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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**SWISS ARMED FORCES XXI – THE ANSWER TO CUR-
RENT OR FUTURE THREATS?**

by

Marco Schmidlin

June 2004

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Richard Hoffman

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**SWISS ARMED FORCES XXI – THE ANSWER TO CURRENT OR FUTURE
THREATS?**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
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from the

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ABSTRACT

A changed security environment after the end of the Cold War forced Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden to reassess their security policy. New threats and challenges such as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), organized crime, the greater disparity of wealth and increased migration have replaced traditional military threats. Larger non-military concerns like peacekeeping operations, humanitarian support, and support to civil authorities have replaced territorial defense. All of which require international cooperation.

Following a comprehensive security strategy, Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden aim to defend their territory, protect their population, and foster international peace and security. Austria and Sweden focus on integration in and solidarity with the *European Union (EU)* and the *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*. Switzerland retains its perpetual neutrality, but has shown increased international cooperation.

Austria and Sweden model their Armed Forces after the *EU Petersberg Tasks* and have small peacetime organizations with a professional cadre and annual conscripts. The Swiss Armed Forces XXI focus mainly on territorial defense and are organized in accordance with universal conscription and a wartime organization.

Traditional political, social and economic aspects hinder Switzerland from following a straightforward strategy toward solidarity and a fundamental change in its Armed Forces. Switzerland's new security policy and its Armed Forces XXI do not fully meet the requirements to fight new threats and challenges together with the international community.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A changed security environment in Europe after the end of the Cold War, characterized on one side by increased integration and cooperation in Europe and on the other side by disintegration and fragmentation particularly in the Balkans, forced most European countries to reassess their security policy. This was and is still true for the traditionally neutral states of Switzerland, Austria and Sweden.

As a consequence of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and increased integration and cooperation in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the three traditionally neutral states of Switzerland, Austria and Sweden are surrounded by primarily democratic states. None of the three countries fear direct military threats, although this cannot be totally excluded. New threats and challenges below the threshold of war increasingly challenge their security. Impacts of international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with associated long range delivery systems, organized crime, vulnerability of societies with their dependence on modern information technologies, demographic trends in less developed countries resulting in the greater disparity of wealth, increased migration, and regional natural and technical disasters with global impacts have replaced former military threats and constitute the main concerns of all three countries. Since these new threats and challenges are not limited to national borders, increased cooperation within Europe and beyond its borders is required. Furthermore, these new threats require military operations other than territorial defense. New non-military missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian support and also increased support for civil authorities in case of severe menaces require new capabilities.

In their security strategy, Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden aim to defend their territory, protect the freedom and rights of their respective populations and foster peace and security in Europe and beyond its borders. In order to achieve these goals, they follow a comprehensive security strategy, including all possible instruments among various policy areas, such as foreign, defense, economic, information, asylum, and environmental policies. While Austria and Sweden clearly focus on integration and solidarity with the EU and NATO, Switzerland follows a strategy of perpetual neutrality with increased in-

ternational cooperation, signifying that cooperation for Switzerland is a valid instrument only if the nations own defense means are not sufficient. In contrast, Austria has realized and accepted that its own instruments are no longer sufficient to meet its security requirements. As a result, it actively supports and fosters the EU's overall goals including a future common defense. The government even declared membership in NATO as a possible strategic option. Sweden still follows its traditional policy of non-alignment, but due to its EU membership has had to reduce it to a non-military alignment policy. Therefore, it considers a common European defense as incompatible with its strategy.

Even if there is a slight shift away from the defense policy as an important security instrument, the respective Armed Forces still have great importance for all three countries. Accomplished or currently active transformation processes should fit the Armed Forces structure, organization, and capabilities for the required new tasks of peacekeeping, humanitarian support, or support of civil authorities in case of severe menaces. While Austria and Sweden increasingly model their Armed Forces after new requirements based on the *EU Petersberg Tasks*, Switzerland still focuses primarily on territorial defense. In contrast to Austria and Sweden's Armed Forces, the Swiss Armed Forces XXI are still organized along the policies of universal conscription and focus on wartime organization. Austria and Sweden have small peacetime organizations consisting of a professional cadre and annual conscripts. Austria has even considered abolishing conscription. Even if Switzerland improved the structure and organization of its Armed Forces, there are still too many shortfalls to appropriately conduct all the assigned tasks.

Traditional political, social, and economic aspects hinder Switzerland's government from following a straightforward strategy toward solidarity. They also prevented the military planners from fundamentally changing the Armed Forces in order to conduct the assigned tasks and to meet required capabilities. As a consequence, Switzerland's new security policy "Security through Cooperation" and its Armed Forces XXI as one important instrument do not yet meet the requirements to fight new threats and challenges together with the European and international community. They constitute a compromise based on traditional political, social, and economic aspects rather than security and military efficiency.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of how internal and external factors influenced Switzerland's security policy and its military transformation from the Swiss Armed Forces 95 to the Swiss Armed Forces XXI. The main question is how the domestic political and military institutions and various coalitions influence Switzerland's security policy and the structure and organization of its Armed Forces. In order to answer this question, this thesis will compare Switzerland's security policy and its Armed Forces with Austria and Sweden, both neutral European states with similar strategic, political, and social conditions.

This thesis is a case study that uses a variety of primary and secondary sources. The framework is drawn mainly from official documents, books, and articles. The chapters are chronologically ordered beginning with a comparison of the security policies of all three countries. First, this chapter will examine the underlying threat perceptions and then examine the security policy goals, strategies, and instruments. Second, it will examine additional decisive factors for the security policy such as the understanding of neutrality, the political system, and economic and social conditions. Finally, this chapter provides an assessment, and gives possible explanations for differences and similarities.

The second chapter examines the Armed Forces in Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden. It begins with a short description of an observable global trend toward small, professional Armed Forces, described in the theory of *Postmodern Military*, which was caused by a change in requirements. The following examination of the assigned tasks, structure and organization of the Armed Forces will provide an assessment if the Armed Forces have the capabilities to meet the new threats and challenges. Finally, the chapter provides possible explanations for deficiencies.

Finally, the conclusion will highlight the major differences and similarities in the security policy and the Armed Forces of Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden. Furthermore, it provides a summary of explanations for the fact that Switzerland's new security policy, "Security through Cooperation" and its Armed Forces XXI do not yet meet the requirements to fight new threats and challenges together with the European and international community.

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II. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe after the end of the Cold War shifted possible threats and challenges from primarily military threats to challenges below the threshold of war. This forced the neutral states of Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden to adjust their security policy. All three have realized that new threats and challenges such as international terrorism, organized crime, vulnerability of modern societies, disparity of wealth, migration, and natural and technological disasters require increased international cooperation. This also extends to increased cooperation among different security instruments within their countries.¹ As a consequence, the governments of all three countries published new security policy reports and provided guidelines for new strategies, goals, and instruments.

Even if Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden have similar threat perceptions, their strategies to protect their populations and to manage the diverse challenges are different. In this regard, the main question for all three countries was and still is whether neutrality constitutes an adequate strategy or if integration in European and international organizations would better meet the necessities of a changed security environment. Austria's new strategy goes farthest in answering this question. Its strategy of solidarity constitutes more a status of a non-aligned state than a neutral one.² The present government even declared membership in NATO as a possible strategic option.³ This rapid change seems to be possible due to a short tradition of neutrality – only 50 years – and due to a political system that gives the ruling government most of the power and leaves the political dis-

¹ For details see: *Sicherheit durch Kooperation; Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz (SIPOL B 2000)* vom 7. Juni 1999; [<http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/vbs/de/home/ausdem/publikationen/berichte.html>] (4/28/2004); *Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin, Analyse-Teil*; Bericht an den Nationalrat; Verfasst von einer Expertengruppe im Auftrag der Bundesregierung; 23.01.2001; [http://www.bundesheer.at/archiv/a2002/akt_20020116_doktrin.shtml] (4/28/2004); Report of the Swedish Defence Commission; *Summary: A More Secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World*; 2003; p. 1-2; [http://www.forsvarsberedningen.gov.se/rapporter/pdf/Slutsatskap_kap1_eng.pdf] (4/16/2004); von Sydow, B.; *Sweden's Security in the 21st century*; p. 19; [<http://www.forsvarsberedningen.gov.se/debattserien/pdf/security.pdf>] (4/28/2004)

² Resolution by the Austrian Parliament; *Security and Defence Doctrine, General Considerations*; p. 7; [http://www.bundesheer.at/download_archiv/pdfs/entschliessung_eng.pdf] (4/15/2004)

³ Security and Defence Doctrine; General Considerations; p. 9

cussions at the level of the political elites. Austria's main security policy instrument was and is foreign policy. However, Austria follows a comprehensive security policy, incorporating other governmental policy areas as well.

Sweden's "Total Defense" and non-military alignment strategy is mainly focused on the country itself, even though Sweden is a member of the EU. With respect to neutrality, Sweden had always had a different understanding compared to Switzerland and Austria and saw it only as a policy instrument in the event of war.⁴ Nonetheless, this policy makes it impossible to join NATO or to support a future common European defense. Defense policy still seems to be Sweden's main security policy instrument even though all other policy areas are considered to contribute to the security of Sweden.

Switzerland's new security policy "Security through Cooperation" acknowledges the need to open its relationship toward Europe. However, its political system and its understanding of neutrality still seem to make it impossible to really open Switzerland and to follow a strategy of solidarity rather than cooperation. Neutrality is a political myth in Switzerland. The conservative political parties and a great part of the population are not yet willing to disregard it.⁵ As a consequence, possible security policy options are reduced to only a few. The political system, in which the instrument of referendum gives the population the right to approve changes to the constitution, amendments of laws, and membership in international organizations, forces the government to find compromises not only with the political elites but also with the whole population.⁶ The new security strategy can be considered as such a compromise. It contributes to the need to cooperate with the international community, but only where and when Switzerland decides to do so. Where it cannot afford to act on its own, Switzerland shifts the burden to the international community. True cooperation and solidarity would mean sharing the burden equally.

⁴ The Swedish Institute; *Swedish Foreign Policy*; Fact Sheet on Sweden; July 2002; p. 1; [<http://www.si.se>] (4/15/2004)

⁵ For details see: Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP); *Wahlplattform 2003-2007*; p. 16-17, 22-23; [http://www.svp.ch/file/Plattform_deutsch.pdf] (5/5/2004); Aktion für eine Unabhängige und Neutrale Schweiz (AUNS); *Grauer Brief 91*; Juli 2003; [<http://www.auns.ch/default.htm>] (5/5/2004)

⁶ The Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation; *How is a new law enacted?* (Legislative procedure); p. 1-4; [<http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/gg/index.html>] (4/8/2004)

Switzerland follows a comprehensive security policy as well, but slightly adjusted the main focus away from the defense policy toward other foreign policy areas.

Economic constraints, caused by an aging population, increased unemployment, and stagnating economic growth, are reducing spending for such traditional security policy instruments as the Armed Forces and the police forces in all three countries. In the last ten years, there was a general shift in government spending away from defense spending toward social welfare and healthcare. Having always had a low military budget, Austria constitutes an exception.⁷ Decreasing military spending makes it less and less possible to modernize the Armed Forces in an appropriate manner. As a consequence, the gap between required and possible capabilities is steadily widening. Especially in Switzerland, where security policy is asking for increased international participation of the Armed Forces, modernization in areas such as C⁴ISR or airlift capabilities would be inevitable.

The following chapter provides a comparison of Switzerland, Austria and Sweden's security policy. The first part of the chapter will examine the different threat assessments, followed by the security policy strategy and its goals and instruments. In the second part, the chapter provides an examination of factors others than the security environment that are decisive for security policy. Finally, the chapter provides possible explanations for differences in the respective security strategies, goals, and instruments.

A. THREAT ASSESSMENT

Logically, the identification of possible threats is primary to security policy thoughts, since they are the basis of formulating goals, strategies and instruments. Since all three European countries are surrounded by mainly democratic states that are members of either the EU or NATO, their threat assessments should be quite similar.

⁷ See: CIA World Factbook; Volume 1986 to 2002; Statistik Austria; *Oeffentliche Finanzen*; 2003; [http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_02/finanzen_txt.shtml] (4/15/2004); Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs; *Fact Sheet No.4*; March 2001; [http://www.social.regeringen.se/pressinfo/pdf/aldre/aldre_en.pdf] (4/16/2004)

1. Switzerland

The international situation has changed fundamentally over the last decade. Until 1989, the world was characterized by a bipolar system of international stability. Today the security environment is characterized not only by greater unity, but also by disintegration and fragmentation, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. On one side, conventional military threats in Europe have decreased. On the other side, the range of other dangers and risks below the threshold of war has increased considerably. Today's security problems cut across borders and can only be solved by joint efforts. For this reason, increased security cooperation in Europe is imperative.

The Swiss government has acknowledged this fact and has revised its security strategy. Switzerland has a central geographic location in Europe and is surrounded by democratic states. All neighbors are – except Lichtenstein – members of the EU and members – except Austria and Lichtenstein – of NATO. This strategic situation allows the assessment that a direct military threat to Switzerland has significantly decreased, even if it cannot be excluded totally. On the other side, open borders within the EU and disintegration and fragmentation have increased the range of other dangers and risks with direct impacts on Switzerland.⁸ In its report, the government has identified the following threats and challenges, ordered along probability and existential impacts on Switzerland: *Uncontrolled proliferation of WMD and weapon systems with long range, exertion of economic pressure, vulnerability of modern information and communication systems, terrorism, violence-prone extremism and organized crime, the great disparity of prosperity, the scarcity of natural resources and uncontrolled migration, demographic trends, natural and technological disasters, violence-prone struggles within Switzerland.* In addition to these threats, *possible military conflicts* in Europe (e.g. Former Yugoslavia) or outside of Europe may have direct impacts on Switzerland, such as a high migration of refugees, or disruption of supply of essential goods.⁹

⁸ SIPOL 2000; p. 14-22

⁹ Ibid; p. 14-22

a. *Uncontrolled Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Weapon Systems with Long Range Capabilities*

The threat of a global nuclear war has become relatively obsolete. However, proliferation of nuclear weapons is continuing and increasing the threat of regional conflicts with such weapons. A few states still have chemical weapon programs outside the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction*.¹⁰ More and more states are developing the capabilities to use biological technology militarily.¹¹ Thereby, the importance of long-range ballistic missiles as delivery systems is steadily increasing. The transfer of technology and the cooperation between states have led to the development of missile industries in several countries.¹² The probability of proliferation of WMD to terrorist groups has increased as well, since the control of these weapons or relevant technology has dwindled in many states.¹³

b. *Restrictions of Free Trade and Exertion of Economic Pressure*

The use of economic sanctions as a political instrument to impose economic, political, or military goals has a long tradition in international relations. In the nineties, the United Nations (UN) regularly used economic sanctions to reestablish peace or impose international law. The US and the EU have used this instrument to implement their own particular economic and political goals. Switzerland was politically accused for the first time of its behavior during the discussion about Switzerland's role in the Second World War¹⁴ and a number of banks and insurance companies faced strong economic pressure. Such pressure is likely in the future as well and has to be considered in security policies.¹⁵

¹⁰ For details see: UN; *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction*; [<http://disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/bwc/>] (5/12/2004)

¹¹ SIPOL B 2000; p. 17-18

¹² Ibid; p. 18

¹³ Ibid; p. 18

¹⁴ For details see: Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg (UEK); [<http://www.uek.ch/de/index.htm>] (5/12/2004)

¹⁵ SIPOL B 2000; p. 18-19

c. *Vulnerability of Modern Information and Communication Systems*

Since today's societies are highly dependent on information and communication systems, the probability of an attack is increasing. The possibility that actors without strategic or economic strength can launch such attacks infinitely multiplies the possible number and their motives.¹⁶ The resulting impacts on the administration, the economy, and the military range from a massive disturbance of Switzerland's economy to a paralyzing of political and military command and control capabilities. Sensitive areas, such as administration at all political levels¹⁷, industry, trade, the banking sector, insurance sector, social welfare institutions, power plants, gas, oil and water-pipelines, transport systems, police, security and first aid organizations, information and communication media, and military command and control systems should be the first priority in protection. Attacks on these vital areas have to be seen as a threat to national security.¹⁸

d. *Terrorism, Violence-prone Extremism, Espionage, and Organized Crime*

New threats are no longer bound to national borders. As a consequence, internal and external security is increasingly inseparable. The fight against these threats requires an increase in domestic police forces, but also improved cooperation on the national and international level.¹⁹ State supported and ideological motivated terrorism was seen as fairly decreasing at the time the security policy report was published. After 9/11, this assessment has to be reconsidered. Also terrorism and extremism born out of social disparities, minority problems, ecological problems, and religious struggles is steadily increasing. Switzerland is not a primary target of international terrorism, but always has to consider attacks on foreign infrastructure, such as embassies or headquarters of international organizations. Preventing Switzerland from becoming a base for logistical support of terrorist groups, a safe heaven, or a transit land constitutes the main task in fighting terrorism. Since Switzerland does not fully participate in the EU's security coopera-

¹⁶ SIPOL B 2000; p. 21

¹⁷ At the state, the canton, and the community level.

¹⁸ SIPOL B 2000; p. 22

¹⁹ Ibid; p. 22-23

tion and because of its geographic position as a crossroad in transportation, communication, finances, and world trade, this is a highly probable risk.²⁰

Violence-prone extremism is highly related to terrorism and sometimes difficult to separate. It is articulated in two different forms within Switzerland. First, Skinheads and related groups are responsible for racism and xenophobia. Even if direct attacks on foreigners have decreased in the last years, they might emerge again due to an increasing number of immigrants and refugees. Second, increasing extremism of foreign groups in Switzerland constitutes a more severe threat. Fights between foreign groups and attacks against third parties, mainly officials and infrastructure of conflict parties, are increasingly common.²¹ After the end of the Cold War, espionage was more likely in political or economic fields than in the military. Even if several forms of political intelligence are observable, the economy and scientific research and development remain the main targets.²² Swiss citizens are most likely the direct victims of criminal acts and, therefore, very sensitive toward public security. Crimes against life and robberies are mounting. Thereby, the increase in criminal acts conducted by foreigners is disproportionately higher than by Swiss citizens.²³

International organized crime could become the most dangerous threat for society, state, and economy. The main activities of the diverse but often connected groups are trade with drugs, people, and weapons, corruption, blackmailing, and money laundering. Probable connections between these groups and terrorist organizations constitute a severe danger. Due to its federal system, small police forces, and non-participation in European Security Institutions such as *Schengen* and *Dublin*, fighting organized crime is very difficult in Switzerland.²⁴

²⁰ SIPOL B 2000; p. 23

²¹ Ibid; p. 24

²² Ibid; p. 24

²³ Ibid; p. 24

²⁴ Ibid; p. 25

e. Economic, Social, and Ecologic Developments, Natural and Technical Disasters

Globalization provides welfare for a lot of people but can also lead to threats and challenges. First, instability in finance markets can destabilize whole economies and regions in a relatively short period of time. Second, many countries in the third world, where a large portion of the world population lives, are not yet been integrated into the international economic system. As a consequence, economic emergencies could lead to crisis, armed struggles, and mass migration. The same could happen in countries in Eastern Europe, since wars are most likely in regions where a great part of the population is excluded, where weak political institutions exist, and where environmental degradation and scarcity of resources increase.²⁵ In addition, there are six basic areas of ecological concerns, which could lead to migration or armed struggles: Scarcity of water, soil erosion, destruction of forests, climate change, rising sea levels, and pollution through toxic waste and release of toxic and radioactive materials.²⁶ The security of a state can also be endangered by natural or technical disasters, such as earthquakes, flooding, avalanches, hurricanes, cold temperatures or continuous aridness, radioactive disasters, and epidemics. Such disasters are often characterized by high impacts on the social, economic and technical environment, which recover only after weeks, months or even years.²⁷

f. Demographic Trends and Migration

Even if the world fertility rate has decreased more than expected, the world population still grows by 100 million per year. In 2025, about 8 billion people will live on earth, 80 percent of them in developing countries.²⁸ Migration to developed countries in Europe and the Western hemisphere will increase, since there are not enough jobs and living facilities in most of the developing countries. Most developed countries have

²⁵ SIPOL B 2000; p. 19-20

²⁶ Ibid; p. 20

²⁷ Ibid; p. 26

²⁸ Ibid; p. 25

to deal with high unemployment as well and migration will lead to social and economic problems. Switzerland is one of the target countries for refugees and immigrants. Increasing numbers of people seeking asylum could lead to xenophobia and racism.²⁹

g. Security Policy Related Technological Development

Military and civil technological developments will have great impact on Switzerland's security. Military technological developments will have great impact on Armed Forces, discriminating against those who cannot afford to keep up. Time becomes the most important factor rather than space or actual strength. In particular, better intelligence in time, shorter command and control processes, laser and microwave weapons, stealth technology, unmanned weapon systems or smaller crews, and increased range and accuracy will characterize the modern battlefield. Eliminating the enemy's command and control capabilities will probably lead to early decisions.³⁰

2. Austria

After the end of the Cold War, Austria's security environment fundamentally changed as well. Having been a buffer zone between NATO and the Warsaw Pact for fifty years, Austria is today surrounded by independent, democratic states. Due to its membership in the EU, it is embedded in a common security and economy organization fostering prosperity and stability. The increased cooperation between the EU, NATO, and also among international organizations such as the UN or the OSCE, has increased stability in Europe as well.³¹ The EU enlargement has and will further move its borders farther east. Austria will be centralized in the EU's geographic core and no longer lie on its periphery. Against this background, possible threats and challenges for Austria have changed. Replacing a mainly military threat, the new challenges are a mix of interdependent, political, economic, military, social, cultural-religious, information technological and ecological dimensions that are difficult to assess. Austria has identified the following main threats and challenges: *military threat, proliferation, destabilization,*

²⁹ SIPOL B 2000; p. 25

³⁰ Ibid; p. 20-21

³¹ Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; p. 25

*globalization, civilization based threats, demographic trends, migration, and scarcity of resources.*³² In addition, it assesses that the *vulnerability of modern societies*, highly dependent on information technology, has increased.³³

a. *Military Threat*

Currently there is no European state that has aggressive political intentions. However, since military threats are the result of the military potential and political intentions, security policy has to consider possible changes in political intentions. Possible re-nationalization of security policies in different countries should be seen as a residual military risk.³⁴ Therefore, the remaining military potential in Europe, even if not strategic-offensive, has to be judged as a potential threat. However, the probability of a classical interstate war in Western Europe can be disregarded. Nonetheless, there is a high probability of sub-conventional and conventional armed conflicts in instable regions in Europe especially on its periphery. Spillovers from armed conflicts in border regions of Europe are possible, representing a major challenge for security.

b. *Proliferation*

Despite diverse banning conventions, the number of states possessing WMD and associated delivery systems has increased. More than twenty-five states are considered having or developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Until 2010, the whole of Europe will be in the range of ballistic missiles launched from outside the continent.³⁵

c. *Destabilization*

Destabilization is mainly caused by lack in democracy and by economic, ethnical, or religious tensions. Having unsolved border disputes or dissatisfied minorities, there are still highly unstable regions in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.³⁶

³² Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; p. 21; 27-31

³³ Ibid; p. 27

³⁴ Ibid; p. 27-28

³⁵ Ibid; p. 28

³⁶ Ibid; p. 28-29

d. Globalization

Globalization causes increased interdependence between external and internal security. The number of non-state actors and occasionally state sponsored has increased. As a result of weak governments and the lack in international counterstrategies, transnational organized crime constitutes an increasing threat. The availability of modern information technology and WMD provides new dimensions to terrorism. The transnational links between different terrorist groups requires international counterstrategies.³⁷

e. Civilization Based Threats, Demographic Trends, Migration, and Scarcity of Resources

Natural, technological, and ecological disasters, global health risks, and diseases have, beside their primarily deadly and devastating consequences, a political dimension as well. They may lead to political and economical destabilization of whole regions, resulting in mass migration.³⁸

In general, the population in less developed countries is growing faster than their economy. The combination of this trend with an increasing scarcity of resources such as water, bad economic management, and nationwide environmental damages, deteriorates living facilities. The resulting lack in state order and regional interstate or intrastate conflicts increases the pressure on migration and may cause disruption of international trade. Concerned by these impacts, the international community is increasingly willing to intervene militarily, in such conflicts in order to stabilize these regions.³⁹

3. Sweden

During the Cold War, Sweden's geo-strategic situation exposed the country to direct threats from the Warsaw Pact. Similar to Austria, Sweden was a buffer zone between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As a consequence, Sweden followed a policy of non-alignment in peacetime and neutrality in the event of war. After the end of the Cold War, Sweden's immediate security environment changed fundamentally. Its borders with the

³⁷ Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; p. 29-31

³⁸ Ibid; p. 29

³⁹ Ibid; p. 22

Soviet Union disappeared and left a security vacuum in the Baltic Sea region. In the meantime, due to EU and NATO integration, Sweden's cooperation with the Baltic States, and Russia's cooperation with the US, the EU, and NATO, stability in Europe increased.⁴⁰ Sweden, as a member of the EU, judges the overall developments in Europe as a chance for more security and prosperity. On the other side, Sweden assesses many challenges and threats to the world community, Europe and its own society and territory.

