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ADMIRALS, INFORMATION OFFICERS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA

BY

ROBERT B. SIMS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS  
(Journalism)

at the  
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1971

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RESEARCH, OBSERVATION, AND THE NEW WORLD

BY

ROBERT M. SMITH

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

(Education)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1951

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Second, there are some Navy people who must be mentioned. Many others could be credited with stimulating and maintaining my interest in naval matters over the years, but since this list must begin and end somewhere, I will limit it to four whose assistance was indispensable in this particular project. Rear Admiral Lawrence Geis, Chief of Information of the Navy Department, and Captain Ken Wade, Deputy Chief of Information, approved the research for the Navy. Commander Jack Garrow acted as my Washington agent. Mrs. Ruth Donahue, the secret weapon of Navy public relations, provided her usual magic to produce the right help right now at the Navy's Office of Information in the Pentagon. They are typical of the outstanding performers and true friends I have known in the Navy, and I thank them all.

Finally, there is that helter skelter family of



11.

Finally, there is one other factor which is of

mine, which for the most part left me alone in the basement with my questionnaires, codes, computer runs, and typewriter. Pat, Jackie, Jim, Carolyn and William are really the reason for my perseverance. They deserve to have the product dedicated to them, and it is.

with, which for the most part left no stone in the quarry.

with a questionnaire, notes, sketches, and film-

Witness, JACOB, son of Carolyn and William and legally

the reason for my preference. They deserve to have the

...and the ...

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This is a study designed to compare the attitudes of top management in the Navy's officer corps with the attitudes of the Navy's uniformed public information officers. The attitudes compared are those relating to the news media of mass communications. A principal purpose of the study is to find out whether or not there is an internal "communications gap" within the Navy between these two groups, and to assess the implications of the findings for Navy public relations.

Although this is problem-oriented applied research, it has larger dimensions. Professional public relations is a twentieth century phenomenon that came into being when owners and managers of large business enterprises found it necessary to defend themselves from a variety of attacks in the public arena. Most of the attacks involved accusations that they were not serving the public interest. The villains of the plot, from the management point of view, were most often representatives of the news media. Early public relations people were usually men who had media experience. They could be counted on to use their friendly



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This is a study designed to report the results of top management in the Navy's national public relations activities of the Navy's national public relations offices. The activities reported are those relating to the new units of mass communication. A principal purpose of the study is to find out whether or not there is an increased "communication gap" within the Navy between these two groups, and to assess the implications of the findings for Navy public relations.

Although this is problem-oriented applied research, it has deeper dimensions. Traditional public relations is a twentieth century phenomenon that came into being when owners and managers of large business enterprises found it necessary to defend themselves from a variety of attacks in the public arena. Most of the people involved in these activities that they were not serving the public interest. The violation of the spirit, then the commercial point of view, were most often representative of the new media. Early public relations people were usually men who had been negotiators. They could be counted on to use their friendly

relations with the press to enhance the reputation of the client. A three-way relationship developed, with management pursuing its goals, newsmen probing in accordance with their values, and public relations personnel trying to mediate and, in some cases, to manipulate. Progressive development of public relations philosophy has convinced many practitioners that the usefulness of an organization and its performance should be the bases for public attitudes toward the organization, and that the public relations function is socially justified when it ethically and effectively pleads the cause of a client or organization in the forum of public debate. Public awareness of the usefulness and the performance of an organization comes through communication, and public relations practitioners can facilitate that communication. Some practitioners also feel that by stressing the need for public approval, they may actually improve the conduct of the organizations they serve.

As organizations have grown in size, the three-way relationship between management, public relations staff, and the news media has become institutionalized. Public relations staffs have become fixtures in most large organizations of American society, including government organizations. Mass society, mass democracy, mass organizations and mass media produced the mass mediator. Cutlip and Center (1964) point out that the public

relations with the press to secure the support of the  
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 their values, and public relations personnel acting in  
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 organizations of business, industry, and government  
 organizations. More activity, more democracy, more  
 organization has been made possible by the news media.  
 Gullip and Conner (1964) point out that the public



relations specialist, whether in government, business, or some other area, is still the "man in the middle" in press relations. "To be effective in his role as a go-between," they say, "the practitioner must have the full confidence of his organization and of the press. This is not easy. Their interests often conflict." (p. 303) This conflict of interests may become an internal organizational problem, with management viewing the public relations staff as an advocate for the "other side," and public relations people seeing management as unreasonably rigid in its policies. A key factor in this situation is the nature of the perceptions held by management of the attitudes of the public relations staff, and vice versa. If the public relations people are viewed as being overly favorable to the news media, for example, they are not likely to have the full confidence of management. If management is seen as being extremely hostile to the news media, public relations staff members may repress policy recommendations that appear to favor the media.

This three-way relationship becomes particularly evident in military services, where hierarchical structures of authority make the attitudes of seniors extremely important and at the same time inhibit the flow of internal communications on which attitudes are based, justified or altered. It is not necessarily true that communication in a large organization is "down the line" all the time. In



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 relations staff cannot very easily policy communication  
 that appear to favor the media.

This uneasy relationship becomes particularly  
 evident in advisory services, where historical attitudes  
 of authority and the attitudes of media are extremely  
 important and at the same time inhibit the view of internal  
 communication as being helpful and needed, justified as  
 it is not necessarily free from communication in  
 a large organization as "down the line" all the time. In

fact, the reverse is more likely. A great deal of face-to-face communication in military settings consists of juniors briefing seniors on their programs and advocating their goals. What is important is that decisions are "from the top down" and what staff members think the boss will decide often takes the place of a verbalized decision. Programs and goals may be tailored to the perceptions staff officers have of what management will approve.

Perceived attitudes, then, are a critical factor in the functioning of any large organization. In military public relations matters, especially, perceptions may be inaccurate due to a tendency toward a minimum of discussion and a maximum of presumption.

For this study, we take a particular bureaucracy and try to find out whether or not there is an internal "communications gap" between top management and public relations staff. As a special case, the Navy can be contrasted with other bureaucracies, including other military organizations. Here we have an extremely large organization with a hierarchical rank structure and a great deal of organizational tradition and folklore. Within the organization we can isolate two groups and call them top management and public relations staff. The Navy's flag officers--in peacetime, its Admirals, Vice Admirals and





Rear Admirals<sup>1</sup>--can be considered representative of top management. This group is certainly not the totality of top management in the organization, since "command" is a Navy concept that applies equally to the Lieutenant Commander or Lieutenant who is skipper of a minesweeper, the Captain who is in charge of an aircraft carrier, and the Vice Admiral who has a fleet at his direction. The flag officer group, however, can be considered those at the pinnacle of management. The Navy's public affairs specialists<sup>2</sup> represent its public relations staff. These officers are designated as specialists by the Navy. They move from one public information assignment to another, working as technical experts whether in the Pentagon, at sea on the staff of a fleet commander, or in a naval district headquarters in the Midwest. They have no commands, and their specialty has had no flag officers since it was created by the Navy at the close of World War II. They are not the

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<sup>1</sup>"Flag officer" refers to any office above the grade of captain. The Navy has a one star wartime rank, commodore, below rear admiral and above captain, that corresponds to brigadier general in the Army. Fleet admiral, a permanent five star rank, was last authorized in World War II.

<sup>2</sup>The military term currently used for officers who work in this area is "public affairs officer." The title "public relations officer" is not used by the military. Throughout this study the terms public affairs specialist, PAO, information officer, and public relations officer are interchangeable.



totality of Navy public relations, since there are non-specialists in public affairs assignments and since the Navy has traditionally adhered to the enigmatic philosophy that public relations is a "responsibility of command" and at the same time an "all hands job." Yet the specialists are unquestionably the technocrats of public relations within the Navy's bureaucracy.

This degree of specialization for public affairs officers, the relative ease in identifying a top management group, and the Navy's reputation as the "silent service" in its relations with the news media make it a particularly appropriate subject for this study. Like other military services, the Navy is a prototype of the large bureaucratic organization. A study of its top management and public relations staff and their attitudes toward the news media should offer some findings that may be generalizable to other organizational settings.

With this in mind, there are questions to be asked about the attitudes of the two groups typified by these Navy officers. These should be raised:

What attitudes do top managers in this large organization hold toward the news media?

Are these attitudes similar to those held by the organization's public relations staff members?

Does each of these groups have an accurate perception of the attitudes held by the other?



possibility of heavy public relations, since there are some  
specialists in public affairs management and some who  
may be traditionally known to the scientific community.  
The public relations is a "responsibility of management" and  
of the same time an "all hands job." Yet the specialists  
are undoubtedly the backbone of public relations  
within the Army's program.

This degree of specialization for public relations  
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Army efforts. These should be taken:  
What activities do you observe in this large organization  
relation held toward the new media?  
The three activities which are shown here by the  
organization's public relations staff (personnel)  
will show of these groups have an immediate impact  
tion of the relations held by the other.

What are the implications for the organization, of these attitudes and perceptions?

Are there general implications for mass communication research, for other organizations, for the news media, or for the study and practice of public relations?

One factor enhanced this study but could have affected it negatively. The researcher is a Navy public affairs specialist, and he has worked with flag officers for the past twelve years. This provided a professional interest in the research project. It also enabled the researcher to obtain cooperation for the study, something social scientists often find difficult. It required, however, that the study be carefully designed to control for personal biases that might otherwise intrude.

The design for the study was strongly influenced by the coorientational approach outlined by Chaffee and McLeod (1968; Chaffee, McLeod and Guerrero, 1969). They suggest that since almost any definition of communication involves at least two persons, it seems reasonable to make an effort to observe and theorize about interpersonal coorientation, rather than to study intrapersonal orientation and assume that communication was "somehow" involved. Their approach includes an explicit model. The coorientational model assumes that a person cooriented with another person has at least two distinguishable sets of cognitions. Each knows





what he thinks, and he has some estimate of what other person(s) think. By using a set of empirical measures, we can apply this model to find out what Admirals think about the news media, what information officers think about the news media, and what each of these aggregates "thinks the other group thinks." That is precisely what this study has attempted to do, by using a set of statements that are either generally favorable or generally unfavorable to the news media, and asking individuals whether they tend to agree or disagree with the statements--and then asking them how they think the other group would respond to the same statements. The study produced data about the information sources of the respondents and other descriptive material, but the focus of the work has narrowed to these questions:

What are the attitudes held by flag officers toward a set of statements that are generally favorable or unfavorable to the news media?

What are the attitudes held by information specialists toward the same set of statements?

How much agreement is there between these two groups?

How accurate is each group at estimating the attitudes of the other?

How much congruency is perceived? (i.e., To what extent does each think the other's attitudes resemble its own attitudes?)

what he thinks, and he has some evidence of what other  
 person(s) think. By using a set of linguistic markers, we  
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 the same matter, what information different individuals have  
 about matter, and what kind of other information they have  
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 What are the attitudes held in this office toward  
 a set of statements that are generally favorable or  
 unfavorable to the same matter?  
 What are the attitudes held by information  
 specialists toward the same set of statements?  
 How much agreement is there between these two  
 groups?  
 How consistent is each group in expressing the  
 attitudes of the other?  
 How much consistency is present? (i.e., do we  
 expect that each group will think the other's attitudes favorable  
 or unfavorable?)

This empirical framework allows us to use precise measures to compare group attitudes toward the media. Based on this comparison, we can venture a partial analysis of the relationship between top management and public relations staff in the Navy and assess the specific and general implications of the findings.





## CHAPTER II

### BACKGROUND AND THEORY

This chapter discusses the major variables of the study and introduces the hypotheses that are to be tested. It reviews literature about the study of large organizations and shows how the roles of flag officer and information officer are formalized in the Navy. "Attitude toward the news media" is defined. Historical relationships between the military and the news media are examined. The coorientational approach is described and the variables of the coorientation model are defined. Research findings and other reasons leading to the general hypotheses are reviewed.

#### Organizational Studies

Institutions of business, government, education, labor, communications, etc., have developed hierarchical administrative and operative social machinery. Systematic investigation of the patterns of interaction and interpersonal relations by Blau and his associates (1956, 1963, 1967) developed organizational theory as a conceptual framework for the study of society. Blau (1956) notes that bureaucracy provides a natural laboratory for research.





The formal organization, with its explicit regulations and official positions, constitutes "controlled" conditions. These controls have not been artificially introduced by the scientist but are an inherent part of the bureaucratic structure. Blau admits that the daily activities and interactions of the members of a bureaucracy cannot be entirely accounted for by the official blueprint. One prime example of "bureaucracy's other face" cited by Blau is the Navy, where informal relations, not officially recognized, play a part in producing efficient solutions that are not possible within the framework of the official institutional structure. As a result, he concedes that bureaucracies are not such rigid structures as is popularly assumed, and that informal interactions are examples of bureaucracy in the process of change. "Nevertheless, the explicitly formal organization, the characteristics of which can be easily ascertained, reduces the number of variable conditions in the bureaucratic situation and thereby facilitates the search for and the testing of explanatory hypotheses." (p. 25)

#### Flag Officer and Information Officer Roles in the Navy

A key to understanding a bureaucracy is knowledge about the social roles within it. Flag officers and information officers in the Navy can be thought of as having specific roles, with certain role expectations.

The formal organization, with its explicit objectives and official positions, constitutes "official" organizations. These concerns have not been critically investigated by the sociologist but are an important part of the organizational structure. Also evident from the early activities was the importance of the members of a bureaucracy, namely the authority recognized for by the official hierarchy. One prime example of "bureaucracy's" other face" came in the form of the Navy, whose informal relations, not officially recognized, play a part in explaining official relations that are not possible within the framework of the official institutional structure. In a sense, the concern that bureaucracies are not such rigid structures as is popularly assumed, and that informal interactions are examples of bureaucracy in the process of change. "Devolution", the explicitly formal organization, the organization of which can be easily explained, reduces the number of variable conditions in the bureaucratic situation and thereby facilitates the search for and the testing of explanatory hypotheses." (p. 15)

#### Formal and Informal Organizations in the Navy

A key to understanding a bureaucracy is to recognize that the formal organization is not the only organization in the Navy. The Navy can be thought of as having specific roles, with certain role expectations,



Allen and Sarbin (in Lindzey, 1968) describe role as a metaphoric term borrowed directly from the theater, intended to denote that conduct adheres to certain "parts" (or positions) rather than to the players who read or recite them:

The conceptual bridge between social structure and role behavior is the concept of role expectations. This is a cognitive concept, the content of which consists of beliefs, expectancies, subjective probabilities, and so on. The units of social structure are positions or statuses (in specialized contexts, jobs and offices). These units are defined in terms of actions and qualities expected of the person who at any time occupies the position. For example, the person who occupies the position of college president is expected to engage in certain actions and not in others. (p. 497)

Navy flag officers, too, are expected to engage in certain activities and not in others. They constitute the recognized leadership of the Navy, and they are assigned to specific jobs calling for skill, experience and motivation they are expected to possess. They even have certain expectations in relations with the news media and the public that are different from other naval officers. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, told a group of newly appointed flag officers in 1969:

By assuming the rank of Rear Admiral, two very interesting changes will most probably affect you insofar as your relations with the public are concerned. First, you will gain a great deal more visibility, and secondly, you'll find your role as an authority on naval matters will increase. As a Rear Admiral, you will stand out more in the crowd. Enlisted men, and some junior officers, will give you more maneuvering room. But you'll also discover that the public will afford you more attention. In some





situations, you'll make friends more easily than you thought possible, and doors previously reluctant to open will swing wide and welcome for you. Your presence on the rostrum will be more in demand, and important civilians will want to include you in their social and community activities. All of this is important and desirable, because you are a member of the Navy's executive management team. I'm sure you will adjust to this increased visibility and I hope you will enjoy it. There are other ramifications to this visibility, however. . . . Suppose a major accident occurs and it involves personnel and equipment in your command. . . . A rumor is spreading in the community adjacent to your shore command which alleges the accident could well have posed a threat to the safety of your civilian neighbors. Once again, you could not be more visible if you tried, as far as the community's leaders are concerned. As the man-in-charge, it's up to you to present the facts, clarify the false information, and quickly dispatch the rumor. Ostrich-like behavior in such cases, is unacceptable. You're the flag officer, the ball is yours, and you are expected to run with it. (Text of remarks at the Senior Executive Management Course, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I., August 8, 1969.)

If the flag officer is expected to run with the ball in such cases, it is the public affairs officer's role to block for him. Information officers are specialists within the Navy's officer corps. Their expertise is in dealing with the Navy's publics, including the news media. Although they are expected to have motivations similar to other naval officers, they are expected to possess skills in the public relations area. Their role also calls for them to be staff men, not policy-makers. Lang (in Janowitz, 1964) provides this analysis:

The distinction between line officer and specialist is most explicit in the Navy. The Navy's promotion system is geared to the advancement of unrestricted line officers, the only ones qualified to command at sea. Categories outside the unrestricted line,





consisting of engineering duty officers, aeronautical engineering duty officers and special duty officers in such fields as communications, intelligence . . . and public information are clearly recognized. Staff corps officers, a third category, are commissioned in or assigned to the Chaplain's Corps, the Civil Engineer's Corps, the Supply Corps, and the various medical service corps. The advancement of officers not in the unrestricted line is linked to the advancement of those qualified for seagoing command by a "running mate" principle, which preserves the integrity of the rank structure but prescribes distinct career lines. (p. 75)

Role theorists devote much attention to conflicts in which the individual finds himself the occupant of two positions with conflicting role expectations. Burchard (1954) used empirical data to show that the position of a military chaplain leads to a role conflict. He serves in both military and religious hierarchies. According to Burchard, the chaplain seeks to reconcile this conflict either through "rationalization" or through "compartmentalization" of role behaviors; rationalization of conflict in roles tends to strengthen the chaplain's role of military officer at the expense of his role of minister of the gospel. Burchard's study dealt with the extreme case of individuals serving in two value-oriented hierarchical organizations, religious and military. No such conflict exists for flag officers or information officers. There may be role conflicts for officers who see themselves as having expectations other than those prescribed for their official positions in the Navy, but it seems reasonable in this study to regard each group as having quite precise





role expectations, formalized by the organization.

### Attitude toward the News Media

Organizational roles may have a strong relationship to attitudes held by individuals in the military toward the news media. Before discussing the relationship between military organizations and the news media, however, we should define the variable "attitude toward the news media."

Attitude studies are plentiful in the social sciences, and definitions of attitude are also commonplace. Insko (1967, p. 2) provides a useful summary of much of the theoretical work in this area. These are examples of definitions he lists:

"An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related." (Allport, 1935)

"Attitude is primarily a way of being 'set' toward or against certain things." (Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb, 1937)

An attitude is a "relatively stable affective response to an object." (Rosenberg, 1956)

An attitude is a "tendency or disposition to evaluate an object or the symbol of that object in a certain



role operations, controlled by the organism.

### Individuals and the social

Operational roles are given a further relationship as evidence that by individuals in the society, roles are given. Before discussing the relationship between roles and individuals and the social, however, we should define the concept 'individual' used in this paper.

Individuals are present in the social

science, and definitions of individuals are also necessary. In fact (1967, p. 2) provides a useful survey of much of the theoretical work in this area. There are two main

definitions in fact:

'An individual is a social and mental being of

conscious, organized, though separate, mental and physical activity or dynamic relationship with the individual's responses to all objects and situations with which it is

related.' (Kilgus, 1967)

'An individual is a social and mental being of

conscious

'An individual is a social and mental being of

conscious and object.' (Kilgus, 1967)

An individual is a social and mental being of

conscious and object of the social and mental being of

way." (Katz and Stotland, 1959)

Insko concluded that for most contemporary theorists the concept of attitude specifically implies affect or feeling of pro or con, favorability or unfavorability with regard to a particular object or entity. It seems that the disputes over the exact locus or nature of this affective bond have receded, in comparison with a strong concurrence among researchers that "something" affective is certainly "there"--and is roughly measurable.

This "affect or feeling" is usually observed empirically by the use of verbal behavior measures, such as self-reported questionnaire items. This approach is often taken in behavioral science research to produce data representing mental attitudes, and to demonstrate the direction and intensity of attitudes.

In the framework that will guide this research, "news media" refers specifically to the channels of mass communications that are generally recognized as the primary carriers of timely formal news content and comment, namely, television, radio, newspapers, and periodicals. Motion pictures and books are excluded from this definition.

As defined for this study, then, attitude toward the news media is an individual's mental affective position, as reflected by his verbal self-description, with regard to formal channels of news communication, people associated with those channels, and content of the channels.

very." (Katz and Merton, 1959)

There is evidence that the mass communication

mediums are moving at a faster rate than the

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Attitude toward the news media is, therefore, an evaluation. The attitude may be related to actual behavior, but it should be recognized that behavioral effects beyond the measured verbal behavior may not necessarily result from an attitude, even a strongly held one. (Festinger, 1964) .

#### Military Attitudes toward the News Media

The military-media relationship is most often studied or discussed from the point of view of the news media. When military attitudes toward the media are commented on, military services and military officers are often pictured as holding hostile attitudes toward the media. One general theme is that military organizations, through elaborate information machinery, generate public attitudes favorable to self-serving military policies, while opposing any open discussion of substantial military questions. Mills (1956) viewed military leaders as part of a "power elite" utilizing extensive communications and public relations techniques to achieve unworthy goals. Wiggins (1964), a media spokesman, saw an intense conflict between freedom of the press and military security policy.

Rosten (1937) failed to discover a single Washington correspondent who concentrated on the military departments in peacetime. Slightly more than two decades later, Underwood (1960) found that there was a Pentagon





press corps of specialized reporters which had, with little notice, become an influential group. He interviewed most of the approximately three dozen military writers in Washington and found that many complained about "ingrained cautiousness" on the part of military officials which hindered reporting, as did "failure of officials to trust responsible newsmen." Rivers (1965, p. 24) quotes one Defense Department correspondent as saying, "By and large, the regulars see themselves as a squad of guerrilla fighters in a journalistic army of desk jockeys. They consider their beat to be tougher and more complex than any other, and they rate the department news policies under which they function much more restrictive than those anywhere else in Washington."

Some observers have commented that the basis for much information policy in the military services seems to be one of informing the public about those things considered "good" in terms of generating support for military programs, and avoiding disclosures of "bad" news. In particular, the Navy's reputation as the "silent service" implies that it routinely avoids disclosure of all sorts. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Phil G. Goulding, an ex-newsman, commented that the Navy "is simply a little withdrawn from the rest of the world and even a little peculiar." (1970, p. 141)

Actually, there are few empirical studies dealing

these cases of systematic repression which had, with little  
 notice, become an institutionalized system. The institutionalized  
 of the systematically those whom it was seeking to  
 eliminate and those whom they designated as "enemies"  
 "enemies" as the part of military officials and  
 officials reporting, as did "allies of officials to some  
 responsible persons." Since 1960, p. 241 gives one  
 defense against the charge of repression as saying, "By 1960,  
 the regime had succeeded in a great of systematic repression  
 in a systematic way of that kind. They considered  
 their part as a system and were seeking to do so.  
 and they were the government was seeking to do so  
 because such repression was their policy and in  
 practice."

From these have emerged the basic for  
 such information policy in the military system were to  
 be one of the main the basic about those things  
 considered "good" in terms of generating support for  
 military purposes, and avoiding disclosure of "bad" news.  
 In particular, the way's regulation in the "state  
 system" implied that it was necessary to avoid disclosure of all  
 news. From the system of belief for people  
 states that a. Corbin, an American, commented that the  
 way "is simply a little without the rest of the  
 world and was a little better." (1970, p. 141)  
 Finally, there are two technical points dealing



with government or military attitudes toward the media, and none dealing specifically with Navy flag officer and information officer attitudes.

