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## Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion

Kelly M. Greenhill<sup>[1]</sup>

Coercion is generally understood to refer to the practice of inducing or preventing changes in political behavior through the use of threats, intimidation, or some other form of pressure—most commonly, military force. This article focuses on a very particular nonmilitary method of applying coercive pressure—the use of migration and refugee crises as instruments of persuasion. Conventional wisdom suggests this kind of coercion is rare at best.<sup>[2]</sup> Traditional international relations theory avers that it should rarely succeed. In fact, given the asymmetry in capabilities that tends to exist between would be coercers and their generally more powerful targets, it should rarely even be attempted.<sup>[3]</sup> However, as this article demonstrates, not only is this kind of coercion attempted far more frequently than the accepted wisdom would suggest but that it also tends to succeed far more often than capabilities-based theories would predict.

The article is organized as follows: I begin by outlining the logic behind the coercive use of purposefully created migration and refugee crises and discuss its relative—if under-recognized—prevalence.<sup>[4]</sup> In the second section, I briefly describe the kind of actors who resort to the use of this unconventional weapon as well as highlight the diverse array of objectives sought by those who employ it. I also show that this kind of coercion has proven relatively successful, at least as compared to more traditional methods of persuasion, particularly against (generally more powerful) liberal democratic targets. In the third section, I propose an explanation for why democracies appear to have been most frequently (and most successfully) targeted. I also advance my broader theory about the nature of migration-driven coercion, including how, why, and under what conditions it can prove efficacious. I conclude with a brief discussion of broader implications and further applications of the theory.

### Defining, Measuring, and Identifying Coercive Engineered Migration

*Coercive engineered migrations* (or *coercion-driven migrations*) are “those cross-border population movements that are deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political, military and/or economic concessions from a target state or states.”<sup>[5]</sup> The instruments employed to affect this kind of coercion are myriad and diverse. They run the gamut from compulsory to permissive, from the employment of hostile threats and the use of military force (as were used during the 1967-1970 Biafran and 1992-1995 Bosnian civil wars) through the offer of positive inducements and provision of financial incentives (as were offered to North Vietnamese by the United States in 1954-1955, following the First Indochina War) to the straightforward opening of normally sealed borders (as was done by President Erich Honecker of East Germany in the early

1980s).[6]

Coercive engineered migration is frequently, but not always, undertaken in the context of population outflows strategically generated for other reasons. In fact, it represents just one subset of a broader class of events that all rely on the creation and exploitation of such crises as means to political and military ends—a phenomenon I call strategic engineered migration.[7] Coercive engineered migration is often embedded within mass migrations strategically engineered for dispossessive, exportive, or militarized reasons. It is likely, at least in part as a consequence of its embedded and often camouflaged nature, that its prevalence has also been generally under-recognized and its significance, underappreciated. Indeed, it is a phenomenon that for many observers has been hiding in plain sight. For instance, it is widely known that in 1972 Idi Amin expelled most Asians from Uganda in what has been commonly interpreted as a naked attempt at economic asset expropriation.[8] Far less well understood, however, is the fact that approximately 50,000 of those expelled were British passport-holders, and that these expulsions happened at the same time that Amin was trying to convince the British to halt their drawdown of military assistance to his country. In short, Amin announced his intention to foist 50,000 refugees on the British, but did so with a convenient ninety-day grace period to give the British an opportunity to rescind their decision regarding aid.[9] And Amin was far from unique.

### Measuring Incidence

In fact, well over forty groups of displaced people have been used as pawns in at least fifty-six discrete attempts at coercive engineered migration since the advent of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention alone. An additional eight cases are suggestive but inconclusive or “indeterminate.”[10] (See [Table 1](#)) Employment of this kind of coercion predates the post-World War II era.[11] However, I focus on the post-1951 period because it was only after World War II—and particularly after ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention—that international rules and norms regarding the protection of those fleeing violence and persecution were codified.[12] It was likewise only then that migration and refugees “became a question of high politics” and that, for reasons discussed later in this article, the potential efficacy of this unconventional strategy really began to blossom.[13]

To put the prevalence of coercive engineered migration in perspective, at a rate of at least 1.0 cases/year (between 1951 and 2006), it is significantly less common than interstate territorial disputes (approximately 4.82 cases/year). But, at the same time, it appears to be markedly more prevalent than both intrastate wars (approximately 0.68 cases/year) and extended intermediate deterrence crises (approximately 0.58/year). At a minimum, this suggests that the conventional wisdom about the relative infrequency of coercive engineered migration (my operative null hypothesis) requires reconsideration. More ambitiously, it suggests that what we think we know about the size and nature of the policy toolbox available to, and used by, state and non-state actors may too require reconsideration. A failure to appreciate the relative pervasiveness of a frequently employed policy weapon can actively impede the ability of both scholars and policymakers to understand, combat, and respond to potential threats, as well as to protect those

victimized by its use.

The imperative to pay greater attention to this phenomenon is underlined by the recognition that the actual number of cases since 1951 may in fact be larger than the fifty-six to sixty-four I have heretofore identified. In addition to the aforementioned fact that this kind of coercion is sometimes embedded within outflows also engineered for other reasons, identification of cases tends to be further impeded by two other mutually reinforcing tendencies. On one side of the equation, states that have been successfully targeted in the past are often reluctant to advertise that fact, even within their own foreign policy establishments. Consider, for instance, that the now infamous 1980 Mariel boatlift had been underway for close to ten days before Victor Palmieri, then U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs, discovered that 1980 was not the first time Cuban President Fidel Castro had attempted to use a mass migration to force concessions by the United States; nor, moreover, did it prove to be the last.<sup>[14]</sup>

Failing to share such critical information can prove highly problematic in the context of crisis decision-making. Nevertheless, such reticence is not wholly surprising. Not only may publicizing past vulnerabilities make a target more susceptible to future predation, but it may also heighten the political costs to be paid within the state's own polity. After all, what leader wants to voluntarily admit having been forced to offer concessions to actors who are commonly portrayed in the media and public fora not as formidable adversaries but, rather, as pathetic foes worthy of derision—for instance, a “tin-pot dictator” like Fidel Castro or an “obsequious” “tyrant” like Erich Honecker?<sup>[15]</sup> On the other side of the equation, some would-be coercers issue their threats and demands only privately. For virtually every obvious challenger, such as Belarussian President Lukashenko, who in 2002 and 2004 publicly proclaimed that, “if the Europeans don't pay, we will not protect Europe from these flows,”<sup>[16]</sup> one can identify a far less visible counterexample. After the Six Day War, for instance, King Hussein of Jordan privately made clear to U.S. diplomats that it was well within his power to turn the ongoing Palestinian refugee crisis into a major embarrassment for both the United States and Israel if the United States failed to exert sufficient diplomatic pressure on the Israelis to take back those displaced by the war—a case I discovered simply by chance while in the archives perusing previously classified documents on Vietnam.<sup>[17]</sup> To go from the particular to the general, one can only wonder how many other such cases might remain unrecognized. In short, irrespective of whether coercion succeeds or fails, cases in which threats were issued only privately can be difficult to identify.

Moreover, issued threats may be not only private but also conspicuously ambiguous. Consider, for example, the suggestive reply of then Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to U.S. President Jimmy Carter during their historic 1979 meeting. After Carter asserted that the United States could not trade freely with China until its record on human rights improved and Chinese were allowed to emigrate freely, Deng smilingly retorted, “Okay. Well then, exactly how many Chinese would you like, Mr. President? One million? Ten million? Thirty million?”<sup>[18]</sup> Whether Deng actually intended to influence U.S. behavior remains unclear, but, in point of fact, his rejoinder reportedly stopped Carter cold and summarily ended their discussion of human rights in China. <sup>[19]</sup> The ambiguity of intent inherent in the Carter-Deng exchange—coupled with the

fact that the migration crisis in question was merely hypothetical—effectively excludes it (and all similarly murky events) from inclusion in my database of cases. Nevertheless, as I illustrate in the next section, even excluding all such cases, there has still been on average *at least one* attempt at coercive engineered migration per year since the Refugee Convention came into force.<sup>[20]</sup> In short, whether publicly announced or privately implied, by threatening (or actually creating or catalyzing) migration crises oneself, or by pleading an inability or unwillingness to control crises generated by others, if conditions are right, these unnatural disasters can be effectively exploited and manipulated in ways that allow a variety of would-be coercers to extract political and economic concessions from their targets.

### **Types of Coercers, Their Objectives and Rates of Success**

Coercive engineered migration can be exercised by three distinct types of challengers: generators, *agents provocateurs*, and opportunists. Generators directly create or threaten to create cross-border population movements unless targets concede to their demands. *Agents provocateurs* by contrast do not create crises directly, but rather deliberately act in ways designed to incite others to generate outflows. Many see themselves as engaging in a kind of altruistic Machiavellianism, whereby the ends (e.g., autonomy, independence, or the restoration of democracy) justify the employment of these rather unconventional means. Finally, opportunists play no direct role in the creation of migration crises, but simply exploit for their own gain the existence of outflows generated or catalyzed by others. So, when these would-be coercers—be they opportunists, generators, or *agents provocateurs*—employ coercive engineered migration, what do they seek, and how effective have past attempts been in helping these challengers achieve their aims?

Just as is the case with traditional military coercion, the demands of challengers who engage in migration-driven coercion have been highly varied in scope, content, and magnitude. Demands have been both concrete and symbolic and have comprised entreaties both to undertake actions and to cease undertaking them. They have run the gamut from the simple provision of financial aid to the termination of insurgent funding to full-scale military intervention and even regime change (see [Table 1](#)). And, despite the fact that the majority of challengers have been markedly weaker than their targets (in 54/64 total possible cases, and 49/56 determinate cases), they have been relatively successful; in fact, they have been more successful than their more powerful counterparts.

*Success* in this context is defined as persuading a target to change a previously articulated policy, stop or reverse an action already undertaken, or disburse side payments, in line with a challenger's demands; in other words, most of a challenger's demands were met. A case is coded as a "Success" if the challenger achieved most or all of its known objectives and as a "Partial Success" if the challenger achieved a significant fraction, but not all, of its aims. A case is coded as a "Failure" if the challenger achieved few or none of its objectives, or achieved its objectives for what appear to be exogenous reasons. Finally, a case is coded as "Indeterminate" if (1) the challenger achieved at least some of its objectives but causality is unclear; (2) there is

insufficient evidence to conclude that coercion was in the end actually attempted; or (3) threats were issued but a crisis never materialized, and it remains unclear, as of this writing, whether the challenger's demands were met. (Indeterminate cases are excluded from aggregate assessments of coercive success and failure.)

**Table 1: Challengers' Objectives, Relative Strengths and Coercive Outcomes\***

Year	Challenger/Coercer	(Principal) Target(s)	Principal Objective(s)	Outcome?
1953	West Germany (O)	United States	Financial aid, political support	Partial Success
1954-55	S. Vietnam & the US (G)	North Vietnam	Defer/cancel reunification elections	Failure
1954-60	Algerian insurgents (AP)	French allies, esp. the United States	Convince allies to pressure France to relinquish Algeria; political-military intervention	Partial Success
1956	Austria (O)	United States	Aid and resettlement	Success
1961	United States (AP/O)	Soviet Union	Deterrence re: Berlin	Indeterminate
1965	Cuba (G)	United States	Regularized immigration	Partial Success
1967-70	Biafran insurgents (G)	United States	Aid; intervention; political and diplomatic support	Partial Success
1967	Israel (G)	Jordan	Bilateral negotiations/peace talks	Indeterminate
1967	Jordan (O)	United States	Pressure Israel re: Palestinian return	SR Success; LR Failure**
1971	Pakistan (G)	India	Cease support for Bengali rebels	Failure
1972	Uganda (G)	United Kingdom	Rescind decision re: military assistance	Failure
1978-82	Bangladesh (G/O)	Burma	Halt outflow of Burmese Muslims	Success
1978-82	ASEAN, Hong Kong (O)	Western great powers, esp. the US	Resettlement and financial aid	Success
1979	Vietnam (G/O)	EC, US	Aid, diplomatic recognition, credit	Indeterminate
1979-80s	Thailand (O)	United States; China	An alliance; political-military support	Success
1979-81	Haiti (G)	United States	Financial and military aid	Success
1979-81	NGO activists	United States; Haiti	End support for regime; undermine it	Failure
1980s	Pakistan (O)	United States	Alliance; political-military support	Success
1979-80s	Soviet Union (G)	Pakistan	Cease support for insurgents	Failure
1979-80s	Exiled insurgents (O)	Pakistan	Control over peace settlement	Success
1980	Cuba (G)	United States	End hijacking; normalize migration, etc.	Partial Success
1981-82	Austria (O)	W. Europe; United States	Refugee resettlement and aid	Success
1982	Thailand (O)	United States; France	Financial aid	Success
early 80s	Honduras (O)	United States	Military aid, training; security pact	Success
80s-1997	Bangladesh (G)	India	End Shanti Bahini (insurgent) funding	Indeterminate
1983-86	East Germany (AP)	West Germany	Aid; tech assistance; border fixity	Success
1984-85	East Germany (AP)	Sweden	Financial aid	Success
1985	Libya (G)	TEM***	Shift diplomatic alliances/positions	Indeterminate
late 80s	Hong Kong, ASEAN (O)	US; W. Europe	Aid and resettlement	Success
1989-90s	Vietnam (O)	EC, United States	Political-diplomatic recognition; aid	Success

