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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**CHINA'S GENDER IMBALANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
ON CHINA-JAPAN AND CHINA-TAIWAN SECURITY
RELATIONS**

by

Jerry Y. Tzeng

December 2011

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Alice L. Miller
Michael A. Glosny

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**CHINA'S GENDER IMBALANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON CHINA-JAPAN
AND CHINA-TAIWAN SECURITY RELATIONS**

Jerry Y. Tzeng
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., Washington University, Saint Louis, MO, 2000

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE PACIFIC)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2011**

Author: Jerry Y. Tzeng

Approved by: Alice L. Miller, PhD
Thesis Advisor

Michael A. Glosny
Second Reader

Daniel J. Moran, PhD
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how China's gender imbalance could affect East Asian security with respect to China-Japan relations and China-Taiwan relations. The research result is ambiguous in that China's excess males may or may not force the Chinese government to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy stance with Japan and Taiwan. On the one hand, the Chinese government has been relatively calm in its dealings with Japan and Taiwan despite the rise of Chinese nationalism. The Chinese government actively contains anti-social behaviors associated with excess males without seriously affecting bilateral relations with Japan or Taiwan. On the other hand, appealing to nationalistic fervor in order to strengthen regime legitimacy could force the Chinese government to be more belligerent. Inaction by the Chinese government in response to Japanese or Taiwanese provocation could compel many in China to engage in mass uprising against the state, thus threatening the regime's power. This thesis also provides possible options to mitigate the social and political tensions presented by these excess males and to prevent potential regional instability. Options such as war, public works projects, foreign marriage tax, population control, testosterone reduction, state-sponsored matchmaking service, and UN peacekeeping are explored.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	LITERATURE AND THEORY	3
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	3
B.	LITERATURE REVIEW.....	3
C.	WHY AN EXCESS OF MALES IS DETRIMENTAL FOR CHINA	9
D.	CONCLUSION	12
III.	EXCESS MALES AND CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS	13
A.	INTRODUCTION	13
B.	SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS	13
C.	THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS ON CHINA'S EXCESS MALES	18
D.	ARE CHINA'S EXCESS MALES REALLY A DIRECT SECURITY THREAT TO JAPAN?.....	23
E.	CONCLUSION	24
IV.	EXCESS MALES AND CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS	25
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	25
B.	CURRENT STATE OF CHINA-TAIWAN AFFAIRS	25
C.	THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS ON CHINA'S EXCESS MALES.....	27
D.	ARE CHINA'S EXCESS MALES REALLY A DIRECT SECURITY THREAT TO TAIWAN?	34
E.	CONCLUSION	35
V.	CONCLUSION: EXCESS MALES MITIGATION OPTIONS.....	37
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	37
B.	ASSUMPTIONS	37
C.	MITIGATING OPTIONS FOR CHINA, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN	38
1.	War	39
2.	Public Works	40
3.	Population Control	41
4.	Foreign Marriage Tax	42
5.	State-Sponsored Matchmaking	43
6.	Testosterone Reduction.....	45
7.	UN Peacekeeping.....	47
D.	CONCLUSION	48
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	51
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	59

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1978, the Communist government in China enacted the controversial “one child” policy to address concerns of over-population and to keep the country’s future population growth at manageable levels. The government was successful in slowing the population growth rate over the past 30 years from 1.33 percent in 1978 to 0.51 percent in 2008; the current population is 1.3 billion.¹ However, China’s cultural preference for males perverted the One Child Policy to create a dangerous gender imbalance. Estimates from both foreign and Chinese demographers show that there are currently between 32 million and 40 million more males under the age of 20 in China than females.² In other words, these excess males in China will not be able to find wives in the next two decades.

With no marriage prospects and no official outlet for their grievances, these excess males are increasingly an issue for the Chinese government. Will this seemingly domestic matter expand into a crisis with regional security implications? How dangerous are China’s excess males to Japan and Taiwan? Will unresolved historical grievances existing in China against Japan and Taiwan negatively influence these excess males? How will China’s management of its excess males ultimately affect security relations between China-Japan and China-Taiwan? Undoubtedly, such uncertainties create anxiety over China’s security positions toward Japan and Taiwan.

Another uncertainty that could affect these excess males is the dynamic nature of foreign relations between these three countries. For Sino-Japanese relations, Japan’s difficult and violent history with China from the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 and continuing through the end of World War II in 1945 has

¹ “East & Southeast Asia: China,” last modified May 4, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

² Wei Xing Zhu, Lu Li, and Therese Hesketh. “China’s excess males, sex selective abortion, and one child policy: analysis of data from 2005 national intercensus survey,” *British Medical Journal* 338 (2009): 1, accessed April 22, 2011. doi:10.1136/bmj.b1211.

created both numerous grievances harbored by the Chinese and a growing trend of nationalism.³ Similarly for China-Taiwan relations, Taiwan's flirtations with formal independence and China's declaration of forceful reunification have made cross-strait affairs a flashpoint for potential conflict in East Asia.

This thesis explores how China's gender imbalance could affect East Asian security with respect to China-Japan relations and China-Taiwan relations. The demographic literature on gender imbalance suggests that, with over 30 million excess males of little financial means and almost no prospect for marriage, the potential for civil instability in China exists. How this potential civil instability in China could deteriorate Sino-Japanese and cross-strait relations is a critical component to determining the thesis' importance to East Asian Strategic Studies. This thesis relies primarily upon qualitative methods to assess what influence the excess males could have on China and to determine its efficacy as a security threat to Taiwan and Japan. Sources include publicly available and "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) primary source PRC government documents, scholarly books and articles, as well as relevant press reporting on the subject.

The remainder of this thesis is organized into four chapters. In Chapter 2, the thesis briefly surveys the relevant literature pertinent to this topic and discusses the theory behind the potential dangers of China's excess males. The third and fourth chapters examine how these excess males could affect by the prevailing tensions in China-Japan relations and China-Taiwan relations. These two chapters also extrapolate the possible security implications China's excess males could have on Japan and Taiwan. Finally, Chapter 5 offers a conclusion and discusses options China, Japan, and Taiwan could explore to mitigate the social and political tensions presented by these excess males and prevent potential regional instability.

³ Kent E. Calder, "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (2006): 130.

II. LITERATURE AND THEORY

A. INTRODUCTION

In order to focus this thesis, this chapter surveys the relevant literature and discusses why excess males pose a danger. The most obvious question one might ask is how will China's excess males pose a threat to the security of Japan and Taiwan? There are three established facts about China that are relevant to this question: 1) China has a surplus of males; 2) China has a strong desire to reunify with Taiwan; 3) and China has strong grievances against Japan.⁴ These three facts form the basis for the hypothesis that China's gender imbalance has serious security implications for both Taiwan and Japan. Based on this hypothesis, one could argue that the internal problems created by these excess males could overwhelm the Chinese government's capacity to manage them. Instead of suppressing these excess males, the government might enlist them to fight for a nationalist cause such as retaking Taiwan or exacting retribution on Japan. Such a scenario, while seemingly improbable, nevertheless offers a starting point from which to determine the approach to the initial question.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature relevant to this thesis is organized into three general areas: demographic changes in China, China-Japan relations, and China-Taiwan relations. The volume of literature written about China's demographic issues nearly surpasses that written about China-Japan relations or China-Taiwan relations. Two issues most often discussed are China's "one child" policy and the skewed male-female sex ratio. The "one child" policy is one of the most controversial population control policies enacted in China. Simply stated, this

⁴ Therese Hesketh, "Too many males in China: the causes and the consequences," *Significance* (2009): 9; Phillip K. Saunders, "Long-term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy," *Asian Survey* 45 (2005): 973; Calder, "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry," 130.

policy prohibits more than one child as a way to curb over-population. When this policy is combined with China's cultural preference for males, the results have dramatically altered China's population demographics for the worse. Zeng et al reported the increase in the male-female sex ratio from 1.06 before 1980 to 1.138 in 1989.⁵ This report did not link the "one-child policy to the growing male-female sex ratio imbalance, concluding only that other factors, such as under-reporting of female births, infanticide, and child abandonment, are the likely cause. Hesketh, Li, and Lu assessed the effects of the "one-child" policy after 25 years and concluded the policy did contribute both to a decline in fertility and to an increase in male-female sex ratio from 1.06 in 1979 to 1.17 in 2001.⁶ This finding was later reconfirmed by Zhu, Li, and Hesketh from China's 2005 National Intercensus Survey.⁷ An analysis of these new data actually showed the male-female sex ratio imbalance increasing to 1.19 by 2005. Hesketh et al, Zhu et al, Coale and Banister, Poston Jr., Gupta and Li, and Liu and Zhang all agree that the "one-child" policy alone could not produce such results.⁸ In fact, almost all the literature reviewed on this topic reached the same conclusion – the "one child" policy is only a minor contributing factor towards the male-female sex ratio imbalance. The main causal mechanism for the imbalance in the male-female sex ratio is the availability of prenatal sex selective technology (for example, ultrasound), combined with the cultural preference for boys.

⁵ Yi Zeng, Ping Tu, Baochang Gu, Yi Xu, Bohua Li, and Yongping Li, "Causes and Implications of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in China," *Population and Development Review* 19 (1993): 290.

⁶ Therese Hesketh, Lu Li, and Wei Xing Zhu, "The Effect of China's One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years," *New England Journal of Medicine* 353 (2005): 1174.

⁷ Zhu, Li, and Hesketh, "China's excess males, sex selective abortion, and one child policy: analysis of data from 2005 national intercensus survey," 1.

⁸ Hesketh, Lu, and Zhu, "The Effect of China's One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years," 1176; Zhu, Li, and Hesketh, "China's excess males, sex selective abortion, and one child policy: analysis of data from 2005 national intercensus survey;" Ansley J. Coale and Judith Banister, "Five Decades of Missing Females in China," *Demography* 31 (1994): 473; Dudley L. Poston Jr., "Son Preference and Fertility in China," *Journal of Biosocial Science* 34 (2002): 341; Monica Das Gupta and Shuzhuo Li, "Gender Bias in China, South Korea and India 1920-1990: Effects of War, Famine and Fertility Decline," *Development and Change* 30 (1999): 637; Tao Liu and Xing-yi Zhang, "Ratio of males to females in China," *British Medical Journal* (2009), accessed Apr 22, 2011, http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/338/apr09_2/b483 (accessed July 17, 2010).