Even if military invasion is no longer an immediate threat, it cannot be ruled out totally. The development in Russia is of great concern for Sweden, since it has great impacts on the security in Northern Europe.⁴¹ In addition, *terrorism, proliferation of WMD, dependence on information technology, international crime, natural and technological disasters, civil wars and failing states, and a growing disparity in wealth* may challenge Sweden's security.

a. Military Threat

Due to general low military preparedness and increased political and economic integration in Europe, military invasion of Sweden is highly unlikely given that Sweden maintains basic defense capabilities. However, the political situation could change quite rapidly, in particular as a result of political and economic turbulences in Russia.⁴² The Swedish government assesses armed attacks against targets in Sweden, aiming at disrupting the functioning of Swedish society or to influence Sweden's decisions and actions, as possible. They could be the result of acute crisis and conflicts in its eastern vicinity and could be conducted primarily with airborne long-range weapons or limited forces. In this regard, especially the spread of WMD gives rise to concern.⁴³

⁴⁰ Summary: A More Secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World; p. 1-2

⁴¹ Swedish Ministry of Defence; *A CHANGING WORLD – A REFORMED DEFENCE*; Stockholm, 1999; p. 6

⁴² von Sydow, B.; p. 19

⁴³ *A CHANGING WORLD – A REFORMED DEFENCE*; p. 6

b. *Russia*

Until 1999, uncertain developments in Russia were seen as the greatest threat to security in Northern Europe.⁴⁴ However, Russia's foreign and security policy became more predictable through improved bilateral relations with the US and major European countries, and increased cooperation with the EU and NATO. On the other side, Russia is still asserting its own interests both with respect to the West and to countries and regions in its own vicinity, such as Chechnya.⁴⁵ Despite all positive developments, uncertainties in economic development and the rule of law remain. Any stagnation would make it extremely difficult to carry through the reforms that have been initiated. As a consequence, predictions about external consequences are very difficult.⁴⁶

c. *Terrorism*

Terrorism, with its increasing probability of using WMD, constitutes a growing threat for security, democracy and open societies. Due to observable international links between different terrorist groups, it is necessary to fight terrorism with increased international cooperation. Terrorist attacks have to be seen primarily as criminal acts and should be dealt with according to standard legal institutions, with respect to international law and human rights, and in the event of armed conflict the laws of war.⁴⁷

d. *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*

Proliferation of WMD cannot be seen as a merely local or regional threat, since any use would have global security impacts. Therefore, states in North Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia, trying to gain possession of WMD constitute a grave global threat. Furthermore, the risk that non-state actors, not hesitate to use them, could gain possession of WMD boosts this threat.⁴⁸ Since missile technology increasingly allows reaching Europe, the development of defense capabilities against such attacks has taken on greater importance.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ A CHANGING WORLD – A REFORMED DEFENCE; p. 2

⁴⁵ Summary: A More Secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World; p. 2

⁴⁶ Ibid; p. 4

⁴⁷ Ibid; p. 8-9

⁴⁸ Ibid; p. 12

⁴⁹ Ibid; p. 12

e. Societies' Dependence on Information Technology

Increasing dependence on information technology has brought the risk that criminal groups, terrorists, and non-democratic states – irrespective where in the world these actors are based – may exploit technology to threaten Sweden's security.⁵⁰

f. Other Threats

In addition to the above-described threats, Sweden assesses other areas of concern. International crime, natural and technological disasters, civil wars, failing states, and growing disparity in wealth could lead to forced or voluntary migration, having impacts on Europe's and Sweden's security.⁵¹ Furthermore, the disparity in military technology developments constitutes a challenge. The gap between the US and the European Armed Forces is widening. Small, non-aligned states can hardly afford to modernize their Armed Forces, as they should. Sweden judges improved cooperation between military industries in Europe as a solution, as long as their own industry is not in danger.⁵²

B. SECURITY POLICY GOALS, STRATEGY AND INSTRUMENTS

1. Switzerland

a. Goals

According to the Constitution, Switzerland "...protects freedom and the rights of its population and guarantees the independence and security of the country."⁵³ To do so, Switzerland fosters common wealth, sustainable development, cohesion within Switzerland, and cultural diversity. Switzerland pleads for a permanent preservation of natural resources and for a peaceful and fair international order. It is in the interest of

⁵⁰ Ministry of Defence; *Continued Renewal of the Total Defence*; Fact Sheet; 2001; p. 1; [<http://www.defence.ministry.se>] (5/12/2004)

⁵¹ Ministry of Defence; *Swedish Security Policy in the Light of International Change*; Regierungskansliet; Stockholm 1998; p. 1-2 and Ministerium des Auswärtigen; *Regierungserklärung anlässlich der ausserpolitischen Debatte im Reichstag am 11. Februar 2004*; p. 10; [<http://www.utrikes.regeringen.se/inenglish/policy/statements/index.htm>] (4/16/2004)

⁵² von Sydow, B.; p. 16-17

⁵³ SIPOL B 2000; p. 38

Switzerland to preserve democracy and peace in Europe, stability in the whole strategic relevant environment, and to keep vital systems working on the national and international level.⁵⁴

The following security policy goals are the result of the constitution and Switzerland's national interests and international solidarity:

- "We [Switzerland] want to decide autonomously about our own internal and external issues, without being influenced through application or menace of direct or indirect violence." Switzerland retains its right to defend its territory or its political interests with all available and appropriate means.
- "We [Switzerland] want to protect our population and their fundamentals for living from grave threats." This is mainly a matter of economic, social, environmental, transportation, energy, and communication policy.
- "We [Switzerland] want to contribute to stability and peace outside our borders and to the establishment of a democratic international community, in order to protect our population from the impacts of instability and war abroad and in order to show our international solidarity."⁵⁵

b. Strategy

In contrast to former security strategies, Switzerland's new strategy slightly shifts the main focus away from defense policy toward a comprehensive security policy, combining all political areas. Having analyzed the threats and challenges, Switzerland's new security strategy, "Security through Cooperation",⁵⁶ is the answer to the necessity to act preventively in foreign and domestic trouble areas in order to diminish impacts on Switzerland. The strategy is based on the willingness and capability to protect the population as far as possible with its own civil and military instruments. Where these are not sufficient, because of the kind of threat, geographic distance or material shortfalls, Switzerland wants to increase international cooperation. Security within Switzerland shall be guaranteed through best possible and flexible coordination of civil and military

⁵⁴ SIPOL B 2000; p. 38

⁵⁵ Ibid; p. 38-39

⁵⁶ The former security strategy was characterized by highest possible autonomy.

security policy instruments. Internationally, Switzerland wants to expand its cooperation with friendly states and with security organizations, particularly the UN, the OSCE, NATO through Partnership for Peace, and the EU.

The strategy results in three main goals:

- Peace support and crisis management

"Switzerland takes its opportunity to contribute to foster peace in its strategic vicinity, to peaceful settlements of international crisis, and to reconstruction of war damaged regions with its appropriate security policy instruments."⁵⁷ Switzerland intends to achieve this goal through membership and participation in international organizations, deployment of civilian and military personnel (e.g. election observers, yellow berets), humanitarian activities (e.g. Swiss Disaster Relief Corps), and initiatives and services relevant to security policy (e.g. the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-Mining, or the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces).⁵⁸ Switzerland's contribution requires an approval by international law, meaning a UN or OSCE mandate.

- Prevention and management of existential dangers

"The security instruments are contributing to prevention and management of grave dangers, in particular natural and technical disasters and disruption of law and order with strategic impacts."⁵⁹ Switzerland intends to achieve this goal through assistance with civil and military personnel in the event of natural or technological disasters at home and abroad, protection of persons and important facilities (e.g. power and communications installations, foreign embassies), and fighting organized crime and terrorism. Military assistance is based on the principle of subsidiary.

⁵⁷ SIPOL B 2000; p. 41

⁵⁸ For details see: Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport (VBS); *Jahresbericht des Bundesrates über die Teilnahme der Schweiz am Euro-Atlantischen Partnerschaftsrat und an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden*; Bern, April 2004; [<http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/sicherheitspolitik/de/home/publikationen.html>] (5/6/2004); Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP); [<http://www.gcsp.ch/>] (5/6/2004), Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF); [<http://www.dcaf.ch/>] (5/6/2004), Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHHD); [<http://www.gichd.ch/>] (5/6/2004)

⁵⁹ SIPOL B 2000; p. 42-44

- Defense

"Switzerland maintains the capability to protect its sovereignty, its territory, its air space and its population from menace and the use of force."⁶⁰ Therefore Switzerland maintains credible Armed Forces with modern equipment and a high level of training, appropriate readiness, and the capabilities to cooperate with foreign forces for defense if necessary. In addition, it wants to maintain an efficient civil protection organization. Switzerland acknowledges that it can defend its territory, population and interest together with allies, since the status of neutrality becomes invalid in the case of a direct military attack. In order to prepare for such a case, cooperation in training is unproblematic as long as it does not constitute a mutual obligation.⁶¹

The new strategy is based on retaining perpetual neutrality but at the same time to use the widest possible freedom of action. Every neutral state decides for itself how far it should follow the policy of neutrality to prove its reliability.⁶² Switzerland assesses that the current and future security environment allows the retention of neutrality without hindering its active participation in fighting common threats and establishing effective international security systems.⁶³ Unfortunately, Switzerland's understanding of neutrality restricts its participation to the UN, OSCE and NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). Joining the most important security organizations for Europe, the EU and NATO, as a full member is politically not feasible. This may result in unwelcome effects of non-participation in and not supporting sanctions and interventions, such as NATO's mission to Kosovo in 1999, even if this would be in the best interest of Switzerland's national goals and policies.

The report assesses mainly three alternatives to the described security strategy. First, going back to strict autonomy is not considered as a real option, since the changed security environment requires cooperation and since Switzerland cannot afford such a strategy from the economic and technical viewpoint. The option to join the EU is

⁶⁰ SIPOL B 2000; p. 44

⁶¹ Ibid; p. 41-45

⁶² Ibid; p. 45

⁶³ Ibid; p. 46

described as the most valid alternative. Membership in the EU would improve Switzerland's security, especially concerning fighting organized crime, migration, and economic pressure. On the other side, having the obligation to support common policies would decrease Switzerland's freedom of action. Therefore, non-membership is considered as the best possible option since it guarantees high security policy freedom.⁶⁴ Due to possible domestic political opposition, the government did not appropriately analyze and explain the current status of the *European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)*. As a consequence, the main part of the political elite and the population still sees the EU mainly only as an economic rather than a security organization.⁶⁵ With regard to defense policy, EU membership would provide a clear benchmark, forcing Switzerland to shape its Armed Forces along the most probable tasks. Membership in NATO is not seen as necessary since Switzerland's willingness to cooperate through PfP would be enough to handle current and future threats and challenges. Conversely, the report addresses the importance of common training, in particular military training, to be able to cooperate in case of emergencies or wars.⁶⁶ Unfortunately, the government does not answer the question, how much cooperation really is possible without joining these organizations.

To conclude, Switzerland realized that an autonomous security policy is no longer a valid strategy to meet current and future threats and challenges. However, it is not yet willing to go the only effective and consequent path, joining the most important security organizations for Europe. The strategy "Security through Cooperation" is highly dependent on the willingness of its neighbors and possible allies to cooperate in the event of crisis or war but also in time of peace. The decision is not in Switzerland's hands, even if this is meant to be. If the European countries are willing to do so against the background that Switzerland only wants to cooperate if it cannot handle the challenges on its own is more than questionable and does not meet prerequisites of real solidarity. The combination of Switzerland's long lasting political myth of neutrality and the unique political system, aiming at consensus among all political parties and the population, still

⁶⁴ SIPOL B 2000; p. 51-53

⁶⁵ Spillmann, K. R., Wenger, A., Breitenmoser, Ch., Gerber, M.; *Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik seit 1945, Zwischen Autonomie und Kooperation*; Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung; Zürich, 2001; p. 234-235

⁶⁶ SIPOL B 2000; p. 50

hinders Switzerland to follow a consequent path. The direct democratic system, giving the citizens the last approval of changes to the constitution, such as membership in an international organization, requires convincing not only the political elite but also the whole population. Therefore, all cantons, trade unions, employer organizations, and numerous associations were invited to comment the first draft of the Security Policy Report in 1999.⁶⁷ Together with the diversity of political opinions, ranging from liberals and social democrats who claim the need to actively participate in European and international organizations including membership in the EU, to conservatives who believe that only acting independently will guarantee Switzerland's survival⁶⁸, forces the government to negotiate compromises in advance instead of following a straight forward policy.

c. Instruments

Due to Switzerland's understanding of security policy as comprehensive strategy the instruments are diverse. Instruments such as foreign policy, civil protection, economic policy, economic supply, national security organization and police forces, or information and communication become more and more important. However, even with a shift away from defense policy, the Armed Forces still play an essential role in the new security strategy. The importance increased after the Federal Council decided not to increase the number of police forces. Instead, the Armed Forces will increasingly and permanently have to support civil authorities in border control and guarding infrastructure.⁶⁹

The Armed Forces have to deal with important political preconditions. First of all, Swiss neutrality does not allow the joining of NATO or any other military alliance. Second, the Armed Forces have to remain basically militia Armed Forces, since the costs are considered to be lower than for professional Armed Forces. Third, the

⁶⁷ Catrina, Ch.; *Defense Reform in Switzerland*; in Gyarmati I. and Winkler T.; *Post-Cold War defense reform: lessons learned in Europe and the United States*; Brassey's; Washington D.C., 2002; p. 8

⁶⁸ For details see: SVP; *Wahlplattform 2003-2007*; p. 16-17, 22-23; AUNS; *Grauer Brief 91*; Sozialdemokratische Partei; *Medienmitteilung 3/26/2002*; [http://al.sp-ps.ch/data/COMM-D/2002/020326_zum-APK-Bericht-EU.pdf] (5/5/2004); Freiheitlich Demokratische Partei (FDP); *Positionspapiere: Prioritäten 2004-2007*; [http://www.fdp.ch/page/content/index.asp_Q_MenuID_E_8428_A_ID_E_20518_A_Menu_E_2_A_Item_E_3.7] (5/5/2004)

⁶⁹ For details see: Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport (VBS); *Ueberprüfung der Zielsetzungen der Armee*; Berichterstattung an die Bundesversammlung gemäss Artikel 149b des Militärgesetzes; Pilotbericht per 31. Dezember 2003; Bern, 2004, p. 20-21 [<http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/vbs/de/home/ausdem/publikationen/berichte.html>] (5/6/2004)

Armed Forces have to deal with a steadily decreasing military budget, due to increasing costs for social and health security and decreasing willingness to spend money for the military.

2. Austria

a. Goals

According to its constitution, Austria protects freedom and rights of its population and security of the nation. It fosters common wealth through economic freedom, social fairness, and cultural diversity. Austria pleads for preservation of natural resources and for a peaceful and fair international order.⁷⁰ Furthermore, as a member of the EU⁷¹ Austria has the obligation to protect the EU's basic principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Finally, Austria has an obligation toward the UN, protecting and securing world peace and inner security, friendly relations with other nations based on equality and sovereignty, and fostering international cooperation.⁷²

In sum, Austria's security interests are based on vital national interests and security interests of the EU. The relationship between both interests is based on the assessment that members of the union are not able to achieve their security goals on their own. Therefore they are dependent on solidarity from their European neighbors. On the other hand, in order to realize common goals, the union is dependent on adequate contribution of all its members.⁷³

To protect these basic principles, Austria follows a comprehensive security and defense policy with the following goals:

- Austria protects its independence, its territory, the constitutional institutions and their freedom of action, and the democratic freedom of its citizens.
- Austria contributes to the establishment of a comprehensive and effective European security order, which consists of military, intellectual, civil and economic elements.

⁷⁰ Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; p. 58

⁷¹ Austria joined the EU in 1995

⁷² Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; p. 58-59

⁷³ Ibid; p. 69

- Austria participates in efforts of the UN, the OSCE, and NATO to secure peace and stability.
- Austria conducts active relations to its neighbors based on cooperation and solidarity.
- Austria actively and equally participates in developing further European integration and supports therefore the common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which should lead to a common defense.⁷⁴

b. Strategy

Austria's security strategy is designed to avoid war and to foster peaceful relations among its neighbors. Similar to Switzerland, Austria follows a comprehensive security policy, relying on systematic cooperation among various policy areas.⁷⁵

In contrast to Switzerland, Austria's security policy is focused on broadest possible active participation in international security organizations, based on the conviction that security and stability can be best guaranteed through cooperation among functionally, complementary, and mutually supportive institutions. Austria is convinced that the better it is integrated in international security architecture, the more efficiently it will be able to safeguard its security interests, to achieve its peace policy objectives, and to shape a stable and peaceful environment.⁷⁶ Thereby, the security of Austria is inseparably linked to the security of the EU.⁷⁷ Even membership in NATO is not basically excluded from diverse security policy options. Therefore, Austria permanently observes the alliance's development and assesses the value of membership for its security and defense policy.⁷⁸ In sum, even if Austria remains basically neutral and wants to keep its sovereignty to decide on the future development of its security policy, its main policy is focused on solidarity with the international community rather than strict neutrality.

The question of what explains Austria's relatively easy change in its policy of neutrality toward solidarity has three answers. First, Austria's neutrality never had the

⁷⁴ Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; p. 59

⁷⁵ Security and Defence Doctrine; General Considerations; p. 1 and 12

⁷⁶ Ibid; p. 7

⁷⁷ Ibid; p. 1 and 5

⁷⁸ Ibid; p. 9

same importance as Switzerland's. Furthermore, its political system, giving main power to the ruling party, allows following a more consequent path in security policy issues as well as other areas. Finally in contrast to Switzerland, Austria already had a broad public debate about membership in European security organizations.

c. Instruments

Similar to Switzerland, Austria's security policy instruments are diverse. The main emphasis is placed on foreign policy, defense policy and internal security. In addition, instruments such as economic, agricultural, transport, infrastructural, financial, educational, and information policy will contribute to a comprehensive security framework.⁷⁹

3. Sweden

a. Goals

Sweden's current security policy goals are described as follows:

The aims of Sweden's security policy are to preserve our country's peace and independence, contribute to stability and security in our vicinity and strengthen international peace and security.

Sweden does not participate in military alliances...Looking to the future, it is more apparent than ever that security is more than the absence of military conflict. Threats to peace and our security can best be averted collectively and in cooperation with other countries. The primary expression of this conviction at the global level is our support for the United Nations. As a member of the European Union we are part of a community characterized by solidarity, whose primary purpose is to prevent war on the European continent.⁸⁰

This statement means that Sweden has similar security policy goals as Switzerland and Austria. As a member of the EU, Sweden also has the obligation to protect the union's basic principles.⁸¹ As the other two countries, Sweden also has the same obligations toward the UN.

⁷⁹ Security and Defence Doctrine; General Considerations; p. 12

⁸⁰ Summary: A More secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World; p. 13

⁸¹ Sweden joined the EU in 1995.

b. Strategy

Sweden's security strategy is not as clearly stated as Switzerland's or Austria's. Sweden is following a comprehensive security policy as well, relying on cooperation among various policy areas. Thereby, each government authority should analyze the vulnerability and the risks in its sphere of responsibility in order to develop areas of cooperation.⁸² The strategy is mainly based on defense policy and on foreign policy. Defense policy consists of *Total Defense*, a principle based on military and civil defense. The aim is to defend Sweden against armed attacks, to assert its territorial integrity, to promote peace and security in its neighborhood, and to strengthen Swedish society to withstand severe peacetime emergencies.⁸³ Sweden's security policy also has an international dimension. Due to the conviction that international security is vital for Sweden's own security, Sweden intends to increase its contribution to international activities, promoting common security and crisis management. As a consequence, Sweden actively participates in the UN, the EU, NATO through PfP, and established a regional cooperation with the countries in the Baltic Sea region.⁸⁴

However, keeping its non-alignment status Sweden does not join military alliances. Nonetheless, within the framework of ESDP, Sweden sees no contradiction by actively contributing to international crisis management using civil and military means, so as to be able to discharge the entire range of the *EU Petersberg Tasks*⁸⁵ in Europe and

⁸² Ministry of Defence; *Society's Security and Preparedness*; Fact Sheet; 2002; p. 1; [<http://www.forsvar.regeringen.se>] (4/3/2004)

⁸³ Ministry of Defence; *Budget Bill 2003*; Fact Sheet on the Swedish Government's Budget Bill 2003; presented to the Parliament on 8 October, 2002; Stockholm; p. 1; [<http://www.forsvar.regeringen.se>] (4/3/2004)

⁸⁴ Swedish Defence Commission; *European Security – Sweden's Defence*; Summary of a report by the Swedish Defence Commission; 1999; p. 4; [<http://forsvar.regeringen.se/inenglish/informationmtrl/infomtrl.htm>] (4/16/2004)

⁸⁵ For details see: Western European Union; Petersberg Declaration; Western European Union Council of Ministers; Bonn, 1992; [www.weu.int] (5/5/2004) and *The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*; [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/search_treaties.html] (5/12/2004)

its vicinity, but also globally. On the other side, Sweden sees no compatibility with its policy of non-alignment with advanced cooperation tending to create a common European defense.⁸⁶

To conclude, Sweden follows a security policy that is characterized by a mix of autonomy and international cooperation. Even if it wants to retain its status of non-alignment, Sweden participates actively in international security organizations. In contrast to Switzerland, Sweden always saw its status of neutrality only as a policy instrument in time of war and never as a political prerequisite or maxim. Furthermore, its political system allows the government to follow a consequent path toward integration in Europe, without the fear of immediate public opposition.

c. Instruments

Similar to the other two countries, Sweden follows a comprehensive security policy, using diverse instruments. In contrast to the other countries, Sweden's main effort seems to be put on defense policy. However, instruments such as foreign, economic, asylum, international development, trade, and environmental policy contribute to a comprehensive security framework as well.⁸⁷

C. OTHER DECISIVE FACTORS

The security environment with its threats and challenges is primarily decisive for security policy. However, there are other factors shaping security policy, its strategies and instruments. The following chapter will provide a comparison of three different additional factors that shape Switzerland, Austria and Sweden's security policy: the *political system*, the *understanding of neutrality*, and the *economic situation*.

