman Committee), to provide for Congressional aid and involvement with their interests in the armed forces. Relations between the Committee and the President were usually amicable, and the existence of the Committee helped reassure the public that their interests were being guarded. (Walter Millis, Arms and the State, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958)

In addition to this major policy document, three other documents were published in the fall of 1941 in response to criticism that the military refused or was unable to supply a firm list of requirements. An Anglo-American "balance sheet" showed existing stocks and projected production of major military items; another, shown only to the President, consisted of a strategic estimate of how we would win the war if we entered; a third Victory Plan listed materials needed to carry out the proposed strategy.

Military plans were still based on assumed values, as civilian policy-makers did not provide any firm requirements or priorities. Key elements were derived from civilian values because of American historical precedent; (and from secret U.S.-British strategic agreements): (1) the military defeat of the Axis to the exclusion of all else; (2) the postponement of political decisions until after the war; (3) the necessity for unconditional surrender, and (4) the priority of the defeat of Germany over the defeat of Japan (the elimination of evil as opposed to greater strategic considerations). As war planning and the war progressed the values and assumptions of the President began to be written into the thinking of the top military policy-makers, although

on lower levels the more traditional professional ethic remained intact.⁶¹

The Joint Board was closely involved in pre-war planning, but a basic restructure of the coordinative planning body was made necessary by the creation early in the war of an Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, to be located in Washington. This body was subject only to the direction of the President and Prime Minister, and was to settle questions of joint strategy, issue strategic direction, and establish and direct a unified command structure.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, created as part of this system, differed from its predecessor Joint Board in three major respects. First, it was for practical purposes a command organization, not merely a planning body or liaison committee. Second, it had a more highly developed system of sub-committees, staff, and secretariat. The old Operational Planning Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff

⁶¹Samuel Huntington contends that this virtual elimination of conventional military wisdom at high policy levels as a balance to the President's basically civilian strategic wisdom was a prime deficiency in World War II planning, and even more so in post-war planning, (or rather the lack of post-war planning.) The U.S. traded military security for military victory. (The Soldier and the State: The theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University Press, 1957)

became the War Plans Division (WPD), the Washington command post of the President's Chief of Staff, General Marshall. A number of new joint planning agencies were created: JSP (Joint Staff Planners), JSSC (Joint Strategic Survey Committee), and the JWPC (Joint War Plans Committee), all of which were channels for the submission of policy papers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Third, the JCS included the Commanding General, Army Air Forces as a co-equal member, (although Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral King still insisted on appealing from Air Corps General Arnold to Army Chief of Staff Marshall on questions of strategy.) [Ref. 47] The closeness of JCS philosophy to that of the President was shown when he overruled their strategic decisions on only three occasions throughout the war.

Both the Army and the Navy planning and policy-making structures underwent significant modification during the war. The Army General Staff was liquidated with the exception of: OPD, which became WPD under General Marshall; G-1 (Personnel) and G-2 (Intelligence). The remaining staff offices were functionally combined with operating bureaus. Three grand organizational groupings were created: Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and the Service of Supply, (which later became the Army Service Forces.) In the Navy, the position of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet was created in December

1941 to ease the Chief of Naval Operations' dual load of operational and administrative duties. CNO was tasked with long-range plans and the Commander-in-Chief with current war plans. Confusion over priorities and lines of authority and responsibility led to the recombination of the positions in March 1942, and the creation of a Vice CNO to free the Commander-in-Chief/Chief of Naval Operations for the strategic and operational direction of the war by handling administrative and logistics matters.

Victory in World War II left the United States a global power committed to participation in world affairs and needing to transform its attitudes and traditions about war and foreign affairs. With the emergence of a strong military establishment, and the complexities of coalition warfare and coalition peace, came problems for which neither traditional military doctrine nor existing plans furnished a solution. The need for a fundamental change in U.S. military and strategic planning became apparent.

IV. PLANNING AS A GLOBAL POWER - 1945-1968

A. PRELUDE TO CHANGE

The great technological and systemic changes that took place during, and especially at the end of, World War II changed the entire world of the American military planner. While, as Edward Luttwak notes, until after World War II the United States had scant need of strategy beyond the technical functions associated with "war planning," the integration of the political, social, economic, and military factors of the "world system" brought about by the war's technological developments created an unexplored environment. [Ref.48] Separation of the military aspects of planning from the political and economic, a keystone of the American military planning system since the Civil War, was no longer possible.

The most novel element of this new environment was the necessity for a constant high level of military forces to meet new international responsibilities. This gave the military greater stature within the government and the nation than it was accustomed to holding during peace. It also forced the uniformed military into the unfamiliar role of military statesmen. [Ref. 49]⁶³ Eventually the War Colleges

⁶³U.S. military officers had served as administrators of American interests around the world for many years, but with

were re-shaped to meet this new need, as the old function of training commanders for success in battle receded, but the Generals and Admirals of the late 1940's and early 1950's were largely opposed to what they perceived as a dilution of professionalism.

A revolution in military technology forced a system for centralized planning and directing of the vastly broadened military programs.⁶⁴ Yet the increased importance of military affairs was not accompanied by a narrowing of the range of actors involved in defense policy-making. The usual post-war resurgence of civilian intervention in the internal management of U.S. standing forces began immediately after hostilities ended. This time, however, one of the first steps taken was the formalization of what previously had been a largely political process. To paraphrase Clemenceau, not only had war become too important to be left to the generals; so had the peacetime defense system.

⁶³(cont)the possible exception of Commodore Perry and a few of the officers in the Far East they had seldom been called upon to be involved in major international policy decisions without the advice, or more often the direction, of the State Department.

⁶⁴It is something of a misnomer to speak of a "military program" after World War II. Despite early post-war reformers' allusions to a National Military Establishment, it has been virtually impossible since the National Security Act of 1947 to treat the uniformed military as an entity separate from the larger "national defense" system.

In creating a new centralized planning and directing system for national defense, one of the first steps was to attempt unification of the military establishment. There were three schools of thought on unification: (1) those primarily interested in improving the military effectiveness of the armed forces; (2) those primarily interested in economic efficiency; and (3) those primarily interested in greater administrative efficiency. [Ref. 50] All these arguments were used to great effect by supporters of unification.

As early as October 1943 General Marshall began a study of post-war military arrangements and conditions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also established a Special Committee for the Reorganization of National Defense, and interviewed a number of general staff officers and other informed personnel. While most senior officers of the Army saw the inevitability and desirability of some integrated military system for the future, powerful forces in the Navy were strongly opposed to such a move because of their fear of having the nation's maritime power in the hands of decision-makers who would not know how to use it properly.⁶⁵

⁶⁵The Air Corps element of the Army supported unification because they envisioned a role for air forces within the new system equal to that of ground forces and naval forces, and encompassing all of the Navy's non-carrier air missions and all Marine Corps air missions.

In March 1944 a House select committee chaired by Representative Clifton A. Woodrum began to accept testimony on proposed postwar military policy. Secretary of War Stimson adduced the Army's positive views on unification, despite the Joint Chief's committee's inability to resolve the problem to their satisfaction. Navy witnesses continued to oppose unification.

Despite opposition within his department, Navy Secretary Forrestal commissioned a study by Ferdinand Eberstadt on post-war reorganization. (Strong sentiment in Congress made it apparent that a reorganization was going to take place). He emphasized his concern that any military reorganization must also include the higher organization of political, diplomatic, industrial, and economic factors. This study proposed a reorganization providing for three separate services but no single integrated defense department. The three services would be linked to the State Department through a National Security Council, which would correlate the activities of all four agencies. Newly created joint agencies would integrate the military services' functions of economic, intelligence, and production planning. [Ref. 51]

Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins prepared the Army's views. Although more sketchy than the Eberstadt proposals, this study called for a single military department, a single

secretary, and a single Chief of Staff of the armed forces to serve as an advisor and executive agent for the Secretary. [Ref. 52]

B. BUILDING A STRUCTURE - 1945-1952

After viewing both studies, President Truman approved a plan combining elements of both. He accepted the Eberstadt study's plan for higher organization, but preferred the Collins study's ideas on service unification. It was this compromise plan which he submitted to Congress in late 1945 as a tentative proposal for a strong post-war military organization and a merger of the armed forces under a single Department of National Defense.⁶⁶ This department was to have a Secretary of cabinet rank, an Under Secretary, and several Assistant Secretaries. The military forces would be separated into three coordinate branches -- land forces, naval forces, and air forces -- each under an Assistant Secretary. Each branch would have a military commander, and these three, together with the Chief of Staff of the Department of National Defense, the senior uniformed representative, would serve as an advisory body to the Secretary and President. [Ref. 53]

⁶⁶Congress was at the time reorganizing its own part in the defense policy process. The National Reorganization Act of 1946 combined into a single committee the Military and Naval Affairs Committees in each house, as it also combined each house's Army and Navy Appropriations Committees.