The abnormally high male-female sex ratio in China has both short and long-term implications far greater than simply more males in the population. Isabelle Attane formulates several population models to investigate the future demographic implication of the high sex ratio in China's population.⁹ Attane projects that by 2050, China will have a deficit in both female and male births (due to a shortage of reproductive-age women) compared to if China had a natural sex ratio of 1.06.¹⁰ However, this is just a future projection and much can happen between now and 2050. Many authors argue that the short-term implications of the skewed sex ratio will challenge China the most. Hudson and den Boer, Hesketh, Hesketh and Zhu, Edlund, Li, Yi, and Zhang, and *The Economist* all agree that the short-term implications would be possible increases in violence and civil unrest due to the surplus in men.¹¹ Roughly one million more males are born every year than females and a great majority of these men will remain single and be unable to marry. Some 70 percent of all violent crime offenders in China are single males between 16 and 25 years old.¹² Edlund et al found that the crime rate in China tracks the male-female sex ratio imbalance – every 0.01 increase in male-female sex ratio increases violent crimes by 3 percent.¹³ All of these authors speculate that it is only a matter of time before these single men disrupt the civil stability of China.

The literature reviewed makes no clear association between Chinese gender imbalance and security implications for Taiwan and Japan, which would

⁹ Isabelle Attane, "The Demographic Impact of a Female Deficit in China, 2000-2050," *Population and Development Review* 32 (2006): 763.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 769.

¹¹ Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea den Boer, "A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace," *International Security* 26 (2002): 22; Hesketh, "Too many males in China: the causes and the consequences," 12; Therese Hesketh and Wei Xing Zhu, "Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes and Consequences," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 103 (2006): 13274; Lena Edlund, Hongbin Li, Junjian Yi, and Junsen Zhang, "Sex Ratios and Crime: Evidence from China's One-Child Policy" (Discussion Paper No. 3214, IZA, 2008); "The Worldwide War On Baby Girls," *The Economist* (March 6–12, 2010): 78.

¹² Hudson and den Boer, "A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace," 32.

¹³ Edlund, Li, Yi, and Zhang, "Sex Ratios and Crime: Evidence from China's One-Child Policy."

suggest a critical gap on this topic. Hudson and den Boer attempt to make the association by implying that these excess males could affect regional security as China seeks ways to employ them for national causes. Hudson and den Boer do not go into any detail regarding what this employment of surplus males would entail, nor do they speculate on how it would affect Taiwan and Japan. In order to expand further on Hudson and den Boer's hypothesis, this literature review shifts focus to China-Japan relations and China-Taiwan relations.

The relations between China and Japan are mired in historical, strategic, and economic complications. According to Kent Calder, China considers Japan as an economic partner, a peer rival, and a historical belligerent.¹⁴ Japan External Trade Organization reported that Japan's total trade with China (imports and exports combined) exceeded U.S.\$300 billion in 2011, making China Japan's largest trading partner and Japan China's third largest trading partner.¹⁵ Both China and Japan are competing for the same energy resources needed to fuel their economies. Since Japan depends exclusively on imports for all of its energy needs, China sees Japan as a direct competitor for the same energy resources. Unfortunately, this competition feeds into China's historical grievances with Japan. Many in China view any action by the Japanese with suspicion and fear due to Japan's historic treatment of China. According to Calder, nationalist sentiments fuel this negative view of the Japanese and hinder efforts at cooperation.¹⁶

The prevalence of anti-Japanese sentiments has forced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to reconsider its ability to control the population for the good of national interest. Gries notes that much of this anti-Japanese sentiment developed from "internet nationalism," which is more capable of converting

¹⁴ Calder, "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry," 131.

¹⁵ "Japan-China Trade in 2010 Exceeds US\$300 Billion to Set New Record," last modified May 12, 2011, <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/20110512035-news>.

¹⁶ Calder, "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry," 133.

popular opinion into political action than traditional forms of activism.¹⁷ This, argues Gries, puts the CCP in a very difficult position: a stable relationship with Japan is crucial to ensuring China's continued economic growth, but cooperating with the Japanese will make the CCP appear weak in the eyes of strident nationalists and undermine the party's legitimacy.¹⁸ China-Japan relations will hinge on China's ability to balance the co-existence of cooperation and conflict with Tokyo.¹⁹

Cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan present similar complications as the relationship between China and Japan. Some authors have said that cross-strait relations have improved because of deepening economic ties. Taiwan's massive investments in China since the early 1980s were a major driver for China's economic growth. Sutter states that in nearly 50 percent of Taiwan's outbound foreign direct investments (over U.S.\$100 billion) were invested in China in 2000, and the trend was predicted to increase in the future.²⁰ The Economist noted that nearly 40 percent of all exports from Taiwan go to China.²¹ This level of economic integration and interdependence (as Sutter and The Economist reason) will lead to more stability across the Taiwan Strait, prolonging the status quo.

Nevertheless, other authors have indicated that cross-strait tensions are destined to escalate in the future. China still considers reintegrating Taiwan a top priority, and the easing of cross-straits tensions will have little influence on China's decision to use force to reintegrate Taiwan. Philip Saunders argues that

¹⁷ Peter Hays Gries, "China's 'New Thinking' on Japan," *The China Quarterly* 184 (2005): 848.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 850.

²⁰ Karen M. Sutter, "Business Dynamism across the Taiwan Strait: The Implications for Cross-Strait Relations," *Asian Survey* 42 (2002): 528.

²¹ "Taiwan's commonsense consensus," *The Economist*, February 24, 2011, accessed April 22, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18229208?story_id=18229208&CFID=164240734&CFTOKEN=98834750.

Taiwan's economic dependence on China represents a strategic shortfall that Taiwan's government has not been able to address.²² Taiwan's increasing dependence on cross-strait trade could bode well for China, creating a situation where China could resort to economic threats to force Taiwan to accept reunification.²³ In addition, some authors note that Taiwan's increasing sense of a separate national identity has already caused tensions with China.²⁴ This nationalism in Taiwan could further the cause for the island's independence and accelerate China's decision to force reunification.²⁵

Many scholars have questioned China's ability to invade Taiwan. Tsang points out the uncertainty concerning China's cost-benefit analysis of a war with Taiwan and suggests how the results will constrain the decision-making process.²⁶ One factor that China must consider is the diplomatic cost associated with attacking Taiwan. Deng argues that China risks sabotaging its strategic goal of creating a peaceful international environment, and force regional states to mobilize hostile containment.²⁷ Another factor that China must consider is the economic cost of attacking Taiwan. Huang asserts that the economic damage would not be localized to just China and Taiwan; the Asia-Pacific region's economies will also be damaged due to the high degree of economic interdependence with China.²⁸ Lastly, the political costs associated with attacking Taiwan will be: 1) condemnation and isolation in international politics if

²² Saunders, "Long-term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy," 984.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Kenneth Lieberthal, "Preventing a War over Taiwan," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (2005): 59; T. Y. Wang and I-Chou Liu, "Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations," *Asian Survey* 44 (2004): 568.

²⁵ Lieberthal, "Preventing a War over Taiwan," 60.

²⁶ Steve Tsang, "Drivers Behind the Use of Force," in *If China Attacks Taiwan: Military, strategy, politics and economics*, ed. Steve Tsang (New York: Routledge, 2006), 13.

²⁷ Yong Deng, "Diplomatic Consequences," in *If China Attacks Taiwan: Military, strategy, politics and economics*, ed. Steve Tsang (New York: Routledge, 2006), 189.

²⁸ Jing Huang, "Economic and Political Costs," in *If China Attacks Taiwan: Military, strategy, politics and economics*, ed. Steve Tsang (New York: Routledge, 2006), 197.

China won; and 2) the collapse of the communist regime if China lost.²⁹ As these authors implied, China's decision to attack Taiwan will not be easy given the multitude of factors and considerations that will affect the outcome of the war.

C. WHY AN EXCESS OF MALES IS DETRIMENTAL FOR CHINA

In order to fill this critical gap concerning the security implications of China's excess males, more consideration is needed of why such a problem is important. In *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, Hudson and den Boer conclude that China's excess males have the potential to incite social upheaval that could threaten stability and the Chinese Communist Party's rule in China.³⁰ Because of the shortage of women resulting from the combination of China's "one child" policy and a cultural preference for males, it has become more difficult for men in China to find suitable marriage partners. The inability of these men to find wives has created a sizeable population of permanent bachelors. According to Hudson and den Boer, these young males all share similar characteristics and behavioral tendencies that make them an issue in highly imbalanced sex-ratio societies like China.

These excess males share many characteristics that distinguish them from the other subsections of the China's population. The first characteristic these excess males share is that they tend to be the most socioeconomically disadvantaged of all males in China.³¹ They are predominantly poorly educated and are from areas of China that suffer from a high sex-ratio imbalance. Unlike men with better socio-economic backgrounds, these males cannot compete effectively in the marriage market and thus frequently end up alone. Secondly, they are often underemployed or unemployed with few resources to make them more viable for marriage.³² They are also more likely to be chosen for low-status

²⁹ Ibid., 203.

³⁰ Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population* (London: The MIT Press, 2005): 258.

³¹ Ibid., 188.

³² Ibid., 189.

jobs that are dangerous and/or labor-intensive.³³ The practice of hypergyny (marrying someone of a higher socioeconomic status) compounds the problem by further reducing the number of available women for these excess males. Third, these excess males are most likely transients poorly regarded in the community and considered social outcasts.³⁴ There is a higher probability that these men might engage in criminal activities because of the high degree of anonymity they enjoy. Due to growing crime rates and overtaxed urban infrastructure, many urban Chinese harbor fear and resentment toward these transients. Lastly, they tend to surround themselves with other single, young males that share the same predicament and disposition.³⁵ This has the negative effect of amplifying their grievances and further enhancing their isolation from normal society.

Not only do these males share characteristics that set them apart from others in society, they are also encumbered with high-risk behavioral tendencies that are inextricably linked with being male. First, males are more aggressive and violent than females.³⁶ Independent of their location and prevailing culture, men usually commit violent crimes. Second, males are more likely to be engaged in anti-social behavior.³⁷ For example, nearly 79 percent of violent crimes committed by lone offenders in the United States are males.³⁸ Third, unmarried males perpetrate more violent crimes than married males of the same age group.³⁹ The basis for this behavioral tendency is the theory that single men have higher levels of testosterone than married men do, and that testosterone

³³ David T. Courtwright, *Violent Land: Single Men and Social Disorder from the Frontier to the Inner City* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 188.

³⁴ Hudson and den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, 190.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 191.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 192.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 193.

³⁸ "Offender Demographics," Bureau of Justice Statistics, accessed September 11, 2011, <http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=942>.