1. Political System

The political systems in the three countries are slightly different, even if all three are democracies. The differences shape the way political decisions are made and imple-

⁸⁶ Summary: A More secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World; 2003; p. 18

⁸⁷ Swedish Foreign Policy; p. 2

mented. The main question in this chapter is how easily a government can change its national and international policies.

a. Switzerland

Switzerland is a confederation, consisting of 26 cantons. It has the purest form of direct democracy, meaning that the population has, if it wishes, the last word in every amendment of the constitution or laws.

The Swiss government consists of the seven members of the Federal Council, who are elected by the United Federal Assembly for a four-year term. The President of the Confederation is elected for just one year and is regarded as the *primus inter pares* for this period, having only equal power among all seven members.⁸⁸ The National Council consists of 200 members who represent the Swiss people. Each canton constitutes an electoral constituency and elects at least one member, whatever the size of its population. Seats are allotted in proportion to the resident population of each constituency. The Council of States has 46 members who represent the Swiss cantons. The Half-cantons⁸⁹ shall select one senator each; the other cantons shall elect two senators. Both the National Council and the Council of States meet as the United Federal Assembly, in order to carrying out elections, arbitrating of conflicts between upper federal authorities, and voting on pardons.⁹⁰

New laws or amendments to laws are initiated either by a popular or cantonal initiative, or by administrative or parliamentary action. In order to initiate a popular initiative, an interest group needs to collect signatures of 100,000 voters within an 18-month period. A popular initiative may be formulated as a general proposal or, much more often, be put forward as a precise new text, whose wording can no longer be changed by the Parliament or the Government. The authorities have the possibility to respond to such an initiative with a counter-proposal in the hope that the people and states give their preference to it. After the new law is drafted, the consultation procedure be-

⁸⁸ The Swiss Federal Council; *The Swiss Federal Council*; 4/8/2004; p. 1; [<http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/cf/index.html>] (4/15/2004)

⁸⁹ Obwalden, Nidwalden, Basel-City, Basel-Country, Appenzell Outer Rhodes, and Appenzell Inner Rhodes

⁹⁰ The Swiss Parliament; *The Federal Assembly*; 4/8/2004; [<http://www.parlament.ch/e/homepage.htm>] (4/15/2004)

gins. The draft is forwarded to the cantons, parties, associations, and other groups with particular interests in the subject. They are all entitled to state their position and propose amendments. Even if these propositions are not binding for the parliament, the possibility of a referendum makes it highly probable to include as many recommendations as possible, gaining public support. Thereafter, the draft goes through a verification process in both chambers of the parliament. If they do not agree, they have to reconsider it in both chambers again. If there is no agreement after the third round, members of a committee of both chambers seek a compromise, which they forward to the two councils for a final vote. At the end, an optional referendum for laws and certain treaties and a compulsory referendum for amendment of the Constitution and on membership to international organizations give the population the right of last approval. An optional referendum has to be sought within 100 days after the parliament has adopted the new law and needs 50,000 electoral signatures. Thereafter, a ballot must be held and a double majority –popular majority and majority of the states – is needed for adoption.⁹¹ The referendum is similar to the veto and has the effect of delaying and safeguarding the political process by blocking amendments adopted by parliament or the government or delaying their effect. The adoption of new laws or a change in the constitution is a complex and lengthy venture. The process takes at least twelve months, but in extreme cases may even take twelve years.⁹²

Against this background, it is obvious that in Switzerland the implementation of new policies is quite difficult. The government not only needs the support of the parliament, but also the support of the population. Thorough public discussion of political issues is necessary to convince the electorate. Security policy issues and in particular the Armed Forces are no exception. The fact that a large majority of Swiss males are serving or have served, supports the not always justified conviction that they are in a good position to judge all military issues.⁹³ It would be difficult to give up old military traditions

⁹¹ How is a new law enacted? (Legislative procedure); p. 1-4

⁹² Ibid; p. 1

⁹³ Catrina, Ch.; p. 16

such as the militia or conscription since nearly every Swiss male identifies himself with the military through these traditions. Abolishing any unit such as traditional packhorse units could mean a loss of individual identity.

b. Austria

Austria is a democratic republic. The citizens directly elect the President of the republic by majority vote for a six-year term. The President appoints the Federal Chancellor and, on the latter's proposal, all members of the government.⁹⁴ The government consists of the Federal Chancellor, the Vice Federal Chancellor and different ministers. It is responsible for all political issues. Deciding, unanimously, about bills is its main legal competence.⁹⁵ The Austrian parliament, also called the General Assembly, consists of a Nation Assembly and an Upper House. Together they are responsible for ratifying new or amendments to laws. The citizens directly elect the National Assembly by proportional vote. The Upper House consists of members of each county proportionate to their population. They are appointed by the parliaments of their respective county.⁹⁶

Like in Switzerland, the government, the National Assembly, the Upper House or the population through initiatives may propose new laws or amendments to laws. Popular initiatives require 100,000 signatures or those of a sixth of the population of three counties. Acceptance of laws basically requires consent of the National Assembly and the Upper House. However, if they are not in consent and the National Assembly retains its position, the law is implemented. The National Assembly, as the representatives of the population, has the main political power. A popular vote is only mandatory for changing the Constitution as a whole or if the National Assembly decides to do so.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Republik Oesterreich; *Bundespräsident*; Bundeskanzleramt; Bundespressdienst; Wien, 1997-2004; p. 1; [<http://www.austria.gov.at/oesterreich/polysystem/praesidentauf.htm>] (4/15/2004)

⁹⁵ Republik Oesterreich; *Bundesregierung – Organisation und Funktion*; Bundeskanzleramt; Bundespressdienst; Wien, 1997-2004; p. 1; [<http://www.austria.gov.at/regierung/reorgfunkt.htm>] (4/15/2004)

⁹⁶ Republik Oesterreich; *Parlament*; Bundeskanzleramt; Bundespressdienst; Wien, 1997-2004; p. 1; [<http://www.austria.gov.at/oesterreich/polysystem/parlament.htm>] (4/15/2004)

⁹⁷ Republik Oesterreich; *WIE KOMMEN IN OESTERREICH GESETZTE ZUSTANDE?*; Bundeskanzleramt; Bundespressdienst; Wien, 1997-2004; p. 1; [<http://www.austria.gov.at/oesterreich/polysystem/gesetzgeb.htm>] (4/15/2004)

As a consequence, the introduction of new policies and laws does not need the immediate support of the population. The government only has to reach consent among the political elites and not among the whole population.

c. Sweden

Even if Sweden is officially a monarchy, in which the King or the Queen holds the office of the Head of State, the government and the parliament have the real political power. The King himself has only representative tasks and is not required to sign any governmental decisions.⁹⁸

The citizens directly elect the Swedish parliament for a four-year term. The number of seats allocated to each party is directly proportional to the number of votes received in the last election. Prior to the election of the Prime Minister and the formation of the government, the Speaker of the parliament must summon one or more leaders of each parliamentary party for consultation. Thereafter, the speaker nominates a candidate for the post of Prime Minister, which is then elected – or not – by the parliament by majority vote. The newly elected Prime Minister proceeds to form a government, whose composition is determined by the balance of political forces in the parliament.⁹⁹ The Prime Minister delivers a statement of government policy at the annual opening of the Riksdag, setting out government policy goals, identifying central political issues and defining priority policy areas at national and international level.¹⁰⁰ Or in other words, the Prime Minister and his government set the political agenda for the next legislation and define in which direction it wants society to move¹⁰¹. However, all major political decisions must be approved by the parliament, which also supervises the activities of the government and has the power to depose it by a declaration of no confidence.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ The Swedish Government; *The Head of State*; 27 March 2003; p. 1; [http://www.sweden.gov.se/systemofgov/system_headofstate.htm] (4/15/2004)

⁹⁹ The Swedish Government; *The Government and the Riksdag*; 4/7/2004; p. 2; [http://www.sweden.gov.se/systemofgov/system_govandriks.htm] (4/15/2004)

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p. 3

¹⁰¹ The Swedish Government; *The Government Tasks*; 4/7/2004; p. 1, [http://www.sweden.gov.se/systemofgov/system_govtasks.htm] (4/15/2004)

¹⁰² *The Government and the Riksdag*; p. 1-3;

Even if there is the possibility for every citizen and organization to initiate new or amendments to laws, the driving factor behind the process of changing laws is the government. The changes are made in legislative proposals, or bills, which are laid before the Riksdag for approval. Thereafter, it is the task of the government to implement the changes or the new laws in a proper way.¹⁰³ Even if the constitution makes provision for the voters to express their views on major political issues through direct referendum, the results of such referendums have normally only consultative character and are not binding for the Riksdag.¹⁰⁴

As in Austria, the Swedish political system leaves the main power on the governmental and parliament level. The citizens can express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government through elections. As a consequence, there is no immediate need to discuss policy issues publicly. If the political elites can agree on a certain policy, the government is able to implement it in a shorter time than in Switzerland. Furthermore, Sweden's one-chamber parliament facilitates decision-making. In this sense Sweden's political system is less time consuming than Switzerland's and Austria's.

2. Neutrality

Even if, according to international law, neutrality basically means not to participate in wars between other states, every neutral state has its own interpretation. The different understandings of neutrality in Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden should provide an explanation for why it is possible for Sweden and Austria to join international security institutions, such as the EU and, in case of Austria probably even NATO, while Switzerland still expresses the need to remain its status of perpetual neutrality.

a. Switzerland

Switzerland freely declared itself a neutral country in 1814. Neutrality was and is, beside the special political system, the most decisive political principle in Switzerland. Manipulating the relationship between the country and the international community,

¹⁰³ The Government Tasks; p. 2

¹⁰⁴ The Government and the Riksdag; p. 1-3

neutrality shapes Switzerland's security policy to a very high degree.¹⁰⁵ Since neutrality disallowed joining a military or an economic alliance possible security policy options were always decreased to only a few. During the Cold War and until 1973 the Armed Forces were seen as the main and exclusive security policy instrument in Switzerland.

The experience from World War II where perpetual and armed neutrality kept Switzerland more or less outside the war seemed to confirm its policy. However, the creation of the UN as a collective security instrument after WWII, banning war and not accepting neutrality as an instrument under international law, required a reassessment of this policy.¹⁰⁶ Switzerland's official reaction was one of absolutism in its neutrality policy, declaring Switzerland wherever possible as a special case. Neutrality was not a political instrument but a structural principle with existential meaning.¹⁰⁷ Not only had the political and economic elite developed an emotional affinity toward neutrality but also a majority of the population.

Between 1945 and 1986 neutrality changed from a security policy instrument toward a political maxim and finally toward a myth. It was defined as "keep [Switzerland] out of foreign affairs" and "do not open the Swiss frontiers too wide", principles of Niklaus von Flüe during the battle of Marignano in 1515¹⁰⁸. Even if neutrality basically means not to participate in wars between other states, Switzerland's understanding went further. In 1954, the Federal Political Department established written rules how to handle neutrality as a maxim of foreign and security policy. The so-called Bindschedler-Doctrine¹⁰⁹ instituted three responsibilities, which were declared mandatory even in times of peace: first, a neutral state is not allowed to start a war; second, such a state has

¹⁰⁵ Spillmann, K. R.; p. 19

¹⁰⁶ Ibid; p. 20

¹⁰⁷ Möckli, D.; *Vor einer neuen Uno-Abstimmung: Drei Erkenntnisse aus der Niederlage von 1986*; in: Bulletin 2000 zur Schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik; p. 57; [<http://www.eda.admin.ch>] (4/12/2004)

¹⁰⁸ The battle of Marignano was fought in 1515, in the Italian Wars, fought by Francis I of France and his Venetian allies against the Swiss Confederates, who then controlled the duchy of Milan. One of the bloodiest engagements in the Italian Wars, its outcome was decided by the timely arrival of Venetian cavalry. Their military ambitions broken, the Swiss made peace with Francis and negotiated (1516) the "perpetual alliance".

¹⁰⁹ Named after its author Rudolf Bindschedler, which was at this time chief of the legal service of the Federal Political Department.

to defend its neutrality and independence; and finally, a neutral state had to follow certain preconditions. The preconditions were defined as follows: a neutral state has to do whatever it needs to prevent involvement in war, and to refrain from doing whatever it could to potentially involve it. As a consequence, Switzerland generally had to prevent taking sides in a conflict and had the obligation to follow a policy of strict armed neutrality.¹¹⁰ Even if these rules were intended to be for internal use only, they became the official concept of Swiss neutrality after publishing them in the Swiss Yearbook of International Law.¹¹¹

In a time when the Armed Forces were the main security policy instrument this narrow definition was not valid for foreign trade policy. Guaranteeing most possible freedom for trade, the only restriction was not to join or establish a tariff or economic union with another state. As a consequence, the Federal Council concluded that Switzerland could not join political or military alliances but could for solidarity reasons actively participate in economic, humanitarian, or technological organizations.¹¹² This policy was internationally accepted during the Cold War. It made Switzerland a neutral state between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and gave it the opportunity to play a role on the international political parquet by offering “good services”. As a consequence, the Federal Council steadily announced that Switzerland with its maxims of solidarity, universality, and disposability had an important role in the world community outside of international organizations and alliances.

However, during the seventies and eighties, Switzerland’s political elite realized that its special status would lead to an unbearable isolation in the world community after such other neutral states as Austria, Sweden, or Finland changed its policies of neutrality by joining international organizations. Switzerland had two options: follow the Swedish model of neutrality or follow the Austrian model. Sweden practiced a dual model, not activating neutrality as long as collective security worked. Or in other words,

¹¹⁰ Spillmann, K. R.; p. 44-45 and Schindler, D.; *Dokumente zur Schweizerischen Neutralität seit 1945: Berichte und Stellungnahmen der Schweizerischen Bundesbehörden zu Fragen der Neutralität 1945-1983*; Schriftenreihe der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik; Bern/Stuttgart, 1984; p. 15-19

¹¹¹ Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht; SJIR 1957; p. 195-199

¹¹² Spillmann, K. R.; p. 45

as long as the Security Council agreed on sanctions, Sweden could participate without giving up neutrality.¹¹³ Austria, on the other side, declared that collective security almost never functioned during the Cold War period and therefore there was enough space for neutral states in the UN. Furthermore, Austria could not be forced to participate in sanctions jeopardizing neutrality since the UN accepted its status. The Swiss Federal Council decided to follow the Austrian model and intended to join the UN. This resulted in immediate strong domestic opposition. After declaring for decades that Switzerland's neutrality was not compatible with collective security and its institutions, such a change in security policy was not accepted by the Swiss population. Seeing a successful long-lasting strategy on the edge, the population voted against UN membership in 1986.¹¹⁴

Both the domestic and the international environment changed after the end of the Cold War. Switzerland's security policy and neutrality had to be reassessed. As a consequence, the Federal Government expressed in its Security Policy Report 90 and its Foreign Policy Report 93 the necessity to adjust its security policy away from mainly defense policy and more toward foreign policy.¹¹⁵ The new foreign and security policy, in a broader sense, was considered to extend beyond Switzerland's borders, contributing to the "active and preventive promotion of peace", and fostering the "establishment and enlargement of collective security efforts."¹¹⁶ Replacing the restricting maxim of neutrality, solidarity with the international community and own interests should be the decisive factors for Switzerland's policies. The Swiss government declared that there is no place for neutrality between a state violating international law and the whole international community.¹¹⁷ Neutrality should be reduced to its core meaning in international law and should only be a last resort in case of a situation in which all other security instruments

¹¹³ For details see: Gabriel, J.M.; *Sackgasse Neutralität*; vdf Hochschulverlag AG an der ETH Zürich; Zürich, 1997, p. 141-143

¹¹⁴ Möckli, D.; p. 59-62

¹¹⁵ For details see: *Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren*; 29.11.1993. In: Bundesblatt 1994T 153; [<http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/g/home/recent/rep/forpol.html>] (5/12/2004) and *Bericht zur Neutralität (1993)*; Anhang zum Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren; In: BBI 1994 I; [<http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/g/home/recent/rep/neutral/neut93.html>] (5/12/2004)

¹¹⁶ Bericht zur Neutralität (1993); p. 173

¹¹⁷ For details see: Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren

do not work.¹¹⁸ Finally, the Federal Council had found a believable explanation for the relationship between neutrality and collective security.

It seemed that the Swiss sovereign accepted this explanation. Even if the opposition fought an emotional campaign having neutrality as the main issue, the Swiss sovereign voted in favor of UN membership in 2002. Furthermore, the new open security policy also had impacts on military domains. In addition to its traditional assignment of military observers to UN missions, Switzerland joined the Partnership for Peace Program in 1996 and deployed an unarmed military unit to the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1996 and 2000. However, compared with other neutral countries, Switzerland's contribution is still marginal.¹¹⁹ Caused by the still valid idea of neutrality, particularly in military issues, the creation of an armed "blue-helmet battalion" in 1994 was abandoned by the sovereign.¹²⁰

Even if the importance of neutrality in international and national policy has decreased since 1945 and the understanding that new threats such as international crime, terrorism, technical and natural disasters do not adhere to it, neutrality is still a defining factor in Switzerland's security and defense policy. The idea that neutrality is the best option to keep Switzerland out of struggles is still popular with the population, political parties, and diverse associations. In order to gain public support, neutrality remains a political prerequisite. Unfortunately this limited the number of possible options for military transformation projects such as the Swiss Armed Forces 95 and the Swiss Armed Forces XXI to only a few options.¹²¹

b. Austria

Austria's relationship in neutrality has changed fundamentally. After World War II, neutrality was the only option for Austria to regain its sovereignty from the occupying forces. Even if Austria was practically forced to become neutral its perception changed from a security policy instrument to a political maxim and a myth. By de-

¹¹⁸ Spillmann, K. R.; p. 162-164

¹¹⁹ Ibid; p. 167-171

¹²⁰ Ibid; p. 173

¹²¹ For details see: SIPOL B 2000

claring that the new security environment in Europe after the end of the Cold War required solidarity rather than neutrality, Austria managed to overcome the dilemma between active political, economic, and military participation in Europe and maintaining neutrality. Currently, Austria's status corresponds more to that of a non-aligned state rather than a neutral one.¹²²

In 1955, the Austrian National assembly ratified the Federal Constitutional Law on Austria's neutrality it was taken for granted that it would be modeled on that of Switzerland.¹²³ But from the very beginning, Austria's understanding of neutrality went further than Switzerland's. For example, Austria joined the UN in the same year. In the aftermath, Austria performed an active neutral policy as an arbitrator between the East and the West. During the following decades, neutrality became in Austria more of a political maxim and a myth than a security policy instrument. With regard to the UN, Austria felt that the UN had an obligation to respect its permanent neutrality, and therefore never calling on it to take coercive measures in a military conflict between other countries. This legal interpretation changed during the Gulf War in 1991. Austria regarded UN charter obligations as superseding neutrality obligations. Having lost its relevance in international relations and in a changed security environment, the classic understanding of neutrality was over.¹²⁴ Austria realized that permanent neutrality would hinder participation in the European integration process, which has been a long lasting determination of Austria's population.¹²⁵ Joining the EU in 1995 was more evidence for Austria's changed security and foreign policy. Participation in solidarity and as an equal player in an institution fostering economical and political development in order to establish a peaceful Europe became more important than maintaining neutrality. Austria adopted the EU's entire legal and political framework, accepting all responsibilities and duties according to the *Treaty of Maastricht* and its provision on the *Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)* and the future common ESDP. After ratifying the *Treaty of Amsterdam* in 1998,

¹²² Security and Defence Doctrine; General Considerations; p. 7

¹²³ Ibid; p. 6

¹²⁴ Ibid; p. 7

¹²⁵ Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; p. 63

Austria's National Assembly decided to participate in the whole spectrum of the *EU Petersberg Tasks*, including possible combat missions enforcing peace.

Austria's change in its understanding of neutrality was mainly caused by the conviction that neutrality had lost its function in a world with a high political and economical interdependence. The establishment of such new institutions of political cooperation and integration as NATO's *Partnership for Peace Program* or the *North Atlantic Council (NAC)* - offering participation to all nations even to former enemies – and higher integration and profound supranational structures in the EU fostered Austria's conviction to follow a policy of solidarity rather than a policy of "standing outside".¹²⁶ The principle of solidarity is thereby considered two-folded: it provides help and support from the international community for an individual state in case of an emergency and it provides support for the international community from each state. Only providing "good services", participating in security policy niches, or providing civil support is not compatible with the principle of solidarity and burden sharing. Furthermore, Austria is convinced that willingness and capability to contribute to international security appropriately to political and economic strength are decisive for a states importance and rank in international politics.¹²⁷ Austria is willing to follow this maxim as Dr. Wolfgang Schüssel, head of the Austrian government, declared in his government policy statement in 2003,

We stand for the development of a European peace and defense community. Austria will not be a free rider in security policy. It will contribute to a European security system including a future standby obligation.

Both the Armed Forces and the executive have to develop their function in a new Europe. Whatever we are considering and planning, we have to take in consideration that security is no longer a reservation of nation states in the 21st century; this is obvious for each citizen in his daily life – whether in his career, during his vacations, in his education, or in his family. Uncertainty, terrorism, and crime do not stop on the border.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; p. 13

¹²⁷ Ibid; p. 14

¹²⁸ Dr. Wolfgang Schüssel; *Regierungserklärung*; Wien, 2003; p. 8; [<http://www.austria.gv.at/>] (4/15/2004)

In contrast to Switzerland, Austria was able to assess the new security environment in Europe in a broader sense. Austria's assessment included options that required practically disbanding permanent neutrality. The ruling party's clear declaration to join NATO in the near future, as a logical consequence to participate in ESDP is further evidence for Austria's changed security strategy. In contrast, even if Switzerland realized that the importance of neutrality has significantly decreased, it never really assessed security policy options, in which it would have to disband neutrality,

The history of neutrality is one explanation for this fact. While Switzerland had chosen to become neutral on its own, Austria was practically forced. Furthermore, Switzerland's neutrality has lasted about two hundred years. It is an inherent part of every Swiss citizen, which he or she is not willing to discard easily. In contrast, Austria's neutrality only survived about fifty years. The different political systems are another explanation. While in Austria the ruling party has the sole responsibility over all political issues, Switzerland's consensus democracy requires broad support from all political parties and the population. It seems that Austria's political system facilitated the implementation of a consequent policy toward Europe and NATO, even if the declaration about joining NATO fostered opposition within the political elite.

c. Sweden

From the very beginning, Sweden had a different understanding of neutrality than both Switzerland and Austria. Sweden's neutrality was never a perpetual one, but was a consequence of its policy of non-participation in an alliance. While neutrality in Switzerland and in Austria became a political maxim, it remained in Sweden a security policy instrument. Sweden never hesitated in adjusting its status of neutrality as a consequence of a changing security environment. After joining the EU in 1995, Sweden follows a policy of non-participation in military alliances, but it is contributing to the EU as much as compatible, including the *Common Foreign and Security Policy*.