1989-92	Bangladesh (G)	Burma	Halt outflow of Burmese Muslims	Success
1990-92	Saudi Arabia (G)	Yemen	Change position on Gulf War/Iraq	Failure
1990s-	Israel (AP/O)	Palestinians	Relinquish claims on Jerusalem	Failure (so far)
1991-92	United States (O)	Israel	Stop settlements in Occupied Territories	Partial Success
1990-91	Albania (G)	Italy	Food aid, financial credits & other assist.	Success
1991	Albania (G)	Italy, EC	Financial aid	Success
1990-94	Albania (G)	Greece	Financial aid	Success
1991	Poland (G,AP)	EC, United States	Debt relief; financial aid	Indeterminate
1990	Ethiopia (G)	Israel	Monetary payoff	Success
1991	Turkey (O)	United States	Humanitarian-military intervention	Success
1992-94	Jean-Bertrand Aristide (AP)	United States	Return to power; US military intervention	Success
1992-95	Bosniaks (G/AP)	UN Security Council	Troop presence; air evacuation	Partial Success
1994	Poland (O)	Germany	Monetary payoff	Success
1994	Cuba (G)	United States	Regularized immigration, etc.	Success
mid 90s	Zaire (O)	Largely US, France, and Belgium	Political-diplomatic recognition, aid	Success
1995	Libya (AP/O)	Egypt	Lifting of sanctions; shift in policy towards Palestinians	Failure
mid 90s	North Korea (G)	China	Financial aid, political support	Success
1997	Albania (G)	Italy	Military intervention	Success
1998	Turkey (G)	Italy	Support/Punishment re: EU bid	Indeterminate
1998-99	Kosovar Albanians (AP)	NATO	Military aid, intervention	Success
1998-99	FRY (G)	NATO, esp. Germany, Greece and Italy	Deterrence, then compellence	Failure
1998-99	Macedonia I (O)	NATO	Financial aid	Success
1999	Macedonia II (O)	NATO	Financial aid	Success
2001-03	Nauru (O)	Australia	Financial aid	Success
2002	Belarus (AP)	EU	Diplomatic recognition; aid	Failure
2002-05	Activists/NGO network (AP)	China	Policy shift on NK; regime collapse	Failure
2002-05	Activists/NGO network (AP)	South Korea	Same as above	Failure
2002-06+	North Korea (NK) (G)	China	Continued diplomatic support & aid	Success
2004	Nauru (O)	Australia	Financial aid	Success
2004	Haiti (G)	United States	Military assistance	Failure
2004	Belarus (AP)	EU	Financial aid	Failure
2004	Libya (AP)	EU	Lifting of sanctions	Success
2004-05	Chad (G)	UN Security Council	Military/political intervention	Indeterminate
2006	Libya (AP/O)	EU	Financial aid	Partial Success

Challenger (and Type) (Generator (G), *Agent(s) Provocateurs* (AP), Opportunist (O)];\* Where discernable, the more powerful actor (challenger v. target) is shown in grey; \*\* SR=short run, LR=long run; \*\*\*Tunisia, Egypt and Mauritania

In the fifty-six determinate cases, challengers achieved at least some of their objectives approximately 73 percent of the time (in forty-one cases). If one imposes a stricter measure of success and excludes partial successes, coercers got more or less everything they reportedly sought 57 percent of the time (in thirty-two cases). Although rather more modest, this more



restrictive rate is comparable to some of the best-case estimates of deterrence success (also 57 percent) and substantially greater than best estimates of the success of economic sanctions (approximately 33 percent) or U.S. coercive diplomacy efforts (between 19 and 37.5 percent).[21] As [Table 1](#) also intimates, this kind of coercion has been attempted in all types of crises—humanitarian disasters, low-intensity conflicts, and full-scale wars—as well as in cases in which crises have been latent or only threatened.

This discussion notwithstanding, one might still conclude that selection effects-related issues mean that this kind of coercion is still a pretty poor method of persuasion, undertaken only by highly resolved challengers and only when they believe there is a relatively high probability of success.[22] To be sure, for a variety of reasons, coercive engineered migration is a blunt instrument that is rarely a weapon of first resort. First, challengers may ultimately catalyze larger crises than they anticipate or desire, and massive outflows can destabilize both states of origin and destination.[23] Fears of just such a collapse, for instance, led to the construction of the Berlin Wall in the early 1960s.[24]

Second, once crises have been initiated, challengers often lose (some degree of) control over them, in no small part because engineered migration-related “cleansing” operations may be carried out by irregulars, or even bands of thugs, who lack discipline and whose objectives may not be synonymous with those who instigated the outflows.[25] Likewise, once migrants and refugees find themselves outside their states of origin, they are often capable of autonomous actions—they might move in different directions and do so in smaller or larger numbers than challengers desire. When this happens, outflows can become more like unguided missiles than smart bombs, making coercing particular targets more difficult.

Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, “the ideal compellent action would be one that, once initiated, causes minimal harm if compliance is forthcoming and great harm if compliance is not forthcoming.”[26] Nevertheless, although migration and refugee movements, once initiated, can be stopped, under certain conditions they can be difficult to undo. As such, threats of further escalation can be quite persuasive, but promises of minimal harm in the face of compliance can be difficult to keep, thereby potentially reducing the value of concession for targets. Indeed, evidence suggests that both China and South Korea viewed concession to the activists trying to compel them to embrace and admit North Korean migrants as likely to stimulate *greater* future harm by encouraging more individuals to follow in their footsteps. Not surprisingly, coercion in this case failed.[27]

Fourth, the potential for blowback can be great and the intended consequences quite costly. For instance, not only did the U.S.-instigated mass migration of North Vietnamese southward following the First Indochina War fail to achieve its stated objective of deterring Ho Chi Minh from pushing for reunification elections, but it also inadvertently further weakened the sitting regime in South Vietnam while simultaneously increasing the U.S. commitment to propping it up.[28] And although Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire benefited significantly from the concessions he was granted in exchange for his agreement to host Rwandan refugees in the mid-1990s, the



decision to allow said refugees to use the camps as bases to launch attacks back across the border provoked enough ire within Rwanda that its government helped engineer his ouster.[29]

Nevertheless, given its apparent success rate of 57-73 percent, for highly committed actors with few other options coercive engineered migration can still appear to be a strategy worth pursuing. This is particularly true for challengers seeking to influence the behavior of potentially vulnerable targets disinclined to accede to their demands under normal circumstances—powerful advanced liberal democracies. From the perspective of traditional international relations theory, this in and of itself represents something of a puzzle. Weak actors should only rarely challenge more powerful ones. So what makes the world’s most powerful democracies such attractive marks? Why should they—particularly, the United States—be most often and most successfully targeted? And, more generally, how and why does using human beings as coercive weapons ever work?

### **How, When, and Why Does It Succeed and Fail?**

Coercers typically employ a variety of overlapping mechanisms when trying to manipulate the decision making of their targets, including the following five most common mechanisms: (1) power-base erosion—threatening a regime’s relationship with its core supporters; (2) unrest—creating popular dissatisfaction with a regime; (3) decapitation—jeopardizing the regime leadership’s personal security; (4) weakening—debilitating a country as a whole; and (5) denial—preventing battlefield success (or political victories via military aggression).[30]

Because coercive engineered migration relies on nonmilitary means of persuasion, the mechanisms of decapitation and denial are for all intents and purposes off the table. But such is not the case for power-base erosion, unrest, and weakening. Each of these mechanisms relies to varying degrees on affecting the behavior of a target’s leadership by manipulating the opinions and attitudes of its civilian population. The success of each in turn is predicated on the effective manipulation of the costs or risks imposed on that same population. In other words, operationally speaking, these three mechanisms rely on what are commonly known as coercion by punishment strategies. Challengers aim to create domestic conflict or public dissatisfaction within a target state in an attempt to convince its leadership to concede to the demands of the challenger rather than incur the anticipated (domestic and/or international) political costs of resistance. In short, challengers try to inflict costs on the population that are higher than the stakes in dispute.[31]

There are two distinct, but non-mutually exclusive, pathways by which migration-driven coercion can be effected using punishment strategies; loosely speaking, they might be thought of as “capacity swamping” and “political agitating.” Simply put, capacity swamping focuses on manipulating the *ability* of targets to accept/accommodate/assimilate a given group of migrants or refugees, whereas political agitating focuses on the manipulating the *willingness* of targets to do so. In both swamping and agitating, coercion is effectively a dynamic two-level game, in which the responses of the target on the international level to threats issued or actions taken by challenger tend to be driven by simultaneous (or subsequent) actions taken by actors within the target state.[32]

Thus, as Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman suggest, “although there is obvious analytic appeal to treating coercion as singular and discrete events that follow a straightforward, linear logic,” coercive engineered migration is more appropriately viewed as “series of moves and countermoves in which each side acts not only based on and in anticipation of the other side’s moves, but also based on other changes” in the prevailing environment.[33] Somewhat paradoxically, evidence suggests the objective dangers posed to targets tend to be greater in the case of swamping but that the probability of coercive success tends to be greater in the case of agitating.

In the developing world, coercive attempts most often focus on swamping and comprise threats to severely tax or overwhelm a target’s physical and/or economic capacity to cope with an influx—thereby effectively debilitating it—if it fails to concede to the coercer’s demands.[34] As previously suggested, although weakening is the primary coercive mechanism in play, such cases often also rely to some degree on the mechanisms of power-base erosion and/or general unrest. In locations where ethnic tensions may already be elevated, where the extension of central government control may be compromised even at the best of times, and where essential resources are limited and consensus on the legitimacy of the political regime is shaky at best, a large influx can present a real and persuasive threat.[35] Such was the case in late 1990, for instance, when Saudi Arabia expelled over 650,000 Yemenis in an attempt to compel the government of Yemen to rethink its “Saddam Hussein-friendly position” and policies in the lead-up to (and during) the First Gulf War.[36] Because Yemeni citizens were highly dependent on remittances from guestworkers employed in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis believed the expulsions would engender sufficient dissatisfaction within the Yemeni population to impel them to pressure their government to shift allegiance.[37]

Capacity swamping can also be an effective strategy in the West. This is particularly true if the incipient crisis is large and sudden, because even highly industrialized states need time to gear up to effectively deal with disasters, be they natural or manufactured.[38] That said, advanced industrial societies tend to have greater resources to bring to bear in a crisis, making threats to fundamentally overwhelm their physical ability to cope harder—although far from impossible—to accomplish. Furthermore, whereas in most cases migration-driven coercion consists of threats to initiate an outflow unless the coercer is assuaged, in the developed world threats not to allow people to leave may also be successfully employed. Under such conditions, however, capacity swamping is obviously a moot point.[39]

In the developed world, therefore, political agitating often supplants capacity swamping as the lynchpin of this kind of coercion. Specifically, challengers on the international level seek to influence target behavior on the domestic level by engaging in a kind of norms-enhanced political blackmail that relies on exploiting and exacerbating what Robert Putnam has called the “heterogeneity” of political and social interests within polities.[40] Exploitation of heterogeneity within Western states is possible because population influxes, such as those created in migration and refugee crises, tend to engender diverse and highly divisive responses within the societies expected to bear the brunt of their consequences. As Marc Rosenblum puts it: “efforts to bend

immigration policy to the national interest compete with pluralistic policy demands originating at the party, sub-national (local and state), and sector- or class-specific levels.”<sup>[41]</sup> Like immigration and refugee policy more generally, real and threatened migration crises tend to split societies into (at least) two mutually antagonistic and often highly mobilized groups: the pro-refugee/migrant camp and anti-refugee/migrant camp. What it means to be pro- or anti-refugee/migrant varies depending on the target and the crisis. Pro-refugee/migrant camps may call for relatively limited, short-term responses, such as accepting financial responsibility for settling the migrant or refugee group in a third country, or far more significant (even permanent) commitments, such as offering the group asylum or citizenship. On the other side, anti-refugee/migrant groups may demand that requests for financial assistance be rejected or, more radically, that migrants be interdicted, refugees be refused asylum or, in extreme cases, forcibly repatriated. The bottom line is that, because targets cannot simultaneously satisfy demands both to accept and reject a given group of migrants or refugees, leaders facing highly mobilized and highly polarized interests can find themselves on the horns of a real dilemma—whereby it may be impossible to satisfy the demands of one camp without alienating the other.