³⁹ Hudson and den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, 194.

contributes to antisocial behavior.⁴⁰ Recent studies have shown that for similar aged men, married men with children have considerably lower levels of testosterone than single men do.⁴¹ Fourth, males of lower socioeconomic standing commit more violence than males of a higher socioeconomic standing.⁴² Scientists Margo Wilson and Martin Daly discovered that unemployed males are four times more likely to commit murder than employed males.⁴³ Fifth, males under the influence of drugs and alcohol commit more violence than males who are clean and sober.⁴⁴ Wilson and Daly found that young unmarried males abuse alcohol and drugs more than married males, older males, or females.⁴⁵ Sixth, transient males both commit and suffer more violent crimes than non-transient males in a given population.⁴⁶ During 1997, migrants accounted for 90 percent of crimes committed in Shanghai's Pudong region.⁴⁷ Lastly, group dynamics tend to exaggerate high-risk behavior among males, especially those who are young, unmarried, poor, and/or substance abusing.⁴⁸ Males in group situations condone, even encourage, risky behavior as a means to elevate their social prestige. Often the group behavior will not rise above the behavior of the worst behaved individual, and they will take more risks than they

⁴⁰ Allan Mazur and Joel Michalek, "Marriage, Divorce, and Male Testosterone," *Social Forces* 77 (September 1998): 315.

⁴¹ Jennifer Corbett Dooren, "Men Biologically Wired to Be Nurturing Fathers," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 13, 2011, accessed September 13, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903532804576566943060360516.html>.

⁴² Hudson and den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, 197.

⁴³ Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, "Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence: The Young Male Syndrome," *Ethology and Sociobiology* 6 (1985): 61.

⁴⁴ Hudson and den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, 197.

⁴⁵ Wilson and Daly, "Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence: The Young Male Syndrome," 65.

⁴⁶ Hudson and den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, 198-199.

⁴⁷ Ren Meng, "Confronting Three Populations of 80 Million," *Inside China Mainland* 19 (January 1997): 79.

⁴⁸ Hudson and den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, 199.

would if they acted alone. Given these characteristics and behavioral tendencies, excess males are a potential destabilizing force that will likely increase crime and violence in China.

D. CONCLUSION

Both the relevant literature and the potential detrimental effects of excess males present a disconnected assessment of future security relations for China, Japan, and Taiwan. On the one hand, the possible destabilizing effects of China's excess males could derail China's march towards global preeminence. On the other hand, many authors argue that China-Japan relations and China-Taiwan relations could be the pivotal factors in determining the security of all three countries. The difficulty now is drawing the connections between what is relevant (Sino-Japanese and Cross-Strait relations) to what is seemingly irrelevant (China's excess males) to China-Japan-Taiwan security relations. The next two chapters will propose the causal linkages that might connect these two unrelated factors and explain how China's excess males could affect the security of Japan and Taiwan.

III. EXCESS MALES AND CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

The concerns about China's excess males affecting Japan's national security would initially seem misplaced. Many security experts would opine that threats such as a North Korean nuclear attack or the fracturing of the American security alliance would pose a greater risk to Japan's national security than a large gang of unmarried Chinese men. While few would dispute that a nuclear-armed North Korea poses an existential security threat to Japan, the contentiousness of China's excess males as a security threat to Japan deserves further examination. In *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, authors Hudson and den Boer offer a cursory explanation that high sex-ratio societies create greater regional instability without discussing the mechanisms that would bring about this instability. This chapter will provide further elaboration on Hudson and den Boer's premise by discussing how the dynamics of Sino-Japanese relations could enable excess males to create instability.

B. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Historically, relations between Japan and China were well defined in that one country was always more prosperous or powerful than the other. China's dominance in the region extended up through the mid-nineteenth century; Japan's preeminence in the region started from the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Noted scholar Kent E. Calder observed that it was only recently the prospect emerged of China and Japan both being powerful and affluent at the same time, largely because Japan's economy has remained stagnant while China's economy and influence have grown rapidly.⁴⁹ China possesses nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and has experienced double-digit

⁴⁹ Kent E. Calder, "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (March/April 2006): 129.

growth rates in its military budget for the last 20 years. Japan has a military profile that is relatively lower than China's military profile. However, Japan's military capability is more advanced with its sophisticated defense-relevant technology and strong alliance with the United States. Even though Japan's constitution has restricted the military to mainly defensive capabilities, it has recently become more proactive regional and global multinational military operations.

The dynamic and complex nature of Sino-Japanese relations creates inherent contradictions. After 39 years of normalized relations, the economies of China and Japan are interdependent. China displaced the United States to become Japan's top trade partner accounting for U.S.\$149B in exports and U.S.\$152B in imports by the end of 2010.⁵⁰ Japan is China's third largest trading partner after the European Union and the United States.⁵¹ Many economic experts forecast trade between both countries to improve steadily from current levels as China's domestic consumption increases in the coming years.

Unfortunately, buoyant trade and close economic linkages between the two countries might be the few positive aspects of their relationship remaining. Many Chinese citizens harbor deep resentment toward Japan based largely on historical grievances. Chinese grievances against Japan could be trace back to the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895 that resulted in the ceding of Taiwan to Japan. The war atrocities committed by Japan against China throughout the 1930s until the end of World War II remain as a vivid reminder of Japan's savagery. Even as Japan quickly divested its militant past after World War 2, Japan's actions throughout the years reinforce a perceived lack of sensitivity or remorse for its wrongdoing on the Chinese. Over the last eight years, many incidents involving the Japanese have only increased Chinese hatred of them. Since 2003, these incidents include:

⁵⁰ "Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics," Japan External Trade Organization, accessed August 1, 2011, <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/>.

⁵¹ "China," European Commission, accessed August 1, 2011, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/china/>.

1. In August 2003, a group of Chinese workers at a construction site in Qiqihar (Heilongjiang Province) unearthed five decayed drums, including one that contained mustard gas. The gas killed one man and injured 43 others.⁵² The gas was undisposed chemical weapons left behind in China at the end of World War II by the retreating Japanese military.
2. In September 2003, Chinese police in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province detained six individuals connected to a sex orgy involving 400 Japanese tourists and around 500 local Chinese prostitutes.⁵³ The incident took place on September 16–18, which coincided with the Mukden Incident of 1931 that began Japan's occupation of Manchuria. Many Chinese expressed their rage and anger over this incident online, citing that these Japanese men engaged in this sex orgy to "humiliate China on what the Chinese already called their national day of humiliation, September 18."⁵⁴
3. Japan's approval of school textbooks that some critics say simplified wartime atrocities, such as the rape of thousands of "comfort women" used as sex slaves by the Japanese military.⁵⁵ As a result, violent anti-Japanese demonstrations erupted throughout several cities in China. Demonstrators vandalized the Japanese embassy in Beijing, and looted and destroyed suspected Japanese-owned businesses.
4. Multiple visits to Yasakuni shrine (a Shinto shrine for Japan's war dead) by then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Since the war dead at the shrine also includes World War Two Class A war criminals, Koizumi's visits garnered condemnation and protest from the Chinese because they felt this

⁵² "Cooperation,' Not Compensation—China to get funds for poison gas leak," *The Japan Times*, October 17, 2003. Accessed August 1, 2011. <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20031017a5.html>.

⁵³ Joseph Kahn, "Chinese Angered by Reported Orgy Involving Japanese Tourists," *New York Times*, September 30, 2003. Accessed August 2, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/30/world/china-angered-by-reported-orgy-involving-japanese-tourists.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Leta Hong Fincher, "China Against Japan Getting a Permanent Seat on UN Security Council," *Voice of America*, April 13, 2005. Accessed August 1, 2011. <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2005-04-13-voa3-66920632.html>.

was “paying homage” to the war criminals and “valorizing their cruelties toward China.”⁵⁶

5. In February 2005, the United States and Japan issued a joint security statement declaring a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan Strait issue to be among their common strategic objectives for the region. This drew harsh criticism from the Chinese government. Chinese citizens quickly took to the streets to vent their anger and protest against what they interpreted as Japan interfering in the internal affairs of China. Some feared this joint security statement indicated Japan’s hidden intentions to renew an invasion of China.⁵⁷
6. In September 2010, disputes over territorial waters and the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands escalated when a Chinese boat captain was detained by the Japanese Coast Guard after his fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels.⁵⁸ Many Chinese citizens protested in front of Japanese diplomatic missions and schools in China for the release of the boat captain and China’s claim over the disputed islands. The Chinese government suspended ministerial-level contacts with Japan, and many Chinese tour organizers and their clients canceled scheduled trips to Japan as a sign of solidarity with the government. Coincidentally, Chinese custom officials halted exports of rare earth metals crucial to Japan’s high-technology industry. Some see this as a retaliatory measure against the Japanese for detaining the Chinese boat captain.⁵⁹ Japan freed the boat captain a few weeks after the collision incident.

⁵⁶ June Teufel Dreyer, “Sino-Japanese Rivalry and Its Implications for Developing Nations,” *Asian Survey* 46 (July/August 2006): 540.

⁵⁷ Yinan He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 50 (February 2007): 14.

⁵⁸ Martin Flacker and Ian Johnson, “Japan Retreats With Release of Chinese Boat Captain,” *New York Times*, September 24, 2010. Accessed August 2, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/world/asia/25chinajapan.html>.

⁵⁹ Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Calls on China to Resume Rare Earth Exports,” *New York Times*, October 24, 2010. Accessed August 2, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/business/global/25rare.html>.

Conversely, China also drew the ire of Japan during this same period. Some of the incidents include:

1. In 2003, three Chinese nationals studying in Japan robbed and brutally murdered a Japanese family of four in the southern city of Fukuoka.⁶⁰ The killings shocked Japan, and when it was learned that the chief suspects were Chinese, media coverage became frenzied. As a result, many Japanese citizens feel that Chinese and other foreigners are largely responsible for the rising crime rate in Japan. However, crime statistics show that nearly all crimes committed (97 percent) in Japan are perpetrated by Japanese citizens.⁶¹ Two of the suspects were apprehended and tried in China; one received the death penalty and the other received a life sentence. The third suspect was apprehended in Japan, tried, and is currently on death row.
2. In 2004, seven Chinese activists landed on a small disputed islet of Uotsurishima and claimed it as part of Chinese territory. During the ten hours on the islet, the activists planted a Chinese flag and gave remote interviews to Chinese media. These seven activists were later detained by Japanese police and charged with violating Japanese immigration laws. The police later stated that one of the detainees had been arrested previously in Japan for vandalizing the Yasakuni Shrine after then-Prime Minister Koizumi's first controversial visit in August 2001.⁶²
3. Again, in 2004, a Chinese submarine entered Japanese territorial waters in the southwestern sector of Okinawa prefecture, about 400 kilometers from Okinawa.⁶³ The incursion lasted less than two hours, and caused the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) to go on alert for the second

⁶⁰ "Japan family murderers sentenced," BBC News, January 25, 2005. Accessed August 2, 2011, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4201167.stm>.

