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CHINA'S FOURTH MODERNIZATION:
PROCEDURE AND EFFECTS ON U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

William J. Suggs

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THESIS

China's Fourth Modernization:
Procedure and Effects on U. S. Foreign Policy

by

William J. Suggs, III

June 1980

Thesis Advisor:

Dr. Claude A. Buss

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China's Fourth Modernization:
Procedure and Effects on U. S. Foreign Policy

by

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Major, United States Army
B.S., Georgia Southern College, 1967

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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June 1980

ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the modernization of China's National Defense sector. After the deaths of two of China's revolutionary leaders, China launched a program to improve the deficiencies of its armed forces. This thesis looks at this new emphasis, focusing on three different aspects. The first aspect deals with an examination of the international and domestic determinants surrounding the Chinese conclusion that it had to modernize its armed forces. This part stresses the inappropriateness of China's military doctrine in defending an adversary on a modern battlefield. The second aspect deals with the role of arms transfers, stressing the effect this procedure has had on the equipment, doctrine, personnel, and training of the military organization in China. The final aspect covered deals with the effect that modernization of China's armed forces will have on U.S. relations with China in the years ahead.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The subject of military modernization in China has been a controversial one every since the creation of the People's Republic of China by the Communists in 1949. This controversy became especially prevalent as a result of the impact of the Korean War. This experience by the Chinese revealed the need for a complete metamorphosis of its army if it was going to "spar" with a modern military force such as the United States.

Evolving from this experience were two contrasting schools of thought regarding the method for developing a new and contemporary fighting force. Both schools represented an adherence to defensive orientation, and disagreed only in the manner in which China was to cope with her weaknesses.

The first school of thought, often referred to as "the exclusively military point of view" (predominant in the General Staff) called for a "quick fix" solution. This view was aptly expressed in the 1950's by Ye Jianying when he called for all measures to be directed at continuing to strengthen the People's Liberation Army (PLA): "This is to say, there must be processed a sufficient quantity of the most modern equipment to arm the Chinese

People's Liberation Army. For the enemy before us is a well-equipped imperialist army."¹

As to the means of acquiring these new weapons, Ye said:

"The equipment of our army today is much improved compared with the past. But we must realize that the present stage of industrial development in our country is still inadequate for the production of large quantities of the most modern equipment for our army. This situation, naturally, is not in keeping with the needs of modern national defense. To improve this backward situation, we cannot but accelerate the development of our industry; within certain limits, it is necessary for us to resort to the expedient measure of placing orders with foreign countries."²

As stated here, Ye's opinion expressed concern for the emphasis placed on national defense requirements, and the continuing development of China's armed forces in terms of equipment and training.

The second school of thought, held primarily by the Party, the leaders of the Ministry of National Defense, and particularly by Peng Dehuai, stressed a position that subordinated immediate military requirements to long-term goals, and combined military, political, and economic factors. Peng's concern was to downgrade the urgency of interim defense measures in favor of a slower, but fuller, development of China's industrial production capabilities, and reliance upon the deterrent capabilities of the Soviet Union. Peng emphasized his thoughts in a speech favoring the new Military Service Law:

". . . with large, well-trained reserves and a sufficient number of reserve officers, with the material support guaranteed by our growing socialist state-owned industry, we can defy aggression by an enemy. If imperialism dares to launch an aggressive war against our country, we will be able on this solid basis, to assemble swiftly an army of sufficient numerical strength to deal resolute counterblows and defend the security of our country. It is precisely in this way that we can, in peacetime, appropriately reduce the number of military personnel in active service and save the manpower and financial resources to be concentrated on a socialist industrialization which will lay down a strong technical and economic foundation for modernizing our national defense."³

The new regime in China today, led by both Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping, has launched a new program of modernization notably referred to as the "Four Modernizations."

This program was initially revealed in a speech presented by Zhou Enlai in 1975 at the Fourth National People's Congress. Zhou stated the following in that address:

". . . we might envisage the development of our national economy in two stages beginning from the Third Five-Year Plan: the first stage is to build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system in fifteen years, that is, before 1980; the second stage is to accomplish comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be marching in the front ranks of the world."⁴

In 1976, this new quest for modernization took on a new image following the deaths of two of China's revolutionary leaders: in January, Zhou Enlai died; Mao Zedong's death followed in September. An intensive commitment on the part of the new leadership to improve

the deficiencies in the national defense sector of China followed their passing.

It is the premise of this thesis that China is aware of the need for modernizing its armed forces; that it cannot accomplish this by itself; that it will require arms transfers; and, that it has proceeded to obtain and buy these arms and technology wherever she could find them. Finally, it is recognized that China's modernization of its armed forces has had, is having, and will have a profound effect on the future course of United States policy toward China.

This thesis addresses the new emphasis placed on the military modernization within China by focusing on three different aspects. First there will be an examination of the international and domestic determinants surrounding the Chinese conclusion that it must modernize its armed forces.

In Chapter III, the role of arms transfers in China will be examined: there will be a discussion of subsequent effects that arms transfers have had on the equipment, doctrine, personnel, and training of the military organization in China, and an analysis of the risks and opportunities facing the armed forces in China will be covered in Chapter IV.

Finally, an assessment of the likelihood that China will achieve its modernizational goals will be provided;

and an examination of the potential of the Chinese armed forces and the effect that potential will have on U.S. relations with China in the years ahead also will be discussed.

FOOTNOTES

¹Hsieh, A. L., Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era, p. 35, Prentice-Hall, Inc., The Rand Corporation, 1962.

²Ibid., p. 39.

³Ibid., p. 38.

⁴Foreign Broadcast Information Service - CHI, p. D-23, 75-13, 20 January 1975.

Godwin, Paul H. B., Doctrine, Strategy and Ethic: The Modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, p. 87, paper prepared at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1977.

II. BACKGROUND OF MODERNIZATION

The political leaders of China are attempting now to rescue the People's Liberation Army (which also includes the Navy and the Air Force) from the depths of disrepair after a neglect of more than ten years. This, no doubt, is a gargantuan task, and to accomplish it successfully will require that the PLA and its leaders overcome some severe obstacles and problems which are currently present within the organization.

An area of concern which must be addressed is whether the military doctrine and philosophy of China is appropriate for the condition of the modern battlefield. Doctrines which were adequate in different stages of the PLA's development are no longer perceived as adequate for China as a world power. Coupling with this precept is the resulting change in China's military philosophy. Because of their importance, these two facets will be the subject of study in this chapter.

The chapter has been divided into three parts: A) to establish an operational definition for the term doctrine, B) to show the evolution of the Chinese military doctrine, originally defined as "People's War," stressing the conflicts which occurred as it changed from a guerilla concept to the definition as perceived by current leadership, and

C), to show the progressive changes in military philosophy stressing, 1) the role of the military in China's domestic structure, 2) the changing views on national defense, 3) the necessity of a good military image, 4) the perception of China's contemporary threat, and 5), the establishment of PLA goals which include the modernization of PLA weapons, improvement of military training and education, improvement of the quality of the soldier, and improvement of the organizational structure.

The Chinese Army, currently listed as the largest in the world, must maintain a first-rate military doctrine to serve as the guideline for establishing sound military policy.

A. DOCTRINE: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

1. Definition of Doctrine

One of the problems which historically has been a stumbling block in the modernization of China's armed forces is the appropriateness and effectiveness of its military doctrine. The official military doctrine of China today incorporates both the politico-military and military concepts of Mao Zedong.

As defined in a study conducted by Dr. Frank Romance on the subject of China's military modernization program, two operative definitions were provided. The first definition was that found in the Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms (a publication of the U.S. Department of Defense):

Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application.¹

The second definition referred to was the official Soviet definition of military doctrine. Dr. Romance indicated that because of the early historical association which existed between the Soviets and the Chinese during the formative period (1927-1960) this definition perhaps would be a more applicable description of the Chinese definition of the term. The Soviet definition states:

A nation's officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of armed forces in them, and also on the requirements arising from these views regarding the country and its armed forces being ready for war. Military doctrine has two aspects: political and military-technical. The basic tenets of a military doctrine are determined by a nation's political and military leadership according to the socio-political order, the country's level of economic, scientific, and technological development, and the armed forces combat material, with due regard to the conclusion of military science and the views of the probable enemy.²

These definitions of doctrine provide a base for inspection of China's military doctrinal concepts. The two major concepts maintained by the People's Republic of China (PRC) today are: 1) People's War, and 2) Wars of National Liberation.³

2. People's War

The doctrine of People's War is China's answer for maintaining and defending its homeland. It is their best

attempt at providing conventional and revolutionary defense against a spectrum of attacks.

The principal type of attack on China which was envisioned by Peking was a sudden attack by long-range nuclear strikes combined with a massive invasion employing both nuclear and conventional weapons. Other threats perceived by Peking included an invasion using conventional weapons far more advanced than those maintained by the Chinese forces. The threat China perceives requires that it maintain a high degree of preparedness. The Chinese insist upon strong political and ideological preparation as well as military preparation. Two factors have evolved as unchanging: the dominance of men and politics.

Early in the development of Mao's military thinking, "politics represented a great faith in the capabilities of the mobilized and indoctrinated masses."⁴ This political orientation also represented a belief in the superiority of the Communist political and economic system as well as the Maoist principle that "the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party."⁵ It was during the Cultural Revolution that deification of Mao became so prominent that the "thoughts and principles of Mao" became the "best weapon" -- more so than artillery, tanks, planes, or even atomic bombs.

This doctrine represents China's "superiority in men and politics" which was referred to as a "moral atomic

bomb." During the 1960's, this meant that strength through politics was more powerful than nuclear weapons.

This concept maintained that China could not be defeated by long-range nuclear strikes, even if used in conjunction with chemical or biological agents. This doctrine holds that to defeat China, an invasion of the area by ground forces would be required following an attack. It then follows that such an invasion would be defeated by a protracted war whereby the whole population would mobilize as soldiers, making every factory, school, and collective farm a combat unit. This tenet of the doctrine is often referred to as "defense in depth."⁶

The doctrine also calls for trading space for time. It requires that the Chinese forces lure, or entice, the enemy to venture deep into the countryside where they become "bogged down in endless battles" and "drowned in a hostile human sea." Coupled with this is the belief that the infantry is still the Queen of Battle, and modern nuclear weapons cannot be substituted for bravery on the battlefield. Emphasis is placed on close combat and night-fighting to neutralize the superiority of men and politics, and to preserve the morale of the PLA in light of the fact that they are facing a superior enemy.⁷

In recent years, this strictly guerilla concept incorporated in the doctrine has been somewhat modified. While

retaining the People's War concept as the basis for its strategic doctrine, the concept of conventional, positional-type defense (as recognized by the Western nations) has been included in their doctrine as a means to protect their growing industrial and political areas.

3. Wars of National Liberation

In the 1960's, Peking began to claim that Mao's military writings held the basic tenets of revolutionary warfare, and consequently were capable of providing the foundation for a model of revolution. This model was felt to be capable of supplying information necessary for promoting successful revolution outside of China in such places as Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁸

As stated in the DIA Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces, unlike the defensive concept of People's War, this was an offensive doctrine aimed at gaining and maintaining the political power of the target country.⁹ However, as Ralph Powell indicated, military operations are only one vital element in the overall Chinese revolutionary doctrine. To be successful, such a revolutionary doctrine must encompass and coordinate political, economic, and psychological policies, as well as military strategy, tactics, and techniques.¹⁰

In support of Wars of National Liberation, the Chinese neither promise nor provide military aid. While eager to urge foreign revolutionaries to revolt against superior

forces, the Chinese have been less likely themselves to intervene in major conflicts that would endanger the security of their own regime. In essence, the emphasis is directed toward self-reliance as the principal means of securing victory.¹¹

Today, China's military doctrine is based essentially upon its doctrine of People's War. This doctrine derived from nearly fifty years of military experience, and incorporates concepts conceived by such military strategists as Sun Tsu, Napoleon, and German and Russian advisors.

The doctrine also provides China with a defense against a conventional attack or a nuclear attack. It was assumed that the Chinese forces would be fighting a military organization which was superior in weapons systems, logistical support, and manpower. The basic issue, therefore, was how to survive in such an environment. To accomplish this, Mao visualized a total war, consisting of the People's Liberation Army and paramilitary forces, supported by a mobilized populace conducting a protracted war against the invading forces.

When summarized, Mao's doctrine of People's War states: "When the enemy attacks, we retreat; when the enemy stops, we harrass; when the enemy retreats, we attack."¹²

Conflicts plagued this strategy early in its development--even before the communists secured the government in 1949. As was pointed out by Dr. Harlan Jencks, an

emerging China specialist, Mao's guerillism was "in eclipse" from December, 1931 until December, 1941.

However, the way was cleared for reemergence of Mao's strategy following two catastrophic military adventures.¹³ One noted in Jenck's study was the "Hundred Regiments Offensive" which incorporated conventional tactics and met with little success.¹⁴ The second failure occurred when the New Fourth Army met with disaster in January, 1941. Following these two failures, the military strategy of Mao began to gain more credence and found its proper place within China's armed forces. By spring, 1945, Mao's military philosophy had gained recognition, both militarily and politically, as evidenced by the expansion of the regular Red Army to 1,500,000.¹⁵

The Yenan period, 1945-1949, found philosophy being somewhat demoted as the military professionals in the PLA began to assert their military expertise. The tactics conducted followed the context of a strategy associated with mobile warfare, and used conventional equipment such as tanks, aircraft, artillery, etc., with reliance on more technical expertise. Thus, the Civil War period found Mao's People's War strategy lacking the support it had during the early guerilla war period against the warlords and the KMT.¹⁶ This early competition between the "Maoist" (or perpetrators of People's War) and the military professionals would become even more controversial as China

began to consolidate and develop along the road to socialism under the new communist regime led by Mao Zedong.