Thus, it is not heterogeneity per se that make targets vulnerable. Instead, the crux of agitation-based coercion rests on the fact that pro- and anti-camps tend to have mutually incompatible interests—which both camps are highly committed to defending—while at the same time target leaderships may have compelling political, legal, and moral reasons to avoid running afoul of either camp. Under such conditions, leaders may face strong domestic-level incentives to concede to coercers’ international-level demands. This is particularly true in those cases when concession is likely to make a real or threatened migration crisis cease or disappear, thereby freeing the besieged leader from the proverbial trap between a rock and a hard place.

The existence of this two-level dynamic, and the potential vulnerability to which it can give rise, is to a certain extent not particularly surprising. Despite rhetorical pronouncements to the contrary, most Western liberal democracies have long had schizophrenic relationships with migrants and refugees. For instance, as Rogers Smith has noted, aside the liberal tradition of the United States and its self-identification as a “nation of immigrants,” there has been an illiberal tradition of “ascriptive Americanism” that envisions an ethnic core of Protestant Anglo-Saxons that must be protected from “external dilution.”<sup>[42]</sup> In other words, the American “romance with the Statue of Liberty has always been a hot and cold affair.”<sup>[42]</sup>

The situation is not markedly different in either Europe or Asia. Germany, for example, is officially a no-immigration country. Nevertheless, anti-immigration rhetoric has long “been counteracted by extensive rights and protections for foreigners granted by the legal system, . . . [which] tames sovereign state power with a catalogue of universal human rights.”<sup>[44]</sup> Likewise, although less than 2 percent of the Japanese population is made up of foreigners—none of whom are Japanese citizens—the idea of a monoethnic Japan is somewhat farcical given that many Japanese, including the emperor, have Korean roots.<sup>[45]</sup> Nor is this Janus-faced attitude a new phenomenon. For example, as the authors of *Refugees in an Age of Genocide* note, “Of all the groups in the 20th century, refugees from Nazism are now widely and popularly perceived as

‘genuine’, but at the time German, Austrian and Czechoslovakian Jews were treated with ambivalence and outright hostility as well as sympathy.”[46]

Moreover, although there are significant legal and normative distinctions that can be drawn between refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, “Just as in spring 1940, when German Jews were interned on the Isle of Man, British newspapers blurred the distinctions between refugee, alien and enemy, so today, according to Alasdair Mackenzie, coordinator of [UK] Asylum Aid, ‘There’s general confusion in many newspapers between an asylum seeker and someone from abroad—everyone gets tarred with the same brush.’”[47] In point of fact, the burden borne by Western liberal democracies represents but a small share of the world’s total displaced population, yet flows into the West are considered disproportionately threatening relative to their size.[48] Within these states, pundits, politicians, and even some policymakers argue that migrants who are from different religious, linguistic, and ethnic backgrounds than the majority in their newly adopted homelands are a danger to societal security. Popular discourses that draw on traditional nationalistic sentiments and xenophobic assertions, such as Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* and *Who Are We?* and Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy,” assert that current waves of migrants and refugees reduce national living standards by siphoning away social resources from “real” citizens, taking employment away from more qualified applicants, bringing tensions from their home state with them, and committing a disproportionate amount of crime.[49]

### **Resistors and Restrictionists**

Consequently, although most Western states are normatively, if not legally, bound to offer refuge and protection for those fleeing persecution, violence, and, in some cases, privation, at least some segment of most target states’ populations is usually unwilling to bear the real or perceived domestic economic and social costs and security risks of doing so. This resistance offers coercers a potential wedge through which they can inflict pain that can endanger a leader’s relationship with his or her core supporters or even stimulate general unrest within a target state. Indeed, in contrast to most foreign policy issues, refugees and immigration have engaged Western publics like few others, especially in regions that have been host to the largest numbers of illegal migrants and asylum seekers.[50]

In one 2004 survey, 52 percent of Americans polled claimed that the present level of immigration represented a “critical threat to the vital interests of the United States,” and 76 percent favored “restricting immigration as a means of combating terrorism.”[51] In a separate 2008 survey, 61 percent said that “controlling and reducing illegal immigration” should be a very important U.S. foreign policy goal, a larger percentage than believed “maintaining superior military power worldwide” was similarly critical (57 percent).[52] The situation is analogous in Western Europe, where an EU-wide survey uncovered a disturbing level of racism and xenophobia within its member states, with nearly 33 percent of those interviewed openly describing themselves as “quite racist” or “very racist.”[53] More than 71 percent of those interviewed claimed, “There was a limit to the number of people of other races, religions, or

cultures that a society can accept,” and 65 percent of interviewees said that this limit had already been reached in their country.[54] In 2007, Europeans ranked immigration behind only fighting crime as the most important policy issue facing the EU in coming years.[55] Even the historically welcoming Swedes and Dutch have grown more restrictionist. In one 2003 poll, for example, 50 percent of Swedes polled said they were opposed to accepting large numbers of refugees, up from 44 percent in 2001; only 25 percent favored acceptance.[56]

By 2007, a majority said they favored tighter restrictions on immigration as well.[57] In the Netherlands, 48 percent of the country’s immigrants believe there are too many migrants in the country, an opinion shared by 65 percent of native Dutch.[58] These sentiments are echoed throughout much of Asia. A 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 89 percent of Indonesians and Malaysians, 84 percent of Indians, 77 percent of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, and 52 percent of Chinese agreed with the statement, “We should further restrict and control immigration.”[59] Likewise, despite being the subject of repeated rounds of domestic and international opprobrium because of his government’s treatment of would-be asylum seekers, Australian (Liberal Party) Prime Minister John Howard handily won reelection in fall 2004. Howard was eventually voted out of office in fall 2007, but few ascribe this loss to his tough stance on refugees and migrants.[60] In neighboring New Zealand, the (Labor Party) prime minister was able to retain power in October 2005 only *after* agreeing to name a politician who was openly hostile to refugees and migrants to the position of foreign minister.[61]

As Oliver Cromwell Cox sums it up, the “true democratic principle” is that the people “shall not be made to do what [they do] not like.’ . . . It is only necessary that the dominant group believes in the menace of the cultural tenets and practices of the other group; whether or not they are actually harmful or not is not the crucial circumstance.”[62] Thus, whether refugees and migrants represent a real threat is beside the point; if they are *perceived* as fundamentally threatening to their security, culture, or livelihood, anxious and motivated individuals and groups will mobilize to oppose their acceptance.[62]

Depending on the location, composition, and magnitude of any given mass migration as well as, to a limited extent, the stage of the business cycle, the size and nature of the objecting group(s) will change. In general, the most vociferous opposition tends to follow an Olsonian logic—that is, groups that feel threatened by the (anticipated) magnitude, speed, or endurance of an inflow and anticipate having to bear concentrated costs associated with said inflow will be strongly motivated to raise vocal objections to accepting, assimilating, or simply shouldering the burdens associated with the migrants or refugees.[64] In contrast to those anticipating more diffuse costs, such individuals and groups will have intensely held interests and strong incentives to mobilize against the refugees or migrants in question. Directly affected populations are frequently joined by nationalistic groups that favor restrictive immigration policies more generally. They tend to represent segments of society that expect to lose some of their social, cultural or political dominance to the group in question. Sometimes, however, these actors are simply political entrepreneurs, trying to cash in on public hostility to immigrants (and thereby derive some personal benefit from opposing their admittance). Indeed, such groups have grown large and



powerful enough within the European Union that they have created a formal caucus, which offers both more political clout and eligibility for EU funding.[65]

Whatever the complexion of the anti-refugee/migrant camp in a given crisis, if rejectionists mobilize against the group in question, pressure is likely to grow for the target's leadership to rebuff the group, close the state's border(s), engage in interdiction and repatriation, or even undertake military action to forestall or stop the outflow at its source. Therefore, *ceteris paribus*, as mobilization increases, so will pressure on the target leadership to take steps to reject or resist accepting responsibility for the relevant migrants or refugees.

That said, although leader(s) within target states may experience moral qualms about adopting rejectionist responses, such responses need pose no significant political problems for said leader(s) if the majority of its population concurs with them.[66] No significant unrest will result, and the leadership's support base will remain intact. Tragically, such was the case for European Jews trying to escape the Nazis by fleeing to the United States during the early part of World War II. Most would-be émigrés were rejected, and for a long time, few Americans objected.[67]

### **Protectors and Promoters**

However, states hostile to migrants or refugees generally do not operate in a vacuum—nor do their leaderships. More commonly in societies marked by heterogeneous and competing interests, while the members of anti-refugee/migrant camps are lobbying for rejection, other equally motivated pro-refugee/migrant groups concomitantly labor to ensure that targets cannot eschew their normative and legal obligations to those seeking refuge from violence, persecution, or privation. As is true of their restrictionist counterparts, the composition, strength, and visibility of pro-refugee/-migrant camps varies from crisis to crisis depending on the race and ethnicity of the refugees/migrants in question and the expected material and/or psychic benefits to be derived from supporting them.[68] Pro-camps tend to be smaller than anti-camps, however, their members also tend to be extremely vocal, publicly savvy, and rhetorically skillful actors such as lawyers and activists. Given their cohesion, focus, and intensely held preferences, pro-refugee/migrant camps may thus make up in political efficacy what they lack in numbers.

More importantly, the relative strength of pro-refugee/migrant camps tends to be bolstered by their members' connections with a variety of domestic and international NGOs and advocacy groups, whose *raison d'être* is the protection and expansion of human rights generally and of migrant and refugee rights more specifically. Since the end of World War II, both refugee advocacy and human rights groups have increasingly joined hands with philanthropic organizations, concerned individuals, churches, concerned ethnic lobbies, and others to create transnational human rights networks that span the globe. As the Irish rock star and activist Bono has observed, "The administration isn't afraid of rock stars and activists—they are used to us. But they are nervous of soccer moms and church folk. Now when soccer moms and church folk start hanging around with rock stars and activists, then they really start paying attention." [69] Although these networks have been growing in strength since the signing of the 1948 Universal

Declaration on Human Rights, they really began to blossom after 1961—with the founding of Amnesty International—and to proliferate, diversify, and grow in robustness after 1970.<sup>[70]</sup> Indeed, the number of human rights-related NGOs doubled between 1973 and 1983, and many of these organizations have been growing in size and efficacy ever since, in no small part due to an enhanced ability to identify causes with “well-institutionalized international norms.”<sup>[71]</sup>

These networks and their allies—members of the media, academia, legislature, and ethnic and political interest groups—rely on two factors in particular to exercise domestic influence over leaders in support of international norms.<sup>[72]</sup> The first is leaders’ desires to remain popular, either due to short-term electoral considerations or because of longer-term concerns about how they will appear in the context of history. The second is policy legitimacy.<sup>[73]</sup> Policies that prescribe strategies or tactics that violate norms can threaten policy legitimacy and thereby severely limit support for those policies in the legislature or parliament, in the media, or in the public at large.<sup>[74]</sup> Although the nature and scope of migration-related legal and normative commitments vary across states, generally speaking the human rights regime has put two major limits on state discretion as it pertains to policy legitimacy: the right of asylum and the principle of racial nondiscrimination, both of which have matured into customary international law that is binding on states.<sup>[75]</sup>

The most broadly recognized manifestations of these norms can be found in the 1948 Human Rights Declaration, the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.<sup>[76]</sup> As legal scholar David Martin put it, “Before the development of these international instruments, opponents of a government practice might have been able to argue only that the measure was a bad idea. Since the adoption of such statements, those opponents are often able to wield a more powerful weapon in the debate, for they may then claim the government practice is not merely bad policy but rather violates international law.”<sup>[77]</sup> The need for legitimacy, particularly when coupled with a desire to remain popular or get reelected, can create a conduit from norms to norms-adherent behavior. <sup>[78]</sup>

As mobilization within a pro-refugee/migrant camp grows, targets will be placed under greater pressure to admit, assimilate, or simply accept responsibility for a given group of refugees or migrants. To be clear, as is true of the converse situation, if a particular group is relatively popular or viewed as innocuous—such as was the case during the first exodus of Cubans to the United States soon after Castro took power in 1959—such pressure may prove unproblematic for a potential target.<sup>[79]</sup> Public opinion may remain generally favorable, making admitting, assimilating, or simply assuming the financial burden for a particular group of migrants or refugees relatively costless. Domestic unrest will not be a significant issue, nor will the target’s power base be threatened.