Sweden's varying neutral policy, critically called "à la carte" neutrality, is evident in the country's history. In order to survive economically and as a state, Sweden had to accordingly adjust its neutrality during WWI to the shifts in power between the major nations. With the outbreak of WWII, Sweden again declared its neutrality. However, when Finland was attacked by Russia, Sweden declined to intervene militarily but

refrained from any declaration of neutrality, offering substantial assistance in arms, credits, and raw materials to the Finns. After the German attack and total occupation of Norway, Sweden had to apply strict neutrality, renouncing any feature of Nordic solidarity. After the fall of France, Sweden was forced to deviate from strict neutrality by allowing German soldiers on leave to pass through its territory. Having no hope of allied support and being wholly dependent on trade with Germany, Sweden had no other choice.¹²⁹

In the post war period, Sweden hoped that the UN, which it joined in 1946, would be an effective instrument for peace. After the Communist Coup in Budapest and the Soviet push for a security pact with Finland in 1948, the idea of some form of Nordic security cooperation was examined once again, as it was after the breakdown of the League of Nations. But negotiations for a Scandinavian defense alliance broke down after Norway and Denmark joined NATO. As a consequence, Sweden chose a policy of non-participation in alliances in time of peace, aiming at neutrality in the event of war.¹³⁰ As the European scene changed again and the communist bloc disappeared, Sweden's opportunities for integration in Europe significantly increased. Sweden joined the EU in 1995, after a referendum in which 52.3 percent of Sweden's electoral voted in favor of membership.¹³¹

Sweden saw its non-alignment policy as fully compatible with the EU, since it considered the union only as a political alliance of democracies. In contrast Austria had to adjust its laws concerning neutrality after joining the EU. Nonetheless, Sweden had to adjust its declaration of non-participation in alliances. In 2002, the socialist government and the three main non-socialist opposition parties were able to agree on a new description of Sweden's security policy. In its declaration the government expressed that,

Sweden pursues a new policy of non-participation in military alliances. This security policy making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of conflicts in our vicinity has served us well.

¹²⁹ Swedish Foreign Policy; p. 1

¹³⁰ Ibid; p. 1

¹³¹ Ibid; p. 1

Looking to the future, it is more apparent than ever that security is more than the absence of military conflict. Acting concertedly and in cooperation with other countries can best avert threats to peace and our security. The primary expression of this conviction at a global level is our support for the United Nations. As a member of the European Union, we are part of a community based on solidarity, whose primary purpose is to prevent war on the European continent.¹³²

Sweden's concept of neutrality is contained in the first sentence. Sweden fully participates in the CFSP, which is based on common values and solidarity. In Sweden's understanding, neutrality is therefore only an unlikely choice in case of an attack on any state which is or shortly will be a member of the EU.¹³³ With regard to the ESDP, it is important for Sweden to find forms of cooperation that are susceptible to development while are also reconcilable with its non-participation in military alliances. More advanced cooperation tends to produce a common European defense and is not considered compatible with Sweden's security policy. However, Sweden tries to intensify its engagement and cooperation with other EU member states in every other area of ESDP.¹³⁴

Sweden still follows a policy in which it decides on a case-to-case basis about participating in military interventions or stepping back to neutrality. Sweden justifies this policy with its interpretation of the *Treaty of Amsterdam*. In Sweden's understanding, the treaty provides the EU with cooperation on crisis management rather than mutual security guarantees. Article 17 of the treaty expresses that "the policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States..."¹³⁵

In contrast to Switzerland and Austria, Sweden always practiced a practical policy of non-alignment. Neutrality is only a valid policy instrument in the case of war. Sweden retains the right to decide itself if and when it follows this option.

¹³² Swedish Foreign Policy; p. 2

¹³³ Ibid; p.2

¹³⁴ Summary: A More Secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World

¹³⁵ von Sydow, B.; p. 15

3. Economic and Social Factors

The end of the Cold War fostered a public belief that military conflicts were over forever and that long-lasting world peace would break out. As a consequence, the willingness to provide financial resources for defense decreased. Furthermore, such factors as demographic trends, unemployment rates, and low economic growth rates fostered such unwillingness. Spending for social welfare and healthcare became more important than spending for national security. The following chapter will provide several economic and social data in order to show how the willingness or the ability to provide financial resources for security and in particular for the Armed Forces has changed in all three countries.

While the developing world has a younger population and is growing overcrowded, the developed world is increasing in age. Developed countries – especially in Europe - will have unprecedented aging crisis, forcing them to provide more and more financial resources for social welfare and health security. Increasing social costs cause reduction in spending for security, affecting not only the ability to modernize or maintain Armed Forces but to have adequate security instruments as a whole.

a. Switzerland

While the percentage of the elderly will further increase in the next decades upwards of 25%, the working-age population will decrease.¹ This means that fewer workers will be able to support a growing retired population. In order to finance social programs, Switzerland will be forced to further prioritize where it is willing to provide financial resources. The trend is obvious. Lacking a clear threat after the end of the Cold War, a large number of Swiss politicians claimed that a further decrease in defense budget was affordable. In 2000, an initiative from the Social Party, the Green Party, and several NGOs required decreasing the military budget by fifty percent, based on the budget in 1987. The gained money should have been spent for social security programs

¹ Bundesamt für Statistik; *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz 2003*; p. 43

and peace projects.¹³⁷ Even if the Swiss population rejected this initiative, continuous political pressure, a slow growing economy (0.2% GDP growth rate in 2002), increased ratio of unemployment (from 2.1% in 2001 to 4.1% in 2003), and special governmental spending to support Switzerland's airline and the nation's exposition "EXPO" forced the government to further decrease military spending.¹³⁸ Decreasing defense budgets is politically easier than decreasing social security or health insurance budgets.

Since 1990 the percentage of expenses for social security on the overall governmental expenses has grown from 20% GDP to 28% GDP (1998). In the same period the percentage of expenses for the Armed Forces decreased from 1.6% of GDP to 1.2% of GDP and will further decrease to 0.9% GDP for FY2004-FY2007¹³⁹. In 1990 the ratio of the military armament program on the overall military expenses was 54%; in 2002 it decreased to 37%.¹⁴⁰ This trend will continue in the next years, even if government officials have announced that the ratio between armament and running costs for the Armed Forces should be changed in favor of the former. As a consequence, Switzerland's military expenditures rank in the lower midfield compared with other European states – even neutral ones. The Armed Forces XXI are based on a fixed budget of 4.3 billion Swiss Francs. But first of all, fixed budgets are not an appropriate or honest solution, since they do not reflect changes in the environment. Second, Switzerland's financial debts forced the government to reduce the budget again to a level of nearly 4 billion Swiss Francs in the meantime.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ The military budget in 1987 was 4.7 Billion Swiss Francs. 4.7 Billion Swiss Francs correspond to approximately \$3.6 Billion (exchange rate 5/2004). For details see: *Eidgenössische Voksinitiative "Sparen beim Militär und der Gesamtverteidigung – für mehr Frieden und zukunftsgerichtete Arbeitsplätze (Umverteilungsinitiative)"* vom 26. März 1997; [<http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vi260t.html>] (5/6/2004); *Komitee gegen groteske Ueberrüstung*; in *Volksstimme Sisach*; Donnerstag, 12.Oktober 2000. In the ballot of November 26, 2000, the population rejected the initiative with 62% No votes.

¹³⁸ For details see: Bundesamt für Statistik; [http://www.statistik.admin.ch/stat_ch/ber00/dkan_ch.htm]

¹³⁹ Ueberprüfung der Zielsetzungen der Armee; p. 18

¹⁴⁰ Ibid; p. 19

¹⁴¹ Ibid; p. 11

b. Austria

Austria's demographic development is similar to Switzerland and Sweden's. Prognoses predict that the ratio of citizens over 60 years will grow from 21% in 2001 to 36% in 2050.¹⁴² Furthermore, Austria has to deal with a current unemployment rate of 4% (2002).¹⁴³ Both factors will cause increases in expenses for social welfare and healthcare. In 2003, the ration of expenditures for social welfare and healthcare on the overall governmental expenditures was already 55%.¹⁴⁴

Surprisingly and in contrast to Switzerland and Sweden, expenses for the Armed Forces have not decreased in the last 15 years. Their average spending of GDP is 1%.¹⁴⁵ Caused by Austria's main focus on foreign policy rather than defense policy, its defense spending has always been very low. However, supporting a common European defense will force Austria to increase defense spending to a European level of about 2% GDP.

c. Sweden

Sweden has problems similar to those of Switzerland and Austria. Its population is also aging. It is expected that the ratio of people age over 64 will increase from 22.3% (2000) to 31.6% (2030), while people of age 20-64 (working age) will decrease from 58.7% to 53.9%.¹⁴⁶ Sweden has had to deal with an average unemployment rate of 5.2% in the last 4 years.¹⁴⁷ As a consequence, expenditures for social security and healthcare have increased steadily in the last ten years to 50% of the overall government

¹⁴² Statistik Austria; *Bevölkerungsentwicklung 2001-2050*; p. 1; [http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_03/bevoelkerung_tab3.shtml] (4/16/2004)

¹⁴³ Statistik Austria; *Beschäftigung und Arbeitsmarkt*; [http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_03/beschaeftigung_tab1.shtml] (4/16/2004)

¹⁴⁴ Statistik Austria; *Oeffentliche Finanzen*; 2003; p. 1; [http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_02/finanzen_txt.shtml] (4/15/2004)

¹⁴⁵ Central Intelligence Agency; CIA World Factbook; Washington D.C.; Volume 1986 to 2002

¹⁴⁶ Ministry of Health and Social Affairs; *Fact Sheet No.4*; March 2001; p. 1; [http://www.social.regeringen.se/pressinfo/pdf/aldre/aldre_en.pdf] (4/16/2004)

¹⁴⁷ EUROSTAT; *Total unemployment rate*; [http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos/queen/display.do?screen=detail&language=en&product=YES&root=YES_copy_539019591709/strind_copy_817397594099/emploi_copy_934568948015/em071_copy_16487242664] (4/16/2004)

spending.¹⁴⁸ The expenditures for the Armed Forces decreased from a former average of 3.5% GDP (1986-2000) to 1.8% GDP in the years 2001 and 2002.¹⁴⁹

In contrast to Switzerland and Austria, Sweden is still willing and able to provide significant financial resources for its Armed Forces, allowing a modernization of its Armed Forces appropriate to its Security policy strategy.

D. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

Since all three countries are located in Europe, it is not surprising that their threat assessments are quite similar.¹⁵⁰ They all acknowledge that the security environment in Europe has improved after the end of the Cold War. As a consequence of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and increased cooperation and integration within the EU and NATO, more or less democratic states and members of the two organizations surround both Switzerland and Austria. Sweden's special geo-strategic situation leads to additional threats and challenges, such as an uncertain development in Russia and its vicinity. However, regional cooperation with the Baltic Sea states and their integration in NATO enhanced Sweden's security.

All three acknowledge that threats and challenges have changed from mainly military invasion to challenges and threats below the threshold of war. A direct military threat aiming at occupying their territory or parts of it is not considered possible within the next 10 to 15 years; even though it cannot be totally disregarded. The impacts of international terrorism, proliferation of WMD with associated long range delivery systems, organized crime, vulnerability of societies and their dependence on modern information technologies, demographic trends in less developed countries resulting in greater disparity of wealth and migration, and regional natural or technical disasters with global impacts constitute the main concerns in all three countries. In addition, Switzerland and

¹⁴⁸ Swedish Ministry of Finance; *Budget Statement*; Economic and budget policy guidelines; p.35; [<http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/03/01/9f243de3.pdf>] (5/6/2004)

¹⁴⁹ For details see: CIA World Factbook; Volume 1986 to 2002

¹⁵⁰ For details see: SIPOL B 2000; Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; 2001; Summary: A More Secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World; A CHANGING WORLD – A REFORMED DEFENCE; 1999; von Sydow, B.

Sweden consider the disparity of military equipment developments as a challenge. Furthermore, Switzerland considers foreign economic and political pressure on such important economic sectors as banks and insurances as a national challenge. In contrast to Sweden and Austria, Switzerland addresses also violence-prone struggles within its territory as an important security issue. In order to fight and meet these new threats and challenges, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden accept the necessity for increased cooperation in Europe and beyond.¹⁵¹

Both Austria and Sweden emphasize the positive sides of the development in Europe with improved integration into the EU and NATO. They consider these organizations as a chance for security developments in Europe. In contrast, Switzerland's security assessment mainly examines threats and challenges and only partially developments of these organizations and their impacts on Switzerland. Even if Switzerland's threat assessment is very broad and detailed, it is mainly focused on itself. Austria and Sweden's assessments are more general but tend to focus mainly on Europe as a whole.

As a consequence of a new security environment, Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden evaluated new or adjusted existing security policy goals, strategies, and instruments. With regard to the goals, all three countries aim to defend their territory, protect the freedoms and rights of their population, and foster peace and security within and beyond European borders.¹⁵² However, while Switzerland's main focus is on its own security, the other two countries clearly focus on the EU with its security goals. Austria and Sweden's membership in the EU significantly shapes their respective security policy. They support further integration within the union. But in contrast to Austria, Sweden's non-military alignment makes it impossible to support a future common European defense.

In order to achieve these goals, all three countries follow a comprehensive security strategy, including all possible instruments among various policy areas. However, the strategies differ significantly in their focus. Switzerland's new security policy, "Security

¹⁵¹ For details see: SIPOL B 2000; Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; 2001; Summary: A More Secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World; A CHANGING WORLD – A REFORMED DEFENCE; 1999; von Sydow, B.

¹⁵² For details see: SIPOL B 2000; Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin; Analyse-Teil; 2001; Summary: A More Secure Neighbourhood – Insecure World

through Cooperation", aiming at acting in international and national cooperation in foreign and domestic trouble areas in order to prevent impacts on Switzerland, seems to be the right answer to a changed security environment. The strategy is characterized by a slightly shift away from defense policy, which was most important during the seventies and eighties, toward foreign and other policies.¹⁵³ However, international cooperation is only a valid instrument if its own national instruments are not sufficient. Switzerland still wants to guarantee its security through highest possible autonomy, even if it acknowledges that such threats as terrorism and organized crime only can be met through international cooperation.

In contrast, Austria has realized and accepted that its own instruments are no longer sufficient to meet its security requirements. Austria realized that its own security was inseparably linked to the interests of the EU and has changed its strategy from neutrality to solidarity. Actively supporting and fostering not only the EU's overall goals but also a future common European defense,¹⁵⁴ Austria will have to increase the importance of its defense policy. The government even declared integration into NATO as a strategic option.

Sweden still follows its traditional policy of non-alignment. However, due to its membership in the EU it had to reformulate it to non-military alignment. As a consequence, Sweden considers a common European defense as incompatible with its own security strategy. Therefore, Sweden's main security policy instrument is still defense policy. However, Sweden actively participates in international activities promoting security as well.

Unfortunately, Switzerland's retaining of permanent neutrality restricts its participation to the UN, the OSCE and PfP. Switzerland only assigns civil or military personnel in niches such as military observers, de-mining, or logistics. Even if these contributions were important, real cooperation would mean to participate in broader tasks. In contrast to Austria and Sweden, Switzerland clearly expresses its non-participation in peace en-

¹⁵³ Spillmann, K. R., p. 143-146

¹⁵⁴ Republik Oesterreich; *Regierungsprogramm der Oesterreichischen Bundesregierung für die XXII. Gesetzgebungsperiode*; Regierungsprogramm 2003-2006; p. 5-7; [<http://www.austria.gv.at/2004/4/7/Regierprogr28.2.03.pdf>] (5/12/2004)

forcement operations (UN Chapter VII operations).¹⁵⁵ Unfortunately for Switzerland, based on experience in recent peacekeeping operations such as Rwanda, Somalia, and Former Yugoslavia,¹⁵⁶ there might be a tendency in the UN Security Council to increasingly assign Chapter VII instead of pure Chapter IV (peace keeping) or so called VI ½ operations,¹⁵⁷ giving the authorization to implement resolutions with force if needed.¹⁵⁸ The question how Switzerland would react if a peacekeeping mission were changing to a peace enforcement mission remains. Withdrawing its troops could lead to a perception of Switzerland as an unreliable partner. Since Switzerland mainly wants to participate with such scarce specialized contingents as logistics, it is more than questionable if future UN mission would rely on Swiss participation. The intention only to participate in peacekeeping missions constitutes a tradeoff between solidarity with the international community and political feasibility.

There are three main reasons for the differences between the respective security policies. Switzerland's political system and its understanding of neutrality still seem to hinder Switzerland to follow a strategy of solidarity rather than cooperation. Parts of its political elites and population are not yet willing to go the only effective and consequent path joining the EU or NATO as the most important security organizations in Europe. As a consequence, possible security policy options are reduced to only a few. The new strategy can be considered as a tradeoff between security requirements and political feasibility.

¹⁵⁵ For details see: *UN Charter Chapter VII*; [<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>] (5/5/2004)

¹⁵⁶ For details see: *UNAMIR*; [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamir.htm] (5/5/2004); *UNOSOM I*; [<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>] (5/5/2004); *UNOSOM II*; [<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2p.htm>] (5/5/2004); *UNPROFOR*; [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprofor.htm] (5/5/2004); McCoubrey, H. and White, N.D.; *The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations*; Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited; Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney, 1996; p. 1-36

¹⁵⁷ Even if there is no Chapter VI ½ in the UN Charter, these operations used to be called like this, because they went beyond traditional peacekeeping operations. For details see: Adam, R.; in Crocker, Ch. A., Hampson, F.O., Aall, P.; *Managing Global Chaos*; Sources of and Responsibilities to International Conflict; United States Institute for Peace Press; Washington D.C., 1996; p. 297-307 and Ratner, S.R.; *The New UN Peacekeeping*; Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold war; McMillan Press LTD; Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London, 1995; p. 56-63

¹⁵⁸ For details see: Doyle, C.; in Azimi, N. and Li Lin, Ch.; *The Reform of United Nations Peace Operations*; Debriefing and Lessons; Report of the 2001 Singapore Conference; Kluwer Law International; The Hague, 2001; p. 249-254

ity. The strategy contributes to the need to cooperate with the international community, but only where and when Switzerland decides to do so. Switzerland shifts the burden to the international community when it cannot afford to act on its own. Conversely, true cooperation and solidarity would require sharing the burden equally. Switzerland's security strategy is highly dependent on the willingness of its neighbors and possible allies to cooperate in the event of a crisis, war or in times of peace. Since Switzerland's understanding of cooperation is rather a notion of “free riding”, it is more than questionable that they are willing to do so. In addition, economic and social prerequisites seem to be responsible for a tradeoff between security policy needs and affordable deeds.

First, Switzerland's understanding and long tradition of neutrality does not allow fundamental changes in its security policy. Keeping Switzerland out of both major World Wars introduced the belief that perpetual neutrality was and is the best policy for Switzerland's survival. Neutrality is still a political maxim. Even if the changed international security environment makes neutrality practically obsolete, it is hard to change the hearts and minds of Switzerland's political elite and general population. In the Swiss mentality it is difficult to imagine why a principle that has served for hundreds of years would no longer be valid. The strong belief in the foreign and security policy maxim of neutrality, the belief in its ability to defend its own borders and the not yet defined relationship with the EU are the main political psychological barriers to changing Switzerland's security policy in a manner required by the international community.¹⁵⁹

In contrast, it is astonishing how easily Austria could change its political maxim to solidarity with Europe and the international community. Austria's neutrality does not have as long a tradition as Switzerland's. In order to regain its sovereignty, Austria was essentially forced to become neutral after WWII. Both factors seemed to facilitate Austria's withdrawal from neutrality in a relatively short period of time and without great opposition from the political elite and the population. It is also impressive how easily Sweden was able to join the EU and work very close with NATO, without affecting its status of neutrality. Sweden always had a different approach to neutrality. As a consequence of its non-alignment policy, strict neutrality was only a possible option in the event of war

¹⁵⁹ Lezzi B; *Die Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik – eine tagespolitische Bewertung*; April 2004; p. 1; [<http://www.bundesheer.at/wissen-forschung/publikationen/person.php?id=256>] (4/16/2004)

but not in peacetime. Therefore, it was and is possible for Sweden to follow a very open minded policy toward international organizations and active participation in international security regimes. Austria and Sweden had already cleared their understanding of neutrality during their debates concerning EU membership. Even if Switzerland had had similar debates in preparing for UN membership in 2002, the issue of neutrality has to be continually examined and cleared.

Second, Austria and Sweden's different political systems seem to make it easier to change and implement governmental ideas. Switzerland's political and social systems are aimed at the broadest possible distribution of power through federalism and such instruments as initiative and referendum. This requires finding compromises among the government, all political parties, and the population. This is also true for security policy. As a consequence, the cantons, all political parties, trade unions, employer organizations, and numerous associations were invited to comment on the draft of the *Security Policy Report 2000*, before it was officially approved and published.¹⁶⁰ Considering the wide range of political opinions, ranging from immediate integration into the EU to strict neutrality and autonomy, to abolishing the Armed Forces¹⁶¹ or even changing to a small professional cadre from mass conscript Armed Forces,¹⁶² it is not surprising that the new security strategy "Security through Cooperation" is a compromise based on political, economic and social limitations rather than on security policy efficiency. Even the announcement of a possible referendum forced the government to negotiate compromises in advance.

Swiss membership in the EU and NATO was already abandoned in the security policy report because of too strong political opposition. Even if the security policy report

¹⁶⁰ Catrina, Ch.; p. 8

¹⁶¹ In 1989, a group called "Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee" (GSOA) launched a first initiative to abolish the armed forces. In the ballot the population voted against the initiative, but the result was surprisingly close (36% Yes to 64% NO). In 2001, they launched a second initiative, which was again deprecated by the population (25% Yes to 75% No) For details see: Haltiner, K., Wenger, A., Bennett, J., Szvirceev, T.; *Sicherheit 2000; Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend*; Forschungsstelle an der ETH Zuerich und MILAK Zürich; p. 43-44

¹⁶² For details see: SVP; *Wahlplattform 2003-2007*; p. 16-17, 22-23; Sozialdemokratische Partei; Medienmitteilung 3/26/2002; [http://al.sp-ps.ch/data/COMM-D/2002/020326_zum-APK-Bericht-EU.pdf] (5/5/2004); Freiheitlich Demokratische Partei (FDP); *Positionspapiere: Prioritäten 2004-2007*; [http://www.fdp.ch/page/content/index.asp_Q_MenuID_E_8428_A_ID_E_20518_A_Menu_E_2_A_Item_E_3.7] (5/5/2004); AUNS; *Grauer Brief 91*; Juli 2003; [<http://www.auns.ch/default.htm>] (5/5/2004); Aktion Volk + Parlament [<http://www.klettgau.ch/pruefen&handeln/ph22001/default.htm>] (5/5/2004)

had clearly expressed the compatibility of neutrality and membership in the EU and emphasizes the improvement in security Switzerland would gain, it still would have been rejected.¹⁶³ The Swiss People's Party and the AUNS were the strongest opponents. They fought their campaign against participation in international operations with armed units - even if an UN or OSCE mandate legitimized them - and increased military cooperation in training with the argument that the government and the military planners intend to join NATO. "It is about joining NATO – nothing else," argued Christoph Blocher. As a consequence, he concluded, "Such a meander is not compatible with neutrality and has to be averted. Switzerland shall not give up its perpetual armed neutrality and its two hundred year old peace tradition."¹⁶⁴ As a result, NATO became a taboo in further discussions about security policy and the Armed Forces transformation project. The Armed Forces were even forced to abandon English terminology in their guidelines and field manuals based on the fear that this could be understood as a first step toward NATO membership. This language ban does not really reflect the security policy requirement to improve interoperability, even if it only a detail.

