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Vietnam and the Soviet Union: implications for Europe and American foreign policy options

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IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE AND AMERICAN
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by

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formulated -- hardline, low key, and minimal involvement. A "low key" option, with emphasis on diplomatic and economic instruments, is recommended as preferable to military means.

Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Implications for Europe and American Foreign Policy Options

by

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This thesis concludes that Soviet expenditures in Indochina, particularly Vietnam, have significantly reduced assets and options available to the USSR in Europe. Economic, military, and political expenditures are assessed. Tradeoffs between the Soviet Union's Indochina resource commitments and European limitations are established. Based on these tradeoffs, three policy options for the United States in South-East Asia are formulated -- hardline, low key, and minimal involvement. A "low key" option, with emphasis on diplomatic and economic instruments, is recommended as preferable to military means.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Soviet interests and capabilities have become truly global in the last twenty years. Russia has the ability, either directly or through proxies, to support national interests anywhere on earth. A recent example involves alleged Soviet support for the leftist insurgents in El Salvador, providing arms and other material through Cuba. In addition to clandestine activities, the Soviets signed ten treaties of friendship and cooperation between 1971 and 1978 with nations ranging from Angolia in Africa to Vietnam in Indochina. These treaties have allowed the USSR to gain access to regions previously beyond its reach and increased its stature as a superpower.

The Soviets' prime theater of interest, however, remains Europe. Eastern Europe has served as an invasion route into Russia twice in this century and today the world's two most powerful military alliances face each other in Central Europe.* Europe is the only place where Soviet and American ground forces stand in direct confrontation. One measure of the dominance of Europe in Soviet interests is the fully equipped and combat ready divisions

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*North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

stationed in Eastern Europe as opposed to those stationed in the central Asian republics or on the Chinese border.

The Soviets have committed the largest proportion of their human and material resources to meet the challenge they perceive in Europe. Peripheral contingencies, however, such as Afghanistan, occasionally demand significant resource commitments. The extent to which these peripheral contingencies demand Soviet resources necessarily reduces assets and options available for Europe.

This thesis analyzes the goals of the Soviet Union in Vietnam and the effects on those goals of the interests acquired and the policies pursued in Vietnam. The type and amount of economic aid provided by the Soviets to Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea is examined, as well as the military assistance provided to those three countries. The political benefits flowing from the Soviet programs are noted, as well as the costs to their policies and investments in their main theater of interest, Europe.

The role of Soviet Southeast Asian policies is then assessed in the context of Soviet global commitments and the proportion of their assets that they have been willing to commit to Southeast Asia. Finally, an analysis is offered regarding the interests, policies and goals of the Soviets in Southeast Asia, especially as concerns the formation and execution of American policy.

A. METHODOLOGY

Soviet and Vietnamese goals in Indochina are discussed and contrasted in the first chapter to determine the basis for their relationship and to assess the degree to which the Soviet's policies seem to be successful. The goals were determined by reviewing critical commentary on the region since 1975 for the current goals and a number of historical sources for determining past Soviet goals in Asia and the region. Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports were invaluable for these purposes.

The second chapter concentrates on determining the resources committed by the Soviet Union to secure their goals in Indochina and the relative cost of those expended resources in terms of maintaining the Soviet empire, especially in Europe. Tradeoffs between expenditures in Indochina and Europe were determined using objective data where possible and subjectively in non-quantifiable areas such as political costs.

The final chapter develops American policy options based on the conclusions reached in Chapter II and the array of interests and goals presented in Chapter I. The options assume a certain set of interests and goals on the part of the United States.

II. GOALS AND BENEFITS IN INDOCHINA

Soviet goals in Indochina are evaluated within the framework of Soviet global security interests defined in Avigdor Haselkorn's The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy 1965-75. Looking at the Soviet Union as the heartland, his thesis is that since the mid-sixties Russia has attempted to establish a security network on its periphery divided into three regions: Warsaw Pact, Middle East/Mediterranean, and South Asia/Far East.

Two crucial events precipitated a dramatic change in Soviet security perception: the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Soviet split. The Missile Crisis found the Soviets overextended and militarily lacking. Describing Mr. Khrushchev's position, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote, "Lacking conventional superiority in the Caribbean, he could neither break the blockade nor protect Cuba against invasion. Lacking strategic superiority, Khrushchev could not safely retaliate elsewhere in the world." [1978:528] The Russians determined never to be caught so grossly inferior again and embarked on a major buildup of conventional and nuclear armed forces that continues today.

The more potent event driving the Soviet strategy was the Sino-Soviet split. The implications of the split extended

beyond immediate military and political goals. It signalled the end of monolithic Communism and a flaw in the 'historical processes' Communist's doctrine depends upon. As one analyst characterized it, the "Sino-Soviet cleavage (is) one of the truly significant events of the twentieth century." [Scalapino, 1972:94] Russia and China in effect returned to their more normal historical relationship and, a point crucial for this study, the Soviet Union faced the specter of a two front war.

"This specter had a profound impact on the political-strategic perspective of the Soviet leadership." [Haselkorn, 1978:4] Although China is militarily backward in comparison, Russia cannot ignor an adversary with a population of one billion people and with which the Soviets have a 4800 mile common border. Chinese possession of a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile force adds to Soviet fears today and complicates future Soviet designs as China begins to modernize.

The Missile Crisis spurred a military buildup designed to give the Soviets the wherewithal to support their goals, the Sino-Soviet split provided the clincher for Soviet strategic moves in Asia since approximately 1965. Soviet strategy can be described as a "long range, unified and coherent design aimed at the establishment of a Soviet-sponsored collective security system all along the periphery of the Soviet Union." [Haselkorn, 1978:vii] The Soviet aim is to prevent complete

encirclement by hostile nations while at the same time diverting the attention of its two major adversaries, China and the United States, and if possible, lure them into confrontation.

The function of the interlinked regions is to provide strategic mutual support both internally within each region and between regions. Thus in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War the Soviet Union provided rapid resupply of war materials to their Arab clients from bases in the Warsaw Pact region. The regions can offer defensive, offensive, or logistic support based on the perceived threat and Soviet objectives.

Unlike the nations in the Warsaw Pact region, the Middle East/Mediterranean and South Asia/Far East regions are not under direct Soviet control. A potential threat to the Soviets exists if the dominant nations in these areas lean toward either the Western or Chinese position. Any decisive political alignment away from the Soviet Union in these regions might be interpreted by Russia as a step toward strategic encirclement. John Erickson interprets the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an effort to prevent this encirclement. [February 1981:16-8] The cost of the Afghanistan invasion, not yet fully accounted, underscores the importance the Soviets attach to preventing breaches in their security system.

Soviet global commitments are costly: thirty Soviet divisions stationed in Eastern Europe alone. Eastern Europe

absorbs most of the fuel and raw materials exported by the Soviets, returning less to the Soviet Union than could be gained by sales on the world market. Military advisors and equipment form an integral part of Soviet relations with countries even nominally associated with their security system. Indochina and Afghanistan are recipients of economics aid and may require expanded support. My assumption is that the Soviet Union has an important set of goals in each region of commitment that justifies, in the leadership's mind, the national burden of supporting them.

A. EVOLUTION OF INDOCHINESE COMMITMENT

From Lenin's time Soviet leaders have appreciated the role of Asia in their 'historical struggle'. The Sixth Communist International (Comintern) Congress held in 1928 produced a "Communist manifesto geared to the twentieth century." [McLane, 1966:67] The document called for the overthrow of "imperialism, of feudalism, and landlord bureaucracy; the establishment of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariate and peasantry on the basis of soviets, expropriation of landowners...nationalism of all land, and establishment of revolutionary worker's and peasants army." [Ibid., p. 67] The precepts of the manifesto were applied in Asia by Comintern agents from Korea to Calcutta including such representatives as Nguyen Ai Quoc, alias Ho Chi Minh, who founded the Indochinese Communist Party in 1929.

It is easy to overestimate Moscow's role in the revolutions which have swept Asia since 1917. Except for Soviet support of the Chinese in the 1920s, their contribution consisted largely of rhetoric and a few zealous Comintern agents. As Ho Chi Minh discovered in Vietnam, nationalism was a far more moving ideal for the Asia masses than was Communism. While Stalin was attempting to build socialism in one country, Russia, and later when he prepared for war with the fascists, the Soviet Union toned down even the rhetoric against colonial powers such as Britain and France. Following World War II the Soviet Union once again focused on Asia and the prospects of damaging the capitalist nations through ferment in Asia.

Mao Tse-tung's successful revolution in China became the beacon for Asian Communists after 1949. Chinese aid and influence in Vietnam was far greater than Moscow's in the 1950s. Chinese aid to the Vietnamese directly contributed to their momentous victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the military success which allowed the state of North Vietnam to come into existence. Chinese influence was such that in 1951 Ho Chi Minh stated that the successes of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were based on "the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and on the thought of Mao Tse-tung." [McLane, 1966:442]

Following the Sino-Soviet split the Vietnamese attempted to maintain a somewhat balanced relationship with the estranged

powers. The Soviets began to figure Vietnam into their China policy in the early sixties. By 1965 Soviet military economic aid was greater than Chinese aid and had escalated the conflict to the point that the United States committed troops to Vietnam. The Soviets may have hoped that the presence of American troops would drive the Chinese into rapprochement with the Soviet Union. As early as 1964 Mao had attempted to blunt Soviet designs by refusing to allow Soviet aid to cross Chinese territory. The American buildup forced him to reconsider and overland deliveries were resumed in 1965; however, they slowed considerably in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. [Parker, 1977:6]

The American drawdown following the Tet Offensive in 1968 lead to a change in the Chinese perception of what constituted the major threat to their security. The Soviet Union was viewed as the major new threat rather than the United States and China began to change its external relationships to combat the new threat. Although Soviet aid to Vietnam still passed through China, the Chinese attempted to influence the Vietnamese to use tactics that would not push the Americans out too precipitously. The Soviet buildup on China's northern border, begun in 1963, looked more ominous than the threat receding on its southern border. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the first use of the so-called Brezhnev

doctrine, was seen by the Chinese as proof of the Soviet aggressive intent. By 1969 China and the United States were actively seeking rapprochement. [Parker, 1977:14]

American involvement in the two Vietnams overshadowed the Soviet-Chinese moves, much as the Cold War clouded the Sino-Soviet split. American power was removed from the Indochinese equation in April 1975 and since that time Soviet goals have become more clear and Chinese fears of Soviet penetration into the region have been realized. Failing to achieve rapprochement with the Chinese based on the American threat in Vietnam, the Soviets now actively support a threat to China by including the Indochinese states in their collective security system.