Neither Secretary of War Patterson nor Navy Secretary Forrestal were satisfied with this compromise. The Army was willing to accept most Navy ideas for higher organization, including a National Security Council, a National Security Resources Board, and a Central Intelligence Agency. The Navy Recognized that there would probably have to be an over-all defense "director" or Secretary. Two obstacles remained: (1) the Army insisted the defense Secretary be in charge of the entire establishment, while the Navy insisted he be only a "coordinator" with no executive authority or separate department; and (2) the Navy felt vulnerable on its rights to own its own air assets and maintain a separate Marine Corps. [Ref. 54]

In June 1946, the President agreed to review a revised organization plan based on discussions with his Secretaries of War and Navy. The new plan suggested a single cabinet level secretary and a Department of National Defense, with three subordinate service secretaries.⁶⁷ The position of Chief of Staff of the armed forces was eliminated. The Navy could maintain a Marine Corps, but land-based reconnaissance

⁶⁷Navy Secretary Forrestal saw this new Secretary of National Defense in a larger integrative role, with the individual service secretaries free to run their own departments without interference.

and ASW air assets were assigned to the Air Force. No action was taken until after the 1946 Congressional Christmas recess but, in January 1947, after changes agreed to by both Secretaries, (including identification of the Navy as primary service for land-based ASW and maritime reconnaissance), Congress saw the new presidential plan. It called for a single Secretary of National Defense with Cabinet rank but no separate department who would preside over the entire "Military Establishment." The individual service secretaries would still have direct access to the President and the Bureau of the Budget, but would sit on the National Security Council rather than the cabinet, and have roles and missions addressed by Executive Order rather than by statute. [Ref. 55]

Congress used this structure for the National Military Establishment in the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253). The Secretary of Defense was tasked as the president's principal advisor on national security, in addition to his duties as head of the National Military Establishment. A Central Intelligence Agency for the collection and processing of intelligence related to national security, and a National Security Resources Board, were also created.

The wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff were formalized and tasked with serving as "the principal military advisors to

the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." [Ref. 56] They were to be assisted by a Joint Staff under a Director, with Deputy Directors for Strategic, Intelligence, and Logistics Plans.

While integrating the National Military Establishment, Congress also created a National Security Council (NSC), which was assigned the mission of advising the President,

"...with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." [Ref.57]

This Council was to focus on policy, not on plans or organization. [Ref. 58]⁶⁸ Statutory members included the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State, National Defense, and the three services, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. The President could appoint other members as he saw fit.

The structure of the National Military Establishment and the independence of the National Security Council lasted only

⁶⁸The roots of the NSC probably lay in the British Committee of National Defense, nationalized through the Standing Liaison Committee of the early 1940's and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee of 1944. Although some Congressional proponents of the creation of the NSC may have supported it in hopes that it would constrain the President (fearing a repeat of the recent experience of Roosevelt's dominance in foreign affairs), it has strengthened his hand by freeing him from dependence on his senior Cabinet advisors.

two years before Congress felt it necessary to make important modifications. In August 1949 the National Security Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President. The new cabinet-level officer's title was changed to Secretary of Defense, his powers were significantly enlarged, and the individual service secretaries lost their cabinet status. All elements of the National Military Establishment were clearly subordinated to the new Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the service secretaries were deprived of direct access to the President. The position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (non-voting) was created to provide coordination for that body's deliberations.⁶⁹

Despite the National Security Council's creation by act of Congress, it became apparent through the years that

⁶⁸(cont)It has affected foreign policy advice to the President in three major ways: (1) by providing a forum of senior officials who can review foreign policy issues for the President; (2) by providing a focal point for the development of foreign policy planning and decision processes; and (3) by providing an umbrella for the emergence of a presidential foreign policy staff. The founders mainly conceived of the NSC in the first role, but it has become most importantly the last. (I.M.Destler, "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some lessons from Thirty Years," in Klaus Knorr, ed. Power, Strategy, and Security, Princeton University Press, 1983.)

⁶⁹The position of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief was allowed to lapse when ADM Leahy retired in 1949.

its use and effectiveness were very much a product of the President and his administration. [Ref. 59] President Truman felt strongly about the advisory nature of the NSC. To emphasize his autonomy, he seldom attended meetings, preferring to receive the results of council deliberations in the form of formal statements, although he occasionally attended during times of crisis when immediate advice was needed. With the onset of the Korean conflict the President took a more personal interest in the NSC, limiting attendance to a size appropriate to discussion, and creating a Senior Staff and Staff Assistants to take responsibility for projects previously assigned to ad hoc committees. [Ref. 60]

While National Security Council operations depended on the priorities and methods of the President, the Department of Defense depended on the priorities of the President, but the methods of the Secretary of Defense. The first Secretary of National Defense was James Forrestal, formerly Navy Secretary.⁷⁰ Although he had been less than totally satisfied with the way Congress chose to structure the new National Military Establishment, he set about to do his best to meet the difficult goals established for him by the President.

⁷⁰President Truman had first asked Secretary of War Patterson to take the newly created position. Only when he declined was Forrestal asked.

The three services were accustomed to preparing their annual budgets based on wartime needs and on the requirement to justify costs only in terms of those needs. With the end of the war and the usual demobilization, President Truman provided Secretary Forrestal with a budget ceiling below which the entire department was to stay. Unfortunately for Secretary Forrestal the three services had not reconciled themselves to unification, and when he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a compromise departmental budget he received instead a combination of the separate budgets of the three services which exceeded the budget ceiling by several billion dollars. Although he did his best to meet the stated priorities of his service chiefs, one of Secretary Forrestal's first major official acts was to make policy by his choice of budget cuts, something the Congressional reformers had not intended, and which he did not desire.⁷¹

⁷¹Forrestal had expected the service chiefs to advise him on the division of funds within the limits set by the President, and to share the responsibility for that division with him. His own role he viewed as that of mediator between the administration and the military services, bridging the gap between what was needed and what was available. The service chiefs, on the other hand, viewed their primary responsibility as the protection of the interests of their own branch, and felt that it was appropriate to "pass the buck" upward on trans-service questions. (Lawrence J. Korb, "The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Conflict in the Budgetary Process, 1947-1971," Naval War College Review, December 1971.)

Louis Johnson succeeded Forrestal as Secretary in early 1949. Secretary Johnson viewed his job as one of enforcing economies on a reluctant military establishment. [Ref. 61] The Chiefs were told to keep their combined budget within the limit or have it arbitrarily cut by the Secretary with no consideration of JCS priorities; to become "team men" or be replaced. This confirmed another weakness reformers had warned against -- the politicization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁷²

Part of the JCS difficulty in developing a compromise budget arose from the usual lack of guidance on strategy and resulting priorities. Congress in a sense provided guidance by its support of strategic bomber programs, but neither Congress, the President, nor the NSC provided the Joint Chiefs with policy guidelines upon which to base a rational resource allocation plan. For the first time, U.S. military policy was made primarily by the budget, instead of the reverse.

⁷²Although the service chiefs had access to Congress and used it when they felt that the importance of a contentious issue warranted, as military men they were torn between their responsibility to ensure that the American public and their representatives were aware of these issues and their responsibility to support the Commander-in-Chief's programs. In the case of Truman's chiefs, their decision to accede to Secretary Johnson's demands without public question led to a loss of status as military experts in the eyes of many observers, and to a demand by Congressional Republicans that President Eisenhower replace the entire JCS when he assumed office.

The U.S. monopoly of the atomic bomb in the late 1940's made possible a theory of almost total reliance on strategic bombers for defense. The appeal of an "end to limited warfare" brought about by the "umbrella" of nuclear defense caught the imagination of Congress.⁷³ When President Truman chose cuts in strategic bomber programs as a method of staying within his self-imposed defense budget ceiling, Congress simply allocated the additional four billion dollars requested by the air forces despite the President's protests.

Attempts to moderate reliance on the nuclear umbrella in favor of a more balanced approach to defense were seldom successful. The Navy-Marine Corps campaign for the maintenance of non-strategic forces met with little approval.⁷⁴ ADM Radford made a well-reasoned appeal for a broader strategy during Congressional hearings on the B-36 bomber, (which had been prompted by accusations of improper influence in procurement and program administration.)

"The kind of war we plan to fight must fit the kind of peace we want. We cannot look to military victory alone, with no thought to the staggering problems that would be

⁷³This with a little help from those glamorous and effective young generals of the Army Air Corps, later the Air Force.

⁷⁴Navy policy-makers were not totally immune to the attractions of the aura of atomic superiority. A large part of their argument against over-dependence on a strategic bomber force dealt not with concerns about the weakness of the strategy but with a desire to maintain or even broaden the Navy's role in the defense structure.

generated by the death and destruction of an atom blitz ...[T]he United States is not sound in relying on the so-called strategic bombing concept to its present extent... In the minds of our citizens this fallacious concept promises a short cut to victory. Our citizens must realize that its [sic] military leaders cannot make this promise." [Ref. 62]

U.S. policy-maker's willingness to base their strategy on the atomic monopoly received a serious blow with, first, the explosion of an atomic device by the Soviets in 1949 and, next, the commencement of a "limited War" in Korea in 1950.⁷⁵ Defense priorities shifted from economy to effectiveness in both conventional and strategic forces, and the NSC finally provided defense planners with a clearly articulated policy statement which to base plans and priorities.