Janowitz (1960) produced sociological data about professional military officers, and came to an intuitive conclusion that there had been a change in the attitudes held by military officials toward the news media. At one time, he said, military leaders had a long-standing tradition of hostility to the press because of their dislike of contradiction. "They saw journalists as particularly obnoxious sources of public criticisms." (p. 395) But World Wars I and II forced the military men to accept the "public relations principle" to maintain "morale" on the home front.

Huntington (1960) believed that the spur of competition in strategic programs drove the services to great efforts to build up congressional and public support, a conclusion based on his interpretation of events.

Winston, on the other hand, systematically surveyed 100 of the 140 Army generals on duty in Washington, D. C., in 1962 to determine their attitudes toward the press and Army information policies. He found that most of his respondents thought the press was not properly serving the people. They did not trust reporters. In a discussion of his findings, Winston argued that the Army hierarchy needed a more profound comprehension of the ideals of America, and



with government as actively involved toward the public, and some leading agencies with very high official and information officer activities.

Thompson (1960) produced a historical study of professional military officers, and went to an interesting conclusion that there had been a change in the attitudes of military officers toward the new media. He was clear, he said, military leaders had a long-standing tradition of hostility to the press because of their failure of coordination. "They are particularly as particularly opposition sources of public criticism." (p. 100) But World War I had changed the military and so changed the "public relations policies" to maintain "peace" as the main focus.

Thompson (1960) believed that the role of communication in strategic programs gives the military a major effort to bring its communications and public support, a transition from its investigation of systems. However, as the book shows, systematically successful use of the new media on any in Washington, D. C., in 1961 to determine their attitudes toward the press and their information policies. The book cost half of its respondents through the years was not generally useful in people. They did not read papers. In a discussion of his findings, Thompson stated that the military needed a more profound comprehension of the role of media, and

said that the generals were naive about the democratic process, but not antagonistic toward it. Their loyalty to the government, he felt, made it difficult for them to understand the strange ways of the press which "seems to criticize government most savagely in times of crisis."

Cohen (1963) used extensive interviews with persons in foreign policy decision-making positions to describe their attitudes toward and relationship with the press. He quotes a former State Department official: "From the standpoint of the State Department, the White House, the Pentagon, the press is looked on as a dangerous, unattractive beast, which can lead you along for a little bit of the way, but which is likely to turn and bite you at the slightest opportunity." (p. 168) Cohen's interviews showed patterns of attitudes toward the press among foreign policy makers as being both favorable and unfavorable, characterized by a "love-hate" relationship. On a frequency basis, almost a third more respondents (78) in the Executive and Legislative branches expressed negative attitudes toward the press than made favorable remarks (60). Unfavorable attitudes were often based on a "pervading sense of fear" growing out of the officials' inability to control what the press does with the information it gets. Respondents favorable to the press frequently expressed this in terms of defense of the characteristics and qualities of correspondents themselves, and their helpfulness in the





process of foreign policy-making. Cohen discusses institutional and personality differences in attitude formation. Some persons "naturally" find it easy to deal with the press, while others find it so difficult that they consistently manage to avoid all contact with reporters. The latter quite apparently outnumber the former. Cohen argues against the assumption that top-level officials can talk to reporters with confidence that comes from their positions of authority, while lower-level personnel are more reluctant to put their careers at risk in these encounters. It is easy, he says, to find good relationships and bad relationships at all levels, and the State Department's procedures which restrict the number of authoritative spokesmen tends to make high-level officials cautious, while releasing junior officials who will not be quoted for attribution from their inhibitions with the press. Cohen touches on the key theme of this research:

It is sometimes argued, for example, that the P-area people--the Public Affairs Advisers, the men in the News Office and the other offices and divisions of the Bureau of Public Affairs--who are professionally concerned with the State Department's public relations, are more likely to be favorably disposed toward the press, while the desk officers--the substantive people, the Foreign Service professionals--have a fundamental antipathy toward the press and other "outside" institutions. There is quite a bit of secondary evidence that supports the main burden of this distinction; most Foreign Service officers are not in direct contact with the press, whether or not their instinct is to avoid it, as one of them asserted. And in the P-area, officials talk freely of their "constant battle" with the desk officers on behalf of "maximum





disclosure." "We wish to make full information available and appear a little bolder; Foreign Service Officers are cautious. . . ." Here, too, we lack the data properly to evaluate this hypothesis, but we can at least indicate some qualifications that should be considered. . . . In the first place, the distinction itself is not wholly valid, since many persons in the P-area are Foreign Service Officers on normal assignment. . . . Furthermore . . . there is circumstantial evidence that more than just a few desk officers are in contact with the press. . . . The line of distinction that seems most valid here, as elsewhere, is . . . between those people in all classifications and at every level in the Department who are confident in their dealings with the press, and those who are not. (p. 156f)

This distinction is important, but there is reason to believe that it is more applicable to the State Department than to the Defense Department, especially its Navy component. Navy public affairs officers do not rotate to and from other areas. There is reason to believe that they do indeed have more frequent contacts with the media than line officers, and that these contacts are probably more pleasant than those of other officers.

Dunn (1969) examined relationships between newsmen and public officials in Wisconsin state government. He concludes that public officials' views of the press are conditioned most by the extent to which they perceive the press as helping them achieve their goals. "When the press serves his purposes, an official sees it as helpful, believes that it is performing its work well, and is willing to cooperate with it. But when the press acts contrary to his purposes, he sees it as a hindrance,





believes that it is performing its work badly, and is likely to get into conflict with it." (p. 85) Dunn found in interviews with 45 public officials that the total number of favorable evaluatory comments about reporters, papers, editorial writers or the press in general numbered 178, while unfavorable comments numbered 274. Fully 56 per cent of the executive officials, administrators, and legislative leaders he interviewed made more unfavorable than favorable evaluations, 40 per cent made more favorable than unfavorable evaluations, and 4 per cent gave an equal number of favorable and unfavorable evaluations.

In a carefully designed study of the attitudes and perceptions of government (non-military) information officials and newsmen in Washington, Nimmo (1964) found that government information officers have three distinct, although usually overlapping, functions: (1) service to the public, the media, and to the administrator; (2) promotion of the organization as a propagandist, publicist or public relations man; and (3) policy-making, either through personal decision or by exercising popular controls over policy-makers. The first of these functions, that of a facilitator providing service, seemed to predominate in the cases Nimmo studied. "The picture that emerges, therefore, is of the information officer as a servant to the public, organization, and press." (p. 31) He used a framework that compared the attitudes of newsmen toward information



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 operation of the system of the public.

officers with attitudes of information officers toward newsmen, and pointed out other relationships for possible comparison in the same way: the relationship between news-managers (i.e., editors and producers) and reporters, and the relationship between government decision-makers and information officers. This study borrows Nimmo's suggestion for research and applies it to the Navy in a systematic manner by using the coorientational approach.

### The Coorientation Model

The coorientation model, as suggested and expanded by Chaffee and McLeod (1967, 1968, 1969), involves in its basic form two persons in orientation toward the same object. The question of its utility for groups of individuals is unresolved, due to problems associated with reification; but it has been used as a framework for question-raising and measurement in studies of professional communicators by Wentz (1968) and by Martin et al. (1970). In the context of relationships in a hierarchical organization like the Navy, there is a certain utility, it seems, to knowing the nature of the stereotyped or "reified other" perception held by individuals, since this reification refers to deeply institutionalized roles.

The coorientation model involves three variables. The first is agreement, the extent to which two persons--or in the case of this study, two groups--actually agree in

efforts with a view to information exchange toward  
 members, but pointed out other relationships for political  
 cooperation in the same way. The relationship between the  
 members (i.e., states and groups) and reports, and  
 the relationship between government decision-makers and  
 information officers. This study follows the suggestion  
 for research and applies it to the study in a systematic  
 manner by using the conceptual approach.

### The Conceptual Model

The conceptual model, as suggested and expanded  
 by Galtung and Johnson (1967, 1968, 1969), involves in its  
 basic form two persons in interaction toward the same  
 object. The question of its utility for groups of individuals  
 also is unanswered, but no previous research with  
 individuals but it has been used as a framework for  
 questionnaires and measurement in studies of psychological  
 communication by Davis (1968) and by Galtung et al. (1970).  
 In the context of relationships in a political system,  
 this form the study, there is a certain utility, it seems,  
 to examine the nature of the relationship or "political system"  
 perception held by individuals, since this relationship  
 refers to deeply individualized roles.  
 The construction which involves three entities.  
 The first is individual, the second is which the individual  
 in the case of this study, the group--essentially group is



their orientation toward some object or entity in their psychological environment. The second variable is accuracy, the correctness with which they perceive the others' evaluation of the object or entity. The third is congruency, the extent to which one group thinks the other agrees. Figure 1 shows the coorientational model, as conceptualized for this study.

From the viewpoint of communication theory, this model is significant in that it suggests that effective communication should, at least, increase accuracy. Increased communication may also increase agreement and congruency, but this is not a prediction to be made lightly, since values are personally derived from experience. Communication may bring little or no change to deeply held values.


Chaffee, McLeod and Guerrero (1969) report one experiment, for example, in which coorientational variables were measured before and after discussion. At the beginning of interview sessions, husband-wife pairs were asked about their opinions on a series of current issues, and about what they thought their spouse's opinions would be. Later, after a 15-minute period in which they discussed these current issues, they were asked the same questions. Chaffee and McLeod report that correlations were found between congruency in the first question period and agreement and accuracy in the second, and between agreement in the first



their attention toward some object or entity in their psychological environment. The second variable is agreement, the extent to which they perceive the others' evaluation of the object as correct. The third is disagreement, the extent to which they agree with the other's agreement. Figure 1 shows the experimental model as conceptualized in this study.


From the principles of communication theory, this model is significant in that it suggests that effective communication should, at least, include agreement, interest communication may also involve agreement and consistency, but this is not a prediction to be made lightly, since unless one mutually agrees from experience. Communication may bring itself as to change to largely hold value.

Gratier, Welch and Gorman (1958) report one experiment, for example, in which experimental variables were measured before and after discussion. In the beginning of individual sessions, independent pairs were asked about their opinion on a series of certain factors, and about what they thought their spouse's opinion would be. Later, after a 15-minute period in which they discussed these various factors, they were asked the same questions. Gratier and Welch report that correlations were found between consistency in the first question period and agreement and knowledge in the second, and between agreement in the first



Note: Boxes in this diagram indicate measures that are taken on each group. Arrows connecting boxes indicate the measures that are compared in constructing the component indices.

Fig. 1.--Component Evaluative Indices of the Coorientation Situation: Agreement, Accuracy and Congruency.



When there is a significant difference between the two groups, the results are significant. The results are significant in the case of the two groups.

Fig. 1. Comparison of the results of the two groups. The results are significant in the case of the two groups.



and accuracy in the second. These results suggest that accuracy improves with communication, as might be expected. They also suggest that two people who think they agree are more likely to explain their values to one another in a communication situation. In this case, the open communication seemed to foster agreement, too. But perhaps it would not be inappropriate to assume that most of the husband-wife pairs liked each other, or that there was some attraction that might have led to a "strain toward symmetry" of the type Newcomb (1953) discussed. In a larger study, O'Keefe (1970) attempted to determine the effect of communication on the coorientation variables in parent-adolescent pairs. His data, gathered from 1,286 Wisconsin junior and senior high school students and their parents, showed that higher communication was significantly associated with higher coorientation scores concerning the importance of the child's going to college. But the data did not clearly show this relationship for a group of political issue items. Thus, while communication may or may not be important in harmonizing attitudes, it is interesting to speculate about the part it plays under specific conditions. Such speculation is particularly interesting when we are talking about groups that are vitally important to the public relations of a specific large military organization (the Navy) and when the attitudes we are discussing are oriented toward the news media

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 O'Keefe (1970) attempted to determine the effect of com-  
 munication as the communication variables in person-  
 relationship pairs. His data, obtained from 1,788 Wisconsin  
 junior and senior high school students and their parents,  
 showed that higher communication was significantly  
 associated with higher communication scores concerning the  
 importance of the child's role in society. But the data  
 did not clearly show this relationship in a group of  
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 interesting when we are talking about groups that are  
 vitally important to the public relations of a society  
 large military organization (the Navy) and when the atti-  
 tudes we are discussing are directed toward the Navy itself.

of mass communications. In this context and in a single study, we touch on many of the basic concerns in present-day study of communications and journalism: interpersonal communications, attitudes, the mass media, government-media relations, and organizational public relations.

One study cannot hope to contribute significantly in all these areas; it seems apparent that the first order of business should be to hypothesize about the relationship of attitudes held by flag officers and by information officers, and to test these hypotheses empirically, using coorientational measures.

#### General Hypotheses

Using this conceptual framework, the researcher designed a study to measure basic feelings toward the news media held by a representative group of Navy flag officers and a representative group of Navy public affairs officers. Research was directed toward determining the following:

- (a) the characteristics of these groups, and the sources of information they utilize;
- (b) their attitudes toward the news media;
- (c) whether or not they tend to reify the other group, and if so,
- (d) the perceptions held by each of the groups of the attitudes of the other group;
- (e) the amount of agreement between the attitudes of the



of these conditions. In this context, we are not simply  
 stating, as we do on many of the other papers in this  
 book, that the study of communication and government is  
 communication, education, and social policy, government-  
 relations, and organizational public relations.

The study cannot help to determine whether  
 in all these areas; it is a question that the study  
 of business should be an hypothesis about the relationship  
 of business and its activities and of information  
 systems, and to test these hypotheses systematically, using  
 quantitative methods.

### General Hypotheses

With this conceptual framework, the researcher  
 designed a study to examine some factors about the  
 media role of a representative group of high level  
 and a representative group of low level public relations  
 officers. Research was designed around the following:

- (a) the characteristics of these groups, and the sources  
 of information they utilize;
- (b) their attitudes toward the news media;
- (c) whether or not they could be said to be the other group,  
 and if so,
- (d) the perceptions held by each of the groups of the  
 attitudes of the other group;
- (e) the amount of agreement between the attitudes of the

two groups;

(f) the degree of accuracy with which they perceive each others' views; and

(g) the degree of congruency (perceived agreement) of each toward the other.

Hypotheses to be tested and an elaboration of the research and reasoning that leads to each are as follows:

(1) The attitudes of Navy flag officers toward the news media are significantly less favorable than the attitudes of Navy information officers.

A basic finding in social psychology is that people "hold opinions, attitudes and beliefs in harmony with their group memberships and identifications." (Berelson and Steiner, 1964, p. 566) Winston's evidence indicated that Army general officers were hostile to the news media, and intuitive assessments by Janowitz and Huntington lead to similar conclusions. Few Admirals have media experience which would lead them to sympathize with the technical problems associated with news reporting, whereas information officers, often from media backgrounds, work with newsmen regularly. Information officers are likely to have routine satisfactory contacts with media representatives, particularly in light of Nimmo's finding that government information officers view their role as one of facilitating the work of the news media. On the other hand, flag officer contacts with the media, as Admiral Moorer's

(1) The degree of conformity with their partners

each other, alone, and

(2) The degree of conformity (percentage agreement) of

each group the other.

Responses to be tested and an indication of the

reasons and reasons that leads to such are as follows:

(1) The degree of conformity with their partners

and the degree of conformity with their partners

of their conformity with their partners.

A basic finding in social psychology is that people

"hold opinions, attitudes and beliefs in harmony with their

group membership and identification." (Asch, 1951)

Asch, 1951, p. 200. Asch's studies indicated that

group members' attitudes were similar to the group norm, and

individuals' attitudes were similar to the group norm, and

individuals' attitudes were similar to the group norm, and

which would lead them to agree with the majority.

Asch's studies with group conformity, where individuals

also indicated that group members' attitudes were similar

to the group norm. (Asch, 1951, p. 200)

Asch's studies with group conformity, where individuals

also indicated that group members' attitudes were similar

to the group norm. (Asch, 1951, p. 200)

Asch's studies with group conformity, where individuals

also indicated that group members' attitudes were similar



remarks to the Rear Admiral selectees indicate, are often crisis-oriented. Cherished service-connected values held by Admirals may be threatened by news media coverage, especially if the coverage includes embarrassing revelations, inaccuracies, or biased reporting. These factors lead to the hypothesis that the information officers' attitudes will be more favorable to the news media than the flag officers' will be.

This does not mean that either group can be declared favorable or unfavorable to the media, although some inferences may be drawn. In testing this hypothesis, we cannot measure favorability or unfavorability in an absolute sense, because we cannot measure attitudes on scales that begin at a "zero point" and progress in standardized equal intervals from zero up or down. We can make some general comments about the way Admirals' and PAOs' attitudes seem to compare with current attitudes in American society as a whole. And while it is equally impossible to say whether the American public is "for" or "against" the media, there are some indications that general public opinion is not overwhelmingly favorable to the media. A CBS News poll of a random national telephone sample of 1,136 adults asked this question: "Except in time of war, do you think newspapers, radio and television should have the right to report any story, even if the government feels it's harmful to our national interests?"



The response: Yes, 42 per cent; No, 55 per cent; Sometimes, one per cent; No Response, two per cent. (New York Times, April 16, 1970, p. 37) The Gallup Organization was commissioned by Newsweek magazine to determine attitudes toward the media of a representative sample of 1,560 Americans. The magazine reported (November 9, 1970, p. 22f) that the key finding of this study was that most Americans believe the media do a good job of reporting the news but that many are "vexed by what they consider cases of prejudice, distortion and unfair selectivity." People who tended to be most critical of bias or inaccuracy were those who were best educated and best informed.

We can look at the group attitude indicators and compare them against these very general indicators of American public opinion about the media, but we cannot flatly say that either group is favorable or unfavorable in an absolute sense. What we can do is test Hypothesis 1, and in so doing we should be able to say that one group--either Admirals or PAOs--is more favorable to the media than the other.

(2) Information officers have a reified concept of flag officers, and are able to indicate what they think the attitudes of "most flag officers" are. Flag officers are able to make the same sort of generalization concerning "most information officers," but not to the extent that information officers can.





McLeod and Chaffee (in Tedeschi, 1971) observe:

"If we are interested in treating the reification of groups as a measured variable rather than as an assumed property, it is important to state the conditions necessary to reification from the point of view of the person, and to develop appropriate operational definitions for the degree of reification in the person's judgment of a group or collectivity." For purposes of this research, we are quite concerned about reification as an either-or phenomenon, something that is generally either real, or not real, for each of the groups studied. We also would like to know, at least in a loose way, the degree to which each group tends to perceive the other group as a "generalized other." Most information officers have worked for or observed one or more flag officers. The attitudes of flag officers are important to them in the bureaucratic decision-making process. Admirals, for the most part, have had contact with information officers, but there is little likelihood that they have given much thought to what information officers think about the news media. Martin et al. found that newspaper editors in Wisconsin had a generalized impression of their "readers," and Wentz found that ex-Navy men were willing to generalize about the attitudes of the "public," and showed a considerable amount of success in assessing aggregate opinion. It is hypothesized, therefore, that flag officers and information officers recognize each

"The first step in creating the collection of groups  
 is a survey of the groups in the area. It is important to know the conditions necessary to  
 collect from the point of view of the groups, and to  
 develop appropriate organizational relationships for the groups  
 in the area. In the process of a group or  
 collectively." The purpose of this research, he has quite  
 concerned about collection as an important relationship,  
 something that is generally not done, he says. The  
 end of the group should be that it will like to have, it  
 has in a sense, the degree to which they have  
 to produce the group as a "generalized other," they  
 information which has been for us observed can be  
 more the other. The relationship of the other and  
 important to them in the relationship. Relationship  
 process. Finally, for the first time, we have seen  
 with relationship between, but there is little difference  
 that they have been able to get to what is required  
 others about the new world. Finally, it is found  
 that newspaper editors in Wisconsin are a community  
 relation to their "reader," and have found that many  
 are not willing to provide about the relation of the  
 "public," and have a relationship between of some in  
 relation between editor. It is emphasized, therefore,  
 that the editor and information editor are not



other as groups whose attitudes can be reified, but that flag officers will find this reification a more uncomfortable mental evolution.

(3) Attitudes of flag officers toward the news media are perceived by information officers as being more unfavorable than they actually are; attitudes of information officers are perceived by Admirals as being more favorable toward the media than they actually are.

Wentz found that his respondents were inaccurate, in an interesting way. They ranked the prestige of "U. S. Navy officer" and "U. S. Navy enlisted man" according to the order in which they thought "a cross-section of the American public" would rank them. Ex-Navy respondents ranked both Navy officers and Navy enlisted men as higher in prestige than a national poll had found them to be, but they thought the poll ranking would be lower than it actually was. If Hypothesis 1 is confirmed, a similar displacement or "contrast effect" (Sherif and Hovland, 1961) in the direction of perceiving less congruency than there actually is would tend to make flag officers see information officers as more favorable to the press than they actually are, and would tend to make information officers see Admirals as more unfavorable to the media than they actually are. Berelson and Steiner report findings indicating that communications down the organizational hierarchy are likely to be critical, and communications up

other at groups whose activities are in progress, but they  
 they officers will find this information a most interesting  
 and most useful.

(7) Attitudes of the officers toward the new world

are generally in a favorable position. In fact, many  
 officers are now taking an active part in the  
 new world. The officers are generally in a favorable  
 position toward the new world. They are generally in a  
 favorable position.

While some of the respondents were laboring  
 in an interesting way. They showed the results of "U. S.  
 Navy officer" and "U. S. Navy enlisted man" according to  
 the order in which they thought "a comparison of the  
 American public" would show. In many instances  
 ranked both Navy officers and Navy enlisted men as higher  
 in prestige than a National Ball had found them to be, but  
 they thought the ball ranking would be lower than it  
 actually was. It is probable that, in general, a higher  
 degree of "courtship" (Harris and Harris, 1941) in the direction of favoring the enlisted man compared with  
 there actually is would tend to make the officers and  
 information officers as well favorable to the press than  
 they actually are, and would tend to make information  
 officers and officials as more unfavorable to the press than  
 they actually are. However, and without regard to this  
 indicates that communications over the organization  
 directly are likely to be better, and communications up



the hierarchy are likely to be commendatory. Thus some members of organizations are nervously looking upward while their superiors assess them, and bad news is held up or distorted in order to keep the good opinions of those higher up. Critical opinions held by flag officers about the news media, the area of the information officers' work, are more likely to be communicated than commendatory ones, and information officer perceptions of Admirals' attitudes are likely to be distorted. A tendency by information officers to "tell the boss what he wants to hear" might lead to a similar distortion of attitude perception by the flag officers, but "the more rigidly or formally organized the hierarchy, the less upward flow of informal communications." (p. 370) The question here is whether the "contrast effect" described by Sherif and Hovland is affected by distorted or nonexistent upward communication. At any rate, the presumption of this hypothesis is that there is a "communications gap" within the Navy organization that distorts group perceptions.

(4) Information officers are more accurate in estimating flag officer opinions than vice-versa.

As with Hypothesis 2, this hypothesis is based on the presumption that the attitudes of flag officers are more salient and important to information officers than information officers' attitudes are to those at the higher levels of management, and that information officers



The hierarchy is likely to be unimodal. From some  
 members of organizations are necessary looking beyond while  
 these associates across them, and now is laid up  
 discussed in order to keep the good opinions of those  
 higher up. Critical opinions held by those officers about  
 the new media, the state of the information business, work,  
 are more likely to be unimodal than communication ones,  
 and information officer perceptions of society, education  
 are likely to be bimodal. A tendency by information  
 officers to "tell the boss what he wants to hear" might  
 lead to a similar distortion of executive perception by the  
 top officers, but "the more rigidly or formally organized  
 the hierarchy, the less aware they of internal communication-  
 errors." (p. 370) The question here is whether the  
 "communication officer" described by Davis and Bowers is  
 affected by distorted or unimodal speech communication.  
 At any rate, the presentation of this hypothesis is that  
 there is a "communication gap" within the firm organization  
 that distorts group perceptions.