⁶¹ J. Sean Curtin, "Japan murder fuels false anti-China furor," *Asia Times*, November 13, 2004. Accessed August 2, 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FK13Dh01.html>.

⁶² J. Sean Curtin, "New Sino-Japanese strain over disputed islands," *Asia Times*, March 27, 2004. Accessed August 2, 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FC27Dh01.html>.

⁶³ J. Sean Curtin, "Submarine puts Japan-China ties into a dive," *Asia Times*, October 17, 2004. Accessed August 2, 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FK17Dh01.html>.

time since World War 2. JMSDF tracked and pursued the submarine with a P-3C Orion aircraft and two JMSDF cruisers until it left Japanese waters. China denied Japan's accusations that the submarine was testing JMSDF capabilities at the fringes of Japan's territorial boundary.

4. Some Chinese scholars are beginning to claim Okinawa as a part of China in numerous Chinese academic journals. These scholars argue that sovereignty over Okinawa is disputed because the Qing Emperor Guangxu objected when Japan abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and established Okinawa prefecture in 1879. These scholars assert that the abolition of the Ryukyu Kingdom by the Meiji government in 1879, American control over Okinawa after post-World War II, and Okinawa's reversion to Japanese sovereignty in 1972 were all illegitimate, which affirmed China's right to claim Okinawa.⁶⁴ Many recent anti-Japanese protesters in China have taken to demand the liberation of Okinawa from Japan and the restoration of the Ryukyu Kingdom.

C. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS ON CHINA'S EXCESS MALES

Chinese attitudes toward the Japanese are closely correlated with the state of Sino-Japanese relations at any given time. When the relationship is perceived to be good, the latent anti-Japanese sentiment is mostly confined to internet chat rooms and blogs. Anti-Japanese sentiment is demonstrated publicly when Sino-Japanese relations are perceived to be bad, and can quickly escalate into violence as illustrated by recent protests. Either way, the underlying anti-Japanese sentiments harbored by many Chinese could create the necessary conditions for China's excess males to incite civil unrest.

Anti-Japanese protests could be the most probable way for China's excess males to organize in sufficient numbers. Protesting will appeal to China's excess males because it provides a forum in which to vent their frustration at

⁶⁴ Kosuke Takahashi, "China scholars enter Okinawa fray," *Asia Times*, October 23, 2010. Accessed August 2, 2011, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LJ23Dh01.html>.

someone or something. The underlying issues that trouble these males might not necessarily be anti-Japanese in nature, such as being poor, under-educated, under-represented, and/or unable to find wives.⁶⁵ These issues manifest as anti-Japanese sentiment because these males might incorrectly assume that their current predicament is the result of Japanese misdeeds in China's past. There could be an escalation to violence because of the behavior tendencies of these excess males—single males of low socioeconomic status have higher tendencies toward violence and group dynamics tend to exaggerate high-risk behavior among males.⁶⁶ As the protest prolongs without resolution, these males might resort to violence as a means to garner more attention to the situation. This could get out of hand quickly because the group's behavior does not rise above the behavior of the worst behaved male.⁶⁷

In order for the latent anti-Japanese sentiment among China's excess males to explode violently onto the streets, an event or situation needs to occur to spark this mass uprising. While it would be hard to predict what situation would spark mass anti-Japanese uprising in China, a common characteristic that will be shared among these situations is Chinese nationalist indignation against Japanese disrespect and humiliation. Nine possible events would provide the potential spark; some will be very similar to those mentioned in the previous sections.

Incident #1: *Any situation that involves a Chinese national arrested or detained by Japanese police in connection with the assertion of Chinese sovereignty over a disputed territory would likely create violent anti-Japanese protests.* A likely scenario would be a group of Chinese nationals infiltrating the Senkaku Islands and reclaiming Chinese sovereignty. The Japanese police would eventually arrest these Chinese nationals, and the Chinese government

⁶⁵ Murray Scot Tanner, "China rethinks unrest," *The Washington Quarterly* 27 (2004): 146.

⁶⁶ Hudson and den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, 192 and 199.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 199.

would demand their unconditional release. Many Chinese citizens in China would protest against Japan for what they perceive as Japanese subjugation. As mentioned early, anti-Japanese protests were organized throughout China in response to the detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain who collided into two Japanese Coast Guard ships near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.⁶⁸

Incident #2: Any situation that involves Japan downplaying its role in the war atrocities committed in China during the second Sino-Japanese War. One likely scenario would be Japanese officials approving history textbooks that contain passages that lessen Japan's involvement in China during the war years. Another likely scenario would be a Japanese politician or government official publically stating that these war atrocities were exaggerated or just plain fabrications. The Chinese government would demand that Japan rewrite those textbook passages to reflect accurately Japan's involvement. They would also demand the offending Japanese politician or government official to be censured for his/her comments. In both scenarios, Chinese citizens would protest against what they see as Japan's surreptitious attempt to revise history and absolve themselves of their crimes.

Incident #3: Any situation that involves a Chinese national being seriously injured or killed by a Japanese national. The reason behind why a Chinese national was injured or killed is immaterial because Chinese citizens would only see Japanese aggression against the Chinese. If the crime occurred in Japan, the Chinese government would demand immediate resolution to the case. If the crime occurred in China, the Chinese government would ensure the case was immediately resolved at the detriment of due process. In both cases, Chinese citizens would protest against this crime and against what they perceived as the reemergence of Japanese aggression.

Incident #4: Any situation where Japanese politicians and/or government officials comment on Taiwan's sovereign status in relation to Japanese politics.

⁶⁸ Flacker and Johnson, "Japan Retreats With Release of Chinese Boat Captain."

A likely scenario would be an influential member of the Diet publically stating that Taiwan is a core interest to Japan's national security, and that Japan would ensure such core interests would be protected. Chinese citizens would protest against what they perceive as Japan's meddling in China's internal affairs. They might also think that Japan was trying to reassert sovereignty over Taiwan, an island the Japanese once colonized from 1895 to 1945.

Incident #5: *Any situation that involves a Japanese national sports team competing against a Chinese national sports team in China.* The result of the game or match would be inconsequential because Chinese citizens would still protest against the Japanese. If China won, celebration and jubilation could quickly devolve into violence because of latent anti-Japanese sentiments.⁶⁹ If China lost, violent protests would be the likely outcome as demonstrated in the violent riots by Chinese citizens after Japan's victory over China in the 2004 Asian Cup final.⁷⁰

Incident #6: *Any situation that involves a Chinese national being seriously harmed or killed by a product made by a Japanese company.* The location from where the harmful product was manufactured is not important, even though the product in question is most likely manufactured in China. The Chinese government would launch an investigation and demand compensation for the victim. Chinese citizens would boycott the Japanese company and protest against what they believe to be Japan's historical disregard for Chinese life.⁷¹

Incident #7: *Any situation that involves Japan successfully gaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.* Japan contributes

⁶⁹ Michael J. Rosenfeld, "Celebration, Politics, Selective Looting and Riots: A Micro Level Study of the Bulls Riot of 1992 in Chicago," *Social Problems* 44 (November 1997): 487. In this article, Rosenfeld argues that the violent rioting that erupted from the 1992 Chicago Bulls' National Basketball Association championship celebration was the result of massive welfare cuts in Illinois and to the televised Los Angeles riots of 1992. The essence of Rosenfeld's argument is adapted for use in the China-Japan context.

⁷⁰ "Chinese riot after Japan victory," BBC News, August 7, 2004. Accessed August 7, 2011, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3541380.stm>.

⁷¹ Johan Lagerkvist, "The Rise of Online Public Opinion in the People's Republic of China," *China: An International Journal* 3 (March 2005): 125.

generously to the United Nation's operating budget (about 20 percent annually), and has sought a permanent seat since 1960s.⁷² Chinese citizens have protested against Japan's recent bid for a permanent seat because Japan has yet to apologize for the atrocities committed by Japanese Imperial troops in China.⁷³ If Japan's bid is successful, Chinese citizens would protest with increased fervor. However, Japan is unlikely to win a bid because of the Chinese government's insistence on blocking Japan's bid.⁷⁴

Incident #8: *Any situation that involves Japan Self-Defense Force operating close to Chinese territorial boundaries and eliciting a direct challenge from the People's Liberation Army.* For example, the USNS Impeccable incident in the South China Sea during March 2009 briefly strained relations between the United States and China.⁷⁵ This incident also indicated China's growing military confidence in the region as it challenges the United States. No public protests against the United States were held in China. However, a similar incident involving the Japanese would likely result in mass protest across China under the perception that Japan is disrespecting China's territorial sovereignty.

Incident #9: *Any situation that involves Japanese politicians and/or government officials visiting the Yasakuni Shrine in Tokyo.* Multiple visits to the Yasakuni Shrine during Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's time in office elicited strong condemnation from the Chinese government and popular protest

⁷² Florian Coulmas, "Japan's Bid for a Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council," *ASIEN* 100 (July 2006): 18.

⁷³ Howard W. French, "China Allows More Protests in Shanghai Against Japan," *New York Times*, April 17, 2005. Accessed August 7, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/17/international/asia/17china.html>.

⁷⁴ "Morally justifiable? China's opposition to Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat," Art of the Possible: The Cambridge University Journal of Politics. Last modified on May 11, 2011. Accessed on August 7, 2011, <http://www.artofthepossible-cambridge.com/index.php?a=12&title=1305064036.html>.

⁷⁵ Ann Scott Tyson, "Navy Sends Destroyer to Protect Surveillance Ship After Incident in South China Sea," *The Washington Post*, March 13, 2009. Accessed on August 7, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/12/AR2009031203264.html>.

throughout China.⁷⁶ A similar visit by any Japanese official would provoke the same response in China, even potentially escalating peaceful demonstrations to violent ones.

D. ARE CHINA'S EXCESS MALES REALLY A DIRECT SECURITY THREAT TO JAPAN?

It is ambiguous whether China's excess males are really a direct security threat to Japan. On the one hand, the answer to this question is no. Despite evidence showing single males are more predisposed to violence and the fragility of Sino-Japanese relations, these excess males are not a direct threat to Japanese national security. There is no evidence that China's 30 million or so excess males are capable of mounting a direct assault on Japan. Some of the aforementioned protests did escalate to violence, but the violence was localized to China without spreading to Japan. Sino-Japanese relations since the 1950s have not deteriorated enough to implore China to use military force against Japan. Much of the vitriol the two countries aimed at one another has been on the diplomatic side of this rivalry. The Chinese government has been effective in managing popular anti-Japanese sentiment and protests across China using the People's Armed Police. Even if the Chinese government fails in containing future anti-Japanese protests and violent unrest ensues, China's excess males essentially become a threat mitigator for Japan's national security. China would be too distracted with terminating the violent unrest that the focus on Japan would be shifted away temporarily.