### **When Rejection Collides with Protection, Vulnerability Results**

But in societies marked by disparate and competing interests and unevenly distributed costs and benefits—material, psychic, or both—associated with mass migrations, situations in which only



one (either the pro- or anti-) camp mobilizes in the face of a crisis will tend to be the exception rather than the rule. This is especially true because of the existence of concomitant splits between elites and the general public. In fact, recent polls suggest that there is no other foreign policy-related issue, including controversial issues such as globalization and the importance of the UN, on which the U.S. public and its elites disagree more profoundly. For example, one Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll found that 59 percent of the U.S. public identified reducing illegal immigration as a “very important” foreign policy goal, compared with only 21 percent of those in the elite.[80] Thus, in the face of an incipient or ongoing crisis, targets will often find themselves facing highly polarized factions with mutually incompatible interests and, thus, facing a fundamental political dilemma.

Challengers who engage in this kind of coercion recognize the existence of these political conundrums and purposefully aim to exploit them for their own political ends; again, this is the crux of the political agitating strategy. In summer 1994, for instance, boats were “being prepared in nearly every village along the southern coast of Haiti” in an explicit attempt to “put more pressure on the US to hasten the return of Aristide.” As one villager noted at the time: “We cannot get arms to fight. . . . *The only way to fight is to get the Americans to keep their promises. The only way to do that is to do what they fear most [have us come to America]*” (author’s emphasis).[81] Likewise, when East German officials quipped in the mid-1980s that their West German counterparts “claim they have a liberal society over there. [We will] let them prove it!,” they fully anticipated that loosing South Asian asylum seekers on West Germany would cause widespread discontent and persuade the previously reluctant West German government to concede to their demands.[82] And they were right.[83]

In fact, would-be coercers often do more than simply exploit extant heterogeneity within target states. They may also aim to increase target vulnerability over time by acting in ways designed to directly or indirectly catalyze greater mobilization, heighten the degree of polarization between groups, and thereby reduce the available policy options open to targets. They may do so by increasing the size, scale, and scope of an existing outflow, shifting its character (e.g., by adding more members of either “undesirable” or particularly sympathetic groups), making escalatory threats, or simply directly lobbying members of pro- and anti- refugee/migrant camps.


In short, challengers aim to influence targets by what is, in traditional coercion, known as *force majeure*, a choice dictated by overwhelming circumstances. Targets, of course, always have a choice, but one that is skewed if they believe the consequences of non-compliance will be a denial of future choice.[84] Thus, coercers seek to narrow a target’s set of domestic policy responses to an outflow—in game theory terms, to narrow the target’s win set—such that concession to their demands begins to appear more attractive, at least as compared to the possibility that the future will hold fewer, still less auspicious choices.[85] This is simply because, with fewer policy options available, the target’s capacity to reconcile internal political conflicts and satisfy competing domestic interests becomes far more circumscribed.[86] As Andrew Mack puts it, costs may “steadily escalate without the ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ becoming more visible. . . . [In which case], the divisions generated within the metropolis

become in themselves one of the political costs for the leadership. . . . Any attempt to resolve one contradiction will magnify the other.”[87] This can create a particularly nettlesome dilemma for a target’s leadership, as well as significantly narrow its room for maneuver.[88] Under such conditions, concession—to avoid general unrest, to avoid powerbase erosion, or to simply make a crisis disappear—can become increasingly appealing, which is of course exactly the coercer’s intent. This is not to suggest that concession in such cases is cost-free, only that in the face of a threatened or mounting crisis the anticipation of future pain and mounting costs has to be weighted against the costs and opportunities associated with ending the crisis now, by conceding to the challenger’s demands.

### **Predicting and Measuring Coercive Success and Failure**

Consequently, targets will be most vulnerable not when their publics and/or elites are unified but rather when there is broad and intense disagreement about the way in which a target should respond to an incipient or ongoing migration crisis. Again, in Olsonian terms, targets will be most vulnerable when a crisis is widely expected to engender both concentrated costs (CC) and concentrated benefits (CB)—albeit by different segments of society—leading to high levels of mobilization both by those in favor of the refugee/migrant group and those opposed to the same group (**Figure 1, Quadrant 4**).[89] Conversely, in cases in which a crisis is anticipated to produce low or diffuse costs (DC) and only diffuse benefits (DB)—and, consequently, neither camp is mobilized and opinion is less polarized—targets will be least vulnerable, and coercion will be least likely to succeed (**Quadrant 2**). Indeed, in most such cases, coercion is unlikely even to be attempted. In cases in which only the pro-refugee/migrant camp is highly mobilized (**Quadrant 1: DC, CB**), target vulnerability will be relatively low because assimilating or accepting the group in question should be relatively easy. Likewise, in cases in which only the anti-refugee/migrant camp is mobilized (**Quadrant 3: CC, DB**), targets should also be relatively less vulnerable because the options of interdiction, border closure, or simple rejection should be easier to implement. That said, vulnerability in Quadrants 1 and 3 will be greater than in **Quadrant 2** because, from those starting points, only one camp’s expectations about the relative size and distribution of costs and benefits needs to shift upward to move the potentially target into **Quadrant 4** (CC, CB).[90]

Figure I: Vulnerability to Coercion



### The Force Multiplier of Hypocrisy Costs

A factor that can further enhance challengers' probability of coercive success is target susceptibility to a special class of political reputational (or audience) costs that I call hypocrisy costs. Political hypocrisy entails the exaggeration by political actors of their state's commitment to morality.<sup>[91]</sup> As I define them, therefore, hypocrisy costs are "symbolic political costs that can be imposed when there exists a real (or perceived) disparity between a professed commitment to liberal values and/or international norms, and demonstrated state actions that contravene such a commitment." Hypocrisy costs are operationalized in a manner akin to what human rights network advocates call "accountability politics," which is to say "once a government has publicly committed itself to a principle. . . networks can use those positions, and their command of information, to expose the distance between discourse and practice. This is embarrassing to many governments, which may try to save face by closing that distance" or by making the gap disappear altogether by ending the crisis through concession.<sup>[92]</sup>

Political scientists and international legal scholars have traditionally focused on the normatively positive potential consequences of accountability politics.<sup>[93]</sup> But hypocrisy-exposing gaps between word and deed can equally well be exploited by actors driven by less benevolent motivations; in fact, the creation of such gaps can even be purposefully instigated or catalyzed by self-serving actors. In the context of this kind of unconventional coercion specifically, having failed to achieve their objectives through traditional channels of influence, challengers may resort to the creation or exploitation of refugee or migration crises. The existence of said crises may encourage targets to behave in norms-violating ways as they attempt to avoid bearing the burdens and incurring costs associated with running afoul of anti-refugee/migrant groups within

their societies.

Then, if normative violations do in fact follow, hypocrisy costs can be imposed by domestic and international pro-refugee/migrant groups seeking to protect those under threat, or even by challengers themselves. For instance, in the middle of the aforementioned attempt by East Germany to coerce West Germany in the mid-1980s, an observer on the western side acknowledged, “As West Germans become angry and start to say rude things about all these black and brown abusers of the right of asylum, it enables West Germany to be depicted as ‘racialist’”—and in violation of its own constitution.[94] Such charges, particularly when coupled with the threat of future and escalating costs, can make concession more attractive, which again is precisely the intent![95]

In other words, would-be coercers can effectively engage—with the (often unintentional) assistance of the pro-refugee/migrant camp—in a kind of norms-aided entrapment, whereby humanitarian norms are used as coercive cudgels by actors with selfish, self-serving motives as well as those with more altruistic aims, often simultaneously.[96] One might usefully conceive of this mechanism as a perverse manifestation of what Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink call a boomerang pattern—but one that operates in reverse of the normatively positive mechanism Keck and Sikkink describe. Instead of costs being imposed by norms-adherent actors on those who routinely violate them, in the case of coercive engineered migration, norms-violating actors seek to impose costs on those who left to their own devices generally aim to adhere to them.[97]

The susceptibility of targets to hypocrisy costs can also be self-inflicted. But why would leaders make rhetorical commitments that could come back to haunt them? One reason is to expand their political options at home. Actors may hope their words will generate votes or offer them other political advantages during a campaign or at some other moment. To quote Michael Ignatieff, academic, activist, and Canadian Liberal Party politician, in the midst of his own attempt to impose hypocrisy costs on the British government:

That is exactly what makes this cooked up indignation about bogus asylum-seekers so absurdly hypocritical. For after manfully attempting to whip up xenophobia against the alien horde of liars and cheats at our gates, both the *Daily Mail* and the Home Secretary piously profess their attachment to our “liberal traditions” in relation to right of asylum. Come off it. Liberalism means something. It commits you to protecting the rights of asylum-seekers to a hearing, legal counsel and a right of appeal. Either you treat asylum-seekers as rights-bearing subjects, or as an alien horde. You can’t have it both ways. When British liberal tradition has [Home Secretary Kenneth] Baker and the *Daily Mail* as its friends, it needs no enemies.[98]

As Ignatieff’s invective suggests, potential targets can make themselves vulnerable by declaring certain groups of (actual or potential) migrants “victims” who are worthy of protection or refuge—for instance, by referring to members of a particular group as refugees whether or not they would appear to fit the legal definition—but then failing to uphold the normative and legal commitments such a normatively exalted designation engenders.[99]

Such norms-enhanced designations may be applied to a broad group for ideological reasons, as was the case when Western leaders promised to welcome all those “fleeing with their feet” from communism during the Cold War, all the while hoping few would come. According to Cheryl Benard, these states very much wanted to “contrast favorably with the communist countries” and to “present life in the West in the best possible light.” On the other hand, they did “not want to encourage more refugees to come” because they “would never be genuinely welcomed.”<sup>[100]</sup> In trying to have it both ways, Western countries routinely placed themselves in rhetorical and normative binds.

These tendencies did not die with the end of the Cold War. Aspiring and incumbent political leaders sometimes also apply normatively privileged designations more narrowly to particular ethnic, religious, or national groups.<sup>[101]</sup> They may do so to broaden their popularity with new segments of their electorates, to shore up their traditional power bases, or—in the midst of active electoral competitions—to draw distinctions between themselves and their competitors, distinctions for which they may be later held to account.

Sometimes actors employ migration-related, normatively enhanced rhetoric with the aim of obtaining not just domestic but also international approval and praise—which may be of value in and of itself, especially for actors concerned about their status and reputation. For example, the 1997 Italian decision to launch Operation Alba was driven not solely by Albanian President Sali Berisha’s promise that the flow of Albanians across the Adriatic would end if Italy delivered aid and military assistance, but also by the Italian imperative “to take into account both Italian popular opinion regarding Albanians,” [which was, to put it mildly, not positive]<sup>[102]</sup> and “Italy’s aspirations in joining the EMU.” At the time, Romano Prodi’s government justified the intervention “in terms of how the Europeans would see them” and “the impression on Europe that its politics would make.”<sup>[103]</sup>

Even if individual politicians have not personally made rhetorically problematic statements, they may nevertheless find themselves vulnerable to hypocrisy costs based on the actions (or historical positions) of their predecessors and, in particular, as a result of long-standing national commitments to a specific group or groups. (The U.S.’s relationship with Cubans is but one obvious example.) As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has quipped, “standards solemnly declared, even if unobserved, live on to supply ammunition to those who thereafter demand observance.”<sup>[104]</sup> Whether leaders resort to the use of normatively exalted rhetoric for instrumental reasons or actually espouse the values they articulate is immaterial. In either case, leaders who employ such rhetoric may set the stage for having to make good on those rhetorical claims or face the political costs of failing to do so, if their actions fail to comport with their articulated commitments.<sup>[105]</sup>

Norms need not even be what Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink call “socialized” to be effective cudgels; they need only be recognized as being important to a segment of society that can inflict costly punishment on the target.<sup>[106]</sup> Hence, to the extent that politically costly charges of hypocrisy can be leveled against a target, its vulnerability to coercion will increase.<sup>[107]</sup> That said, hypocrisy costs are not a necessary condition; polarized and mobilized

interests can be independently sufficient to persuade leaders to concede. Neither is the imposition of hypocrisy costs a guarantee of coercive success.<sup>[108]</sup> Nevertheless, in the face of acute heterogeneity and high pro- and anti-camp mobilization, hypocrisy costs can serve as effective force multipliers that enhance the vulnerability of certain leaders and certain targets to migration-driven coercion.