On February 27, 1950 the NSC issued a paper, designated NSC-64, calling for taking "all practicable measures" to prevent further communist expansionism in Southeast Asia, referring to Indochina as a "key" area and effectively broadening the containment doctrine to include Asia. Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt that there was need for a more inclusive statement of U.S. policy and an even greater

⁷⁵George Kennan, while head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, had warned that the policy of containment chosen by Truman as the best way to deal with expansionism would be far more likely to lead to a limited local war than a major conflict.

need to change the situation whereby Defense Department strategic thinking was limited by budget ceilings. Over several weeks in the spring of 1950 he and Paul Nitze, head of the Policy Planning Staff, and a group of specialists from the State Department, Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated an NSC paper which became the most important and influential U.S. policy statement for a decade.⁷⁶

NSC-68, as the paper was designated, called for a major American rearmament and an increase in annual defense expenditures from less than 14 billion dollars to as much as 50 billion dollars. It analyzed the world situation in terms of a need for a greatly expanded military, diplomatic, and economic effort to cope with a critical Soviet threat, which it identified as being "antimated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seek[ing] to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world." [Ref. 63]⁷⁷ Secretary Acheson, fearing dilution of impact, directed that the paper

⁷⁶Although NSC papers of the Truman years were composed less of specific policy directives than of broad statements of principle, they were an important source of guidance to planners who were accustomed to having to deduce policy from political statements and budget approvals. (Stanley Falk, "The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXIX (Sept. 1964)).

⁷⁷The nature and severity of this Soviet threat were exaggerated for effect. Mr. Nitze, the prime architect of

be promulgated without the usual inter-agency clearing procedure, so it was essentially a State Department document. (NSC-68 was drawn up before the outbreak of the Korean War, but the war lent it great credibility.)

Critics have pointed out that NSC-68 was a ponderous expression of elementary ideas, wherein Secretary Acheson and the creators of the paper were interested more in polemic value than in precise rationality. However ponderous or elementary, NSC-68 served the purpose for which it was designed. Military planners translated its recommendations into force levels, and it provided a foundation for the enormous force and budgetary expansion of late 1950 and 1951.⁷⁸

C. USING THE STRUCTURE - 1953-1960

Although President Truman was more willing to use the NSC and the JCS in the policy-creation process after the

⁷⁷(cont) NSC-68, realized that overstatement was necessary to overcome the sense of complacency into which policy-makers had fallen during the period of atomic monopoly. (John C. Donovan, The Cold Warriors; A Policy-Making Elite, D. C. Heath and Company, 1974)

⁷⁸The State Department wanted to publish NSC-68, but the Defense Department insisted that it remain secret because of fears that its publication might constitute a commitment which could not be met, causing embarrassment and loss of credibility. Like the arguments over the military use of atomic power, the arguments over basic priorities and strategy were kept within the upper levels of government. Strategy had not yet become a political question.

cōmmencement of hōstilities in Kōrea, he viewed these bodies strictly as sources of infōrmatiōn and advice to his ultimate pōlicy-making rōle. With the assumption of office by President Eisenhower in January of 1953 the rōle of the NSC and, tō a lesser extent the JCS, changed significantly.

Eisenhower's election in 1952 signaled the entry of the military pōfessiōnal intō pōlitics, an interesting reversal of the usual American traditiōn of politicians entering the wartime military. This was nōtable proof of the enhanced rōle of the military in American sōciety as a result of World War II. Any fears of increased militarization of a gōvernment "in the hands of the pōfessiōnal military" were unjustified; with a fōrmer pōfessiōnal soldier in the White Hōuse the U.S. was tō experience a cōsiderable diminutiōn of the pōwer of "purely military" factōrs in the cōntrol of affairs. [Ref. 64]⁷⁹

Althōugh the new President's defense objective's were not distinctly articulated, they were nevertheless identifiable: (1) clear and unchallenged civilian respōnsibility in the

⁷⁹It was Eisenhower's very credibility as a military man which allōwed him tō make cuts and mōdificatiōns that might otherwise have been refused. President Eisenhower's actions and pōriōrities pōvide an instructive case study in why most "American military men" are mōre accurately identified with the "American" than the "military" element of their backgrōund.

Defense Establishment; (2) maximum effectiveness at minimum cost; and (3) the best possible military plans. As part of his election platform, he promised an increased role for the NSC, which he felt President Truman was not using as Congress had intended. A committee chaired by Nelson Rockefeller presented its findings on defense reorganization to the new president at the end of April, 1953, and Eisenhower used most of its recommendations both to make changes and to justify changes he had already made.⁸⁰

As early as January 1953 President Eisenhower began to change the NSC, introducing clear lines of responsibility and authority and creating the position of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to coordinate NSC activity. He created a permanent NSC staff and systematized staff requirements, fixed a specific hour and day for meetings, (which he usually attended, unlike his predecessor), and added the requirement that each meeting begin with a current intelligence briefing by the CIA director. [Ref. 65] In

⁸⁰One of the issues which the committee had been directed to study was whether there should be separate and parallel lines of command for civilian and military activities and policy-making within DOD. The committee unanimously found that it was impossible to make a sufficiently clear distinction within DOD between military and civil affairs to serve as a basis for divided responsibility. (Walter Millis, Arms and the State, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958.)

addition to statutory members, regular attendees included the Treasury Secretary, Director of the Budget Bureau, and the Special Assistant on Disarmament. The former Senior Staff was replaced by a Policy Planning Board directly under the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. This body was composed of Assistant Secretaries from the member departments and agencies, and it was here that the real policy work of the NSC was centered. Finally, an Operations Coordination Board was made responsible for ensuring that policies approved by the president were carried out.

In addition, the Rockefeller Committee recommendations to transfer the functions of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board to new Assistant Secretaries of Defense were followed. Six new Assistant Secretaries were added to the existing three, their position as staff rather than line being emphasized. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were excluded from the chain of command. The Secretary of Defense would in future designate one of the military departments as executive agency for a unitary theatre and that department would designate its Chief of Staff as the theatre commander.⁸¹ The position of the Chairman of the JCS was

⁸¹Although this was a change in form rather than substance it had important implications for the authority structure within DOD.

enhanced by making the selection and tenure of officers of the Joint Staff subject to his approval, and transferring the management of the Joint Staff to the Chairman alone. [Ref. 66]

Because President Eisenhower had a great deal of military expertise, he needed a Secretary of Defense who was a manager rather than a military advisor. [Ref.67]⁸² Both Secretary Wilson and his successor, Secretary McElroy, were interested in managing rather than making defense policy, and they expected the JCS to be part of the OSD staff. The president apparently agreed with their philosophy, because one of his first steps upon assuming office was to select a set of service chiefs whom he felt would support his policies. Despite Congressional criticism of this further politicization of the military advisement function, these service chiefs were generally able to balance their relationship as appointees and advisors, and maintained their credibility more than had their successors.

During the mid-1950's the NSC made increasing use of outside consultants. In 1957 a committee of consultants, originally convened at the president's direction to examine

⁸²Eisenhower already had a strong source of foreign policy advice in Secretary of State Dulles, and Dulles' propensity for dominating policy input plus the increasing influence of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs sometimes made independent contributions from a military point of view rather difficult.

the implications of a proposed massive fallout shelter program, used their report as a vehicle for the overall review of American defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviets. This Gaither Committee Report was strikingly similar to NSC-68, and was accepted as a major cold war policy document.⁸³

On April 3, 1958 President Eisenhower announced plans for a second significant reorganization of the defense structure, based in part on the findings of the Gaither Committee. He concluded that:

"Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever...Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands...singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander in Chief." [Ref. 68]

All combat forces were absorbed into the unified and specified commands, and the service secretaries were removed from the operational chain of command, which went from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commanders. The Joint Staff was greatly enlarged and provided with an integrated operations division. Most significantly, the Joint Chiefs were given the authority and

⁸³The report's resemblance to NSC-68 is not surprising, as one of the special consultants to the committee was Paul Nitze. (John C. Donovan The Cold Warriors; a Policy-Making Elite, D.C.Heath and Company, 1974)

encouraged to delegate major portions of their service responsibilities to their Vice Chiefs so they could concentrate on JCS duties, and the Chairman, JCS became a voting member of that body rather than just a coordinator. [Ref. 69]

The 1958 changes to the defense establishment were the last major official changes in form undergone by that entity. While the form may not have changed, the functioning continues to evolve. Every president since Eisenhower has attempted to improve the effectiveness of his defense policy making system according to his own chosen style. When the 1958 changes were made, however, there was no reason to believe that they would not control the new weapons, new tactics, and new strategies that were coming to the fore.