Finally, security policy in all three countries is influenced by economic and social factors. They all have to deal with a steadily aging population and high or growing unemployment rates. This will require further increases in spending for social welfare and health insurance. Since economic growth does not sufficiently contribute to the government's ability to appropriately increase its expenses, balancing within the different policy areas is necessary. The more stable security environment in Europe has led to the conviction that decreasing expenses for security policy and in particular defense policy is reasonable. On the other side, new threats and challenges, leading to the intention to increase international civil and military participation and cooperation, would require a modernizing of the Armed Forces. In particular Switzerland currently lacks in such capabilities as C⁴ISR or airlift, which are necessary to cooperate internationally. However, since Switzerland is steadily decreasing its defense spending, the gap between security policy wishes, intentions and real capabilities is widening. The government, the political elite and the population will have to clearly decide what the security of Switzerland is

¹⁶³ SIPOL B 2000; p. 50

¹⁶⁴ NZZ Online; "*Neutralitätswidriger Irrweg*"; March 2001; [<http://www.nzz.ch>] (5/10/2004)

worth. Currently, the Armed Forces cannot fully meet the requirements of the assigned tasks.

In order to overcome these domestic constraints and to change Switzerland's course of action toward real solidarity with the international community, the government has to initiate a broad public discussion about different security policy options. It is essential to show the population that the new security environment, especially in Europe, requires a fundamental change in Switzerland's security policy toward real solidarity instead of “on looking”. In particular the EU should be seen not only as an economic but also as a security organization. Compromises in advance are the wrong approach, because they do not serve the purpose and they do not convince opponents of the need for a change in Switzerland's security policy.¹⁶⁵ Switzerland's security policy will be able to meet the requirements of a steadily changing security environment only if it is willing to base them on security efficiency rather than on political, social, and financial aspects.

¹⁶⁵ Lezzi, B.; p. 4

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III. ARMED FORCES

Fundamental changes in the European security environment, as described in the previous chapter, forced almost every state to reassess its Armed Forces' tasks, structure and organizations. The new threats and challenges increasingly require international or multinational cooperation and lead to a shift from traditional defense operations toward international peace support and humanitarian operations.¹⁶⁶ Since most European states' Armed Forces had a mainly focus on territorial defense during the Cold War, they had to be transformed. The new missions require small, mainly professional, interoperable, multi role Armed Forces. Or in other words, as Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal in their book *The Postmodern Military* call it, most Armed Forces transformed from a modern or late modern type toward a postmodern type.¹⁶⁷ Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria's Armed Forces undertook or are undertaking transformation processes as well.

All three countries assigned missions to their Armed Forces that can be considered postmodern and all retain traditional defense missions. Switzerland has slightly adjusted its priorities toward contribution to peace support and crisis management (international missions) without peace enforcement and toward contributions to prevention and management of existential menaces (domestic and international support of civil authorities). Nonetheless, defense of its territory is still the main justification for maintaining Armed Forces.¹⁶⁸ Sweden's *Total Defense* concept does not seem to reflect the theory of the postmodern military. Its long tradition of contributing to international peace support operations including peace enforcement, and the conviction that such missions contribute

¹⁶⁶ Lord Robertson; NATO Secretary-General; in Gyarmati I. and Winkler T.; p. vii and Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport (VBS); *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee XXI (Armeeleitbild XXI)* vom 24 Oktober 2001; p. 13-15; [<http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/vbs/de/home/rund/armee/armeeleitbild.html>] (4/17/2004)

¹⁶⁷ For details see: Moskos, C. C., Williams, J. A., Segal, D. R.; *The Postmodern Military*; Armed Forces after the Cold War; Oxford University Press, New York, 2000; p. 1 and 15 and Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 13-15

¹⁶⁸ Catrina, Ch.; p. 11

to Sweden's security should be evidence enough for the contrary.¹⁶⁹ Austria's main focus on international missions in accordance with *EU Petersberg Tasks* including peace enforcement reflects the most postmodern military theory.¹⁷⁰ While Sweden and Austria increasingly model their Armed Forces' structure and organization toward postmodern military, Switzerland retains a structure that can be seen at best as late modern.

Even though the probability of a direct military attack is considered quite low, the strong beliefs in the foreign and security policy maxim of neutrality and in being able to defend Swiss borders are the two main justifications for the retention of the Armed Forces. The lack of a clear military threat provoked the statements that there is no objective standard to determine the Armed Forces' necessary size and capabilities.¹⁷¹ This rationale is why the Armed Forces retain the entire range of capabilities. Conversely, military planners have always had to deal with uncertainties. Therefore they derive their concepts based on reasonable scenarios. This is possible for both defense and peace support operations. Additionally, EU or NATO membership would provide a clear focal point to meet current and future threats and challenges and would therefore force Switzerland to transform its Armed Forces in a more appropriate way.¹⁷² Non-membership requires high autonomy and more importantly, leaves the door open to model the Armed Forces

¹⁶⁹ For details see: Brochure: *The Swedish Armed Forces*; p. 5 and *An international role* [<http://www.mil.se/article.php?id=7296>] (5/12/2004)

¹⁷⁰ Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; *Teilstrategie Verteidigungspolitik*; p. 8-9; [http://www.bmlv.gv.at/facts/bh_2010/grundlagen.shtml] (4/17/2004)

¹⁷¹ Catrina, Ch.; p. 11

¹⁷² Spillmann, K. R., p. 235 and The Council of the European Union; *A Secure Europe in a Better World*; European Security Strategy; Brussels 2003; [<http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>] (5/17/2004); Western European Union; *Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations*; Recommendations for strengthening European capabilities for crisis management operations; WEU Council of Ministers; Luxembourg, 22-23 November 1999; [<http://www.wcu.int/>] (5/14/2004); NATO; *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*; Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999; [<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>] (5/14/2004); NATO Handbook; *NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative*; Chapter 2; p. 47-53; [<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm>] (5/14/2004); NATO; *The Key to the Prague Summit*; An agenda for Change; [http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/in_focus/capabilities/prague-capabilities.pdf] (5/14/2004)

along traditional political, social and economic aspects rather than military efficiency. As a consequence, alternative defense models are not seriously considered.¹⁷³

Focusing on peace support operations would also require a reassessment of the structure and organization of the Swiss Armed Forces. Since the current threats and challenges require rapid deployable forces in adequate strength and quality, systems of conscription and mobilization are no longer effective. While Switzerland still makes no distinction between wartime and peacetime organization and retains a mass army with universal conscription, Austria and Sweden have small peacetime organizations consisting of mainly professional officers and the annual conscripts along the enlisted.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, Switzerland's system of short basic training and several refresher courses make it difficult to have available enough rapid deployable units with a high level of training. In Austria and Sweden, training periods of seven to eight month including support missions to civil authorities help in conducting all the Armed Forces' tasks and to train their units appropriately.

All three countries only deploy volunteers to international peace support operations, in what does not fully correspond with the postmodern military theory. As a consequence, only a relatively small number of personnel are deployable. While Sweden considers declaring participation in international missions mandatory for professional officers, Austria considers abolishing conscription entirely.¹⁷⁵ Switzerland intended to declare participation in international operations mandatory for professional officers and NCOs as well. However, since the training is highly dependent on professionals, assignments to international missions are not very probable. Only Austria includes training for

¹⁷³ Haltiner, K. W. and Hirt, E.; in Moskos, C. C., Williams, J. A., Segal, D. R.; p. 210-211

¹⁷⁴ For details see: Armeeleitbild XXI; Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; Bundesheer; [<http://www.bundesheer.at/karriere/offizier/info/index.shtml>] (4/22/2004) and [<http://www.bundesheer.at/karriere/unteroffizier/info/index.shtml>] (4/22/2004); The Kingdom of Sweden; Participating State; Vienna Document 1999; Annual Exchange of Information on Defence Planning; 2004; [<http://www.mil.se/article.php?id=10921>] (4/28/2004); and Försvarmakten; *Officer's Training – 4. The New officer Education*; [<http://www.mil.se/article.php?id=2435>] (4/23/2004); The International Institute for Strategic Studies; *The Military Balance 2003 2004*; Oxford University Press; 2003; p. 64 and p. 79

¹⁷⁵ Bundesheer-Reformkommission; *Bundesheer 2010*; Bericht 2003; p. 9; [http://www.bundesheer.at/facts/bh_2010/artikel.php?id=522] (4/16/2004) and Zilk, H.; *Sieben Thesen zur Wehrpflicht*; Bundesamt für Landesverteidigung; Bundesheer-Reformkommission; Presseausendung 4. November 2004; [http://www.bundesheer.at/facts/bh_2010/pa_body.php?id=522] (4/22/2004)

international operations into basic training.¹⁷⁶ Switzerland and Sweden's peacekeeping units are trained in special courses and facilities.

The new command structure in Switzerland's Armed Forces, consisting of a Chief of the Armed Forces and two independent services, constitutes a significant improvement. It facilitates overall military planning and decision-making. However, the structure still has critical shortfalls such as parallel command and operational structures, too many battalions with focus on territorial defense, and an unaffordable training organization. Traditional regional, political, and military aspects hinder the military planners to properly analyze and synchronize possible structural and organizational options. Lacking an operational doctrine resulted in inter-service and intra-service competition to retain as many battalions and personnel as possible. Furthermore, the announcement that the Armed Forces XXI would start after only 3 years of planning and a lack in decision-making caused by a possible referendum against the amendments to the military laws helped foster this competition.

Since the Armed Forces in Switzerland are mainly modeled after territorial defense and wartime organization, main weapon systems and current procurement programs focus on defense. The political preconditions of neutrality and the three folded tasks compel the Armed Forces to maintain capabilities to conduct military operations along the whole spectrum with a high degree of autonomy. Yet, scarce financial resources do not allow a modernization or to maintain modern weapons for all possible missions. As a result, the Swiss Armed Forces run the risk of having only low level capabilities along the whole military spectrum, and not being able to fully conduct all the required tasks. Austria follows a different path. International missions have the highest priority in both current weapon systems and future procurement programs. Austria increasingly focuses on accordance with a future common European defense. Sweden, which already has a modern Armed Forces model, shapes its weapons systems after the requirements of both traditional and new missions. However, in contrast to Switzerland and Austria, Sweden is still willing to provide appropriate financial resources.

¹⁷⁶ Teilstrategie Verteidigungspolitik; p. 12

The following chapter provides a comparison of Switzerland, Austria and Sweden's Armed Forces. In the first part, the chapter provides a short theoretical approach to the theory of postmodern military as long as the tasks and structure of Armed Forces are concerned. In the second part, the tasks, the structure, and the organization of the respective Armed Forces will be examined. Finally, the chapter provides possible explanations for the deviation from postmodern military and for the differences in the Armed Forces' tasks, structures, and organizations.

A. THE POSTMODERN MILITARY

Armed Forces' missions and structure are mainly shaped by the security environment of a state, the resulting threat perceptions, but also by social changes such as demographics. Most of these factors have fundamentally changed in the twentieth century. The threat of a massive war in Europe has faded. New challenges like regional or civil wars, humanitarian emergencies, and terrorism all require new missions and new structures for the Armed Forces.¹⁷⁷ According to Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, three main military eras can be differentiated.¹⁷⁸ The Armed Forces missions and their structure changed along with fundamental changes in the security environment. While the main mission used to be defense against invasion, today's missions range from fighting war fighting to tasks that would not traditionally be considered as military missions.¹⁷⁹

Enemy invasion was the major threat for nations in the Modern Era from 1900 to 1945. As a consequence, territorial defense was the main mission for Armed Forces. Mass armies with overall conscription were considered the most efficient and affordable organization for this task.¹⁸⁰

In the second era, the Late Modern or Cold War Era between 1945 and 1990, the security environment changed. Nuclear war became the major threat. In order to guaran-

¹⁷⁷ Lord Robertson; p. vii

¹⁷⁸ Moskos, C. C.; p. 1 and 15

¹⁷⁹ Ibid; p. 2

¹⁸⁰ Ibid; p. 1 and 15

tee common security, the main mission for most Armed Forces changed to support of the alliances on both sides of the iron curtain. Even if territorial defense was an integral part, it was no longer first priority. The Armed Forces remained mass-conscripted armies but with a change to military professionalism within the officer corps.¹⁸¹

Finally, starting after the end of the Cold War, the Postmodern Era is characterized by improved cooperation and integration particular in NATO and the EU. As a consequence, most European states no longer perceive military invasion as a real threat. Yet, instability and armed struggles in different regions, such as the Balkans, are evidence enough that worldwide peace would not be in the immediate future. New threats just below the threshold of war began emerging. Realizing that fighting these new threats required increased international and multinational cooperation and a shift toward peace-keeping and humanitarian support, most countries assigned these new missions to their Armed Forces. To be able to meet these new requirements, the Armed Forces had to undergo more fundamental changes. Since the new missions increasingly require rapid deployable units, sustainable logistical support, appropriately trained personnel, and increased interoperability, the Armed Forces structure and organization changed toward small professional armies.¹⁸² Additionally, modern weapons systems are less efficiently manageable by part time soldiers.

B. TASKS

1. Switzerland

Switzerland's Armed Forces are still considered an important instrument to implementing security policy. As a consequence, their assigned tasks are consequently fitting into Switzerland's security policy goals and missions. The three main tasks of the Swiss Armed Forces, provided in the Federal Constitution are: *Peace support and crisis management, Area protection and defense, and Contribution to prevention and management of existential menaces*.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Moskos, C. C.; p. 1 and 15

¹⁸² Ibid; p. 2 and 15

¹⁸³ For details see: Federal Constitution of Switzerland; Article 58, paragraph 2; SIPOL 2000; p. 59-60 and Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 20-23

a. Peace Support and Crisis Management

Peace support and crisis management is aimed at fostering peaceful settlements to conflicts abroad and minimizing impacts on Switzerland. Furthermore, it should prevent a future direct military threat to Switzerland. As a consequence, the Armed Forces participate in peace support operations and support humanitarian missions, including disaster relief in the vicinity of Switzerland.¹⁸⁴

With regard to peace support operations, the Armed Forces only participates in missions legitimized by a UN or OSCE mandate and if they are compatible with Switzerland's foreign and security policy. The Armed Forces accomplish this task by participating in multinational missions with special tasked units and/or specialists. To defend themselves and to be able to execute their mission, they may be armed if necessary. Switzerland does explicitly exclude participation in combat operations to enforce peace.¹⁸⁵ Since Switzerland's Armed Forces are basically organized along a system of conscription, the participation in peace support missions is voluntarily for militia soldiers. For professionals – officers and NCOs who until now mainly performed as instructors – participation is mandatory, but also depends on the number of officers available.¹⁸⁶ However, since the training organization is highly dependent on professionals, assignments to international missions are not very probable.

Currently, Switzerland is able to deploy one company to peace support operations, within a few months and for the duration of the mission. In the near future, the Armed Forces have to be able to deploy up to one battalion or two independent task force companies at the same time. The battalion and the companies consist of infantry, logistics, command and control, engineering, intelligence, military police and/or airlift elements depending on the mission.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 21

¹⁸⁵ Ibid; p. 21

¹⁸⁶ Ibid; p. 38

¹⁸⁷ Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport (VBS); Broschüre "Armeeleitbild XXI. Sicher mit uns."; Auflage Nr. 1; 2003; p. 28; [<http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/vbs/de/home/rund/armee/0/brosch.html>] (4/16/2004) and Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 39

Participation in humanitarian missions and humanitarian support for single states is based on the principle of subsidiary. The Armed Forces have to be able to deploy appropriate units without time for preparation, meaning within hours or a few days. The units consist basically of protection, logistics, communication, and rescue elements.¹⁸⁸

b. Area Protection and Defense

Area protection and defense are still the main justification to maintain Armed Forces even if their probability is the lowest among the three tasks. The Armed Forces have to be prepared to counter all military threats to Switzerland's territory or population.

Area Protection means that the Armed Forces have to have the capabilities to defend important strategic regions including the air space and to protect important infrastructure within the vicinity of Switzerland. Area Protection consists of the following possible operations:

- Protection of the sovereign over the air space.
- Protection of large border areas in order to prevent border crossing.
- Protection of key areas in order to prevent attacks on important infrastructure and to secure important areas for future operations.
- Protection of transit routes and infrastructure (roads, railway tracks, energy transfer mediums, and communication installations) in order to guarantee their functioning.
- Protection of other important infrastructure.¹⁸⁹

The Armed Forces shall be able to conduct such operations after a mid-term time of preparation - weeks or month - and for an infinite duration. The Armed Forces have to be able to conduct several of these operations simultaneously with two to three brigades and elements of the Air Force, autonomously or in cooperation with allied Armed Forces.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 39

¹⁸⁹ Ibid; p. 41

¹⁹⁰ Ibid; p. 21 and p. 41

With regard to Defense, the Armed Forces have to be able to accomplish the following operations:¹⁹¹

- Protection of the sovereign over the air space; in minimum prevent enemy's air space superiority over Switzerland, and eventually – after dissolution of neutrality (based on a political decision) – participation in air operations together with other allied Armed Forces.
- Autonomous defense of Switzerland's territory and - after dissolution of neutrality –defense in cooperation with allied Armed Forces.
- Protection of regions and infrastructure within Switzerland.

The Armed Forces have to have the capabilities to fight in forward - inclusive foreign, main, and rear areas at the same time. As a consequence, the Armed Forces consist of six to eight combat brigades, associated support and logistic units, and the Air Force. The Air Force's air to ground capability has to be rebuilt.¹⁹² Currently, the preparation time for defense missions is considered to be years. During this time the Armed Forces shall be able to increase their preparedness and their strength in personnel. This is only possible if the Armed Forces maintain key capabilities, an appropriate strength in personnel, modern equipment, and high standards in training.¹⁹³

With regard to ballistic missile defense, Switzerland is not capable of actively defend itself. It will have to decide about participation in possible future common European ballistic missile defense architecture. Such cooperation would raise the question about its compatibility with Switzerland's neutrality since it would include mutual obligations in time of peace and in time of war.¹⁹⁴

c. Contribution to Prevention and Management of Existential Menaces

The Armed Forces contribute to the prevention and management of existential menaces only if the civil authorities are exhausted in personnel and material. Three different forms of support are differentiated:

¹⁹¹ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 41

¹⁹² Ibid; p. 42

¹⁹³ Ibid; p. 23

¹⁹⁴ "Armeeleitbild XXI. Sicher mit uns."; p. 17

- Military disaster relief by immediate support to civil authorities with material and personnel (spontaneous support). Or support by deploying in maximum one Disaster Relief Company, two Infantry Companies, Mobile Logistic Elements, and elements of the Air Force upon a request by civil authorities. The elements have to be able to support the civil authorities within hours and for the duration of the mission.
- Subsidiary protection missions include protection of important persons and repatriation of Swiss citizens from areas of crisis. These missions have to be executed within days. Furthermore, it includes protection of such important infrastructure as embassies in Switzerland and aboard, protection of international conferences and events, support to the border control agency, and countering existential menaces to inner security. These missions are mainly executed by military police supported by the Air Force. However, since the sustainability of these formations is very low, other formations have to be able to conduct such missions.
- Air Space control, executed by the Air Force with several aircrafts or as a whole depending on the duration of the mission.¹⁹⁵

d. Cross Sectional Areas

In addition to the above-described tasks, the Armed Forces have to have the capabilities for other important tasks. The ability to properly decide on the strategic, operational, and tactical level requires the correct information at in both times of peace and war. Therefore, the Department of Defense has its own Strategic Intelligence Agency responsible for assessing developments in Switzerland's security environment.¹⁹⁶ The Armed Forces have a Military Intelligence Agency assessing the developments in military affairs and supporting the military leadership, and an Air Force Intelligence Agency responsible for operational and tactical intelligence for the Air Force.¹⁹⁷

Centralized logistical command and control shall guarantee the same processes in peacetime, crisis, or war. Civil logistics, industrial corporations, public healthcare institutions, and military logistics shall cooperate in any given situation.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 44-45

¹⁹⁶ Department of Defense is here used as the short form of the departments official name "Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport"

¹⁹⁷ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 45-46

¹⁹⁸ Ibid; p. 46-47

Active and passive protection against information warfare is essential for command and control. A pure defensive strategy – protection against direct attack or cyber war – is seldom successful. The Armed Forces have to improve their offensive information warfare capabilities.¹⁹⁹

2. Austria

Austria's Armed Forces are currently undergoing a transformation process. Therefore it makes more sense to examine the future tasks instead of looking at the present ones. The tasks for Austria's Armed Forces, evaluated by a reform commission, can be differentiated by three categories.²⁰⁰ The first category consists of traditional national tasks, the second is focused on Austria's contribution to and cooperation with multinational and international operations and the third category serves both national and international purposes. First priorities are international operations including the *EU Petersberg Tasks*²⁰¹, second are support operations for civil authorities and third are defense operations.²⁰² As a consequence, financial resources for capabilities required in international operations will be increased while those for purely defense capabilities will decrease.

a. National Tasks

The Armed Forces' national tasks reflect traditional military missions. Compared with international tasks, these tasks have significantly diminished. The Armed Forces have to conduct the following national tasks,

- Defend Austria's territory and its air space; protect the population and strategic important infrastructure. Tasks not included in a future common European defense have to be accomplished autonomously or in cooperation with other allied Armed Forces.
- Keep an appropriate force in reserve to support civil authorities in disaster relief and law enforcement. The Armed Forces shall focus on fighting

¹⁹⁹ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 47-48

²⁰⁰ Bundesheerreformkommission (ÖBH 2010) beim Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung

²⁰¹ For details see: Western European Union; Western European Union Council of Ministers; *Petersberg Declaration*; Bonn, 19 June 1992; [<http://www.weu.int/>] (5/13/2004); Ortega, M.; *Petersberg tasks, and missions of the European Force*; European Union; Institute for Security Studies; [<http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf>] (5/14/2004); The NATO Handbook; *The Western European Union (WEU)*; Chapter 15; p. 360-368

²⁰² Bundesheer 2010; p. 15-16

such new risks as terrorism, organized crime, proliferation, and attacks against information technology. Appropriate intelligence capabilities have to be developed.