### **Target Defenses and Evasive Actions**

To be sure, coercion is not a one-sided game, and targets are not without recourse. Although, due to their generally liberal democratic nature, the majority of targets are constrained from responding in kind (by initiating outflows of their own), many do find ways to fight back and to resist, sometimes successfully. Three responses in particular warrant mention. First, under certain conditions, targets can externalize, outsource, or simply buck-pass the visible (and politically costly) consequences of migration crises onto others, thereby skirting successful coercion by persuading third parties to warehouse, host, or even assimilate an undesirable group.<sup>[109]</sup> Transferring responsibility is not always an option, however, particularly if the displaced are already inside the target state or if other potential host or asylum states themselves fear destabilizing consequences associated with an influx.

Second, some target governments manage to navigate the political shoals represented by their constituents' mutually incompatible interests, by assuaging one or another camp through the use of side-payments or by changing mobilized actors' minds about the desirability of a given migrant or refugee group through issue redefinition. In other words, leaders may succeed in shifting domestic perceptions of the expected costs or benefits associated with a particular influx.<sup>[110]</sup> Third, targets may successfully launch military action—or threaten to do so—to forestall or stop outflows at the source. Indeed, sometimes targets even use the threat of hypothetical outflows to justify military actions they wish to take for other reasons. In a 1982 speech before the National Governor's Association, for instance, former U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig sought to raise support for U.S. interventions in Latin America with reference to the potential migration-generating consequences of failing to act.<sup>[111]</sup> President Ronald Reagan used similarly inflammatory language in a speech the following year, claiming that a failure to forestall the installation of Marxist regimes in the region could result in "a tidal wave of refugees—and this time they'll be feet people, not boat people—swarming into our country seeking a safe haven from Communist repression to our south."<sup>[112]</sup> Sometimes targets simply convincingly threaten other actions that persuade challengers to back down or staunch an outflow. When evasion succeeds, coercion will fail, or at least be less successful than challengers may have hoped or anticipated.

Coercion can also fail because of miscalculations by challengers themselves. For instance, although such cases appear to be relatively unusual, attempted migration-driven coercion may—like strategic bombing—unify the target's population rather than polarize it. Similarly, if a group of migrants or refugees—previously viewed with skepticism or hostility—is effectively recast as the victim of gross human rights abuses and worthy of protection, mobilized opposition may



evaporate and with it the possibility of successful coercion.<sup>[113]</sup> This is a key point that reinforces the fact of the dynamic nature of this coercive, two-level game. More broadly, whenever there are significant downward shifts in the level of mobilization of (and degree of polarization between) pro- and anti-camps over time, coercion is likely to fail.

The ability to effect successful coercion in the migration realm is further inhibited, in part, by the fact that relatively few of these crises ever reach the desk of target state executive(s). Instead, most remain within **Quadrant 2** (of [Figure 1](#)) and off the radar screen of the country's executive branch. As Morton Halperin, former National Security Council (NSC) member, has noted vis-à-vis the U.S. context, leaders “lack the time or inclination to concern themselves with such issues. A president might link a particular policy with a particular disaster, but the bottom line is that the president is just too busy to focus upon anything but the larger strategic issues.”<sup>[114]</sup> Thus, whatever its normative repercussions, a migration crisis will become an issue of executive-level concern only when a failure to make it disappear promises to inflict tangible political costs on the target's leader(s)—in short, only when a crisis moves toward the danger zone of **Quadrant 4**.

Nevertheless, as we have now seen, migration-driven coercive attempts happen at least once a year. Moreover, when attempted, coercive engineered migration has succeeded at least in part almost three-quarters of the time, most often against relatively powerful, advanced liberal democracies. In light of all we know about international politics, coupled with all the aforementioned potential obstacles to success, why should this be the case?

### **Why Liberal Democracies are Particularly Vulnerable**

Advanced liberal democracies are particularly susceptible to the imposition of hypocrisy costs (and to coercive engineered migration, more generally) for two interrelated and self-reinforcing reasons, each of which reflects a distinct conception of what are traditionally viewed as liberal values and virtues. The first factor—a consequence of what is often referred to as *normative* or *embedded liberalism*—is that the majority of liberal democracies have codified commitments to human rights and refugee protection through instruments such as the 1948 Human Rights Declaration, the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol.<sup>[115]</sup> These international conventions and associated domestic laws not only provide a set of normative standards against which the actions of actors can be judged but also place certain legal obligations on states to meet the responsibilities they impose.

On the one hand, such codified commitments provide certain protections and guarantees for those forced to leave their home countries in times of crisis and under duress. On the other hand, however, these same safeguards constrain the ability of states to control their borders and so afford other actors bargaining leverage over signatory states through the employment of norms-enabled (political and legal) entrapment. As James Hampshire observes (albeit only with actors with beneficent intentions in mind), “International law plays a role, not so much as an external constraint upon national sovereignty . . . but as a source of liberal norms, which can be mobilized by domestic [and international] political actors including judiciaries and nongovernmental



organizations.”[116] Simply put, norms do, as many argue, “provide incentives and disincentives for different kinds of actions” for those who embrace them.

They also, however, provide incentives and disincentives for exploitation of these same norms—sometimes with the indirect assistance of well-meaning activists and jurists.[117] Hence, as the adoption and codification of relevant norms grows, and the extent to which individual rights are constitutionally protected increases—and, by extension, what we might refer to as normative liberalization rises—susceptibility to hypocrisy costs likewise grows, and vulnerability to coercion concomitantly increases.

The second source of particular liberal democratic vulnerability lies in the transparent and inherently conflictual nature of political decision making within these states. This *political liberalism* manifests itself, among other ways, in a wide variety of domestic political arrangements that provide access points for societal groups to influence governmental policy. As I discuss further below, there is great variation in the nature and scope of these arrangements, as well as in their level of transparency. Thus the degree to which this factor constrains the policy options available to target leaderships facing real or threatened crises varies significantly, even among liberal democracies. Nevertheless, politically liberal states share certain vulnerability-enhancing tendencies in common. For one thing, not only do opposition parties in democracies tend to have strong incentives to criticize and publicize missteps by sitting governments, but they also face powerful political incentives to adopt positions that run counter to those embraced by incumbents, whether or not those policies are currently viewed as problematic.[118] Thus, opposition leaders may add the handling of an ongoing migration or refugee crisis to their list of grievances, and the position adopted could be either in favor or opposed to the displaced. For instance, the opposition may contend that the government is “betraying a just cause and sabotaging the political rights” of a group of migrants or refugees or they may equally well claim the government “has sold out to the refugees [or migrants] at the expense of the nation itself.”[119]

Consequently, bold assertions by the leaders of target states that they can withstand the competing, often intense domestic political pressures exerted by a migration or refugee crisis—and thus will not ultimately concede to coercers’ demands—may ring hollow to challengers, who can readily observe the sometimes hostile and escalatory push and pull of democratic political battles.[120] In short, this particular (political liberalism-motivated) vulnerability arises from the fact that liberal democracies espouse what are supposed to be absolutist principles, but cross-cutting cleavages and the inherently conflictual nature of pluralistic politics make them anything but absolute. As Alexis de Tocqueville long ago:

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. . . . a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience.[121]

In other words, just as credibility can be a major problem for weak actors trying to convince more powerful ones to comply with their demands, credibility can prove equally problematic for powerful states if they are liberal democracies.

Of course, states (liberal and otherwise) do differ significantly in their capacities to shape—and be shaped—by their societies. The structural position of a state in relation to its society can be viewed as varying along a continuum from decentralized and constrained by societal groups to centralized and insulated from society.

Analytically speaking, we can distinguish between “soft” (decentralized and constrained) and “hard” (centralized and autonomous) states.[122] “Soft” states tend to be characterized by a high number of policy inputs and actors and relatively low levels of policy autonomy. Because they are most exposed to the vagaries of pluralism, we consequently expect the most highly liberalized and decentralized soft states (such as the United States) to be the most vulnerable of all.[123] Although further research is necessary to confirm the preliminary findings offered here, the data in [Table 1](#), which demonstrates that the United States appears to have been the single most popular target of migration-driven coercion between 1951 and 2006, support this proposition.


In sum, codified commitments to protect human rights and pluralistic politics can interact in such a way as to offer would-be coercers powerful bargaining leverage via exploitation of what liberal targets rightly view as their virtues and, in effect, transform liberal democratic virtues into international bargaining vices.[124] To reiterate, this represents the converse of traditional two-level games logic: Whereas in traditional two-level games, domestic actors seek to convince their international counterparts that they face significant constraints on their autonomy, in the coercive context, they seek to convey the precisely the opposite impression. But due to the independent and joint effects of normative and political liberalism within liberal democracies, this can prove onerous at best.

### **Moving beyond Liberal Democracies**

Although liberal democracies are particularly vulnerable to this unconventional brand of coercion, they are not equally vulnerable; nor are they exclusively so. For one thing, variation exists in levels of political and normative liberalization across liberal states. For another, many illiberal states possess some liberal characteristics and exhibit some measure of political and normative liberalization—sometimes more than their supposedly liberal counterparts.

We can conceptualize variation in the two sources of target vulnerability in a 2 X 2 matrix as a function of: on one axis, variation in the degree to which the target has adopted and codified norms that provide rights and protections for refugees and migrants, specifically, and human rights, more generally (normative liberalism); and, on the other, the level of decision-making and policy-making autonomy within the target state (political liberalism) (see [Figure 2](#)).[125]

Figure II: Vulnerability Across Regime Types



Although both factors are significant, the existence of the hypocrisy cost force multiplier suggests the degree of normative liberalism might be ultimately more influential than the degree of policymaking autonomy (political liberalism) in determining target vulnerability *ex ante*. On the other hand, politicians naturally care more about domestic politics than international influences, so the degree of political liberalism might be expected to offer more predictive value in terms of ultimate outcomes. In any case, as levels of normative and political liberalism rise (and policy autonomy declines) the aggregate vulnerability of a state also rises—consequently making “soft” liberal democracies particularly vulnerable.

Conversely, *ceteris paribus*, personalistic authoritarian or totalitarian governments should be least vulnerable to this kind of coercion. By definition, such states are less politically liberalized than their democratic counterparts. They are consequently also “harder”, more centralized, and characterized by relatively high degrees of policy autonomy, thereby granting their leaderships greater latitude in responding to potential migration crises. In the aggregate, illiberal, authoritarian states tend to be less normatively liberalized than their democratic counterparts and correspondingly subject to fewer constraints on this dimension, too. As [Table 1](#) illustrates, few such states appear to have been targeted, and still fewer successfully so.

That said, only rarely are all other things equal. For one thing, not all autocracies are alike. Like democracies, they too differ in the level, degree, and scope of policy autonomy afforded to their leaderships.<sup>[126]</sup> Moreover, few leaders, even in illiberal states, can operate for long without the consent of at least a significant subset of their people. The size of the so-called “selectorate”—the group of individuals formally responsible for determining the fate of the leadership of a state—also varies across states.<sup>[127]</sup> What is key, however, is that illiberal leaders too must

answer to some subset of their constituents, so domestic discord can exercise some (albeit weaker) effects within these states.

Moreover, in an era of increasing globalization, it is widely assumed that most states (illiberal or otherwise) want to be a part of what is often referred to as the “international community of states” and to reap the political and economic benefits enjoyed by its members. As Victor Cha puts it, illiberal regimes in the post-Cold War era have no choice but to open up simply in order to survive.<sup>[128]</sup> (Although the global economic crisis that began in 2008 may have dampened the enthusiasm of some for the global project, the sentiment largely remains.) Thus, although their domestic constraints are fewer, the behavior of most illiberal states is still subject to potentially costly, external scrutiny. Non-democracies are therefore also vulnerable to the imposition of hypocrisy costs by other states and by international and domestic political actors, albeit rather less so than their liberal democratic counterparts.

### **Alternative Explanations**

Might there be other explanations that can better account for or explain the decisions of targets—liberal or otherwise—to concede or resist? Three obvious alternatives are worth considering: (1) geographic proximity, (2) size of a (threatened) mass migration, and (3) prior target affinity or hostility toward a particular migrant/refugee group (as manifested in part by preexisting policies directed at relevant migrant/refugee groups).