D. THE "NEW LOOK" AT STRATEGY

During the first half of 1957 many old military policies and issues of civil-military relations were coalescing into one large, vague, and elusive problem -- the "new warfare." In January 1954, Secretary of State Dulles had announced that the United States possessed a capacity for "massive retaliation" against hostile action, and would not hesitate to use it if the U.S. or any of its allies were attacked. At the same time, agreements allowed allies some knowledge of tactical nuclear weapons, and intensive study was begun of the tactical and strategic employment of nuclear weapons.

The "great equation" of the best defense for the least dollars, promised by Eisenhower in his election campaign, took the form of more strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and fewer conventional forces based on the "more bang for the buck" thesis. [Ref. 70]⁸⁴

In 1956 and 1957 the "golden age" of American strategic thinking began, with the publication of W.W. Kaufmann's Military Policy and National Security and Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. The basic assumptions underlying the strategy of deterrence upon which American nuclear strategy has always rested were: (1) realism, (as defined by political historian Hans Morganthau); (2) moral neutrality; (3) peace and security as desirable goals; (4) the cold war as the essential model, and (5) rationality in end/means analysis. [Ref.71] From 1945 to 1949, while the U.S. held a monopoly on atomic weapons, no significant works on nuclear strategy appeared. From 1949 to 1954, strategists approved renewal of general purpose forces as a result of the war in Korea, but no proponent of balanced forces could overcome the sentiment that future Korea-type conflicts might best be deterred by a strategic posture emphasizing nuclear weapons.

⁸⁴The cost per unit of energy output was figured to be much lower in a nuclear weapon than in a conventional weapon of comparable force.

Changes in technology, such as the development of credible ICBM forces by both the U.S. and the Soviets, and the launching of the Sputnik spacecraft in August 1957, brought about a revolution in strategic thought. Between the Kaufmann and Kissinger books and Klaus Knorr's On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age in 1966, nuclear strategists produced many works on most aspects of contemporary strategy.⁸⁵

All these emphasized the systemic nature of modern strategy. Robert Osgood stated that:

"[I]n a nuclear age...to concentrate on planning wars is little short of madness. Today there is no alternative to peace...[M]ilitary strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion -- in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power -- to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert, and tacit means." [Ref. 72]

⁸⁵Ken Booth, in his article "The Evolution of Strategic Thinking" (John Bayliss and others, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975) provides an excellent list of significant works on strategy from the "golden age." He cites: A. Wohlstetter, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases (a 1954 precursor); W.W. Kaufmann (ed.), Military Policy and National Security; H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957); R. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (1957); A. Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs (January 1959); B. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (1959); H. Kahn, On Thermo-nuclear War (1960); T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960); H. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (1960); H. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (1961); G. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a

One outcome of the strategic works of the mid-1950's was a new respectability for the concept of limited war, which the Army seized upon to justify its existence. A 1956 Army study proposed a "National Military Program" among whose elements were the deterrence of general war, the deterrence of local aggression, the defeat of local aggression, and victory in general war. From this study and the works of strategic thinkers of the period would evolve the concepts of "flexible response," "balanced deterrence," and "measured retaliation." [Ref. 73]

E. NEW FRONTIERS - 1961-1963

In 1959 Senator Henry Jackson initiated a study of the national security policy process. His Sub-committee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Relations conducted an inquiry over the next three years on how government processes helped or hampered prompt and effective action in national security affairs. Although the full committee report was not released until November

⁸⁵(cont)Theory of National Security (1961); T.C.Schelling and M.Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (1961); K.Knorr and T.Read, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (1963); W.W.Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (1964); H.J.Morgenthau, "The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy," American Political Science Review (March 1964); A.Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (1965); T.C.Schelling, Arms and Influence (1966); P.Green, Deadly Logic (1966); K.Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (1966).

1961, the staff report on the National Security Council was released on December 12, 1960, and newly elected President Kennedy used this report as an entering wedge for his modifications to the NSC.

The new Special Assistant for Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, was directed to consider specific recommendations that included: (1) meetings should be scheduled only to advise the president or to receive his decision on specific major items; (2) reports should offer clear expressions of alternate courses; (3) meeting attendance should be limited to "principal actors" only; (4) the Policy Planning Board should be replaced by a group used mainly to criticize and comment on policy developed by the departments or stimulated by the president; (5) the president should rely mainly on the Secretary of State to synthesize foreign and defense policy; (6) the Operations Coordinating Board should be abolished and responsibility for policy implementation given to an action officer; (7) the NSC staff should be reduced and more closely integrated; (8) the statutory membership of the Chairman of the Office of Civilian Defense Management should be dropped; and (9) ways and means should be found to better integrate NSC recommendations with budget decisions made outside the Council. [Ref. 74]

The implementation of recommended changes was made to correct the major deficiency the Jackson Sub-committee found

in the NSC, that it was paying too much attention to foreign policy questions rather than adequately performing its role of integrating and coordinating the military and political aspects of the national security policy equation. More importantly, it was to mold an NSC that would better suit the new president's operating style.⁸⁶

In contrast to President Eisenhower's preference for formalized structure and extensive staffing, President Kennedy had a much more ad hoc and collegial style. he believed that policy should be shaped primarily through day-to-day decisions and actions, and thus tended to rely more on his personal advisors rather than the cumbersome government staffing procedures. During the Kennedy administration the president's personal staff filled many of the advisory and planning roles of the NSC and the State Department. Formal

⁸⁶The subcommittee's overall concluding statement, delivered by Senator Jackson on November 15, 1961, included the following findings: (1)We need a clearer understanding of where our vital national interests lie and what we must do to promote them; (2)Radical additions to our existing policy machinery are unnecessary and undesirable;(3)The key problem of national security is not reorganization - it is getting our best people into key foreign-policy and defense posts;(4) There is serious over-staffing in the national security departments and agencies;(5)The career services should be made better training grounds for posts of national security leadership;(6)We should reduce the needless barriers that stand in the way of private citizens called to national duty;(7)Used properly, the National Security Council can be of great value as an advisory body to the President;(8)No task is more urgent than improving the effectiveness of the Department of State;(9)We need a stronger, not a weaker,

reorganizational lines were often ignored as the President appointed inter-agency task forces to complete projects he felt would benefit from a cross-fertilization of ideas. [Ref. 75]

The strategic philosophy of "flexible response" seemed to the new president to be the appropriate solution to what he felt was the most pressing need in foreign and defense policy: attaining a greater degree of correspondance between U.S. committments and capabilities. [Ref. 76] Containment still remained the basic objective, but Kennedy's advisors provided a more pessimistic assessment of the communist threat and a more optimistic assessment of what the U.S. could do to meet it.⁸⁷

Because he felt so strongly about the importance of personal advice, and the relationship between the President and his advisors, Kennedy wanted to appoint his own Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 77] The terms of the incumbent chiefs had not expired, however, so he appointed Gen. Maxwell Taylor

⁸⁶(cont)Bureau of the Budget; and (10) The Congress should put its own house in better order. (Henry M. Jackson, The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965)

⁸⁷Part of the motivation for the acceptance of flexible response as a defense policy was Kennedy's strong concern over the inability of the West to cope with insurgency movements, which he saw as an increasing threat.

his personal military advisor until the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was available.⁸⁸ Taylor had come to Kennedy's attention as the result of his book The Uncertain Trumpet, which blamed the deficiencies of the American defense system on the lack of a national basis for determining military requirements.

After the Bay of Pigs incident, in which the president felt his military advisors failed him, the JCS lost all credibility in Kennedy's eyes. Even when he was able to appoint his own men to the Joint Chiefs the uniformed military was basically treated as a tool of the Secretary of Defense, who became the primary source of "military" advice. [Ref. 78]⁸⁹

President Kennedy appointed McGeorge Bundy his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Bundy made several changes to the NSC to meet the president's preferences. The Policy Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board

⁸⁸Kennedy did not want to "fire" the existing Chiefs, and had he been willing to do so Congress would probably not have accepted such action.

⁸⁹There is some irony in that when Kennedy began to ignore his Joint Chiefs of Staff, that body was finally becoming a true joint policy agency. The new generals and admirals who were rising to senior posts were planners and administrators as much as combat leaders, and most of them had absorbed the values of the unified defense establishment far more than had their predecessors.

were abolished, and over the next few years the NSC role changed from general policy formulation to a specific advisory function. By the Cuban Missile Crisis, the president was treating the NSC almost as part of his personal staff. Bundy also changed the NSC staff from an administrative to a thinking staff. [Ref. 79]

President Kennedy felt very strongly that rationalizing the government policy-making procedures was vital to the country's well-being. This was particularly true in the case of the Defense Department, with its huge budget devoted to the essential but somewhat esoteric "national defense." Before assuming the presidency, Kennedy appointed a committee, chaired by former Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, to study the defense organization. The findings of the committee contained two recommendations that served as the keystones of Kennedy's defense policy: (1) the administration must develop the military structure required for a firm foreign policy without regard to budget ceilings; and (2) these military forces must be operated at the lowest possible price. [Ref. 80] Kennedy selected former Ford president Robert McNamara as his Secretary of Defense to effect these recommendations.