(4) Information officers are more accurate in perception  
 than other officers in the hierarchy.

As with hypothesis 3, this hypothesis is based on  
 the perception that the existence of this system has  
 more value and interest to information officers than  
 information officers' activities are to those at the higher  
 levels of management, and that information officers

therefore make a greater effort to determine flag officer attitudes. Because they try harder, they are more accurate. This sort of reasoning explains Martin's rather surprising finding that Wisconsin newspaper editors had a more accurate perception of their readers' attitudes about riots at the University of Wisconsin than the readers had about the editors' attitudes, despite the fact that the editors were communicating to the readers, presumably. The opinions of the public, we suspect, may have been more salient and important to the editors than vice-versa, despite journalistic folklore to the contrary. Of possible relevance, too, is Wentz' finding that value-oriented mass communicators were more accurate in assessing the public's views than others. The explanation follows this line of reasoning: advertising and public relations men know what values the public holds because that is their main task, whereas those in electronic media are not so accurate in assessing public opinion because they deal in outputs of communications but get few inputs from the public. If we follow similar reasoning, it seems that public affairs officers, constantly involved in scanning the environment to determine the attitudes of various groups and the general public, would tend to be accurate in predicting attitudes. Flag officers get few inputs from the information officers and are not expected to be expert at attitude prediction anyway.

therefore have a greater chance of being included in the  
 selection. Because they are small, they are more  
 numerous. This fact of increasing number makes it rather  
 surprising finding that Wisconsin newspapers which had a  
 large number of copies of their papers, actually have  
 more of the University of Wisconsin than the smaller and  
 more numerous papers. However, this fact that the  
 editors were communicating to the public, obviously, the  
 opinion of the public, we suspect, may have been more  
 related to the interest in the public than the  
 general journalistic opinion in the country. Of course  
 this, too, is true, finding that the editorials were  
 communicated back were made in writing the public's  
 view from other. The editorials follow the line of  
 reasoning, editorial, and public relations and have been  
 value the public have been able to find with ease,  
 whereas there is no reason why we do not mention in  
 discussing public opinion because they are in subject of  
 communication and get the right from the public. It is  
 follow similar reasoning, it seems that public affairs  
 officers, generally involved in writing the statements  
 to determine the value of various groups and the  
 general public, would tend to be more in position  
 officers. This officers get the right from the public  
 from officers and are not expected to be experts in public  
 relations.



(5) Congruency (perceived agreement) is greater for Admirals than for information officers.

People may think their evaluations are the same as other people's, without that necessarily being the case. This could be called "perceived cognitive overlap," but for simplicity Chaffee and McLeod refer to it as "congruency." If the rationale used for Hypothesis 3 is followed, we see that flag officers can be thought of as being unfavorable toward the news media and as perceiving information officers to be favorable, relatively speaking. Information officers, on the other hand, could be considered as being favorable to the media, while perceiving relative unfavorability on the part of the Admirals. The question here is the degree of difference in these perceived attitudes. If we suppose that there is some sort of distortion of the Admirals' perception of information officer attitudes due to an organizational constraint that calls for the lower ranking officials to "tell the boss what he wants to hear," it is logical to assume that the flag officers perceive more agreement than the information officers perceive.

(6) Both information officers and flag officers are less favorable toward television than toward newspapers, or news magazines--particularly with regard to whether news about the Navy is reported in a fair and unbiased way.

This hypothesis is intuitive and tentative. It presumes a feeling by these groups that television has a

(1) Continued Information of Officer

Officer's own information of the case.

People may have been mistaken in the way as other people's, without any possibility being the case. This could be called "perceived negative reaction," but the slightly earlier and more correct is in "negative." If the reaction and for hypothesis is correct, we say that they officers can be thought of as being unaware of the new facts and as receiving information.

Officers to be involved, collectively speaking. Information officers, on the other hand, could be considered as being favorable to the whole, while positively relative and unfavorable on the part of the whole. The question here is the degree of difference in these perceived reactions. It we suppose that there is some sort of difference of the officers' perception of information which reaction was to be organizational concern that calls for the form taking attitude to "call the case what it really is," it is logical to assume that the line officers perceive more agreement than the information officers perceive.

(2) Organizational concern and line officers

Just because there is a difference in these perceptions, or that organizational concern with regard to whether they should be involved is a fact and obvious fact. This hypothesis is tentative and limited. It provides a basis for a study group that follows on a



great influence on the American public, and a resultant sensitivity to the television news content that is more pronounced than their sensitivity to newspaper and, certainly, news magazines. It also presumes that the attitudes of these officials may have been affected by public attacks on the objectivity of news coverage in the broadcasting industry initiated by high government spokesmen, especially Vice President Spiro Agnew, in late 1969. These attacks continued through the time of this survey. (Chapter III contains a review of the news environment during this period of time.) A basic tenet involved is the finding that attitudes within a group are particularly subject to influence "by the most respected and prestigious member(s) of the group, the opinion leader(s)." (Berelson and Steiner, 1964, p. 569) Also worth considering is the impact of a CBS television documentary about the management of a torpedo development project by the Navy. "Cost overruns" were highlighted in the program. In addition, it is clear that findings of attitudes critical of television are not unusual in empirical research. Walters (1970) interviewed 76 women at Madison, Wisconsin, and found that 58 per cent indicated strong agreement that television interfered with family activities, and that 49 per cent felt strongly that television was a barrier to family communication. More to the point, Steiner (1963) reported that in a national sample survey, 1,177 men were asked, "Now I would



[illegible]

like to get your opinions about how Radio, Newspapers, Television and Magazines compare. Generally speaking, which of these would you say presents the fairest, most unbiased news?" Responses, by percentage were as follows: newspapers, 31 per cent; television, 28 per cent; radio, 20 per cent; magazines, 11 per cent; and 10 per cent, don't know. These events and findings resulted in Hypothesis 6, which is contrary to an alternate hypothesis that is also backed up by empirical data. The alternate prediction would be that most media audience members think newspapers and news magazines are more biased than the broadcast media, since the broadcasters are bound by government regulations and a "fairness" doctrine. One finds support for this hypothesis in data gathered by the Gallup opinion research firm in December 1969, after Vice President Agnew leveled his accusations against the broadcasters. Gallup's poll contained this question: "There has been much talk about whether the TV networks deal fairly with all sides in presenting the news dealing with political and social issues. How do you feel about this . . . do they deal fairly with all sides or do they tend to favor one side?" Forty per cent of the respondents said TV deals fairly, 42 per cent said it favors one side, 18 per cent had no opinion. Men in the sample said "deal fairly" 39 per cent of the time; "favor one side," 46 per cent; and 15 per cent had no opinion. While this did not represent a ringing





endorsement for television, it nevertheless bettered the score newspapers had on the same question. Only 37 per cent of the total sample said newspapers deal fairly, 45 per cent thought they favor one side. Again, the men in the sample were more positive: 37 per cent said "deal fairly" and 49 per cent said "favor one side." For the reasons cited above, we hypothesize that the results of this national poll will be reversed for the flag and information officers insofar as Navy news is concerned, although there is no reason to think that this hypothesis will be strongly supported.

(7) Both information officers and flag officers believe that other military services are more favored by the media than the Navy is.

It seems natural enough to feel that someone else may be getting a "better deal" than you are. This is certainly likely to be the feeling when naval officers look at media coverage of their service. For one thing, these officers probably tend to select news about their service to watch, read or hear. Since military news is so often crisis or controversy oriented, the result is that these officers are cognizant of a disproportionate amount of "unfavorable" news about their service. It is not hypothesized here, however, that Navy officers necessarily feel that the Army is more favored by the news media than the Navy is. That would be too much to expect, since the



Army had its share of unfortunate and reportable experiences in the Vietnam War. Even before, Navy opinion was that the Army had less public respect than any other service. A sample survey of 583 recently separated Navy and Marine Corps officers and enlisted men conducted by the Harris organization in 1965 for the Navy Department showed that only one per cent of the respondents felt the Army was the most respected service, compared to 46 per cent who felt the Navy was the most respected. Past reputation and publicity were the two most commonly given reasons for these opinions. Why, then, might the Navy's flag and information officers feel that the Air Force and the Marine Corps are favored? Well, if the Army is not, and the Navy is not, the only two left are the Air Force and the Marines. There is little doubt that the Air Force, a young and highly visible service, has been glamorized by the media at times, or that the Marine Corps has regularly been pictured in a heroic mode. At any rate, it is hypothesized that the naval officers will perceive things as being this way insofar as news media coverage is concerned.

#### Summary of Hypotheses

The hypotheses to be tested in this research, then, are as follows:

H-1. The attitudes of Navy flag officers toward the news media are significantly less favorable than the



Army and the nature of difficulties and uncertainties experienced in the various war. Even before, Navy opinion was that the Army had been badly equipped since the war. A sample survey of 500 recently returned Army and Marine Corps officers was conducted by the Service Organization in 1953 for the Army Department showed that only one per cent of the respondents felt the Army was the most respected service, compared to 45 per cent who felt the Navy was the most respected. Some reputation and publicity were the two most commonly given reasons for these opinions. Why, then, might the Navy's flag and information officials feel that the Air Force and the Marine Corps are favored? Well, it is the Army is out, and the Navy is not, the only two left for the Air Force and the Marines. There is little doubt that the Air Force, a young and highly visible service, has been glorified by the media at times, or that the Marine Corps has regularly been glorified in a heroic mode. At any rate, it is hypothesized that the Navy officials will perceive things as being this way, looked at how well coverage is covered.

Summary of Findings

The hypothesis to be tested in this research, that, we are following:  
H-1: The attitudes of Army type officers toward the Navy will be significantly less favorable than the

attitudes of Navy information officers.

H-2. Information officers have a reified concept of flag officers, and are able to indicate what they think the attitudes of "most flag officers" are. Flag officers are able to make the same sort of generalization concerning "most information officers," but not to the same extent that information officers can.

H-3. Attitudes of flag officers toward the news media are perceived by information officers as being more unfavorable than they actually are; attitudes of information officers are perceived by Admirals as being more favorable toward the media than they actually are.

H-4. Information officers are more accurate in estimating flag officer opinions than vice-versa.

H-5. Congruency (perceived agreement) is greater for Admirals than for information officers.

H-6. Both information officers and flag officers are less favorable toward television than toward newspapers, or news magazines--particularly with regard to whether news about the Navy is reported in a fair and unbiased way.

H-7. Both flag officers and information officers believe that other military services are more favored by the media than the Navy is.

attitudes of many information officers.

8-2. Information officers have a better concept of the officer, and are able to understand what they think the attitude of "most officers" are. They officers are able to make the same sort of generalization concerning "most information officers," but not to the same extent that information officers can.

8-3. Attitudes of the officers toward the news media are perceived by information officers as being more unfavorable than they actually are; attitudes of information officers are perceived by officials as being more favorable toward the media than they actually are.

8-4. Information officers are more concerned in expressing their own opinion than they are.

8-5. Conservatism (perceived attitude) is greater for officials than for information officers.

8-6. Both information officers and the officials are less favorable toward television than toward newspapers, the news magazines—particularly with regard to whether news about the Army is reported in a fair and unbiased way.

8-7. Both the officers and information officers believe that their military activities are more favored by the media than they are.



### CHAPTER III

#### DESIGN AND MEASURES

The basic instrument of measurement for this study was a self-administered anonymous questionnaire which Navy flag officers and information officers in the Washington, D. C., area were asked to complete in early 1970.

##### Research Location

The location of the study was Washington for two principal reasons:

(1) Limiting the study to one area provides a uniform mass media menu. In Washington, there is a major morning newspaper, The Washington Post, a major evening newspaper, The Evening Star, and a tabloid afternoon paper, Scripps Howard's Washington Daily News. Other East Coast newspapers are easily available, in particular the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Baltimore Sun. In addition, most of the respondents are provided a clipping service reprint of articles of interest to the Department of Defense, as well as summaries of television news reports and comment. The three major television network evening news programs are aired in consecutive half-hour time slots, so that viewers may watch one, two, or all three of the network

### CHAPTER III

#### THE STUDY AND ITS SCOPE

The basic importance of communication for this study was a self-evident one. The communication system which they use is the most important and influential element in the Washington, D. C., area and is central to the study in 1970.

#### Research Design

The focus of the study was Washington for two

#### Principal Reasons

(1) Limiting the study to one area provided a uniform area which was, in Washington, D. C., a major national newspaper, *The Washington Post*, a major evening newspaper, *The Evening Star*, and a national afternoon paper, *Scraps*. *Howard's Washington Daily News*. Other local newspapers are easily available, in particular the *Los Angeles Times*. *San Francisco Chronicle* and *San Francisco Examiner*. In addition, most of the correspondence was provided a clipping service which at a minimum of interest to the Department of Defense, as well as numerous of relations with private and public. The three major television networks (ABC, NBC, CBS) were also included in the study. It is noteworthy that since the study was conducted in 1970, all three of the networks were under one ownership, and, as all three of the networks

news programs. ABC's evening news begins at 6:30 p.m., NBC's starts at 7 p.m., and the CBS evening news starts at 7:30. A metro-media television station and other local channels provide non-network news programs. Radio stations offer a variety of formats, and include network outlets. Subscriptions by government offices make most periodicals available.

(2) There are more flag officers and public affairs officers stationed in Washington than at any other location. The 156 Admirals listed in "United States Navy Flag Officers on Active Duty in the Washington, D. C., Area" (Bureau of Naval Personnel, March 1, 1970) represent 46 per cent of all active duty flag officers in the Navy. Of 187 individuals listed on "Public Affairs Officer Roster" (Chief of Information, Navy Department, January 1970), 53 (28 per cent) were in Washington assignments. The remaining flag officers and PAOs are spread all over the world, many of them afloat. Thus, Washington is the only locale in which enough respondents could be contacted to provide statistically reliable estimates for data analysis.

#### The Survey Groups

(1) Flag officers. Admirals who were in the process of arriving or departing Washington in assignment changes or who were on extended temporary duty assignments away from Washington were excluded from the survey, as were retired flag officers filling active duty billets, and the Chief of





Naval Operations and Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Also excluded were officers at Annapolis, Hyattsville, and Patuxent River, Md. Officers of the rank of Captain who had been selected for promotion to Rear Admiral, but not yet promoted, were included. The total survey population was 141. Of these, 125 responded, for a response rate of 89 per cent.

(2) Public affairs officers. The PAO survey population was 55. Of this number, 51 (93 per cent) responded. These officers were all designated by the Navy in the Special Duty (Public Affairs) category, except for one officer who had served as an enlisted journalist in the Navy and was assigned to the Media Relations Division of the Office of Information on the press desk. Other officers serving in public affairs assignments but not designated as specialists were excluded from the survey.

#### Questionnaire Construction

The survey questionnaire was developed in a communication research design seminar at the University of Wisconsin. It was constructed in two very similar versions, one for Admirals and one for PAOs. The two versions were the same except for minor changes to make each appropriate for its respondents and to obtain relevant demographic data. Appendix A reproduces the basic questionnaire and indicates the differences between the two versions. The

Survey questions and video clips of recent questions. Also included were officers at San Diego, San Francisco, and Sacramento Bay, the officers of the rank of Captain and had been selected for promotion to rank Major, but were not promoted, were included. The total survey population was 141. Of these, 112 responded, and a response rate of 79 per cent.

(1) Public safety officers. The San Diego population was 22. Of this number, 21 (95 per cent) responded. These officers were all designated as San Diego in the survey. (Public Safety) survey, except for one officer who had served as an enlisted firefighter in the Navy and was assigned to the Marine Division of the City of San Diego on the press desk. When officers serving in public safety assignments but not designated as firefighters were included from the survey.

### Questionnaire Construction

The survey questionnaire was developed in a communication research design school at the University of California. It was constructed in two very similar versions, one for the public and one for the police. The two versions were the same except for minor changes to meet each group's needs. The questionnaire was to include various questions for the respondents and to include various questions for the police. The questionnaire was to include various questions for the respondents and to include various questions for the police. The questionnaire was to include various questions for the respondents and to include various questions for the police.



questionnaire was constructed to measure each respondent's attitude toward the media and his perception of the attitudes of the other group, and to ascertain his information sources.

### Variables and Their Measurement

(1) Group Variables. The study proceeds from the assumption that within a role group, attitudes will tend to be somewhat homogeneous. Therefore, the role group to which the respondent belongs becomes a key variable. Characteristics used as variables for sub-group analysis for the flag officers are educational level, source of commission, area of military experience, service college attendance, length of time a flag officer, and previous duty in a public affairs assignment. Variables used for sub-group analysis for the PAOs were educational level, source of commission, length of time in the information specialty, and rank.

(2) Information Sources, the "Multi-Media User," and the "High Media User." Respondents were asked to indicate their utilization of television, radio, and daily newspapers on the basis of whether they watched, heard, or read certain news programs, news reports, and newspapers "never," "rarely," "often," or "daily." Responses were coded on a 0 to 3 scale in ascending order (0 = "never"). In the case of periodicals, respondents were asked to indicate whether

questionnaire was designed to determine the relationship of the  
 attitude toward the media and the frequency of the  
 utilization of the media group, and to determine the  
 information sources.

#### Variables and Their Measurement

(1) Group variables. The study proceeds from the  
 assumption that within a single group, respondents will tend to  
 be somewhat homogeneous. Therefore, the study group is  
 which the respondents belong becomes a key variable.  
 Characteristics used in analysis for each group include:  
 sex, age, education and occupational level, income, and  
 commission, rank of military experience, service policy  
 experience, length of time in the military, and previous  
 duty in a public affairs assignment. Variables used for  
 subgroup analysis for the study were occupational level,  
 source of commission, length of time in the information  
 specialty, and rank.

(2) Information sources. The "Public Affairs Year," and  
 the "High Media Year." Respondents were asked to indicate  
 their utilization of television, radio, and daily newspaper  
 on the basis of whether they watched, heard, or read certain  
 news programs, news reports, and newspaper "front,"  
 "editorial," or "daily." Responses were coded on a  
 5 point frequency scale (0 = "never"). In the case  
 of particular, respondents were asked to indicate whether

or not they "regularly read" certain publications. Group means and standard deviations were computed for comparative analysis. Also, respondents were divided into categories according to the extent and variety of their media use. Those who watched at least one television news program often or daily, who heard at least one radio station's news reports often or daily, who read at least one newspaper on a daily basis, and who read at least one news magazine regularly were considered "multi-media users" for analysis purposes. As a variation of this, respondents were allotted one point for each television news program watched often or daily, one point for each radio station whose news reports he heard often or daily, one point for each newspaper read daily, and one point for each news magazine read regularly. Respondents with a total of seven or more points were considered "high media users."

(3) Reification. The ability or tendency of Admirals and PAOs to reify the opposite group was measured by analysis of "no opinion" responses to a question that asked individuals to tell whether they thought "most flag officers" (or "most public affairs officers") would tend generally to agree or disagree with certain statements about the news media. Responses of "no opinion" were interpreted as indicating that the respondent could not, or would not, estimate the attitudes of the others in a generalized way. A high percentage of "no opinion"



...and that the opposite group was indicated by analysis of 'no opinion' responses to a question that asked individuals to tell whether they thought "most big officers" (or "most public affairs officers") would tend generally to agree or disagree with certain statements about the news media. Responses of "no opinion" were interpreted as indicating that the respondent could not, or would not, estimate the attitudes of the officers in a generalized way. A high percentage of "no opinion"

responses was taken as an indication of a low degree of reification.

(4) Attitude Toward the Media. Respondents were asked to read 11 statements about the news media and to indicate whether they tend generally to agree, disagree, or have no opinion concerning each statement. Three of the statements were specifically designed to determine whether the respondent thought Navy news was fair and unbiased on the television news program or programs he regularly watched, and in the newspapers and news magazines he regularly read. The other eight questions were designed to scale the respondent's general attitude. They obtained measures on his opinions on a variety of statements related to the news media. A scale of favorability and unfavorability to the news media was constructed and scores for the eight general statements were summated and analyzed. A favorable response to a statement was scored as one point, a no opinion or neutral response was scored as two points, and an unfavorable response was scored as three points. The eight statements included five with which agreement was scored as a favorable measure, and three with which agreement was considered unfavorable. The summated point total from these eight measures was used to rate individuals on a scale ranging from eight points (highly favorable to the media) to 24 points (highly unfavorable to the media). To score the maximum number of points, 24, an individual

response was taken as an indication of a low degree of  
rejection.

(2) Results showed the initial response was taken  
to mean a statement about the new media and its impact  
whether very low (usually no good, dislike, or low) or  
positive (usually good response). Thus, the statement

was specifically designed to determine whether the  
respondent thought they were not able and limited in the  
decision making process or perhaps in regular contact,  
and in the newspaper and news agencies in regular contact.

The other eight questions were designed to work in the  
respondent's general attitude. They obtained answers on  
his opinions on a variety of statements related to the new  
media. A scale of acceptability and unacceptability to the  
new media was constructed and scores for the eight questions

statements were summed and assigned a level of  
response to a statement was scored as one point, a low  
degree of neutral response was scored as two points, and  
an unfavorable response was scored as three points. The

eight statements included five with which agreement was  
scored as a favorable answer, two which were scored  
as unfavorable answers. The summed score for  
from these eight questions was used to create individuals on a

scale ranging from eight points (highly favorable to the  
media) to 24 points (highly unfavorable to the media). To  
score the median number of points, 24, as unfavorable;



respondent would have to agree with three statements ("Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve." "There is too much interpretation of the news on television." "Newspaper editorials are overly critical of government."), while disagreeing with five statements ("News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way." "We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government." "Television is doing a good job of reporting the news." "Most reporters are trustworthy." "Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news."). To score the optimum favorable number of points, eight, the respondent would have to disagree with the first three statements while agreeing with the last five. Frequency counts and percentages were computed for each of the statements and compared by role group.

(5) Coorientation Between Admirals and PAOs. For analysis purposes, the Admirals and PAOs were divided into "favorable" and "unfavorable" cells of relatively equal size. Sub-analyses of these cells used demographic variables, as well as the "multi-media user" and "high media user" variables.

The coorientation model variables (Chaffee and McLeod, 1968) were derived as follows:

Comparison of group mean attitude scores provided a measure of the agreement coorientation variable.

The eight statements were repeated later in the questionnaire, with Admirals being asked what they thought

respondents would have to agree with these statements  
( "The freedom of the media is not such a simple matter"  
indeed it is more." "There is too much incense-burner of  
the name of television." "Newspaper editorialists are mostly  
critical of government." ), while disagreeing with the

statements ("we know the way is correct in a generally  
fair and unbiased way." "The most effective news gathering  
to insure honesty in government." "Television is doing a

good job of reporting the news." "Most reporters are  
trustworthy." "Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting  
the news." ). To score the opinion favorable number of

points, eight, the respondents would have to disagree with  
the first three statements while agreeing with the last  
five. Frequent counts and percentages were computed for  
each of the statements and reported by this group.

(2) Discrimination Between Subjects and Items. For  
analytic purposes, the subjects and items were divided into  
"favorable" and "unfavorable" pairs of relatively equal  
size. Sub-analyses of these cells were descriptive  
evaluations, as well as the "total media bias" and "high  
media bias" ratings.

The confidential model variables (gender and

Method, 1961) were derived as follows:

Comparison of group mean ratings across gender

a measure of the strength of discrimination variable.