B. SOVIET SECURITY SYSTEMS IN ASIA BEFORE VIETNAM

When Brezhnev announced the formation of an Asian collective security system in 1969 there already existed a series of Soviet ties with Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and India to form the basis of the system. Some of the ties were quite old and stable such as those with Outer Mongolia, others required constant revitalization, like those with India. Declared an independent state in 1924, Outer Mongolia almost immediately aligned itself with the Soviet Union. Soviet internal interference and the Mongolian Communists were decisive factors in Mongolia's political development. Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin

stated in 1925 "In Mongolia we have a government completely directing its policy along the lines of close rapprochement with the USSR." [Clubb, 1971:214] Since 1963 Outer Mongolia has provided a base for six Russian divisions as part of the buildup on the Chinese border. [Kaplan, 1981:271]

North Korea is not a Soviet satellite although a recipient of significant amounts of Soviet aid. Sharing a common border with both China and Russia, North Korea has attempted to maintain balanced relations between the two while garnering as much help for itself as possible. In July 1961 the North Koreans signed very similar treaties of cooperation and mutual assistance with both Moscow and Peking. [Clubb, 1971:452]

North Korea, because of its attempt to balance relations with China and the Soviet Union, plays little actual role but great potential in the Soviet effort to contain China. The Soviets do not maintain troops in North Korea nor have they supplied their most sophisticated weaponry; however, the Soviets have supplied Mig 21 aircraft and have trained many North Koreans in the Soviet Union. Given the right conditions, the Soviet Union might provide North Korea with the military resources to invade the South and distract American attention.

The Soviet Union has actively courted other nations on its periphery such as Burma, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Burma attempts to maintain a neutral position between the great powers but faces an active Communist insurgency problem. The Burmese Communist Party has received more support from China than from the Soviet Union and it is unlikely that Burma will become a willing member of the Soviet system. Within the Burmese Communist Party it is only the "older" elements of the party that lean toward the Soviet Union. [Scalapino, 1975:182]

The Soviets supported India against Pakistan in their 1965 conflict but today attempt to maintain friendly relations with both countries. Pakistan maintains good relations with China and barring internal eruptions should not become a Soviet ally. The Soviet goal is to avoid alienating Pakistan completely.

Afghanistan is a key country in the Soviet security system. In December 1978, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation. Article 8 of the treaty stated that the controlling parties "will facilitate the development of cooperation among Asian states and the establishment of... mutual confidence among them and the creation of an effective security system in Asia." [Survival, March/April 1979: 92-93] This article provided the Soviets some form of legal support for their later aggression. The limits of long range Soviet goals in Afghanistan are not clear. A

Pakistani report that 30,000 Soviet families have settled in Afghanistan's northern provinces indicates the Soviets do not intend to leave in the near future. [Grand Strategy, 1 April 1982]

Today Indochina must be added into the existing Soviet security framework in Asia. Some important questions are: 1. What current interests in Indochina do the Soviets have?; 2. What policies have the Soviets implemented to secure their interests?

C. RECENT SOVIET INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, Indochina in particular, is directly linked to Soviet-Chinese relations. Soviet aid to North Vietnam expanded greatly in the early to mid-sixties in an effort to increase the American commitment to the point where China felt threatened and sought rapprochement with Russia. [Parker, 1977;1] When America decided to reduce its commitment and Sino-American rapprochement became imminent in 1969, Soviet strategy became increasingly and openly based on containment of China, Soviet aid to Vietnam remained substantial, and Soviet interest in Vietnam as a member of its recently announced collective security system increased.

After the unification of Vietnam, the facade of Communist solidarity gave further evidence of withering away. Le Duan, Vietnamese Communist Party First Secretary, visited Peking in

September 1975. No joint communique was issued following the visit. The Chinese pressed him to drop close relations with the Soviets and acknowledge the danger of Soviet hegemony; however, the Vietnamese still perceived the United States to be the major threat to the region. [Loescher, 1979:135] In October Le Duan went to Moscow and signed a long and short term aid agreement. In January 1976 the Soviets agreed to participate in forty aid projects in Vietnam. Early in 1976 the Chinese-Vietnamese dispute over the Paracel Islands intensified and it became evident Vietnam had chosed alignment with Russia at the risk of hostility with China. [Parker, 1977:33]

The Soviet Union had provided the military aid necessary for North Vietnam to invade the South and could provide aid to help Vietnam begin to build in peace. China, on the other hand, was still recovering from the Cultural Revolution and not able to provide substantial aid of any type to Vietnam: China's weakness was an advantage to the Soviets.

Soviet interests were also served by the deterioration of Vietnam's relations with China and Kampuchea between 1975 and 1978. Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, probably not possible without Soviet aid, has allowed the Soviets to expand their interests to all the Indochinese states. The Soviets have advisors in Kampuchea and have begun to develop naval facilities at two locations. [FBIS, 10 March 1982:J1]

Another result of the invasion of Kampuchea has been the increased isolation of Vietnam from the Western and non-Communist Asia world, particularly ASEAN,* increasing Vietnam's dependence on Soviet aid. The invasion triggered a Chinese attack on Vietnam proper, solidifying Vietnam's anti-Chinese stance, lessening the influence of the pro-Chinese elements in Vietnam's leadership, and making Soviet support that much more important.

Vietnam's extreme dependence allows the Soviets some leverage in using Indochinese territory to further their global interests. Naval and air facilities used by the Soviet military allow monitoring of American activity and present a challenge to American interests in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

Soviet policy toward Vietnam since 1965 has been to supply substantial amounts of aid in support of Vietnam's goals with little known interference in internal North Vietnamese affairs. The quid pro quo that has taken place is in the name of fraternal association, more realistically meaning that the divergence between Soviet and Vietnamese goals has not yet been a serious source of conflict.

1. Specific Soviet Goals

The Soviet Union has four generally accepted goals in Southeast Asia:

*Association of Southeast Asian States: Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia.

1. Contain China by offsetting Chinese influence in the region, both in the Communist states and parties and among non-Communist states;

2. Obtain facilities in the region to support Soviet military force projection, especially naval facilities;

3. Gain acceptance as a power in Southeast Asia that must be included as a necessary part of any settlements or negotiations pertaining to the region;

4. Foster trade with the region and gain access to raw materials. [(Scalapino, 1975:179) (Horn, 1973:494) (Pike, 1979:1160)]

A fifth goal may be added to this list: 5. the Soviet is attempting to establish strong state to state relations with each of the Indochinese states with the aim of establishing a loosely held sphere of influence and as a hedge against deteriorating relations with the Vietnamese.

a. Contain China

The goal of containing China and offsetting Chinese influence is the most important to the Soviets. A hostile Vietnam faces China with an unstable situation on its southern border. The Soviets have been able to exploit the regions traditional fear of China and, by supplying Vietnam with the means of resistance, faced China with a two-edged sword. Attacking Vietnam raises regional fears of Chinese hegemony while inaction allows the Vietnamese to consolidate their position in Laos and Kampuchea, posing a long term security problem for China.

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the Soviet Union and Vietnam in 1978 represents the capstone of Soviet efforts to secure Vietnam in their security system. Article six of the treaty states:

> "in case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties... shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries." [Survival, 1979:41]

While well short of a military alliance, this article tied the security interests of the two countries together at China's expense. Vietnam's entry into the Soviet dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) insured that aid to Vietnam would not be totally dependent on the Soviet Union, aid explicitly offered in Article two of the treaty between the two countries. The Soviets were able to include Vietnam in their Asian security system while invoking the economic resources of the Warsaw Pact region to help support the new arrangement. [Pike, 1979]

b. Facilities

A military annex to the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty was signed following the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Although the annex was not made public, [Pike, 1979:1163] the use of facilities is quite probably linked to Soviet aid. The French magazine Le Point reported that for doubling economic aid from three to six million dollars per day the Soviets gained unrestricted use of four former

American bases: Ton Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang. The Vietnamese deny any link between aid and base rights. In January 1981 Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach stated that Soviet use of Vietnam's territory was justified because "we had the same enemies. The victories of the Soviet Union were good for us. Ours were good for it. We are linked by a common fight." [FBIS, 28 January 1981:K4] In the same month he stated that the Soviets had no bases in Vietnam and that none were being planned, however, he noted that future developments could alter the plans.

Despite the lack of formally announced 'bases' the Soviets have been able to service combat ships in Vietnamese ports and station TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft at Vietnamese airfields. The number of Soviet aircraft and ships using Vietnam as a stopover or basing point has consistently risen since 1978. [Pike, 1979:1163-1166]

In addition to naval and air facilities the Soviets have installed several communication and intelligence gathering centers in Vietnam and Laos. The center in Vietnam has capabilities similar to a complex in Cuba and may monitor all communications in the area of the South China Sea. A satellite communication receiving station has been constructed in Laos "to meet the ever increasing demands for communication between Moscow and

Vientiane." [FBIS, 16 February 1982:I5] Perhaps an additional reason is to gain greater electronic access to southern China and to act as a relay station between Moscow and the main Soviet communication center at Cam Ranh Bay.

Soviet access to the landmass, waters, and airspace of Indochina further their interest in containing China and countering the United States in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The strategic implications of the Soviet emplacement are important: turn around time for units deployed to the Indian Ocean are greatly reduced; Soviet naval units can easily operate in the South Pacific; naval choke points such as the Straits of Malacca are within easy range; Soviet aircraft can perform reconnaissance missions along the south China coast or in the South China Sea; strike aircraft, such as the Backfire bomber, could pose a threat to China or other nations in the region; airlift support of Vietnamese operations is easily accomplished. This list is not exhaustive but it does underscore the advantages the Soviets accrue from their military presence in Indochina.

c. Acceptance as a Regional Power

The Soviet Union is accepted as a regional power, but neither respected nor liked. The Soviets have had limited success in achieving their goal of being consulted and involved in any international settlement affecting the region. Soviet

ability to control events is questioned by the ASEAN nations because, despite Soviet assurances that border violations would not occur, three days before a June 1980 ASEAN Ministers meeting a force of 200 Vietnamese troops attacked several kilometers into Thai territory. Naturally, Soviet credibility as a stabilizing power is weakened by such events. Each of the ASEAN nations faces an internal insurgency claiming association with Communism; none of the governments in power wishes to form a close relationship with a major Communist power such as the Soviet Union that might fuel domestic instability.