⁸⁹(cont) They were still uniformed military professionals, however, and resented the fact that their advice was seldom sought and often ignored.

McNamara chose the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) as his primary tool in rationalizing the defense policy process. The system was installed by Charles J. Hitch, an ex-RAND economist appointed Assistant Secretary (Comptroller), and his deputy, Alain C. Enthoven.⁹⁰ Cost effectiveness based on systems analysis methods became the backbone of the planning system.

PPBS provided an analysis that cut across service boundaries, affecting the way they carried out their roles and missions. Requirements and funding were categorized into nine major mission and function areas, or programs; (1) Strategic Retaliatory Forces; (2) Continental Defense Forces; (3) General Purpose Forces; (4) Airlift and Sealift; (5) Reserve and Guard; (6) Research and Development; (7) General Support; (8) Retired Pay; and (9) Military Assistance. [Ref. 81]

A Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) served as a master plan for the budget process. This plan, updated yearly, contained programs approved by OSD with estimated costs projected for the next five years. The budget process itself was extended to eighteen months and divided into three distinct cycles. During the planning cycle the JCS produced its threat assessment, JCS and unified commands produced force level

⁹⁰Enthoven later became an Assistant Secretary when his Office of Systems Analysis was raised to that status.

recommendations, and concurrently OSD produced a Major Program Memorandum (MPM) for each of the mission areas.⁹¹ During the programming cycle the secretary received the planning documents, along with JCS comments on the OSD input and OSD comments on the JCS input. The services also submitted Program Change Requests (PCR) suggesting modifications to the FYDP.⁹² During the budgeting cycle the services prepared traditional category separate budgets. These were reviewed by the Comptroller's Office and by the secretary, who often made minute changes himself.

Secretary McNamara saw himself as an active manager providing aggressive leadership to eliminate waste, unnecessary duplication, and gold-plating. He expected the JCS to incorporate economic criteria into their traditional military requirements studies. The JCS were no more or less important than any of his other advisors, and he expected them to support his decisions.

⁹¹The uniformed military inputs were usually ignored, and the MPM became the primary planning document.

⁹²Of the average 300 PCR submitted annually by the services to the Office of Systems Analysis, few were approved. The three factors in disapprovals were: (1) poor analytic techniques; (2) the requests did not convey a sense of priority to the base program; and (3) cost. (Lawrence J. Korb, "The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Conflict in the Budgetary Process, 1947-1971," Naval War College Review, December 1971)

Under McNamara, defense planning was dominated by civilian defense intellectuals who had management, or analytic, rather than strategic orientations. McNamara's methods were criticized largely because they ignored military advice and influence, and because much of the analysis seemed designed to support preconceived solutions or decisions already made. For the first time, however, the Secretary actually had real control of the Defense Department.

Claims that McNamara upset the civilian-military balance are not necessarily accurate. Military advice was still available, but decision-makers chose to make decisions based on other criteria. The JCS had access to Congress, and occasionally used it. The services learned basic logic on why they had the requirements that they did, and they learned to use systems analysis methods to present these requirements. [Ref. 82]

F. DEFENSE POLICY UNDER A DOMESTIC PRESIDENT - 1963-1968

When Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, the United States inherited a president whose interest and experience in foreign and defense policy were almost non-existent. He was not comfortable in those realms, and he initially depended almost entirely on his advisors for policy decisions.

As President Johnson's own style of operation evolved, the impact of the White House Staff was reduced, while that of the Cabinet officers was strengthened. The primacy of the State Department in Foreign policy matters was reaffirmed, and a degree of formality was restored to the NSC with the creation of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of State, and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups. [Ref. 83]

In 1962 President Kennedy had designated Secretary McNamara his action officer on Vietnam, so President Johnson initially left that problem in the secretary's hands. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288, produced by the NSC in March 1964, was the first public document to eliminate the ambiguity of U.S. policy on Vietnam, in stating that "we seek an independent non-communist South Vietnam..." [Ref.84] U.S. "advisory" activity increased, and by February 1965 the U.S. had commenced aerial attacks on North Vietnam. In March the first non-advisory ground troops reached Indochina.

Initially McNamara had treated the build-up in Vietnam as a short-term prospect, instructing his staff to write budgets based on the assumption that the war would be over by the end of the Fiscal Year and deleting "non-urgent" programs from the figures. This practice led to the necessity of requesting budget supplements from Congress each year, which

embarrassed the President and hurt McNamara's credibility. By the mid-1960's, these limitations had been raised.

Until late 1966 Secretary McNamara supported the President's chosen method of "gradualism" in bombing, rather than strong counter-force bombing, believing that it was more suited to the philosophy of "flexible response," in which he believed.⁹³ In October 1966, however, McNamara visited Vietnam to view progress there, and what he saw convinced him that the war was a losing proposition. He recommended the stabilization of U.S. ground forces, and stressed the need for greater dependence on South Vietnamese forces. His open opposition to the President on one hand and the rise of uniformed military influence, to which he had been opposed for the past six years, undercut his value as a senior advisor and policy maker. He was appointed President of the World Bank in February 1968, and was replaced by Melvin Laird as Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 85]

Secretary Laird kept the basic defense planning system he had inherited from McNamara, but his personal style and the relative amount of credence he gave to civilian and uniformed

⁹³The President exercised extremely detailed control over the bombing, including target selection, ordnance, and execution. He let General Abrams run ground operations with little interference, and the general chose a strategy of attrition for his forces. Air strategy and ground strategy were therefore at cross-purposes.

military advice differed significantly from that of his predecessor. Rather than viewing his role as one of controlling the defense program, Laird saw himself as the Pentagon spokesman within the administration, and as the Department of Defense advocate to Congress and the public. He viewed the Joint Chiefs as the primary military advisors not only to himself but to the government as a whole, and he encouraged them to air their differing opinions to Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, etc. In return, he held them more tightly to budget ceilings as finally approved by himself and the president.

Because of his approach to planning, Secretary Laird's requirement that the defense budget be more tightly controlled was not unreasonable. He was willing to bargain, negotiate, and compromise with the JCS in order to get a concensus, and this in turn encouraged the Joint Chiefs to work as a team, as there was not the intense pressure to protect individual service interests in competition for resources. By improving the status of the uniformed military in the planning process, Secretary Laird helped to restore a degree of balance to the outcome of the policy process.⁹⁴

⁹⁴President Johnson and many of the people he brought with him into the administration were heavily oriented toward domestic interests, and had a basic lack of understanding of defense policy and mistrust of the uniformed military. Secretary Laird could never fully break through this barrier, but he tried to represent his military advisors in the best

V. REDEFINING THE ROLE - 1968 and AFTER

A. REVERSING TRENDS - 1968-1976

When President Nixon took office in January 1968, he inherited a legacy of non-coherence in defense planning, despite Secretary Laird's changes. President Johnson's primary interest in domestic issues and his failure to ever gain a firm understanding of the potential of the defense policy planning system left the formal structure in confusion.

Neither the new president nor his selected Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, had previous experience managing complex large-scale organizations, and neither had experienced the potential limits of personal grasp or the potential benefits of delegation. Both men, however, had recognized competence in the foreign affairs field, and this promoted confidence, (among themselves and others), in their capacity. In 1969 the president pledged to restore the NSC to its pre-eminent role in national security planning, and he set about restructuring that body based on a goal of a personally devised purposeful and coherent policy responsive to what he saw as a watershed era in U.S. foreign policy. [Ref. 86]

The keystone of President Nixon's foreign policy was the "Nixon Doctrine" under which the U.S. would not relinquish any of its global commitments, but would put less effort into meeting them directly, especially in Asia, using more aid and less U.S. military presence, and leaving to allies military activities uncongenial to the U.S.⁹⁵ He favored a return to the concept of asymmetrical response, applying strengths against weaknesses, and he began to assign military policy to a place as one element of foreign policy rather than as an independent system.

The new president made two general structural and procedural changes with direct impact on the military profession and military professionals in the planning process: (1) internal adjustments within DOD restored greater responsibility to military professionals in the budgeting process, and (2) NSC machinery was restructured to allow for a more formalized integration of political, military, and other aspects of national security planning. These changes were significant, but they were a matter of emphasis and technique rather than substance. [Ref. 87]

⁹⁵From 1969 to January 1974 the number of American forces in Vietnam dropped from 550,000 to 24,000, and spending on these forces dropped from 25 billion dollars annually to 3 billion dollars. Congress fully supported and even pushed these moves. (Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, The Brookings Institution, 1979.)