- Protect its own military infrastructure and provide an active component in the domain of information warfare.²⁰³

b. International Tasks

The main focus of the future tasks is on international operations. The reform commission requires the following capabilities:²⁰⁴

- Develop the capabilities to accomplish brigade level operations within an international crisis management operation in the vicinity of the EU for the duration of one year.
- Prepare the capabilities to accomplish division level operations within a multinational operation according to developments in the European security environment.
- In the meantime, be able to accomplish two independent battalion level operations within an international crisis management operation in a wider vicinity of the EU for the duration of several years.
- Provide a multi-role rapid reaction force in coordination with the relevant multinational concepts.
- Provide a rapid deployable intelligence component in order to secure the deployment of Austrian forces and/or to support Austrian agencies abroad in the event of a crisis.
- Provide the capabilities to fulfill area protection operations within Austria and to contribute to host nation support for a multinational peace support operation.
- Provide command and control capabilities for special operations in Austria and abroad.
- Provide appropriate interoperability including staff working procedures in order to participate in multinational operations.
- Provide military support to international humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

c. Cross Sectional Tasks

These tasks contribute to both national and international operations. The Armed Forces have to:²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Teilstrategie Verteidigungspolitik; p. 8

²⁰⁴ Ibid; p. 9

²⁰⁵ Ibid; p. 8-9

- Protect the sovereignty over the Austrian air space and develop the capabilities to participate in air missions within a multinational peace support operation with combat air assets. With respect to a future European ballistic missile defense, Austria shall actively contribute to its development and its future operation.
- Have the capabilities to early detect crisis and to substantially contribute to appropriate intelligence on the national and international level.

3. Sweden

Currently Sweden, like Austria is undergoing a transformation in its Armed Forces. The current and highly probably future tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces are the following,

- Defense against armed attack.
- Maintaining Swedish territorial integrity.
- Contribution to peace and security in the world.
- Assistance to Swedish society in times of severe peacetime difficulties.²⁰⁶

a. Defense against Armed Attack

The Armed Forces are to be preparing in peacetime to defend Sweden against armed attacks that could threaten its freedom and independence. The Armed Forces shall be able to defend Sweden's whole territory, its interests, and to counter actions that are aimed at undermining its sovereignty or disrupting key functions of society, regardless their origin.²⁰⁷

b. Maintaining Swedish Territorial Integrity

The presence of Swedish forces near its borders and in surrounding waters shall reduce the risk of conflict. In order to maintain Sweden's territorial integrity in peacetime, the Armed Forces must detect and repel violations of the territory, maintain a presence, and conduct exercises in all of Sweden and its surrounding seas and air space.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Brochure: *The Swedish Armed Forces*; Stockholm; p. 5; [<http://www.mil.se/article.php?id=1672>] (4/17/2004)

²⁰⁷ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 6

²⁰⁸ Ibid; p. 5

c. *Contribute to Peace and Security in the World*

Together with other countries, Sweden is to take part in international peace promoting, including peace enforcement and humanitarian operations.²⁰⁹ The Armed Forces shall actively participate in Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) and other security building and conflict prevention regimes. They shall also assist in post-conflict situations.²¹⁰

d. *Assisting Swedish Society in Times of Severe Peacetime Difficulties*

The Armed Forces have to provide resources to support other authorities. Together with the *Civil Defense*²¹¹ the Armed Forces must be able to prevent or assist in managing non-military disasters and crisis, such as natural disasters, environmental accidents, acts of terrorism, and large influxes of refugees. Effective cooperation with other authorities is vital.²¹²

C. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

1. Switzerland

a. *Preconditions*

The Swiss Armed Forces have just finished a transformation process that started in 1999 and ended with the start of Armed Forces XXI on January 1, 2004. This transformation was considered to be the largest in the armed force's history. However, the changes are not as revolutionary as they were intended. Unfortunately, most of the military establishment, politicians, and the population consider transformation only as a periodic revolution rather than a continuing process. As a consequence they expect a perfect concept, structure, and organization from the beginning. The newly established section *Armed Forces Development* within the Armed Forces Headquarters should foster a change in such thinking.

²⁰⁹ The Swedish Armed Forces; p. 5

²¹⁰ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 5

²¹¹ Civil Defense includes the whole society and all its functions, such as health service, emergency service, and the supply of power.

²¹² The Swedish Armed Forces; p. 5

In its security policy report, the government expressed the need for Switzerland to maintain its neutrality. As a consequence, it cannot join a military alliance. The Armed Forces have to maintain capabilities along the whole spectrum of assigned missions with a high degree of autonomy. Scarce financial resources are dispersed, which decreases the chance of improving specific vital capabilities such as C⁴ISR. By joining an alliance, it would allow for more focus on specific tasks. This would increase the chances of having high standard capabilities in these areas instead of having medium to low level capabilities in all possible tasks.

In the same report, the government expressed the need to maintain Armed Forces that are basically organized along a militia system with overall conscription.²¹³ Military service is mandatory for men and voluntary for women. On a voluntary basis, all military positions including combat positions are open to women. The official justification for retaining militia Armed Forces is three folded. First, the principle of the militia has been a long lasting tradition in the political, social, and military system in Switzerland. Second, the militia's Armed Forces are better integrated in society than professional Armed Forces. Finally, militia Armed Forces are meant to be less expensive. As a consequence, almost every function in the Armed Forces has to be open to militia soldiers, even brigade commands. The ratio of professionals to the overall force is only about 1.5%. They act mainly as instructors or handle weapon systems that part time soldiers can no longer manage.

Due to the different probabilities of threats, the Armed Forces strength and preparedness may be different for different tasks. While a low military threat would allow decreasing the Armed Forces' strength and readiness, missions such as peace support or coping with existential menaces require high readiness. The total number of the Armed Forces decreased from 350,000 to 200,000. There are 120,000 active military personnel and 80,000 reservists, which acts to complete the full strength of the battalions in case of a major crisis or war.²¹⁴ The Swiss Armed Forces are organized along a system of gradu-

²¹³ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 60

²¹⁴ Active has not the meaning of professional soldiers, but of militia soldiers who have to serve for 3 weeks every year.

ated readiness.²¹⁵ Parts of the Armed Forces must be rapidly deployable (hours to days) or after a short period of preparation (weeks to month). Due to its force generation capability, other parts can be kept on a low readiness (years). This implies that, based on a political decision at the right time, strength in personnel, equipment, length of service, and training can be adequately increased according to changes in the security environment.

Multi-functionality is a prerequisite for the Armed Forces, since they have to fulfill three main tasks. In this sense, not every single unit or individual soldiers have to be able to execute all missions along the spectrum. Rather the entire Armed Forces as a whole are responsible for this objective.²¹⁶ Because of the increased cooperation with other authorities within Switzerland and foreign Armed Forces in international operations, the Armed Forces have to improve their interoperability. The capabilities to cooperate in international peace support and humanitarian operations have to be increased as a first priority and capabilities to cooperate in area protection and defense are secondary.²¹⁷ Interoperability includes language skills, staff procedures, equipment, and in particular command and control systems. Beside procurement programs, common exercises and training programs within PfP shall increase interoperability.²¹⁸

b. Organization

Since different missions require special skills and different strengths, the Swiss Armed Forces are basically organized with a task force structure. Battalions and squadrons are the basic modules.²¹⁹ Both the *Land Force* and the *Air Force* are divided into a *Training Command* and an *Operational Command*. The Training Command is responsible for providing units "fit for mission" and for training of NCOs and officers up to the level of battalion commanders. In the case of an actual mission, the units are assigned to the Operational Command, which is responsible for the training up to the status of "fit

²¹⁵ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 24-29

²¹⁶ Ibid; p. 61

²¹⁷ Ibid; p. 30

²¹⁸ Ibid; p. 30-31

²¹⁹ Ibid; p. 25

for the mission" and has operational command for the mission itself. In addition to the Armed Forces Operational Staff, both the Land Force Command and the Air Force Command should be able to conduct joint operations.

The newly created function *Chief of the Armed Forces* concentrates the responsibility for overall defense planning and improves command and control capabilities. The previous organization with several Commanders-in-Chief of Corps and the Commander of the General Staff as *primus inter pares* was in this sense highly ineffective and inefficient.

(1) The Chief of the Armed Forces. The Chief of the Armed Forces has full responsibility for defense planning and exercises operational command of all elements of the Armed Forces in peacetime and crisis. However, he will not automatically have operational command in wartime, since the parliament will elect a Supreme Commander in such a case. The Chief of the Armed Forces is directly subordinated to the Minister of Defense, which has the political responsibility for the Armed Forces.²²⁰ The Chief of the Armed Forces leads the *Land Force* and the *Air Force*, the *Armed Forces Cadre Training Organization*, the *Armed Forces Logistics Organization*, and the *Armed Forces Command and Control Organization*. The *Armed Forces Planning Staff*, the *Armed Forces Operational Staff* and his personal staff support him in conducting his tasks.²²¹

(2) The Armed Forces Planning Staff and the Armed Forces Operational Staff. The Planning Staff is responsible for development of doctrine, defense planning, and evaluation of guidelines for the Armed Forces' readiness. It develops strategic military guidelines based on security policy inputs. The Operational Staff provides permanent command and control of the Armed Forces. It also includes centers of competence, such as the NBC Centre or SWISSINT. The Operational Staff is responsible for development of operations based on military strategic guidelines.²²² SWISSINT, as the

²²⁰ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 51

²²¹ Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport (VBS); *Foliensammlung neue Schweizer Armee*; PowerPoint presentation; p. 32; [<http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/groupgst/de/home/armee.html>] (4/27/2004)

²²² "Armeeleitbild XXI. Sicher mit uns."; p. 42

centre of competence for international operations, is responsible for planning, providing and deploying all Swiss military contingents to peace support missions. Currently, Switzerland assigned about 250 military personnel to international peace support operations.²²³

(3) The Armed Forces Cadre Training Organization. The Armed Forces Cadre Training Organization provides additional training for all militia (officers) and professional cadres (officers, NCOs).²²⁴

(4) The Armed Forces Logistics Organization and Armed Forces Command and Control Organization. While the Logistics Organization is responsible for management and supplies of the Armed Forces' material²²⁵, the Command and Control Organization supports the Operational Staff.

(5) The Land Force. The Land Force is lead by its Commander-in-chief Land Force. His subordinates are the *Chief of Training*, the *Chief Operational Staff*, 4 *Provincial Commands*, and the *Commander-in-chief Military Security*. The Chief of Training is responsible for the training organization, which consists of 7 branch specific training units²²⁶. The Provincial Commands perform as a connector between the cantons and the Armed Forces, providing special knowledge and leading subsidiary operations in their region. The Operational Staff has operational command and is responsible for training of staffs and units up to "fit for the mission". The military security organization supports subsidiary operations, contributes to internal security, and is responsible for operating and maintaining permanent headquarters.²²⁷

Intentionally the Land Force should consist of six to eight combat brigades.²²⁸ However, currently the Land Force has nine combat brigades with assigned battalions already in peacetime: four Infantry Brigades, three Mountain Infantry Brigades, and two Armored Brigades. However, the brigades do not represent operational

²²³ SWISSINT; [<http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/groupgst/de/home/peace/peace.html>] (4/27/2004)

²²⁴ "Armeeleitbild XXI. Sicher mit uns."; p.42

²²⁵ Ibid; p. 42

²²⁶ 1 Signal, 1 Artillery, 2 Infantry, 1 Engineers/Disaster relief, 1 Tank, 1 Logistics

²²⁷ Foliensammlung neue Schweizer Armee; p. 41 and 44

²²⁸ Armeeleitbild XXI; p. 53

structure. They will be newly tasked if a mission is due. This organizational shortfall was basically a result of regional interests, military tradition, inter-service and intra-service competition.

With regard to the number of brigades, the mountain regions were complaining that they were underrepresented in the Armed Forces XXI. They argued that since a great part of Switzerland is mountainous, the number of mountain infantry should be increased. This argument is valid so far. However, there is no real need for a third mountain infantry brigade since the difference in training between regular infantry and mountain infantry is marginal. But the real problem was that instead of replacing a regular infantry or armored brigade, the planners created an additional mountain infantry brigade. As a result, the current strength of the Land Force rather reflects regional and particular interests than military necessity.

With regard to the command structure, the inefficient organization was caused by the belief that brigades should be embedded in their respective region and that cohesion within a brigade is an important factor for combat. First of all, cohesion cannot be a valid argument since the brigades will be tasked anyway in the case of an operation. Second, the recent years have shown that the militia brigade staffs are highly occupied with preparing training and exercises for their battalions instead being trained in decision making and command and control themselves, since they serve only few weeks a year. Furthermore, a straightforward organization would have abolished the Provincial Commands and would have assigned responsibilities in civil-military coordination to the Operational Staff on the level of the headquarters. The current organization constitutes a break in operational command in case of an escalation from a subsidiary mission, lead by the Provincial Command, to a for example area protection mission, lead by the Operational Staff. However, strong political and military traditional opposition hindered the introduction of such an organization.

(6) The Air Force. The Air Force is lead by its Commander-in-Chief Air Force. His subordinates are the *Chief of Training*, the *Chief Operational Staff*, and *CEO of the Air Force Logistic Organization*. In contrast to the battalions of the Land Force, all battalions and squadrons are basically subordinated to the Air Force Training

Command, which consists of three units.²²⁹ If an operation is due, the squadrons and battalions are subordinated to the Operational Staff, having operational command over all operations of the Air Force. The Air Force Logistic Organization is responsible for supply and maintenance of Air Force material.²³⁰ Unfortunately, regional and particular interests prevented merging all logistics under a single organization. Since the Air Force Logistics Organization and the Armed Forces Logistics Organization are mainly civil organizations, probable loss of jobs was politically infeasible.

c. Training

(1) Conscripts. After passing basic training of 18 or 21 weeks depending on the branch, conscripts will have to pass annual refresher training of nineteen days each from age twenty-one to twenty-six. Thereafter, they are assigned to the reserve until the age of thirty, when they are discharged from the Armed Forces. The basic training is mainly focused on core defense capabilities up to the level of "fit for mission".²³¹

In order to have enough rapid deployable personnel and to improve the Armed Forces sustainability, conscripts have the possibility to do their service in one period of 300 days. Their number is restricted to no more than 15% of annual conscripts. In first priority, these single-term soldiers, called "Durchdiener", are assigned to subsidiary missions after passing basic training. Only if such units are exhausted, regular units doing their 3-week service should be deployed. Unfortunately, low knowledge about this opportunity caused that only about 50% of the needed 2000 single-term soldiers could be drafted for 2003.²³² Furthermore, since the training organization lacks enough professional personnel, they rather perform as instructors than as rapid deployable personnel.

(2) Militia Officers and NCOs. Militia Officers and NCOs are drafted from recruits after 7 weeks of basic training. Thereafter, NCOs are trained for additional 30, officers for 46 weeks. Besides their branch specific training, all officers will have to pass additional training in the Armed Forces Senior Cadre Training Institute, aim-

²²⁹ 1 Air borne (Combat aircrafts, helicopters, UAVs, diverse aircrafts), 1 Air Defense, 1 Command and Control

²³⁰ Foliensammlung neue Schweizer Armee; p. 47

²³¹ "Armeeleitbild XXI. Sicher mit uns."; p. 36-38

²³² Ueberprüfung der Zielsetzungen der Armee; p.12

ing at changing mentality from individual branch thinking toward joint war fighting. While future platoon leaders acquire an overview over all branches missions and structures, future company and battalion commanders, staff officers, and general staff officers are trained in staff planning and command and control procedures. Subaltern officers serve until the age of 36, captains until the age of 42, and senior officers until the age of 50.²³³

(3) Professional Officers and NCOs. Their careers begin with passing regular basic training as conscripts and passing NCO or Officer School. After that, officers attend the Military Academy for one respectively three years, depending on their civil background. NCOs attend the academy for two years. The main task of professional officers and NCOs is training of conscripts, NCOs and militia officers within the Training Commands. The new structure of the Armed Forces and the basic training system with three starts per year requires about 5000 professionals. However, the Armed Forces only have about 3300 professional military personnel.²³⁴ Lacking financial resources, the DOD had to stop acquiring more personnel. More militia personnel and single-term soldiers performing as instructors should fill the gap. Professionalizing training, as it is required in the security policy report, is more than questionable under such circumstances.

(4) International training. Basic training does not include peace-keeping skills. The conviction that such skills can be deduced from war fighting training and the fact that 18 to 21 weeks do not allow any additional training are main justifications for this shortfall. Voluntary peacekeepers are trained in the SWISSINT Training Center or abroad.

d. Main Weapon Systems and Procurement Programs

Switzerland's main weapon systems are still focused on defense capabilities, even if this task has the lowest probability. Compared to its size and terrain, Switzerland keeps a high number of main battle tanks (MBT), artillery, and armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV).²³⁵ Switzerland has no ballistic missile defense capabilities, only short-range ground based air defense capabilities, and no air to ground fighting ca-

²³³ "Armeeleitbild XXI. Sicher mit uns."; p.38

²³⁴ Ueberprüfung der Zielsetzungen der Armee; p. 12;

²³⁵ Ibid; p. 11

pabilities.²³⁶ Due to high costs and technical and operational requirements, ballistic missile defense is only realizable within a common European architecture. Air to ground fighting capability is mainly required for defense, area protection, or peace enforcement tasks. But since Switzerland does not and will not participate in peace enforcement operations, it should have low priority. Middle and long-range air defense capabilities have only low priority, even if they could be an alternative or a complement to costly air borne air defense capabilities.

Switzerland particularly lacks airlift capabilities, which is a requirement for increased contribution to peace support operations. Switzerland's main deficiency is in interoperable C⁴ISAR capabilities. These are absolutely required for cooperation with other countries in the three areas of defense, civil support, and peace support. However, since such systems are expensive, require a common national and international architecture and are hardly manageable by militia soldiers, it would be very difficult for Switzerland to improve these capabilities due to its limited financial resources and its militia system.

Procurement procedures used to be carried out separately by each service, focusing on single weapon systems. New missions, the new structure, and limited financial resources increasingly ask for joint solutions and platforms that fit into an overall architecture. The creation of an Armed Forces Planning Staff responsible for mid-term and long-term overall investment plans constitutes a real improvement. The Swiss Defense Procurement Agency is responsible for overall research, development, evaluation, procurement, maintenance, sale and liquidation.²³⁷

The ongoing procurement program is focused on mainly defense capabilities. New infantry fighting vehicles ordered in 2000 or armored recovery vehicles ordered in 2002, both to improve the armored brigades fighting capabilities, are evidence enough.²³⁸ The Armed Forces' obligation for an autonomous as possible territorial defense could justify such acquisitions. Due to financial constraints, future procurement has

²³⁶ For details see APPENDIX

²³⁷ "Armeeleitbild XXI. Sicher mit uns." p. 42-43

²³⁸ The Military Balance 2003 2004; p. 267-268

to be focused on capabilities required for highly probable tasks. The steadily decreasing military budgets limit the ability to really modernize the Armed Forces. Cost intensive acquisitions such as new fighter or transport airplanes will only be possible with additional funds.²³⁹ These of which are highly improbable considering the current political and financial conditions.

To conclude, the Swiss Armed Forces underwent fundamental changes in their structure and organization. Even if these changes constitute an improvement in effectiveness and efficacy, political, social, and traditional aspects caused important shortfalls. Switzerland lacks in vital capabilities, even if it has quite modern equipment. As a consequence, Switzerland should steadily modernize its Armed Forces in accordance with its security policy goals and to improve its international security. In order to close the current gap between required capabilities and available financial resources, Switzerland either has to increase its military spending or to reassess the Armed Forces tasks.

2. Austria

a. Preconditions

Based on Austria's main focus on international operations along the *EU Petersberg Tasks*, the *Bundesheer-Reformkommission*²⁴⁰ evaluates different possible systems for the Armed Forces for the immediate future, 2010-2015. Since international operations increasingly require rapid deployable forces in adequate strength and quality, systems of conscription and mobilization are not efficient enough. Therefore, the commission examines *inter alia* if conscription should be abolished.²⁴¹ However, until a governmental decision is made, Austria's Armed Forces are still based on its current system. The future structure and strength in personnel of the Armed Forces' peacetime organization will be based on requirements for international operations and domestic sub-

²³⁹ Ueberprüfung der Zielsetzungen der Armee; p. 11

²⁴⁰ The Bundesheer-Reformkommission is a commission consisting of civilians and military personnel, which is evaluating a possible new structure and organization of the Armed Forces based on security policy guidelines.