On the other hand, China's excess males could be an indirect threat to Japan. There is an underlying concern as to how much longer the Chinese government will continue to contain this anti-Japanese sentiment. The proliferation of mobile communication technology means that it will be increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to contain public dissent. In China, the internet has become a haven for anti-Japanese rhetoric that is

⁷⁶ "Koizumi shrine visit stokes anger," BBC News, August 15, 2006. Accessed August 14, 2011, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4789905.stm>.

frequently militant in tone and intent. Additionally, the internet also provides an effective means to organize anti-Japanese protests through social media websites and discussion forums. The real security threat is the increased uncertainty of how the Chinese government will respond to the actions of these excess males. If the Chinese government escapes widespread civil unrest by appealing to these excess males and hardening its rhetoric against Japan, Sino-Japanese relations could take a violent turn.

E. CONCLUSION

The state of Sino-Japanese relations will be the primary factor determining the level of indirect threat China's excess males pose to Japan's national security. The key to popular anti-Japanese sentiment in China is the perception that Japan has not fully apologized and atoned for its wartime actions. The longer Japan chooses to ignore this issue, the greater the intensity of anti-Japanese sentiments is created. This also increases the likelihood of violence incited by China's excess males. Worsening relations between the China and Japan could be either dangerous or advantageous to Japan depending on China's management of its excess males. Japan's national security is threatened if China collaborates with its excess males, whereas Japan's national security is safe if China is preoccupied with containing widespread civil unrest. Improving relations between the two countries could provide opportunities for Japan to positively engage and solve China's excess male problem. In either case, Japan can ensure minimal national security threat from China's excess males by being less antagonistic in its relations with China.

IV. EXCESS MALES AND CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

The relations between China and Taiwan have oscillated between relative peace and potential war since 1945 without sufficient resolution that satisfies both countries' governments. To many security experts, this situation between the two countries has created the most dangerous flashpoint in northeast Asia. While there are a few issues that could ignite a cross-strait conflict, the issue of how China's excess males could affect Taiwan's national security deserves further investigation. As with the previous discussion on China-Japan relations, this chapter will provide further elaboration on Hudson and den Boer's premise by discussing how the dynamics of China-Taiwan relations could enable excess males to create instability.

B. CURRENT STATE OF CHINA-TAIWAN AFFAIRS

The interests of the ruling regimes in both China and Taiwan have transformed since 1949 into largely incompatible objectives. China insists upon recovery of the island of Taiwan which it asserts is a part of China's sovereignty, cut from the mainland first by the Japanese and then by the KMT. Taiwan initially believed that reunification with China would be the ultimate end state, although this belief has wavered since full democracy. More recently, Taiwan has sought increasing autonomy and international space despite China's objections, with the majority of the population favoring a status quo of neither formal independence nor Chinese control.

Both China and Taiwan have taken steps to build better relations across the Strait. China's reunification rhetoric quieted in 2005 when the CCP regarded Taiwan "less as an ideologically charged and urgent matter and more as a pragmatic and low-key management issue."⁷⁷ Since then, China has made more

⁷⁷ Bruce Gilley, "Not So Dire Straits," *Foreign Affairs* 89 (January/February 2010): 46.

concessions to Taiwan by allowing greater participation in multilateral international organization like the World Health Organization and limited presence in the United Nations. Ma Ying-jeou's presidential victory in 2008 reversed much of the damage created by Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. President Ma promised the Taiwanese public and China that he would not seek unification, independence, or conflict.⁷⁸ Shortly after Ma's promise, cross-strait talks resumed and agreements were made to enhance economic ties. Both sides agreed to allow 270 direct flights per week across the strait to enhance tourism and commerce by eliminating intermediate points like Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea. Chinese and Taiwanese leadership no longer feared the specter of greater economic integration as a means to dissipate political power.

Many see China and Taiwan's economic entanglement as having clear and immediate political benefits. As Taiwan's industrial manufacturing and commercial sales become increasingly intertwined with Chinese production capabilities, China believes that Taiwan's businessmen will both resist interruption of ties and pressure Taipei for closer political relations to gain benefits and protection. Large numbers of Taiwanese already live and work in China where they are subject to China's influence. The creation of business alliances between China's and Taiwan's commercial interests favors China as it did with Hong Kong commercial interests. In Hong Kong, this arrangement proved crucial to easing the British handover and to subsequent implementation of China's model of "one country, two systems."⁷⁹ China's leadership views these connections as a logical mechanism for peacefully resolving the cross-strait impasse.

Unfortunately, continuing American arms sales to Taiwan has renewed cross-strait tensions. Most recently in 2010, the Obama administration approved the sale of PAC-3 missile defense systems, Black Hawk utility helicopters,

⁷⁸ Ibid., 47.

⁷⁹ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005): 10.

Harpoon anti-ship training missiles, C2 communications equipment, and Osprey-class minehunters for an estimated value of U.S.\$6 billion; the decision on the sale of F-16C/D fighters is still pending.⁸⁰ China's leadership protested the arms sales stating that it was a violation of China's internal affairs and it could destabilize any positive gains made by China and Taiwan in the past few years.⁸¹ The United States has maintained that the sale was in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act that legally obligates the availability of weapons for Taiwan's defense.

C. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS ON CHINA'S EXCESS MALES

The effects of cross-strait relations on China's excess males are not entirely clear. On the one hand, China-Taiwan relations could have no effect on these excess males. As discussed in the previous section, the Chinese public's sentiment towards Japan is unanimously negative. One can see a direct correlation between worsening Sino-Japanese relations and increases in anti-Japanese protest. China's excess males could use such protests as a means to broadcast their grievances. However, anti-Taiwan sentiment is mainly harbored by the state and not by the Chinese public. Actions such as the missile exercises off the coast of Taiwan leading up to the 1996 Taiwanese Presidential elections and the threat of military action against the island if independence is declared are state initiated with no influence from the public. Any public protest in China against Taiwan would need to be manufactured by the CCP and sustained by both the PLA and the state's propaganda apparatus. Even though these excess males are generally poorly educated, they might see through the CCP's hollow attempts to elicit support for China's Taiwan policy.

⁸⁰ Shirley A. Kan, "Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990," *U.S. Congressional Research Service* (RL30957, August 2, 2011): 47.

⁸¹ John Pomfret, "U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan, angering China," *The Washington Post*, January 30, 2010, accessed September 14, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/30/AR2010013000508.html>.

On the other hand, worsening cross-strait relations and the CCP's rhetoric against Taiwan could incite China's excess males to protest. Attitudes toward Taiwan are closely shaped by the prevailing views held by the CCP. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the CCP's irredentist claim to Taiwan stems from a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness. While the Taiwanese government of recent years has been cautious not to add to this national discourse, the Taiwanese public is less inhibited in expressing its views against China and China's confrontational posture towards Taiwanese sovereignty and self-determination.⁸² China's excess males could see the defiance exhibited by the Taiwanese public as furthering China's humiliation and weakness. Reclaiming Taiwan could be seen by these excess males as the ultimate end state to make everything right for themselves and China. Knowing that the consequences for failing are potentially regime-threatening, the CCP is striving to reintegrate Taiwan into China in order to avert domestic nationalist backlash and a crisis of regime legitimacy.

Lately, many have questioned the relevancy of nationalism in China's Taiwan policy. Taiwan, by virtue of its geographic location, represents a potential strategic threat to China. It could serve as a forward operating base for foreign military operations against China. Even in peacetime, foreign influence over Taiwan could constrain China's ability to develop and project naval power and ensure maritime security in East Asia. The CCP would need to propagandize this potential existential threat in order to provoke China's excess males to support a more belligerent policy towards Taiwan.

Taiwan needs to initiate a provocative event or situation in order to push the CCP into action and cultivate enough anti-Taiwan sentiment among China's excess males. Based on cross-strait dynamics of the past 20 years, a clear provocation to China would be Taiwan moving towards independence or

⁸² Janet Ong, "Taiwan Pro-Independence Party Protests China Policies in Rally," Bloomberg, accessed September 14, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avk5M6TBgRrs&refer=asia>.

enhancing its capability to declare independence. Listed below are six possible events that would ignite a firestorm of protest and violent conflict involving China's excess males.

Incident #1: *Taiwan declares independence.* Almost all China observers agree that such a scenario would result in immediate armed conflict between China and Taiwan. Taiwan could declare independence two different ways: 1) the president could declare it unilaterally, or 2) the people overwhelmingly vote for independence. China could try to coerce Taiwan into reaccepting the status quo, but that could prove risky to the CCP if Taiwan remains defiant. In order for the regime not to lose face, the CCP could conclude that a swift military response against Taiwan would be the only course of action for China as codified in Article 8 of the March 14, 2005 Anti-Secession Law.⁸³ The CCP's propaganda apparatus could stoke up support for military action against Taiwan with nationalistic sentiments and a steady diatribe against the Taiwanese separatists. Since the CCP has closely linked the loss of Taiwan to China's century-long humiliation at the hands of imperialist foreigners, mass protests could erupt throughout China to support forcefully reclaiming sovereign territory and the reestablishment of national dignity. The vast majority of the protesters could be excess males because their behavioral tendencies and characteristics would draw them to such gatherings. The presence of these excess males would dramatically increase the likelihood of the protests turning violent. Even if the CCP has no intention of going to war with Taiwan, the likely turmoil created by the excess males because of CCP inaction could force an invasion of Taiwan in order to appease the masses.

Incident #2: *Taiwan develops a nuclear weapon.* Like declaring independence, this scenario could also result in a swift response from China. In this situation, the CCP could feel compelled to initiate a preemptive strike to remove the threat before Taiwan has the opportunity to use it against China. The

⁸³ Kerry Dumbaugh, "Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices," *U.S. Congressional Research Service* (RL33510, December 14, 2007): 10.

CCP would need to make the public see that Taiwanese separatists are threatening China's survival. The idea of a preemptive strike could garner overwhelming public support for the CCP in China. The CCP could push for a preemptive strike by focusing on claims that the Taiwanese separatists are readying themselves for an attack on the mainland. They could argue that the nuclear weapon would reverse the course of China's economic and social progress and kill thousands of innocent civilians. Another argument the CCP could also put forward is the claim that putting down these Taiwanese separatists is of grave importance to China's national security. Since separatist influences have infiltrated all levels of the Taiwanese government, it is imperative that these influences be purged before reintegrating Taiwan into China. Lastly, the CCP could argue that China needs to make a stand with Taiwan, as in Xinjiang and Tibet, to protect its territorial integrity or risk the nation further humiliation and shame. Protests against Taiwan could spring up across China as nationalism takes hold among the Chinese people. The government could be urged by the public to take immediate action to eliminate this nuclear threat. The likelihood of excess males inciting violence at these protests increases as the government prolongs inaction.