President-elect Nixon had selected Henry Kissinger as his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Although General Andrew Goodpasture, as a member of Nixon's transition team, was the original architect of the changes to the Nixon defense planning system, Kissinger became involved in the latter part of the transition period, bringing with him former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Morton Halperin as an advisor. As an academic, Kissinger had published works on the theme of the overwhelming importance of purposes over techniques. He had explored methods of achieving primacy for purposeful action and creative thinking in an increasingly bureaucratized environment, and he felt it was important to avoid both the excess formalism of the 1950's and the unstructured style of Kennedy and Johnson. [Ref. 88]

It soon became obvious that foreign policy under President Nixon would be White House and NSC-centered rather than State Department-centered. NSC meetings were scheduled frequently and regularly, and a specific agenda was followed. The advisory nature of the council was emphasized; although it provided a forum for discussion of issues by senior policy-makers, all decisions were reserved to the President. Attention was redirected to presidentially directed policy reviews, (National Security Study Memorandum), to be drafted by the numerous interagency committees, which were to present

not agreed recommendations but real options for consideration. For issues transcending the jurisdiction of existing committees, ad hoc groups were established. All committee results were screened by the Kissinger-chaired Review Committee, which decided whether they would be handled by the formal council or would be sent to the State-chaired Under Secretaries Committee.⁹⁶

Four significant new committees were established at the Assistant or Under Secretary level; (1) Vietnam Special Studies Group; (2) Defense Program Review Committee, (which monitored DOD); (3) the Verification Panel; and (4) the Washington Special Actions Group, (which dealt with short-term fast-moving situations.) With each new committee and with the inevitable increase in staff, special assistant Kissinger broadened his control over council activities, choosing to personally chair most senior inter-departmental committees and groups. He also tightened his control by use of a personal style involving authoritarianism centralization of power, and a degree of secretiveness. [Ref. 89]

For the first years, the Nixon NSC dealt primarily with broad, long-range policy reviews, but over time the subject

⁹⁶This senior review group did not exist initially, and until its inception there was some confusion as to the function and hierarchy of the various committees. After issue review began, however, priorities became obvious from the actions of the Kissinger dominated group.

of studies shifted to narrow operational questions reflecting the somewhat narrow interests of Kissinger. The sheer number of studies overwhelmed the available staff machinery, and Kissinger's arbitrary methods further contributed to the hectic atmosphere. By September 1973, when he was appointed Secretary of State, retaining the special assistant position as well, Kissinger had gained almost complete control of the foreign policy formulation process by his control of interdepartmental NSC committees and his jealously guarded access to the president. He maintained his control by taking many of the senior NSC staff personnel to the State Department with him, and by selecting his successor as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs upon his replacement in November 1975.

Secretary Kissinger's term as Secretary of State extended into the administration of President Ford. Brent Scowcroft had been selected as Kissinger's successor as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, but Ford allowed Kissinger to dominate the foreign policy and, to a large extent, the defense policy planning process from the State Department. Although the NSC again convened regularly, (a practice it had begun to neglect in later Kissinger years), the complex network of committees was difficult to manage

effectively without Kissinger's centralized control.⁹⁷ When President Carter assumed office in January 1977 one of his first priorities was to modify the foreign policy and defense planning systems.

B. LEARNING FROM "FAILURE"

Although President Ford had attempted to maintain what he perceived as the U.S. commitment to a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, public sentiment and Congressional action had by 1975 decreed that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was over.⁹⁸ The United States had attempted to resolve a political issue with military force, ignoring the lessons of the French in Indochina, and had ended up trying to solve a military problem with political force.⁹⁹

⁹⁷Critics point out that it was difficult to manage with Kissinger's centralized control, as attested to by frequent cancellations of committee meetings and wasted staff work caused by sudden shifts in priorities.

⁹⁸Part of the reason President Nixon had been willing to allow continued North Vietnamese presence in the South as part of the Paris accords was his determination to maintain sufficient involvement of U.S. aid and troops to ensure U.S. credibility as a negotiator. Congress' 1974 prohibition of military involvement and 1975 aid cuts of fifty percent destroyed any credibility the U.S. might have had. (Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, The Brookings Institution, 1979.)

⁹⁹In On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (Presidio Press, 1983), Harry G. Summers contends that the senior uniformed military were partly at fault for the early

Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts contend that while U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam failed, the domestic decision-making system worked, and that U.S. action in Vietnam was not an aberration of the decision-making system but a logical culmination of principles that leaders brought with them. [Ref. 90]¹⁰⁰ The vestiges of strategic bombing as the ultimate tactic led to a situation wherein the air war became an adaptation of ends to fit preferred means, and the failure of military planners to understand and apply what to them were non-traditional irregular warfare concepts further contributed to the failure. [Ref. 91]

The JCS from the beginning had been passionate advocates of a political option which would bring U.S. involvement in the war to an end, [Ref. 92], but when it became obvious that the political cost of such action was unacceptable to political leadership, they viewed escalation to a level above the opponent's means as the only viable alternative to

⁹⁹(cont)(pre-1965) military involvement in Vietnam because of their failure to ensure that civilian policy-makers understood the potential consequences despite their reluctance to listen. The opposing argument is the traditional one used by senior uniformed military; it is inappropriate for the uniformed military to involve itself in political questions, including when the use of military force is appropriate.

¹⁰⁰Gelb and Betts list three general criteria by which the U.S. system can be said to have worked: (1) the core consensual goal of postwar foreign policy (containment of communism) was pursued consistently; (2) differences of both

to achieve a victory.¹⁰¹ When President Nixon instituted his program of Vietnamization, uniformed military planners were ready to fully support him.¹⁰²

The Vietnam war brought an end to the consensus on containment, at least among theorists. In the 1970's a "Second Wave" of works on strategy looked not in new directions but at old questions revisited, revitalizing strategic thinking with a dissatisfaction with the assumptions of the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction)

¹⁰⁰(cont)elite and mass opinion were accompanied by compromise, and policies never strayed very far from the center of opinion both within and without the government; and (3) virtually all views and recommendations were considered and virtually all important decisions were made without illusions about the odds for success. (Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, The Brookings Institution, 1979.)

¹⁰¹Fear of traditional American anti-militarism was part of the decision to first downplay involvement and later downplay negative aspects of that involvement. Policy-makers might have been wiser to have injected a degree of emotionalism into the proceedings from the very beginning in order to arouse the traditional American sense of mission.

¹⁰²The myth of the overwhelming importance of strategic bombing still persisted even at this late date and despite earlier studies by JCS (Sigma II tests of September 1964) indicating that most senior commanders doubted that it could have crucial results. President Nixon took the risk of bombing sensitive targets on the advice of his senior military advisors, but he recognized both the political and military risks, and he warned them, in effect, that "this had better work." (Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, The Brookings Institution, 1979.)

doctrine.¹⁰³ Advanced technology led to the continuing improvement of a better "war-fighting" capability in the form of strategic counterforce doctrine and improved conventional capabilities, and the attitudes which had contributed to a relative decline in American power since the early 1960's were newly examined.¹⁰⁴ New assumptions were formed, centered around a view ruling out major war between the chief military powers on rational grounds as politically pointless; the strategy of war was replaced by the strategy of crisis management.

C. NEW APPROACHES - 1977 and AFTER

President Carter was elected in November 1976, partly as a result of an extended backlash against the "Watergate"

¹⁰³Colin Gray, himself part of this group, coined the term "Second Wave" in referring to such writers as Brennan, Ikles, and Janowitz.

¹⁰⁴In a study for the Director, Defense Nuclear Agency entitled "Nuclear Strategy and National Style" (Rpt. No. DNA 5814F-1), Colin Gray lists seven attitudes contributing to this decline: (1) the belief that a nuclear war could not be won; (2) the belief by defense intellectuals that other cultures shared, or would come to share, American values and strategic ideas; (3) optimism that Soviet thought and behavior could evolve in a constructive direction; (4) the belief that the American military establishment posed as great a threat to traditional American values as Soviet ambitions (which had probably been misassessed); (5) a widespread belief in the superiority of American technology and strategic ideas; (6) substitution of an endeavor to manage the strategic balance in place of defense plans geared to a unique foreign policy response; and (7) a tendency to sink back into ill-preparedness pending the next "security shock."

image of his Republican opponent. He was determined to change the image of the national policy-making process, and to show that he would not repeat his predecessor's mistakes, and selected Zbigniew Brzezinski as his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Brzezinski shared Kissinger's academic background, but his management style differed significantly. He cut the NSC staff in half, and established a simple and flexible system involving primarily two committees, the Policy Review Committee and the Special Coordinating Committee. Chairmanship of the Policy Review Committee rotated according to subject rather than being controlled by the special assistant.

The Carter administration never developed a clear sense of priorities. [Ref. 93] Instead, it tried to do everything at once, which created serious difficulties in setting priorities. President Carter preferred to receive his foreign policy and defense policy advice from his Secretaries of State and Defense, his national security advisor, and top aides in an informal but regularly scheduled luncheon meeting. His search for a balance between humanism and pragmatism made him somewhat skeptical of the objectivity of military advice. After the Iranian hostage crisis of late 1979 he began to lose some of his idealism, but the voting public had been unconvinced of the viability of "born again" defense policy for some time, and in November 1980 Ronald

Reagan was elected on the platform which included a promise to restore American credibility and prestige.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. THE AMERICAN STYLE

The operational style through which the American military planning system developed, has two primary components; (1) institutional factors, important in the development of the military establishment; and (2) personal factors, important in the development of the "American character." Both components were integral from the inception of the American military planning system, with surprisingly little change in the almost even balance between the two.