B. DOCTRINAL CONFLICTS

1. Period of Early Modernization, 1949-1956

The Communists came to power in October, 1949.

They no longer had to fight a guerilla war either to stay alive or to avoid destruction of their organization by government forces. Their new responsibility was to provide for the defense of the country, and to maintain law and order. The experience gained during the Korean War provided China with the realization that it must modernize its armed forces.

Beginning with the establishment of the PRC in October, 1949, China's leaders have been confronted with problems of adhering to this doctrine, or supplanting it to develop a military policy commensurate with the problems that were facing its armed forces at the time. It is not the purpose of this study to cover all of the conflicts which have evolved over more than a quarter of a century in regard to the appropriateness of this doctrine. However, some of the criticisms which have particular relevance to today's modernization process will be covered.

The situation in China following the Civil War was one of economic despair. Although recognizing the need for a strong military force to provide defense, China was in no position, economically or industrially, to pursue it alone.

Thus, after being rebuffed for support from the West, China immediately turned to the Soviet Union. This partnership was consummated with the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February, 1950.¹⁷

The entry into the Korean War by the Chinese in 1950 found certain concepts of the People's War Doctrine losing ground to that of a more contemporary, modern, and defensive doctrine which included the concept of a specialized, professional army. In an article by Harry Harding, these changes were credited with occurring as a result of a desire by the Chinese to emulate the Soviet Union because of experience gained during the Korean War.¹⁸ This war made a dramatic impression on the military, and it demonstrated the limitations of their previously successful guerilla war strategy and tactics.

Recognizing these weaknesses, the Chinese set out to correct them. As a result, a tremendous drive toward modernization was instituted with the able assistance of the Soviet Union. Progress had been made to the point that the Chinese were advancing from the sole development of conventional, basic, land armaments (such as small arms and artillery) to the more sophisticated assembly of jet fighters (complete construction of light piston aircraft) and construction of tanks, and of submarine and small patrol craft. In 1956 the first Chinese manufactured jet fighters were turned out.

By 1954, the Chinese began to see the implications associated with modern military equipment, especially nuclear weapons. Chinese leaders were forced to recognize the impact of weapons that they did not possess at that time. This situation certainly put stress on the already developing conflicts in regard to correct, or appropriate, military doctrine.¹⁹

. By 1955, the resistance to the pace of modernization started to lessen, and Chinese military men began to stress the importance of nuclear weapons and new military technology. As was pointed out earlier, one of these men, Ye Jianying, called for a "sufficient quantity of the most modern material to arm the Chinese People's Liberation Army."²⁰ Others in this same group, Su Yu and Liu Po-ch'eng, were arguing for a quick-fix of China's strategic posture with expansion of weapons production, increases in R & D expenditures, large-scale purchases of conventional weapons, and the transfer of nuclear technology from the Soviet Union. This group, however, was matched against another faction consisting of a military-civilian coalition. Members of this group included such notables as Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqui, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and Deng Xiaoping. They stressed economic development, even though such action would reduce allocations for the military budget.

2. Period of Soviet Decline, 1956-1960

This conflict was resolved in 1956 with the

publication of Mao's report on "The Ten Great Relationships" in April. (Later, this same speech would be republished and would serve as the catalyst for China's current Four Modernizations Program.) In the original version, Mao called for a reduction in military spending, allowing those resources to be allocated to economic development.²¹

At this time, the divergent view between the two competing military factions was (in part) a conflict over doctrine and over policy: Should Communist China acquire her own nuclear weapons, or should she depend upon the assistance of the Soviet Union?

By 1958, this question led to significant policy disputes, which led to further decisions concerning the development of military doctrine. On 6 September 1958, the Central Committee of the party adopted a resolution which followed closely the tenets of Mao's strategy of People's War, doctrine, and strategy.²² In conjunction with these tendencies, by the end of the Great Leap Forward, many of the professional military officers began to complain about the increased priority given to political training and community production. Military doctrine became a problem in that the professional military officers were arguing that material and technological factors were more important than the human element. Although these controversies existed, there was no disagreement as to whether the army should be modernized, only that it should

follow a path encompassing traditional Maoist doctrine, the main tenets being that "man is the main factor in war," and that "politics must take command."²³

A prominent leader calling for modernization was Peng Dehuai, the Defense Minister of the PLA. Peng saw the emphasis on reassertion of People's War as a denigration of the professional role of the armed forces. A problem which had serious impact on China's modernization effort was the attack by Defense Minister Peng against Mao's political and economic strategy. This outspoken old veteran of the Long March and the Korean experience had irritated Mao with his brand of professionalism and modernization of the PLA, as well as his vicarious attitude toward the Soviet Union. As a result of his direct attacks against Mao, Peng was purged as the Defense Minister and replaced by Lin Biao, a staunch supporter of Mao at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee held at Lushan August 2-16, 1959. This action soon was followed by withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China leaving her virtually isolated internationally. This dealt a damaging blow to modernization of China's armed forces.²⁴

3. Period of Self-Reliance, 1960-1967

The sudden cessation of Soviet military and economic assistance found the PLA unable to pursue their modernization program in the manner that was desired. They were forced to abandon their sprouting new jet fighter

production program, submarine program, and medium bomber program. Also, training was cut back because of attrition of material and shortage of fuel.²⁵

These constraints, however, did not dampen the enthusiasm of Peng's replacement, Lin Biao. By 1960, Lin had initiated a modernization effort which gave attention to domestic roles, but also incorporated the development of nuclear weapons, and several new machine industries which stressed development of sophisticated weapons. This military policy of incorporating both the military aims and the political aims of the party was an effort to become self-reliant, and it became known as "Walking on Two Legs."²⁶ (See Appendix, Chart 1.)

In 1964, Mao began to rely increasingly on the PLA as a model for the rest of society as evidenced by the "Learn From the PLA" campaign. This campaign leaned toward the domestic roles of the PLA.

By 1965, the military professional faction began to reassert itself. In light of the U.S. activity in Vietnam, a call for readjusting the priorities and for reallocating funds came to the forefront again. China's Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ch'ing again had called for a crash program of defense preparations. However, his proposal was opposed, and eventually Lo was purged because of the effect such a program would have on Mao's programs for the future.²⁷

4. Period of Cultural Development, 1967-1969

In 1967 the PLA became increasingly involved with domestic duties associated with the Cultural Revolution. These requirements necessitated the assignment of almost one million men of the PLA to administer the programs.²⁸

The PLA influence in politics increased appreciably in 1969. The Ninth Central Committee found 45% of its composition being representatives of the military, the highest ever recorded. In 1971, Lin attempted a coup, and supposedly died in a plane crash.²⁹ This increase in domestic functions by the PLA during the Cultural Revolution caused Mao concern. By 1968, the concern was visible as steps were taken to bring both the domestic and the strategic functions of the PLA into better balance. However, the road leading to improvement and modernization of the PLA was not yet to be paved with "Golden Bricks" and traversed by soldiers in "Silver Tracked Tanks."

The road to modernization of the PLA still contained some pot-holes, some serious obstacles, as represented by the "Gang of Four" whose ideological views surfaced causing consternation and delay in promoting the value of obtaining a modern military establishment with professional standards. This radical group, deeply involved in the Chinese media, utilized their position to criticize the growing trend toward modernization which was in its embryonic stages by 1975.³⁰

5. Period of Contemporary Modernization, 1969-Present.

Not until 1976, with the accession of Chairman Hua Guofeng, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, and Defense Minister Ye Jianying, did the multifaceted issue of military modernization return to the forefront of political issues in China. This new situation was a direct outgrowth of changed political circumstances in the post-Mao period. The death of Mao, followed by the fall of the radical element (the Gang of Four), erased the barriers which had checked military modernization for more than a decade. The new political leadership, together with important military leaders, called for a rapid improvement of China's weapons and military equipment on the grounds that the PLA had fallen behind in the procurement of modern military technology.³¹

This new upsurge in support of professionalizing and modernizing the Chinese armed forces does not necessarily represent a clear consensus as to the appropriate doctrine to follow in achieving that goal. Today, there are officers who are still skeptical about the relevance and appropriateness of Mao's doctrine of People's War to meet China's defense requirements. To counter, there are those who advocate gradual modernization. This group intends to retain the doctrine of People's War because of the morale-building qualities it has in light of the economic and technological problems prevalent in China today.

C. MILITARY PHILOSOPHICAL CHANGES

1. Role of Military in China's Domestic Structure

The debate over the desired path to follow has been published in the Chinese press, and discussed in speeches presented at conferences held throughout China. On 1 January 1977, the Peking Review republished a speech which signaled a step-up in seeking to improve the military capabilities of the PLA. This speech, entitled "On the Ten Major Relationships," was made originally by Mao in a meeting of the Politburo in April, 1956. It dealt with the steps in social revolution and socialist construction. The third relationship concerned the connection between economic construction and defense construction. Mao's precept was that defense construction should follow industrial modernization, and the administrative and defense budget should be cut from thirty (30) to twenty (20) percent.³²

The exact reason the leadership chose to republish this speech remains to be seen. It is likely that Hua sought to use the words of Mao to establish his legitimacy and to emphasize his concern for strengthening the weapons and equipment of the PLA. Another possibility could have been that Beijing recognized the immensity of the problem and was taking steps to dampen any unrealistic hopes. Also, it could have been an attempt by the new leadership to opt for something less than a forced-draft modernization.³³

Whatever the intended purpose of the article, it did serve to spur on the drive to improve the military capabilities of the PLA. In February 1977, Hua Guofeng held several conferences in Peking with many of China's military leaders to discuss the direction of this new program. In a New York Times article, Drew Middleton pointed out that Hua Guofeng adopted a program whereby China would reorganize its army into a smaller, more flexible force with more modern weapons, and with a more centralized command and control system. The decision by the leadership to follow this line implies a willingness to abandon the idea that Soviet invaders would be "drowned" in China's "human sea" of troops and accept a more modern defensive strategy which calls for the utilization of more sophisticated modern weapons by a smaller, better-trained ground, air, and naval force in the defense of China. Both Hua and Yeh, according to an editorial in the Liberation Army News and the People's Daily, newspapers of the Communist Party, called for the army to end the practice of putting politics ahead of military expertise. Instead, they urged military men to learn from the "hardbone Sixth Company, a mobile military unit which adheres to rigid requirements in training and is always in combat readiness."³⁴

In a speech commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the founding of the PLA on 1 August 1977, Yeh Chien-ying, Minister of Defense, addressed the ideas surrounding the new philosophy:

"Our army's modernization calls for powerful ground, air and naval forces and modern arms and equipment, including guided missiles and nuclear weapons; it calls for rigorous training and hard work to develop a real ability to wipe out the enemy as required in combat, and mastery of the techniques involved in handling modern arms and equipment and of the consequent new tactics. Workers, peasants and intellectuals throughout China and all PLA commanders and fighters must seize every moment, race against time and strengthen the building of the army, the militia and people's defense, and step up scientific research in national defense and production by defense industries."³⁵

By early 1978, the new leadership had adopted a national policy. In his report to the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) in February, Hua Guofeng stated that large-scale military modernization will follow, not precede economic development. "We must," he said, "take steel as the key link, strengthen the basic industries, and exert a special effort to step up the development of the power, fuel, and raw and semi-finished materials, industries and transport, and communications. Only then can we give strong support to agriculture, rapidly expand light industry, and substantially strengthen the national defense industries."³⁶

It should become clear from the above statement that the modernization of China's military is directly linked with the modernization of China's economy--especially the development of China's technical and scientific capabilities, the achievement of greater productivity and quality control, the expansion of such key industries as metals (high grade metals and alloys), machine building (modern military

equipment and armament), chemicals, fuels, and transportation. Consequently, the economic objectives of the military and the new leadership are identical. Whatever the exact nature of the military modernization may become, the new leadership is bound to include the increased procurement of the conventional and advanced weapons systems that can be produced by China as a result of their new program and policies for the modernization of China's economy. This was reiterated in a speech by Hua to the Fifth NPC which stated: "The national defense industries should put their production to good account, diligently carry out research and trial production, and then production of more and better modern conventional and strategic weapons."³⁷

2. Changing Views on National Defense

a. Deng Xiaoping, Vice Premier

In February 1980, Deng Xiaoping outlined the objectives for the nation for the coming decade by identifying three main tasks: first, the nation had to oppose hegemonism, China's codeword for Soviet expansionism; second, to realize the unification of Taiwan with the mainland; and third, to strengthen economic development. Deng said that of those three, economic development was the most important since an economically weak China would not be able to resist Soviet expansionism effectively. China's leadership intends to be prepared to thwart any action which might develop from the Soviet threat.³⁸

b. Xu Xiangqian, Minister of National Defense

In an article entitled "Strive to Achieve Modernization in National Defense--in Celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China," Xu Xiangqian, a veteran commander and politburo member and the new Minister of Defense, pointed out the goals in modernizing China's national defense:

". . . we must gear the modernization of our national defense to our needs of resisting foreign aggression and defending our country. We must develop our weaponry with stress on the main points and in a planned way. Take conventional weapons and special weapons for example. We must lay stress on the development of conventional weapons while continuously developing nuclear weapons and other sophisticated weapons. We are developing nuclear weapons to break down the nuclear monopoly. We use them in defense. We do not base our victory in war on nuclear weapons. With regard to the development of existing weapons and new-type weapons, we must first put our footing on the present foundation, bear in mind our need to constantly be prepared for war, strengthen and improve the existing weaponry and increase its battle efficiency. Meanwhile, we must strive to develop scientific research in national defense so this research can anticipate the defense industry. We must actively design and manufacture new-type weapons. We must strive to equip our army with new weaponry in a considerably short period, improve our weaponry step-by-step and make it attain the advanced world level."³⁹

3. Necessity of Good Military Image

A set of guidelines produced for the PLA by the Politburo Department of the Chinese PLA stressed the importance of maintaining a good image with the people:

". . . efforts must be made to conscientiously study and analyze the new situation and the new

problems which have cropped up under the new historical condition with regard to relations between the army and the government, and between the army and the people, to carry out education on the purpose of the army and the tradition of supporting the government and cherishing the people in light of the new situation and the new problem, and to improve the fundamental attitude of cadres and fighters toward local government and the people. PLA units must formulate pacts on supporting the government and cherishing the people, regularly carry out activities and set good examples in observing the policies, laws, and decrees of the party and the government."⁴⁰

Besides the dispute over the appropriateness of China's military doctrine, China's leaders are concerned about the effectiveness and capability of China's forces to meet the ever-increasing threat to its territorial security.