The first two alternatives are premised on the idea that a target’s propensity to resist or concede is predicated on its ability to stop or to absorb an influx. By extension, the smaller the distance from the source of the outflow and/or the larger the size of the outflow, the lower the probability that a target can independently combat or absorb the group in question, the higher the credibility of the threat to inflict the promised punishment on the target, and thus the greater the probability of coercive success. Although geographic proximity between the source of an outflow and the target undoubtedly increases the vulnerability of that target, propinquity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success. As the data in [Table 2](#) and [Table 3](#) illustrate, history has been characterized by myriad non-proximate successes and by numerous proximate failures. In short, geography has been far less important than the degree to which targets are held responsible for, and thus are compelled to respond to, particular crises—whether for historical, domestic constituency-driven, or geopolitical reasons. For example, given the root culpability of the United States for what ultimately became known as the Vietnamese boatpeople crises, it twice found itself vulnerable to coercion from afar by Hong Kong and a core group of ASEAN member states.<sup>[129]</sup>

In terms of evaluating the second alternative explanation—real or threatened migrant outflow size—obtaining reliable numbers on the precise size of outflows is difficult at best. Nonetheless, it is reasonably easy to distinguish among orders of magnitude, from hundreds to millions. Again, although larger outflows assuredly place greater stress on the carrying capacities of states and affect their susceptibility to both swamping and agitation, the data demonstrate that overall

outcomes are not correlated with the scale of the unnatural disasters in question. For example, both Ethiopia and Poland successfully convinced Israel and Germany, respectively, to make concessions over groups that were small (even by per capita standards), whereas India did not alter its behavior to comport with Pakistani desires, despite an inflow of 10 million Bengalis who were relatively unwelcome for reasons other than pure numbers.[130]

**Table 2: Examining Alternatives: (Threatened) Outflow Size and Geographical Proximity**

	<b>Challenger(s)</b>	<b>Migrant/Refugee Group</b>	<b>(Principal) Target(s)</b>	<b>Outcome?</b>	<b>(Expected) Size of the Migration?*</b>	<b>Is Target Geographically Proximate to Source?*</b>
1	West Germany	East Germans	United States (US)	Partial Success	Medium	No
2	SVN & the US	North Vietnamese	North Vietnam	Failure	Large	Yes
3	Alg. insurgents	Algerians	French Allies, esp. United States	Partial Success	Large	No
4	Austria	Hungarians	United States	Success	Medium	No
5	United States	E. Germans (Berlin)	Soviet Union	Indeterminate	Med-Large	No
6	Cuba	Cubans	United States	Partial Success	Small	Yes
7	Biafran insurgents.	Biafrans	W. Europe, United States	Partial Success	Large	Yes
8	Israel	Palestinians	Jordan	Indeterminate	Large	Yes
9	Jordan	Palestinians	United States	SR Success; LR Failure***	Large	No
10	Pakistan	East Pakistanis	India	Failure	Large	Yes
11	Uganda	UK passport holders.	United Kingdom	Failure	Medium	No
12	Bangladesh	Rohingyas	Burma	Success	Medium	Yes
13	ASEAN, HK	Indochinese	Western GPs, esp. US	Success	Large	Yes
14	Vietnam	Vietnamese	Euro. Cmty. (EC), US	Indeterminate	Medium	No
15	Thailand	Cambodians	United States; China	Success	Large	No; Yes
16	Haiti	Haitians	United States	Success	Medium	Yes
17	NGO activists	Haitians	United States; Haiti	Failure	Medium	Yes
18	Pakistan	Afghans	United States	Success	Large	No
19	Soviet Union	Afghans	Pakistan	Failure	Large	Yes
20	Afghani. insurgents	Afghans	Pakistan	Success	Large	Yes
21	Cuba	Cubans	United States	Partial Success	Medium	Yes
22	Austria	Poles	W. Europe, US	Success	Medium	No
23	Thailand	Vietnamese	United States; France	Success	Medium	No
24	Honduras	Mostly <i>Contras</i>	United States	Success	Medium	No
25	Bangladesh	Chittag. /Chakmas	India	Indeterminate	Medium	Yes
26	East Germany	Mixed	West Germany	Success	Medium	Yes
27	East Germany	Mixed	Sweden	Success	Medium	No
28	Libya	TEM guest workers.	Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania	Indeterminate	Med-Large	Yes; Yes; and No
29	HK, ASEAN	Viet. boatpeople	Western great powers, esp. United States	Success	Large	No
30	Vietnam	Vietnamese	EC/EU, US	Success	Large	No
31	Bangladesh	Rohingyas	Burma	Success	Medium	Yes

32	Saudi Arabia	Yemeni laborers	Yemen	Failure	Large	Yes
33	Israel	Soviet Jews	Palestinians	Failure (so far)	Small-Med	Yes
34	United States	Soviet Jews	Israel	Partial Success	Small-Med	No
35	Albania	Albanians	Italy	Success	Medium	Yes
36	Albania	Albanians	Italy, EC	Success	Medium	Yes
37	Albania	Greek Albanians	Greece	Success	Medium	Yes
38	Poland	Poles; Mixed	EC, US	Indeterminate	Large	Yes; No
39	Ethiopia	Falashas	Israel	Success	Small-Med	No
40	Turkey	Iraqis	United States	Success	Large	No
41	Aristide	Haitians	United States	Success	Medium	Yes
42	Bosniaks	Bosnians	UN Security Council	Partial Success	Large	Mixed
43	Poland	Poles	Germany	Success	Small-Med	Yes
44	Cuba	Cubans	United States	Success	Medium	Yes
45	Zaire	Rwandans	Largely US, France and Belgium	Success	Large	No
46	Libya	Palestinians	Egypt	Failure	Small	Yes
47	North Korea	North Koreans	China	Success	Large	Yes
48	Albania	Albanians	Italy	Success	Medium	Yes
49	Turkey	Kurds	Italy	Indeterminate	Small	Yes
50	KLA	Kosovar Albanians	NATO	Success	Large	Mixed
51	FRY	Kosovar Albanians	NATO, esp. G,G, I****	Failure	Large	Mixed
52	Macedonia I	Kosovar Albanians	NATO	Success	Large	Mixed
53	Macedonia II	Kosovar Albanians	NATO	Success	Large	Mixed
54	Nauru	Mixed--S. Asians	Australia	Success	Small	No
55	Belarus	Mixed	EU	Failure	Large	Yes
56	Activists/NGO network	North Koreans	China	Failure	Small-Med	Yes
57	Activists/NGO network	North Koreans	South Korea	Failure	Small-Med	Yes
58	North Korea	North Koreans	China	Success	Large	Yes
59	Nauru	Mixed	Australia	Success	Small	No
60	Haiti	Haitians	United States	Failure	Med-Large	Yes
61	Belarus	Mixed	EU	Failure	Large	Yes
62	Libya	Mixed-N. African	EU	Success	Medium	Yes
63	Chad	Darfurians	UN Security Council	Indeterminate	Medium	Mostly No
64	Libya	Mixed-N. African	EU	Partial Success	Medium	Yes

\* Small outflows: ≤ 15,000+/-, Medium outflows: 15,000-500,000+/- and Large outflows: 500,000 and up; \*\* Geographically proximate refers to those states that are directly adjacent to, or whose borders lie within several hundred miles of, the source of the outflow; \*\*\* SR=short run, LR=long run; and \*\*\*\* Germany, Greece, Italy

This leaves us with the final alternative, prior affinity or hostility toward a particular refugee/migrant group. It has been hypothesized that a prior affinity or historical (e.g., colonial) relationship with a particular group might affect the response of a target to attempted coercion.

But in which direction? In favor of the group or against it? On the one hand, it is widely understood that target countries in which particular immigrant communities have become well established can have significant influence over their leaders, which would lead to enhanced support and heightened mobilization within the pro-refugee/migrant camp.<sup>[131]</sup> And it is certainly true that asylum burdens are strongly (positively) correlated with historical links between countries of origin and countries of destination.<sup>[132]</sup>

Table III: Why Alternative Explanations Are Insufficient

		Geographically Proximate?				No. of cases (out of a total of 56)
		<i>Successes</i>		<i>Failures</i>		
		Y	N	Y	N	
Flow Size	S	1	3	0	3	7
	M	14	7	2	1	24
	L	9	8	8	0	25

On the other hand, however, research has also shown that, historically, hostility and envy have not been highest vis-à-vis entirely foreign groups but, rather, groups “who have some ethnic or other affinity to that host country—such as Algerian  *pied noir*  forced to return to France in the 1960s after the war of independence, displaced Germans resettling in West Germany after World War II, Ugandan Asians with British passports admitted to England, and Afghan Pathans moving into ethnically-related areas of Pakistan.”<sup>[133]</sup> Thus, it could equally well be true that prior relationships with migrant groups enhance the strength and size of the anti-refugee/migrant camp.<sup>[134]</sup>

Likewise, both situations—highly developed affinity in one segment of society and highly developed hostility in another—could simultaneously obtain, making coercive success still more likely. As Robert Art rightly noted, “previous immigration into a target state and its immigration policies [toward that group can] play an important role, [however] that role only has significant effects for its disruptive (as opposed to absorptive) effects for democracies.”<sup>[135]</sup> In short,



existing relationships with particular migrant/refugee groups can and often do play a measurable role in determining outcomes, but whether those effects make coercive success more or less probable is case-specific, rather than systematically correlated (either directly or inversely) with the nature of the preexisting relationship or policies. More to the point, prior relationships will indeed heighten potential effects in cases in which crises become salient to pro- or anti-camps (or to both). However, neither the existence of previous policies nor the nature of extant relationships is independently determinative, i.e., neither one is a necessary nor a sufficient condition for determining outcomes.

### **Broader Implications and Further Applications**

This proposed theory and analysis offered in this article have clear policy implications in today's immigration anxiety-ridden environment. Long before September 11 galvanized a new preoccupation with border security, issues surrounding refugees and illegal migrants had transmuted in many countries from a matter of low politics to high politics, involving a shift in the definition of national security threats and in the practice of security policy. And while the potential significance of this kind of coercion has been underappreciated by many migration scholars, the same cannot necessarily be said for potential target states.<sup>[136]</sup> For example, U.S. *National Intelligence Estimates* have included warnings of U.S. vulnerability to this kind of coercion and have recommended taking steps to guard against future predation.<sup>[137]</sup> Similarly, in 2007 Australia shut down the Pacific Solution in no small part to guard itself against future coercive attempts by the tiny island of Nauru. Likewise, in 2003 alone the European Union committed to spending 400 million euros to increase border security, at least in part to deter future migration-driven coercion; and in 2006, China constructed a fence along part of its border with North Korea to impede cross-border movements.<sup>[138]</sup> Some states have even conducted military exercises designed to leave them better prepared to respond to potential massive influxes across their borders.<sup>[139]</sup>

Moreover, the related political and national security implications extend far beyond the politically charged realms of immigration, asylum, and border security policy. Indeed, it has been suggested that the non-spontaneous "flood of refugees from East to West Germany in 1989 . . . helped to bring down the Berlin Wall, expedited the unification of the two German states, and generated the most significant transformation in international relations since World War II."<sup>[140]</sup> Migration and refugee flows have likewise been identified as one of the most significant causes of armed conflict in the post-Cold War period.<sup>[141]</sup> Since 2004 alone, we have witnessed the consequences of coercive engineered migration in arenas as significant and diverse as economic sanctions and arms embargoes (the EU lifted the last remaining sanctions against Libya in exchange for assistance in staunching the flow of North Africans into western Europe);<sup>[142]</sup> ethnic conflict, military intervention, and interstate war (between Sudan and Chad, over refugees from Darfur); and nuclear proliferation and regime change (in that China's fears of a mass influx of North Koreans have tempered its posture toward, and dealings with, both North Korea and the United States over the North Korean nuclear program).<sup>[143]</sup>

At the same time, although the analysis herein focused specifically on migration, the theory it develops regarding the leverage weak actors can exercise through skillful exploitation of political heterogeneity and normative inconsistencies (the instrumental use of norms) is more broadly generalizable. Indeed, the theory may be applied to any issue area in which the rhetorical pronouncements and/or juridical and normative commitments of actors and governments come into conflict with their observed behavior.<sup>[144]</sup> Additional potential applications include humanitarian intervention; wartime rules of engagement; and policies regarding sanctions, embargoes, and other non-lethal instruments of persuasion. Furthermore, states and their leaderships are also not the only targets of hypocrisy-based political pressure. Norms, just like human beings, can be wielded as coercive weapons, and they can be wielded in the service of beneficent and altruistic goals, as well as self-serving and immoral ones. While further research is necessary to better understand how, where, and how successfully this unconventional method of influence can be employed outside the migration realm, the significance of this kind of norms-driven, two-level coercion should be neither underestimated nor ignored.