Incident #3: *A military accident between the two countries occurs in the Taiwan Strait.* China has been more aggressive in enforcing its territorial integrity as its military capability has increased in the past twenty years. This has meant pushing beyond the bounds of China's territorial waters and extending into its economic exclusion zone. With both countries' maritime boundaries in such close proximity to each other, China's aggressive patrols could lead to a military incident with Taiwanese patrols. This incident could escalate into a full-scale military conflict before both sides have the chance to investigate the incident thoroughly. Fearing that a soft response could damage the regime's power in China, the CCP could order the military to mobilize for war. The CCP's propaganda apparatus could spin this situation in China's favor by placing the blame on Taiwan and its antagonistic military. Seeing no other option, the

Taiwanese would counter by mobilizing its military to repel against a possible invasion. There might be calls for third-party mediation to deescalate cross-strait tensions, but the momentum of the situation may be too great to slow or stop. People on both sides of the strait could stage mass protests about what they see as a clear provocation for war by the other side. Unfortunately for China, this situation is more perilous because of its excess male population. If these excess males perceive that the government is not taking decisive action against Taiwan, their protesting might turn violent and disrupt civil order in China.

Incident #4: *An increase in Chinese females marrying Taiwanese males, thus further reducing the pool of available women in China.* Taiwan is also experiencing its own issues with gender imbalance. Factors such as declining birth rates, cultural preference for boys, and different mortality rates have created a society where men significantly outnumber women. This has created a strain on the availability of women in Taiwan's marriage market. Typically in Taiwan, men seek a woman who is two to four years younger as the ideal marriage partner.⁸⁴ Such a practice places downward pressure on the pool of younger women in Taiwan while creating an increase in the number of single women above the age of 30.⁸⁵ Traditionally in Taiwanese culture, the unspoken marriage deadline for women is often considered 30 years of age.⁸⁶ This distortion in the marriage market has resulted in increasing numbers of inter-ethnic marriages between Taiwanese males and Asian brides, especially ones from China. If cross-strait relations sour and China no longer wants to maintain the status quo, the CCP's propaganda arm could cast Taiwan as the villain with respect to the outflow of Chinese brides to Taiwan. Because of negative coverage created by state-controlled media and the anxieties generated, China's

⁸⁴ Wen Shan Yang and Ying-ying Tiffany Liu, "Gender Imbalances and the Twisted Marriage Market in Taiwan" (paper presented at the CEPED-CICRED-INED Seminar on Female Deficit in Asia: Trends and Perspectives, Singapore, December 5-7, 2005).

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ "The flight from marriage," *The Economist*, August 20, 2011, accessed September 29, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/21526329>.

excess males could perceive these Taiwanese males are exacerbating the gender imbalance problem by taking away eligible Chinese women. This resentment could manifest itself into popular protest against Taiwan, which could prompt the CCP to take action in order to reaffirm its power in China.

Incident #5: *A group of Chinese tourists are injured or killed in Taiwan.* After Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he quickly permitted Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan. Fewer than 200,000 Chinese tourists in tour groups visited Taiwan the first year, but the numbers have steadily increased each year to over 1.63 million in 2010.⁸⁷ The move to allow individual tourists to visit from China starting in 2012 is expected to double the number of Chinese tourists to 4 million and generate an additional U.S.\$4.59 billion to Taiwan's GDP.⁸⁸ Such an influx of Chinese cash and tourists could prove too tempting to ignore for criminals in Taiwan. An incident similar to the Qiandao Lake Incident in 1994 that killed 24 Taiwanese tourists in China's Zhejiang Province could weaken cross-strait relations and potentially escalate tensions.⁸⁹ With the Qiandao Lake Incident, Chinese officials initially gave false information stating that no foul play had occurred but retracted the statement nearly three weeks later by admitting the tourists were murdered by bandits. These officials also refused to transfer the bodies to Taiwan, choosing instead to order the bodies cremated without concurrence from the relatives of the deceased or Taiwanese officials.⁹⁰ Many people in Taiwan interpreted these actions as an indication of a cover-up by the Chinese government and protested accordingly. If Taiwanese officials mishandle the situation in the same manner as Chinese officials did in

⁸⁷ Adela Lin and Janet Ong, "Taiwan Predicts 29 percent More Chinese Tourists," Bloomberg, accessed September 28, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-28/taiwan-predicts-29-more-chinese-tourists.html>.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Rone Tempest, "Boat Fire That Killed 24 Taiwan Tourists Strains China Relations: Incident embarrasses Beijing by spotlighting mounting insecurity in the countryside," *Los Angeles Times*, April 16, 1994, accessed September 28, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/1994-04-16/news/mn-46491_1_taiwan-tourists.

⁹⁰ Uli Schmetzer, "China Unable To Cover Up Killings," *Chicago Tribune*, April 21, 1994, accessed September 28, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-04-21/news/9404210283_1_taiwanese-chinese-massacre.

1994, an anti-Taiwan backlash could occur. Many in China (including excess males) could protest against what they perceive as a conspiracy against China and demand the government to take immediate action. As in the previous incidents, inaction on the CCP could escalate the protests to violence.

Incident #6: *A delegation of Chinese government officials are seriously injured or killed by a mob of angry protesters in Taiwan.* Anti-China protests staged by pro-independence supporters have become more frequent since President Ma took office in 2008. Most of the protestors are sympathetic to the DPP's rhetoric and feel that the closer ties President Ma is pushing to create with China are dangerous for Taiwan. Even though the protests have been largely peaceful, there have been occasions where anti-China fervor has manifested into a more violent form. In October of 2008, Zhang Mingqing, vice president of China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), was physically assaulted by pro-independence protestors while visiting a temple in the southern Taiwanese city of Tainan.⁹¹ While Mr. Zhang's injuries from the attack were minor, the incident does underscore the volatility of anti-China sentiments in Taiwan. As more Chinese officials make visits to Taiwan while cross-strait relations are improving, anti-China sentiments harbored by DPP supporters could harden and become extreme. Incidents similar to what Mr. Zhang experienced could increase and make the Taiwanese government more on edge. These hostile encounters could escalate into deadly violence against the visiting Chinese officials if the ruling party in Taiwan does not address the protesters' concerns about China. Because the CCP might interpret such violence as a provocation against China, cross-strait tensions and anti-Taiwan sentiments in China could immediately heighten. This condition could fuel mass protests across China urging the government to take action against Taiwan.

⁹¹ "Chinese official attacked by pro-independence activists in Taiwan," [channelnewsasia.com](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/384278/1/.html), accessed September 28, 2011, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/384278/1/.html.

D. ARE CHINA'S EXCESS MALES REALLY A DIRECT SECURITY THREAT TO TAIWAN?

Similar to the case with Japan, it is uncertain whether China's excess males are really a security threat to Taiwan. On the one hand, the answer to this question is no. China's excess males are not a direct threat to Taiwan's national security despite the contrary evidence of excess male behavioral tendencies and the tenuousness of cross-strait relations. The CCP has not taken any military action against Taiwan since 1996 when the PLA fired missiles at Taiwan to prevent the island's first-ever presidential election. Cross-strait relations have improved significantly since 2008 when President Ma of the KMT took office. There have not been any mass anti-Taiwan demonstrations in China, although anti-China protests in Taiwan have been a common occurrence for the past few years. Taiwan and China are both economically intertwined, with Taiwanese firms employing millions of Chinese citizens in China. To most Chinese citizens, the people of Taiwan are considered their brothers and sisters because of similarities in culture and language. The Chinese could reason that attacking Taiwan would be akin to attacking one's own family. Based on this logic, China's excess males could see little reason to advocate violence. These excess males could even draw the logical conclusion that closer cross-strait ties could eventually increase the number of available women in the marriage market. Even if the CCP succeeds in using nationalism to create regime support and anti-Taiwan protests ensue, China's excess males could essentially reduce the threat to Taiwan's national security by distracting the government. The CCP would focus massive resources and energy to contain these excess males and stop the violence from destabilizing civil order.

On the other hand, China's excess males could be an indirect threat to Taiwan. Since Mao's death in the late 1970s, the CCP has relied on economic growth and nationalism to sustain the regime's survival. One aspect of the nationalism the CCP continues to instill in its people is the idea that China's greatness will not be achieved until it unifies with Taiwan. The CCP would

certainly fight to avoid the loss of Taiwan because so much of the regime's legitimacy is fused with this issue.⁹² The Chinese people would expect the regime to do everything in its power to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent. People in China (mainly the excess males) would most likely hold anti-Taiwan demonstrations to show support for swift action to reclaim Taiwan if independence is declared. These excess males would incite mass civil unrest throughout the country if the CCP took no action against Taiwan. Given that this possibility would weigh heavily on the CCP's decision-making, the regime would have no choice but to attack Taiwan in order to stave off civil chaos in China. Unfortunately, attacking Taiwan would only offer the CCP a brief respite before the next decisive moment: whether China wins or loses the war. Winning the war would realize China's national goal of unification with Taiwan and cement the CCP's legitimacy with the Chinese people. Losing the war would almost certainly propel these excess males to violent upheaval and bring the collapse of the CCP.⁹³ While there are many factors to consider if China could win a war against Taiwan, the possibility of losing and its likely devastating aftermath would force the CCP to ensure regime survival by waging Clausewitzian total war and winning Taiwan at all cost.

E. CONCLUSION

The primary factor determining the indirect threat China's excess males pose to Taiwan's national security will be the relationship China and Taiwan have with each other. The CCP's legitimacy is intricately intertwined with preventing Taiwan's independence. Since the regime used nationalistic sentiments to influence public attitudes towards Taiwan, a backlash against the CCP could result if the actions taken against Taiwan are deemed insufficient by the Chinese people (especially the excess males). Because of this fear and the need to suppress public outrage, the CCP would undoubtedly use swift military force to

⁹² Michael D. Swaine, "Trouble in Taiwan," *Foreign Affairs* 83 (March/April 2004): 42.

⁹³ Jing Huang, "Economic and Political Costs," in *If China Attacks Taiwan*, ed. Steve Tsang (New York: Routledge 2006): 202.

incapacitate the island if Taiwan's government makes a formal declaration of independence. Conversely, Taiwan could be safe from Chinese retaliation because the CCP might be too preoccupied containing widespread civil unrest caused by excess males. The current trend of improving relations between the two countries could provide opportunities for Taiwan to positively engage and solve China's excess male problem. By helping China with its excess male problem, Taiwan could prevent the problem from threatening its security and the status quo.