4. Perception of China's Contemporary Threat

The goals and objectives for China's national defense are based on the perceived threat the Soviet Union poses for the security of China. Since the Czechoslovakian invasion in 1968, the Jin Pao River incident in 1969, and the Afghanistan intervention in 1979, the Soviet Union has been deemed China's "Enemy Number One."

Over a period of ten years, the Soviet Union has increased its forces opposite China's borders. Today it is estimated that the strength of the Soviet Union is some forty-six (46) divisions, approximately forty-three percent (43%) of its forces compared to only nineteen (19) divisions in the early 1970's, and eleven (11) divisions in 1968.⁴¹ This includes substantial numbers of tanks and motorized

rifle components. The Soviets enjoy a 3:1 superiority in tanks, and 10:1 superiority in armored personnel carriers.

In 1978, the Soviet Pacific fleet had some seventy (70) submarines, and sixty-five (65) major surface-combat vessels. There were substantial air capabilities including the MIG-25 Foxbat and MIG-23 Flogger, both high-performance, mach-speed aircraft. They are far superior to anything the Chinese could muster.

In the nuclear area, Soviet forces have several delivery vehicles along the border, including MIG-27's and SU-24's, as well as SS-1 and SS-12 mobile tactical missiles. Nearly two hundred M/IRBM's have been deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway, including some of the new SS-20 IRBM's with their MIRV'd warheads. The Soviets also had over two hundred and sixty SLEM's and four hundred ICBM's in the Far Eastern Sector. This certainly represents a formidable force; and, at the present time, one with which the Chinese would have extreme difficulty contending in the event of a confrontation between the two powers.⁴²

Having looked at the principal threat which faces China, it is now necessary to examine some of the internal determinants of the modernization program which have generated concern by Chinese leaders and represent their current demand for modernization of China's armed forces.

5. Establishment of PLA Goals

a. Modernization of PLA Weapons

Considering the Chinese experiences in military engagements over the past 30 years, and the obvious capabilities of their potential adversaries, China's present military leaders certainly must appreciate the role modern weapons will play in determining the outcome of armed conflict in today's modern battlefield. This appreciation is shown by the inclusion of the defense sector as one of the four modernizations. Exactly how this will be accomplished is still problematic.

As stated by Hua in his speech to the Fifth NPC, "the national defense industries should put their production to good account, diligently carry out research and trial production, and the production of more and better conventional and strategic weapons." This call for the modernization of the defense sector by both the military leaders and political leadership seems to suggest that there is a consensus among the policymakers on the need to modernize, and that it will require the import of military weapons and equipment.⁴³

Closely linked to the theme of weapons modernization has been the resurgence of professionalism. Hsiao Hua, the Deputy Director-General of the General Political Department of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, said in 1952 that the modernization of the army calls for the mastery of "military science, skillful use of modern weapons and equipment, strict observance of military

discipline, and the art of conducting coordinated action of all branches of the army." He also called for the training of professional officers in that it is "necessary to prepare in a planned manner and train cadres who can master military science."⁴⁴ Today, this same need has been stressed by the military by calling for the attainment of specialized and complex skills which are necessary to operate and maintain complex weapons.⁴⁵

b. Improvement of Military Training and Education

This new emphasis on military training shows that the death of Mao and the ouster of The Gang of Four removed a number of constraints which seriously had hampered the professional advancement of the PLA. The military officers who experienced the Korean War are strongly in favor of concentrating their efforts on building a strong national defense sector and avoiding non-military affairs.

It is their contention today that The Gang of Four slandered efforts to develop the most advanced national defense technology saying that "when the satellites go up into the sky, the red flag would inevitably trail in the dust." The radicals also contended that "according to its reactionary logic, we should not have atomic bombs, make new weapons, or equip our PLA units and militia forces with new weapons. The only thing that can be done is to do what our ancestors did: use sharp arrows to cope with an enemy armed to the teeth."⁴⁶

Additionally, they declared that any effort to improve training should be disavowed since it was "advocacy of the purely military viewpoint and a resurgence of the bourgeois military line."⁴⁷ There also were reports that indicated that they made a farce of military training.

In an article carried by Chiehfang Ching Pao:

"Consider Chaing Ch'ing, for example. Bayonet training should aim at hard, accurate, and fierce blows to the enemy. She said: 'No good. The movements are ungraceful.' She forced all PLA units to learn the movements of theatrical sword dancers. It would be a total disaster . . . if all PLA units followed her instructions."⁴⁸

The new regime led by Hua and Deng has stressed the importance of military training. The results of this new emphasis on professionalism are seen in their reports on the progress of training in the PLA units.

In Shanghai, reports indicate that their PLA air force units have grasped the control task of education and training, thereby improving overall combat capability. This is evidenced by air force regiments fulfilling their three-year training program one year ahead of schedule. Anti-aircraft units reportedly have established new records in live ammunition firing. Also, some 700 units, and some 8,600 individuals were commended for meritorious performances while fulfilling various combat training tasks.⁴⁹

In Shanghai naval units, similar feats were recognized in combat readiness training and defense construction. All naval vessels more than fulfilled their

training mission with over seventy percent (70%) of the units obtaining ratings of outstanding during live ammunition fire evaluation.⁵⁰

One more example of the accomplishments being obtained through this renewed emphasis on training is reflected in an article on a Jinan, Shandong artillery company. The number one artillery company last year took only four months to complete the amount of defense construction work which was originally scheduled for seven and one-half months. Also, it was credited with establishing good records in military training, and in raising the cultural level of commanders and fighters.⁵¹

In another article reflecting the leadership's central task of education and training, the Beijing PLA units were stressing military training. The article indicated that units engaged in group training, military exercises with live ammunition, had greatly increased compared with previous years, and that more training hours have been added than had been planned previously.⁵²

c. Improvement of the Quality of the Soldier

In conjunction with the new emphasis on military training, there has been a revival of specialized training of officers in military academies.⁵³ This new stress is to enable the officers to acquire the knowledge necessary to manage a modern revolutionary army.

A similar theme was carried in an article in Chien-fang Ching Pao. According to the article, a modern army requires officers with professional training: "officers cannot be trained with the same methods as those for soldiers."⁵⁴

The supreme policy-making body for the Chinese armed forces, The Military Affairs Commission, reestablished officer training colleges in all eleven of China's military regions in an effort to increase the number of professional officers. Additionally, the two institutions responsible for producing staff officers were reopened: The National Staff College for junior ranks, and the National War College for colonels and above. They had been closed by Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution.⁵⁵

In China's "White Papers," the leadership stressed:

"that in order to meet the needs of actual war, it is essential to set strict standards for training and place strict demands on the army, carry out mass military training programs in an extensive, down to earth way . . . it is necessary to run military academies and schools of all categories well, and to train command and technical personnel who are both Red and Expert and capable of carrying out modern warfare."⁵⁶

d. Improvement of Organizational Structure

In addition to better trained soldiers and officers, the new leadership also is calling for a more streamlined, more flexible force armed with more modern weapons. It is the feeling among both British and

American diplomats in Peking that this new military modernization program eventually will lead to a reduction in the large military bureaucracy and troop levels.⁵⁷

The implications of the new military doctrine and the need for new weapons have been restrained by the ossified generals of the Long March in the policymaking positions. Up until just recently, China was employing the oldest generals in the world. The same generals, were they in the U.S. armed forces, or in the Soviet armed forces for that matter, would have been retired twenty years ago. The retention of these officers has, for the most part, prevented innovation, and has encouraged stagnation. Reliance on a commanding gerontocracy created frustrations among the younger up-and-coming professionals.

To eliminate these liabilities, and to secure capable leadership willing to follow his tenets, Deng allowed some of his opponents to retire quietly, and secured draft regulations to ensure the retirement of other aging cadres.⁵⁸ This group was the most serious threat to the new post-Mao leadership. This action, coupled with Deng's continued emphasis on de-Maoification, should enable the military to appoint and promote officers with increased professional competence, thus allowing for more capable and efficient use of the new military doctrine and weapons which are to be implemented into Chinese armed forces.

FOOTNOTES

¹Romance, F. J., Modernization of China's Armed Forces, p. 1, paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, California, March 30 to April 1, 1979.

²Ibid., p. 2. A good analysis of some of the intangible impediments to the successful modernization of the Chinese armed forces, particularly a modern weapons inventory. Another source of definition applicable to the Chinese doctrine is contained in a study by Godwin, P. H. B., Doctrine Strategy, and Ethic: The Modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, presented to Documentary Research Branch, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June, 1977.

³Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces (DDI-2680-32-76), pp. 1-7, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., July, 1976. This handbook is an excellent, comprehensive, and concise source of information on the armed forces of the People's Republic of China. Although somewhat dated, it still provides useful information on the military doctrine, tactics, uniforms, and the techniques of the armed forces of China as well as providing outline format for studying the Chinese armed forces.

⁴Powell, R. L., Maoist Military Doctrines, p. 11, American-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc., New York, NY.

⁵Ibid., p. 4.

⁶Ibid., p. 4-5.

⁷Ibid., p. 6-7.

⁸Ibid., p. 8-9.

⁹Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces, pp. 1-10.

¹⁰Powell, Maoist Military Doctrines, p. 10.

¹¹Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces, pp. 1-10.

¹²U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sino-American Relations: A New Turn, Trip Report, Committee Print, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 40.

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¹⁴Jencks, H., The Politics of Chinese Military Development: 1945-1977, p. 108, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, Ann Arbor Michigan, 1978.

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²⁰Ibid., p. 87.

²¹Shambaugh, "China's Quest for Military Modernization," p. 297.

²²Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," p. 89.

²³Joffe, E., Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964, p. 56, Harvard University Press, 1965.

²⁴Uhalley, S. Jr., Mao-Tse-Tung: A Critical Biography, p. 131, Franklin-Watts, Inc., 1975.

²⁵Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," p. 91.

²⁶Whitson, W. W., ed., Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's, "The Making of Chinese Military Policy," Harding, H., Jr., p. 70, Praeger, 1973. A chronology of Chinese military policy from 1953 to present will be found in Appendix, Chart #1. This was extracted primarily from the above book by Whitson, and taken from an article by Harry Harding, Jr. This chart provided a synopsis of the major issues and policies adopted by the Chinese leadership, and was updated by the author.

²⁷Ibid., p. 378.

²⁸Ibid., p. 381.

²⁹Terrill, R., A Biography, Mao, p. 348, Harper and Row, 1980.

³⁰Shambaugh, "China's Quest for Military Modernization," p. 296-300.

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³⁴"Hua Urges Army to Stress Military Skill, Not Politics," New York Times, p. 5, 27 Feb 1977. Frazier, "Military Modernization in China," p. 37.

³⁵FBIS, PRC Daily Report, FBIS-CHI-77-147, p. E-11, 1 Aug 1977, Starbuck, T. R., Arms and Modernization in the People's Republic of China, p. 10, paper prepared for NS 4140, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, 20 Mar 1979.

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⁴⁶Gelber, H. G., Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975-1978, p. 74.

⁴⁷Joffe, E. and Segal, G., "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," p. 12.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹JPRS, 75169, 20 Feb 1980, China Report, No. 62, p. 37.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 39.

⁵²JPRS, 75006, 25 Jan 1980, China Report, No. 54, p. 40.

⁵³Gelber, Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975-1978, from notes on Chapter 2, #54, p. 208.

⁵⁴FBIS-CHI, Peking Domestic Service, 25 Jun 1977, in FBIS, 29 Jun 1977, p. E-116.

⁵⁵Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook - 1979, p. 38-39.

⁵⁶U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, A New Realism, Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China, July 3-13, 1978, Report by Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 95th Cong, 2d Sess., Dec 1978, p. 119.

⁵⁷"Peking Said to Plan for a Smaller Army and Improved Arms," New York Times, 6 Apr 1977, p. L-67.

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III. ARMS TRANSFER: A PROCEDURE FOR MODERNIZATION

It should be apparent now, after having looked at some of the speeches of the new regime that the modernization of China's armed forces is necessary. Although, at this particular time there is no indication that China intends to completely abandon the military principles laid down by Mao Zedong, there are indications that they were compelled to make decisions regarding the procedures to be adopted to accomplish successfully the goals established for the new modernization.

One of the procedures they turned to was arms transfer. The historical role that arms transfers have played in transforming the PLA to its current position in China will be analyzed first.

Next, the Chinese procedures to construct an analytical model for studying arms transfers will be examined. This examination will establish a definition of arms transfer, explore the causes and conditions of Chinese policies, and will stress the particular incentives motivating the Chinese and the factors restraining the progress of their program.

In an article by Xu Xiangquan, China's Minister of National Defense, he identified China's weapons as an important element in the modernization of national Defense.