Singapore Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan summed the ASEAN position at the ministers meeting, "Vietnam had by a deliberate act allowed Indochina to become the cockpit of the Sino-Soviet conflict... Their (Vietnam) entire strength in the confrontation is derived from the Soviet Union." [FBIS, 17 June 1981:A2] Instead of turning to the Soviets, the ASEAN nations have looked to the United Nations for a solution, supported the formation of a 'united front' of the Kampuchean groups against the Vietnamese, and linked the Soviets with the intransigent stance Vietnam has taken in negotiations.

Russia has provided enough aid to the three Indochinese states to insure Soviet participation in most major foreign policy decisions made by these states.

Soviet economic aid, advisors, and technical assistance is crucial to all three. In return the Soviets have had diplomatic support from the three in addition to growing strategic military access.

d. Trade and Access to Raw Materials

The Soviets would like to increase their trade with the entire Pacific Basin region including Indochina and the ASEAN nations. The Soviet ambassador to Thailand has stated "Southeast Asia is now an area where there is competition for natural resources." [FBIS, 29 January 1981: J6] In Laos the Soviets have signed an agreement to help extract tin ores and to build a tin refinery. In Vietnam they have signed an accord calling for a joint oil exploration enterprise. [FBIS, 22 June 1981:K5, 22 June 1981:I3]

Trade and raw materials benefits are a long term Soviet goal, but there is little evidence that these potential benefits are a decisive factor in Soviet planning. The Soviets are not in need of the raw materials and trade offered by the region as much as other powers such as Japan. Soviet gains in commerce in Indochina have not offset the accompanying loss of trade with the ASEAN nations. [Robinson, 1980:24-25]

e. Form a Loose 'Sphere of Influence' Based on State to State Relations

The Soviets have established direct relations with the governments in Laos and Kampuchea. Soviet planning

groups work with their Laotian counterparts, Soviet military advisors work with Laotian military units, and other groups, such as the USSR-Laotian Friendship Association, foster direct Soviet access to Laos. In February 1982 Assistant Defense Minister and Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Ogarkov visited both Vietnam and Laos. In Laos Marshall Ogarkov inspected Laotian military units and spoke with Lao military and civilian officials including President Souphanouvong, the apparent number two man behind General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihan. [FBIS, 12 February 1981:I1-I2] In March, Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Nikolay Baybakov visited Laos after visiting Vietnam, meeting with the chairman of the Laotian Central Committee. The two sides:

> "expressed their unanimity to coordinate the implementation of the state plans of the two countries, namely in the economic and social construction fields which aim to contribute to the Lao revolution in the national socialist defense and construction... this cooperation... will also enhance and consolidate the existing friendship relations and combative solidarity between the parties, governments, and peoples of the two countries." [FBIS, 5 March 1982:I1]

Two aspects of the quote are significant: 1. the stress placed on Soviet-Lao ties and; 2. the absence of any reference to other Indochinese states, specifically Vietnam. The report of Ogarkov's visit likewise contained no mention of Indochinese solidarity.

The rhetoric used by the Soviets to describe their relations with Vietnam on the one hand and Laos and

Kampuchea on the other differs. With Laos and Kampuchea the Soviets have "friendship relations and combative solidarity" whereas with Vietnam stronger ties are conveyed based on "military solidarity and all-round cooperation." [Text of Fifth Party Congress in FBIS, 9 April 1982, p.11,18] Despite emphasis on their relationship with Vietnam, the Soviets are attempting to foster stronger state to state relations with the other two Indochinese states. Events in Cambodia highlight more sharply Soviet diplomacy.

In late December 1981, Kampuchea Defense Minister Pen Sovan and three associates were removed from their positions. The surprise firings were partially due to Sovan's contention that the key to Kampuchea's future lie only in the strengthening of solidarity with the Soviet Union. Sovan's dismissal indirectly supports the position that the Soviets are attempting to strengthen their influence in the region by improving state to state relations with Cambodia. Sovan was apparently removed without prior consultation with the Soviets, severely straining Soviet-Vietnamese relations and openly showing that Sovan's pro-Soviet stance was considered important by Moscow. [Chanda, 16 April 1982:18]

D. VIETNAMESE GOALS

1. Internal Goals

The main internal goal of the Vietnamese Communist Party is "to construct a modern socialist industrial state

with a minimum of coercion in a context of agrarian poverty and social division." [Turley, 1980:42] The Vietnamese must integrate the recently conquered South with the relatively socialized North and establish central control of the economy.

Improvements in agriculture are the first and primary goals. In the first years after 1975 Vietnam suffered a three million ton deficit in foodstuffs per year. Over two million tons were imported from the Soviet Union and today Vietnam still imports twenty percent of its foodstuffs from Russia. [Pike, 1979:1161] Population growth has been faster than the food production increases and by 1980 the rice ration was down from the 15 kilogram per month per person provided during the war to 8-10 kilos per month. [Thayer, 1978:221]

The problems plaguing agricultural production are similar to those in the Soviet Union following the Revolution and prior to Lenin's introduction of the New Economic Plan. Heavy state taxes provide no incentive for the peasants to produce more than they can consume, particularly in the South where sixty percent of the peasants had been free land-holders at the end of the war. [Turley, 1980:44-52] Pragmatic steps taken by the VCP Central Committee have given the peasant more rights to manage surplus production and in 1981 the harvest in North Vietnam, where the program was initiated, was excellent. However, massive imports are still required to keep the population fed at subsistence level. [Chanda, 8 January 1982:56-57]

Industrial production of any type is a problem in Vietnam. In 1979 the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee announced that "if some types of state-produced goods can now be better produced and developed by the handicraft and artisan industry and private capitalists, they must boldly be assigned to the latter. The organizational forms of production must not be fixed." [Turley, 1980:52]

A major goal of the Vietnamese is to spur industrial production. Vietnam has the worst balance of payments deficit of any country in the world. The exodus of refugees has severely damaged industries such as fishing and coal mining. Most of the 900,000 refugees who have fled the country since 1975 have gone in fishing boats. The expulsion of ethnic Chinese removed most of the managers and miners from the coal industry. Coal in particular is a source of hard currency the Vietnamese desperately need. The International Monetary Fund has suspended Vietnam's drawing rights until the nation can prove the money is being used for peaceful purposes and not to finance the war in Kampuchea. [Wall Street Journal, 5 April 1982:25] The aggregate effect of these economic woes is to increase Vietnam's dependence on the aid provided by the Soviets.

Integrating North and South Vietnam is a major goal. Severe problems exist because of the ethnic divergences and the persistence of what the Vietnamese leaders

call the pre-1975 way of thinking. The formation of New Economic Zones greatly contributed to the exodus of the 'boat people', and the process of forming new zones has been slowed considerably in the past few years. The reluctance of the conquering Northerners to use the bureaucratic skills of the Southerners was initially a problem. [Turley, 1980]

The principle obstacle to successful integration is a lack of trained party cadres. The Soviet Union has been instrumental in managing this problem by accepting thousands of Vietnamese for technical and administrative training in the Soviet Union. In 1979 there were an estimated 30,000 Vietnamese students and worker trainees in the Soviet Union and another 6,000 in Eastern Europe. In April 1982 the Vietnamese Minister of Labor praised the Soviet Union for training "cadres, scientists, technicians, economic managers ... and skilled workers specializing in various economic and technical sectors." [FBIS, 9 April 1981:K19]

Party problems continue to exist and were a major topic of discussion at the Fifth Party Congress held in March 1982. The VCP report to the Congress stated:

> "The realities of the past few years have also clearly shown the party's weakness and shortcomings in economic and social leadership, as manifested in deficiencies with regard to the implementation and centralization of the party's lines in practical organizational capacity, in the style of leadership presenting features not suited to the new stage."
> [Text of Fifth Congress Report, FBIS Supplement, 9 April 1982:50]

Improving the performance of the party cadres is seen as a crucial step in solving the other major problems. Internal steps have included non-violent purges and a massive recruitment and training program. Technical and management training provided by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe satellites offer the only route presently available for Vietnamese cadres to receive the training necessary to manage the nation in peace.

2. External Goals

Vietnam's prioritization of external goals may change in 1982-83 in light of indications the Soviets are either unwilling or unable to provide as much support as they have in the past. [Chanda, 16 April 1982:17-18] Unless Russo-Vietnamese relations deteriorate drastically, however, Vietnam's primary goal will remain the consolidation of its current relations with neighboring Laos and Kampuchea. It is an open question whether Vietnam seeks lasting dominance over its neighbors or simply to remove any lingering threat to its newly won independence.

The immediate goal is to secure recognition of the Vietnamese installed government of Heng Samrin in Kampuchea. Since Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in 1978, the ASEAN nations have attempted to end Vietnam's occupation through U.N. mediation. These efforts have failed because Vietnam refuses United Nations participation and insists that

representatives of the Heng Samrin regime be included in direct negotiations--confronting ASEAN with what amounts to de facto recognition of the Phnom Penh regime.

Vietnam does desire a solution to the Kampuchea problem because the current situation is very costly in terms of manpower and material resources. Maintaining the Samrin regime currently requires Vietnam to maintain a 180,000 man force in Kampuchea. The type of solution is crucial because the Vietnamese are fearful that Kampuchea could be used as a haven for organizing insurgencies among Vietnam's minorities, therefore, the occupation may continue until that potential threat is no longer perceived. [Turley, 1980:98]

The broader goal may be the creation of an Indochinese Federation. The idea has been suggested by many free-world writers and is not completely denied by the Vietnamese themselves.* Mention of a special relationship between the Indochinese states was first seen in a 1976 visit of the Lao Premier to Hanoi. In 1980, a Vietnamese economic planner stated:

> "In a firm strategic position in which Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are interdependent it is necessary to

*In March 1982 interview, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach stated in relation to the three states: "In the past there was solidarity and cooperation. This solidarity was of crucial importance in our struggle for independence. It cannot be broken off just like that. Fate has welded Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea together.

> combine the disposition of strategic regions with economic regions and to regulate and distribute the workforce and the population for building grain production bases, industrial zones, infrastructures..." [Chanda, 20 June 1980:28]

Provinces in Laos and Kampuchea have been linked with sister provinces in Vietnam. The indication is that Communist social engineering will apply to the resources of the entire Indochinese peninsula, coupled with the Communist corollary of central control.

The Federation is held together by the presence of 30-50,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos and 180,000 troops in Kampuchea. Without Soviet aid it is difficult to imagine how Vietnam could continue its occupation. The Vietnamese have no munitions industry and few technicians and administrators to spare.