## References

1. This article is drawn from Kelly M. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Cornell University Press, 2010) with our great appreciation to the author and publisher. For further details or to purchase a copy, please visit the *Weapons of Mass Migration* web page on the website of Cornell University Press: [http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/cup\\_detail.taf?ti\\_id=5622](http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/cup_detail.taf?ti_id=5622).
2. In a recent volume that functions as a survey of state of the field of migration, for instance, it was not even mentioned as a possible driver of forced migration. See Heaven Crawley, “Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Internally Displaced: The Politics of Forced Migration,” in *The Politics of Migration: A Survey*, ed. Barbara Marshall (London: Routledge, 2006), 60-62. Likewise, at a conference in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in January 2003, an internationally known migration scholar told me, “Your theory is all very logical, very persuasive and everything; I just don’t believe this ever happens.”
3. For a pithy discussion of traditional views on crisis initiation by weaker powers, see T. V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), chaps. 1-2.
4. Because the accepted wisdom suggests this kind of coercion is rare at best, it serves as my operative null hypothesis.
5. Because the focus is on strategically generated population movements, I have excluded from this definition externalities-driven inflows and outflows—that is, those inadvertently generated as a consequence of other policies (e.g., people displaced by the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in China) or of conflict (e.g., the Belgian and French refugees who fled the German

offensive in World War I). Also excluded are migrations that result from policies of neglect (e.g., people fleeing the famine in Ethiopia in the early 1980s). Included, however, is strategic repatriation. Also included is the unusual, but sometimes potent, situation in which the movement of people into a challenger's territory is encouraged for strategic reasons. (See the appendix for several coercion-related examples.)

6. See Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration*, Appendix for details.

7. In addition to the coercive variant, these purposeful crises can be usefully divided by the objectives for which they are undertaken into three distinct categories: dispossessive, exportive, and militarized engineered migrations. *Dispossessive engineered migrations* are those in which the principal objective is the appropriation of the territory or property of another group or groups, or the elimination of said group(s) as a threat to the ethnopolitical or economic dominance of those engineering the (out-)migration—including what is commonly known as ethnic cleansing. *Exportive engineered migrations* are those migrations engineered either to fortify a domestic political position (by expelling political dissidents and other domestic adversaries) or to discomfit or destabilize foreign government(s). Finally, *militarized engineered migrations* are those conducted, usually during armed conflict, to gain military advantage against an adversary—via the disruption or destruction of an opponent's command and control, logistics,

or movement capabilities—or to enhance one's own force structure, via the acquisition of additional personnel or resources. For a detailed examination of the other categories and their uses, see Kelly M. Greenhill, "Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War," *Civil Wars* 10 (2008): 6-21.

8. At the time, Asians owned most of the big businesses in Uganda.

9. Phares Mutibwa, *Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1992); Marc Curtis, *Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses* (London: Vintage Books, 2004).

10. The numbers of migrants and refugees affected by these coercive attempts have been both large and small, ranging from several thousand to upward of 10 million. The displaced groups exploited have comprised both coercers' co-nationals and migrants and asylum seekers from the other side of the globe. There have been dozens of distinct challengers and at least as many discrete targets. However, for reasons I explore in detail below, advanced liberal democracies appear to be particularly attractive targets; indeed, the United States has been the most popular target of all, with its Western European liberal democratic counterparts coming in a strong second. (See [Table 2](#).)

11. During World War II, for instance, the Polish government-in-exile attempted to gain greater leverage over the postwar distribution of spoils by directing people fleeing the Nazi onslaught to England—obviously not the most direct path of escape—where they were enlisted in the Allied

war effort. See, for instance, Anita Prazmowska, "Polish Refugees as Military Potential: Policy Objectives of the Polish Government in Exile," in *Refugees in the Age of Total War*, ed. Anna C. Bramwell (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 219-32. See also Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War through the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 284.

12. I employ Legro's definition of norms as "collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors." Jeffery Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism in World War II," *International Organization* 51 (1997): 33.

13. Arthur Helton, refugee and migration expert, quoted in Barbara Crossette, "The Century of Refugees Ends. And Continues," *New York Times*, December 31, 2000.

14. David Wells Engstrom, *Presidential Decision Making Adrift: The Carter Administration and the Mariel Boatlift* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 189.

15. See, for instance, Joe Klein, "Why Not Kill Dictators with Kindness?" *Time*, March 3, 2003; Stephen Kinzer, "Germans Remember Little Good of Honecker, and Much Evil," *New York Times*, May 31, 1994.

The irony, of course, is that the failure of a target to take past behavior into account can materially undermine its ability to thwart or circumvent future coercion.

16. Quoted in Robin Shepherd, "Belarus Issues Threat to EU over Summit," *Times*, November 14, 2002.

17. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL), National Security Files of the Special Committee of the

National Security Council, Box 11, 12, 13, Refugees Folder: "(Secret) Telegram from Ambassador to Jordan, Burns to the Secretary of State," (circa) July 31, 1967. As the appendix illustrates, such cases are far from unusual. It is possible that I have by chance discovered all of them; however, the law of probability suggests this is unlikely.

18. Quoted in George Borjas, *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3.

19. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 407.

20. See also Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration*, Chapter 1 for a discussion of coding rules.

21. See Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 25-48; Gary Clyde Hufbauer,

Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute, 2008). See also the introduction, note 3.

22. See James Fearon, "Selection Effects and Deterrence," *International Interactions* 28 (2000): 5-29.

23. Although just such an outcome will be as a good thing if the challenger is, for instance, an NGO trying to bring down a dictatorship, it is a highly undesirable outcome in most cases.

24. "The Construction of the Berlin Wall," Berlin website, available at: [www.berlin.de/mauer/geschichte/index.en.html](http://www.berlin.de/mauer/geschichte/index.en.html).

25. As one Yugoslav journalist put it when discussing the 1999 Yugoslavian offensive in Kosovo: "there were differences between the police and the army. The police were in favour of expulsions because they could steal money from people. The intelligence guys were against it because they said it was bad for us." Quoted in Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 241-42. See also John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'" *International Security* 25 (2000): 42-70.

26. Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 89.

27. See Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration*, Chapter 5 for details.

28. As one U.S. serviceman who helped transport Vietnamese south put it, "What would happen if southern Vietnam fell? . . . Be it right or wrong, we have declared ourselves to these people and to the world as encouraging their flight to freedom, and, participating in it. We have therefore, morally married a long-term responsibility. Even politically, we must not lose face in the Far East by selling these people short." Quoted in Ronald B. Frankum Jr., *Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954-1955* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2007), 207. See also Kathryn C. Statler, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2007), 152.

29. See Sarah Kenyon Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), chap. 4.

30. Byman and Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion*, 50.

31. "The hope is that the government will concede or the population will revolt." Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 21.

32. See Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games," *International Organization* 42 (1988): 427-60; John S. Odell, "International Threats and Internal Politics: Brazil, the European Community and the United States, 1985-1987," in *Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold K.

Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

33. Byman and Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion*, 37-38.

34. See, for instance, Karen Jacobsen, "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes," *International Migration Review* 30 (1996): 655-78.

35. Cheryl Benard, "Politics and the Refugee Experience," *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (1986): 623-24.

36. William Drozdiak, "UN Force Resolution Dangerous, Yemen Says; Bush Urged to Send Envoy to Meet Iraqis," *Washington Post*, November 26, 1990.

37. As one expellee reported, Saudi police asked: "Are you for or against us?" When he replied that he did not know much about the Gulf crisis, they said, "Go to your country and, when you have found out which side you are on, come back and tell us." Patrick Cockburn, "Crisis in the Gulf: Immigrant Yemenis Incur Saudis' Wrath," *Independent*, November 24, 1990.

38. Consider, for instance, the tragically underwhelming initial U.S. response to Hurricane Katrina.

39. In one such example, Israel reportedly paid \$2,000 for each of the 16,000 Falashas it evacuated from Ethiopia after the fall of Mengistu in 1991. See the Appendix, case 39, in *Weapons of Mass Migration*.

40. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," 444.

41. Marc R. Rosenblum, "Immigration and U.S. National Interests," in *Immigration Policy and Security: U.S., European and Commonwealth Perspectives*, ed. Terry E. Givens, Gary P. Freeman, and David L. Leal (London: Routledge, 2008), 15.

42. See Rogers Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 101 and chap. 11, *passim*.

43. Victor H. Palmieri, former Ambassador-at-large and U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, quoted in Mary M. Kritz, ed., *US Immigration and Refugee Policy, Global and Domestic Issues* (Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, 1983), xi.

44. Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 64; see also, Hermann Kurthen, "Germany at the Crossroads: National Identity and the Challenges of Immigration," *International Migration Review* 29 (1995); Philip Martin, "Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration," in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin, and James Hollifield (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 189-226.

45. Doug Struck, "In Japan, U.S. Expat Fights the Yankee Way," *Washington Post*, July 5, 2003.
46. Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Responses* (London: Routledge, 1999), 408. See also Rosenblum, "Immigration and U.S. National Interests," 16-18.
47. Anne Karpf, "We've Been Here Before," *Guardian*, June 8, 2002, Weekend Pages.
48. Mark Mazower, *The Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Knopf, 1998), 346. See also Robert Mandel, "Perceived Security Threat and the Global Refugee Crisis," *Armed Forces and Society* 24 (1997): 77-103; Human Rights Watch, "Stemming the Flow: Abuses against Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees," 2006, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/09/12/stemming-flow>.
49. Kyle Grayson and David Dewitt, "Global Demography and Foreign Policy: A Literature Brief and Call for Research," York Centre for International and Security Studies Working Paper no. 24, York University, Toronto, 2003, 9. See also Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Huntington, *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004); Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994).
50. Ole Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 193-94; Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation State*, chaps. 5-7.
51. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations "2004 Global Views Survey," Chicago, 2004, chap. 4, 49-50.
52. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, "American Attitudes on US Foreign Policy," September 22, 2008, available at: [http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS\\_Topline%20Reports/POS%202008/2008%20Public%20Opinion\\_Foreign%20Policy.pdf](http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202008/2008%20Public%20Opinion_Foreign%20Policy.pdf).
53. Eurobarometer, "Racism and Xenophobia in Europe," Opinion Poll 47.1, special report no. 113, Luxembourg, December 18-19 1997, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_113\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_113_en.pdf).
54. *Ibid.*, 5-6.
55. European Commission, "National Report, Executive Summary: Germany," *Standard Eurobarometer* 68, 2007, available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68\\_de\\_exec.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_de_exec.pdf).
56. Tommy Grandell, "In Sweden, A Growing Tide against Admitting More Refugees,"



*Associated Press*, June 13, 2003.

57. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “World Publics Welcome Global Trade—But Not Immigration,” October 2007, available at: <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=258>.

58. “Even Migrants Say Netherlands Is Full,” Expatica, October 24, 2003, available at: [www.expatica.com/index.asp?pad=2,18,&item\\_id=35222](http://www.expatica.com/index.asp?pad=2,18,&item_id=35222).

59. Only South Koreans strongly disagreed (78 percent); Pew Global Attitudes Project, “World Publics Welcome Global Trade.”

60. In fact, for his own part, the former prime minister views his stringent migration and refugee policies as one of the things that made him popular and kept him in office for more than eleven years. Personal conversation with John Howard, former prime minister of Australia, March 2008.

61. Winston Peters, the politician chosen, warned of an “immigrant invasion which would turn New Zealand into an ‘Asian colony’” and “complained [that] Muslim extremists were being allowed in the country.” “Peters Is NZ’s New Foreign Minister,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, October 17, 2005.

62. Oliver Cromwell Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), quoted in Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin Press, 1999), 48.

63. As Robert Jervis makes clear, what constitutes a threat lies in its perception. Even though what Klaus Knorr termed an “anticipation of harm” may or may not be warranted, the effects of a perception of threat may be the same. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 28-31, 372-78. For the definition of a threat as the “anticipation of harm,” see Klaus Knorr ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1976).

64. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). See also Jeannette Money, *Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Deutsche Bank Research, “Rise in Antiimmigration Sentiments in the United States,” Frankfurt Voice Demography Special, July 30, 2002, 1-8; Peter H. Schuck, “Immigration Law and the Problem of Community,” in *Clamor at the Gates: The New American Immigration*, ed. Nathan Glazer (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1985), 285-307.

65. Jumana Farouky, “The Many Faces of Europe,” *Time*, February 15, 2007.

66. Although legal challenges to such responses may be mounted.

67. Kushner and Knox, *Refugees in an Age of Genocide*; Arthur D. Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy* (New York: Random House, 1967), 41; Herbert Druks, *The Failure to Rescue* (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1977), chap. 1.

68. See, for instance, Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin A. Schain, "The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe: Introduction," *West European Politics* 17 (1994): 1-16; Loescher, "Refugee Movements and International Security"; Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation State*. Joppke persuasively demonstrates how the differing "moral obligations" of states toward particular immigrant groups have profound and varying effects on their policies toward members of these and other groups.

69. Quoted in Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Getting Religion on AIDS," *New York Times*, February 2, 2003.

70. See Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), chap. 4.

71. Darren Hawkins, "Human Rights Norms and Networks in Authoritarian Chile," in *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 47.