Xu stated that:

"The fast development and extensive application of modern science and technology have caused tremendous changes in weaponry. The modernization has become an integral part of national defense modernization. To improve and develop our army's weaponry, we must take our country's current conditions into consideration and study the policies and principles we should follow in modernizing national defense. . . ."1

An examination of the historical role of arms acquisition will provide an excellent vehicle by which to judge the importance of weapons in the up-date of the current armed forces.

A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

During the Revolutionary Period (1927-1949) of the development of the Chinese Communist Army, the acquisition of arms and equipment was very difficult. In Griffith's study of China's forces at this time, he pointed out that the communist armies:

". . . existed in name only. They were poorly equipped; machine guns, mortars, and ammunition were always in short supply. Their only means of resupply or requisition was through captured weapons from the enemy--the KMT and Japanese . . . the Communists said, 'The Whites supplied our weapons, our ammunition, horses, radios, and other equipment and actually delivered them to us--on the battlefield.'"2

Ellis Joffe further confirmed this assessment in reporting that:

". . . as late as 1945, a United States military intelligence report summed up the sorry state of the communists' military equipment as follows:

The Chinese communist forces are poorly armed. Their manufacturing facilities are extremely limited, and they are forced to depend almost entirely on captured weapons and equipment. The communists have a few old and badly worn artillery pieces, but no artillery ammunition. Trucks and other mechanized equipment are destroyed when captured because the lack of fuel and the lack of trained personnel precludes their use. No protective equipment is available against chemical attack, and signal and medical supplies are insufficient. The troops, all of whom are trained primarily in guerilla tactics, depend completely on small arms and individual close-combat weapons."3

The acquisition of this equipment from the various sources was not without some serious problems. Because of the manifold origins of the equipment, the ammunition needed to operate the varied types was not the same. The operation of the equipment also proved difficult because of the training needed to operate each select piece. It was not until 1948 that the communists were sufficiently trained to operate the vast assortment of captured weapons. 4

By the time of the Communist takeover in 1949, the People's Liberation Army was equipped with a conglomeration of Japanese and United States produced weapons, mostly captured from the Nationalist forces, or given to them by the Soviets. It is claimed by the Communists that gross capture during the period from 1946 to mid-1950, was: 3,160,000 rifles, 320,000 machine guns, 55,000 artillery pieces, 622 tanks, 389 armored cars, 189 military aircraft, and 200 (small) warships. 5

With the onset of the Korean War, the PLA was still poorly equipped, armed only with rifles and small quantities of

automatic weapons. There still was a varied assortment, and there was little standardization in equipment--or organization for that matter.⁶ This situation proved costly to the PLA as they sustained heavy losses in light of the superior equipment used by the U.S., who was soon to become their principal enemy. This experience quickly led the Soviets to come to the aid of the Chinese. It is estimated that the Chinese received about two-billion dollars worth of military assistance from the Soviets from 1950 to 1951. The Chinese were compelled to purchase this equipment, thus incurring heavy debts. The lesson learned, particularly with respect to the "leash" which was attached, served as a reminder to the Chinese the liabilities of such a relationship in the future.

The aid, however, led to claims by the Chinese of increased improvement in their military equipment inventories. The Russians truly had provided the best equipment they had, and the improvement was evident. The Chinese Air Force reached a high standard, and the ground forces were rearmed and re-equipped. Most of these equipment changes were coupled with changes in doctrine and organization reflecting the Soviet influence. This improvement led Z'hu De, Commander in Chief of the PLA, to declare: "The great historic transition of the PLA from its lower state to its higher stage had begun."⁷ Samuel Griffith added in his account that, "The PLA divisions

1952 bore little resemblance to its predecessor that crossed the Yalu in October and November, 1950."⁸ This experience in Korea led the Chinese to appreciate the importance of a modern, well-equipped force.

By 1955, the changes which had taken place within the PLA led to debates between those favoring a total modernization of the PLA after the model of the Soviet Army, and those favoring the maintenance of the traditional liberation army.

The first group, referred to as the modernizers, stressed the need for nuclear weapons and other advanced military technology; the second group, the conservatives, stressed the importance of the basic political factors, massive military manpower, and reliance on eventual development of their own weapons and equipment needs.⁹ This debate continued until the last years of Mao's life, as was pointed out earlier. (See Appendix, Chart 1.)

It was not until after the deaths of both Mao and Zhou Enlai in 1976 and the accession of Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping that a sincere effort was realized to improve the capabilities of the PLA. A procedure which was sure to play an important part in this desire was arms transfers. It is important now to examine the various determinant factors which might have led to the quest for arms transfers by the Chinese.

B. ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR STUDYING ARMS TRANSFERS

Recently a study conducted by Edward A. Kolodziej outlined a method for analyzing arms transfers.¹⁰ In his study, Kolodziej looked at arms transfers as a subsystem of international relations. He stated that this subsystem is a product of the interrelations of four sets of actors. These actors are categorized according to their composition, principal objectives, and the targets of their activity. They include: the national, subnational, transnational, and international actors.¹¹

In his study the author deals with the arms transfers of China on the nation-state or national level. Actors on this level consist mainly of the ruling elites of the state, who are charged with defining the exterior relations of the state.¹²

Kolodziej further states that actor's objectives concern the goals sought by a particular actor entering into a particular agreement. These objectives are operationalized in terms of the desired behavior sought from the targeted actor. Goals are achieved or advanced according to the effectiveness of the control or manipulation conducted on the behavior of the other actor.

Factors identified by Kolodziej as leading to the cause and conditions for arms transfers were grouped into (from one to four) subcategories of substantive relations: strategic, economic, diplomatic or political, and scientific

or technological. Kolodziej further suggests that there exists between the different levels of actors a web of real and perceived interdependencies. He defines such interdependencies as "the effect of one actor's actions (or inaction) on the behavior of another, whether at the same level of behavior of another, whether at the same level of action or at another."¹³ He further suggests that such effects may (or may not) be perceived by the initiating or receiving actor, or by either of them. Although admitting that different levels of relations can be pointed out as being interdependent, they do not necessarily have to be viewed by analysts or perceived by the actors as purposely organized or directed. These relations may later become relevant in explaining the rationale behind arms transfers, as those intentionally generated by actors.¹⁴

It also is important to point out that there is not necessarily a congruence or coherence between actor perceptions of the causes and conditions of arms transfers, and the actual factors which may have led to them. Both such interdependencies should be accounted for in analysis to increase our understanding of the need for arms transfers.¹⁵

Although each of the four actors and four relationships are present in the arms transfers being conducted in China, this study will deal primarily with national actors and the strategic incentives which led China to turn to arms transfers

as a procedure to follow in the modernization of its armed forces.

C. STRATEGIC INCENTIVES

One of the main reasons behind the demand for arms in a given region is to establish a national defense force for the purpose of providing territorial security. In the case of China, this desire is manifest in a concern that its present force structure may not be adequate to protect it from the growing number of potential adversaries with significant amounts of modern weapons. A list which the Chinese might construct showing these adversaries surely would include, not only the Soviet Union, but also India, Vietnam, Taiwan, (and with less emphasis perhaps) North Korea and the United States.¹⁷ To understand China's apprehensions, it is essential to have a clear picture of the composition of its military forces.

1. Current Status of the PLA

The PLA comprises all three of China's armed services, collectively: Army, Navy, and Air Force. The PLA is estimated to have 4.3 million men and women, of whom approximately 3.6 million make up the Army; 360,000 in the Navy; and 400,000 in the Air Force. It is the largest armed force in the world.

The Chinese ground forces are divided into Main Force (MF) and Local Force (LF) divisions and formations. The difference

between these two elements exists mainly in command and control, and the level of equipment.

The Main Force units are controlled centrally from Peking, and are available for operations in any part of China. Their mobility was evident during the recent counter-offensive conducted in February 1979 against Vietnam when a number were moved to bolster China's forces in that area. Their equipment is better than that of the Local Force divisions, which are mainly infantry divisions equipped to provide territorial defense of the border, or internal defense.¹⁸

There are a total of 130 MF divisions, of which only eleven (11) are armored divisions and three (3) airborne divisions, the remainder being infantry. In addition, there are forty (40) air defense and other artillery divisions, and some 150 independent regiments. The armament for all of the MF's include some 10,000 tanks, consisting of the T-62 light tank, the PT-76 light amphibious tank, and the T-59 medium tank.¹⁹ The LF's have seventy (70) infantry divisions, and about 130 independent regiments.

The Chinese Navy is essentially an inshore force with only limited ocean-going capacity. It ranks second in numbers only to that of the Soviet Union, but most of its surface vessels are under 100-tons displacement. There are sixty-eight (68) "Whisky" and "Romeo" class submarines, two "Ming" class, one "Golf" class, and one "Han" nuclear

powered submarine.

The Chinese surface fleet consists of seven (7) "Luta" class destroyers with STYX surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), four (4) "Gorky" class destroyers with STYX SSM, eighteen (18) frigates, and nineteen (19) patrol escorts. The STYX SSM has a range of twenty miles, much less than the Soviet and Western abroadship missiles. There also are a number of hydrofoil patrol craft.²¹

The air arm of the Navy operates about 700 aircraft in four (4) bomber, and five (5) fighter divisions. The fighter units are mainly for air defense and are integrated into the overall national defense system in the event of war.

The Air Force has some 5,000 craft, and is the third largest in the world. It is also the oldest, with most of the aircraft being of Soviet design, which are a generation or more behind. Their most advanced aircraft is the Chinese version of the MIG-21, with the remainder of the fighter force composed of MIG-15, -17, and -19 aircraft. Although China is working at improving its indigenous aircraft industry (as evidenced by the purchase of Rolls Royce Spey engines from Britain in 1975, which was to power a new aircraft called the F-12), it still is hampered greatly by the lack of good metallurgy and jet engine technology.²¹

China's nuclear force consists of the CSS-1 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), of which there are thirty to forty

(30-40) with an estimated range of 600-700 miles. It may well be replaced later by the CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) of which China now has fifty to seventy (50-70), with an estimated range of 1,500 to 1,700 miles. The IRBM is capable of reaching Soviet cities east of the Urals, and Central and Eastern Asia; the MRBM can strike targets in the eastern part of the Soviet Union.

Chinese missiles are currently liquid-fueled, but solid propellants are being developed. A limited number of CSS-3 Multi-stage Limited Range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) are also in the inventory. The Military Balance currently lists two, with an approximate range of 3,500 miles which would be capable of reaching European Russia. The only ICBM in China's nuclear inventory is the CSSX-4. This missile has the potential of reaching the west coast of the continental United States. Successful test-firing of this missile in the South Pacific by the Chinese was conducted between 18-21 May 1980. U.S. officials felt, however, that even with an accelerated program, the Chinese could deploy no more than a few dozen long-range missiles in the next five or six years. Delivery vehicles for China's nuclear inventory includes approximately ninety (90) TU-16 intermediate range jet bombers.²²

To summarize, although numerically the world's largest armed force, the PLA remains a product of the 1950's. As

Western observers have confirmed (most recently, U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown), the Chinese soldier is physically fit, highly disciplined, superbly motivated, and well-led; but, in comparison with soldiers in modern armies, he is poorly equipped, inadequately serviced, and insufficiently trained for complex operations. Moreover, the equipment of the Chinese Army, Navy, and Air Force is no match for the advanced modern weaponry of the United States and the Soviet Union.

2. New Weapons Procurement

These technological deficiencies, glaringly apparent to the Chinese, represented a problem for which a solution was not readily available within China. At this time as well, a solution to the problem was to be obtained through outside help, most probably, the "second world."

The solution which the Chinese visualized was one in which China's knowledge of military and technical interests would have to be augmented by drawing on foreign knowledge and experiences. Thus, at the present time, China's leadership has expressed interest in the introduction of foreign military equipment. This was expressed aptly in the 30 July 1978 "White Paper" of China:

". . . in the present age in which science and technology are developing by leaps and bounds, we will be the subject of attack if we do not have modernized and powerful national defense and do not master all the weapons as well as the struggle, tactics, and methods which the enemy already possesses or may possess. We should

quickly improve the backwashes of our country's weapons and equipment. . . . It is also necessary to pay attention to learning from the advanced experiences of foreign countries, effectively improve the weapons and equipment of our army, navy, air force, and militia, and not only have modern conventional arms and sufficient ammunition, but also improve the quality of atom bombs, guided missiles, and other sophisticated weaponry and equipment."²⁴

The specific goals for the short-term have not been publicly announced by Beijing with respect to the modernization of its armed forces. However, there is ample evidence of the kinds of weapons, equipment, and technology in which the Chinese have shown an interest. An article prepared by Angus Fraser lists the types of weapons, equipment, and technology in which China has expressed interest since 1 January 1977:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PERCENT OF SAMPLE</u>
Whole aircraft (26).....	34.1
Anti-tank weapons.....	17.6
Shelter, nuclear attack.....	9.5
Anti-submarine warfare gear.....	7.1
Computers with military applications.....	5.9
Reconnaissance & communication satellites.	5.9
Anti-aircraft weapons.....	4.7
Tanks & armored personnel carriers.....	4.7
Nuclear weapons & missiles.....	3.6
Naval engines.....	2.3
Submarines.....	1.2
Equipment f/ships over 10,000 tons.....	1.2
Laser applications.....	1.2
Bridging equipment.....	<u>1.2</u>
	TOTAL 100.1*

*Discrepancy due to rounding.²⁵

One can see from an examination of the foregoing list that more than half of the items focus on defense against an invader.