Achievement of Vietnam's second cluster of external goals, broadening its sources of aid and improving relations with its non-Communist neighbors and the West, has been severely hampered by their military ventures in Indochina. The invasion of Kampuchea alienated many of Vietnam's neighbors and brought a sharp reaction from the West. Normalization with the United States, proceeding fairly smoothly prior to the invasion, hinges on Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea. In June 1981 Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated "The United States will not normalize relations with a Vietnam that occupies Kampuchea and remains a source of trouble to the entire region." [New York Times, 21 June 1981: A12]

Short of adjusting their primary goal, the Vietnamese have made several efforts to improve relations with the non-Communist world. In 1978 Premier Pham Van Dong toured the ASEAN to improve Vietnam's image, offering to establish bilateral relations. Demands to Thailand for the aircraft and boats used in the 1975 evacuation were dropped, refugee and economic agreements were signed, the treaties of friendship were proposed. In the years 1977-78 Vietnam attempted to re-involve the United States in Vietnam, dropping demands for war reparations as a precondition for normalization and asking for aid on a humanitarian basis.* [Thayer, 1978:221-223]

The Kampuchean invasion aborted these early efforts but Vietnam has attempted bilateral approaches several times since 1978 and recently offered to conclude non-aggression pacts with the separate ASEAN states. [FBIS, 19 February 1982:K6-7]

E. SUMMARY

The following Soviet and Vietnamese goals have been presented:

Soviet	Vietnamese
	Internal
1. Contain China	1. Improve agriculture

*One author reported President Nixon had previously of offered 3.5 billion in reconstruction aid but the plan was blocked by Congress. [Thayer, 1978:224]

2. Gain access to facilities for military forces
3. Establish itself as a regional power
4. Access to trade and raw materials
5. Establish strong state to state relations with the individual Indochinese states

2. Strengthen Party cadres in order to strengthen economic and political controls
3. Increase industrial production
4. Integrate and socialize South

External

1. Dominate Indochina
2. Gain international acceptance of Kampuchea's Heng Samrin regime
3. Broaden sources of aid
4. Improve relations with Asian non-Communist and Western states

Vietnam is in the uncomfortable position of having to depend on the Soviets to help fulfill most of their internal goals and their most important external goals. Improving agricultural production and feeding the populace requires Soviet aid in terms of farm equipment fertilizers, and foodstuffs to feed the population. A crucial part of economic development is the availability of people trained to manage the tasks of an industrialized society. The Soviet Union provides almost all the training available to Vietnam, Vietnam's war making capability, and diplomatic support for the Vietnamese goal of legitimizing the Samrin regime.

Vietnam's dependence allows the Soviets to fulfill most of their regional goals. Soviet efforts to establish state to state relations with Laos and Kampuchea may, however, conflict with Vietnam's goals in Indochina. The Sovan incident highlights the potential strain caused by that divergence. Soviet goals already met could be jeopardized by closer relations between Vietnam and the non-Communist world. Reduced economic dependence may bring the divisive factors of the two alien cultures into play.

Although Vietnam appreciates Soviet aid, Vietnamese consider the Russians to be more racist than other societies and to have a gauling degree of cultural chauvinism. [Pike, "Vietnam and the USSR," 225-256] Regardless of their differences, the Vietnamese-Soviet relationship will continue to be mutually beneficial unless Vietnam changes its stance in Kampuchea or the Soviet Union curtails its support.

III. COSTS OF EMPIRE

Soviet expenditures in Indochina must meet two criteria. First, they must be sufficient to sustain Soviet credibility as an ally and a regional power. The Soviets desire non-Communist states such as the ASEAN nations to perceive the USSR as a power willing and able to contribute to regional development. Second, expenditures in Vietnam and throughout Indochina must be related to the Soviet's ability to maintain their commitments. Soviet Russia is constrained by limited economic resources and many competing commitments.

The massive amounts of aid already provided to Vietnam have not been used as efficiently as the Soviets had hoped. [Chanda, 16 April 1982:18] In the past 18 months the Soviets have had to attempt to rationalize their relationship with Vietnam. Factors such as Poland's economic disintegration and shortcomings in the Soviet economy have demanded a closer accounting of all the costs of maintaining the Soviet empire. Vietnam represents just one.

Three types of costs will be evaluated and related to potential tradeoffs in Europe: economic, military, and political.

A. ECONOMIC

The Soviets and Vietnamese face an enormous task in developing Vietnam's economy. In 1975, the year North Vietnam unified the country by force, Vietnam was an economic basket case. There was little industrial production, virtually no energy production, and dangerously reduced agricultural production. Food, capital, and training were desperately needed. The Soviet Union provided 1.2 billion dollars in aid the first year after the war, including 2-3 million metric tons of food required to meet the basic food needs of the population. In Vietnam's first five year plan, 1976-80, the Soviet Union pledged sixty percent of the 3.2 billion dollars required by the plan. [Pike, 1979:1160-1165] Since 1976 the Soviets have continued to provide significant amounts of aid to Vietnam and also to Laos and Kampuchea.

Current estimates of Soviet expenditures in Indochina range from three to six million dollars (equivalent) per day, the majority going to Vietnam. [FBIS, 10 March 1982:J1] The total amount of expenditure may be much higher. In 1981 the total amount of military aid was estimated to be between 900 million to 1.0 billion and economic aid between 4 and 6 billion dollars (see Table I). Most of these amounts represent repayable loans at approximately 4 percent interest. The immediate return to the Soviet Union is very small given Vietnam's stunning trade deficit and underdeveloped resources.

TABLE I

Soviet Military and Economic Aid to Vietnam, 1975-1981

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Military	123-150**	44-50	75-125	600-850	890-1.4***	790-905	900-1.0
Economic	450-500	560-750	750-1.0	810-1.0	900-1.1	2.9-3.2	4.0-6.0
Total	573-650	604-800	825-1.125	1.410-1.850	1.790-2.5	3.690-4.105	4.9-7.0

**millions of dollars
***1.4 billion

		Low		High
Total Investment 1975-81	=	14.792	-	21.480
1982 Estimate				
1.0	Military	3.432	-	4.480
4.0	Economic	10.370	-	13.550

*Amounts provided by Professor Douglas Pike. They will appear in his forthcoming book Vietnam and the USSR: A Study of a Geopolitical Relation, University of California Press, late 1982 or early 1983.

The large spread between estimates results from different accounting procedures among the various intelligence communities and private analysts. These figures do not represent gratis aid - most of it is in the form of loans and credits granted at approximately 4% interest. Figures from 1980-81 represent amount provided to Vietnam - aid provided to Laos and Cambodia takes place under bilateral agreements with the Soviets.

Vietnam possesses significant potential wealth. In the early seventies the Vietnamese produced 3.5 percent of the world's total rice crop and were capable of being a rice exporter. Natural rubber, copra, citrus fruits, and other commercially valuable crops can be grown in Vietnam. Tin, zinc, and coal deposits exist that have not been fully exploited. The waters surrounding Vietnam, especially in the South, include some of the best fishing areas in the world. All of Indochina possesses valuable timber resources. The problem is and has been that Vietnam does not have the means to extract and fully use its resources. Before the Soviet Union can realize any meaningful return on its economic investment in terms of imports it must provide the means and the training for Vietnam to extract its potential wealth. [Espenshade, 1980:30-45]

Soviet economic aid is targeted to build the Vietnamese economy to the point where it can export some of its wealth in useable form to the Soviet Union. This is not malicious on the part of the Soviets; every nation with common sense strives for the most favorable terms of trade possible. Summarizing the aid program, the Soviet military attache to Vietnam recently stated:

> "The internationalism and fraternal sentiments of the Soviets toward Vietnam are reflected in the assistance given by the Soviet Union to Vietnam in building or restoring nearly 100 projects including the biggest ones in Southeast Asia such as the Binh hydroelectric

power plant on the Da River, the Pha Lai thermoelectric power plant, the Bim Son cement plant, the Thang Long Bridge on the Red River, and so forth."
[FBIS, 18 March 1982:K9]

The scope of the aid program is indicated: electrical power for industrialization, cement for construction, and bridges, etc., for improved transportation.

Building the power plants creates an infrastructure of support and a number of trained workers. The Soviet sponsored Tri A power plant located 70 kilometers (KM) northeast of Ho Chi Minh city (Saigon) will employ 20,000 workers, require many miles of railroad to be constructed, and create a new, very large reservoir. The Soviets are providing the construction materials and the technicians, specialists and engineers necessary to supervise the construction and train the workers. [FBIS, 25 February 1982:K3] Other areas of major Soviet investment are agriculture, energy resources, mineral extraction and other resources such as natural rubber, transportation and communication, and consumer goods production.

Vietnamese and Soviet sources agree that developing agriculture is the most critical task facing Vietnam. The Vietnamese Minister of Agriculture stated at the recent Fifth Party Congress that the acceleration of production is most "vital" and it was equally vital "that we accelerate the scientific and technical revolution in agriculture." [Minister of Agriculture Report, Nhan Dan, 8 April 1982:3]

A Soviet commentator similarly stated "Agriculture remains the most important thing for Vietnam at the present time." [FBIS, Soviet Union, 17 February 1982:E2]

Technical development of Vietnam's agriculture relies exclusively on aid from the Soviet Union and the East European satellites. The Soviets have provided large amounts of farm machinery and associated equipment including items such as a completely furbished tractor plant located near Da Nang capable of producing 150 units per year. [FBIS, 7 January 1981: E9] The 1982 Soviet-Vietnamese Trade agreement specifies a sizeable increase in the delivery of machinery and spare parts plus other farming necessities such as nitrogen fertilizers. [FBIS, 4 March 1982:E3]

The Soviets have supplied Vietnam with tons of machinery and other equipment in an effort to raise the quantity of natural rubber produced. Under Soviet guidance (or pressure?) large tracts of previously uncultivated land have been dedicated to rubber production with the goal of quickly raising the amount available for export to the Soviet Union. [FBIS, 9 January 1981:K9; 5 March 1981:K11]

Raising Vietnam's food production is crucial to the Soviets because the Soviets have little food to spare. Vietnamese farmers have had little incentive to increase production, at first because of the high state taxes and later because, even when allowed to keep their surplus

production, no goods were available to purchase. Pham Van Dong's report to the Fifth Party Congress stated, "we should consider agriculture the first front and must step up consumer goods production to meet present urgent needs of every day life." [FBIS, 22 April 1982:K9] The Soviets have supplied a quantity of consumer goods including cloth, ready made clothes, shoes, etc., free. [FBIS, 12 February 1982:K6] The aid provided benefits to both nations because the consumer goods help to raise agricultural production and thus reduce Soviet food assistance. The emphasis on aid such as the consumer goods, fertilizer more than foodstuffs, and machinery to increase rubber production, is evidence of the Soviet effort to rationalize their relationship with Vietnam.