The eight statements were reported later in the

questionnaire, with subjects being asked what they thought



most PAOs' attitudes would be, and vice versa. From this a scale was constructed to provide a measure of perceived agreement, the congruency orientation variable.

Comparison of the mean actual score and the mean perceived score for each group provided a measure of the accuracy coorientation variable.

### Pretest

A pretest was used to arrive at the method for measurement of the attitudes just described, and to estimate the utility of the questionnaire as a tool for this research. The questionnaire designed for the pretest was similar in format to the final version, but included 13 general statements about the news media instead of eight.

The pretest had the following objectives: to determine whether or not individuals actually thought of the media as being a single object or entity, to assess their willingness to evaluate the media in the prescribed format, to eliminate statements in the questionnaire that might prove ambiguous or difficult to answer, to decide whether or not individuals perceived flag officers and PAOs as "generalized others" as a meaningful reification, and to insure that the questionnaire could be completed rapidly enough to insure an adequate response rate.

In the pretest, the questionnaire was administered to 13 Navy, Marine Corps, Army and civilian information specialists who were not in the group to be surveyed. It



most often, still others would be, and vice versa. With this a  
 point was considered to provide a measure of personal  
 agreement, the possibility of individual variation.  
 Comparison of the data with the data and the data  
 provided some very good results. A measure of the  
 degree of correlation was also.

## Results

A general trend was to have a low level of  
 agreement of the results, and to  
 indicate the ability of the participants as a whole for  
 this reason. The questionnaire showed the low level  
 was similar in terms of the data, but included  
 12 general statements about the data, and of eight.  
 The general was the following: to  
 determine whether or not individual ability through of  
 the results as being a single subject or group, to have  
 their willingness to answer the results in the questionnaire  
 found, to determine whether or not the questionnaire was  
 able to provide sufficient or different to answer, to decide  
 whether or not individual participants had sufficient and the  
 as "generalized results" as a significant result, and to  
 indicate that the questionnaire could be completed rapidly  
 enough to indicate an adequate response rate.  
 In the process, the questionnaire was administered  
 to 12 days, with some, and some information  
 specialists who were not in the group to be surveyed. It

was administered to two senior Navy officers and three civilians who were asked to critique the questionnaire from the point of view of flag officers. It was also reviewed by two professors on the University of Wisconsin journalism faculty.

The pretest showed that there was reason to believe that all those pretested had a mental image of an entity, "the news media," that was appropriate for the conceptualization of the study. It indicated that several would have preferred a less restrictive answer format. They felt that a dichotomized agree/disagree response, with "no opinion" as the only alternative, did not allow enough range for a response which was, for example, 40 per cent agree and 60 per cent disagree. The pretest indicated, however, that the respondents had little trouble in utilizing this format for perceived attitudes, nor was there a problem insofar as perception of generalized "others" was concerned. Inasmuch as the respondents in the pretest did commit themselves to an agree or disagree or no opinion attitude, despite reluctance, and since use of a graded five point or seven point scale would have required a more time-consuming and perhaps more confusing questionnaire, while adding nothing to an aggregated assessment of favorability and unfavorability toward the media, the agree/disagree/no opinion format was retained. To some extent, also, the "no opinion" category provided an index to the degree of reification

was submitted to the senior Navy attorney and after  
division who were asked to criticize the questionnaire form  
the point of view of flag officers. It was also reviewed  
by the professors on the University of Wisconsin faculty  
board.

The present showed that there was reason to believe that all those presented had a mental image of an entity, "the new media," that was appropriate for the conceptualization of the study. It indicated that members would have presented a less restrictive answer. They felt that a diagnostic survey/questionnaire, with "no opinion" as the only alternative, did not allow enough room for a response which was, for example, "no one can give an answer some distance. The present indicated, however, that the respondents had little trouble in relating their answers for perceived attitudes, not was there a problem in the perception of generalized "attitudes" was concerned. Indeed, as the respondents in the present did not understand the answer or disagree on or within attitudes, despite differences, and since one of a group of five boys in some point would have required a more time-consuming and perhaps more complex questionnaire, with added working to an appropriate assessment of feasibility and utility policy toward the media, the questionnaire/option format was retained. To some extent, then, the question category provided an index to the degree of understanding



perceived by individuals. Those who did not perceive the group as a homogeneous entity would tend to opt for "no opinion" rather than select an agree or disagree option. Five of the 13 statements were eliminated by the pretest as being ambiguous or misleading. For example, the statement "American news media are a valuable intelligence source for Russia" was deleted when it became apparent that this was not a measure of attitude toward the media, but of knowledge or opinion about the techniques of military intelligence.

#### Administration of the Questionnaire

Questionnaires were distributed by mail or delivered to all prospective respondents during late March and early April 1970. Appendix B reproduces the covering letter used with the questionnaire. The covering letter identified the researcher as a naval officer, and this was done purposely for two reasons: to enhance the response rate and to encourage the respondents to answer with candor. None of the respondents was told that the study would compare flag officer and information officer attitudes.

#### The News Environment at the Time of the Study

This survey was conducted at a time when most observers felt that the military's public image had suffered a setback because of the Vietnam War. The tendency

perceived by individuals. That the did not perceive the  
 group as a homogeneous entity would tend to give the  
 opinion a more open status as regards the dispute.  
 Two of the 11 statements were identified by the speaker as  
 being erroneous or misleading. For example, the statement  
 "American news media are a valuable intelligence source for  
 Russia" was deleted when it became apparent that this was  
 not a matter of attitude toward the media, but of knowl-  
 edge or opinion about the techniques of military  
 intelligence.

#### Organization of the Questionnaire

Questionnaires were distributed by mail on  
 delivered to all prospective respondents during late March  
 and early April 1970. Besides a response the covering  
 letter used with the questionnaire. The covering letter  
 identified the respondent as a naval officer, and this was  
 done purposely for two reasons: to enhance the response  
 rate and to encourage the respondents to remain valid.  
 Some of the respondents were told that the study  
 would compare their attitudes and perceptions of the war  
 with those of other naval officers.

#### The Navy Department of the Title of the Study

This survey was conducted at a time when some  
 observers felt that the military's public image had  
 suffered a serious blow in the Vietnam War. The survey

to blame the media for delivering bad news has often been discussed, and it should not be discounted in interpreting the results of this survey. Events in Vietnam, the capture of USS Pueblo and a subsequent Court of Inquiry involving the ship's crew, losses of nuclear submarines, collisions at sea, and other incidents created enough bad news for the Navy in the months and years prior to this survey to make naval officers of all ranks and specialties acutely aware of the role of the news media. If they were not aware of this role and its relationship to government, remarks by Vice President Agnew in late 1969 highly critical of the news media may have called it to their attention. In December 1969, Navy Times reported that Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the Chief of Naval Operations, said the attitude taken by television and the press toward the man in uniform was a dangerous thing. He said this attitude was influencing young men either not to get into the armed service or, having gotten in, not to stay in. The result, he said, could be real trouble for the Navy in the 1980s and 1990s. Admiral Moorer's remarks, according to the service journal, "mirrored the feeling long prevalent in the military that only the bad, the violent and the disruptive make news." (December 10, 1969, p. 4)

In addition, there were these related news reports between February and April 1970:

- (1) Dr. Walter Menninger, a member of the National





Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, suggested in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington that news reporters be licensed as doctors and lawyers are; Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield of Montana said he would oppose strongly any attempt to do so.

(2) Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa charged that the Nixon Administration was embarked on a course of restricting individual liberties. It started, Hughes said, with intimidation of the news media by Vice President Spiro Agnew and Attorney General John N. Mitchell.

(3) Mayor Sam Yorty of Los Angeles accused the news media of bombarding the public with nothing but bad news.

(4) The President of the United Mine Workers of America, Anthony Boyle, said that his union had been the victim of a "journalistic lynching bee" since the murder of union official Joseph A. Yablonski.

(5) Federal Communications Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, a Lyndon Johnson appointee, said that managers of the nation's media were not putting up much of a fight against what he called Nixon Administration news censorship.

(6) Welfare Secretary Robert Finch killed in its infancy a policy calling for written reports on all contacts between newsmen and officials of the National Institute of Mental Health.

(7) Vice President Agnew assailed what he called the "liberal news media" for disseminating "drivel."

[illegible]

...and the results are as follows:

13. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1977; 237: 1000-1001.

known information was reported to a number of contacts and individuals involved. It was noted, however, that the inclusion of the name of the person who was the subject of the investigation was not included in the report.

(3) Mayor has been at the same location for years.

Table 2. Comparison of the results with previous studies.

25. *Explain, with citation and in your own words, the* (1)

James Earl Ray, said that his mother and Dean the  
 victim of a "journalistic" investigation, which the writer of  
 the article about A. J. Brown.

(2) Robert Cummings County, Oregon

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...and the ...

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS: Manuscripts should be sent to the Editor, Dr. J. H. W. Lam, Department of Chemistry, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong.

\*\*\*\*\*

Exposure to a 100% low-moisture period

(9) *Wiederholungsfrage* (repeated question)

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(8) Chief Justice of the United States Warren Burger rebuffed a CBS network news team that attempted to cover his speech to the American Bar Association after he had said he would allow no television or radio coverage.

(9) Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine was named chairman of a committee of Democratic Party senators to try to repair what they considered an "imbalance" of newspaper and television coverage in favor of the Nixon Administration.

(10) Chairman Dean Burch of the Federal Communication Commission said that Vice President Agnew probably reflected the view of many Americans when he suggested that "kooks" and "oddballs" be ignored by television and radio.

(11) CBS television's "60 Minutes" program on the development of the Mark 48 torpedo included one witness who called the Pentagon's handling of the matter "not a disaster, but an atrocity." Cost overruns were the subject of the report. The Navy originally refused to provide a spokesman to discuss the project on the program, but the civilian Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development did participate.

(12) The first prize essay in the Naval Institute Proceedings annual contest by Captain Robert J. Hanks, U. S. Navy, blasted military critics for what he termed their unfair attacks on the motives, abilities and integrity of the officer corps. In "Against All Enemies," he said it was time for the military officer to speak out publicly in his own defense.

(1) This Committee of the United States Senate has  
 conducted a full investigation into the matter and has  
 its report on the subject of the investigation of the  
 said committee after no violation or other discovery.

(2) General Counsel J. Edgar Hoover has stated that  
 one of a committee of investigation very recently in  
 their work has concluded as "satisfactory" of investigation and  
 following coverage in favor of the State Department.

(3) General Counsel J. Edgar Hoover has stated that

Commissioner said that Vice President Thomas E. Dewey

collected the list of new questions when he requested that  
 "known" and "unknown" be placed by reference to known.

(4) The following is the list of questions as the

development of the list of questions listed the witness who  
 called the President's handling of the matter "not  
 direct, not as satisfactory." Four questions were the subject  
 of the report. The Navy originally refused to provide a  
 statement to discuss the subject of the report, but the  
 civilian Justice Department of the Navy has accepted and

development of the investigation.

(5) The first point made in the report is that

Investigation was conducted by General Counsel J. Edgar

V. E. Dewey, which alleged that the Navy was found

that could relate to the matter, including not only

at the subject point. In "General J. Edgar Hoover," he said it

was also the Navy's failure to make any inquiry in

his own defense.

(13) Vice President Agnew charged the news media smeared government officials with "tons and tons of innuendos" published in pursuit of Pulitzer Prizes, while glossing over the "evils of communism." "Our media," he said, "would be well advised to recognize a new dimension of their responsibilities to critically examine our enemies which have no free press to criticize them."

(14) George Reedy, who had served as press secretary to President Lyndon B. Johnson, said all presidents try to manipulate the press but the press as a whole can never be won over and newspapermen eventually "become the enemy."

(15) Herbert G. Klein, President Nixon's director of communications, said he felt that the time had come for "cooling off" of the debate between the broadcast industry and the Administration.

It is obvious from this list that "attitudes toward the news media" can be assumed to be a relevant variable for the study of senior military officers in this time period.





## CHAPTER IV

### RESULTS AND ANALYSES

This chapter consists of findings concerning information sources used by flag officers and public affairs officers, presentation of data used to test the hypotheses of the study, analyses of the data and reports of other relevant findings.

#### Information Sources

Before examining data relevant to the research hypotheses, we can discuss the news media sources preferred by the respondents and the degree to which these sources were utilized. A general observation here is that public affairs officers consistently reported themselves to be more frequent users of news media than did flag officers, except in certain specific instances and in professional periodical reading.

Selection of news programs and publications showed similar basic patterns for each group, but there were some differences in their preferences. Both Admirals and PAOs seemed to rely more on newspapers than on television or radio.

of other relevant evidence, hypotheses of the data and reports relative officers, examination of data used to test the information sources used by the officers and police. This chapter discusses the findings concerning

Before examining data collected in the research hypothesis, we can discuss the basic methodological issues raised by the respondents and the degree to which these sources were utilized. A general observation is that public affairs officers consistently reported themselves to be more frequent users of news media than did their officials, except in certain specific instances and in professional periodical reviews.

seemed to rely more on newspaper than on television as



a. Newspapers. The Washington Post was easily the newspaper read most frequently by respondents in each group. The Post achieved a mean reading score among flag officers of 2.6 and among public affairs officers of 2.8. (Three points were allotted for "daily" reading, two points for "often," one point for "rarely" and no points for "never.") Looking at it in a slightly different way, 78 per cent of the Admirals said they read this paper daily and another nine per cent read it often; 82 per cent of the PAOs read this paper daily and all the others read it often. Flag officers reported themselves more frequent readers of the Wall Street Journal and New York Times than did information officers. PAOs were much more likely to read the tabloid Scripps-Howard Washington Daily News than were Admirals. A total of 54 per cent of flag officers and 80 per cent of information officers also said they regularly read the Department of Defense press clipping service. Table 1 shows mean reading scores for newspapers.

b. Television. Public affairs officers reported themselves more frequent viewers in all categories. The CBS and NBC evening news programs were clearly the most frequent choices of the two groups. Within groups, PAOs favored the CBS evening news program slightly, while flag officers watched NBC more often than CBS. NBC led CBS as a morning news source for both groups. Table 2 shows mean viewing scores for television news.

a. Investigation. The investigation was made by the newspaper and was primarily by telephone in each group. The first subject was a man residing some miles from the office on 1st and named David William of 1st. (These points were visited for "daily" reading, two points for "often," one point for "rarely" and no points for "never.") Looking at it in a slightly different way, 78 per cent of the subjects said they read this paper daily and another nine per cent said it often. Of the rest of the 1900 read this paper daily and all the others read it often. This indicates reported themselves were frequent readers of the Wall Street Journal and New York Times than did information officers. 1900 were more likely to read the various New York Times and Wall Street Journal than were subjects. A total of 16 per cent of the officers and 80 per cent of information officers also said they regularly read the Department of Justice press releases. Table 1 shows when reading paper for newspaper.

b. Education. Table 2 shows officers reported education more frequent than in all categories. The GED and HED reading were frequent with nearly the same frequency as the two groups. Within groups, 1900 received the GED reading more frequent than the other two groups. The GED reading was more frequent than the other two groups. Table 2 shows when reading more sources for both groups. Table 2 shows when reading more for education level.

TABLE 1  
DAILY NEWSPAPERS READ BY ADMIRALS AND  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

	Mean Reading Scores <sup>a</sup>	
	Admirals	PAOs
Washington Daily News (evening)	.3	1.1
Baltimore Sun (morning)	.2	.6
Washington Star (evening)	1.7	2.1
Washington Post (morning)	2.6	2.8
New York Times (morning)	1.6	1.5
Wall Street Journal (morning)	1.8	1.0
All others (N)	.1 (125)	.5 (51)

<sup>a</sup>Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

TABLE 2  
TELEVISION NEWS VIEWING BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Mean Viewing Scores <sup>a</sup>	
	Admirals	PAOs
NBC Today Show (morning)	.5	1.0
CBS Morning News	.1	.2
CBS Evening News (7:30 p.m.)	1.1	1.9
ABC Evening News (6:30 p.m.)	.7	1.0
NBC Evening News (7:00 p.m.)	1.3	1.7
All Others (N)	.5 (125)	1.0 (51)

<sup>a</sup>Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.





c. Radio. Again, PAOs rated themselves more frequent media users in all categories. The ABC news affiliate in Washington, WMAL, was most often selected by each group. WTOP, a CBS station with a "nonstop news" format, was second with the flag officers but was slightly less frequently heard by PAOs than WRC, the NBC radio news outlet. For each group there was a positive correlation between WTOP and "other" radio news programs, indicating a probable tendency to listen to stations with attractive music as alternates to the all-news station. Comments by respondents indicated that radio news is heard quite a lot in automobiles during the trip to and from work. Other respondents commented that they chose stations because of the type of music played rather than for news content. Table 3 gives radio news listening scores.

d. News Magazines. For the three publications categorized as news magazines in this study, PAOs were more regular readers than Admirals. Table 4 shows that Time was regularly read by more Admirals and PAOs than either of the other two. PAOs were much more frequent readers of Newsweek than flag officers, but readership of the conservative U. S. News and World Report was about the same for each group. For Admirals, being a regular reader of U. S. News was just as likely as being a regular reader of Newsweek. Since national readership of the former does not approach Newsweek's, this finding may indicate an

[illegible][illegible]



TABLE 3

## RADIO STATION NEWS REPORTS HEARD BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Mean Listening Scores <sup>a</sup>	
	Admirals	PAOs
WRC (NBC)	.5	1.2
WMAL (ABC)	1.2	1.5
WTOP (CBS)	.9	1.1
All Others	.8	1.2

<sup>a</sup>Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

TABLE 4

## NEWS MAGAZINES READ REGULARLY BY ADMIRALS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

	Percentage Regular Readers <sup>a</sup>	
	Admirals	PAOs
Newsweek	34	61
Time	56	67
U. S. News and World Report	34	35
(N)	(125)	(51)

<sup>a</sup>Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

# TABLE 1

Year	Percentage	Value
1951	8.5	1.1
1952	7.5	1.1
1953	8.0	1.1
1954	8.0	1.1

Percentage in order from 1951 to 1954

# TABLE 2

Year	Percentage	Value
1951	8.5	1.1
1952	7.5	1.1
1953	8.0	1.1
1954	8.0	1.1

Percentage in order from 1951 to 1954

independent decision by the flag officers in favor of the more conservative editorial policy.

e. Professional and military-oriented periodicals.

In this category, flag officers were clearly more avid readers than information officers. More than twice as many Admirals as PAOs said they read Armed Forces Management, for example. The groups were about equal in readership of general interest military-oriented publications such as Navy Times, Armed Forces Journal, and All Hands, a monthly magazine published by the Navy. Another Navy publication, Direction magazine, which provides guidance to commanding officers and public affairs officers, was read by almost all of the PAOs and by almost none of the Admirals. Commanders Digest, a newsletter-type publication of the Defense Department intended primarily for the management level, was more regularly read by Admirals by a 3-2 margin. Readership of Navy Times, a weekly newspaper, was highest overall. Eighty per cent of both admirals and public affairs officers read it. Table 5 shows comparisons for the periodicals in this category.

f. Other periodicals. Table 6 indicates that readership percentages for periodicals in this category were generally lower than for professional and military-oriented periodicals, and group preferences were mixed. More Admirals (48 per cent) than PAOs (41 per cent) were readers of National Geographic, which topped other



independent function by the staff officers in favor of the more conservative editorial policy.

#### 4. Editorial and administrative policies.

In this category, the officers were clearly more conservative. The information officers, more than twice as many as the editorial staff, said they read about 1000 papers a month. The group was about equal in membership of general interest military-related publications such as *Army Times*, *Army Journal*, and *Army News*, a weekly magazine published by the Army, *United Army Publications*, *Disarmament magazine*, which provides guidance to commanding officers and public affairs officers, was read by almost all of the staff and by almost none of the editors.

*Government Digest*, a newsletter-type publication of the Defense Department, was read by almost all of the editors, was more frequently read by editors (3-5 copies) than by staff (1-2 copies), a weekly newspaper, was read by almost all of the staff and by almost none of the editors. *Army Times*, a weekly newspaper, was read by almost all of the staff and by almost none of the editors. *Disarmament magazine* was read by almost all of the staff and by almost none of the editors. The periodicals in this category.

5. Editorial and administrative policies. This is a category of publications for general interest in this category were generally lower than for professional and military-related publications, and group preferences were mixed. *Army Times* (42 per cent), *Army News* (41 per cent), *United Army Publications*, which focused on

TABLE 5

PROFESSIONAL AND MILITARY-ORIENTED PERIODICAL READING  
BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Percentage Regular Readers <sup>a</sup>	
	Admirals	PAOs
Broadcasting <sup>b</sup>	0	10
Direction	7	80
All Hands	70	78
Navy	50	53
Navy Times	80	80
Armed Forces Journal	57	53
Naval Institute Proceedings	66	51
Commanders Digest	61	41
Naval Aviation News	34	22
Aviation Week & Space Technology	26	14
Armed Forces Management	56	24
Undersea Technology	17	4
Scientific American <sup>b</sup>	5	0
Foreign Affairs <sup>b</sup>	6	0
(N)	(125)	(51)

<sup>a</sup>Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

<sup>b</sup>Not on questionnaire check list; written in.

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Page	Admiral	
10	0	... ..
20	7	... ..
30	20	... ..
40	25	... ..
50	30	... ..
60	37	... ..
70	40	... ..
80	41	... ..
90	44	... ..
100	50	... ..
110	55	... ..
120	57	... ..
130	57	... ..
140	57	... ..
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990	57	... ..
1000	57	... ..

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TABLE 6  
OTHER PERIODICAL READING BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Percentage Regular Readers <sup>a</sup>	
	Admirals	PAOs
Sports Illustrated <sup>b</sup>	0	8
Playboy	11	37
TV Guide	5	16
Look	18	29
Atlantic	5	8
Life	33	39
Business Week	20	18
National Geographic	48	41
Reader's Digest	37	25
Harpers	6	4
Fortune	20	6
National Observer <sup>b</sup>	5	0
(N)	(125)	(51)

<sup>a</sup>Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

<sup>b</sup>Not on questionnaire check list; written in.

## TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE GROUP

Percentage of population		Sex
Male	Female	
100	100	100
95	95	95
90	90	90
85	85	85
80	80	80
75	75	75
70	70	70
65	65	65
60	60	60
55	55	55
50	50	50
45	45	45
40	40	40
35	35	35
30	30	30
25	25	25
20	20	20
15	15	15
10	10	10
5	5	5
0	0	0
(10)	(10)	(10)

100 is the total population. The percentage of the population in each age group is shown in the following table.

100 is the total population. The percentage of the population in each age group is shown in the following table.

periodicals in this category in both groups' readership. Fortune readers among the flag officers outnumbered those in the PAO group by more than 3-1. Life and Look were more regularly read by information officers than by flag officers, and Reader's Digest more regularly by Admirals than PAOs. TV Guide, the leading magazine in national circulation, was read by only five per cent of the Admirals and 16 per cent of PAOs. And what sort of man reads Playboy? Well, in the Navy it is more likely to be a public affairs officer (37 per cent) than a flag officer (11 per cent). It is impossible to control this finding for age.