Liberalism's conflict with and impact on military values was the most important institutional factor. [Ref.94] The liberal philosophy, popular at the creation of the American nation, saw peace as the natural state of man. Since power struggles were an aberation of nature, there was no need for a standing army. In the rare conflict the citizen would rise to meet the threat, then happily return to his natural state of peace. [Ref.95] Leaders in peace would be the best leaders in war, for they lacked any untoward ambitions for power or tendencies toward militarism. The idea of a separate standing military was anathema; like any other bureaucracy, it would build upon itself and eventually take

action to sustain itself, and such action would be wrong.

[Ref.96]

The United States was born by breaking away from the European power balance system, and this combined with the liberal ideal of peace as a natural state to convince early policy-makers of the wisdom of avoiding alliances. [Ref.97]¹⁰⁵ For over a century the American cultural system and government evolved in isolation from the developed world, attaining a strong sense of personal and institutional ethnocentrism.¹⁰⁶ This isolation, the abundance of resources, and the entrepreneurial willingness to exploit them, gave the U.S. the luxury to experiment with a peaceful society. The absence of immediate external threat precluded a need for the expenditure of resources and effort on national defense and, with the exception of the Civil War years, Americans spent little on defense until the 20th Century.

Despite the Founding Fathers' intellectual inheritance of liberalism, as businessmen and lawyers they were also the

¹⁰⁵The practicality of staying out of European quarrels was probably the most important of the considerations involved.

¹⁰⁶Despite the diverse ancestry of the early Americans, this isolation also helped to create a surprisingly homogeneous culture. By the end of the 18th Century the common man of European ancestry living in the United States was already an identifiable American.

heirs of a sense of realism which recognized a basic conflict between the democratic ideas of their countrymen and the practical requirements of formal government. George Mason admitted, "Notwithstanding the oppression and injustice experienced among us from democracy, the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted." [Ref.98] They therefore suffered the dilemma of having little faith in the people but insisting that government be based on them. Jeremy Belknap said, "Let it stand as a principle that government originates from the people; but let the people be taught ... that they are not able to govern themselves." [Ref. 99]

This juxtaposition of the values of the common man with the need for pragmatic leadership led to a seemingly dichotomous style of idealistic rhetoric and realistic action which over the two centuries of the nations' existence, became so ingrained that most Americans do not recognize its irony. [Ref.100]¹⁰⁷

The final institutional factor having a major impact on the development of the U.S. military planning system is the structure of the government pertaining to the selection of

¹⁰⁷See Hans Morgenthau for a thorough discussion of realism and idealism in U.S. foreign policy, and of how the loss of the early statesmen's sense of balance between the two has affected U.S. actions.

policy-makers. American policy-makers at the highest level are elected to relatively short terms of office, (four years being standard), and a major criterion for their selection is accountability to the electorate. Democratic governments are intrinsically maladapted to long-range planning for this reason. The frequent calling to account forces policy-makers to place a high premium on near-term results, and the popularity of a decision often is more important than its rationality. [Ref. 101] Another result of the policy-makers' short terms is a lack of continuity in both policies and priorities.¹⁰⁸ The existence of a strong infrastructure of professional bureaucrats blunts the impact of this problem in the civilian hierarchy, but the frequent turnover of middle and senior level decision-makers within the uniformed services tends to exacerbate it.

Personal factors important in the development of the American character consisted partly of personality traits, which actually conflicted with military structural values, and partly of traits which made it difficult to develop a sense of professionalism or a planning philosophy. The

¹⁰⁸Since World War II one of the first actions of a new President has usually been to change significantly the priorities and sometimes the structure of the planning system, largely in an effort to distance himself from his predecessor's policies. The impact of a new Congressman is much more diluted, but potentially significant.

agressive individualism of most young Americans, [Ref.102] was not conducive to military discipline, (although it produced a soldier with initiative unheard of in most armies), and the culture provided more encouragement to individualism than it did to discipline. The American credo of democracy and of "majority rule" as the source of authority, [Ref.103], was also difficult to reconcile with the traditional hierarchical structure and leadership structure of the military.¹⁰⁹

Because the American had seldom been called upon to contribute directly to his own defense,¹¹⁰ he was reluctant to forgo his pursuit of personal and commercial happiness for the questionable rewards of military service, an unpleasant but necessary obligation in wartime only.

Only when the American's "crusader spirit" and sense of mission were aroused by some righteous cause was he eager to become involved in the military, and that only for the usually short time it took to resolve the issue or for his

¹⁰⁹Attempts to "democratize" the military structure resulted in the disastrous militia system of the nation's first century.

¹¹⁰The bulk of the King's troops in America prior to the independence were British regulars and mercenaries, not local recruits, and after independence geographic isolation and British seapower protected him. Even during the revolution only about three percent of the population was under arms. (Walter Millis, Arms and Men: a Study of American Military History, Rutgers University Press, 1956)

enthusiasm to wear thin. [Ref.104] Because he saw everything in terms of "good" and "evil," he always fought on the side of good, (good by American standards), and if the cause was not cloaked in these terms he was unwilling to become involved.¹¹¹

B. IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN STYLE ON THE U.S. MILITARY PLANNING SYSTEM

The American military establishment grew from this unique experiment in government and nationhood, and evolved with the American historical experience. Six elements of the American style had direct impact on the development of the military planning system.

Two elements can be traced to the style's liberal heritage. First, liberalism's anti-military orientation ensured the exclusion of the uniformed military from the mainstream of government decision-making, (until World War II), with the result that many policies having important consequences for the military establishment were formed in the absence of uniformed military input. [Ref.112] The existence of separate planning system was considered not only unnecessary but provocative.

Next, civilian policy-makers, primarily in Congress, were in absolute control of military policy, ostensibly because of

¹¹¹This character trait was the first and most significant factor in the American public's loss of support for action in Vietnam.

the doctrine of civilian control of the military.¹¹² Congressional involvement was not limited to broad policy issues. As late as the Civil War congressional committees and individual congressmen interested themselves in the routine details of military operations. [Ref.105] This involvement lessened after the Civil War, but the involvement of executive branch civilian policy-makers increased sporadically, reaching a high point during the term of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. [Ref.106]

A third element is that the American style's democratic heritage contributed to unclear and often divergent goals, resulting from the lack of continuity and the popular accountability of operation in a democratic system. Fourth, uniformed military planners received little guidance as to national priorities, and therefore were unable to complete even the most routine plans with any assurance that they met requirements. [Ref.107] Until World War I, most strategic military planning was done by ancillary bodies such as the War Colleges, and was kept discreet for political reasons.

¹¹²The concept of civilian control of the military as established in the constitution had by the 1840's been adapted to the "spoils system," providing another source of political appointments, (the Military and Naval Academies and senior militia posts), and sponsorship for Congressmen.

The fifth element having an impact was the fact that as a result of the low priority accorded military policy during peacetime, significant attention was paid to the military planning system only during wartime, and significant changes were made to the system only as a result of wartime necessity and apparent weaknesses. Planning systems operated beyond obsolescence instead of evolving with technology and foreign policy, and Americans always entered a conflict "fighting the last war."¹¹³ Every wartime generation had to relearn the lessons of history. [Ref.108]

The final factor in the American style on the military planning system was a belief in the absolute separation of "military" issues from "political" issues. Politics was outside the uniformed planner and policy-maker's realm; civilian policy-makers resolved political issues or directed the military how to resolve them, but the military professional was not to express an independent judgement on the issues.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Fortunately American adaptability under pressure is very great, and by the end of each conflict the system had been brought up to date, only to languish unchanged until the next great conflict.

¹¹⁴ The early military leaders who interested themselves in political issues were politicians in uniform, not professional military men. From the 1840's to the beginning of the Civil War, and after that war, the professional military brotherhood largely eschewed politics, foreign and domestic. (Leonard Wood and Billy Mitchell were notable exceptions.) When President Kennedy encouraged his senior

C. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PLANNING SYSTEM

It is arguably inaccurate to refer to a U.S. military planning system before 1898. The luxury of non-involvement made possible by geographic isolation and the tacit protection of British seapower made long-term planning unnecessary in the eyes of congressmen controlling the military. The War Department and, in 1798, the separate Navy Department, were administrative bodies, not planning bodies. After the War of 1812, the military departments were upgraded with the creation of the War Department general staff in 1813 and the Board of Naval Commissioners in 1815, but these were simply modernized administrative bodies. [Ref.109]

In 1821 the position of Commanding General of the Army provided senior civilian policy-makers with a source of operational advice, (as did the short-lived position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1861 to 1869), but emphasis was on battlefield operations rather than long-range planning. [Ref.110]

The Naval War College (1884) was the precursor of a military planning system, and its very existence was

¹¹⁴(cont)military advisors to provide military insight on what they considered political questions, they essentially abdicated their advisory responsibilities to DOD civilians, who were quite willing to produce politico-military policy without military input.

frequently questioned in the first decade. [Ref.111] The experiment of the Naval Policy Board (1890) lasted only a short time, but the success in the Spanish-American War of war plans created by these two seminal bodies finally lent military planning a degree of respectability.