Industrialization is severely hampered by Vietnam's lack of energy sources. Water power potential exists in abundance, and there are limited amounts of coal, oil, and natural gas. Soviet aid to develop water-generated electrical power, such as in the Da River project, has been discussed. Soviet aid is perhaps even more important for Vietnam to extract its other energy resources because of a complete lack of indigenous talent in the field of offshore oil and gas exploration. In June 1981 the two countries signed a joint exploration and exploitation agreement aimed at tapping offshore oil and natural gas deposits. Nhan Dan hailed the agreement, stating that "This cooperation has given birth to Vietnam's

natural gas branch whose development plays a very important role in socialist industrialization." [FBIS, 22 June 1981: K5] Nguyen Lam, chairman of the Planning Commission, stated that in 1982 Vietnam's first offshore well will be drilled. The Soviets continue to supply 1.5 million tons of oil annually, although Vietnam is attempting to cut imports because the price of Soviet oil keeps rising. [Chanda, 8 January 1982:13-14]

Transportation, industrial construction, and cultural exchange represent the other major areas of Soviet aid. Many bridges and roads have been constructed, rail lines installed, and construction materials supplied. On 16 February 1982 the twenty-fifth anniversary of Soviet-Vietnamese cultural exchange was marked by ceremonies held in both the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The Soviets hailed the occasion by presenting the works of Lenin translated into Vietnamese. [FBIS, 17 February 1982:K8]

Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach stated recently that total Soviet aid for the period 1976-1980 reached the total provided in the previous thirty years. [FBIS, 6 May 1982: K8] The 1982 trade protocol between the countries continues to concentrate on developing Vietnam's self-sufficiency while perhaps cutting back on the delivery of foodstuffs.

> "In 1982 the USSR will continue deliveries of power generating, mining and quarrying, transportation and conveyance equipment, farm and roadbuilding machinery,

> lorries, oil products, nonferrous metals and rolled nonferrous metal, sawn timber, cotton and other consumer goods. A sizeable increase is to be made in the deliveries of Soviet commodities imported for the Vietnamese economy, particularly rolled iron and steel, nitrogen fertilizers, and spare parts and machinery, equipment and transport facilities."
> [FBIS, 4 March 1982:E3]

In return the Vietnamese are expected to supply the Soviets with growing quantities of natural rubber, fresh vegetables and fruits, parquet blocks, coffee, tea, footwear, rugs and other consumer goods. For the increased return, Thach stated that total Soviet aid for the 1980-85 period will increase fourfold over the 1976-80 amount. [FBIS, 6 May 1982:K1]

Laos and Kampuchea are also receiving increased amounts of Soviet aid. Approximately 25,000 tons of construction materials will be delivered to Laos in 1982 under the terms of a recently signed Soviet-Lao agreement. [FBIS, 22 March 198 :I4] There is a Lao-Soviet protocol on economic, technical, and scientific cooperation under which a feasibility study is being done by the Soviets to determine if an oil pipeline running from Vietnam to Laos can be constructed. [FBIS, 24 April 1981:I2] The Soviets manage several other projects in Laos and carry out goodwill projects such as building schools and providing road construction material. [FBIS, 1 July 1981:I2] The Soviets also deliver oil and some consumer products to Laos.

In February 1981 the Soviet Union and Kampuchea signed an economic aid agreement. Tractors, Vehicles, construction equipment, and most recently 37 trucks have been turned over to the Phnom Penh government. [FBIS, 18 February 1981:H7; 2 March 1982:H2] Overall, the aid given to Laos and Kampuchea is significantly less than that afforded Vietnam. The amount is growing and the trend between now and 1985 should clearly show an increase in bilateral aid with the two smaller Indochinese states. The economic return for Soviet investment in these two countries will be extremely small for the foreseeable future; Laos and Kampuchea suffer the same problems as Vietnam to a far greater degree.

1. Soviet Economic Costs in Perspective

Total Soviet economic aid to Indochina in the period 1976-81 was roughly four billion dollars.* This conservative figure represents visible aid in terms of material delivered and capital absorbed. There are many hidden costs such as the advisors who fly and manage an airline operation in Kampuchea and the Air Traffic Controllers who help manage

*The figure is based on a total of 8.9 billion derived from adding 1.2 billion dollars in 1976 [Pike, 1979] to the total in subsequent years, graduating 1.2 by .1 per year to 1.5 in 1979. Pike provides the figure 1.9 for 1980 and using current estimates I figured 1.6 billion total for 1981 using an average of 4.5 million per day. Economic aid total was estimated using Pike's ratio of 45.55 economic versus military aid. [Pike, 1981]

the airspace above Indochina. The funds spent to improve facilities used by the Soviets and to construct new ones also represent costs.

Naturally, resources expended in Indochina are not available for other commitments. The economic shortfalls of the socialist community exacerbate the problems of supporting an economically weak state such as Vietnam, which absorbs but does not contribute to the system. There is a circular effect in that the Soviet Union makes demands on East European countries to help support its empire, contributing to the internal economic problems of those nations. When an East European nation suffers economic problems, it must turn to the Soviet Union, plagued with its own severe economic problems, for assistance.

"The Vietnamese people sincerely thank the Soviet Union and other Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) countries for their great assistance," hailed Nhan Dan, the Vietnamese daily newspaper, in May 1981. CEMA members were specifically congratulated for their part in constructing the trans-Vietnam railroad. [FBIS, 27 May 1981:K7] As early as June 1978 the East European countries had provided significant aid to Vietnam: 700 tons of equipment for telegraph lines from Hungary; cement mixers from Bulgaria; compressors and truck mounted cranes from the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and rails and diesel generating stations

from Poland. [Pike, 1979] The GDR and Bulgaria continue to supply considerable aid. In May 1981 the GDR signed a long-term trade agreement with Laos in addition to an agreement the GDR already had with Vietnam. The extent of East German aid is difficult to estimate; some has been expended on service-oriented projects such as bicycle repair shops. [FBIS, 13 March 1981:K17] Bulgaria has signed an agreement with Kampuchea and Vietnam for developing agriculture, forestry, and mineral exploration. Thousands of Vietnamese students are enrolled in Eastern European schools for technical and management training.

Eastern Europe can ill afford to support Indochina's development. The oil crises of the 1970s and the centrally planned mismanagement of many Eastern economies have rendered them extremely vulnerable. The Eastern bloc countries recently had to provide 800 million dollars worth of credit to support Poland. Vietnam will not be capable of contributing to CEMA for many years, because its goods are not readily adaptable to European markets and its need for development capital is immense.

The situation in Eastern Europe poses several problems for the Soviets. Faltering satellites such as Poland are an embarrassment to the Soviet system. Poland's 25 billion dollar Western debt has stymied the flow of credit and civil unrest has been open and widespread. [Wall Street

Journal, 23 April 1982:28] The Poles are forced to turn to the Soviets and satellite neighbors for raw materials and other products they can no longer afford to purchase from the West.

Other bloc countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia are openly expanding the private sector to help meet the demands of their public and to support their economies. The Czechs allow individual entrepreneurs to perform services such as dressmaking, carpentry, and barbering for profit -- small steps, but ones that were banned following the 1968 invasion. Hungary plans to boost the private share of its retail economy to about five percent. [Wall Street Journal, 22 April 1982:34; 12 May 1982:28] Hungary recently became the second Bloc country to apply for membership in the Western-controlled International Monetary Fund (IMF). Its membership application has been approved, allowing Hungary to increase its drawing rights on Western capital. [Wall Street Journal, 6 May 1982:32]

The billions of dollars worth of Soviet resources expended in Indochina could be used (a) to bolster failing economies such as that of Poland before they reach the critical stage or (b) assist other bloc countries facing economic stagnation in order to prevent alteration of their economics in ways the Soviets could not help but disapprove. Eastern Europe already absorbs most Soviet foreign aid, so commitments such as Vietnam and Cuba absorb whatever is left over.

In 1982 the Soviet Union is expected to suffer its lowest growth rate since World War II. Many industries are performing well below the state-determined goals. The Soviet news agency TASS has reported shortfalls in nonferrous metals, building materials, light industry, and milk and bread production. The grain crop has been poor for several years. 1981 was a disaster with an estimated shortfall of 80 million tons. Some reports indicate the Soviets will not be able to import enough to make up for the failure because transportation and storage problems limit the amount of imported grain the nation can manage. The end result will be a reduction in the meat available and more hardships for the Soviet consumer. The government has candidly warned the public to expect serious shortages. [Wall Street Journal, 8 April 1982: 25; 26 April 1982:1]

Although the Soviets have relatively less Western debt than the East European nations, it is still substantial: 7.3 billion in 1970, 8.5 billion in 1980. [Anderson, 12 April 1982:38] The Soviets are using gold for collateral on their loans and selling large quantities of gold to get hard currency -- a process that lowers the price of gold and the value of Soviet reserves. [Wall Street Journal, 25 March 1982:26]

Vietnam's absorption of resources from the Soviets and bloc countries must be considered in the context of the

bleak economic situation of the entire socialist community. Vietnam's need for agricultural development and industrial modernization parallels the major shortfalls of the Soviet economy. If the Soviets have a difficult time feeding themselves, how can they feed the Vietnamese?*

Far Eastern Economic Review reports that many East European diplomats in Asia have not tried to hide their "lack of enthusiasm for the Vietnamese involvement in Kampuchea or their unhappiness at being called upon to foot the bill." [Chanda, 29 February 1980:12] Their complaints probably refer not to directly financing the war and occupation but to the increased economic aid required to make up for the Soviet aid diverted to the war effort.

2. Economic Tradeoffs

Two possible tradeoffs exist between Soviet options in Eastern Europe and their commitments in Indochina:

1. Eastern Europe's technical, financial and military support of Indochina limits East European willingness and ability to support other Soviet projects;

2. Soviet resources expended in Indochina are not available to support the USSR's overriding interest in maintaining dominance in Eastern Europe.

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*The Soviets do not face starvation, but they face yet another cut in per capita meat consumption that is already low. Meat consumption is a primary indicator of the well-being of the population; its reduction in 1982 represents another unfulfilled commitment from the Brezhnev leadership.