The aircraft sought did not include any long-range bombers. However, the Chinese did emphasize ground support-interceptor aircraft ranging from the highly sophisticated NATO F-16 to the British Harrier VSTOL. The latter was mentioned most, probably because of its capability for vertical and short takeoffs and landings which would be advantageous in some of the border areas of China. Additional items dealt with the Chinese need for tactical defense weapons: anti-tank weapons, anti-submarine warfare, anti-aircraft systems, and more modern battlefield transport systems.

Some items, such as satellites, naval engines, laser fire-control systems, and targeting devices, have a dual role and are just as applicable for civilian use.²⁶ The United States has just granted purchase privileges to China recently for the Landsat-D-photo reconnaissance system which is scheduled for service in 1981. While having possible military uses, the satellite is not classified as a military spy satellite.²⁷

In the nuclear area, China's interest remains low key and appears to indicate a desire to exchange information on such areas as advanced physics. There has not been much published concerning their desire to acquire help in the production of nuclear weapons.²⁸

This list is not all-encompassing, and what is not on it may be as important as what is there. It is not possible to say that the Chinese are not interested in other systems or activities. It could, however, indicate that these interests are being carried out quietly. This is not to say that China is seeking to be supplied covertly by arms suppliers, since this might create retaliation on the part of the super powers toward such suppliers. Therefore, it can be said with some degree of safety, that the Chinese do not have primary interest in most of the systems missing from the list.

It should be pointed out, however, that at the present time there have not been many actual purchases. This restraint by the Chinese may indicate their desire to avoid some of the pitfalls which other developing countries have experienced in their effort to modernize and develop a plan which would provide success for China.

D. FACTORS CONSTRAINING THE ARMS TRANSFER PROGRAM OF THE PRC

Even a cursory listing of the weapons desired reveals the ambitious extent of the program envisaged. Whether it succeeds or not will depend upon easily discernible variable factors.

1. Cost Factor

First of all, the cost would be tremendous to modernize a force structure as large as that of China. In the tank category alone, the cost to replace China's present 10,000

tanks would be on the order of \$5-7 billion dollars. If a commensurate proportion of mechanized infantry, mobile artillery, and service and combat support were added, the investment costs would more than double.²⁹

2. Political Factor

The ability of the current regime to carry out its objectives and goals for the modernization of its military will depend upon the desires expressed by the ruling group, and their perceptions of the needs of China. It is for this reason that Deng is currently insuring that leadership in the military field accepts the new desire toward greater emphasis on discipline and professionalization. This new effort is dramatized by the recent placement of Deng supporters in the Politburo, and the stepping down of Deng from the position of Chief of Staff, as well as a reshuffling of the military region officials.

General Yang Dezhi, an old Korean War veteran hand-picked by Deng himself, assumed the post of Chief of Staff of the Chinese Armed Forces, and membership in the Military Affairs Commission of the Communist Party.

The recent military reshuffling has seen the replacement of all commanders in China's vital border regions, including the one with the Soviet Union.³⁰ In Urumqi Military Region, the new commander is Xiao Quanfu.³¹ Another once purged veteran to return to command is Ye Fei, a Deng supporter and the new Navy commander.³² It appears that these new

shifts are an effort by Deng and other members of the ruling group such as Tu Shiyou, member of the politburo, to replace the old Mao PLA which was organized around a guerrilla-led people's war, with a younger group who places emphasis on modern technology, military science, and equipment.

3. Absorptive Capability Factor

Another constraint which will limit China's ability to achieve its goals of modernization is the absorptive capacity of its military personnel, the military industrial complex, and the lack of skilled technicians.

a. Military Personnel

In 1978, Hua Guofeng, the Chairman of the Central Committee, publicly admitted that it would take a few years to restore the army to its position of prestige and power.³³ By about 1960, for a period of ten years, the army personnel had been subjected to training associated with the guerrilla and revolutionary armies rather than with the more professional force of the Soviet model.

A new training program was instituted which ordained that the two basic tasks for the army were "to increase the political consciousness of all personnel, and to study Mao-Tsetung writings on military affairs."³⁴ The campaign also encouraged the military schools and academies to make appropriate changes in their training programs. The schools were required to rewrite military textbooks using Mao's doctrine as the guiding light.³⁵

Coupled with the changes in the soldiers training was the "Officer to the Rank" movement which epitomized the whole campaign by Mao against professionalism. In this campaign, a directive was issued which ordered all officers except the aged, the infirm, and the sick to "spend a month annually in the ranks as ordinary soldiers." The purpose of this program was to get the officers to experience the life of a soldier and thus enable them to be a better soldier and officer in the tradition of perfect unity between officers and men, superiors and subordinates, soldiers and civilians." It was emphasized that this program was necessary for making officers both "red" and "expert."

In conjunction with the officer movement was the "everyone a soldier" campaign. This too, went against the grain of the professional officer who did not share the view that an armed militia could go against a superior armed invader. They preferred, rather, to rely upon a well-trained, well-equipped standing army. Nevertheless, the task of training this new militia force fell upon the army--thus diverting men and equipment away from the army and military unit training.³⁶ This type of training and experience continued until 1971 with the subsequent fall of Lin Biao as Minister of Defense. It is this type of training atmosphere that has permeated the military over the years since 1958 up to the modernization under Hua Guofeng, which was

implemented in the early seventies. The value of professional skill and ability was subordinate to the politically "pure" personnel.

Consequently, the personnel who entered the army during this period have developed good morale, and have acquired the basic hand-to-hand close combat skills associated with a revolutionary army, but they are not educated nor trained in tactics necessary to fight a war on the modern battlefield.

This was evidenced in an article by Far Eastern Economic Review that described a situation which occurred following the recent country-offensive by the PLA against its neighbor Vietnam in February 1979. A regiment which was stationed in Fujian Province commented during a discussion session:

". . . based on the actual situation of the companies, and in connection with the experiences of the Sino-Vietnamese self-defensive counter-attack, they (the members of the regimental party committee) have boldly reformed their past training methods. The methods of training infantrymen and artillerymen together, training fighters and technicians together, and carrying out training to produce versatile soldiers have been conducted."³⁷

The lessons which were learned from the Vietnam War are being returned to the military schools, and those who distinguished themselves in combat are being inducted into the officer corps. In November 1979, one of the infantry schools located in Fuzhou Military Region took in

1,600 new students, of whom 1,100 were veterans. During the welcoming ceremony, the political commissioner of the region told the new students: "Although you did not fight against a highly modernized army, it was closer to a modern war than our past wars. The experience was very valuable."³⁸

These examples further enforce the lack of training and experience the soldiers of the PLA had in February, reinforcing the idea that they would have difficulty using modern weapons effectively.

b. Military Industrial Complex

China's military industrial complex is backward and unable to absorb modern technology and equipment. The Chinese Aero industry is a good example of this backwardness. This industry is capable of producing its own aircraft such as the MIG-19, the mainstay of the PLA Air Force, as well as the MIG-21, and other variants. However, in the production of the Shenyang F-7, an unlicensed copy of the MIG-21-F, which could have been China's present front-line fighter, problems developed which forced the suspension of production in 1966. Apparently there was no way to resolve the problem that had surfaced, thus, only sixty to eighty (60-80) copies were produced. It was thought that the problems were in the engine design, particularly the metallurgy technology which is necessary for high speed turbine engines which power the aircraft.

This assumption seemed to be confirmed in 1975 when the Chinese entered a coproduction agreement with Britain's Rolls Royce Corporation for the purchase of the Spey turbo-fan engine.³⁹ No doubt the Chinese will develop and design an aircraft which can use this engine effectively.

It will take time, since the Chinese aircraft industry obviously lacks an R & D base, and its production methods are still in the "middle ages." Many of the Chinese aircraft components are handmade, and, as a result, often do not meet standards. Consequently, the power plants, electronic navigation equipment, metallurgy, and weapons systems do not meet the standards of advanced weapons of the world.⁴⁰ Although China is striving to conceal these deficiencies, it seems that today they are not up to the task.

This failure of industry is evident also in the ground forces of the PLA and their equipment. Many weapons are urgently in need of replacement, and many kinds of weapons require augmentation.

The Chinese T-50 medium tank is an example. This tank, although not old, is considered to be China's main battle tank. It is based on the design of the Soviet T-54, a 1950 vintage. Thus, it lacks power traverse, stabilization for the 100-mm gun, and the luxury of a night infra-red sighting device. It is easy to see that

any encounter with the Soviet enemy and its new equipment would cause extreme anxiety on the part of the Chinese troops. The Chinese leaders themselves have more than once admitted that their equipment lags behind that of Western countries.

This same impression came through during the recent trip to China by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. The Chinese military had put on a demonstration for him, using elements of the 38th Flight Division and the 6th Tank Division. After observing the demonstration, Secretary Brown said:

"What comes through is the pride the Chinese military has in its duties, and also in its ability to perform. They are obviously quite well-trained . . . and the equipment we saw was well-maintained and capable of performing well. But, the equipment was not as modern as the superpowers produce. It corresponds to the best that the United States and the Soviet Union had perhaps a dozen years ago."⁴¹

Such statements by informed military men illustrate the problem the Chinese industry would have in developing or maintaining the sophisticated weapons of today.

c. Skilled Technicians

The problems discussed above are a result of the Cultural Revolution. During this period, technical education suffered severely because of constraints by politically-colored policies toward education, lack of travel abroad by the Chinese, and little exchange of information. China, once a country known for its

inventiveness (i.e., cast iron, gunpowder, paper, compass)⁴² is looked upon today as a backward giant.

This decline developed during Mao's last years, when China's universities were forced to abandon examinations and to accept poorly trained and academically unqualified students merely on the basis of political recommendations from factories, communes, and military units. As has been previously brought out, the slogan of the day was "Better Red than Expert." The academic books were burned by the millions, and many teachers and researchers were beaten and humiliated, some to the point of committing suicide. Class hours were scheduled more for political study; manual labor was stressed more than academics. For ten years, China's massive educational system wallowed in its politically imposed ignorance, at the cost of a lost generation of scholars, scientists, engineers, artists, and other educated persons.

The results were expressed in an interview conducted by a Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun,⁴³ with Chou Peiyuan, Vice President of the Academy of Sciences in China. Chou said that today there were only "between 300,000 and 400,000" scientists and technicians, which is not adequate representation for a country the size of China. This somewhat gloomy picture was reiterated in a statement by Fang Yi, Vice President of the Chinese Academy

of Sciences, who said in 1977 that: "China's science and education are in such a state that virtually everything needs to be done." This same tone was repeated when Yi delivered his report to the National Science Conference held in Peking during late March and early April, 1978. At that time he said: "Our country is now lagging fifteen to twenty years behind in many branches, and still more in some others."⁴⁴

d. Education

A recent study conducted by the U.S. Office of Education, which analyzed China's present college entrance examinations, produced some interesting data on China's educational system. An analysis of the test showed that Chinese high school students lag behind their American counterparts in chemistry, and possibly physics, but are roughly as well prepared in mathematics. It also indicated that curricular advances in science and mathematics are a decade or two behind the U.S., and that the standards of Chinese students in history and language may be somewhat lower than they were before the Cultural Revolution.

A spokesman for China's Ministry of Education indicated that the teachers in college had found the real standards of general knowledge, and the student's ability in applying their knowledge to be lower now than in the 1960's.

Additionally, it was disclosed that out of 4.6 million students who took the entrance exam, only 270,000 Chinese were admitted to college last fall. Less than 4% of China's young people are able to go to college as compared with more than 40% in the United States.

China recently disclosed that illiteracy had increased during the last decade. About 120 million people under the age of forty-five are now illiterate, according to the Deputy Minister of Education, Zang Boping. He indicated that since 1949, the communists had taught 120 million peasants to read and write. He added that 30% of China's 800 million villages remained illiterate.

Today, China has some 210 million students enrolled in educational programs from kindergarten to postgraduate schools. With college examinations recently reinstated, only 5.8% of those taking them were admitted in 1979. Of all of the Chinese applying for postgraduate studies, only 1.4% were accepted.⁴⁵ From these statistics it would appear that China certainly is not capable of coping with the problems associated with a modern military modernization at this time. Also, it is apparent that the time required will be substantial before China will be capable of solving these problems.

While technological, organizational, and economic constraints are only amenable to long-term modification,

political conditions can exert a substantial impact on the shorter run. The Chinese are acutely aware of inadequacies in the area of defense, and the dangers connected with relying on inappropriate defense strategies and technologies.

China's new relationship with the West, particularly with the United States, seems to indicate that its new leaders are determined to revise the past diplomatic, economic, and security arrangements it had long relied upon.

What are the possibilities surrounding a new strategic realignment? In what area are the interests of the U.S. and China shared, or parallel? What expectations are projected in the future with respect to arms transfers between China and the U.S.? What are the risks and opportunities associated with advancing the relationship further?

A closer examination of the past and current strategic interests with regard to U.S.-Chinese relations should provide some interesting regional and global perceptions for the future.

FOOTNOTES

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⁵Garthoff, R. L., "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, p. 86-87; Fraser, A. M., Military Modernization in China."

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¹¹Ibid, p. 56.

¹²Ibid, p. 5.

¹³Ibid. p. 3-9.

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¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁷Etzold, T. H., "Analysing Military Modernization: The State of the Art, 1978," draft article.

¹⁸Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook--1980, p. 41-44; The Military Balance: 1979-1980, p. 55-57; Gunston, B., Hinton, H. D., Kennedy, W. V., Lyon, H., Nelsen, H. W., and Sweetman, B., The Chinese War Machine, p. 114-121, Crescent Books, 1979; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Annual Posture Statement of the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Publication, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1979; The sources listed above are open, and provide data on the composition of China's armed forces, the latter providing an informative breakdown of the capabilities of China's armed forces. Military Balance is an authoritative compilation, while The Chinese War Machine is a very comprehensive study of the Chinese Armed Forces.