### Tests of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 predicted that attitudes of flag officers toward the news media would be significantly less favorable than attitudes of information officers. In the test of this hypothesis, a low summated attitude score indicates favorability toward the news media on eight attitude measuring statements. Possible scores range from eight to 24. The mean summated attitude score for flag officers is 16.9, with a standard deviation of 4.3. The mean summated attitude score for public affairs officers is 11.7, with a standard deviation of 3.1. This clearly supports the hypothesis ( $z = 8.97, p < .001$ ); the flag officers, as a group, rate themselves as dramatically less favorable toward the media than do the information officers



periodicals is also necessary in both groups, respectively. During research among the first research community which is the 9th group by more than 7-1. Data and look very new regularly read by information articles than by first editions, and research's findings were regularly by research from 1968. In 1968, the leading magazine is national circulation, was read by only 10% per cent of the readers and 10 per cent of 1968. And when read of new reads regularly well, in the way it is more likely to be a positive attitude toward (1) per cent than a 10% of other (11 per cent). It is impossible to monitor this finding for any.

#### Table of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 predicted that members of the elite group would have more positive attitudes toward the mass media than the significantly lower level of the elite group of information articles. In the case of this hypothesis, a low statistical significance was indicated. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the mass media on high levels of reading frequency. Possible reasons for this were right to be. The mass group had a score of 4.1. The elite group is 10.9, with a standard deviation of 4.1. The mass group had a score of 4.1. This clearly supports the hypothesis ( $t = 2.71$ ,  $p < .05$ ); the elite group, as a group, has a significantly higher level of reading frequency than the information articles.

as a group. Moreover, as Table 7 indicates, flag officers had significantly less favorable attitudes than information officers on each of the separate measuring statements.

These data strongly suggest that Admirals and PAOs have different attitudes toward the media, but do not indicate why. One possibility is that favorability toward the media is based on media consumption. Accordingly, the "multi-media users" were separated from individuals who did not meet the "multi-media" criteria defined in Chapter III. Table 8 shows a comparison of summated attitude scores for multi-media user Admirals and multi-media user PAOs, and indicates that multi-media use does not account for the difference in group attitudes. Multi-media Admirals had exactly the same attitude score as other Admirals, and multi-media PAOs were slightly less favorable to the news media than other PAOs. Differences between Admiral and PAO group scores continued to be statistically significant.

In a similar test, the results of which are also shown in Table 8, "high media users" were compared with others in their groups. While high media user Admirals had a mean attitude score that was somewhat (but non-significantly) more favorable to the media than others, high media user PAOs had a mean attitude score that was somewhat less favorable (but also non-significantly) than other PAOs. Again the predicted differences between Admiral and PAO

as a group. However, as Table 3 indicates, this difference was significantly less favorable attitudes than individuals' attitudes on each of the separate measuring instruments.

These data strongly suggest that individuals and groups

have different attitudes toward the media, but do not indicate why. One possibility is that personally formed attitudes are based on media consumption. However, the "multi-media users" were separated from individuals who did not use the "multi-media" criteria defined in Chapter III. Table 3 shows a comparison of measured attitude scores for multi-media users (individuals and multi-media users) and individuals that multi-media use does not account for the difference in group attitudes. Multi-media individuals had exactly the same attitude score as other individuals, and multi-media users were slightly less favorable to the news media than other groups. Differences between individuals and group scores continued to be systematically significant. In a similar case, the scores at which we also shown in Table 3, "high media users" were negatively affected in their groups. While high media users' attitudes and a mean attitude score that was somewhat (but not significantly) more favorable to the media than others, high media users had a mean attitude score that was somewhat less favorable (but also non-significantly) than other groups. Again the predicted differences between individuals and groups



TABLE 7

AGREEMENT WITH STATEMENTS ABOUT THE NEWS MEDIA, BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

Favorable Statements	Admirals (N=125)	PAOs (N=51)	
"News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way."	Agree No Opinion Disagree 50% 4 46	90% 4 6	$z = 7.05$ $p < .001$
"We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government."	Agree No Opinion Disagree 57 11 32	82 8 10	$z = 4.00$ $p < .001$
"Television is doing a good job of reporting the news."	Agree No Opinion Disagree 34 6 60	65 2 33	$z = 3.63$ $p < .001$
"Most reporters are trustworthy."	Agree No Opinion Disagree 44 23 33	86 6 8	$z = 5.93$ $p < .001$
"Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news."	Agree No Opinion Disagree 42 8 50	86 4 10	$z = 6.75$ $p < .001$



TABLE 7 (Continued)

Unfavorable Statements	Admirals (N=125)		PAOs (N=51)		
	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree		
"Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve."	53%	14	34	22%	z = 5.35 p < .001
				0	
				78	
"There is too much interpretation of the news on television."	71	9	21	45	z = 3.67 p < .001
				2	
				53	
"Newspaper editorials are overly-critical of government."	59	11	30	37	z = 3.42 p < .001
				2	
				61	



<p>составы не делаются применяются только для испытания</p>	<p>применяются для испытаний применяются</p>	<p>30 15 10</p>	<p>10 5 5</p>	<p>10 5 5</p>	<p>10 5 5</p>
<p>на том же на испытании испытания не проводятся</p>	<p>применяются для испытаний применяются</p>	<p>15 10 10</p>	<p>10 5 5</p>	<p>10 5 5</p>	<p>10 5 5</p>
<p>применяются для испытаний применяются</p>	<p>применяются для испытаний применяются</p>	<p>15 10 10</p>	<p>10 5 5</p>	<p>10 5 5</p>	<p>10 5 5</p>

испытания	испытания	испытания	испытания
10	10	10	10
5	5	5	5
5	5	5	5

испытания и испытания

TABLE 8

## FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY MEDIA USE INDICES

	Admirals		PAOs		ROW Significance Test
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	
Multi-media Users	16.9	(52)	11.9	(37)	$z = 6.33, p < .001$
Others	16.9	(73)	11.0	(14)	$z = 6.28, p < .001$
Column Significance Test	$z = .0$ n.s.		$z = .95$ n.s.		
High Media Users	15.7	(40)	12.0	(31)	$z = 3.94, p < .001$
Others	17.5	(85)	10.8	(20)	$z = 8.27, p < .001$
Column Significance Test	$z = .69$ n.s.		$z = 1.36$ n.s.		

Notes: (1) Low mean score indicates more favorable attitude toward media.

(2) "Multi-media users" read one or more newspapers daily, watch one or more television news programs often, hear radio news often, and read a news magazine regularly. "High media users" rely on at least seven different news sources on a regular basis, but not necessarily on a variety of types of media.





groups were significant, regardless of the level of media use.

On the basis of this analysis, it appears that neither variety of media use, as typified by the multi-media user, nor quantity of media consumption can explain the difference between the two groups of officers in their attitudes toward the media.

Another possibility is that educational level is related to attitude toward the media. To examine this, respondents who had one or more years of postgraduate study were separated from those who had done only undergraduate work. (All but one of the 176 respondents indicated at least four years of college, and that one said he had "3½.") Table 9 shows the results of the analysis of attitude scores divided this way. Again, Hypothesis 1 is supported, and educational level appears to have a negligible relationship to attitude scores.

There is the possibility that flag officers who have served in public affairs assignments at some time during their career hold attitudes toward the media that are not significantly different from PAO attitudes. Table 10 shows the results of a test of this supposition. It indicates that although flag officers with PAO experience had a more favorable score than other flag officers (very close to a statistically significant level), their score is still significantly less favorable than that of

groups were significant, regardless of the level of analysis used.

On the basis of this analysis, it appears that neither variety of social use, as typified by the number of social uses, nor quantity of media consumption can explain the differences between the two groups of officers in their attitudes toward the media.

Another possibility is that educational level is related to attitudes toward the media. To examine this, respondents who had one or more years of postgraduate study were separated from those who had some only undergraduate work. (All but one of the 176 respondents indicated no lower level years of college, and that one said he had "Jr.") Table 2 shows the results of the analysis of attitudes scores divided this way. Again, hypothesis 1 is supported, and educational level appears to have a negligible relationship to attitude scores.

There is the possibility that the officers who have served in public office assignments at some time during their career hold attitudes toward the media that are not significantly different from the civilians. Table 3 shows the results of a test of this hypothesis. It indicates that although this officer with 120 years' experience had a more favorable score than other 120 officers (very close to a statistically significant level), there was no well significantly less favorable than that of

TABLE 9

## FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

	Admirals		PAOs		Row Significance Test
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	
College only	16.5	(28)	11.6	(25)	$z = 4.37, p < .001$
Some Post-graduate study	17.0	(97)	11.8	(26)	$z = 7.33, p < .001$
Column Significance Test	$z = .51$ n.s.		$z = .22$ n.s.		

Note: Low mean score indicates favorable attitude toward media; "Some Postgraduate Study" indicates one or more years.

TABLE 10

## FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, AMONG OFFICERS WITH PAO EXPERIENCE

	Admirals		PAOs		Row Significance Test
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	
PAO duty	15.8	(16)	11.7	(51)	$z = 3.60, p < .001$
No PAO duty	17.1	(109)	-	-	-
Column Significance Test	$z = 1.60$ n.s.				

Note:  $z = 1.69, p < .05$



TABLE 2

PROBABILITIES TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY KNOWLEDGE TEST

	Media		Non-Media		Significance Test
	(n)	Mean	(n)	Mean	
College only	(78)	12.3	(12)	11.8	$\alpha = 4.3, p < .001$
Non-College	(97)	17.0	(14)	11.9	$\alpha = 7.13, p < .001$
Significance Test		$\alpha = 7.2$		$\alpha = 1.1$	

Notes: For each score indicates favorable attitude toward media; "Non-College only" indicates one or more years.

TABLE 3

PROBABILITIES TOWARD THE MEDIA, AMONG GRADUATES WITH NO KNOWLEDGE

	Media		Non-Media		Significance Test
	(n)	Mean	(n)	Mean	
Yes only	(18)	12.8	(12)	11.7	$\alpha = 1.4, p < .001$
No Yes only	(100)	17.1	-	-	-
Significance Test		$\alpha = 1.4$			

Notes:  $\alpha = 1.4, p < .02$

PAOs.

Additional partialing analyses separated individuals within each group according to characteristics that might account for the between-group differences in attitude scores. For a quick look at the data, flag officer and information officer scores were dichotomized according to whether favorability toward the media was "high" or "low." There were 62 flag officers in the high favorability cell with 8 to 17 points on the attitude measurement scale, and 63 in the low favorability cell with 18-24 points. PAOs were divided with 24 in the high favorability cell (8-11 points) and 27 in the low cell (12-18 points). Table 11 gives the results of this analysis, which can be summarized as follows: Flag officers who had attended a service college such as the Naval War College or National War College tended to have more favorable attitudes toward the media than those who attended no service college; source of an Admiral's commission (i.e., whether Naval Academy or not) had almost no relation to attitude toward the media; those who had been flag officers for less than five years were slightly more favorable to the media than their seniors; and those whose experience was in surface ships were more favorable than staff or special duty Admirals, aviators or submariners. None of these differences was significant. For PAOs, favorability decreased with rank, except that the highest ranking, the Captains, scored more

Additional particles, however, suggested limited  
 and which were found according to observations that  
 right around the bottom group difference in attitude  
 scores. For a quick look at the data, they differ and  
 information either scores were distributed according to  
 whether favorability toward the radio was "high" or "low."  
 There were 22 high ratings in the high favorability cell  
 with 5 to 17 points on the attitude measurement scale, and  
 23 in the low favorability cell with 12-14 points. 2000  
 were divided with 22 in the high favorability cell (8-11  
 points) and 17 in the low cell (12-14 points). Table 11  
 gives the results of this analysis, which can be summarized  
 as follows: The ratings who had attended a service  
 college such as the Great War College or National War  
 College tended to have more favorable attitudes toward the  
 radio than those who attended no service college; scores of  
 an Admiral's commission (i.e., whether they) tended to  
 not) had almost no relation to attitude toward the radio;  
 those who had been high officers had less than the young  
 were slightly more favorable to the radio than their  
 parents; and those whose experience was in distant ships  
 were more favorable than those of equal duty elsewhere,  
 although no significant. None of these differences was  
 significant. For 2000, favorability decreased with rank,  
 except that the highest ranking, the Admiral, scored more



TABLE 11

## FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY GROUP INDICES

Favor- ability Cell					Signif- icance Test	
Percentage Flag Officers						
	1-4 years		5 or more			
High	52	45	z = .81			
Low	48	55	n.s.			
(N)	(63)	(58)				
No <del>PAO</del> PAO						
	Duty		Duty			
High	48	62.5	z = 1.12			
Low	52	37.5	n.s.			
(N)	(109)	(16)				
Naval Academy						
	Academy		Other			
High	50.5	47	z = .32			
Low	49.5	53	n.s.			
(N)	(95)	(30)				
No Service						
	College		College			
High	39	53	z = 1.40			
Low	61	47	n.s.			
(N)	(33)	(92)				
Staff or Special Duty						
	Aviation	Surface	Submarine	Duty		
High	45.5	57	47	45	z = 1.17	
Low	54.5	43	43	55	n.s.	
(N)	(33)	(42)	(19)	(31)	(surface vs. all others)	
Percentage Public Affairs Officers						
	Ensigns	LTJG	LT	LTCDE	CDR	CAPT
High	100	100	56	48	11	62.5
Low	0	0	44	52	89	37.5
(N)	(1)	(1)	(9)	(23)	(9)	(8)



favorably than Commanders, Lieutenant Commanders, or Lieutenants.

It appeared from this that public affairs officers with the rank of Commander might score near enough to the Admirals' score to eliminate group differences. Table 12 compares these scores. They remained statistically significant ( $z = 2.99$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Still another possibility was that PAOs with less than four years of PAO duty, if separated from the other PAOs, would leave a PAO group with no significant difference in score from the Admirals. Table 13 presents the data from this test. Again, significant differences occurred between the PAOs and Admirals.

All these tests of Hypothesis 1 show a single significant relationship in respondents' attitudes toward the media: flag officers are less favorable than information officers, and there seem to be no factors of either career history or media use that explain the difference. This is rather strong evidence in support of the reasoning that led to Hypothesis 1; i.e., the difference is most likely attributable to the different bureaucratic roles played by these officers.

Hypothesis 2 was formulated to test the proposition that Admirals and public affairs officers perceived each others' attitudes as reifications, and that PAOs were more likely to reify flag officer attitudes than vice versa.

When Admirals and PAOs were asked to say whether



Experiments and Conclusions, Department of Agriculture, no

discrepancy.

It appeared from this that the results obtained

with the level of demand for light were not enough to the

results, more to indicate group differences. This is

compared these scores. They remained statistically

significant ( $t = 2.75$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Still another possibility

was that those with less than 1000 of 1000 were, if

separated from the other 1000, would have a 100 group with

no significant difference in score from the 1000.

Since it appears the data from this test, again, suggest

least differences occurred between the 1000 and 1000.

All these cases of hypothesis I show a slight

significant relationship in hypothesis, significant factors

the median the difference was less than the 1000 group

tion of factors, and there was no in the case of the

group history of which was that explain the difference.

There is rather strong evidence in support of the hypothesis

that had no hypothesis I, i.e., the difference is more

likely relationship to the difference between the 1000

group of these factors.

Relationship I was formulated to test the hypothesis

that factors and group factors explain the difference

between groups as well as between, and the 1000 were more

likely to have the other factors than vice versa.

From this it was found that the 1000 were more

TABLE 12

FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, PAOs OF COMMANDER RANK  
COMPARED TO FLAG OFFICERS

Admirals		PAO Commanders		Significance Test
Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	
16.9	(125)	13.4	(9)	$z = 2.99, p < .01$

Note: Low score indicates favorability toward media.

TABLE 13

FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY NUMBER OF YEARS AS A PAO

	Admirals		PAOs		Row Significance Test
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	
PAOs for 1-4 years	*	*	10.8	(16)	$z = 8.36$ $p < .001$
PAOs for 5 years or more	*	*	12.1	(35)	$z = 7.27$ $p < .001$
Column Significance Test				$z = 1.59$ n.s.	

\*For comparative purposes, totals for all Admirals (mean 16.9, N=125) were tested against PAO totals.

Note: Low mean score indicates favorability toward media.

TABLE 12

STABILITY TOWARD THE WEST, FROM THE COMPOSITE AREA  
TOWARD THE EAST

Year	(1)	Mean	(2)	Stability Toward West
1952	(1952)	12.4	(3)	$t = 2.86, p < .01$

Note: Low scores indicate instability toward

West.

TABLE 13

STABILITY TOWARD THE WEST, BY NUMBER OF YEARS IN A JOB

Year	(1)	Mean	(2)	Stability Toward West
Year for 1-4 years	*	*	10.4 (1952)	$t = 2.78, p < .01$
Year for 5 years or more	*	*	12.1 (1952)	$t = 2.17, p < .05$
Column Significance			$t = 1.88$	

\*For comparative purposes, Table 12 shows the stability toward the West, from the composite area toward the East, for the same years (1952-1953).

Note: Low scores indicate instability toward West.



they thought most of the other group would tend generally to agree or disagree with eight attitude measuring statements about the news media, "no opinion" responses were consistently higher for the Admirals than for the PAOs, indicating that the Admirals were more unable or unwilling to generalize about PAO attitudes than PAOs were about Admirals' attitudes. Table 14 shows the responses for each group. One statement called for two reifications-- individuals were asked what they thought about "most reporters." On this question, flag officers chose "no opinion" 37 per cent of the time when assessing the PAO group's attitude. When giving their own attitude, many were also unable to generalize, 23 per cent opting for "no opinion." PAOs, on the other hand, had no problem in generalizing about reporters, just as they had none in generalizing about flag officers. (See Table 7.)

These data indicate that both groups perceived each others' attitudes as reifications, and that PAOs were significantly more likely to have a generalized picture of flag officer attitudes than vice versa.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that flag officer attitudes toward the news media will be perceived by information officers as being more unfavorable than they actually are, and that attitudes of information officers will be perceived by Admirals as being more favorable toward the media than they actually are. Hypothesis 4 is that information

They thought that if the other group would send something to give an impression with right attitude towards the matter about the new book, "no opinion" response was consistently higher than the results seen for the other individuals that the results were more similar or similar to generalization about the individuals than they were about individuals' attitudes. Table 1 shows the response for each group. The responses called for two categories--individuals were asked what they thought about "most important." On this question, 15 of 15 officers chose "no opinion." 27 per cent of the time when answering the two group's attitudes. When asked about the attitudes, only were also asked to generalize. 15 per cent of the time "no opinion" was chosen. On the other hand, and no opinion is generalizing about responses, just as they had seen in generalizing about the officers. (See Table 1.)

These data indicate that both groups perceived that officers' attitudes as relativistic, and that they were significantly more likely to have a relativistic bias in the officer attitudes than vice versa.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the officer attitudes toward the new media will be perceived by information officers as being more relativistic than they actually are, and that responses of information officers will be perceived by leaders as being more relativistic toward the media than they actually are. Hypothesis 3 is that information

TABLE 14

## PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' ATTITUDES, BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

Favorable Statements		Admirals' (N=125)		PAOs' (N=51)	
		Perceptions of PAO Attitudes		Perceptions of Admirals' Attitudes	
"News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way."	Agree	43%	22%		
	No Opinion	30	2		
	Disagree	27	76		
"We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government."	Agree	50	57		
	No Opinion	35	8		
	Disagree	15	35		
"Television is doing a good job of reporting the news."	Agree	38	22		
	No Opinion	32	4		
	Disagree	30	74		
"Most reporters are trustworthy."	Agree	40	33		
	No Opinion	37	4		
	Disagree	23	63		
"Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news."	Agree	41	33		
	No Opinion	32	2		
	Disagree	27	65		



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TABLE 14 (Continued)

Unfavorable Statements		Admirals' (N=125) Perceptions of PAO Attitudes		PAOs' (N=51) Perceptions of Admirals' Attitudes	
		Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	
"Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve."	Agree	26%			63%
	No Opinion	36			6
	Disagree	38			31
"There is too much interpretation of the news on television."	Agree	42			74
	No Opinion	34			6
	Disagree	24			20
"Newspaper editorials are overly-critical of government."	Agree	43			67
	No Opinion	38			4
	Disagree	19			29

Significance test for overall mean "No Opinion" scores:  $z = 5.88$ ,  $p < .001$

influenzae virus vaccine (split, adjuvanted, recombinant)  $\times 0.5$  ml, 0.5-0.7

Statement	Yes	No	Don't Know	Refused to Answer	Not Applicable
1. I am a member of the Communist Party of the United States	10	80	10	0	0
2. I am a member of the National Student Reliance Party	10	80	10	0	0
3. I am a member of the National Student Reliance Party	10	80	10	0	0
4. I am a member of the National Student Reliance Party	10	80	10	0	0
5. I am a member of the National Student Reliance Party	10	80	10	0	0
6. I am a member of the National Student Reliance Party	10	80	10	0	0
7. I am a member of the National Student Reliance Party	10	80	10	0	0
8. I am a member of the National Student Reliance Party	10	80	10	0	0
9. I am a member of the National Student Reliance Party	10	80	10	0	0
10. I am a member of the National Student Reliance Party	10	80	10	0	0

(Bauer, 2001; de Vries, 2000)



officers are more accurate in estimating flag officer opinions than vice-versa. Hypothesis 5 is that congruency (perceived agreement) is greater for Admirals than for information officers. Figure 2 presents summated mean scores for the coorientation variables. The results strongly support these inter-related hypotheses, with one exception.

Public affairs officers' perceptions of Admirals' attitudes toward the media have a mean summated score of 18.7, compared to the flag officers' actual score of 16.9. ( $z = 2.73, p < .01$ ) Flag officers' perceptions of public affairs officers' attitudes have a mean score of 15.4, compared to the actual 11.7 score. ( $z = 6.73, p < .001$ ) Thus, as predicted, information officers are more accurate than flag officers, but in each case the perceptions are significantly in error. Also, congruency is greater for Admirals, who perceive information officers' mean score as +1.5 from their own score. ( $z = 2.94, p < .01$ ) Information officers perceive a huge lack of agreement ( $z = 10.29, p < .001$ ) between their score and the Admirals'. The direction and extent of error in perception is as predicted for the public affairs officers. They think the flag officers are more hostile to the media than they actually are. But the prediction about Admirals' perception is only partially supported. Although the direction in the Admirals' perception of PAO attitudes is as expected (the

officers and some women in uniform. The officers  
opinion was that. Generally it is that country  
(particular emphasis) is given for details from the  
information for officers. Figure 2 presents summary data  
scores for the comparison variables. The results  
showed that these information differences, with one  
exception.

Public Affairs Officers' perceptions of details,  
relating to the media have a mean summed score of  
10.7, compared to the 'lay officers' mean score of 10.1.  
( $t = 3.7, p < .01$ ) Lay officers' perceptions of public  
affairs officers' activities had a mean score of 10.6,  
compared to the actual 11.7 score. ( $t = 5.1, p < .001$ )  
Thus, as predicted, information differences are more accurate  
than lay officers. But in each case the perceptions are  
significantly in error. Also, accuracy is greater for  
details, who provide information officers' mean score is  
11.5 from their own score. ( $t = 5.7, p < .01$ ) Information  
officers receive a mean score of agreement is 10.1,  
 $p < .001$  between their score and the details'. The  
agreement and extent of error in perception is as predicted  
for the public affairs officers. They think that lay  
officers are more hostile to the media than they actually  
are. But the public affairs officers' perception is only  
partially supported. Although the difference in the  
details' perception of the officers is as expected (the




Fig. 2.--Coorientation Model with Agreement, Accuracy, and Congruency Scores\* for Flag Officers (N=125) and Public Affairs Officers (N=51) Attitudes Toward the News Media.

\*Note: Low mean attitude score indicates favorability toward the media.






Fig. 1. Diagram of the model with frequency, power, and station data. The frequency (10.5) and power (10.3) are the same for all stations.

\*Note: The model is a simplified representation of the actual system. It is intended for illustrative purposes only.