The first tradeoff is supported by the realities of civil unrest in Poland and the willingness of other states such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia to risk open ideological deviance to improve their economies. Indochina is not the cause of the socialist malaise but its absorption of resources exacerbates the trade and financial problems of the bloc.

The second tradeoff requires the Soviets to prioritize goals. Funds expended in Indochina cannot be quickly recouped. Opportunities for stabilizing the economic situation in Poland or forestalling Hungary's bid to join the IMF by making Soviet funds available have already been lost. Current events indicate that prioritization has occurred: 1.2 billion dollars were provided to Poland recently and the Poles were able to pay back $500 million in interest on rescheduled loans; Vietnam has had to default on a 500 million dollar payment due Japan. [Anderson, 12 April 1982:41]

The problem for the Soviets is to determine in what quantity and for how long Eastern Europe will demand resources otherwise available for Indochina. A seed for discord exists between the long term requirements of the Soviet and East European economies and the Vietnam's Foreign Minister's statement that Soviet aid will increase fourfold between 1981 and 1985.

B. MILITARY

Soviet military expenditures in Indochina surpass the amount of economic aid provided to Vietnam and the other Indochinese states. Of the estimated 8.9 billion dollars worth of aid provided between 1976 and 1981, 4.9 was spent on military support. The tonnage delivered doubled in 1977-78, and 1979 was 50 percent greater than 1978. [Pike, 1979: 1160-66] Soviet military assistance has allowed Vietnam to maintain a 1.1 million man army, fourth largest in the world, and occupation troops in Laos and Kampuchea numbering between 210,000 and 250,000.

Vietnam has no arms industry and could not maintain its present military commitments without massive external aid. ["USSR and Vietnam," Pike, 1979:255] The stockpiles of American arms captured by the North Vietnamese in 1975 are dwindling, and transportation of arms and other materials is largely accomplished by Soviet rather than captured American aircraft. Soviet AN-26 and AN-12 aircraft directly supported the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, making up to thirty flights per day. [Pike, 1979:1164-66]

The Soviets directly participate in Vietnamese operations. TU-95D reconnaissance aircraft fly from airfields in Vietnam over the conflict areas in Kampuchea and near China, presumably sharing some of their intelligence finds with the Vietnamese. In mid-1979 there were about 5,000 Soviet

advisors serving in Vietnam. [Pike, 1979:1164] Today there are an estimated 8,000 throughout Indochina. [Weintraub, 28 December 1981:1; FBIS, 10 March 1982:J1]

Thai sources report that Soviet engineering corps troops are in Kampuchea building bridges and roads. [FBIS, 4 May 1982:J6] The Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (VODK), a radio broadcast controlled by the anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, has reported that Soviet troops have been directly involved in chemical operations. They also claim several Soviets have been killed in Khmer Rouge engagements with the Vietnamese. [FBIS, 20 May 1981;H4]

The type and quantity of Soviet military aid delivered to Vietnam has changed over time. Immediately after the unification, supplies consisted mostly of small arms and ammunition designed to control the populace newly 'liberated' in the South. When the Vietnamese prepared and launched their offensive against Cambodia the Soviets switched the type of aid provided to include artillery, helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and other equipment needed for that type of war. Deliveries of this second type of aid continue today. [FBIS, 4 May 1982:J6] A third type of aid has been added in roughly the last year that confirms Vietnam's position in the Soviet collective security system. The aid includes warships and strengthened defenses around Cam Ranh Bay and other important Soviet installations. More interesting is evidence that

joint planning may be taking place between the Soviet military and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). The planning is mostly Soviet and the design is to have the PAVN forces act as an adjunct to Soviet forces in the event of a major war with China.*

The Department of Defense booklet Soviet Military Power designates Vietnam as a major Soviet arms client and as having major concentrations of Soviet and East European military advisors. [September 1981:84-85] The East German military attache in Vietnam stated "many infantry officers from our country have actually assisted the Vietnamese Army in building the technical NCO school... in Ho Chi Minh city and formulating its teaching and training to become lecturers and instructors in the Vietnamese Army." [FBIS, 3 March 1982: K13]

In the past 18 months Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary have sent military delegations to Indochina. Pledges of mutual support were made, e.g., "consolidate and strengthen the relations between the nations and armies of Laos and Hungary and to give long term assistance to each other." [FBIS, 21 April 1982:I1-I3] Exactly what and how much aid is provided by the East European nations is not clear. The evidence suggests that the commitment is growing.

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*Based on an interview with Professor Douglas Pike, former American Foreign Service Officer. He served in Vietnam from 1960-1970 and is currently at the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

1. Military Tradeoffs

How much do Soviet and East European military expenditures in Indochina limit Soviet military options in Europe and elsewhere? Probably very little. The Soviet Union has 4.8 million men under arms. They have more tanks, aircraft, and artillery pieces than any state on earth. Their airlift and sealift capability are equalled only by the United States. [Soviet Military Power, 1981:3-4] In 1980 approximately 20 percent of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) was expended in support of the Soviet military. [Scott and Scott, 1981:379] The 8,000 advisors, military aid and equipment provided to Vietnam represent marginal costs to the Soviet military machine in return for the advantages of having facilities in Indochina.

The military expenditures are more significant when lumped together with economic aid figures. The total amount represents a tremendous loss in opportunity costs. There are other costs engendered by the Soviet military presence and support for Vietnam. These are difficult to quantify but very important: political costs. Political costs affect Soviet relations in the region and, as in the case of illegal chemical warfare, could have international repercussions. The political costs of the Soviet involvement in Indochina may, in the long run, be more damaging to Soviet interests than either economic or military expenditures.

C. POLITICAL COSTS

According to the Soviets, many lives have been saved by the food provided to Vietnam by the Soviets. The power plants and mineral extraction projects offered by the Soviets represent a serious effort to transform Vietnam into a modern, developed state. Throughout Indochina the Soviets are building roads and providing aid that in the long run will help to integrate Indochina into the world community. The problem with this rosy picture is that with Soviet aid has come a large Soviet military presence coupled with support of Vietnam's military adventures. This military aid is clearly to support the joint goals of the Soviets and Vietnamese in Southeast Asia.

The Soviets and Vietnamese have seriously damaged their relations with non-Communist nations, especially those in ASEAN, by their military involvement in Kampuchea. Each of the ASEAN states has publicly announced its desire for Vietnamese troops to leave Kampuchea in order to relieve tensions in the region and as a prerequisite for establishing good relations with Vietnam. The Vietnamese, however, have steadfastly refused to take part in any international conference on Kampuchea that would condemn their position or call for United Nations supervised elections in Kampuchea designed to elect a legitimate government.

The Vietnamese aggression has resulted in a unified stand on the part of the ASEAN nations. While maintaining they are

not a military alliance, other rudimentary forms of aid and support have been agreed upon by member states, in the event one of them is attacked. Philippine President Marcos has stressed the need for a negotiated settlement and called on other nations such as Japan to use its influence to pressure Vietnam into a compromise.

The Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has bluntly stated, "Vietnam needs to make peace with her neighbors and call off the confrontation with China. To do this she must withdraw from Kampuchea." [FBIS, 27 July 1981:02] Pacific basin nations such as Australia have determined that no aid be given to Vietnam until its military forces are removed from Laos and Kampuchea. The Australian Parliament has also decided to support policies that would result in the independence of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea based on democratically elected governments. The nations condemning the Vietnamese are fully aware that only Soviet support makes the occupation of Laos and Cambodia possible.

Soviet prestige is at a low ebb in the region. In 1981 Indonesia's Vice-President, Adam Malik, stated "The Soviet Union now represents the greatest threat to the area because it is helping Vietnam realize Ho Chi Minh's old dream of a single Southeast Asian Communist grouping." [Talbott, 1981: 106] The image of the Soviets was not improved when the United Nations conference called for by the ASEAN states

was boycotted by Vietnam with open Soviet support. The Vietnamese-Soviet counter proposal for a regional conference to discuss security issues was rejected by ASEAN. The Malaysian Foreign Minister stated that the proposal could not resolve the major problem of Kampuchea and that it conflicted with United Nations resolutions dealing with Kampuchea. Indonesia's Foreign Minister reported that ASEAN's stand against such a conference could not be reversed by Soviet support for the proposals. [FBIS, 26 February 1981: N1]

Soviet military forces based in Indochina have raised fears in the region and beyond, making an American presence more welcome to some. Australian Prime Minister Malcombe Fraser has commented on the danger posed by Soviet Backfire bombers based in Vietnam because of their ability to strike Australian cities with only one refueling. The new threat is being considered in Australian Air Force tactical planning and, more worrisome for the Soviets, weighs heavily in a new agreement between Australia and the United States allowing B-52 aircraft to make servicing stops at Darwin. [FBIS, 17 March 1981:M1] Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has been the most vocal about the dangers of a too precipitous pullout of American forces from Asia--a fear far more prevalent after 1975. The ASEAN nations have accepted and probably appreciate America's more active role in the region in the last

few years as a counterweight to the growing Soviet power and to further Vietnamese aggression. [Talbott, 1981:104-197]

The Soviet military presence in Indochina has significantly increased the pressure for Japan to rearm, with all the ramifications that has for the global military balance. Some 58 members of the Japanese Diet recently issued a statement calling for an amendment to the Japan-United States security agreement, noting that it is the duty of the Japanese people to contribute to the formation of a peaceful world order. The statement reasoned:

> "At a time when the area of operations of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is expanding to the Indonesian peninsula and when there is a growing fear for the safety of our sea lanes, is it not time for us to show our willingness to shoulder our responsibilities to defend ourselves and to protect our sea lanes..." [Wall Street Journal, 19 April 1982:23]

The United States is pressuring the Japanese to increase their defense spending. It is an open question whether the long term interests of either the Soviet Union or the United States will be served by a more fully rearmed Japan; there is no question that if the Japanese chose to rearm the Soviet threat in Indochina will play a major role in the decision.

The degree of Soviet involvement in Vietnam associates it with the many internal problems Vietnam is suffering. Despite seven years of substantial Soviet aid, Vietnam today hardly represents a model of Communist success. Soviet aid has yet to produce a Vietnam capable of feeding its own population.