¹⁹The Military Balance: 1979-1980, p. 55-57.

²⁰Frazier, A., "Military Modernization in China," p. 38-39; The Military Balance: 1979-1980, p. 55-57.

²¹Ibid.; The Chinese War Machine, p. 114-117; Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook--1980, p. 42.

²²"China Launches Its First ICBM in South Pacific," Monterey Peninsula Herald, p. 1, 18 May 1980; "China Indicates Second ICBM Test-Firing," Monterey Peninsula Herald, p. 7, 21 May 1980; The Chinese War Machine, p. 171-173.

²³Gelber, G., Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China: 1975-1978, p. 79. The term "second world" represents an element in China's new way of viewing world affairs. In 1965, China's view of the world was represented by an "imperialist camp, a "socialist" bloc, and several "intermediate zones," consisting of those developed countries not confined to either the imperialist camp or the socialist bloc. The new philosophy sees the world divided into three parts: "First World," consisting of both the United States and the Soviet Union; a "Second World" to include Japan and the more developed countries of Eastern and Western Europe, and a "Third World including all of the developing nations, to include China itself. This new world view stresses the categorization of nations according to size, power, and level of development rather than by ideology, internal politics, or economic system. A much more pragmatic way of looking at things. U.S., Congress, House, United States-China Relations: The Process of Normalization of Relations, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, Nov 18 to Dec 8-17, 1975, and 2 Feb 1976, Committee Print, p. 8, 94th Cong, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1976. For a fuller

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²⁴U.S., Congress, House, A New Realism, Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China, July 3-13, 1978, p. 19.

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³⁶Ibid., p. 138-150.

³⁷Bonavia, D., "Ridding the Army of Dogma," Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 23-24, 9 Nov 1979.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹"China's Air and Missile Forces," Richardson, D. and Warwick, G., eds., Flight International, p. 20-22, 22 Sep 1979.

⁴⁰JPRS, 74396, Xinhua News Agency, p. 73-78, 17 Oct 1979.

⁴¹U.S., Congress, House, A New Realism, Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China, 3-13 Jul 1978.

⁴²U.S., Congress, Senate, Sino-American Relations: A New Turn, p. 27.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴U.S., Congress, Chinese Economy, Post Mao, p. 475-480.

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IV. SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: ITS RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The eyes of the world have focused on the United States and China following the dramatic signing of the Shanghai Communique in February 1972, at the conclusion of the historic visit of (then President) Richard Nixon to Peking. This development marked an end to an American policy of twenty years. China had been the target of U.S. efforts to block the spread of communist influence in Asia. This new relationship has yet to allay the suspicion and doubt regarding future relations between these two countries.

To comprehend current issues, this chapter will trace the history of U.S. interests in China from past issues and policies to those which have evolved today. The objective for the historic normalization of relations between China and the U.S., as stated in a report prepared by Secretary of State William Rogers, called for "the creation of a stable peace in Asia, in which the legitimate interests of all parties will be served."¹

A. EARLY INTERESTS AND CONCERNS FOR MAINTAINING THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER

Several American foreign policy debates are evolving out of the new relationship between the United States and China. One of these debates centers on mutual interests in

containing the expansion of the Soviets in Asia. The United States has been concerned over this issue since it recognized in the late nineteenth century that some basic U.S. security interests were tied to maintenance of an East Asian power balance.² This concern grew out of American interest in protecting China from domination by European or Japanese imperialism. It further led to the "Open Door Notes" of 1899 and 1900 drafted by an American official, William W. Rockhill. His interest eventually persuaded both President William McKinley and Secretary of State John Hay that the United States should use its new position in Asia, and in the world, to limit the new power struggle in China. The purpose of the Open Door Notes was to sustain equality of economic opportunity within each of the spheres of influence in China, and to protect it from being dismembered.

At this time, American interests in China were perceived differently by Government, merchants, and religious institutions of the United States. The Government considered China as a large country striving to gain nation status, and a country quickly becoming the focal point of world interest.

The merchants saw China as a valuable new market for United States goods. The thought of adding one inch of cloth to clothes in China brought visions of monetary profit beyond belief.

American missionaries visualized opportunities for vast religious conversions in China because they regarded it as a country of heathens in need of spiritual enlightening. Consequently, early interests in China were basically self-interests rather than a genuine concern for the protection of China as an emerging nation.³

Convinced that a strong China would be the best guarantor of its own independence, the United States soon became known as China's protector against European and Japanese imperialism. This image was reinforced by President Wilson, the League of Nations, and the Nine Power Treaty of the Washington Conference in 1922. It sought to protect China from world imperialism as well as to promote the preservation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

1. Japanese Expansion into China

In 1930, the Imperial Power of Japan began to stretch its tentacles into China. These moves were reported in U.S. newspapers, but concern for internal problems of the United States outweighed any involvement with China at this time. By the summer of 1940, the war between Japan and China became the major concern in Asia of American policymakers. Although the most immediate national interest seemed to reside in Europe, the Tripartite Pact of 1940 allied Germany with Japan, and thus joined Europe and Asia as threats to U.S. security. The American response became one of military aid which maximized

Chinese potential to resist Japanese expansionism. However, in geopolitical terms, this decision was based on an European-centered notion of world peace.⁴

During the war, the United States continued its efforts to develop and maintain an effective and stable government in China. As the end of the war approached, the U.S. became concerned that the defeat of Japan, and its subsequent withdrawal, would permit foreign powers (particularly Russia) to move into the vacuum being created.

Recognizing this threat to our interests, the U.S. sent an observer mission into Yenan, China in July 1944 to persuade the Nationalists and Communists to overcome their differences.⁵ It was hoped that such a reconciliation would preserve the unity of China in the postwar period and prevent the Soviet Union from developing a position of power in East Asia; and as such, become a potential threat to U.S. interests. With the recall of General Joseph Stillwell, U.S. Military Advisor to Chiang Kai-Shek, in October 1944, the United States realized that the Nationalists could not provide the support necessary to safeguard American interests in the face of expanding Russian influence.⁶

Then in 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the U.S. began to rely on agreements with Russia to maintain the necessary stability and balance in Asia. "Specifically, the United States judged that a balance of power could be maintained

on the basis of agreement and American-Soviet goodwill, and that sustained U.S. power politics would not be required."⁷ This new policy was based on the desire of the United States to maintain a stable situation for future negotiations with the U.S.S.R. over East Asia.

Following the defeat of Japan, and the start of the Civil War in China, U.S. policymakers strove to remain as uninvolved as possible in the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists. If support were to go to either side, the preference would have been to the Nationalists. A few Foreign Service Officers pointed out the damage which might result to the U.S. national interest if the Chinese Communists were completely alienated and driven into the arms of the Russians. However, U.S. spokesman General Hurly felt that the Chinese Communists were of little consequence and not capable of controlling China.

Thus, the United States supported Chiang during the Civil War which inevitably forced the Chinese to move closer to the Soviet Union.⁸ The Chinese Communists defeated the Nationalists in 1949 and established the People's Republic of China on the mainland, forcing the Nationalists to withdraw to the island of Taiwan.

The international situation in the late 1940's began to take on some new patterns for the United States. The developing Cold War in Europe demonstrated that new tactics were

required to maintain a strategic balance favorable to American interests. The U. S. could no longer rely upon Soviet goodwill to bolster stability in East Asia.

By the end of 1940 and early 1950, the Chinese Communists had swung to the Soviet side by establishing an alliance which caused the U.S. renewed concern. This alliance was concluded on 14 February 1950, and was directed against Japan, or "any other State which should unite with Japan directly, or indirectly, in acts of aggression."⁹ Of course, this last statement referred to the United States.

2. Soviet Support in China

This move by Russia to support China was evidence that the Soviet Union intended to act unilaterally in their own interests. This was a diversion from the so-called framework of cooperation which was to have been followed under the Yalta agreement. This system, if upheld by the United States, required a hands-off policy in China. The Yalta system had postulated a new balance of power in the Far East, as well as American and Soviet cooperation to encourage the growth of an independent China. These were goals which never materialized.¹⁰

The U.S. determination to limit involvement in internal affairs in China is apparent in a statement of President Truman:

"The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges, or to establish

military bases in Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."¹¹

This hands-off view by the United States was maintained essentially because the U.S. was following a global Cold War strategy which placed China under the tutelage of the Soviet Union. The United States felt that China could be a launching pad for communist expansion into South and Southeast Asia. The view in Washington maintained that China was weak, and did not pose an immediate threat.

On 25 June 1950, Soviet-armed North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel and attacked South Korea. In November, this action was followed by Chinese support provided to the North Koreans when General MacArthur insisted on driving to the Manchurian border, thereby posing a serious threat to the security of China.

This dual-pronged attack served notice to most Americans that China and the Soviet Union were, in fact, a threat to the interests of the United States. This caused a demise of any possibility of a Sino-Soviet disagreement, and joined together the European and Asian policies in a "globalization of containment."¹²

This new policy met with wide agreement and resulted in a network of American military bases (especially those in Okinawa), bilateral and multilateral alliances with friendly or threatened states, and economic and military assistance programs. Coupled with containment, the United States also launched an attempt to isolate China by preventing its representation in the United Nations, and limiting diplomatic recognition and trade.¹³ Aimed at restricting the spread of the monolithic bloc, the containment policy lasted until 1960 when the myth of the Sino-Soviet pact became apparent.

It is important to note that prior to 1960, there were several instances which occurred that caused doubt as to the actual strength of that pact. On various occasions between 1955-1957, the Chinese attempted to probe the intentions of the United States toward rapprochement. In retrospect, the moves appeared to have been Chinese attempts to gain equality of maneuver from its end of the Soviet alliance.¹⁴ However, these attempts were not successful, and received little positive response from the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Dulles stated on 12 March 1957 that recognition of Communist China would serve no national purpose, but would strengthen and encourage influences hostile to us and our allies, and further imperil lands whose independence is related to our own peace and security.¹⁵

3. The Soviet "Withdrawal"

Attempts at reconciliation with the United States, as noted earlier, apparently resulted from an inequality in relations with the Soviet Union. This suspicion proved true in 1960 when the Soviets stabbed the Chinese in the back.

Soviet Premier Khrushchev, taunted by the widening ideological gap between the U.S.S.R. and China, suddenly called home his technicians, and cancelled all military and economic support. Consequently, the Chinese were left in an extremely vulnerable position, with many factories incomplete and others unable to operate. This act, coupled with restraints by the West, forced China into a position of self-sufficiency.¹⁶

These moves by the Soviets undoubtedly surfaced because of conflicting views of the two countries regarding current tactics for strategic and domestic activities. The Soviets were seeking a cautious, peaceful coexistence, while the Chinese pushed for a more militant worldwide struggle. In internal or domestic matters, the Chinese had completely abandoned the Soviet model, instituting in 1958, their Great Leap Forward and the commune programs.

In sum, increased Chinese radicalism in internal matters paralleled its growing militancy in its foreign policy. The Chinese focused primary attention on questions of ideology and revolutionary strategy.

The developing Sino-Soviet dispute provided U.S. planners of the 1960's with a potential lever to use against the Soviet Union in negotiations, and a lever to gain a more favorable balance of power in East Asia. When John Kennedy became President, he hinted at resolving some of the problems with China and moving toward a closer relationship.¹⁷ These moves did not materialize since Kennedy's administration enjoyed only a slim margin of support in Congress, who feared the domestic political costs of dealing with such a sensitive issue as U.S.-China policy.

American involvement in the Vietnam War served to solidify the fear on both sides with respect to aggressive behavior, and prevented any progress toward reconciliation.¹⁸ Chinese antagonism toward the U.S. was revealed by Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi in a press conference for foreign correspondents in September, 1965:

"For sixteen years we have been waiting for the U.S. imperialists to come in and attack us. My hair has turned gray in waiting. Perhaps I will not have the luck to see the U.S. imperialist invasion of China, but my children may see it, and they will resolutely carry on the fight."¹⁹

Chinese aggression was personified in the 1960's with its attack on India, and the subsequent support it provided for the revolutionary "People's Wars" in Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam. These actions fed fuel to those critics of rapprochement with China. One of these critics, Roger

Hilsman, agreed that Vietnam had to be held to contain Chinese expansion directed toward India.²⁰ This feeling had earlier been espoused by proponents of the Domino Theory.

4. Hints of Future Normalization

The antagonistic atmosphere generated by these two belligerents (U.S. and China) began to diminish toward the end of the 1960's. It was feared that the Vietnam conflict would, by spillover, beget a Sino-U.S. conflict. Thus the two sides, utilizing the Warsaw talks, reached a tacit understanding: as long as the United States did not attack the PRC, the latter would not intervene in Vietnam, and vice versa. This understanding between two historical adversaries provided a hint that further changes might be in the making.²¹

The possible fulfillment of the prognosis indicated that significant changes lay ahead. In an article appearing in the October 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs, Richard Nixon said that he felt:

" . . . that the United States should be distinguishing carefully between long-range and short-range policies, and fashioning short-range programs so as to advance our long-range goals. Taking the long view we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations. . . . The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce changes. . . ."²²

Surprisingly enough, it was under the Nixon administration that several events on the international scene took place

which eventually led to the present "Era of Respect" between the United States and China.