Admirals think information officers are significantly more favorable toward the media than the Admirals themselves are), they clearly believe the PAOs are significantly less favorable toward the media than PAOs actually are ( $z = 6.73$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and this is contrary to Hypothesis 3 and to Sherif and Hovland's theory of "contrast effect." This unexpected finding is discussed below.

Hypothesis 6 holds that both groups are less favorable toward television than toward newspapers or news magazines, and that this is particularly the case where the fairness and unbiased nature of news about the Navy is in question. Data presented in Table 15 generally support this hypothesis. PAO attitudes are significantly more favorable to news magazines and newspapers than to television. Admirals' attitudes are significantly more favorable toward news magazines than television and they are more favorable overall toward newspapers than toward television, but not to a statistically significant degree.

There is an anomaly in that Admirals indicated more favorability toward television when asked whether or not they tend generally to agree that Navy news is fair and unbiased on the television news program(s) they regularly watch and in the newspaper(s) and news magazine(s) they regularly read. One possible explanation for this is that their attitudes relate to specific newspapers and television news programs. The near monopoly of the liberal Washington

positive effect on television ratings was significantly more favorable toward the media than the positive effect on ratings. They clearly believe the media are significantly less favorable toward the media than they actually are ( $t = 0.71$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and this is contrary to hypothesis 1 and to

Smith and Swanson's theory of "context effect." This

unexpected finding is discussed below.

#### Hypothesis 2: Media that both groups are less

favorable toward television than news magazines at news magazines, and that this is positively the news about the television and magazine ratings of news about the news is in question. Two processes in which it generally reports

this hypothesis. Two variables are significantly more favorable to news magazines and magazines less so than television. Smith's, Swanson's are significantly more favorable to news magazines than television and they are

more favorable toward television than news magazines. This finding is contrary to Smith and Swanson's hypothesis, but not to a statistically significant degree.

There is an anomaly in that Smith's indicated more favorable toward television than news magazines at news

magazines and news magazines at news magazines. They tend generally to agree that news is this and

positive on the television news program(s) they regularly

watch and in the newspaper(s) and news magazine(s) they

regularly read. One possible explanation for this is that

their evaluation ratings in general magazines and television

news programs. The last member of the Smith's indicated



TABLE 15

ATTITUDES TOWARD TELEVISION, NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS MAGAZINES  
BY ADMIRALS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

	Mean Attitude Scores <sup>a</sup>					
	Television		Newspapers		News Magazines	
	Adms	PAOs	Adms	PAOs	Adms	PAOs
"Navy news . . . is fair and unbiased."	2.0	1.5	2.2	1.3	1.8	1.3
"Doing a good job of reporting the news."	2.3	1.7	2.1	1.2	-	-
"Too much interpretation."	2.5	1.9	-	-	-	-
"Editorials overly critical."	-	-	2.3	1.8	-	-
Mean Sum	2.3	1.7	2.2	1.4	1.8	1.3
(N)	(125)	(51)	(125)	(51)	(125)	(51)

<sup>a</sup> Low score indicates favorability. Range 1-3.

Significance tests of mean scores

Admirals: TV/Newspapers  $z = .90$  n.s.  
 TV/News Magazines  $z = 3.64$ ,  $p < .001$   
 PAOs: TV/Newspapers  $z = 1.77$ ,  $p < .05$   
 TV/News Magazines  $z = 2.35$ ,  $p < .01$



Post as the local morning newspaper can be contrasted with a television menu consisting of three network news programs in prime evening news viewing hours and several other network and local news shows, and with the trio of news magazines that are available. Additionally, some of the flag officers indicated dissatisfaction with the Post in written comments in this survey. One said, for example:

In my opinion the Washington Post is a dangerous newspaper. Since it is the only morning newspaper, it has too (much) circulation, thereby influencing many citizens. It is super liberal, anti-government, and its destructive criticism seldom offers workable solutions for the real-world. I also resent the government subsidizing it by buying thousands of copies every morning for the various government offices, but I have no solution since it's the only local morning newspaper with adequate coverage, and I'm forced to read it myself tho I almost regurgitate over the editorial page. I do much better at night with the Star. (Flag officer number 85)

On the other hand, this was not a universal opinion. One Admiral said:

I enjoy my daily Washington Post--I read it from cover to cover. I like the thorough coverage of world events in the Post. I generally tend to oppose their editorial slant and the Herblock cartoons but I am stimulated to appreciate the unfavorable twist an observer can take; makes me try to do better. (Flag officer number 39)

To explore the possibility that attitude toward this particular newspaper was associated with an unfavorable attitude toward newspapers vis-a-vis television and news magazines on this attitude item, a comparison was made between responses to the attitude statements and television news programs watched daily or often, newspapers read often



Just as the local business newspaper can be contrasted with a national news organization of whose network news programs in prime evening news viewing hours and several other net-

work and local news shows, and with the kind of news organization that are available. Additionally, some of the kind of news indicated investigation with the fact in relation to news in this survey. One said, for example:

In my opinion, the Washington Post is a business newspaper. Since it is the only business newspaper, it has the (local) character, which is involving many elements. It is a paper liberal, anti-government, and its distinctive editorial position of other works is solutions for the rest of the world. I also believe the government is making it by having thousands of dollars every morning for the various government offices, but I have no solution since it's the only local evening newspaper with separate coverage, and it's forced to read it myself. I think newspaper coverage was the editorial page. I do not believe it right with the time. (The editorial number 23)

On the other hand, this was not a newspaper:

opinion. One added said:

I enjoy my daily Washington Post—I read it from cover to cover. I like the thorough coverage of world events in the Post. I generally tend to agree with editorial views and the editorial coverage and I am attracted to opposition the Washington Post as editorial coverage we try to be better. (The editorial number 23)

To support the possibility that coverage toward

this particular newspaper was associated with an interview-

able article toward newspaper all-time categories and

news magazines on this article item, a comparison was made

between responses to the article statements and relationship

news program watched daily or often, newspapers read often

or daily, and news magazines read regularly. Table 16 presents these data. It lends some support for the explanation that an aversion to the Washington Post influenced respondents to downgrade the "newspaper(s) read regularly" in comparison to "television news program(s) watched regularly" and "news magazine(s) read regularly."

Hypothesis 7 predicts that both groups believe other military services are more favored by the media than the Navy is. Table 17 presents data that strongly support this hypothesis, equally for both groups. Thirty-nine of 47 PAOs who rated a service as most favored by the media listed either the Air Force or the Marine Corps. Similarly, of 97 flag officers rating media favorability toward the services, 91 rated either the Air Force or the Marine Corps first. The Navy is, however, seen as more favored than the Army, so the hypothesis is not "absolutely" supported. Some of those who rated the Army in other than last place qualified their rating with a comment to the effect that they were interpreting "most favored" as meaning the one that had the most coverage. Thus the Army score, low as it is, may be inflated. The relatively large number of respondents who chose not to rate the services could be in agreement with one respondent who said:

As to who gets the best press right now, that's like arguing relative rank among ensigns, or virtue among \_\_\_\_\_ /sig/. We're all painted black. (Flag officer number 23)





TABLE 16

**AGREEMENT THAT NAVY NEWS TENDS TO BE FAIR AND UNBIASED,  
BY SPECIFIC NEWS SOURCES**

	Percentage Admirals Agree	(N)	Percentage PAOs Agree	(N)
<u>Evening TV News</u>				
ABC	51	(19)	91	(11)
NBC	45	(49)	76	(29)
CBS	49	(45)	75	(36)
<u>Newspapers</u>				
Washington Post	32	(108)	82	(51)
Washington Daily News	29	(7)	71	(17)
Wall Street Journal	40	(76)	92	(12)
Washington Star	40	(68)	79	(38)
New York Times	42	(68)	77	(22)
Baltimore Sun	100	(2)	80	(5)
<u>News Magazines</u>				
Time	53	(70)	85	(34)
Newsweek	61	(43)	81	(31)
U. S. News and World Report	65	(43)	67	(18)

Note: Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest, in each media category.

Respondents did not rate each program or publication specifically. "Agree" answers to "fair and unbiased" statements were analyzed by those that respondents indicated they regularly watched or read. As a result, the total number of cases is more than the number of respondents.

Table 10

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE SERVICE OF THE GOVERNMENT, BY TYPE OF SERVICE, 1950-1959

Percentage of Total Employment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1950	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
1951	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
1952	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
1953	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
1954	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
1955	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
1956	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
1957	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
1958	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
1959	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0

Notes: Figures are based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce. The figures are based on the number of employees in the service of the government, as reported by the government. The figures are based on the number of employees in the service of the government, as reported by the government. The figures are based on the number of employees in the service of the government, as reported by the government.

TABLE 17

MILITARY SERVICE MOST FAVORED BY THE MEDIA,  
AS PERCEIVED BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Admirals (N=97) Mean	PAOs (N=47) Mean
Air Force	2.4	2.3
Marine Corps	1.9	2.1
Navy	1.4	1.4
Army	.5	.2

Note: Three points were allotted for a first place ranking, two for second, one for third, none for last.



TABLE 1

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF YEARS  
IN THE ARMY AND THE NUMBER OF YEARS IN THE  
NAVY

Years in Army (N=11)	Years in Navy (N=11)
1.1	1.1
1.2	1.2
1.3	1.3
1.4	1.4
1.5	1.5

These data points were selected for a linear regression, and the results are shown in the table below.

## CHAPTER V

### DISCUSSION

The results of this research generally support two major hypotheses--that Navy public affairs officers have more favorable attitudes toward the news media than Navy flag officers have, and that there are systematic distortions in the way each group perceives the other's attitudes. The concrete findings of the study have implications in several directions. This chapter discusses the findings in terms of their implications for Navy public affairs, for public relations and the news media in general, and for communications research.

#### Navy Public Affairs

Navy public relations was subordinated to the Office of Naval Intelligence until the beginning of World War II. The Navy's Office of Information was established to meet conditions prevalent during that war, most particularly: an organized, accredited and sometimes uniformed military press corps; a censorship program; total national mobilization in support of the war effort; and general popularity of the armed forces. The major news medium was the written press, backed up by radio and

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#### Navy Public Affairs

Navy public relations was subordinated to the Office of Naval Intelligence until the beginning of World War II. The Navy's Office of Information was established to meet conditions prevalent during that war, and particularly in connection with recruitment and retention of military personnel. A conscription program, such as national mobilization in support of the war effort, and general popularity of the armed forces. The major news medium was the written press, backed up by radio and



newsreels. The general philosophy of public relations was that publicity is the pathway to public support. None of these conditions is the same thirty years later.

The public affairs specialty in the Navy was established after World War II in the context of wartime experience. This group of fewer than a hundred officers included many ex-newsmen. The public information program and the specialists who manned it were viewed by top Navy management primarily as tools for achieving public support at a time when competition between services for a reduced military budget was intense. The Navy's public relations program shrank after World War II, expanded during the Korean fighting, contracted again after Korea, was enlarged as American involvement in Vietnam increased in the mid-1960's, and by 1970 was shrinking again. The scope of public relations activities has been associated more with the needs and interest of the news media during wartime than with the Navy's organizational goals--which would logically call for more public relations activity when there is not a natural public interest in the military.

Perhaps one reason that Navy public relations activities have not always logically pursued organizational goals is the traditional low priority assigned to public relations by professional military men, and their distinct disinclination to become involved in the public information process. This study demonstrates that present Navy leaders

unacceptable. The general philosophy of public relations was that publicity is the key to public support. Hence the press conference is the main thirty years later.

The public relations specialist in the navy was

established after World War II in the context of public relations. This group of about 1000 a hundred officers included navy personnel. The public relations program and the specialists who worked at that time by top navy management primarily in order to achieve public support at a time when competition between systems for a reduced military budget was intense. The navy's public relations program began with World War II, organized navy command between light, converted after World War, was assigned as national involvement in Vietnam launched in the mid-1950's, and by 1970 was continuing again. The scope of public relations activities has been considered more with the home and interest of the navy media during various that with the navy's organizational goals--which would logically call for more public relations activity when there is not a general public interest in the military.

Perhaps one reason that navy public relations

activities have not always logically entered organizational goals is the traditional low priority assigned to public relations by professional military men, and their dislike distinction to become involved in the public information process. This study demonstrates that prominent navy leaders

have definite attitudes toward the media. Seemingly, news media coverage of the Navy is salient enough to be considered a high priority concern of the service's management. Yet the group of specialists dealing with public affairs is still small. It is subordinated and out of the main stream of the Navy's officer corps. Its attitudes are either unknown or misread by many flag officers. Quite probably it is impotent in its ability to influence management decisions in many cases. Since such differences in attitudes toward the news media and perceptions of those attitudes exist between Admirals and PAOs, an observer is forced to comment about both the "attitude gap" and the "communications gap" within the organization, and how these may affect Navy public relations.

It is quite possible that these gaps result from the personnel structure of the Navy. Flag officers are the select elite chosen to lead others. They are the cream of the crop, representing long years of experience and the positive traditions of the Navy, including the tradition of non-involvement in public affairs activity. They are dedicated to their service and to their country. Public affairs officers, while not prohibited from having one of their number become a flag officer, have never had an Admiral. A description of the information specialty in the Navy (Larson, in progress) shows that specialists were at first considered a marginal group in the Navy, where they



from British vessels toward the coast. Similarly, only  
 small numbers of the Navy is willing enough to be  
 considered a high priority because of the service's unique  
 nature. For the purpose of scientific studies with public  
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 main stream of the Navy's official work. The activities are  
 either unknown or stated by many like officials. Public  
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 Navy (Navy, in progress) shows that specialists are at  
 least considered a separate group in the Navy, where they

performed work not directly related to operating ships or aircraft at sea. Larson's research indicates a trend in the Navy toward greater appreciation for the public affairs function and less criticism of the specialist group in the 1960's. The older patterns of thought remain, however, as the Navy's organization shows. That information duty, even of a non-specialist nature, is a kiss of death to the career ambitions of a naval officer is illustrated by the present study's findings that only 13 per cent of the flag officer respondents had ever served in public affairs billets. Some of these started at the top, after becoming Admirals, with assignment as Chief of Information. All the Chiefs of Information of the Navy Department have been either aviators, submariners or surface line officers. The Navy has, in its personnel system, effectively concluded that--at the top--public relations is too important to be left to public relations specialists, while down the line it is too unimportant to require uniformly outstanding performance. This gives special meaning to a comment by one Admiral respondent:

Navy Public Affairs officers are uniformly incompetent. They are failures as naval officers who are attracted to the supposed glamor of association with big names. My personal experience in working with PAOs has been that they have, when accompanying me to monitor a meeting with the media, been utterly useless, and in many cases a detriment to the effort, butting in, trying to aggrandize themselves, etc., doing everything but something useful. I can't say much more for the caliber of the average reporter I have worked with. (Flag officer number 88)

performed more or less directly related to the project and  
 almost as well. However, research indicates a trend in  
 the Army toward greater specialization for the public affairs  
 function and less reliance on the specialist group in the  
 1960's. The other programs of the Army family, however, are  
 the Army's organization group. That organization group, even  
 of a non-specialist nature, is a step in the direction  
 of a specialist nature of a staff effort as illustrated by the  
 current study's findings that only 11 per cent of the staff  
 officers respondents had ever served in public affairs  
 positions. Some of these officers at the top, after becoming  
 available, will be assigned to staff of the organization. All the  
 Chiefs of Information of the Army Department have been  
 either military, administrative or public affairs officers. The  
 Army has, in the personnel aspect, effectively succeeded  
 in making the public affairs position as too important to be  
 left to public relations specialists, while doing the same  
 in the assignment of public affairs officers to the Army  
 Department. This gives special meaning to a common  
 one should recognize:  
 New public affairs officers are not only important.  
 They are also in great demand and are assigned  
 to the highest levels of responsibility in the Army.  
 My personal experience in working with them has been  
 that they have, when assigned, been to monitor a  
 meeting with the public, been actively involved, and in  
 many cases a member of the staff, serving in  
 trying to understand themselves, not doing everything  
 but everything well. I don't say they have the  
 caliber of the people I have worked with.  
 (This officer is not a)



Actually, the results of this study lend some support for a belief that Admirals have more faith in PAOs as standard naval officers than is warranted. Flag officers clearly believe that information officer attitudes toward the media are much closer to the Admirals' own attitudes than they really are. This finding downgrades the typical public relations man's complaint that management does not support the PAO because it thinks he is "on the newsman's side." The PAOs are a lot more favorable to newsmen than management knows, probably because they have carefully concealed their empathy with the media from a management that they in turn view as being more hostile to the media than it really is. Whether closing this communications gap would have a salutary affect on Navy public relations or not is debatable.

As for the attitude gap, there are two approaches. One is to assume that the gap should be closed: that Admirals and PAOs should have similar attitudes toward the news media. The other is to argue that the attitude difference is natural and needs no rectification. If we adopt the former approach, it is clear that there must be more communication between the two groups, and that this communication must be doubly successful; more accurate cross-perception must develop, and attitudes must change. If we accept the status quo of the latter approach, we are saying that both groups have attitudes toward the media





that will benefit the Navy in the long run: PAOs who work with the media understand media problems and should have more favorable attitudes toward the media than management.

In either case, there is reason to believe that the Navy's public relations personnel structure and policy does not do justice to the importance of public support to the Navy. Flag officer attitudes and comments indicate that they are concerned about the effect the news media have on public attitudes toward the Navy. The question is whether they connect this concern with Knorr's (1970) position that public support is a component of the actual military power of a nation. These are some of the flag officer comments:

I believe we need more aggressive news proffering to media about the Navy--to tell our story! (Flag officer number 8)

The Navy should get more aggressive about responding to biased, shaded or emotional reports and articles. (Flag officer number 121)

News media need and must have Navy assistance in achieving truly objective reporting of Navy news. Without it, they will tend to misinterpret, and create their own slants. (Flag officer number 19)

We need a professionally competent Navy public affairs group about as badly as we need a more responsible public press. It's not all bad, but there is much room for improvement in both. (Flag officer number 24)

The comparative intensity of management's attitudes toward the news media indicates real concern for the media's product and its affect on the Navy's public support. Management probably does recognize the importance of public support as a component of military capacity in the United



[illegible]

States, perhaps more so than its public relations staff. But the organization has not demonstrated a commitment to use its best people in the small group of specialists that is supposed to work toward maximizing public support for the Navy, or as sub-specialists who receive training in public relations by postgraduate education or learn in public affairs assignments. Most outstanding senior line officers of the present, those who are Admirals, have not held public affairs assignments during their careers. This gives little reason to believe that potentially outstanding officers are seeking or being assigned to public affairs work, either as sub-specialists or transfers to the specialist group.

It is difficult to equate the flag officers' apparent concern for public relations with the Navy's failure to take more positive action to encourage its best people to work in this area. What seems to be called for is an organizational recognition of the importance to the country's actual military strength of public support. This should be backed by a conscious effort to provide a motivated, top-notch corps of public affairs specialists and to assign line officer standouts to public affairs work as a normal and important part of their career development.

In summary, the implications for Navy public affairs from this study are as follows: Navy management and public relations staff attitudes toward the news media

First, perhaps there is some one public relations staff,  
 but the organization has not demonstrated a commitment to  
 use the staff people in the small group of specialists that  
 is supposed to work toward building public support for  
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 officers of the present, those who are available, have not  
 held public affairs assignments during their careers. This  
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 officers are seeking or being assigned to public affairs  
 work, either as spokespersons or trainers for the  
 specialist group.

It is difficult to expect the line officers,  
 especially those for public relations with the Navy,  
 to have more positive action to encourage the line  
 people to work in this area. What seems to be called for  
 is an organizational recognition of the importance of the  
 country's overall military strategy of public support. This  
 should be backed by a concerted effort to provide a  
 well-defined, top-down concept of public affairs specialists  
 and to assign line officers elsewhere to public affairs work  
 as a normal and important part of their career development.

In summary, the implications for Navy public  
 affairs from this study are as follows: Navy management  
 and public relations staff activities toward the Navy public



are well apart. Flag officers have had little experience with full-time public relations work and may have marginal respect for people who work in the communications field. Management and public relations staff do not communicate well enough to have accurate perceptions of each other's attitudes toward the news media. Considering the "attitude gap," this "communications gap" may not be so bad for Navy information specialists--who might find their jobs harder if management realized how out-of-step PAO attitudes are on this subject. But it seems that, whatever the risk for this group, increased accuracy would be a worthwhile goal of internal communication--whether or not one deems that increased agreement is also. If each group communicated its values and rationale to the other group better, it is quite possible that attitudes would become more homogeneous, and that the Navy's effectiveness with the news media might be enhanced. An alternate possibility is that the difference in attitudes is natural because each group has its own organizational role to fill, and that the Navy functions better with each holding firmly to its own attitudes. If that is the case, the relative size, quality and authority of the groups leave no doubt about one thing: when decision-making time comes in the Navy, flag officers are in charge, and their attitudes toward the news media are the ones that will prevail. Those attitudes, even if they are correct and proper, are hardly likely to improve

are well aware. They believe that their experience with full-time public relations work and any past background, for people who work in the communications field, management and public relations work in our community will enough to have accurate perceptions of each other's attitudes toward the new media. Considering the "attitude gap," this "communications gap" may not be as bad for many information specialists who might think their job is harder if management raised the entry-level pay. Attitudes are on this subject. For it seems that, whatever the risk for this group, increased accuracy would be a worthwhile goal of internal communication—whether or not the group that increased accuracy is also. It is not group communication, it is value and perception to the other group. Hence, it is quite possible that attitudes would become more homogeneous, and that the Navy's effectiveness with the new media might be enhanced. An alternative possibility is that the difference in attitudes is related to the fact that the group has its own organizational role to fill, and that the Navy functions better with each holding itself to its own attitudes. It is clear in the case, the relative size, quality and authority of the groups have no doubt about one thing: when decision-making time comes in the Navy, the officers are in charge, and their attitudes toward the new media are the ones that will prevail. These attitudes, even if they are correct and proper, are hardly likely to improve



the Navy's relations with the news media.

### Public Relations and the News Media

The findings of this study are in accord with Cutlip and Center's view that the public relations practitioner is the man in the middle in press relations. Organizations want news reported in a manner that will promote their objectives and not cause trouble, while newsmen want stories that will interest readers and viewers. Executives, generally, whether in industry or government, have complaints against the news media. Media representatives often have counter-complaints.

Said one of the information officer respondents in the survey:

It appears to me that throughout Navy Public Affairs, our officers and enlisted are losing whatever identification or sympathy they may have had at one time with or for the working newsman. He is usually "the other side," hence our defensive public affairs operation. . . . Add this to the fact that most flag officers, because of their longtime insulation from the action and interaction of civilian society, do not appreciate PA problems nor understand them, and therein lies the roots of most of the Navy's problems with the press and with public attitudes. (PAO number 26)

Another obvious implication of the study is that the Navy has incorporated professional public relations practitioners within its structure. These are public relations specialists, not just naval officers who happened to be assigned to work with the media. They constitute a public relations staff with distinct attitudes and functions.



the Navy's relationship with the press.

# Public Relations and the Navy

The importance of this study and its need for the Navy and the public is that the public relations work-  
shop is the one in the middle in these relations.  
Organizations have been reported in a number of ways with  
business, their objectives and not only in the public, while com-  
municating with the public will become easier and clearer.  
Government, generally, whether in industry or government,  
have complaints against the Navy. Public relations  
often have common complaints.