Current economic conditions are reported to be much worse than they were in 1975. Many factories have closed and the people have less to eat than they did during the war. [Doan Van Toai, 24 March 1982:24]

In April 1982, the Wall Street Journal reported that Vietnam continues to hold approximately 126,000 people in "reeducation camps" described as similar to concentration camps in conditions of existence and brutality. It is not uncommon for a new Communist nation to deal brutally with non-conformists and the situation in Vietnam highlights the fact that totalitarian methods have not changed since the Soviets fine-tuned the arts of repression in the 1920s and 30s. The Wall Street Journal editorial stated "The reeducation camps don't appear to have yet approached the ferocity of the Soviet gulag, where tens of millions lost their lives in post-Revolutionary Russia." [8 April 1982:20]

Soviet-Vietnamese labor exchange relations have been treated skeptically in Western reports. In an effort to balance the trade deficit with the Soviet Union and perhaps to increase the number of trained workers, thousands of Vietnamese have been sent to Russia to work in Soviet factories. Their length of stay will be five to six years. The Vietnamese will be paid and treated as Soviet workers according to the agreement, with part of their pay going toward the interest payments on Vietnam's debt. Vietnamese

and Soviet sources acknowledge the existence of the agreement but state the workers are to "receive vocational training and improve their professional skills... and become an enlightened and trained work force of the Vietnamese working class." [FBIS, 16 April 1982:K2]

The Western media have labeled it slave trade, placed the projected number of workers involved at 500,000, and indicated that many workers will go to Siberia. One radical view links the extension of Western credit for the Siberian gas pipeline to the importation of slave labor to lay the pipe because of the Soviet manpower shortage. [Wall Street Journal, 3 May 1982: 28] The truth probably lies between the Soviet-Vietnamese and Western versions. The Soviets pay a political price regardless of the truth because, except for deported slave labor, there is little precedent for the Soviet-Vietnamese labor exchange accord.

1. Political Tradeoffs

Some Soviet political costs are related to economic aid: Eastern Europe faces limits on its ability and willingness to support external commitments, Indochina taxes those limits. A larger political cost stems from the perception of the Soviets in the non-Communist world. There is a possibility that the cumulative effect of the Polish Crisis, Afghanistan invasion, and Soviet actions in Indochina could reinforce the long held American image of the Soviet Union as an international renegade.

The West European printed news media seem to have taken scant notice of Soviet involvement in Indochina.* The most serious critique only indirectly assailed the Soviets. The European Community, represented by the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, lent its support to ASEAN demands that Vietnam withdraw from Kampuchea and bona fide elections be held to form a new government. [Leapman, 16 July 1981:6h] Other articles condemning the Vietnamese gulag and the alleged use of chemical warfare have also appeared. [Moorehead, 6 April 1981:5gj; Kelley, 27 October 1981:6h]

There was no indication that a linkage between Soviet activities in Indochina and a more strident anti-Soviet stance either in the media commentary or in statements of government leaders. This does not mean that there is not concern, public and official, about events in Indochina and the Soviet role in the region.

There is evidence linking Western Europe's image of the Soviets with Russia's external involvements. A Der Spiegel poll taken in November 1981 noted:

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*Research included review of all 1981 West European FBIS and 1981 London Times. Also reviewed October 1981 through April 1982 German Tribune, English language summary of events and official statements in West Germany. Representative of German Information Center in New York City stated that no poll had been taken in West Germany to determine a link between the public perception of the Soviets and Soviet activities in Indochina.

> "The image most Germans have of the Soviet Union is still influenced by the occupation of Afghanistan. Only 11 percent think Moscow will withdraw its troops from the country. The majority (59 percent) assumes Afghanistan will become an Eastern bloc state. And 26 percent even expect the Soviets not only to stay in Afghanistan, but to 'invade other countries from that state." [23 November 1981:68]

Obviously stark differences exist between the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan an its involvement in Indochina. The Afghanistan invasion employed Soviet troops in direct aggression with no pretense of proxies. The Soviet emplacement in Afghanistan represents a significant threat to West Europe's interests because of the proximity of Middle East oil resources.

There is nothing openly aggressive or illegal in the Soviet Union's activities in Vietnam, which cannot be said of Afghanistan. The situation could change if multiple sources outside the United States confirm the use of chemical warfare in Indochina or the Soviets become more directly involved in the guerrilla war in Kampuchea and Laos.

The Soviet involvement in Indochina may have an immeasurable effect on public opinion in Western Europe. The Der Spiegel poll also found that 73 percent of those questioned felt that the Soviet Union was attempting to attain military superiority and 40 percent--the largest percentage agreeing to any of the choices offered--felt that the Soviets wished to attain military superiority in order to expand their domain.

Overall, however, there is little evidence that Soviet activities in Indochina damage their image or represent a significant political cost in Western Europe.

D. SUMMARY

Three areas of Soviet commitments and related costs in Indochina have been presented: economic, military, and political. Economic expenditures and costs are high relative to limited Soviet resources and Vietnam has little ability to repay its debts. The military costs, while significant, probably do not limit Soviet military options in other parts of the world. Military and economic costs added together are very expensive in terms of lost opportunity costs. In Eastern Europe these costs may be translated into an inability either to bolster Poland's economy before it reached the point of collapse or to provide sufficient economic inventives to Hungary and Czechoslovakia to prevent their taking steps toward economic liberalization.

Military expenditures in support of Vietnam and the visible deployment of Soviet forces have created political costs for the Soviets both regionally and globally. The ASEAN nations have condemned the Vietnamese and the Soviets for the situation in Kampuchea. The non-Communist Pacific Basin states are in general more willing to accept American power in the region as a counter to the Soviet intrusion. Perhaps the most important

cost, politically and militarily, is the impetus the Soviet presence in Indochina has given to the Japanese to consider rearming.

The following conclusions are important to consider before proceeding to the next and final chapter concerning American policy options in Southeast Asia:

1. the major tradeoff between Soviet resources committed to Indochina rather than Europe (or elsewhere) is economic;

2. little or no military tradeoff exists except as military expenditures add to economic costs;

3. regional political costs are incurred by the Soviet military involvement in Indochina in the form of anti-Soviet feelings and increased support for an American counterweight. There is little evidence that these costs are transferable to Europe.

IV. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS

American foreign policy has several broad goals: establish global stability, i.e., world peace, promote economic and social welfare at home and abroad, and the achievement of a world order in consonance with our own goals and ideals. For America, peace and progress must be built on the free expression of the political will of the people in each nation. These lofty goals may sometimes be shaded by short-term national interest, but in the main they represent the major themes of American foreign policy since 1945.

Some of the tools used in pursuit of these goals have been military and economic aid to foreign nations and, when deemed necessary, direct application of American military power. The China Aid Act of 1948 was one of the first major aid programs for Asia. After the start of the Korean War the United States adopted a policy of granting aid to "reinforce non-Communist governments by strengthening and broadening the basis of economic life, improving the condition under which people live, and showing in unmistakable ways the genuine interest of the United States in the welfare of the people of Southeast Asia." [Buss, 1961:376-368] More pragmatically, the military aid program supported local troops that presumably would be used to contain anti-government insurgents at a far lower cost than direct American involvement.

American policy managing these tools has changed several times since the end of World War II. Immediately after the war the focus was on rebuilding Europe; Asia became a serious concern only as the conflict in China escalated. The Truman Doctrine, announced in March 1947, the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, the Korean War, and the domestic trauma caused by McCarthyism, all contributed to make the 1950s America's most viciously anti-Communist period. The attitude of the time could be labeled confrontational: any nation that associated with either the Russian or Chinese Communists was viewed with suspicion, no middle ground was considered feasible. Neutralism or non-alignment, such as that claimed by Nasser or Nehru, was labeled as "immoral" by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. [Crabb, 1972:289-290]

By the early 1960s non-alignment was no longer viewed as a necessarily evil state. Experience had shown that non-alignment was not tatamount to avowed emnity; a neutral would still be friendly even if uncommitted. A reappraisal of American foreign policy in general had begun to take place.

President Kennedy acknowledged America's limits soon after his inauguration stating "that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient--that we are only six percent of the world's population--that we cannot impose our will on the other 94 percent of mankind--that we cannot right every wrong and reverse every adversity--and that therefore there cannot

be an American solution to every world problem." [Quoted in Schlesinger, 1978:424] Regarding the Communists, he stated "If we cannot put aside our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity." [Ibid., 424] The reappraisal was arrested by Kennedy's death and the specter of a Communist takeover in the Republic of South Vietnam. [Halberstam, 1973]

The Vietnam War was America's first set back. The conduct of the war polarized the American populace and led to a wholesale challenge of our government and our way of life: American power had truly reached a limit. Ironically, President Nixon's pronouncement of the Guam or Nixon Doctrine in 1969 echoed President Kennedy's earlier statements.

> "The United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but... America cannot --and will not--conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest." [Quoted in Nathan, 1981:367-368]

Under the Nixon Doctrine, American arms and aid might be forthcoming but direct involvement of American ground forces was unlikely. Non-Communist Asian states were expected to provide the manpower for their own defense.

Following the North Vietnamese victory in 1975 and the withdrawal of American forces from Thailand in 1976, there was speculation that the Nixon Doctrine heralded a total American military withdrawal from East Asia. Asian scholars

such as Robert Scalapino were quick to point our the many problems such a withdrawal would cause Asia and the United States. [1975:204-212] Without some American counterweight, China or Russia were expected to fill the void and, through the implicit threat of force, make their interests of more concern to the region than those of an isolationist United States.

Today the fear of a total American military withdrawal has evaporated. On his trip to Asia in June 1981, Secretary of State Haig strongly reiterated America's determination to stand by its security commitments to Thailand and the Philippines. [Kam, 21 June 1981:A12] In April 1982, Vice President Bush affirmed the American commitment to South Korea and stated that there would be no change in American policy toward North Korea. [FBIS, 27 April 1982:E1] In Australia the Vice President called the ANZUS treaty a valuable contribution to the preservation of world peace.* [FBIS, 3 May 1982:M1] In Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew noted that the Vice President's visit was the second in sixteen months, a welcome sign from the Reagan administration of American support for ASEAN. The Vice President stated that although Singapore and the United States are not allies in the formal sense, they both believe in the

*Australia, New Zealand, and the United States tripartite security agreement signed 1 September 1951.

need for the United States to maintain "a strong and study influence in the Pacific region." [FBIS, 28 April 1982:01-2]

In sum, America continues to support its interests, primarily non-military in the Pacific, not abrogating the Nixon Doctrine but avoiding the worst fears of its implications. It is this America, one that sees and at least rhetorically accepts the Soviet global challenge, that confronts the situation in Southeast Asia and will formulate American policy in response to it.