²⁴¹ Zilk, H.

sidiary operations. Due to possible changes in the security environment, an adequate force generation capability has to be retained.²⁴²

The Austrian Armed Forces' wartime organization is based on a system of conscription and mobilization. All Austrian males between 17 and 50 are liable for military service. On a voluntary basis, all military positions including combat positions are open to women. The Armed Forces' peacetime organization has 35,000 active soldiers, from whom 16,000 are professionals, 17,000 conscripts and the remainder are civilians. The reserves, which complete the Armed Forces to full strength in time of crisis or war, consist of two different types. The ready reserves have a force of 75,000 personnel and can be called up within 72 hours. The larger contingent has a force of 990,000 personnel, but no service commitment.²⁴³

Austria has realized that in particular, international peace support operations require interoperability, availability in a shorter time, sustainability and survivability, and intelligence capabilities.²⁴⁴ As a consequence, the new Austrian Armed Forces will consequently be shaped along these criteria, as far as the financial resources allow. In order to be able to meet all these requirements, Austria will certainly have to increase its military spending. Its current spending of 1% of GDP will not allow adequate modernization, neither in equipment nor in structure and organization.

b. Organization

The Austrian Armed Forces have no military Supreme Commander. The President of the Republic has overall command over the Armed Forces and can therefore be seen as its Supreme Commander. In peacetime he delegates this responsibility to the Defense Minister. The *Inspector General of the Armed Forces* and the newly created *Chief of General Staff* seem to be the military commanders with main power. The Ministry of Defense is organized like the *Minister's Cabinet*, the *Directorate for Security Policy*, the *Bundesheer-Reformkommission*, two administrative sections, and the *General Staff*. The *Command Land Force*, the *Command Air Force*, the *Command Special Force*,

²⁴² Teilstrategie Verteidigungspolitik; p. 12

²⁴³ The Military Balance 2003 2004; p. 64-65

²⁴⁴ Teilstrategie Verteidigungspolitik; p. 10-11

the *Command International Operations*, the *Command Force Support*, the *Command C⁴I*, and all military academies are subordinated to the Minister of Defense on an equal level.²⁴⁵

(1) The General Staff. The General Staff consists of a Planning Staff, a Procurement Staff, and an Operational Staff and is responsible for force development and planning, procurement, and has operational command over all operations.²⁴⁶

(2) The Land Force. The Land Force consists of three Infantry Brigades, two Mechanized Infantry Brigades, nine Provincial Commands, one Signal Regiment, and one Signal Battalion. These active units are responsible for both executing missions and for training.²⁴⁷

(3) The Air Force. The Air Force mainly consists of three Airborne Regiments, three Air Defense Regiments, four Air bases, one Air Force Signal Battalion, the Air Space Control Organization, the Air Force Intelligence Organization, the Pilot Training Organization, and the Air Force Logistics Base. They have the same responsibilities as the units of the Land Force.²⁴⁸

(4) The Command Special Force. The Command was established in 2002 in order to meet requirements of the changed security environment. It consists of forces that are able to execute operations for which conventional forces do not have the capabilities, such as evacuation, hostage rescue, protection of vital infrastructure, special intelligence, or fighting against terrorists. They are specially trained, equipped, rapid deployable.²⁴⁹

(5) The Command International Operations. The Command is responsible for Austria's participation in international peace support operations. It consists

²⁴⁵ Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, *Organisation Zentralstelle*, Chart 1 of 1; [http://www.bundesheer.at/images_skaliert/strukturreform_top_864x556_1068461480.png] (4/22/2004)

²⁴⁶ Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; Chart 1 of 1; [<http://www.bundesheer.at/organisation/gliederung/images/gstb.png>] (4/22/2004)

²⁴⁷ Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; *Militär International*; Österreich; Landstreitkräfte; [http://www.bundesheer.at/truppendienst/milint/td_milint-laenderinfo.php] (4/22/2004)

²⁴⁸ Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; *Militär International*

²⁴⁹ Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; *Bundesheer*; *Jadgkommando*; *Spezialeinsatzkräfte*; [<http://www.bundesheer.at/karriere/jakdo/spezialeinsatzkraefte.shtml>] (4/22/2004)

of a staff, a training center and a center for international cooperation.²⁵⁰ Austria has established two different international operations' pillars. The *Force for International Operations*, consisting of military cadre personnel having already passed their basic training, has high readiness and is therefore rapid deployable. Having signed a special contract for at least three years, volunteers can be assigned to international operations for at least six month.²⁵¹ The *Preparation Units*, the other pillar, are open to all ranks. These volunteers are only called up if there is an actual operation due. The Preparation Units are only responsible for training.²⁵² Austria has currently about 1000 military personnel assigned to international peace support operations.²⁵³

c. Training

(1) Conscripts. Recruits have to pass basic training of seven or eight month, having the choice between the two lengths. In case of seven-month training, they have the obligation for thirty day refresher training. Privates are incorporated in the Armed Forces until the age of fifty.²⁵⁴

(2) Militia Officers and NCOs. Militia Officers and NCOs have to pass their basic training as conscript. Thereafter, NCOs are trained for additional 13 weeks. Militia Officers first have to serve as NCO. Thereafter they have to attend voluntary exercises to be promoted to lieutenant.²⁵⁵ After basic training both officers and NCOs serve 60 to 90 additional days until the age of 65.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁰ Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung Chart 1 of 1; [<http://www.bundesheer.at/organisation/gliederung/images/kdoie.png>] (4/22/2004)

²⁵¹ Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; Bundesheer; *Internationale Einsätze*; [<http://www.bundesheer.at/ausle/auslepd/index.shtml>] (4/22/2004)

²⁵² Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; *MERKBLATT zur freiwilligen Meldung (KIOP-VOREIN)*; [http://www.bundesheer.at/ausle/auslepd/freiwillige_meldung.shtml] (4/22/2004)

²⁵³ Informationssystem des Bundesministeriums fuer Landesverteidigung; *Auslandeinsätze; Laufende Missionen*; [<http://www.bundesheer.at/ausle/missionen/mission.shtml>] (4/23/2004)

²⁵⁴ *The Military Balance 2003 2004*; p. 64

²⁵⁵ Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; Bundesheer; *Karriere Offizier*; [<http://www.bundesheer.at/karriere/offizier/index.shtml>] (4/22/2004) and *Karriere Unteroffizier*; [<http://www.bundesheer.at/karriere/unteroffizier/info/index.shtml>] (4/22/2004)

²⁵⁶ *The Military Balance 2003 2004*; p. 64

(3) Professional Officers and NCOs. The main part of Austrian Officers and NCOs are professionals. Their career begins with passing regular basic training as conscripts. Thereafter, officers have to attend the Military Academy for a four-year term and branch specific schools for a one-year term. NCOs have to attend the NCO Academy for about one year. In the aftermath, both careers are characterized by a mix of attending school, practice as instructor and leader in their units, and assignments to international missions.²⁵⁷

(4) International training. Currently training for core military capabilities takes the main part of basic training. However, future basic training will include skills for the whole spectrum of the *EU Petersberg Tasks*.²⁵⁸

d. Main Weapon Systems and Procurement Plans

Austria's Armed Forces have decreasing defense capabilities. The reason is two fold. First, low military spending over the last decades made it impossible to improve such capabilities appropriately. Second, Austria's main focus on international peace support operations caused a shift away from defense towards peacekeeping capabilities. Austria has already deactivated such equipment as towed artillery and fortress artillery, no longer needed for the highest priority tasks.²⁵⁹ Austria does not yet have appropriate logistics capacities to contribute to multinational operations. But it has airlift capabilities to transport its own troops abroad. Furthermore, Austria lacks in ballistic missile defense capabilities, air defense and air space control capabilities. Austria decided to buy new fighter airplanes type EUROFIGHTER²⁶⁰, even if this was strongly opposed by different political parties and parts of the population.

To conclude, Austria increasingly balances its structure, organization, training, and main weapon systems accordingly to its focus on international peace support operations. Austria's intention to fully support a future common European defense will be highly decisive for its future. However, the current structure and organization is

²⁵⁷ Karriere Offizier and Karriere Unteroffizier

²⁵⁸ Teilstrategie Verteidigungspolitik; p. 12

²⁵⁹ The Military Balance 2003 2004; p. 64-65

²⁶⁰ Ibid; p. 264

still inefficient. International cooperation and joint war fighting requires a straightforward structure and organization. Despite prioritized military spending in its most probable tasks, Austria will hardly be able to contribute appropriately to a common European defense without increasing its future spending to at least the average of other members of the EU. The future will show if Austria's government and the Armed Forces are able to overcome political, financial and economic constraints similar to those in Switzerland. It seems that this should be possible. If so, Austria's Armed Forces will be an effective and efficient security policy instrument.

3. Sweden

a. Preconditions

Sweden's defense is based on a concept called *Total Defense*, meaning that not only the Armed Forces have to contribute to defense but the whole society. Therefore everyone aged between 16 and 70 living in Sweden must serve in Total Defense if required, either in military service, civil duty, or general service. Enlistment is voluntary for women but mandatory for men.²⁶¹

The Swedish Armed Forces' wartime organization is based on a conscription and mobilization systems. All Swedish men between 19 and 47 are liable for military service, but not all have to carry it out. A selection system based on certain criteria provides the required strength in personnel. On a voluntary basis all military positions including combat positions are open to women.²⁶² The Armed Forces overall strength in personnel is 200,000 when fully mobilized. The Armed Forces peacetime organization, after a new reduction, will have a total strength in personnel of 20,000. Approximately 12,000 are officers and the remainders are civilians. Annually about 16,000 conscripts begin their national service.²⁶³

²⁶¹ The Swedish Armed Forces; p. 13

²⁶² The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 9

²⁶³ Ibid; p. 9

Based on its threat assessment and the resulting tasks, Sweden intends to create a more flexible, rapid deployable, and network based forces. Elements that no longer fit in the new defense concept will be phased out.²⁶⁴ The transformation process is seen as a continuous change over the next decades.

b. Organization

(1) Supreme Commander. The Supreme Commander is the head of Sweden's Armed Forces. He is directly subordinated to the government and responsible for all activities of the Armed Forces, their organization, readiness, endurance, and capabilities in compliance with political decisions and allocated resources. He is assisted by the *Armed Forces Headquarters*.²⁶⁵

(2) The Armed Forces Headquarters. The Headquarters, as the highest command level, consists *inter alia* of the *Joint Strategic Plan and Policy*, the *Joint Forces Development*, the *Joint Forces Training and Management*, and the *Joint Forces Command*. The Headquarters is responsible for operations management but also for military strategy issues and force development.²⁶⁶ While Joint Strategic Plans and Policy is responsible for planning and composition of the Armed Forces, Joint Force Development is responsible for planning of weapon systems and material for combat units.²⁶⁷ The Joint Force Command, consisting of an Operational Staff and three Component Commands – Army, Navy, and Air Force – has operational command over all national and international missions.²⁶⁸ As a consequence, the four military districts, which are responsible for cooperation with other authorities of Total Defense and training,²⁶⁹ and the operational combat units, are directly subordinated to the Joint Forces Command.

²⁶⁴ The Swedish Armed Forces; p. 6

²⁶⁵ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 7-8

²⁶⁶ Swedish Armed Forces; *The Swedish Armed Forces Leadership*; [<http://www.mil.se/article.php?id=9595>] (4/21/2004)

²⁶⁷ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 8

²⁶⁸ The Swedish Armed Forces Leadership

²⁶⁹ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 14

The Training and Management Organization is responsible for development, maintenance, and disbandment of combat units to the command organization.²⁷⁰

(3) The Swedish Armed Forces Logistics Organization. The logistics organization is responsible for all support and maintenance tasks, such as equipment maintenance, transport, financial auditing, and travel.

(4) SWEDINT. SWEDINT used to be a more or less independent command but is now, since January 2004, a part of the Swedish Life Guards Regiment. Its main tasks are training of Swedish and international personnel in staff work and peacekeeping, development and coordination of Swedish participation in peace support operations, supporting Swedish units and individuals in national matters, and planning and providing PfP training activities. SWEDINT consists of military officers, police officers and civilians.²⁷¹ Currently, about 1000 military personnel are assigned to international peace support operations.²⁷²

(5) Wartime organization. The wartime organization consists of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters including the Joint Forces Command and Army Division Headquarters, the military districts, land, maritime, air forces, and territorial defense forces. The Land Force consists of six brigade staff units (2 inactive), some 38 battalions along mechanized, infantry, artillery, air defense, combat engineer, logistics, ranger, and military police. The Maritime Force consists of two surface warfare flotillas, one mine warfare flotilla, one submarine flotilla, one amphibious brigade staff, and three amphibious battalions. The Air Force consists of three fighter control and surveillance battalions, one airborne early warning group, eight air base battalions, eight fighter squadrons, and six air transport squadrons. The territorial defense consists of 14 battalions and of approximately 133 Home Guard battalions.²⁷³

²⁷⁰ Swedish Armed Forces; *How the Armed Forces are organized*; [<http://www.mil.se/article.php?c0art&id=7300&do=print>] (4/21/2004)

²⁷¹ Swedish Armed Forces; *About Swedint*; p. 1-2; [<http://www.swedint.mil.se/article.php?dontaddcount=1&id=8562>] (4/21/2004)

²⁷² Swedish Armed Forces; *An international role*: [<http://www.mil.se/article.php?id=7296>] (4/21/2004)

²⁷³ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 11-12

(6) Peacetime Organization. The peacetime organization develops and maintains competence and retains readiness units, stationed at 14 Army, two Naval, two Amphibious, five Air Force and one Joint Helicopter establishment throughout the country.

The logistics units are unified in the Swedish Armed Forces Logistics (SWAFLOG). Sweden has no standing land forces. However, a number of units in the Air Force, the Navy, and some minor elements of the land forces are deployable in short time.²⁷⁴

c. Training

(1) Conscripts. The length of basic training for conscripts varies between 230 and 300 days, depending on the service they belong to. While conscript section leaders are trained for 300 to 450 days, conscript deputy platoon leaders are trained for 330 to 450 days. After their basic training, all conscripts have to participate in refresher training exercises for a total of 240 days. During a year, two exercise periods, but not more than 34 days, may be used.²⁷⁵ Regular officers of the combat units to which the conscript will be assigned are responsible for basic training of Army and Amphibious conscripts. Navy conscripts are trained on ships assigned to different combat units, and Air Force conscripts are trained at peacetime Air Force bases.²⁷⁶

(2) Officers. The Swedish Armed Forces consist mainly of a professional officer corps. However, beside reserve officers, there are also some conscript officers. The officer corps forms basically the cadre around which combat units are organized. There are no NCOs in the Swedish Armed Forces. The professional officers directly attend the National Defence College without passing basic conscript training. The Career Officer Program lasts two years and is divided in a joint part (one year) and a branch or specialized part (one year). In contrast to previous programs, the current programs have a more pronounced focus on international and civilian support issues.²⁷⁷ In the aftermath, professional officers follow a career in which periods of training troops is

²⁷⁴ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 12-15

²⁷⁵ Ibid; p. 16

²⁷⁶ Ibid; p. 16

²⁷⁷ Officer's Training – 4.The New officer Education; p. 1-2

mixed with personal education and training in military schools. In order to get promoted, officers have to pass different programs, such as the Tactical Program on the company level (one year), the Staff Program (one year) on the national and international tactical staff level, or the Advanced Command Program (two to two and a half years) on the national or international tactical and operational level.²⁷⁸

(3) International training. Training for international missions has a long tradition in Sweden. Together with other Nordic countries, Sweden established a special peacekeeping training system. Denmark provides training for military police officers and CIMIC personnel, Finland for military observers, Norway for logistics and transportation personnel, and Sweden for senior staff officers, police officers and civil staff officers. However, basic unit training remains in the responsibility of each country.²⁷⁹ Sweden's units for peacekeeping are trained in special courses and facilities. Regular basic training in the Armed Forces, except the Officer's training, does not include skills for international operations.

d. Main Weapon Systems and Procurement Plans

Based on its security strategy of non-military alignment and its contribution to international peace support operations, Sweden's Armed Forces still maintain capabilities along the whole spectrum of national and international tasks.²⁸⁰ Sweden wants to shape its Armed Forces along a Network Based Task Force Structure. Capabilities in situational awareness and command and control have to be improved. The current modern systems have to be integrated due to their intentional designed for single platforms.²⁸¹

In order to be able to afford modernization, Sweden wants to shorten procurement cycles. Joint procurement development including all services, industry, aca-

²⁷⁸ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 15 and Officer's Training – 4. The New officer Education; p. 2-3

²⁷⁹ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; p. 16

²⁸⁰ General Håkan Syrén; *Presentation by the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces at the National Conference of Folk och Försvar (People and Defence) in Sälen*, January, 2004; p. 8; [<http://www.mil.se/article.php?id=10590>] (4/27/2004)

²⁸¹ Swedish Armed forces; *Network Based Defence – A smarter way to fight*; p. 4; [<http://www.mil.se/article.php?id=7295>](4/27/2004)

demic institutions and international military industries seem to be the solution.²⁸² Nonetheless, Sweden still spends approximately twice as much for defense as Switzerland or Austria. Sweden's major procurement projects are:²⁸³

- Medium Range SAM System
- Artillery Shell
- Medium Size Multi-Role Armored Vehicle
- Advanced Mortar System
- New Light Anti-Tank Weapon
- Medium Utility Helicopter
- Light Utility Helicopter
- Corvette
- Submarine
- Heavy Torpedo
- Fighter Airplane JAS 39
- Reconnaissance Pod
- IR and RR Air-to-Air Missile

To conclude, the Swedish Armed Forces are increasingly shaped for national and international joint operations. The structure and organization provides a more and more straightforward approach toward efficiency and effectiveness. Sweden's Armed Forces have and will continue to have modern weapon systems for all its national and international tasks. Even if its capabilities meet modern European standards, Sweden is continually improving its capabilities. Although Sweden has decreased its military spending in the last years from about 3% GDP to 2% GDP, it is still willing to provide appropriate financial resources to modernize its Armed Forces.

D. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

In conclusion, all three countries assigned missions to their Armed Forces that can be considered postmodern and all three still retain traditional defense missions. Switzerland has slightly adjusted its priorities toward contributions to peace support and crisis management (international missions) and toward the prevention and management of existential menaces (domestic and international support of civil authorities). Nonetheless, the

²⁸² Network Based defence – A smarter way to fight; p. 4;

²⁸³ The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; Annex 4; p. 1

defense of its territory is still the main justifications for maintaining Armed Forces.²⁸⁴ Sweden's *Total Defense* concept does not seem to reflect the theory of postmodern military. Its long tradition of contributing to international peace support operations including peace enforcement and the conviction that such missions contribute to Sweden's security should be strong evidence of its defense policy.²⁸⁵ Austria's main focus on international missions along the *EU Petersberg Tasks* including peace enforcement reflects the most postmodern military theory.²⁸⁶ While Sweden and Austria increasingly shape their Armed Forces' structure and organization toward postmodern military, Switzerland retains a structure that can be seen at best as late modern.

Even if the probability of a direct military attack is considered to be very low, the strong belief in the foreign and security policy maxim of neutrality and in being able to defend its borders are the justifications for the retention of its Armed Forces. Therefore, structure, organization, main weapon systems, and current procurement programs still have a main focus on defense. Scarce financial resources hinder Switzerland ability to maintain modern Armed Forces for all assigned tasks. Austria follows a different path. International missions have the highest priority in all aspects of military planning. Thereby, Austria increasingly focuses in concordance with a future common European defense. In order to do that, Austria will certainly have to increase its military expenditures. Sweden models its Armed Forces after requirements for both traditional and new missions. In contrast to Switzerland, Sweden seems to be willing to provide the necessary financial resources.

Lacking a clear military threat, many officials in Switzerland claimed that there would be no objective standard to determine the Armed Forces' necessary size and capabilities.²⁸⁷ As a consequence, the Armed Forces should retain capabilities along the whole spectrum. But military planners always have to deal with uncertainties. Therefore, they have to derive their concepts based on reasonable scenarios. This is possible for both

²⁸⁴ Catrina, Ch.; p. 11

²⁸⁵ For details see: Brochure: *The Swedish Armed Forces*; p. 5 and *An international role*

²⁸⁶ Teilstrategie Verteidigungspolitik; p. 8-9

²⁸⁷ Catrina, Ch.; p. 11

defense and peace support operations. Second, EU or NATO membership would provide a clear focal point to meet current and future threats and challenges, and would therefore force Switzerland to transform its Armed Forces in a more appropriate way.²⁸⁸ Non-membership requires high autonomy and, more important, leaves the door open to shape the Armed Forces along political, social, economic, and military aspects rather than military efficiency. As a consequence, alternative defense models are not seriously considered.²⁸⁹

Focusing on peace support operations would also require a reassessment of the structure and organization of the Swiss Armed Forces. Since current national and international threats and challenges increasingly require rapid deployable forces in adequate strength and quality, systems of conscription and mobilization are no longer effective enough.²⁹⁰ Switzerland still makes no distinction between wartime and peacetime organization and retains a mass army with universal conscription. Austria and Sweden have small peacetime organizations consisting of mainly professional officers and the annual conscripts along with enlisted personnel.²⁹¹ Having a ratio of about 50%, the professional officer corps, in Austria together with the professional NCOs, creates the core of operational units. Due to their availability and training, they are increasingly assigned to international or multinational peace support operations. In Switzerland the ratio of professionals to the overall strength of the Armed Forces is only about 1.5%. They are mainly responsible for training and education of conscripts or for handling weapon systems that are no longer manageable by part time soldiers.

Furthermore, Switzerland's system of short basic training and several refresher courses make it difficult to have enough rapid deployable units with a high training level available. The newly created single-term soldiers were considered to close this gap. Un-

²⁸⁸ Spillmann, K. R., p. 235 and A Secure Europe in a Better World; Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations; The Alliance's Strategic Concept; NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative; The Key to the Prague Summit

²⁸⁹ Haltiner, K. W. and Hirt, E.; in Moskos, C. C., Williams, J. A., Segal, D. R.; p. 210-211

²⁹⁰ For details see: Moskos, C. C.; p. 1 and 15

²⁹¹ For details see: Armeeleitbild XXI; Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung; Bundesheer; Karriere Offizier and Karriere Unteroffizier; The Kingdom of Sweden; Vienna Document 1999; and Officer's Training – 4. The New officer Education; The Military Balance 2003 2004; p. 64 and p. 79

fortunately, there are not enough such "Durchdiener". The reasons are diverse. First, their number is restricted. Second, low knowledge about the conscripts caused a shortfall of about 50%. Finally, lacking enough professionals for the training organization, they serve as instructors rather than as rapid deployable personnel. Therefore, the Armed Forces are forced to deploy regular units for civil support operations who then miss their annual training in their core business. In Austria and Sweden, training periods of seven to eight months include support missions to civil authorities to conduct all the Armed Forces' tasks and to train their units appropriately.

Due to their conscript systems, all three countries only deploy volunteers to international peace support operations, which do not fully correspond with the postmodern military theory. As a consequence, only a relatively small number of personnel are deployable. While Sweden considers declaring participation in international missions mandatory for professional officers, Austria considers abolishing conscription in general.²⁹² Switzerland intended to declare participation in international operations mandatory for professional officers and NCOs. However, since the training and organization is highly dependent on professionals, assignments to international missions are not likely. Only Austria includes training for international operations in its basic training.²⁹³ Switzerland and Sweden's peacekeeping units are trained in special courses and facilities.

Even if the government's security policy report expresses the need for increased professionalism in the Armed Forces, the main focus on territorial defense and the strong political opposition among political parties and associations, hinder considering real alternative models. With its current shortfalls in structure and organization and its restricted financial resources, the Armed Forces XXI are not able to fully conduct all the assigned tasks. The Swiss Armed Forces XXI constitutes a compromise between military requirements and political and social feasibility.

The main focus on territorial defense requires an adequate strength in personnel. Because of financial constraints, this can only be guaranteed through a militia system with universal conscription. By consequently focusing on today's most probable mis-

²⁹² Bundesheer 2010; p. 9 and Zilk, H.

²⁹³ Teilstrategie Verteidigungspolitik; p. 12

sions, it would allow to further decrease the strength of the Armed Forces. A system similar to Austria and Sweden could be a real future option between full professional forces, which are considered to be too expensive and a militia system with universal conscription, which does not meet military requirements of current and future tasks. Even if the government and military planners initially intended to introduce such a system strong political and public opposition banned it. Diverse Officer and NCO Associations but also diverse private associations claimed that such a system would create a two-category officer corps, providing high command position only to professionals and letting the militia doing the less attractive work of lower ranks.²⁹⁴ Furthermore, the opponents claimed that such a system would penetrate the long tradition of militia not only in the Armed Forces but also in the political and social life in Switzerland. Despite the fact that military integration in Swiss society is important, military efficiency should be the decisive factor shaping Armed Forces. Furthermore, since conscripts are less and less willing to become NCOs or officers and their employers are decreasingly willing to accept military absences from work, the Armed Forces have difficulties in acquiring the best skilled conscripts for the NCO and officer ranks. As a result, quality and military efficiency decreases.

With regard to the length of basic training, the military planners considered to change the system from short basic training with several refresher courses toward a long single-term basic training with no or only a few refresher courses. But again, political opposition banned such a change. First, the opponents claimed that such a system would penetrate the constitution, not allowing the Armed Forces to have a standing army. A militia system would by definition require short basic training and several refresher courses. In this sense, it is surprisingly that Sweden's long-term basic training does not penetrate its constitution, which also forbids a standing army. The definition reflects a more tradition rather than legal obligation. Second, a long single-term basic training would be incompatible with the needs of Swiss males attending university. They would finish their studies one year later than their female colleagues or male colleagues not liable for military service. As a consequence, they would be discriminated against when looking for a job. The contrary is true. Having the obligation to pass only a single long-term basic training and no refresher courses would allow students to concentrate on their studies

²⁹⁴ NZZ Online; *Armee XXI – Chance und Gefahr?* [<http://www.nzz.ch/dossier/2003>] (5/6/2004)

without interruptions. In addition, such a system would increase employers' acceptance of conscription since it would diminish the absences from work. Strong political opposition forced the government and the military planners to retain universal conscription along all ranks and a system with short basic training and several refresher courses.