One of the most important of these complaints is  
the Navy's:

It appears to us that throughout Navy public relations,  
our efforts and efforts are being overlooked. It  
seems to us that the Navy is not doing as well as it  
or for the public. It is usually "the other  
side," but we believe public relations efforts.  
... The fact is that the Navy is not doing as well as it  
should. It is not doing as well as it should. It is not doing as well as it should.  
and the fact is that the Navy is not doing as well as it should.  
It is not doing as well as it should. It is not doing as well as it should.  
The fact is that the Navy is not doing as well as it should.  
The fact is that the Navy is not doing as well as it should.  
The fact is that the Navy is not doing as well as it should.

Public relations efforts of the Navy are not

The Navy has indicated professional public relations  
personnel within its structure. There are public relations  
personnel, but they are not doing as well as they should be.  
be assigned to work with the public. They are not doing as well as they should be.

Public relations efforts with the public are not doing as well as they should be.

as well as loyalty to the organization. In general, public relations staffs have some handicaps that come from being a part of the organization, rather than experts from an outside counseling agency. The staff man has the advantage of team membership, but an everpresent subordinate role leads to the danger of his becoming a "yes" man. As we have seen, Navy public relations staff men's attitudes toward the media are incorrectly perceived by management, quite possibly because the PR men have tended to be conciliatory in their communications up the line in the organization. Despite this lack of objectivity handicap, there are distinct advantages that go along with team membership. Certainly the public relations staff man in the Navy is valuable because he has inside knowledge of the military and his service. As a result he can serve the news media and his organization better.

Another implication of the study is that service to the public via the news media is of prime concern to Navy information officers. In this sense, they are part of a special breed of practitioners of public relations, those in government service. While they are devoted to the goals of their organization and government, they see their function as complementary to the news media, not antagonistic. Their favorability toward the media is so pronounced that it raises some questions about the theory that government-media relationships are characterized by "adversarity"

as well as loyalty to the organization. In general, public relations staffs have some knowledge about how to bring a part of the organization, rather than agents from an outside consulting agency. The staff has had the advantage of some membership, has an experience, and understands the needs of the group of his interest a "you" man. As we have seen, very public relations staff men's attitudes toward the media are increasingly perceived by management, quite possibly because the staff men have tended to be conflict in their communications up the line in the organization. Despite this lack of negatively handling, there are distinct advantages that he along with some membership. Certainly the public relations staff men in the staff is valuable because he has inside knowledge of the military and his service. He knows he can work the news media and his organization better.

General reputation of the staff is that service to the public via the news media is of prime concern to many information officers. In this sense, they are part of a special kind of relationship at public relations, those in government service. While they are devoted to the needs of their organizations and government, they are their function as completely to the news media, not antagonistic. Their favorability toward the media is no pronounced that it raises some questions about the theory that government public relationships are characterized by "obedience."



(Rivers, 1970). If we take the attitudes of the management level in this survey, we find attitudes that may be considered hostile to the media, although not necessarily more hostile than those of comparable segments of the American civilian population. But the Navy public affairs officers' attitudes show no support for the hypothesis that they view the media as an adversary. A much better characterization of the newsman/government public relations man relationship than adversarity, it seems, is what Nimmo calls "facilitation." Government organizations, the Navy being one example, are so large and so complex that news about them cannot be collected with ease by any external newsgathering organization. Public relations men, working as agents for newsmen, are able to facilitate news coverage of the government. The fact that public relations practitioners have a loyalty to their organizations and a basic commitment to serve them rather than the newsgathering organizations is really one of value placement. Obviously, government public relations officials feel that their organizations are necessary institutions serving in the public interest. The news media, too, are necessary institutions serving in the public interest. There need not be great adversarity if both sets of institutions, government and media, are performing well. When the complete scope of government-media relations is examined, it appears that cooperation and facilitation emerge as the key elements,

February, 1970. It was the conclusion of the program  
level in this survey, we find evidence that we do  
considered better in the media, although not necessarily  
more realistic than some of corporate segments of the  
national public opinion. But the very public affairs  
affairs' attention since no support for the hypothesis that  
they view the media as an adversary. A good deal  
of the material of the program/segment public relations  
was selectively the adversary, it seems, in that it  
calls "realism". Government operations, the very  
being one example, are so large and so complex that even  
about them cannot be collected with any of the material  
investigative operation. Public relations and, working  
as agents for news, we hope to facilitate news coverage  
of the government. The fact that public relations practice  
do not have a right to their organizations and a right  
commitment to action that takes them in organizations  
organization is really one of their placement. However,  
government public relations officials feel that their  
organizations are necessary functions served in the  
public interest. For some media, too, are necessary insti-  
tutions serving in the public interest. There need not be  
great rivalry it now case of institutions, government  
and media are performing well. When the public serves of  
government public relations is examined, it appears that  
cooperation and facilitation serves as the key element.



not adversarity. But just as bad news often receives the attention of the media, and bad media reporting often gains the attention of those in government, irregularities in government-media relations (the cases in which adversarity is the key element) often receive a disproportionate amount of attention from those who examine these relationships. The implication of this study is that the public relations practitioner has a valid, useful purpose in government. His attitudes provide a bridge between the management of the organization and newsmen. If he does his job properly he serves the public, his organization and the media--probably in that order of priority. It seems that a mature concept of public relations, in whatever organizational setting, calls for the same from the individuals who are practitioners.

As for the news media, the study clearly demonstrates that Navy Admirals are not overwhelmed with pleasure about the treatment their service has been receiving in the news department. It shows, too, that if newsmen have a friend in the Navy, it is likely to be the public affairs officer. The implication is that news industry spokesmen who decry the practice of public relations in the military are ill-advised. It would seem more to their advantage to support the public affairs specialists as necessary cogs in the process of mass communication. Certainly, the answer to getting more information about the



not necessarily. But just as the news often reflects the  
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 should exist, fails to take into account the individuals who  
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 studies that news media are not overwhelmed with  
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 have a role in the news, it is likely to be the public  
 efforts of the news. The implication is that news industry  
 agreement with the public is public relations in the  
 industry and ill-served. It would seem more to their  
 advantage to support the public affairs specialists as  
 necessary core in the process of news communication.  
 Generally, the answer to giving more information about the

military to the public does not lie in dismantling military public information efforts.

Furthermore, data from opinion polls such as those cited in Chapter II, when compared with the responses of flag officers and information officers, lead to some observations about their attitudes that may not fit some stereotypes held by the media. One observation is that flag officers are not very different from the general public in their attitudes toward the news. If we consider the fact that the Admirals are highly educated (at least 57 bachelor's degrees, 55 masters, two PhDs, four law and seven medical degrees were reported), that they are generally well informed, and that they have a great deal of personal knowledge of news events which involve the Navy, we recognize that their apparent hostility to the media is not an isolated phenomenon, but rather the same sort of response a researcher would probably get if he asked college presidents what they thought about media coverage of their universities, politicians what they thought of news about campaigns, bank presidents what they thought of economic news reporting, or student leaders for their opinions about news coverage of the campus. There is little reason to believe that the majority of flag officers would agree with the majority of American respondents who indicated in the CBS poll that they would favor restriction of press freedom under some circumstances. The flag

ability to the public how we did in international affairs  
public information efforts.  
Twelve years, their own opinion polls were as close  
as to the public as they could get with the response of  
the citizens and international relations, and to some  
extent from their own polls that we are the same  
questionnaire held by the public. One question is that  
the citizens are not very different from the general  
public in their attitudes toward the world. It is possible  
the fact that the attitudes are highly educated (at least 75  
percent) is because, as persons, we think, for law and  
order, medical research and reported, that they are aware  
of all well informed, and that they have a great deal of  
personal knowledge of news events which involve the world,  
we recognize that there appears hostility to the world is  
not an isolated phenomenon, but rather the same kind of  
response a community would probably get if we asked  
college presidents what they thought about world coverage  
of their universities, politicians what they thought of  
news about coverage, high presidents what they thought of  
economic news coverage, or student leaders for their  
opinion about news coverage of the campus. There is  
little reason to believe that the majority of the citizens  
would agree with the majority of business respondents and  
indicated in the CBS poll that they would favor restriction  
of news freedom under some circumstances. The day



officer attitudes, then, are neither a surprise nor the vented frustrations of an isolated minority. They are rather typical attitudes to be expected from Americans in similar social roles. The anomaly, if there is one, is the homogeneous nature of the favorable attitudes held by public affairs officers toward the new function. Here, too, we have a rather highly educated group (50 of the 51 have college degrees, and 15 hold the master's), one that is well informed, and knows a lot about Navy events that make news. The easy explanation is that PAOs feel a sort of empathy with newsmen--after all, communication is their professional specialty in the Navy. Also, while they know a great deal about the Navy side of news stories, they are also knowledgeable about the newsmen's problems and the complicated process of news reporting.

The fact remains, however, that most of the top management of the Navy--which may be typical of other elite groups in American society--is not very satisfied with the job being done by the news media. Yet the responses of the Admirals ranged from being as unfavorable as possible on the eight measuring statements to being as favorable as possible. It is important that we disaggregate individuals and illustrate that all shades of attitudes are represented by the group score, as these indicate:

In my opinion, news media isn't as biased against us as we seem to think. (Flag officer number 18)

. . . some papers (and other media) are fair, some are

officials, managers, and workers. They are  
 various functions of an industrial organization. They are  
 various types of activities as the organization grows in  
 size and complexity. The complexity of the organization is the  
 responsiveness of the organization to the environment.

Public affairs officers have the new function. They,  
 too, have a higher level of responsibility. They are  
 have various functions, and it is not the manager's job to  
 is well informed, and knows a lot about the organization  
 and the environment. The new organization is not just a  
 of activity with management. All communication is the  
 professional responsibility in the organization. Also, while they  
 a great deal about the organization and the environment, they are  
 also knowledgeable about the manager's problems and the  
 organization's response to the environment.

The first function, however, is the work of the organization.  
 management of the organization may be typical of other organizations  
 groups in business society. It is not very different from the  
 job being done by the organization. Yet the response of the  
 organization to the environment is not very different from the  
 the first function of the organization to be the organization as  
 possible. It is important that we distinguish individuals  
 and illustrate that all kinds of activities are represented  
 by the organization, as the organization.

It is important, new organizations are not just a  
 we are in business. (This is the organization's  
 . . . some reports (and other things) are in, some are



not. Some slant news to an unacceptable degree. Some editorial pages are unfair, even venal and vicious. Some try very hard to be objective. (Flag officer number 20)

We tend to blame the press rather than ourselves when an unfavorable event is reported. (Flag officer number 96)

Re Navy coverage. We could do a lot worse, and I think we've been rather fortunate. When we continue to make boo-boos, why complain? (Flag officer number 114)

Quite often, comments volunteered by the flag officers were critical of certain aspects such as commercialism or access, as these show:

I believe that most news media are primarily interested in selling a product. As a result many unimportant events and people get unwarranted attention by the press and in many instances the reporting fails to be factual or concise or accurate. This may be partially due to the need to fill time or space but the major reason is to sell a product. (Flag officer number 106)

I feel the Navy could and should submit reclaims or rebuttals to those articles that ~~sometimes~~ give a biased or unfair story about the Navy. I also feel the press could and should print the rebuttals as prominently in the paper as the articles they refute. For example--the Navy carriers took a severe beating in the press last fall. The Navy placed in the Congressional Record a factual story about the aircraft carrier that refuted most of the charges made in the press (and congress). This Navy rebuttal never got published in any newspaper--to my knowledge. (Flag officer number 69)

Interestingly enough, in light of Wiggins's thesis that the conflict between military secrecy and press freedom is at the root of problems between the military and the media, only one of the flag officers stressed a concern about secrecy. He said:

Having been in security & intelligence field for . . . years, I have developed an unfavorable opinion of news



From the very beginning of the investigation, (this officer  
historical papers are written, even when and without  
any. Some times more to an uncorroborated degree. Some  
times 10)

no information is reported. (Any official should  
be told to find the local police department when

we've been rather fortunate. When we visit the lake  
we could do a lot worse, but I think

Quota refers to number of volunteers by the time

of insects were utilized in certain habitats and in certain

[illegible][illegible]

Impressively enough, in light of Wexler's thesis

the point, only one of the King's officers received a command  
freedom is at the heart of the problem between the military and  
that the conflict between military strategy and peace

... I have discussed an administrative solution of course.

media reps integrity and their ability to act in the interest of the U. S. There have been a few exceptions encountered, but majority have convinced me they will do almost anything for a name and a buck. (Flag officer number 112)

Some respondents lined up with Vice President Agnew, as did these:

In my view, V. P. Agnew was entirely correct in his assessment of the media--and the media reaction to his view was uniquely revealing of their inbred self-serving attitude. (Flag officer number 89)

The trend in television news analysis took a real sharp change after Spiro lowered the boom. If Agnew doesn't keep quiet, he's going to talk himself right into the White House! (PAO number 22)

Other comments reveal additional concerns, many of which were about intentional or unintentional bias in the news and the general performance of the media. Here are some of those:

Although I won't accuse the media of being wilfully unfair and biased . . . I do believe that newsmen (this includes TV, Radio, etc.) in general and reporters in particular are superficial, prone to error or preconceived misinterpretation and generally inclined to manufacture news or embellish it. My worry is that they lack the sensitivity to realize this automatically works to make their product biased or unfair when their intentions are not deliberate to do this. We need less aggressive and more responsible performance from these people. (Flag officer number 58)

The most general complaints I have personally about newspaper/TV reporting are: (1) the tendency to editorialize in supposedly pure reporting, and (2) less than desired thoroughness in research, particularly in technical and professional areas, on the part of reporters. I frankly attribute the latter to a less than appropriate sense of responsibility for what they are saying on the part of a good many reporters. You might call it laziness. (Flag officer number 8)

The news media generally "comment" on the news, and



to show anything for a man and a work. (7) The  
recovered, but nobody have recovered in day will  
located at the U.S. There have been a few religious  
with very heavily and even ability to act in the

Some respondents lined up with this position:

1999-2000

On 17 May, V. E. Jones was forcibly removed from his apartment at the hotel and the matter was referred to him. Jones was subsequently removed from the hotel and the matter was referred to him. Jones was subsequently removed from the hotel and the matter was referred to him.

The above is a reproduction of the original document. It is a copy of a letter from the FBI to the State Department, dated 10/10/50. The letter is addressed to the State Department and is signed by J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI. The letter discusses the activities of the "Black Legion" and the "Black Legion" in the United States. The letter is a copy of a letter from the FBI to the State Department, dated 10/10/50. The letter is addressed to the State Department and is signed by J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI. The letter discusses the activities of the "Black Legion" and the "Black Legion" in the United States.

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have and the general outburst of the battle, there was

100.542 10. 0000

Although I don't believe the seeds are being willingly  
united and blessed. . . I do believe that someone (this  
includes W. J. Hall, too) in general the response is  
generally not respectful, prone to error or even  
deliberate misrepresentation and generally lacking in  
commitment more or less than it is.  
They lack the sensitivity to realize that respectfully  
works to make their product almost or really when their  
intentions are not helpful to the field. We need more  
aggressive and more responsible performance from them.  
(W. J. Hall, March 1981)

The most honest complaint I have personally about newspaper TV reporting was (1) the tendency to editorialize in supposedly pure reporting, and (2) the overuse of quotations in research, particularly in connection with professional news, on the part of reporters. I frankly attribute the latter to a lack of space and want of responsibility for what they are saying on the part of a good many reporters. You might call it laziness. (This without number 2)

The new title partially "removes" or "cleans" the



"editorialize"--slanting news reporting to their views --rather than reporting the news and reporting "all views." (Flag officer number 98)

I am concerned about the scarcity of honest, unbiased news reporting--press or TV. Everybody tends to have "an angle." (Flag officer number 76)

When one reads the occasional news story to which he is privy--and notes the lack of accuracy--he wonders why read newspapers, or listen to radio/TV. Yet you can't shut off the need because (it is) important. (Flag officer number 48)

TV and the visual-verbal impact of selective news reporting is . . . highly volatile. . . . A high order of intellectual honesty and close top management monitoring and supervision (industry not govt.) is required to assure an objective presentation. . . . (Flag officer number 111)

The news media have become the judge and jury for public affairs, defense policy, domestic policy and foreign policy. (Flag officer number 122)

These negative comments should not be taken as the sputterings of individuals who feel threatened by the media. They actually repeat many of the themes of responsible critics of the news industry. For the most part, they call on the media to improve its performance: something the media has frequently asked of the military. Some journalists may consider the attitudes of the flag officers a compliment. Their pens have drawn blood. Yet they have drawn it with attacks their victims consider irresponsible under rules that allow for no retaliation. Certainly, the sword is virtually useless against the pen in the United States, no matter what the holder of the sword thinks of those who wield the pen.

"Unofficially" -- saying how reporting is their view  
-- and then reporting the fact and reporting "all  
views." (This official number 2)

I am interested about the security of honest, unbiased  
news reporting--grade of TV. Everybody needs to have  
"an angle." (This official number 3)

When one reads the occasional news story to which he is  
pity--and notes the lack of accuracy--he wonders why  
read newspapers, or listen to radio/TV. Yet you can't  
shot off the real picture (it is) lastest. (This  
official number 4)

TV and the visual-verbal impact of selective news  
reporting is . . . highly volatile. . . A high order  
of intellectual honesty and clear ego management  
involving the separation (industry not just) is  
required to handle an objective presentation. . .  
(This official number 5)

The news media have become the jolly and jay for  
public affairs, business policy, domestic policy and  
foreign policy. (This official number 6)

These negative comments should not be taken as the

equivalence of individuals who feel threatened by the  
media. They normally report many of the themes of  
responsibility crisis of the news industry. For the most  
part, they call on the media to improve its performance;  
sometimes the media has responsibly asked of the military.  
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officials a compliment. Their pens have given food. Yet  
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Generally, the word is viciously against the fact  
in the United States, no matter what the degree of the  
good things of those who value the pen.



### Communications Research

This study put the coorientational model to the test in a group situation. The model was more useful than originally anticipated. Foremost, from a methodological point of view, it directed the researcher to measure respondents' attitudes and compare them with other attitudes and perceptions of others' attitudes without explaining--and probably biasing--the research project. The technique merits further application in organizational studies. Also, the model permitted the researcher to measure and compare group characteristics in a meaningful way. Chaffee and McLeod's model was intended to describe dyadic communication situations between two individuals, such as parent and child. This study applied the coorientation model to two groups, and used a check of the reification assumption to determine whether one group was seen as a generalized entity by the other group. The check showed that "flag officer," as a reification, is a real "thing" for almost all public affairs officers. In some cases, public affairs officers were more likely to visualize the generalized flag officers as agreeing or disagreeing in their attitude toward a statement about the news media than to see themselves as agreeing or disagreeing. To them, a generalized flag officer was apparently not much more difficult to conceptualize than a generalized own personality. On the other hand, "public affairs officer" is not





an easy reification for Admirals. It may be argued that the study stretches the model too much because of the reification problem. Actually, though, the very fact that flag officers found public affairs officers difficult to stereotype in their thinking (as they also found "most reporters" a difficult reification) is important to the interpretations of the study. It illustrates an organizational separation between management and public relations staff, and leads to an assumption that top management in the Navy--for various valid reasons--is either not aware of and acquainted with its public relations specialists, or else considers their activities and attitudes to have relatively low priority. Thus the coorientational model proved very useful even at this point of vulnerability.

Did the reification problem affect the validity of the empirical data gathered by the study? To a certain extent it did. If the research had failed to show such clear results, acceptance of the findings might be challenged. But there is so little ambiguity in the data that greater precision of measurement is not required. What the coorientational model attempts to do, after all, is take a lot of the impressionistic guess-work out of research and point toward the reality of the social situation. It certainly does that in this study. As a framework for research, it provides better data than an open-ended unschematic approach could possibly generate, permitting

an easy solution for the future. To say so would be to  
 the study of the social sciences. The study of the  
 collection problem. However, the very fact that  
 the collection of data is a social science is  
 a fact that is often overlooked (as they are found) and  
 therefore a scientific collection is important in the  
 interpretation of the study. It illustrates an organiza-  
 tional organization between government and public collection  
 staff, and leads to an organization that is important in  
 the study of various social sciences in other parts of  
 and associated with the public collection specialists, or  
 also considers their activities and activities in the  
 relatively low activity. Thus the organizational model  
 must be very small even at this point of rationality.  
 Did the collection problem affect the validity of  
 the original data collected by the study? To a certain  
 extent it did. If the research had failed to show such  
 clear results, organization of the findings might be dis-  
 rupted. But there is no little ambiguity in the data that  
 greater precision of measurement is not required. Was the  
 organizational model adequate to do, after all, is not a  
 lot of the fundamental framework of research and  
 leads toward the reality of the social situation. It  
 certainly does that in this study. As a framework for  
 research, it provides better data than an organized  
 systematic approach could possibly generate, generating



the study to focus on its objectives and to incorporate a convenient rating scale approach to measurement.

This study did not use the coorientation model as it was originally intended, that is, to evaluate the communication variable in a social situation. For other researchers using the model, some important methodological considerations must be faced. One is the difficulty of observing communication. A second is the nature of the person-to-person relationship of individuals in a coorientational situation. A third, when group study is undertaken, is measurement of one group's attitudes toward the other group--is there like or dislike, respect or lack of respect, etc. There was almost no way to obtain reliable information about the amount or type of communication between flag officers and public affairs officers. Nor was the amount and type of interpersonal communication a particularly relevant measure for this study, which merely sought to establish the direction of group attitudes toward the media and the differences in group perceptions of the other group's attitudes. Flag officer-public affairs officer relationships in Washington are not, as a rule, on a one-to-one basis. Thus, no study of pairs was contemplated. Such pairing might be interesting, but it would of necessity be a limited examination of Admirals and their personal staff public affairs officers. It seems sufficient to consider flag officers and PAOs as interchangeable

the study to focus on the objectives and on the hypotheses to be tested. This study did not use the experimental method and it was originally intended, that is, to achieve the communication variable in a social situation. For other researchers using the model, some important methodological considerations must be noted. One is the difficulty of observing communication. A second is the nature of the person-to-person relationship as individuals in a social situation. A third, when group study is indicated, is measurement of one group's attitudes toward the other group--is there like or dislike, respect or lack of respect, etc. There was almost no way to obtain reliable information about the form or type of communication between the attitude and social interaction. One was the second and type of interpersonal communication. A particularly relevant measure for this study, which was used to establish the direction of group attitudes toward the media and the differences in group perceptions of the other group's attitudes. The other variables in the attitude relationship is Washington and me, as a rule, on a group-level basis. Thus, the study of group was conducted. Some finding might be interesting, but it would be necessary to a limited examination of the data and that general with social attitude outcome. It seems sufficient to consider the attitude and the on interpersonal



individual units in the Navy's organizational bureaucracy. Their role relationships are determined by their place in the Navy's structure. Any given information officer in the survey may have worked closely with an Admiral or Admirals either in Washington or elsewhere, or that if he has not, he is well aware of the probability that he will. Flag officers in Washington may have had public affairs officers working for or with them in sea or shore assignments. If not, they no doubt know that they are likely to have a staff PAO in the future. The organizational role relationship and the coorientation model make the results of this study generalizable, and offer the prospect of a follow-on replication over time. This prospect is particularly inviting since the news environment of the present study indicates that attitudes of the respondents may have been influenced by pronouncements of high government officials and Navy leaders, by controversy about news reporting that was covered with at least adequate emphasis by the media, and by an international and national climate of bad news for the military. One might hypothesize that at other times, with different spokesmen, muted controversy, or an improved news situation, some attitudes toward the media held by these two groups would change--or that new attitudes would replace old as the composition of the groups changed. Such a hypothesis suggests a test of two commonly accepted assumptions of journalism: (1) that criticism of the news



indicated which is the Navy's organizational responsibility. Their role relationships are determined by their place in the Navy's structure. Any given information officer in the Navy may have worked closely with an Admiral or Admiral's staff in Washington or elsewhere, or that if he has not, he is very much of the possibility that he will. They officers in Washington may have had public affairs officers working not at each other in set of their relationships. If not, they no doubt know that they are likely to have a staff who is the future. The organizational role relationship and the coordination of this role is the result of this study particularly, and other the purpose of a follow-up application over time. This project is particularly invited since the new environment of the present study indicates that relations of the components may have been influenced by recommendations of high government officials and Navy leaders, by controversy about new reporting chain was covered with at least moderate emphasis by the media, and by an international and national climate of the new for the military. One major hypothesis that is often times, with different equipment, mixed controversy, or no reported new situation, some activities toward the media held by these two groups would change--or that new situation would replace old as the composition of the group changed. Such a hypothesis suggests a task of the research community as follows: (1) that activities of the Navy

media by leaders causes government organizations to hold negative attitudes and/or take restrictive action against the media; or, conversely, that less criticism of the media by government leaders would cause government officials to take more favorable attitudes toward the media; (2) that unfavorable attitudes toward the media develop when the news is unpleasant; or, officials would be more favorable to the media if the news were not so bad. We often hear these two assumptions repeated as part of journalism's folklore--especially the latter, usually couched in a "beheading the messenger" analogy--but they deserve rigorous examination.