72. Robert W. McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

73. See William Quandt, "The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (1986): 826-37; John H. Aldrich and John L. Sullivan, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz before a Blind Audience?'" *American Political Science Review* 83 (1989): 123-41; Alexander George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy," in *Change in the International System*, ed. Ole Holsti (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 235.

74. McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy*, 44-45.

75. David Martin, "Effects of International Law on Migration Policy and Practice: The Uses of Hypocrisy," *International Migration Review* 23 (1989): 553-54.

76. The right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution is enshrined in Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol define who refugees are and establish their rights in their

country of refuge. The strongest limit on state discretion is the principle of *non-refoulement* (enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention), which stipulates that, save in certain limited and exceptional cases, refugees must not be returned in any manner whatsoever to territories where their “lives or freedom” might be endangered.

77. Martin, “Effects of International Law,” 554-55.

78. McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy*, 45.

79. See, for instance, Silvia Pedraza, *Political Disaffection in Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

80. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations “2004 Global Views Survey,” chap., 49-50. See also MORI Social Research Institute for Migration Watch UK, “British Views on Immigration,” report, February 10, 2003, available at: [www.mori.com/polls/2003/migration.shtml](http://www.mori.com/polls/2003/migration.shtml).

81. “Incident at Baie du Mesle,” *Time*, July 11, 1994.

82. Frank Johnson, “East Germans’ Refugee Ploy Upsets the West,” *Times*, July 26, 1986; Rupert Cornwell, “Bonn Takes Steps to Stem Flood Of Refugees,” *Financial Times*, August 28, 1986.

83. “Bonn, Feeling Pressure of Voters, Is Trying to Curb Refugee Influx,” *New York Times*, August 24, 1986.

84. Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 29.

85. See, for instance, Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, “Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions,” *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (1984): 49-74.

86. See, for instance, Byman and Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion*.

87. Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics* 27 (1975): 187.

88. See, for instance, Judith Kelley, “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why?: The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-surrender Agreements,” *American Political Science Review* 101 (2007): 573-89.

89. Olson, *Logic of Collective Action*, chap. 1. See also (although it focuses on more long-term policy-making processes rather than crisis responses), Gary P. Freeman, “National Models, Policy Types, and the Politics of Immigration in Liberal Democracies,” *West European Politics*

29 (2006): 227-47.

90. Conversely, of course, in such cases only one camp needs to be assuaged to move the target into the relative security of quadrant 2.

91. Suzanne Dovi, "Making the World Safe for Hypocrisy," *Polity* 34 (2001): 10.

92. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, 24.

93. See, for instance, Martin, "Effects of International Law," 547-78; Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*; Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55 (2001): 47-80.

94. Quoted in Johnson, "East Germans' Ploy Upsets the West."

95. In fact, leaders who anticipate vulnerability to claims of hypocrisy may make preemptive concessions to forestall crises before they arise. For example, soon after taking office in 1981, President Ronald Reagan—who had previously criticized Jimmy Carter's handling of uncontrolled migration from Haiti—offered concessions to Baby Doc Duvalier of Haiti to circumvent the possibility that similar criticisms might be levied against him (see chap. 4).

96. *Entrapment* is traditionally defined as the act of a law enforcement agent that induces a person to commit an offense that the person would not have, or was *unlikely* to have, otherwise committed.

97. This is because, if norms-violators block redress to domestic NGOs, these organizations can activate transnational networks, whose members then pressure their own states and (if relevant) third-party organizations, which in turn place pressure on targets. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, 13.

98. Michael Ignatieff, "Mythical Hordes in a Lurid Fantasyland," *Observer*, October 13, 1991.

99. On the political significance of defining groups as legitimate or illegitimate migrants, see Lina Newton, "'It's Not a Question of Being Anti-Immigration': Categories of Deservedness in Immigration Policy Making," in *Deserving and Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy*, ed. Anne L. Schneider and Helen M. Ingram (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), esp. 147-67.

100. Benard, "Politics and the Refugee Experience," 621.

101. See, for instance, Lina Newton, *Illegal, Alien or Immigrant: The Politics of Immigration Reform* (New York: New York University Press, 2008); Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

102. Jessika ter Wal. "Racism and Cultural Diversity in the Mass Media," 2002, available at:

[http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/material/pub/media\\_report/MR-CH4-8-Italy.pdf](http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/material/pub/media_report/MR-CH4-8-Italy.pdf).

103. Ted Permuter, "The Politics of Proximity: The Italian Response to the Albanian Crisis," *International Migration Review* 32 (1998): 211, 203. See also John Morrison, *The Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees: The Endgame of European Asylum Policy?* (Geneva: UNHCR Policy and Evaluation Unit, 2000), 31.

104. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Human Rights and the American Tradition," in *The American Encounter: The United States and the Making of the Modern World*, ed. James F. Hoge and Fareed Zakaria (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 389.

105. See, for instance, Gil Loescher, "The European Community and Refugees," *International Affairs* 65 (1989): 631. Such situations are analogous to the blowback that leaders sometimes face when they inflate the nature of security threats for the purposes of securing domestic support. Having aroused the passions of their domestic polities, they find that backing down can prove difficult at best. See also Brian Rathbun, *Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), for a compelling set of examples of how European politicians and parties use their fellow politicians' rhetoric against them.

106. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction," in *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organization* 53 (1999): 379-408.

107. For an argument that suggests leaders differ in their susceptibility to charges of hypocrisy, see Vaughn P. Shannon and Jonathan W. Keller, "Leadership Style and International Norm Violation: The Case of the Iraq War," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3 (2007): 79-104.

108. See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, *Stemming the Flow*, chap. 10, in which Human Rights Watch notes, "Despite rhetoric about making the 'extent and development' of cooperation on migration matters contingent on Libya's commitment to fundamental refugee and human rights, the EU is moving forward with Libya, particularly on migration enforcement."

109. See, *ibid.* Nevertheless, as became clear in the midst of the Indochinese boatpeople crisis in the late 1970s, attempted buck-passing can also backfire, inadvertently permitting further—and more successful—coercion by enterprising opportunists.

110. See H. Richard Friman, "Side-Payments versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations," *International Organization* 47 (1993): 387-

409. On their specific application to the migration realm, see Marrus, *Unwanted*.

111. Haig asked his audience to “just think what the level might be if the radicalization of this hemisphere continues. . . . why it would make the Cuban influx [referring to the Mariel boatlift of 125,000 people two years before] look like child’s play.” Quoted in “Haig Fears Exiles from Latin Areas May Flood the US,” *New York Times*, February 23, 1982.

112. Quoted in Teitelbaum, “Immigration, Refugees, and Policy,” 435.

113. See Friman, “Side-Payments versus Security Cards.” Of course, the converse is also true should coercers aim to galvanize action within the pro-camp. That said, research suggests that, at least in the U.S. context, changing the prevailing frame in policy debates is a difficult task. See, for instance, Jeffrey M. Berry, Frank R. Baumgartner, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech, “Washington: The Real No-Spin Zone,” in *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why*, ed. Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), *passim*.

114. Morton Halperin, quoted in Joshua Rovner, “Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy Relations,” unpublished paper (2005), 40.

115. See, for instance, James Hollifield, “Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and Control in the European Community,” *International Migration Review* 26 (1992): 568-95.

116. James Hampshire, “Disembedding Liberalism?: Immigration Policies and Security in Britain since 9/11,” in *Immigration Policy and Security: US, European and Commonwealth Perspectives*, ed. Terri E. Givens, Gary P. Freeman, and David L. Leal (London: Routledge, 2009), 116-17.

117. Ward Thomas, *The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 195. See also Jeffery Legro, “Which Norms Matter?”

118. See Kenneth A. Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?: Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” *International Organization* 53 (1999): 233-66.

119. Benard, “Politics and the Refugee Experience,” 624.

120. For an analogous argument, see Bernard Finel and Kristen Lord, “The Surprising Logic of Transparency,” in *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*, ed. Bernard Finel and Kristen Lord (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 137-80. See also Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).

121. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, eds. and trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and

Delba Winthrop (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 219.

122. Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and John Ikenberry, "Towards a Realist Theory of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (1989): 467-69.

123. This proposition is consistent with an argument made by Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum about variability in the abilities of states to restrict immigration. See *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering* (London: Berghahn Books, 2001), 101-2.

124. Susan Peterson, *Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Ronald Rogowski, "Institutions as Constraints," in *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 125-26.

125. The proposition that the level of domestic autonomy is a key variable comports with Idean Salehyan and Marc Rosenblum's empirical (U.S.-focused) findings with respect to asylum admissions. See "International Relations, Domestic Politics and Asylum Admissions in the United States," *Policy Research Quarterly* 61 (2008): 104-21.

126. Brandon J. Kinne, "Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective," *International Studies Perspectives* 6 (2005): 114-28.

127. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).

128. Victor D. Cha, "Korea's Place in the Axis," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (2002): 79-92.

129. See, for instance, W. Courtland Robinson, *Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response* (London: Zed Books, 1998).

130. See Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration*, Appendix.

131. See, for instance, Smith, *Foreign Attachments*.

132. Eiko Thielemann, "Towards a Common European Asylum Policy: Forced Migration, Collective Security and Burden Sharing," in *Immigration Policy and Security: U.S., European and Commonwealth Perspectives*, ed. Terry E. Givens, Gary P. Freeman, and David L. Leal (London: Routledge, 2008), 173.

133. Benard, "Politics and the Refugee Experience," 622.

134. See, for instance, Noora Lori, "The Institutionalization of Un-assimilation: Second-Generation North African Immigrants in France," *Columbia University Journal of Politics and Society* 17 (2006): 95-116.

135. Email communication with author, March 2009.

136. There have been a few noteworthy exceptions. See, for instance, Gil Loescher, "Refugee Movements and International Security," *Adelphi Paper* 268 (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992); Michael Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy," *International Organization* 38 (1984): 429-450; Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). Nevertheless, no one has followed up or expanded on these important but largely atheoretical works (and others like them published by these scholars).

137. See, for instance, National Intelligence Council, "Growing Global Migration and Its Implications for the United States," National Intelligence Estimate 2001-02D, March 2001, which warns that the United States remains vulnerable to attempts by foreign governments to use the threat of mass migration as leverage in bilateral relations or to relieve domestic pressures. See also Central Intelligence Agency, *Long-Term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2001).

138. On the Pacific Solution's demise, see Connie Levett, "Pacific Solution Cost \$1 Billion," *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 25, 2007. On the European Union and Belarus, see Volker ter Haseborg, "Radioactive Refuge: Offering Asylum in Chernobyl's No Man's Land," *Der Spiegel*, October 14, 2005. On the Chinese border fence and North Korea, see Norimitsu Onishi, "Tension, Desperation: The China-North Korean Border," *New York Times*, October 22, 2006.

139. James Brooke, "North Korea Lashes Out at Neighbors and US," *New York Times*, August 19, 2003; personal conversations with U.S. military officials, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Miami, Fla., April 2000, and MIT, Cambridge, Mass., October and November 2001; Sam Dillon, "US Tests Border Plan in Event of Mexico Crisis," *New York Times*, December 8, 1995.

140. Gil Loescher, "Refugee Movements and International Security," *Adelphi Paper* 268, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), 3.

141. Idean Salehyan and Kristian Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," *International Organization* 60 (2006): 335-66.

142. Author's communication with EU officials, February 2005 (in Frankfurt, Germany); and June 2005 (at United Nations headquarters). See also Sara Hamood, "EU-Libya Cooperation on Migration: A Raw Deal for Refugees and Migrants?" *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21 (2008): 19-42; *Afrol News*, November 3, 2004; "Immigration: EU to Assist Libya," AKI (Italy), June 3, 2005; and (Report from the) *Third European Parliament/Libya Interparliamentary Meeting* (April 2005).

143. Moreover, the *Economist* reported in August 2006 that Gaddafi was likely again attempting



to coerce the EU through the use of migrants. See “Sunk: More Boats, More Drownings—and Suspicions about Libya’s Role,” *Economist*, August 24, 2006. On Darfur, see “Chad: President Threatens to Expel Darfur Refugees as Attacks Surge in Lawless East,” IRIN, April 14, 2006. On North Korea, see “Kim Jong Il Goes Ballistic,” *Economist*, July 6, 2006; Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” *Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder*, June 18, 2008, available at: [www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth\\_korea\\_relationship.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth_korea_relationship.html).

144. See, for instance, Jeffrey Taliaferro, “A Pact with the Devil Roundtable,” H-Diplo/H-Net: Social Sciences On-line, 2007, available at: [www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/APactWithTheDevil-Roundtable.pdf](http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/APactWithTheDevil-Roundtable.pdf).