One reason for the lack of urgency in the development of a planning system before 1898 was the dearth of opportunity to study the consequences of poor military planning.¹¹⁵ The increased frequency and intensity of military involvement in peacetime affairs, including the occupation of lands taken from Spain, and involvement in Latin American and Caribbean matters, forced the development of some sort of planning apparatus.

The wartime Naval War Board was succeeded by the General Board (1900), which dealt with both planning and operations; in 1899 the administrative position of Chief of Staff of the

¹¹⁵The early years of the Civil War provided numerous opportunities to study these consequences, but the special traumas of internal conflict were blamed for most of them. By the end of the war the system's deficiencies had supposedly been "corrected," and that premise was not tested for another thirty-three years, when the failure of the army logistics system in Cuban action proved it false.

Army replaced the operational Commanding General;¹¹⁶ and in 1903 the Army General Staff was created specifically to deal with questions of strategy and planning. With the 1909 creation of the Navy functional "aide" system, both services had modern administrative systems; and with the 1903 creation of the Army War College, both had fairly complete planning systems.¹¹⁷

Still lacking was a sense of long-range strategic military planning, and a structure designed to deal with it. The War Colleges did some work in this area, but they were moving from strategic studies toward a more tactical orientation, and the Army General Staff was increasingly mired in the day-to-day details of administration.

Homage was paid to the increased complexity of warfare by the creation of the Joint Board of the Army and Navy in 1903. [Ref. 112] This body was commissioned to produce joint strategic war plans, which it did for a few years. Unfortunately a new awareness of the need for long-range strategic military planning and joint doctrine conflicted with the political reality of isolationism and neutralism, and efforts tied to these concerns had to be hidden from

¹¹⁶This partly as the result of an on-going power struggle between the Commanding General and the Secretary of War. The Secretary won.

¹¹⁷See Huntington for a thorough discussion of these changes.

public (and the President's), view until 1916 when the urgency of preparing for involvement in the European quarrels allowed a renewal of strategic planning.¹¹⁸

Although the United States returned to isolationism after World War I, military planners kept a rudimentary modern planning system alive, despite the resurgence of the standard policy of peacetime neglect of military matters. The airpower controversy made civilian policy-makers aware of evolving strategic considerations, and saved the strategic aspect of the military planning system from oblivion.

The new experience of operating with allies during World War I was taken seriously by military planners, and long before civilian policy-makers admitted the complexity of world political and economic interdependence, strategic military planners were thinking in terms of multi-national military involvement for the U.S. This was the first major attempt to view the U.S. as part of a greater world system, and as such was the harbinger of American strategic thought.

¹¹⁸The range of "strategic" planning in 1916 was much narrower than since 1941, simply because U.S. interests were much narrower.

World War II marked the beginning of a revolution in the American military and foreign policy style, with consequent changes to the military planning system.¹¹⁹ As the only major power to survive the war with its economic system and industrial base intact, the United States became the "champion" of Free-World forces in the battle against communism. These vastly enlarged world commitments forced the retention (after 1947) of a much larger than usual peacetime military establishment, and made necessary the expansion and professionalization of the military planning system.

Strategic thinking and planning during the war years was largely ad hoc and reactive. The combination of President Roosevelt's personal style and dominance of the decision-making process, the need for flexibility and freedom of action by the military in operational matters, and the isolation of the public and sometimes Congress from the management of forces in the field, allowed senior military planners to conduct the war without fear of immediate

¹¹⁹World War II was a significant watershed not only in military affairs, but also in political, economic, and social affairs. The last vestiges of the old European power system gave way to a bi-polar system ostensibly based on ideology, the world economic system increased in complexity, and modern communications spread the "revolution of rising expectations" to all parts of the world.

accountability. Concentration centered on winning the war; there was neither time nor energy to devote to long-term strategic issues, which had always been the province of the civilian policy-maker.¹²⁰

The military had a system capable of dealing with the routine administrative details of modern force since the early 20th Century. With the National Security Act of 1947, a structure for unified planning was created, (and strengthened in 1949, 1953, and 1958.)¹²¹ The new structure dealt not only with the administration and operation of a unified National Military Establishment but also made provisions for a formalized system of integrated strategic planning.

With the end World War II came the traditional dissolution of the wartime force structure in anticipation of a return to normalcy. By early 1947, President Truman's decision to commit American money, and armed forces if necessary, to contain the spread of communism made it clear that the definition of normalcy had changed drastically.

¹²⁰The structure was created in 1947, but unified planning did not function with any degree of success until MacNamara's time at DOD, and after he left it went into remission again.

¹²¹There were exceptions to this short-term orientation, most notably Gen. Marshall's concern for post-war operations and JCS' similar interests.

[Ref.113] In July 1947 George Kennan articulated the idea of "containment," which was to serve as the basis for U.S. strategic and military thought for the next fourteen years.

[Ref.114]

While President Truman was basing his rhetoric on the doctrine of containment, he was also struggling to control the size of the budget. His chosen method was to base the size of the military's share of the budget on how much was left after all other programs had been funded. Thus his foreign and domestic priorities were at cross-purposes, a situation dramatically clarified by the necessity for Congress to over-ride his objections and provide funding for the Korean action outside the normal budget.

President Eisenhower had no real argument with the doctrine of containment. His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who dominated foreign policy, changed containment from a doctrine to an ideology, and introduced the idea of a "zero-sum" world in which, when any nation went communist, American security was lessened. [Ref.115] The importance of credible U.S. forces and the need for economy at home were resolved by a greatly increased reliance on nuclear weapons, which were less expensive for force gained than were conventional forces.

By the late 1950's, strategists questioned the viability and wisdom of over-reliance on nuclear weapons as a source of

security. [Ref. 116] The frightening potential consequences of nuclear conflict brought into question the desirability of their use under any circumstances, but especially where the application of lesser force could accomplish the goal. Reality lagged behind theory, however, the launching of Sputnik in 1957 provided a final impetus to the missile race, and started a technological spiral that was to have a dramatic impact on American military planning.

In 1961, Senator Henry Jackson's Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery completed a two year study of the defense policy-making structure. Among the committee's findings was the need for a clearer understanding of where vital U.S. national interests lay and what should be done to promote them. President Kennedy chose systems analysis, with its power to rationalize defense operations and "scientifically" analyze threat, as the best method to meet these needs.

Systems analysis provided a new way of looking at military issues. [Ref. 117] Any non-quantifiable element was disqualified from consideration, and non-rational factors such as intuition and experience were irrelevant. As strategic thought moved from consideration of mutual assured destruction to flexible response, the uniformed military input to the military planning system shrank. The capabilities and limitations of technology became the dominant source of strategy.

The failure of systems analysis and the rationalist ideology in Vietnam contributed to a profound mistrust of these methods and ideas. As early as 1967 strategists were warning against total reliance on quantitative measures, [Ref.128], and in 1970 Stefan T. Possony and J.E.Pournelle published The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War, a seminal work on what continues today to be the primary approach to military thought and planning: strategic analysis.

Strategic analysis provides a strategy for fighting a technological war, with strategy driving technology rather than the reverse. [Ref.129] It integrates the four major elements of technology, government support, nonmilitary conflict, (psychological operations, economics, etc.), and the military arts, providing a synthesis of the traditional planning process and technological considerations.

In the seventies and early eighties such analysts as E.S.Quade (Analysis for Public Decisions) and strategists as Richard K. Betts (Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises), Sam Sarkesian, (Beyond the Battlefield: the New Military Professionalism), and Colin Gray (Strategic Studies), continued in the same vein to explore methods to integrate military strategy and planning which can be applied to attain U.S. goals. It is too early to say whether strategic analysis will be any more successful than its predecessors,

but since it combines the best elements of previous planning styles, it shows promise.

Writing shortly after World War II, Max Lerner observed the necessity of having "soldiers on the [American] landscape." To a great extent one of the major political chapters in the American story has been occurring since World War II. How can an essentially democratic nation, committed to individual freedom, maintain itself between an external authoritarian threat and the pull of the Garrison State? It has been demonstrated how hesitant the United States was to accept a powerful Secretary of Defense, how universal military training was rejected, and in recent years the debate over the general staff. The history of the American culture would clearly suggest that military planning in the United States must reflect the basic cultural context: the intellectual currents combining behaviorism and quantitative methods with experience are only part of the American planning imperative, combining military requirements with American values.

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