Thanks to work by Chaffee and McLeod and others, this study's findings about Admirals' and PAOs' attitudes can be considered in relationship to the results of other coorientational research. Much previous work has indicated that greater communication is correlated with greater agreement, accuracy and congruency. But if we assume this for flag officers and information officers, we are on the pathway to the assumption that persuasive communication changes attitudes in proportion to the amount of communication processed. While it is fashionable to call for more dialogue to resolve differences of opinion, this "more communication, more consensus" assumption is not automatically acceptable, enticing as it may be to a communicator. Testing this in the Admiral-PAO-media context would require





another study with other measures. A researcher could select Admiral-PAO pairs, determine their attitudes, measure in some way their interpersonal communication, and find out how much like/dislike, respect/lack of respect, etc., exists, and draw some conclusions. Designing and obtaining cooperation for such a study would be extremely difficult, however. Until meaningful research of this nature is undertaken, we are left with but one way to apply theory to the real situation. That is to take the findings of other coorientational studies in communications and generalize from these to the Navy situation that is known to exist as a result of this study.



## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY

This chapter tells how and why the study was designed, then summarizes its findings and the implications derived from the research.

The study consisted of a survey of Navy flag officers (Rear Admirals, Vice Admirals and Admirals) and Navy public affairs specialists in Washington, D. C., in early 1970. A self-administered anonymous questionnaire was completed by 125 Admirals (89 per cent of the survey population) and by 51 PAOs (93 per cent response rate). The aim of the research was to determine the comparative attitudes of these two groups toward the news media of mass communications. The attitudes of these individuals are salient to any understanding of Navy public information policy; they are top management and public relations staff in the Navy's organizational bureaucracy.

A research design based on Chaffee and McLeod's coorientation model provided quantified measures of attitudes toward the media held by each group, as well as measures of the perceptions of the other group's attitudes. Favorability or unfavorability toward the media was



## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY

This chapter tells how and why the study was designed, how materials for testing and the instructions derived from the research.

The study consisted of a survey of Navy Civil Officers (Navy Officers, Navy Officers and Seamen) and Navy Public Affairs Specialists in Washington, D. C., in early 1970. A self-administered anonymous questionnaire was completed by 113 officers (80 per cent of the survey population) and 31 Seamen (51 per cent response rate). The aim of the research was to determine the composition of these two groups toward the role of public communication. The attitudes of these individuals are related to my understanding of Navy Public Affairs Policy; they are not management and public relations work in the Navy's organizational context.

A content analysis based on Cohen and Malin's communication model provided a framework of attitudes toward the role of each group, as well as measures of the perceptions of the other group's attitudes. This study is an attempt to understand the role of

measured by eight statement items to which respondents could agree or disagree or decline to give an opinion. Information sources were identified and compared, and primary sources were compared with attitudes toward specific types of media. Attitude agreement, accuracy of perception, and congruency (perceived agreement) were measured and compared. Respondents were asked to rate the military services on the basis of which was, in their opinion, most favored by the news media.

Public affairs officers reported themselves to be generally more frequent users than flag officers of newspapers, television, radio and news magazines, but not of professional and military-oriented periodicals. Both Admirals and information officers seemed to rely more on newspapers than on other media.

Attitudes toward the news media held by information officers were dramatically more favorable than flag officer attitudes toward the media. Favorability and unfavorability were not related to either variety or quantity of media use, to educational level, or to Admirals' having served in public affairs billets at some time during their careers. Public affairs officers of Commander rank were closer than those of other PAO ranks to flag officers in attitudes toward the media. Even so, there was a statistically significant difference between the attitudes of the Commander group and the Admirals. Service college attendance

measured by their response time in which respondents could give or decline to give an opinion. Information sources were identified and compared, and primary sources were compared with attitudes toward specific types of media. Positive response, contrary to expectation, and comparison (perceived agreement) with research and opinion. Respondents were asked to rate the ability sources on the basis of which was, in their opinion, most favored by the mass media.

While attitude differences recorded themselves as being generally more favorable than the attitude of each source, television, radio and news agencies, but not of professional and literary-oriented agencies. While on television and information sources aimed to help most on news agencies and on other media.

Factors related to the mass media role of information sources were generally more favorable than the attitude toward the media. Favorability and information-ly were not related to source category or quality of media use, to educational level, or to attitude, having scores in public attitude higher or lower than during their careers.

While attitude differences of respondents were closer than those of other two groups to their attitude in earlier years toward the media. Even so, there was a significant difference between the attitude of the younger group and the elderly. Between college students



tended to correlate with a more favorable attitude toward the media among flag officers, as did experience in surface ships as opposed to duty in submarines, staff or special duty, or naval aviation. These differences were not statistically significant, and the degree of favorability seemed almost completely unrelated to other partialing variables: length of time as a flag officer and source of commission. Public affairs officers with more than four years' experience as PAOs tended to be less favorable to the media than those with four years or fewer, but the difference was not statistically significant.

Admirals were less accurate in predicting public affairs officer attitudes toward the news media than information officers were in predicting Admirals' attitudes. The information officers had a concept of "generalized flag officers" and were willing to predict attitudes on the basis of that reification. Visualizing the attitudes of "generalized public affairs officers" was more difficult for flag officers. Flag officers perceived greater agreement between their attitudes and PAO attitudes than vice versa. Public affairs specialists thought flag officers were less favorable toward the news media than they actually were. Admirals thought PAOs were less favorable to the news media than they actually were.

Overall, both groups were more favorable toward newspapers and news magazines than toward television news.



However, most flag officers thought newspapers they regularly read were more biased and unfair in their coverage of Navy news than television news programs they regularly watched or news magazines they regularly read. Both groups felt the Air Force and Marine Corps were more favored by the news media than the Navy, but rated the Navy's treatment as better than the Army's.

There were implications from the study for communications research, for Navy public affairs, and public relations and the news media in general.

The research project showed that the coorientation model was useful and valid for a group study, especially since the results of the study could be interpreted in the light of previous coorientational research in communications.

The fact that there was an "attitude gap" and a "communications gap" between top management and the public relations staff of the Navy implies some problems for Navy public affairs. The attitude gap--a striking difference between PAO and flag officer attitudes toward the news media--indicates that there is an organizational difference between these two groups that is so strong it dictates different attitude patterns. A basic difference in role functions is apparently the primary reason for the attitude differences. They may also be partly a result of the Navy's personnel system, which has not encouraged the development



However, and they alloted enough resources they  
 regularly there were some times and others in their over-  
 age of many years than calculated some projects they  
 regularly wanted to have experienced they regularly want  
 both groups felt the Air Force and Marine Corps were more  
 favored by the new media than the Navy, but that the  
 Navy's situation was better than the Army's.  
 There were 10 questions from the Navy for comment-  
 section question, for Navy public affairs, and public  
 relations and the new media is general.  
 The research project shows that the organization  
 model was useful and valid for a group study, especially  
 since the results of the study would be interested in the  
 light of previous organizational research in organiza-  
 tional.  
 The fact that there was an "accidental" gap, and a  
 "communication gap" between the management and the public  
 relations staff of the very large and complex for Navy  
 public affairs. The accident gap was a striking difference  
 between the two and they alloted attention toward the new  
 model--the fact that there is an organizational difference  
 between these two groups that is an error is different  
 different accident patterns. A basic difference in role  
 focusing is especially the primary reason for the military  
 difference. They are also in part a result of the Navy's  
 personnel system, which has not recognized the development

of a highly motivated public affairs specialist corps or assigned outstanding line officers to full-time public affairs tours with regularity. The communications gap--a misreading of attitudes of the other group by both Admirals and PAOs--indicates that organizational factors distort interpersonal communications between the groups. Conciliatory communication by the information officers to the Admirals left the impression that they are not as favorable toward the media as they really were; emphasis on unpleasant reactions to the media in the Admirals' communications to the PAOs made the information officers think the Admirals were more hostile to the media than they actually were. These gaps imply some dysfunction in the Navy, since those who make decisions about Navy information policy (the Admirals) have harsher attitudes toward the media than the technical public relations specialists who do most of the dealing with the media--and each group misinterprets the attitudes of the other. A continued combination of these factors is unlikely to enhance Navy relations with the news media or contribute to increased public support, a necessary component of the actual military strength of the United States.

Implications for public relations and for the news media in general from the study are primarily twofold:

(1) The study reaffirms Cutlip and Center's observation that the public relations man is the man in the middle in

of a highly motivated public relations specialist group in  
 assigned responsibilities like officers to full-time public  
 affairs work with publicity. The communication system  
 relationship of members of the public group by both  
 leaders and followers that organizational structure  
 direct interpersonal communication between the group.  
 Coefficiency communication by the information officers to  
 the leaders left the impression that they were not  
 involved toward the media as they really were. emphasis on  
 important reactions to the media as the leaders' communi-  
 cations to the press made the impression officers think the  
 leaders were more involved in the media than they actually  
 were. From this study some dysfunction in the group, since  
 these two main decisions about group information policy (the  
 leaders) have narrow relations toward the media than the  
 technical public relations specialists who do most of the  
 dealing with the media and each group misrepresents the  
 attitudes of the other. A continued confusion of views  
 before is unlikely to emerge from relations with the media  
 media as evidenced in increased public relations work.  
 very complex of the actual reality situation of the  
 United States.

Implications for public relations and for the media  
 media in general from the study are primarily twofold:  
 (1) The study indicates that the media's observation  
 that the public relations man is the man in the media is



press relations. The Navy PAOs are mediators between management and newsmen, and their attitudes imply that they are intent on building bridges between the two.

(2) Although flag officer attitudes are not necessarily more hostile to the media than could be expected from individuals in similar civilian social roles, the favorability of the public relations practitioners of the Navy toward the media is homogeneous and quite high in a comparative sense. This should be a signal to the media that this particular public relations group wants to serve the public via the news media. The government-media relationship in this case is more properly described as one of facilitation and cooperation than one of adversarity, at least from the public relations man's viewpoint. It is possible to generalize that public relations staffs in other organizations, especially government, can be facilitating links--bridges, not roadblocks--serving the public in cooperation with the mass media of communications.



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## APPENDIXES

## NOTES

## APPENDIX A

## TEXT OF QUESTIONNAIRES

## SURVEY OF FLAG OFFICER ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MEDIA

(Note: PAO questionnaire was titled "Survey of Public Affairs Officer Attitudes," etc. Text of the two questionnaires was the same, except as noted.)

Note: This is an anonymous questionnaire. The answers are only to be used in a statistical analysis. Nothing will be connected with your name. Returned questionnaires will be destroyed after analysis. There is a space for your comments at the end of the questionnaire. The success of this study depends upon complete responses from everyone.

1. What daily television news programs do you watch, and how regularly?

never   rarely   often   daily

WMAL-ABC-Channel 7

ABC Evening News (Frank Reynolds)

\_\_\_\_\_

WRC-NBC-Channel 4

Today Show

\_\_\_\_\_

The Huntley-Brinkly Report

\_\_\_\_\_

WTOP-CBS-Channel 9

CBS Morning News (Joseph Benti)

\_\_\_\_\_

CBS Evening News (Walter Cronkite)

\_\_\_\_\_

Others (please specify):

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_



## APPENDIX 1

## TEXT OF QUESTIONNAIRES

## SURVEY OF NEWS OFFICERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MEDIA

(Note: Each questionnaire was titled "Survey of Public Affairs Officers' Attitudes," and, two of the two questionnaires was the same, except as noted.)

Note: This is an anonymous questionnaire. The answers are only to be used in a statistical analysis. Nothing will be connected with your name. Returned questionnaires will be destroyed after analysis. There is a space for your comments at the end of the questionnaire. The success of this study depends upon complete responses from everyone.

1. What daily television news programs do you watch, and how frequently?

Watch news often daily

Watch news often daily

Watch news often daily

Watch news often daily

Watch news often daily

Watch news often daily

Watch news often daily

Watch news often daily

Watch news often daily

Watch news often daily

## 2. What radio news reports do you hear, and how regularly?

never rarely often daily

WMAL (American)

\_\_\_\_\_

WRC (NBC)

\_\_\_\_\_

WTOP (CBS)

\_\_\_\_\_

Others--for example, WAVA, WDON, WEAM, WEEL, WFAX, WGMS,  
WHMC, WHRN, WINX, WLMD, WOL, WOOK, WPGC, WPIX,  
WGMR, WUST, or WWDC (please specify):

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## 3. What daily newspapers do you read, and how regularly?

Baltimore Sun

\_\_\_\_\_

New York Times

\_\_\_\_\_

Wall Street Journal

\_\_\_\_\_

Washington Daily News

\_\_\_\_\_

Washington Post

\_\_\_\_\_

Washington Star

\_\_\_\_\_

Others (please specify):

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## 4. Please check the weekly news magazine(s) you regularly read, if any.

\_\_\_\_\_Newsweek \_\_\_\_\_Time \_\_\_\_\_U.S. News & World Report

## 5. Please check any of these publications which you regularly read.

\_\_\_\_\_All Hands \_\_\_\_\_Armed Forces Journal \_\_\_\_\_Atlantic

\_\_\_\_\_Armed Forces Management \_\_\_\_\_Aviation Week & Space  
Technology

\_\_\_\_\_Business Week \_\_\_\_\_Commanders Digest \_\_\_\_\_Direction





☐ Defense Dept. press clippings      ☐ Fortune  
☐ Harpers      ☐ Life      ☐ Look      ☐ Navy, the Magazine of Seapower  
☐ Navy Times      ☐ National Geographic  
☐ Naval Aviation News      ☐ Naval Institute Proceedings  
☐ Playboy      ☐ TV Guide      ☐ Readers Digest  
☐ Undersea Technology

Please list other such publications you regularly read:

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

6. How often do you hear a "press briefing"?

☐ never      ☐ rarely      ☐ often      ☐ daily

7. Here are some statements about television, radio, newspapers and magazines; about the people who are associated with them; and about their content--in other words, about the mass media in general. Please read each statement and indicate whether you tend generally to agree or disagree with each, or have no opinion.

	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>
a. News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way.	_____	_____	_____
b. We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government.	_____	_____	_____
c. Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve.	_____	_____	_____
d. Television is doing a good job of reporting the news.	_____	_____	_____
e. Most reporters are trustworthy.	_____	_____	_____

\_\_\_\_\_ Detention Dept. press clippings \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ Reports \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ Navy, the Navy- \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ rise of Sandomir \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ National Geographic  
\_\_\_\_\_ Travel Edition News  
\_\_\_\_\_ Reader Digest  
\_\_\_\_\_ TV Guide  
\_\_\_\_\_ National Geographic

Please list other such publications you regularly read:

• How often do you use a "pulling" device?

vitro      netto      vlassi      siron

7. Have you some statements about calibration, radio, news-  
papers and magazines; about the people who are associated  
with them; and about their content--in other words, about  
the mass media in general. Please read each statement  
and indicate whether you tend generally to agree or  
disagree with each, or have no opinion.

of your old tools and  
reported a lot of interest  
and enthusiasm.

1. The above information was  
provided to the  
author by the  
author.

1. The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been identified as having been in contact with the subject of this investigation, and who have been identified as having been in contact with the subject of this investigation, and who have been identified as having been in contact with the subject of this investigation.

Long's will at intervals be  
given to the committee to do

and, most important, the  
costs.

- |  | AGREE | DISAGREE | NO<br>OPINION |
|--|-------|----------|---------------|
| f. Navy news in the newspaper(s) I read is fair and unbiased.  | _____ | _____    | _____         |
| g. There is too much interpretation of the news on television.   | _____ | _____    | _____         |
| h. Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news.  | _____ | _____    | _____         |
| i. Navy news on the television news program(s) I regularly watch is fair and unbiased.   | _____ | _____    | _____         |
| j. Newspaper editorials are overly critical of government.   | _____ | _____    | _____         |
| k. Navy news in the news magazine(s) I regularly read is fair and unbiased.  | _____ | _____    | _____         |
| 8. Which branch of the armed forces is most favored by the news media? Please rate the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in order, listing the one you think is <u>most favored</u> as number (1), the second-most favored as number (2), etc.   |       |          |               |
| (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____  |       |          |               |
| 9. Here are some of the same statements you saw earlier. Please indicate whether or not you think <u>most Navy public affairs officers in Washington</u> would tend generally to agree or disagree with each. (Note: On PAO questionnaire, respondents were asked how "most Navy flag officers in Washington" would answer.) |       |          |               |

- |  | AGREE | DISAGREE | NO<br>OPINION |
|--|-------|----------|---------------|
| a. News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way. | _____ | _____    | _____         |
| b. We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government.    | _____ | _____    | _____         |



NO  
JAMES HARRISON GARDNER

1. Navy news in the news-  
paper(s) I read is fair  
and unbiased.
2. There is too much inter-  
pretation of the news on  
television.
3. Newspapers are doing a good  
job of reporting the news.
4. Navy news on the television  
news program(s) I regularly  
watch is fair and unbiased.
5. Newspaper editorials are  
overly critical of govern-  
ment.
6. Navy news in the news-  
paper(s) I regularly  
read is fair and unbiased.
7. Which branch of the armed forces is most favored by the  
news media? Please rate the Army, Navy, Air Force, and  
Marine Corps in order, listing the one you think is  
most favored as number (1), the second-most favored as  
number (2), etc.
8. Have any kind of the news statements you saw earlier.  
Please indicate whether or not you think most Navy  
media officials in Washington would tend agree  
all to agree or disagree with each. (Rate: 1-5)  
Questionnaire, responses were asked how "most Navy  
media officials in Washington" would answer.)
9. How about the Navy is  
reported in a generally  
fair and unbiased way.
10. The news aggressive news  
reporting to insure  
honesty in government.

NO  
AGREE   DISAGREE   OPINION

- |   |       |       |       |
|---|-------|-------|-------|
| c. Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve. | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| d. Television is doing a good job of reporting the news.                    | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| e. Most reporters are trustworthy.  | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| f. There is too much interpretation of the news on television.              | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| g. Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news.                   | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| h. Newspaper editorials are overly critical of government.                  | _____ | _____ | _____ |

10. For about how long have you been a flag officer?

\_\_\_\_\_Years

(Note: Not on PAO questionnaire. PAOs were asked, "What is your rank?")

11. Have you ever served in a primary or collateral duty public affairs billet?

\_\_\_no    \_\_\_yes    If yes, about how long ago?\_\_\_\_\_

(Note: Not on PAO questionnaire. PAOs were asked, "About how many years have you been a public affairs officer?")

12. What was the source of your commission? \_\_\_Naval Academy

\_\_\_NavCad    \_\_\_Other (please specify):\_\_\_\_\_

13. In what area is most of your military experience?

\_\_\_naval aviation    \_\_\_surface ships    \_\_\_submarines

\_\_\_staff or special duty    \_\_\_other (please specify):

\_\_\_\_\_ (Note: Not on PAO questionnaire.)

NO  
POST PREVIOUS QUESTION

- 7. Performance of the media  
Is as bad that people  
should insist it improve.  
\_\_\_\_\_
- 8. Television is doing a good  
job of reporting the news.  
\_\_\_\_\_
- 9. Good reporters are  
increasingly.  
\_\_\_\_\_
- 10. There is too much inter-  
pretation of the news on  
television.  
\_\_\_\_\_
- 11. Newspapers are doing a  
good job of reporting  
the news.  
\_\_\_\_\_
- 12. Newspaper editorials are  
overly critical of  
government.  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. For about how long have you been a film director?

\_\_\_\_\_ years

(Note: Not on the questionnaire. Does mean mean, "What  
is your rank?")

11. Have you ever served in a primary or secondary duty  
public affairs office?

\_\_\_\_\_ no \_\_\_\_\_ yes If yes, about how long ago?

(Note: Not on the questionnaire. Does mean mean, "How  
long have you been a public affairs officer?")

12. What was the source of your commission? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ (please specify):

13. In what area is most of your military experience?

\_\_\_\_\_ naval aviation \_\_\_\_\_ surface ships \_\_\_\_\_ submarines

\_\_\_\_\_ staff or special duty \_\_\_\_\_ other (please specify):

(Note: Not on the questionnaire.)



14. Please circle the highest year of school completed:

High School    College    Graduate or professional study

1   2   3   4    1   2   3   4        1        2 or more

15. List the degrees you hold: Degree        Major field

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

16. What service colleges have you attended?

\_\_\_\_\_

PLEASE RETURN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE.  
THANK YOU.

The following space is provided for any comments you wish to make about the news media, Navy public affairs, this survey, etc. Use the back of the page for your comments if needed.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

14. Please circle the highest year of school completed:  
High School College Graduate or Professional Study

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 or more

15. List the degrees you hold: Bachelor's Master's

16. What service colleges have you performed?

17. Please indicate your classification in the following categories.  
None 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

The following space is provided for any comments you wish to make about the survey, your participation, this survey, etc. The back of the page for your comments is needed.

## APPENDIX B

## TEXT OF LETTER TO PROSPECTIVE FLAG OFFICER RESPONDENTS

Dear Admiral \_\_\_\_\_:

As part of my Navy postgraduate studies, I am trying to determine the news media preferences of Flag officers in the Washington area, and their attitudes toward the media. This research has the approval of the Chief of Information. It will be of considerable benefit to our service if successfully completed, but its value depends entirely on the cooperation given by individual Flag officers.

I solicit about five minutes of your personal time--to fill out the enclosed questionnaire, which is strictly anonymous.

Your help will be greatly appreciated. A post card, also enclosed, will let me know that you are participating.

Thank you.

Very respectfully,

Robert B. Sims  
Lieutenant Commander,  
U. S. Navy



## APPENDIX B

## TEXT OF LETTER TO PROSPECTIVE FIELD OFFICER MEMBERSHIP

Dear Sir:

As part of my new postgraduate studies, I am trying to determine the new media presence of field officers in the Washington area, and their attitudes toward the media. This research has the approval of the Chief of Information. It will be of considerable benefit to our service if successfully completed, but its value depends entirely on the cooperation given by individual field officers.

I solicit about five minutes of your personal time--to fill out the enclosed questionnaire, which is strictly anonymous.

Your help will be greatly appreciated. A post card, also enclosed, will let me know that you are participating.

Thank you.

Very respectfully,

Robert E. Blum  
Lieutenant Commander,  
U. S. Navy







Thesis

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Admirals, information  
officers, and the news  
media.

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