In 1968-69, the clash between the Soviet Union and China changed from an ideological and political disagreement to one of military confrontation. After becoming disturbed about internal events within China (the Cultural Revolution) and witnessing the acquisition of a Chinese nuclear capability, the Soviets began shifting forces to the Eastern border of Russia. This increasing buildup by the U.S.S.R., coupled with their actions in Czechoslovakia, and the new "Brezhnev Doctrine" of limited sovereignty, caused Peking to revise its strategy. Peking's action advocated caution, and followed an old Chinese proverb: "Once bitten, twice shy."²⁸

By 1969, the danger of a Sino-Soviet confrontation was confirmed with two subsequent clashes on the Ussuri River island of Chenapo (Damansky). Several incidents along the border followed, as well as cloaked threats by the Soviets at the possibility of a nuclear strike against China.²⁴ Since these incidents, relations between the two countries have been rather chilly, and the military situation has yet to be defused.

On the American side, by 1968, President Johnson had laid the groundwork for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Recognizing the mood of the American people, along with the intensifying global situation, the Nixon administration moved

forward with improvement of the U.S.-China relations. Most unexpectedly, in November 1968, Peking called for a Warsaw meeting to be held on 20 February 1969 for the purpose of concluding an agreement constructed around the five principles of peaceful coexistence. However, this meeting did not reach fruition. The Chinese cancelled in on 19 February because of diplomatic problems involving asylum for a Chinese diplomat.²⁵ After several queries initiated by Nixon through foreign intermediaries, the talks were reopened in January, 1970.²⁶

5. U.S. Visits to China and the Shanghai Communique

Seemingly convinced that the U.S. was indeed withdrawing its forces from Vietnam, China agreed to a visit by the U.S. Table Tennis team in April, 1970--from a stage of uncertainty into an incipient rapprochement.²⁷ In early July 1971, Kissinger made a secret visit to Peking. The secrecy was meant to preserve the respective relationship of both the U.S. and China on the international scene. This included the U.S. relationship with Japan, and the Soviet Union's unstable association with the PRC. Primary topics of discussion at this secret meeting were details and plans for the upcoming visit of President Richard Nixon to Peking, which followed in February 1972 and concluded with the historic Shanghai Communique, the document which outlined a new formula and framework for future relations

between the United States and China.²⁸

The essence of the Communique consisted of three main sections: One stated the agreed position; another stated U.S. differences, and the last one stated China's differences. Although the Communique may not have provided all of the solutions to the problems incurred over nearly a quarter of a century, nor cement full diplomatic relations between the two countries, it did "open the road to the Great Wall," permitting the two countries to begin the process of normalization.

B. SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP--PRESENT STATUS

Reviewing the events which occurred historically between the United States and China, we find the most significant change was the transformation from an extremely hostile adversary-type relationship to one of military restraint with economic and cultural exchanges. Granted the latter two aspects of the relationship are probably better understood, it was the military-security relationship that made them possible. Though being difficult to explain, the military-security relationship is derived from parallel interests. This chapter will outline these parallel interests and provide some suggestions as to the probability of the U.S. and China developing, or furthering, a relationship based on military-security ties.

The security policies of the U.S. have retained sufficient flexibility to respond to the enormous on-going changes in the international arena. The security issues in East Asia have been especially conducive to the development of an environment which allows greater attention to those elements of possible parallelism or convergence of U.S.-China military-security concerns and interests.²⁹

1. Parallel Interests--Their Development

U.S. security concerns and interests are a direct response to the increased military presence of the Soviet Union in Asia. Moscow's move into Afghanistan in December 1979, continued support of Hanoi's aggressive moves into Cambodia, combined with the increased Soviet naval presence in Asia have created attention both in Washington and the friendly capitols of Asia. Both Washington and Peking are united in their opposition to the Soviets expanding military presence, and their widening position of power in the Asian's arena, particularly their current position in Afghanistan.

Another area of parallel interests exists in the remilitarization of Japan. Neither Washington nor Peking favor an extensive remilitarization, especially if it means Japan's acquisition of a nuclear capability. Although the outcome is the same, the reasons for this parallelism is quite different. The planners in Washington suspect that a remilitarized Japan would aggravate the regional balance

causing destabilization throughout East Asia, perhaps even weakening the historic U.S.-Japan relationship.

The fear which pervades within Peking stems from thoughts that if Japan were not tied to the U.S. security umbilical cord, it might venture into an association with the Soviets. There is also existant in Peking, the historic reminder of past adventurism in China by the Japanese.

Both the U.S. and China have combined their influence in the area, and are seeking to check the expansion of Soviet influence. The Chinese are, in the long-term, seeking to discourage the presence of any non-Asian power to remain in the area. It is pragmatic, though, for the time being, to encourage the continued presence of the United States to forego any opportunity that would enable the Soviets to take advantage of a vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal from Asia.

Within third world countries, both the United States and China agreed that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to the efforts by any other country, or group of countries, to establish such hegemony."³⁰ This parallel was pronounced and specified in the Shanghai Communique.³¹

2. Chinese Support of NATO

Additionally, leaders in Peking advocate a strong U.S. supported North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and enjoin that no compromises between Europe and Moscow be made.

However, at times Peking has suggested that Europe exhibit more independent action in their dealings with Washington.³²

In sum, it should be readily apparent that although there are congruent interests existing between China and the United States, parallelism is found mainly in military-security problems, while their competition focuses principally on broad, international economic and political issues.³³ It all stems from the common U.S.-PRC interest in checking the obvious aggressive, hostile policies of the U.S.S.R.

C. RECENT SINO-U.S. MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

1. Normalization and New Trends

Until 1979, progress being made in the new relationship between the United States and China was marginal at best. But, with the establishment of "normalization" between the two countries, led by the Carter administration, new trends began to develop. They centered mainly upon economic cooperation, and, in turn, led to the development of a new vocabulary for use between the two countries: assembly, processing, co-production, compensation trade, production sharing, establishing a partnership, an equity joint venture, and wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries.³⁴

China's foreign trade potential with the U.S. was stealing the limelight of this new relationship, particularly following approval by the U.S. Congress in January

1980, of the Sino-American trade agreement which sanctioned most-favored-nation treatment of China.³⁵

This agreement had been sought at the highest levels in Peking. The Chinese have made no secret of their desire for U.S. technology and equipment. This desire began to take on new colors when Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, made his trip to China from 6-13 January 1980. Although Brown's trip coincided with the U.S./Soviet controversy over Cuba, as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, officials in the U.S. made it known that arrangements for the visit had been discussed in the Spring, and reinforced during Vice President Mondale's visit in August.³⁶ There were some officials who felt the trip signalled the Carter administration's concern about the deteriorating international situation which resulted from a lack of Soviet response. There was also the fear that the administration was preparing to play its "China Card" against the Soviet Union.³⁸

Questions about the China Card brought to the surface additional concerns about the possibility of Japan, Western Europe, the United States, and China forming a defense alliance to check the Soviet threat to Asian security.³⁹ The White House continued to stress that the United States intended to pursue an even-handed policy toward the Soviet Union and China. Although this was published policy, knowledge of factions within the White House began to emerge.

Secretary of State Vance's policy to prevent a leaning by the U.S. toward China was successfully challenged by National Security Advisor Brezezinski who was sympathetic towards a Sino-U.S.-Japan United Front--against the advances of the Soviets into Asia.

A summation of the patterns taking place was aptly stated in remarks delivered by Vice President Mondale in a speech on 27 August 1979, during his China visit. He said:

"Any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests. This is why the United States normalized relations with your country, and that is why we must work to broaden and strengthen our new friendship. We must press forward now to widen and give specificity to our relations. The fundamental challenges we face are to build concrete political ties in the context of mutual security. . . . Today the unprecedented and friendly relations among China, Japan, and the United States bring international stability to Northeast Asia."⁴⁰

2. Mutual Security Issues

The mutual security issue really began to stimulate concern after the leak of a secret Pentagon study in October. This study fueled the sensitive issue of U.S. arms sales to China. Although both Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown continued to reiterate that the U.S. policy against selling arms to China was still valid. These issues created concerns and questions which prompted hearings and debates regarding American policy toward China.

Robert Sutter, a Congressional analyst and Chinese specialist, indicated in a report discussing this issue, that the debate stemming from the possible establishment of military ties with China has apparently become more divisive, contentious, and fractionalized as experts and specialists have examined it.

An effort has been made to illuminate the risks and the opportunities which prevail in this issue, and to assist in determining which policy would be in the best interest of this country.

3. Countering the Soviet Presence and Arms Transfers

Some arguments which have been proposed by the experts and specialists should be taken into consideration. The presence of Soviet soldiers on the Chinese border caused arguments about their effect on the military balance in Europe. In the four Soviet "military districts" bordering China and Soviet Outer Mongolia, there are now forty-six Soviet divisions (or approximately twenty-five percent of the Soviet Army's ground forces). The fact that their forces are located on the Chinese border prevents them from being utilized in Europe, where they could upset the equilibrium between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

There are additional expenses incurred by the Soviets to maintain these forces in an area which is located far from maintenance and logistical support supplies.

Consequently, this situation provides the West with an

indirect strategic benefit.

One should be wary of depending upon such a situation, even though the experts continue to state that the dispute is deep-rooted between the Soviets and Chinese, and tied to cultural, historical, and ideological hostilities. Applying an appropriate sports adage, "A good offense is a good defense," one should realize that even the most guarded and tactical of detente could generate a lessening of Russian presence on the Chinese border, thereby releasing forces for use against NATO. It is important that we do not rely too heavily on the present dissension between the two powers.

4. Arms Sales to China--Playing the China Card

Another dimension which has been addressed is the method of containment of Soviet expansion as a purely military one. This agreement revolves around the strengthening of Chinese forces outright, by supplying them with U.S. weapons. Another method would be to encourage the Europeans. This latter version has been the policy which the present administration has continued to uphold.

The advantages to this military dimension revolves around the comparative advantages for both sides. The Chinese retain an enormous reservoir of manpower, while the West retains the industrial and technological base for weapons production. It thus holds true that a given amount

of weaponry would only yield a marginal increase in capability, whereas the same weapons to the Chinese forces would have an exponential effect. As an example, if the West were to provide the Chinese Air Force with much needed air-to-air missiles, a supply of which would upgrade the capability of the Chinese against Soviet forces, thus requiring an increase in deployment of Soviet forces to the East. Of course, as mentioned already, this same contribution could be made via the advance technology of the Europeans. This was accomplished in 1975, with the British SPEY jet engine, which is now being incorporated into the Chinese Air Force.

Another school of thought for implementing the "China Card" stresses "diplomatic means," but not necessarily at the exclusion of supplying military equipment. The strategy which this method proposes is development of closer Sino-American relations through diplomatic means, such as the abandonment of the Taiwan Defense Treaty. This would be incentive enough to get the Soviet Union to correct the balance of power in the area. For the West, this would mean, perhaps, a more compromising relationship to compete with the amity that Peking is already offering.

Still another approach would be utilization of economic weapons to facilitate leverage against the Soviets. This

school of thought stresses the idea that rapid technological and industrial development by China would provide the necessary base it needs to develop a significant military potential. In this instance, the Soviets would be forced to seek an accommodation with Washington either to assist the enhancement of China's technological capability, or to establish themselves in a safe situation for the future, when China has acquired her rightful place among the developed nations of the world.

Both these latter methods of implementing the China Card (the diplomatic and economic) though not necessarily supporting the geopolitical objective, have been able to satisfy these objectives of abandoning Taiwan. The logic of the China Card just discussed does hold, however, and one must also be aware of the inherent dangers of implementing such a policy. There are those that express concern for solutions which appear supportive in the short-term and provide a quick-fix; however, in the long-term represent bad judgment and perhaps an expensive lesson.

In examining the China Card strategy, the feasibility of implementing various methods does not present a large problem. The new pragmatic leadership permits the acceptance of such rational actions as they provide enchantment to China. Therefore, the actual problems arise from the long-term consequence of the moves.

The question that comes to mind now is: what would the Soviet reaction be to such moves? One of the first reactions by the Soviets would be an assessment of the threat that such moves would precipitate. If this assessment proved to be a threatening one, it could produce any number of possibilities.

For one thing, the Soviets could launch a limited conventional attack against the border areas of China. Such an attack would dispel the assumption that China is able to defend itself. It would also bring embarrassment to the current regime, because of the inability of the United States to equip the Chinese adequately due to an insufficient number of weapons.

It should be evident now from this scenario that a successful play of the China Card would require more than just a token deterrent--rather one capable of checking the Soviets. This should immediately bring to the fore the fallacy of counting on such an "alliance" as a deterrent since China would scarcely contribute to an alliance with its present military incapacities. In the short-term, such a policy, to some, would not seem to be in the best interests of the U.S. to pursue.⁴¹

5. Assessing the China Card Risks and Opportunities

From this review of the pros and cons of implementing the China Card, one can assess the advantages and

disadvantages and seek to determine the best policy for the United States to follow in developing a relationship within the triangle.

The possible advantages with regard to U.S. interests occur by developing direct military links, or operationalizing the China Card, and include:

--Helps the Chinese to strengthen itself against possible Soviet threats so that it can effectively defend itself.

--Ties down Soviet forces in the East, diverting military and other sources away from Europe and the Middle East.

--Creates uncertainty in Soviets as to the amount of support the U.S. would be willing to provide China in the event of a conflict, thereby reducing the use of military action against China.

--Decreases the threat, enabling the Chinese to either delete or postpone development of advanced weapons designed to reach the U.S.

--Prolongs the reestablishment of relations of rapprochement between the Chinese and Soviets.

--Increases the Chinese stake in the current relationship, particularly that of the military leaders, perhaps inducing more constraints or concessions in dealing with the U.S.⁴²

In addition to some advantages in operationalizing the China Card, there also are some potentially dangerous aspects to be considered. Some of the arguments which have been presented include:

--Reduces the chances for establishing a peaceful and stable world order by increasing the willingness of the Chinese to resort to military force to solve their conflict with the Soviets, or even the Vietnamese.