The new command structure in Switzerland's Armed Forces consisting of a Chief of Armed Forces and two independent services; each with an operational and a training organization. This structure constitutes a significant improvement. First of all, it facilitates overall military planning and decision-making. Unfortunately, due to political fear of constituting any prejudices, the Chief of Armed Forces was designated after the main planning for the new Armed Forces XXI was done and after the ballot about amendments of the military laws.²⁹⁵ In general, the announced referendum and broad political and public discussion about such issues as length of service, structure, and organization of the Armed Forces seemed to freeze the decision-making process among military leadership. This had severe consequences for the transformation process. In order not to interfere with the job of the future Chief of Armed Forces, the former Chief of General Staff, being the *primus inter pares*, hesitated to clearly decide about such important issues as the number of combat brigades, the training organization, or the length of basic training. As a consequence, the different planning groups had to deal with too many uncertainties. Furthermore, the lack of clear decisions resulted in inter-service and intra-service competition, aimed at retaining as many battalions as possible.

Second, the structure reflects a shift away from a purely training character of the Armed Forces and toward an operational character. The operational staffs are no longer occupied with the training of their units. Unfortunately regional, political and military constraints made it impossible to assign all battalions of the Land Force to the training commands in peacetime, as was proposed by the Armed Forces. The belief that the brigades should be integrated in their respective region and that cohesion within a brigade is

²⁹⁵ The amendment of the military law, allowing arming Swiss soldiers in peace support operations and allowing bilateral agreements for cooperation in training with foreign armed forces was accepted by the population in a ballot on June 10, 2001 by 51%. For details see: *Volksabstimmung vom 10. Juni 2001*; [<http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20010610/index.html>]; Die Bundesversammlung – Das Schweizer Parlament; [<http://www.parlament.ch/homepage/do-archiv/do-archiv-militaergesetz.htm>]; *Abstimmungstext Bundesgesetz ueber die Armee und die Militärverwaltung (Militärgesetz, MG); Aenderungen vom 4. Oktober 2001*; [<http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20030518/explic/d-pp6075.pdf>] (5/13/2004)

an important factor for combat resulted in an inefficient organization. First, cohesion cannot be a valid argument since the brigades will be tasked in the case of an operation. Second, the recent years have shown that the militia brigade staffs are highly occupied with preparing training and exercises for their battalions instead being trained in decision making and command and control themselves.

In addition to structural shortfalls and political aspects, there are two important factors that were responsible for inefficiency in the structure and organization of the Swiss Armed Forces XXI. First, the lack of an operational doctrine fostered intra-service and inter-service competition. Having no clear accepted idea how the Armed Forces intend to accomplish the required tasks opened the door for lobbying among the services and branches. This aimed to maintain as much battalions as possible. For example, after realizing that the planned structure would exceed the maximum in personnel strength, the planners decided to abolish single functions within all battalions instead of reconsidering the total number of battalions. An operational doctrine would have provided clear guidelines of which and how many battalions the Armed Forces needed to conduct their tasks.

Second, a main part of the military establishment, politicians and the population consider changes in force structure and organization only as a periodic revolution rather than a continual process. Therefore, the former Minister of Defense announced shortly after starting the transformation process in 1999 that the Armed Forces XXI would start January 1, 2003 with its new training organization, followed with the new operational organization January 1, 2004. The short time for the transformation process and the need to have more or less perfect solutions right from the beginning hindered the military planners to properly analyze, synchronize, and decide about different proposed options for both the operational and training organization. They could not follow the intentional process of evaluating a military strategy, formulating a doctrine, analyzing the required processes, and lastly developing the appropriate structure and organization.

To conclude, all three countries basically assigned postmodern tasks to their respective Armed Forces. However, while Sweden and Austria increasingly shape their Armed Forces' structure and organization toward postmodern military, Switzerland retains a structure and organization that can be seen at best as late modern. Even if the

Armed Forces XXI can be considered a step forward, there are still too many shortfalls in strategy, doctrine, structure and organization to fulfill the required tasks. Changes in force structure and organization are still mainly based on institutional tradition, political, social, and economic aspects rather than on military efficiency. As a consequence, alternative defense models are not seriously considered.²⁹⁶ The following official governmental justification should be evidence enough:

The militia system has historically developed in our country along the political and military domain. ... The system of militia allows gaining profit of civil knowledge and contributes to a broad embedment of the Armed Forces in the population.²⁹⁷

Such Armed Forces [small professional Armed Forces] would no longer be militia Armed Forces and would therefore require a change in the constitution. If such Armed Forces would have to defend Switzerland's territory in case of an attack, they had to be strong enough and most modern equipped, what would go beyond the scope of the actual military budget.²⁹⁸

In order to overcome these shortfalls, the military establishment has to change its attitudes toward efficiency and effectiveness. Politicians will have to clearly decide, if the Armed Forces are an important security policy instrument. Furthermore, they will have to reassess the assigned tasks. If the Armed Forces are still an important security policy instrument and if there is a real need for all three tasks, they will have to appropriately increase the financial resources. If they are not willing or not able to do so, they will have to reduce the tasks in order to close the existing gap between security policy wishes and real military capabilities.

²⁹⁶ Haltiner, K. W. and Hirt, E.; in Moskos, C. C.; p. 210-211

²⁹⁷ Armeeleitbild XXI, p. 16

²⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 33

IV. CONCLUSION

A changed security environment in Europe after the end of the Cold War, characterized on one side by increased integration and cooperation in Europe and on the other side by disintegration and fragmentation particularly in the Balkans, forced most European countries to reassess their respective security policy. This was true for the neutral countries of Switzerland, Austria and Sweden.

As a consequence of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and increased integration and cooperation in the EU and NATO, these neutral were surrounded by democratic states. None of the three countries fear direct military threats, although this cannot be totally disregarded. New threats and challenges just below the threshold of war increasingly challenge their security. Impacts of international terrorism, proliferation of WMD with associated long range delivery systems, organized crime, vulnerability of societies with their dependence on modern information technologies, demographic trends in less developed countries resulting in greater disparity of wealth and increased migration and regional natural and technical disasters with global impacts have replaced former old military threats and constitute the main concerns of all three countries. Since these new threats and challenges are not bound to national borders, increased cooperation in Europe and beyond is required.

A. SECURITY POLICY

As a consequence, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden formulated new or adjusted existing security policy goals, strategies, and instruments. All three countries aim to defend their territory, protect freedoms and rights of their respective population and foster peace and security within and beyond Europe borders. In order to achieve these goals, they follow a comprehensive security strategy. This includes all possible instruments in various policy areas, such as foreign, defense, economic, information, asylum, and environmental policy. While Austria and Sweden clearly focus on integration and solidarity with the EU and NATO, Switzerland follows a strategy of perpetual neutrality but has shown increased international cooperation. This has come to signify that cooperation is

only a valid instrument if the national's own means are not sufficient. In contrast, Austria has realized and accepted that its own instruments are no longer sufficient to meet its security requirements. As a consequence, it actively supports and fosters not only the EU's overall goals but also a future common defense policy. The government even declared membership in NATO as a possible strategic option. Sweden still follows its traditional policy of non-alignment but due to its EU membership, it had to reduce it to non-military alignment. It considers a common European defense as incompatible with its strategy.

Three main reasons cause the different strategies. In contrast to Austria and Sweden, Switzerland's understanding of neutrality and its unique political system hinder a wider opening toward Europe and following a strategy of real solidarity rather than self-centered cooperation. Furthermore, economic and social prerequisites are responsible for a tradeoff between security policy needs and affordable deeds. First, Switzerland's understanding and long tradition of neutrality does not yet allow fundamental changes in its security policy. Keeping Switzerland out of both major World Wars introduced the conviction, that perpetual neutrality was and still is the best serving instrument for Switzerland's survival. Even if the changed international security environment makes neutrality practically obsolete, it is hard to change the hearts and minds of Switzerland's political elite and population. As a consequence, parts of Switzerland's political elites and population are not yet willing to go the only effective and consequent path, joining the EU and/or NATO as the most important security organizations in Europe. As a result, possible security policy options are reduced to only a few. The strong belief in the foreign and security policy maxim of neutrality, the belief in its ability to defend its borders on its own and the not yet defined relationship to the EU are the main political psychological barriers in changing Switzerland's security policy. These changes would be consistent with the analysis of the international environment in the Security Policy Report 2000. In contrast, it is astonishing how easy Austria changed its political maxim to solidarity with Europe and the international community. Austria's neutrality has not as long a tradition as Switzerland's. Furthermore, Austria was practically forced to become neutral after WWII in order to regain its sovereignty. Both factors facilitated Austria's changing of its thinking on neutrality in a relative short time and without great opposition from the political elite and the population. It is also impressive how easily Sweden was able to join the EU and

how it is able to work very close with NATO without affecting its status of neutrality. Sweden always had a different approach to neutrality. As a consequence of its non-alignment policy, strict neutrality was only possible in the event of war but not in peacetime. Therefore, it was and is possible for Sweden to follow a very open minded policy toward international organizations and active participation in international security regimes. In addition, Austria and Sweden already had to clear their understanding of neutrality during their debates about EU membership. Even if Switzerland had similar debates in preparing for UN membership in 2002, it seems that the issue of neutrality has to be revisited again and again.

Second, Austria and Sweden's different political systems seem to make it easier to change and implement governmental ideas. Switzerland's political system, aimed at the broadest possible distribution of power through federalism and such instruments as initiative and referendum, require finding compromises among the government, all political parties and the population. This is true for security policy as well. As a consequence, the cantons, all political parties, trade unions, employer organizations, and numerous associations were invited to comment on the draft of the *Security Policy Report 2000* and later also the *Guidelines to the Armed Forces XXI* (Armeeleitbild XXI) before they were officially approved and published. Considering the wide range of political opinions, from immediate integration into the EU to strict neutrality and autonomy to abolishing the Armed Forces to devising a small professional cadre rather than mass conscript for the Armed Forces, it is not surprisingly that the new security strategy "Security through Cooperation" and the Armed Forces XXI are a compromise based on political, economic, and social limitations rather than on security policy and military efficiency. The announcement of a possible referendum forced the government to negotiate compromises in advance. Membership in the EU was already abandoned in the security policy report because of strong political opposition. Even had the security policy report clearly expresses the compatibility of neutrality and membership in the EU and emphasizes the improvement in security Switzerland would have gained. NATO membership was declared as not necessary in the current security environment.

Third, all three countries have to deal with a steadily aging population and high or growing unemployment rates. This will require further increases in expenditures for so-

cial welfare and health insurance. Since economic growth does not sufficiently contribute to the government's ability to appropriately increase its expenses, a shift within the different policy areas is necessary. A more stable security environment in Europe has led to the conviction that decreasing expenses for security policy and in particular defense policy is reasonable. This is true for Switzerland and Sweden. The exception is Austria, but its expenses have traditionally been low. On the other side, new threats and challenges, leading to the intentional increase in international civil and military participation and cooperation, would require the modernization of their respective Armed Forces. Since Switzerland steadily decreases its defense spending, the gap between security policy wishes, intentions and real military capabilities is widening. The government, the political elite, and the population will have to clearly decide what the security of Switzerland is worth. Currently, the Armed Forces cannot fully meet the required tasks.

To conclude, Switzerland realized that an autonomous security policy is no longer a valid strategy in a changed security environment. Its political system and its understanding of neutrality still seem to make it impossible to really open Switzerland and to follow a strategy of solidarity rather than cooperation. As a consequence, Switzerland has only few security policy options. The new strategy can be considered as a political and social compromise. It contributes to the need to cooperate with the international community, but only where and when Switzerland decides to do so. True cooperation and solidarity would require sharing the burden equally. Switzerland's security strategy is highly dependent on the willingness of its neighbors and possible allies to cooperate in the event of a crisis, war or times of peace. Since Switzerland's understanding of cooperation is akin to diplomatic “free riding”, it is more than unlikely that they are willing to do so.

B. ARMED FORCES

The Armed Forces in all three countries underwent or are undergoing transformation processes. Small professional armies or so called postmodern forces seem to be the right answer to new missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian support, which require rapid deployable units, sustainable logistics, highly trained personnel, and increased interoperability. Furthermore, weapon systems that are no longer manageable by part time soldiers also require increased professionalism.

Austria and Sweden increasingly shape their Armed Forces along these new requirements since they mainly focused on international operations along the *EU Petersberg Tasks*, including peace enforcement. They clearly distinguish between a wartime organization and a small peacetime organization. The peacetime organization consists of the professional officers' corps and of the annual conscripts. Austria had even considered abolishing its conscription system. Basic training of seven to eight months facilitates both profound training and rapid deployment for support operations. Both Austria and Sweden only deploy volunteers among the enlisted to international operations. In contrast, even if the new Swiss Armed Forces XXI were considered to constitute a fundamental change in tasks, structure, and organization, their actual shape does not fully meet the requirements of the new conditions as acknowledged in the governmental security policy report. Nonetheless, the new command structure, consisting of a Chief of Armed Forces and two independent services, each with an operational and a training organization, constitutes a significant improvement. First, the structure facilitates overall military planning and decision-making. Second, the structure reflects a shift away from the purely training character of the Armed Forces toward a more operational character. On the other side, the current structure and organization still reflects late modern characteristics rather than postmodern ones. Mass wartime organization, overall conscription, low ratio of professional military personnel, and short basic training with several annual refresher courses constitute characteristics for territorial defense capabilities rather than for such new missions as peace-keeping, humanitarian support, and support for civil authorities.

There are many explanations for this development in the Armed Forces. The security policy preconditions of neutrality diminish the possible options to only a few. The three-folded tasks, including territorial defense, require maintaining appropriate capabilities along all missions. On the other side, restricted financial resources do not allow equipping and modernizing the Armed Forces appropriately. Furthermore, political and regional interests, the military and social tradition of militia systems, lack in decision making, and the timeframe for transformation caused important shortfalls in structure and organization of the Swiss Armed Forces XXI. All factors together cause a gap between required and real possible capabilities, hindering the Armed Forces to really accomplish all the required tasks.

First, the precondition of neutrality limits possible defense policy to only a few options. Since membership in a military alliance is not possible, the Armed Forces are required to conduct all three assigned tasks – peace support and crisis management, area protection and defense, contribution to prevention and management of existential menaces – with a high level of autonomy. This requires an adequate strength in personnel, which is only affordable with overall conscription. Mainly focusing on the most probable missions – peacekeeping, humanitarian support, and civil support - would further decrease the strength in personnel but would require reassessing the system of conscription. Furthermore, non-membership leaves the door open to hide behind the argument that since Switzerland lacks a clear military threat it would be hardly possible to determine the required size and capabilities. However, this argument is not valid, since peacekeeping and the other new missions provide clear benchmarks. Membership in the EU or NATO would provide clear benchmarks as well as it would force Switzerland to change its Armed Forces along the policies of military efficiency rather than political, social, economic and military aspects.

Second, these political and traditional aspects placed the focus on the least probable task of area protection and defense. Even if a changed security environment requires a shift toward other tasks, defense is still the main justification to retain Armed Forces in Switzerland. The result is that the Armed Forces XXI still consists of too many battalions with mainly defense capabilities, such as armored or artillery battalions. Main weapon systems and current procurement programs are mainly focused on the wartime organization and defense capabilities.

The same political and traditional aspects prevented the introduction of a straightforward command structure, subordinating all battalions to the newly created training commands and only assigned them to the operational command in case of a mission. Furthermore, they prevented the abolishment of unnecessary provincial commands. The belief that the brigades should be embedded in their respective region, that cohesion within a brigade is a decisive factor for combat effectiveness and that only the provincial commands are able to provide special regional knowledge resulted in an inefficient organization. First, the brigades would have been tasked anyway in case of an operation. Furthermore, the brigade staffs would be highly occupied with preparing training and exercises

for their battalions instead of being trained in decision-making and command and control themselves. Finally, the switch in the operational commands between the provincial command and an operational staff in case of an escalation from a civil support mission to an area protection mission constitutes an unnecessary break in operational command.

Political and traditional aspects also forced the Armed Forces to maintain a militia system with overall conscription along all ranks and short basic training with several annual refresher courses. The supporters of a militia system claimed that the system has a long tradition not only in the Armed Forces but also in the political and social life of Switzerland. Furthermore, they claimed that professionalize the officers' corps would discriminate against militia officers and offer less attractive lower ranks and a single long-term basic training would penetrate the constitute constitution; one that does not permit Switzerland to have a standing army. Additionally, such a system would be incompatible with the requirements of students liable for military service. Since such a system would extend their studies, they would have a disadvantage to non-liable and female students in finding a job. Conversely, a single basic training would free them from the obligation of several annual refresher courses and would therefore diminish impacts on studies and on work. However, the argument gained strong support along politicians and military planners. In sum, all the described aspects made the introduction of a military system similar to Austria and Sweden not politically feasible.

Third, the lack in decision-making and the overall time frame prevented a proper analysis and development of the Armed Forces XXI. The announced referendum against amendments to the military laws and broad political and public discussion about such issues as the length of service, structure and organization froze the decision-making process among the military leadership. This had severe consequences for the transformation process. The former Chief of General Staff, being the *primus inter pares*, hesitated to clearly decide about such important issues as the number of combat brigades, the training organization or the length of basic training. As a consequence, the different planning groups had to deal with too many uncertainties. Furthermore, the lack in clear decisions resulted in inter-service and intra-service competition, aimed at retaining as many battalions as possible.

Most of the military establishment, politicians, and the population consider changes in force structure and organization only as a periodic revolution rather than a continual process. Therefore, the former Minister of Defense announced shortly after starting the transformation process in 1999 that the Armed Forces XXI would start January 1, 2003 with its new training organization, followed with the new operational organization January 1, 2004. The short time period for the transformation process and the need to have more or less perfect solutions right from the beginning hindered the military planners to properly analyze, synchronize, and decide about different proposed options for both the operational and training organization. They could not follow the intentional process of formulating a military strategy, creating a doctrine, analyzing the required processes, and lastly developing the appropriate structure and organization. Instead, they had to execute all these stages simultaneously which resulted in a highly unsynchronized structure and organization. The lack of an operational doctrine contributed to intra-service and inter-service competition as well. Having no clear accepted idea of how the Armed Forces intend to conduct the required tasks opened the door for lobbying among the services and branches in order to maintain as many battalions as possible. An operational doctrine would have provided clear guidelines of what and how many battalions the Armed Forces needed to conduct their tasks.

C. THE FUTURE

Switzerland's new security policy "Security through Cooperation" and its Armed Forces XXI as one important instrument do not yet meet the requirements to fight new threats and challenges together with Europe and the international community. Traditional political, social and economic aspects hindered Switzerland to follow a straightforward strategy toward solidarity. The same aspects hinder the military planners in fundamentally changing the Armed Forces in order to conduct the assigned tasks and to meet required capabilities.

In order to overcome these domestic constraints and to change Switzerland's course of action, the government has to initiate a broad discussion about different security policy options. It is essential to show the population that the new security environment, especially in Europe, requires a fundamental change toward real solidarity with Europe

and the international community, instead of standing outside. The EU should be promoted as a security and economic organization rather than solely the latter. Compromises in advance are the wrong approach, because they do not serve the purpose and they do not convince opponents of the need for a change in Switzerland's security policy.

Even if defense reform has to be directed by the political leadership, a clearer division of responsibilities is required. Instead of long lasting debates about length of service, length of basic training, number and composition of brigades and battalions, or the command structure, the political establishment should clearly concentrate on analyzing the overall security environment, security developments in Europe with its organizations, drawing consequences for Switzerland. Thereafter, they should clearly and properly decide about the strategy to be followed, including such important issues as membership in an alliance or the required tasks for the Armed Forces. Having made a decision, they should then be willing to provide the appropriate financial resources. Changes in security policy and the Armed Forces should be seen as a continual process rather than a periodic revolution. Switzerland should not only annually assess the performance of the Armed Forces but also the security environment, including the threat perception and developments in security organizations. This would allow to steadily adjusting its security policy strategy, its goals and instruments.

The military establishment should properly analyze different structural and organizational options among military efficiency rather than political and traditional aspects. Only clear joint concepts, accepted by all services and branches, will have a chance to convince political decision makers and public opinion. Inter-service and intra-service competitions only foster political impingement in military domains. Furthermore, the military establishment should point out the consequences of different political choices by clearly stating what the Armed Forces are able and not able to accomplish. The new command structure of the Armed Forces XXI should facilitate such actions.

Only if Switzerland is willing to base its security policy and in particular defense policy on security and military efficiency rather than on political, social, and financial aspects, will it be able to meet the requirements of a steadily changing security environment with all its current and future threats and challenges.

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APPENDIX

Main weapon systems of the Swiss Armed Forces²⁹⁹	
MBT	232 Leopard 2
AIFV	920 M-113
MOR	96 M-113
APC	657 Piranha
SP ARTY	224 M-109
RECCE	398 Eagle
ATGW	120 Piranha TOW
SAM	Stinger, 27 units Rapier
AD	54 units 35mm guns, Skyguard fire control radar
FTR	3 squadrons with 33 F/A-18 C/D and 45 Tiger F-5 E/F
TPT	1 squadron with 26 Super Puma, 35 Alouette III, 14 PC-6; and other airplanes
UAV	4 systems ADS 95 Ranger

Main weapon systems if the Austrian Armed Forces³⁰⁰	
MBT	114 Leopard 2A4
LT TK	137 Kurassier
APC	500 different types
TOWED ARTY	104 (deactivated)
MOR	241 M-43
SP ARTY	162 M-109
FORTRESS ARTY	24 (deactivated)
MRL	16 M-51
ATGW	378 RBS-56, 87 RJpz Jaguar
SAM	36 Mistral
AD	72 guns 35mm guns, Skyguard fire control radar; air surveillance radar Goldhaube; 217 20mm
FTR	1 wing with 23 Saab J-35Oe
LIAISON	12 PC-6B
TPT	3 C-130K
HEL	65 different types

Main weapon systems of the Swedish Armed Forces (without Navy)³⁰¹	
MBT	280 Leopard2
AIFV	2000 different types
APC	600 different types
TOWED ARTY	155 different types
SP ARTY	26 BK-1C
MOR	659
ATGW	Rb-55; RB-56
RL	AT-4
RCL	Carl Gustav
SAM	RBS-70; RBS-97; RBS-90
AD GUNS	200
UAV	3 systems Sperwer

²⁹⁹ Bundesamt für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport; Die Armee in Zahlen; p. 2; [http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/vbs/de/home/ausdem/publikationen/zahlen_2004.html] (4/19/2004)

³⁰⁰ The Military Balance 2003 2004; p. 64-65

³⁰¹ The Military Balance 2003 2004; p. 79-80

FGA/RECCE	1 squadron with 16 SAAB
MULTI-ROLE	5 squadrons with 135 SAAB
FTR	2 squadrons with 47 SAAB
SIGINT	2 Korpen
AEW	6 Argus
TPT	6 squadrons with 8 C-130; 3 King Air and several others
HEL	2 battalions with 50 helicopters different types

List of abbreviations: 302

AD	Air Defense	MOR	Mortar
AD GUNS	Air Defense Gun	MRL	Multiple rocket launcher
AEW	Airborne early warning	MULTI-ROLE	Multi-role aircraft
AIFV	Armored infantry vehicle	RCL	Recoilless launcher
APC	Armored personnel carrier	RECCE	Reconnaissance
ATGW	Anti-tank guided weapon	RL	Rocket launcher
FGA	Fighter, ground attack	SAM	Surface-to-air missile
FORTRESS ARTY	Fortress artillery	SIGINT	Signals intelligence
FTR	Fighter (aircraft)	SP ARTY	Self-propelled artillery
HEL	Helicopter	TOWED ARTY	Towed artillery
LT TK	Light tank	TPT	Transport
MBT	Main battle tank	UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle

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