V. CONCLUSION: EXCESS MALES MITIGATION OPTIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

With over 30 million excess males, China's gender imbalance is quickly becoming a dire security risk to China. Hudson and den Boer hinted that China could face critical internal challenges because of the detrimental behavioral tendencies these excess males possess. What are uncertain are the challenges these excess males could present beyond the borders of China. This thesis has researched the possible implications China's excess males could have on Sino-Japanese and cross-Strait security relations. While there could be many these males, this author argues that the main factor is China's foreign relations with Japan and Taiwan.

The challenges excess males might present to Sino-Japanese relations and Cross-Strait relations are ones that China, Japan, and Taiwan need not stand idle and let such situations dictate the terms. While it is uncertain if such scenarios could produce catastrophic results, China, Japan, and Taiwan could preemptively engage these excess males to limit the violent destruction hinted in the previous two chapters. Preemptive engagement could also stem the potentially destabilizing effects that civil unrest could have on the region. Whether the engagement method is violent or non-violent, all three countries need to understand that the state of their relationship will determine how these excess males will react. This chapter will present a small sampling of preemptive options that these three countries could explore in order to limit or mitigate the devastating potential of China's excess males. All of the options presented in this section are interchangeable between the three countries and could be implemented concurrently to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

In order to focus the discussion better on how China, Japan, and Taiwan should engage each other with respect to the issue of excess males, a few

assumptions are needed for both Sino-Japanese relations and China-Taiwan relations. For relations between China and Japan, the first assumption is that China and Japan will never reach a diplomatic solution to permanently improving relations between them; the best their relationship will achieve is vacillating between being serviceable and being disastrous. The second assumption is that both countries want to avoid war; China does not want to draw the United States into the conflict, while Japan does not want to risk destroying its struggling economy. The last assumption is that the Chinese government will not risk upsetting regime legitimacy and stability in order to prevent war between China and Japan.

For cross-strait relations, the first assumption is that Taiwan wants to maintain the current status quo with China. The reasoning behind this assumption is two-fold: 1) announcing formal independence would certainly provoke a violent response from China, while 2) reunifying with China could undo many of the social and personal freedoms the Taiwanese currently enjoy. The second assumption is that both countries want to avoid war. A cross-strait war could cripple the economies of both China and Taiwan because of the high level of economic interdependence. For Taiwan, the United States' ambiguous commitment to defend the island could make war with China too perilous to pursue. For China, war with Taiwan might mean the collapse of the CCP regardless of the outcome.⁹⁴

How China, Japan, and Taiwan arrive at a specific state in their relationship is beyond the scope of this discussion; what is of interest is how to engage these excess males with respect to a specific state of the China-Japan or China-Taiwan relationship.

C. MITIGATING OPTIONS FOR CHINA, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN

The most obvious way to improve relations and stabilize regional security would be for Japan and Taiwan to stop antagonizing China. As simple as this

⁹⁴ Huang, "Economic and Political Costs," in *If China Attacks Taiwan*, ed. Steve Tsang, 203.

solution may seem, the complexity of their relationships can turn innocent gestures into international incidents. Any actions that China could interpret as pro-independence by Taiwan or anti-Chinese by Japan are liable for intense scrutiny, criticism, and retaliation.⁹⁵ Outbursts of nationalist indignation and protest could further complicate the situation for parties. This may lead many people to wonder if wounds from the past can be healed.

1. War

If relations between China, Japan, and Taiwan cannot be salvaged, war could be the most logical method of preempting China's excess males. In the book *Bare Branches*, Hudson and den Boer write that societies in the past pursued war as a way of dealing with the issue of excess males.⁹⁶ For example, early 16th Century Portugal had an estimated sex ratio of 112 males to 100 females.⁹⁷ In order to distract these legions of excess males from destabilizing the Portuguese monarchy, the king ordered a military expansionary campaign along Africa's north coast. Hudson and den Boer estimated that the military campaign was successful in killing 25 percent of all Portuguese males, thereby reducing the overall number of males existing in Portugal.⁹⁸ They suggest that China might suffer the same fate if the country does not rectify the issue and the associated societal impact. According to the diversionary war theory, China could manufacture an armed conflict to deal with the domestic problem of excess males.⁹⁹ A conflict with Japan over the Senkaku/Daiyou Islands or with Taiwan over pro-independence overtures is plausible if China looks to placate the masses and cull its excess males. However effective war might be at reducing

⁹⁵ June Teufel Dreyer, "Sino-Japanese Rivalry and Its Implications for Developing Nations," 541.

⁹⁶ Hudson and den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Males*, 212.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 213.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 214.

⁹⁹ Jaroslav Tar, "Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict," *The Journal of Politics* 72 (2010): 422.

the number of excess males in society, China should not start a conflict with Japan or Taiwan to justify recalibrating its skewed sex ratio back to natural levels. The destructive nature of such an endeavor would inevitably extend beyond the waters around the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands or the Taiwan Strait; locations in China, Japan, and Taiwan would likely be potential targets. There would be a high probability that scores of women would be killed as collateral damage because of the military operations conducted in Chinese urban areas, thus further exacerbating the imbalanced sex ratios in China.

2. Public Works

Conversely, if relations between the three countries are serviceable, Japan and Taiwan could seek collaboration with China in order to maintain cordial bilateral relations and to solve the issue of excess males. One collaborative option Japan and Taiwan could pursue with China is commissioning massive public works projects that utilize Chinese males as laborers. Such projects could provide ample employment opportunities and constructive distractions for these excess males. For example, the Three Gorges Dam project employed an estimated 250,000 workers throughout the 17 years needed to complete the dam.¹⁰⁰ Another equally large public works project was the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, which employed over 100,000 workers during its five-year construction.¹⁰¹ One possible project that Japan and Taiwan might commission would be a shipping canal that cuts across the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand. The benefits of this canal would be shorten transits between the Indian Ocean and South China Sea and bypassing the pirate dangers of the Strait of Malacca. Such a project could employ as many as 100,000 Chinese workers to build the

¹⁰⁰ Bruce Kennedy, "China's Three Gorges Dam," CNN, accessed August 16, 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/asian.superpower/three.gorges/>.

¹⁰¹ Tian-Yi Wu et al, "Who Should Not Go High: Chronic Disease and Work at Altitude during Construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railroad," *High Altitude Medicine and Biology* 8 (June 2007): 88.

canal.¹⁰² While working in Thailand, these Chinese excess males could potentially find suitable Thai females to wed and take back to China.

3. Population Control

Another collaborative option Japan and Taiwan can pursue with China is developing a population control program that artificially selects for female offspring. This program would be a modification of the existing One Child Policy: married couples in China would be either financially rewarded for female offspring or fined for male offspring. Japan and Taiwan can be responsible for funding the program and providing the financial rewards to married parents who comply with the program's parameters. China can be responsible for administering the program, enforcing the program rules, and collecting the fines. There is precedence for such a scheme in Asia; Singapore has a program that pays married couples to have children as a means to combat low birth rates. Called the Child Development Co-Savings (Baby Bonus) Scheme, married Singaporean citizens can receive a cash gift up to U.S.\$3300 each for their first and second child and U.S.\$5000 each for their third and fourth child.¹⁰³ The Singaporean government will also make dollar-for-dollar matching contribution for the amount the parents save in their child's Child Development Account. While the fundamental problem in China is different from that of Singapore's population problem, the incentives structure in Singapore's Baby Bonus scheme could be adapted by Japan, Taiwan, and China to achieve the desired results.

Additionally, this collaborative program would have a limited duration of five years. In 2009, China reported that the total number of live births in the previous year was about 18,134,000.¹⁰⁴ The sex ratio for these births was 113

¹⁰² Rajesh B. Thapa et al, "Sea navigation, challenges and potentials in South East Asia: an assessment of suitable sites for a shipping canal in the South Thai Isthmus," *GeoJournal* 70 (April 2008): 165.

¹⁰³ "Child Development Co-Savings (Baby Bonus) Scheme," last modified June 15, 2011. Accessed August 17, 2011, <https://www.babybonus.gov.sg/bbss/html/index.html>.

¹⁰⁴ "Annual number of births (Births)," United Nations Children's Fund, last modified July 14, 2010. Accessed August 15, 2011, <http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SOWC&f=inID%3A75>.

males to every 100 females.¹⁰⁵ By selecting against males, the number of female births would increase with respect to male births. There would still be some male births because some parents are able and willing to pay the fines. Over the program's five-year lifespan, one can expect the total number of live births to decrease. For illustrative purposes, total number of live births decreases to about 12 million per year because of the effectiveness of the program. One can expect the number of female births to increase above the normal annual female birth rate because girls that would have been aborted or abandoned as a cultural consequence of male-preference under the One Child Policy would now survive. A 20 percent increase in female births would result in about 10 million baby girls per year. By the end of the program, China would have enough females to rebalance the skewed sex ratio to natural levels.

4. Foreign Marriage Tax

China, Japan, and Taiwan could devise a marriage tax that targets foreign men and discourages them from marrying women in China and exacerbating the excess male problem. Men from Japan and Taiwan who intent to marry a Chinese national must pay a nonrefundable foreign marriage authorization fee to their respective countries. Once these Japanese or Taiwanese men (or any foreign men) are in China, they must comply with Chinese tax regulations for foreign marriage. Foreign males who meet a two-year residency requirement and want to marry Chinese females in China must pay a marriage tax that is equivalent to five-times the male's annual foreign salary. Those who do not meet the residency requirement must pay a marriage tax that is equivalent to ten times the man's annual salary. An additional clause would tax couples the equivalent of five-times their combined annual income if they divorce within three years of marriage could further discourage foreign marriage.

¹⁰⁵ "Sex Ratio," Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, last modified August 7, 2011. Accessed August 15, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2018.html>.

Because of this marriage tax scheme, the Chinese government could portray themselves as virtuous protectors of Chinese women and ardent supporters of the excess males. They could claim the tax scheme is designed to limit cultural pollution from foreign influences, which could be used to align the government with nationalistic forces to forge greater regime legitimacy. In addition, the revenue generated by all three countries from this marriage tax scheme could be used to offset the cost of social programs designed to help China's excess males.

Despite the instant appeal, the success of such a marriage tax would be marginal. In absolute terms, foreign marriages in China have negligible impact on the pool of available Chinese women. The number of foreign marriages represents a very small percentage of the total number of marriages each year in China; for instance, foreign marriages represent only 2,236 of the 128,532 total marriages registered in Shanghai in 2010.¹⁰⁶ The minute increase in the number of available women because of this foreign marriage tax would do little to ease the excess male problem. Some might argue that these women are less likely to marry an excess male because their preference was to marry a foreigner. Others might argue that the vast majority of China's excess males possess neither the wealth nor the social status of a foreigner, therefore less likely to attract these women. If both arguments are correct, a foreign marriage tax would provide no relief for China's excess male problem.