--Adds additional credence to the Soviet's perception of collusion by the U.S. and China against them, causing Soviet paranoia to heighten, Sino-Soviet tensions to increase, and perhaps increase Soviet pressure on China overall.

--Increases the likelihood of destabilizing U.S.-Soviet relations.

--Weakens the relations between the U.S. and Japan by creating doubt as to the basic priorities of the U.S. in East Asia.

--Increases latent fears in smaller Asian nations of a possibly adventuristic China venturing into their spheres of influence.

--Creates a dependence on the part of the U.S. which might cause it to be drawn into a Sino-Soviet conflict in China's behalf (the February 1979 incident between China and Vietnam ran this risk).⁴³

6. Military Cooperation: A Good Investment?

The arguments just discussed presented the risks and opportunities involved in operationalizing the China Card. An examination of the current developments between the U.S. and China will help determine the degree of interaction needed on the question of military cooperation and provide an assessment as to whether such actions are in the best interests of the United States.

Developments between the U.S. and China in the area of military cooperation, and the ensuing policy dealing with such matters, took a drastic turn following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in December 1979. This action by the Soviets called particular attention to the so-called "even-handed" policy regarding bilateral relationships between the U.S.-U.S.S.R, and U.S.-PRC. This policy seemed to be dropped and the "tilt" directed more towards the Chinese.

During Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's historic trip to China on 6 January 1980, he appealed to the Chinese leaders to join the United States in finding "complementary actions" to counter such examples of Russian expansion.⁴⁴ This appeal was later followed by an announcement by Brown in which he said:

"On a case by case basis, we are ready to consider transfer of technology to the People's Republic of China that includes civilian and

military application. The Carter administration stands by its refusal to sell weapons to China, but it has no objections to allied aid."⁴⁵

The progress which was made between the two during this trip may never be fully known. However, reports indicate that the two sides agreed to exchange military delegations, including a visit by Gen Biao, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Communist Party's Military Affairs Commission (in other words, Secretary Brown's counterpart).⁴⁶ This trip took place in May of this year.

It was apparent that Biao's trip to the U.S. was certainly directed toward establishing contacts in the military equipment production area. The itinerary he followed supports this. He inspected an American Motors Corporation plant in Indiana which manufactures tactical vehicles for the U.S. Army.⁴⁷

Another plateau reached during the trip which relates to the transfer of "dual purpose" technology was the agreement to sell the sophisticated Landstat surveillance satellite ground station to China. There also was favorable consideration of other Chinese requests for advanced technology. The U.S. will continue to limit U.S. defense sales of non-lethal military support equipment, and certain lines of dual technology items that have both civilian and military application.

The arms trade is as tentative as other dimensions of the China market. For now it would appear that the U.S. and China are going to focus on only a few areas. Among these are fixed wing aircraft that can lift both military and civilian loads, transport helicopters, trucks, reconnaissance cameras, early warning radar, and other electronic search and detection equipment.⁴⁸

Significant developments have been made with regard to military cooperation between the United States and China, and their development certainly is understandable in light of our parallel interests--that of countering Soviet expansion into Asia. But, as spelled out by Harry Harding in a New York News article, "We must be certain that we are not acting in a fit of childish pique, but are taking hard-headed decisions that are in the best long-term interests of the U.S."⁴⁹ It is obvious that Harding, a noted sinologist, is perplexed concerning moves being made to drop the "even-handedness" policy toward one in favor of the Chinese. This concern is expressed by Harding when he prescribes a method of providing a more extensive military relationship with China.

The above method requires that these problems be considered. First, it is evident that both China and the United States retain differing views in regard to the

situation existing in Asia. These views are particularly manifested in differences regarding the question of Taiwan, South Korea, and Indochina. Any military aid to China may come back to haunt us if China's current domestic and foreign policies were to change. The case of Vietnam in February 1979 indicates China's will to use military force if it is necessary to accomplish their intended objectives.

Secondly, using China to act as a counterweight for the United States would not now be possible because of the disparity of force between it and the Soviet Union. According to a recent Pentagon study, it might cost between \$41-\$63 billion dollars to give China the necessary means to defend against a conventional Soviet attack. At this point in time, neither the United States nor China could afford it, and China's absorptive capacity is unable to meet the task.

Finally, a thorough assessment of the values and effects of a military relationship between the United States and China on the Soviet Union has not been made. It may be that the risks are greater than the benefits, and such a move might work to disadvantage in the long run.⁵⁰

The essence of the Harding article is "caution," and this still holds true with regard to establishing a military cooperation with China. We must be certain that

a military link with the Chinese is a truly effective way of protecting our interests against Soviet pressure.

In sum, the military relationship between the United States and China offers a method of countering the Soviets in Asia. However, at this time, backing the Chinese against the Soviet Union could be very risky. It is widely known that expedients contrived to meet immediate crises tend to become permanent. Consequently, the current courtship of China, initiated to exert influence and leverage in dealing with the Soviets may develop into a marriage that, in the future, could jeopardize rather than strengthen the interest of the United States.⁵¹

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- ³⁰Hinton, H. C., Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States, p. 47-48.
- ³¹Ibid.
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³³Ibid., p. 228.

³⁴Cohen, J. A., "A Year of High Adventure in Coming Joint Ventures," Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 44, 7 Mar 1980.

³⁵Ibid., p. 41.

³⁶"Defense Chief Plans China Trip," Baltimore Sun, p. 5
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³⁷Ingersoll, B., "Sec. Brown to Visit Peking Jan 6,"
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⁴⁵Cooley, J. K., "U.S. Limits Use of Its 'China Card'--
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⁴⁶Harding, H., "Playing the China Card: Watch Out for
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⁴⁷Lachia, E., "U.S. Defense Suppliers Look for Big China
Sales," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, p. 6, 16 Jun 1980.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁹Harding, H., "Playing the China Card: Watch Out For Fast Deals," p. 31.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Karnow, S., "Risks of Getting Too Thick With China," Washington Star, p. G-3, 20 Jan 1980.

V. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

While no doubt remains that within the Chinese military and political leadership the debate continues over the specific pace and emphasis to be placed on the modernization of its military forces, a general decision has already been made that Mao's doctrine of People's War is no longer an adequate prescription for meeting the new Four Modernization goals. The new regime apparently has shifted its primary reliance on manpower and motivation to accept not only the requirement for a nuclear deterrent, but also the necessity of having a conventional force with the capability of deterrence based on mobility and firepower.

Having made that decision, the success of their military modernization program is going to depend upon: 1) China's political stability, 2) Maintenance of a positive military image, and 3) Patience over a long period of time.

A. POLITICAL STABILITY

When one tries to forecast the future of China's current modernization effort, they must always maintain an historical perspective, since changes may not be permanent. It is true that the current regime has achieved some things such as a new economic plan, a new body of law, and a new corps of leaders. The ability to accomplish some of these goals can

be attributed to the political stability of the regime of Hua and Deng. The ability of the current regime to maintain this stability will determine whether or not China is to enjoy similar success. The achievement of modernization depends less on hardware than on the efficient functioning of governmental and social processes. It requires that the various parts of the system fit together, and that they be managed in an adaptive and flexible way.

It is apparent from the recent political maneuvering at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (which met on February 20, 1980) that such a program is being conducted by Deng. He and the moderates are stripping the leadership bodies of any opposition to their current modernization programs and replacing them with supporters of their policies. Such a plan, according to Deng, is necessary to insure continuity of thought and the ultimate accomplishment of a Chinese-style modernization.

B. MILITARY IMAGE

The success of the modernization of the military will require that its positive image be preserved with the populace of China. The current regime seems to recognize this since the Political Department of the PLA has included it as a requirement in the PLA Guidelines for Political Work

in 1980. The current program calls for:

". . . the army's glorious tradition of supporting the government and cherishing the people and to further improve relations between the army and the government, and the army and the people. Efforts must be made to conscientiously study and analyze the new situations and the new problems which have cropped up under the historical conditions with regard to relations between the army and the government, and the army and the people, to carry out education on the purpose of the army and the tradition of supporting the government and cherishing the people in light of the new situation and the new problems, and to improve the fundamental attitude of cadres and fighters toward local governments and the people. . . ."1

This close relationship between the army and the people must continue so that a symbiotic relationship remains. It is clear that as industry and the economy become developed, understanding and cooperation of the vast population will be needed to meet the needs of the military.

C. TIME

Finally, the modernization of the PLA is going to take a long time. Although it is one of the Four Modernizations, Deng Xiaoping, himself, stated that greater priorities of the country will be granted to the other three: agriculture, civilian industry, and science and technology. Only by achieving significant progress in these three areas can the PLA expect to experience any real long-term growth in its capability. From the preceding discussion, one can expect that this will not occur in the near future.

Therefore, over the next few years, we can expect small selective purchases of advanced military equipment by the Chinese. China will be looking for weapons which they can adapt, improve upon, and manufacture.² China has forsaken a quick-fix option, and will modernize the PLA slowly--relying on Western European arms suppliers and the United States for its source of modern weapons and technology.

The Chinese leadership of today is aware of the necessary role that modern weapons and techniques most play on the contemporary battlefield, as evidenced by a quote from Peking's theoretical journal, Red Flag:

"Our military thinking must tally with changing conditions. If we treat and command a modern war in the way we commanded a war in the 1930's and 1940's, we are bound to meet with a big rebuff and suffer a serious defeat."³

It has also been shown that leadership recognizes the necessity of receiving support from outside China if it intends to have its military modernization program fulfilled.

Rapprochement between the United States and China at present appears to be the "pot of gold" at the end of the rainbow following a violent storm. It is true that China's recent detente with the West has greatly served the interests of both sides, particularly in light of the recent events in Afghanistan. China's opportunity has mitigated the effects of the Soviet Union's growing strategic dominance and its

effect on the world's balance of power. It is evident that the tilt toward strengthening the military relationship between the United States and China at present is a parallel action that serves the interests of both countries. The Soviets can not help but realize and recognize that both the United States and China share an interest in improving the balance of power in East Asia.

One must also keep in mind the possibility that the United States will not always enjoy a more intimate bond with China than with the Soviet Union. The U.S. must formulate policies allowing for harmony between all three countries, whatever the degree of closeness in their relationship, as they all say they are working for future peace and stability in the entire East Asian region.

For the foreseeable future, the United States should approach its military relations with China, specifically arms transfers, with extreme caution. It should, however, continue to maintain its stance of deterrence against the Soviet Union, and be prepared for a similar power of deterrence should changes occur in the PRC-U.S.S.R. relationship. This also allows China time to reestablish a better economic and industrial base, and time to produce more of its own military hardware (with assistance from the United States and Western Europe).

This would seem to negate the possibility that China would

adopt procedures or policies which would be inimical to the interests of the United States in the future. Even-handed treatment of the Soviet Union and China in the early 1980's seems to be the most advantageous position for the United States to adopt.

FOOTNOTES

¹Foreign Information Broadcast Service, OW 281231,
p. L-18, 2 Jan 1980.

²"Chinese Army Burdened by Outdated Weapons," Baltimore Sun, p. 1, 11 Jan 1980.

³Bonavia, D., "Ridding the Army of Dogma," p. 24.

APPENDIX

CHART I: CHRONOLOGY OF CHINESE MILITARY POLICY SINCE 1953

YEAR	POLICY	SITUATION
1953-55	Leaning to One Side	Emphasis on professionalization.
1955-56	Conflict	Demands to accelerate modernization clash with demands to reduce military expenditures.
1956-57	Walking on Two Legs	Continued modernization at relatively protracted pace, increasing attention to politicization and domestic role of PLA.
1958	Leaning to One Side	Emphasis on politicization to accompany Great Leap Forward.
1959	Conflict	Objections to excessive politicization.
1960-63	Walking on Two Legs	Under Lin Piao, attention to domestic role of PLA; continued protracted modernization and development of nuclear weapons.
1964	Leaning to One Side	Emphasis on domestic role - "learn from PLA" campaign.
1965	Conflict	Demands for crash program of defense preparations including reduction in domestic activities of PLA to counter American escalation in Vietnam.
1966	Walking on Two Legs	Deeper involvement of PLA in domestic activities as Cultural Revolution begins; precautions to reinforce defense and deterrence postures.
1967-69	Leaning to One Side	Preoccupation with maintaining or restoring domestic order.
1969-71	Walking on Two Legs	Attempts to bring domestic and strategic roles to better balance. ¹

(Added by author to update Chart):		
1971-76	Conflict	Gang of Four attack military modernization and stress resurgence of political activities.
1976-80	Walking on Two Legs	Stress economic development; attempt to improve PLA training, doctrine & organization takes place. ²

¹Whitson, W. W., ed., Harding H. Jr., "The Making of Chinese Military Policy," The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's, p. 373, Praeger, 1973.

²Shambaugh, D. L., "China's Quest for Military Modernization," p. 295-302.

CHART II: ARMS-TRANSFER SUBSYSTEMS

ACTOR	AGENCY	OBJECTIVES	TARGETS: RECIPROCAL ACTOR INFLUENCE
National	Nation-states and national governmental authorities	Security, political influence, economic growth, solvency, full employment	
Subnational	Military organizations Industrial and corporate units	Military security Maximum economic gain (profits in market economies or budgetary allocations in controlled economies)	
Transnational	Technoscientific centers (research groups, universities, institutes) Governmental bureaucracies	Service functions for military and private sector in pursuit of new knowledge, techniques, and products Surveillance and control of other subnationals	
International	Alliance organizations: NATO, Warsaw Pact	Offense, defense, deterrence; collective political influence; internal management and policing of dependent states	

Source: Hackavy and Neuman, Arms-Transfers in the Modern World, p. 6

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