5. State-Sponsored Matchmaking

Japan and Taiwan could also develop a state-sponsored matchmaking service that would strive to find suitable mates for China's excess males. This service could base its operating procedures on Singapore's state-sponsored

¹⁰⁶ "Shanghai Makes Public Statistics on Marriage and Divorce Registrations in 2010," Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau, February 9, 2011, accessed November 23, 2011, <http://www.shmzj.gov.cn/gb/shmzj/node896/node898/node904/userobject1ai27644.html>.

matchmaking service.¹⁰⁷ While Singapore's service provides an effective template from which China, Japan, and Taiwan can build their service, modifications such as abolishing the requirements for both parties to have at least a college degree or minimum annual salaries would need to be made in order to meet China's objectives of placating excess males.

Funded by a partnership between China, Japan, and Taiwan, this state-sponsored matchmaking service could be made available only to men in China who fit the target characteristics of excess males: 1) single, 2) between the ages of 20 and 45, 3) no higher than a high school equivalent education, and 4) an annual income lower than the national average.¹⁰⁸ China could utilize its diplomatic and economic influences throughout the region to enable its matchmaking service's ability to look for potential mates. Many Asian countries could benefit handsomely from friendlier diplomatic and economic relations with China. Southeast Asian countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Laos could provide this program with a source of ethnically compatible single women. The practice of outsourcing mates from Southeast Asian countries is performed by single men in Taiwan and Hong Kong because of higher degrees of financial independence and the dwindling pool of age-appropriate single local females in those two areas.¹⁰⁹

Unfortunately, the number of excess males in Taiwan and Hong Kong are many orders of magnitude smaller than the number in China. Authors Hudson and den Boer's demographic calculations suggest that China will have about 29–33 million excess males aged 15–34 by 2020.¹¹⁰ This number is the biggest impediment to the success of the proposed matchmaking program. A question

¹⁰⁷ "About Social Development Network," last modified June 14, 2011, http://www.lovebyte.org.sg/web/host_p_1main.asp.

¹⁰⁸ Therese Hesketh and Zhu Wei Xing, "Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes and Consequences," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 103 (September 5, 2006): 13273.

¹⁰⁹ Yang and Liu, "Gender Imbalances and the Twisted Marriage Market in Taiwan."

¹¹⁰ Hudson and den Boer, *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, 145.

the program creators would need to answer is whether Southeast Asia can provide sufficient numbers of single females to satisfy the demand from China's excess males. A preliminary calculation based on the population numbers and sex ratios of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Indonesia suggests that there are only about 1.7 million excess females, which is 17–19 times smaller than the number of excess males in China.¹¹¹ Even if all of these excess females were successfully paired with an excess male counterpart from China, China would still possess an overwhelming sex imbalance problem. Broadening the search for single females beyond Southeast Asia could increase the pool of available women for the matchmaking program. This approach could present many cultural and racial issues that even the most desperate of China's excess males might not be willing to compromise. Conversely, single women from areas outside of Southeast Asia might have similar apprehensions about marrying these excess males. While this matchmaking program could provide monetary compensation to both parties as a way to bridge any cultural and racial divide, the social stigma of marrying someone who is not Chinese (or even Asian) could be too much of a barrier for these excess males.

6. Testosterone Reduction

Given that a state-sponsored matchmaking service might not be feasible because of the sheer numbers of excess males in China, a different approach would be needed. A better option for China, Japan, and Taiwan might be to co-develop a program that decreases the overall levels of testosterone in China's excess male population instead of trying to find wives for them. Many scientific studies have shown a causal link between high testosterone levels and

¹¹¹ "The World Factbook," last modified October 2, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>. The total number of excess females in each of the countries listed above is calculated with the equation: ***Total Females ÷ (Males Sex Ratio + 1)***. The population data for each country is gathered from the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook website.

aggression.¹¹² By reducing the overall testosterone levels in China's excess males, the corresponding decrease in aggressive behavior could mitigate the chances of a violent uprising against the CCP.

As with the state-sponsored matchmaking service proposed above, Japan, Taiwan, and China could fund this "pacification" program that exclusively targets these excess males. This program could adopt a two-pronged approach to reducing the levels of testosterone: 1) castrate imprisoned males and 2) administer estrogen hormones to non-imprisoned males on a voluntary basis. Targeting imprisoned men would be a logical choice to reduce the number of excess males for the first part of the program. According to the International Centre for Prison Studies at the University of Essex, China has an estimated 1.65 million incarcerated men.¹¹³ Even though these men only account for about five percent of the excess males, their criminal actions make them a threat to society and the government. Mandatory castration of prisoners would reduce testosterone levels among these men, serve as punishment for crimes committed, and act as a deterrent for criminal activities.

The second prong of the program could be an initiative that voluntarily castrates excess males in exchange for monetary compensation and benefits. The program would focus its efforts on the excess male population between the ages of 20 and 45, but it could be potentially opened to all single men in China. For the duration of their contract, these volunteers would agree to a form of chemical castration that lowers their testosterone levels. Prostate cancer medication such as luteinizing hormone-releasing hormone (LH-RH) agonists that prevent the testicles from receiving signals to make testosterone could be

¹¹² John Archer, "Testosterone and human aggression: an evaluation of the challenge hypothesis," *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Review* 30 (2006): 340; and Jordan W. Finkelstein et al, "Estrogen or Testosterone Increases Self-Reported Aggressive Behaviors in Hypogonadal Adolescents," *The Journal of Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism* 82 (1997): 2436.

¹¹³ "World Prison Brief – China," International Centre for Prison Studies, accessed October 9, 2011, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=91.

administered regularly to these volunteers until they reach fifty years old.¹¹⁴ Studies have shown that this medication can achieve levels of testosterone similar to those achieved with orchiectomy (removal of the testicles).¹¹⁵ In order to compensate for the potential side effects of chemical castration, a monetary compensation could be paid along with state-provided medical care. The Chinese government could levy heavy fines or even impose prison sentences for volunteers who violated or prematurely terminates their contracts.

However, some people might interpret the implementation of this “pacification” program as a clear violation of human rights. They could argue that denying China’s excess males the opportunity to procreate and live life as a whole person contravenes the basic nature of being human. While such appeals might garner support and sympathy among Western human rights activists, China would likely ignore the international outcry about its human rights abuses and continue with the program. The success of this “pacification” program would be of great importance to the future of China, Japan, and Taiwan and the survival of the CCP.

7. UN Peacekeeping

Instead of trying to reduce the levels of testosterone in China’s excess males, another option would be to harness this aggression for a global good. China, with assistance from Japan and Taiwan, could develop a security force comprised solely of its excess males. This security force would be funded by Japan and Taiwan and assigned to the United Nations as a permanent military force. Commanded by a permanent member nation in the United Nation Security Council such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, or Russia, this security force could be permanent replacements for UN peacekeeping forces

¹¹⁴ G. Tolis, D. Ackman, et al, “Tumor growth inhibition in patients with prostatic carcinoma treated with luteinizing hormone-releasing hormone agonists,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 79 (March 1982): 1661.

¹¹⁵ Michael K. Brawer, “Challenges with Luteinizing Hormone-Releasing Hormone Agonists: Flare and Surge,” *Reviews in Urology* 6 (2004): S17.

throughout the world. China's excess males would volunteer to join the security force and commit to five years of service. The size of the security force could be as large as 300,000 if only 1 percent of the estimated 30 million excess males in China serve.¹¹⁶ They could receive 20–25 percent higher salaries than the average People's Liberation Army recruit in order to attract greater participation and retention.

This collaboration would be advantageous for all parties. The United Nations gets greater legitimacy as an arbitrator of peace and stability. Japan gets greater involvement in international security without committing its military forces or violating Article Nine of its constitution. Taiwan gets greater international identity and visibility without antagonizing China. China gets greater international recognition as a responsible power by providing the manpower to put towards world peace; it also gets gainful employment of its excess males. There is a potential that the number of excess males would be reduced because of the security force operating in hostile areas. While the loss of lives would be regrettable, China would ultimately see this development as an acceptable means to rid itself of a social problem.

D. CONCLUSION

This thesis research yields three conclusions. First, these excess males may have a significant impact on the stability of China's foreign relations with Japan and Taiwan. Serviceable relations will maintain the status quo and minimize agitation. If relations worsen, nationalistic sentiments in China will provoke extreme responses from these excess males. Since these males possess greater aggressive and violent tendencies, anti-Japanese and anti-Taiwan protests in China would quickly escalate into chaos. Secondly, China's excess males are an indirect threat to the national security of Japan and Taiwan. In an attempt to pacify the possible mass civil unrest created by these excess

¹¹⁶ Mina Chang, "Tipping the Scale: Gender Imbalance in China," *Harvard International Review* 30 (2008): 11.

males, Beijing could pursue military measures against Japan and Taiwan to ensure regime survival. The purpose would be to divert these males' attention away from the CCP and onto a common enemy who is either perpetuating historical grievances or advocating formal independence. Lastly, these excess males trap China between two bad choices. On the one hand, choosing inaction against Japan or Taiwan would doom China to widespread social unrest and possible regime collapse. On the other hand, choosing military action against Japan or Taiwan could lead to defeat, in which case regime collapse is highly likely. It would be imperative that China wages total war to increase the probability of victory. However, the potential cost of this victory could be economically and politically devastating to Japan, Taiwan, and China.

Despite the gloomy forecast for China-Japan and China-Taiwan security relations, China's excess males do present an opportunity for greater regional cooperation. Japanese and Taiwanese collaboration with China could mitigate the problem, improve Japan and Taiwan's public image with the Chinese public, strengthen bilateral relations, and enhance regional stability. The preemptive options presented above to mitigate the potentially devastating effects of China's excess males represent a small sampling of the possible courses of action. The interchangeability of the options gives China, Japan, and Taiwan flexibility in implementing mitigation programs that satisfies all parties. While war might seem like the most logical option to reduce the number of China's excess males, the potential destruction could render any gained benefit useless to the participants. The other options are not without issues, but they are beneficial for the entire region by offering a more positive approach. The success of this collaboration will depend on how determined each country is to solve this excess male problem. Japan and Taiwan can ill-afford to standby and be idle when engaging China's excess male problem could improve relations with China and create lasting stability.

While some might object to the engagement methods suggested, this author believes that a certain degree of moral ambiguity is necessary to manage China's excess males aggressively, efficiently, and effectively.

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