A. HOW DOES SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDOCHINA AFFECT THE UNITED STATES?

The Soviet military presence in Indochina represents the first real naval challenge to American dominance in the Pacific since the end of World War II. Soviet ships and aircraft operating from installations in Vietnam are capable of reaching most nations in Southeast Asia. Previously Soviet aircraft could not reach the area except for long range reconnaissance. Soviet ships no longer have to return to bases in the Soviet Far East for resupply.* The Soviets are strategically placed to cut the Middle East oil supply route to Japan. The naval facilities in Vietnam and Kampuchea greatly reduce the turn around time for units deployed to the Indian Ocean. These military aspects of the Soviet involvement in Indochina are serious; America's budding naval buildup is designed in part to counter the threat in the Pacific.

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*Military implications discussed in Part I, pp. 14-16.

Admiral Noel Gayler, former Commander in Chief of United States forces in the Pacific, wrote of the Soviet presence in Asia:

> "The Soviets can, in some circumstances, coerce any nation dependent on overseas trade or Middle Eastern and overseas oil.
>
> --They can, in some circumstances, reduce or constrain American and allied power and their influence in Asia.
> --They can make some difference in the outcome of factional strife in Asia." [1981:14]

Specifically in relation to Indochina, the Admiral stated "A most important--and dangerous--development is the new Soviet capability to operate from Vietnam." [Ibid., p. 10] A journalist noted "It is argued that whoever controls Southeast Asia, and the sea lanes which carry petroleum and raw materials to Japan, also control's Japan's future and has the potential to bring the country to its knees." [Tyler, 21 March 1980:33] Japan is perhaps the United States' most crucial ally in Asia today and the Soviet threat must be countered by American and allied power.

The Soviet presence has another effect the Soviets may not have intended:

> "Moscow is building military power of every category at a rate that suggests an attempt to overawe the world in furtherance of Soviet objectives. Yet, the Soviets appear to feel genuinely threatened in Asia by the potential alliance of the United States, China, and Japan. They seem to have little insight into the fact that the conditions for such an alliance have been created precisely by their own military buildup and military interventions. [Gayler, 1981:8]

Vietnam represents one of the Soviets most serious interventions.

Many of the political costs to the Soviet discussed in Chapter II are beneficial to the United States. Soviet overtures to China, such as Brezhnev's latest "we are ready at any moment to continue talks on existing border questions," are undermined by continued Soviet support for Vietnamese operations in Laos and Kampuchea. [Wall Street Journal, 25 March 1982:33] Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping has stated that China's Vietnam policy was directed at the Soviet Union, which he described as seeking to encircle China and secure regional domination through the "Asian Cuba" Vietnam. [U.S. Congress, 1979:7]

The testimony of Hoan Van Hoan, former Vietnamese Central Committee member who defected to China in 1979, supports the Chinese view of Soviet policy. Hoan stated that Le Duan kept the Sino-Vietnamese conflict going at Moscow's behest. The land border between China and Vietnam is clearly delineated and not the root of the conflict. [Chanda, 18 April 1980:7-8] Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Han Nialong has stated "actually there are not so many points of contradiction between China and Vietnam itself. It is purely Vietnam's bullying of a neighboring country with the support of the Soviet Union." [Ibid., p. 12] The United States benefits because China is unlikely to accept rapprochement with the Soviets at American expense while they perceive a Soviet sponsored threat on their southern border.

The negative reaction of Southeast Asian states, especially ASEAN, to Soviet power projection in the region has been a benefit for the United States. Singapore and Thailand have been most vocal in asking the United States to provide aid and maintain military presence in the region. Since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1979 the Thais have been especially interested in arms aid from the United States... The Thai Prime Minister has directed his ambassador to the United States to "lobby in the House, Senate, and State Department, and conduct a public relations program with the American press and public" with the objective of making America "fully appreciate the vital role of Thailand in the global power balance." [FBIS, 12 January 1981:I1] Singapore has publicly supported American involvement in settling the Kampuchean problem. As early as 1976 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew perceived the Soviet naval presence in the region to be the major threat to the region. [Solomon, 1981:106, 245-249]

The other three ASEAN states, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, although somewhat less hardline than Thailand and Singapore in their condemnation of Vietnam, have each supported calls for an international settlement of the Kampuchean issue. Both Indonesia and Malaysia deny that ASEAN will ever become a security alliance, yet both have considerably upgraded their military forces since 1975. Most of the arms purchased have been from Western nations.

The United States suffers little economic cost from the Soviet presence in Indochina. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a serious need for the resources available in the region. The Soviet Union receives very little economic benefit from its investment in Indochina and it is unlikely the United States would fare better were it to assume the financial burden of Vietnam's development.

Summarizing, there are two related clusters of effects the Soviet presence in Indochina has on America. First, the Soviets pose a military threat to America's allies in the region. Soviet air and naval power can reach out from bases in Vietnam as it was unable to do from bases in Russia. The reaction of Australia to the Backfire bombers stationed in southern Vietnam highlights the impact of the new threat. From Indochina the Soviets can involve themselves in the internal disputes of neighboring nations, undermining the American goal of regional stability. The Soviets have gained a strategic position for undermining the fragile democratic forms that have appeared in the ASEAN states. [Scalapino, 1975:206-210]

Second, derived from the first, the ASEAN and other Asian states are more receptive to the employment of American influence and show of power in the region as a counterweight to Soviet influence and power. This was evidenced by China's gentle suggestion to the Philippines that American bases be

allowed to remain on Philippine soil, Thailand's request for American security support, and ASEAN's request for American support in resolving the Kampuchean issue.

These effects must be considered in the formation of American policy toward Indochina and Asia in general.

B. POLICY OPTIONS

Although the options discussed below are designed to achieve results in Southeast Asia, they cannot be divorced from the global object of countering the Soviets. In each option an attempt is made to link Soviet options and expenditures in Europe to the formation of American policy in Southeast Asia. Three options are presented: 1. hardline; 2. low key influence; 3. maintenance of current level of involvement.

1. Hardline

The hardline option has economic, military, and political elements. Economic:

1. Embargo American trade with the Soviet Union;
2. Deny credit to the Soviet Union and East European nations while declaring nations such as Poland in default;
3. Pressure American allies to sanction the Soviets, deny credit to Eastern Europe, and withhold all aid from Indochina.

The Soviets are facing a severe grain shortage and hard currency crunch. An American grain embargo would help make a bad situation worse. The financial crisis has been

brought on by the relatively low world prices for oil and gold and three years of bad harvests the Soviet Union has suffered.

Imposing a grain embargo after the Afghanistan invasion and then lifting the embargo while still pressuring our allies for sanctions against the Soviets has seriously damaged American credibility. Although the official reason given by the United States for lifting the embargo was its ineffectiveness, our allies perceived it as a response to domestic pressures. The Japanese government went so far as to say it was embarrassed by the American move because it undermined the concerted action taken by the West against the Soviet Union. [FBIS, 24 April 1981:C1] A complete and sustained American embargo would improve our bargaining position with our allies in both Europe and Asia.

The United States could exacerbate Soviet problems by advocating actions such as declaring Poland in default and, as President Reagan did at the Versailles Summit, asking for a curtailment of low interest loans and credits to the Soviet. Wisconsin Senator Robert Kasten wrote recently that by declaring Poland in default "We will force the Russian leaders to pay the full price for the Communist system they have imposed on their own people and those of Eastern Europe." [Wall Street Journal, 7 May 1982:26] He further states that the crisis in Poland offers an opportunity to hasten the breakdown of the Soviet system.

Eastern Europe, for reasons presented in Chapter I, remains the first external priority for the Russian leadership. A complete cutoff or substantial slowdown of Western credit to the Eastern bloc coupled with existing financial problems might force the Soviets to choose between their commitments in Europe and at home and those it supports in places like Indochina.

The United States already exerts pressure on its allies to limit the amount of aid supplied to Vietnam. The object is to have Vietnam moderate its behavior or to remain isolated from the Western community. In June 1981 then Secretary of State Alexander Haig clearly stated the American position: "We will continue to question seriously and economic assistance to Vietnam, whatever the source, so long as Vietnam continues to squander its scarce resources for aggressive purposes." [Leapman, 14 July 1981:14] Limiting Western aid to Vietnam increases costs for the Soviets but is unlikely to cause the Soviets to reconsider and reduce their commitment, however, combining the effects of increased Soviet costs in Europe and Indochina based on Western sanctions might force the Soviets to reduce their commitment to Indochina.

The major hardline military element calls for--supplying arms, ammunition, and funds to the anti-Vietnamese forces in the region.

The object of this element is to increase the costs to both the Soviets and Vietnamese of maintaining their current

policies in Indochina. The war in Kampuchea represents a significant drain on Vietnam's human and material resources. One estimate puts the cost to the Soviets at 2.5 million dollars per day to support the Vietnamese occupation. [Turley, 1980: 110] In addition to Kampuchea, there are resistance movements in Laos and Vietnam itself. The seriousness of the movements is indicated by the 30,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos and the 180,000 troops in Kampuchea.

There are three separate anti-Vietnamese resistance groups in Kampuchea. The largest is the infamous Khmer Rouge, responsible for the deaths of approximately three million Cambodians following the defeat of the American supported Lon Nol government in 1975 and prior to their ouster by the Vietnamese in 1978-79. Since their defeat the Khmer Rouge have dropped their open affiliation with Communism and taken various other steps to repair their image. The other two groups, the Khmer Serei nationalists led by Son Sann, and the relatively new FUNCIPEC,* the latest group sponsored by Prince Sihanouk, are more ideologically compatible with the West but unfortunately much smaller organizations than the Khmer Rouge.

The three groups formed a coalition in June 1982 with Prince Sihanouk as President. There is little ideological agreement between the groups. The major point of agreement

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*National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia.

between them is that the Vietnamese must be removed from their country. The coalition was formed at a crucial time for preventing the Vietnamese backed Heng Samrin regime from gaining the United Nations seat currently held by representatives of the Pol Pot government. China and ASEAN strongly backed the formation of the coalition as an important step toward creating an alternative political unit to the Vietnamese regime. The coalition also offers a convenient focus for the supply of military and other forms of aid.

The costs of the war in Kampuchea could be increased if the United States chose to support the anti-Vietnamese forces both militarily and diplomatically. American aid has been sought by all three groups forming the coalition. In April 1981 Son Sann announced his intention to approach the Reagan administration for aid, stating "We do not lack manpower but we are short of guns and ammunition." [FBIS, 20 April 1981:H6] When Prince Sihanouk formed FUNCIPEC he assigned a former Cambodian Premier, In Tam, the task of seeking aid from Washington. In Tam supposedly will be responsible for forming a nationalist army for the new government. At the time, Sihanouk stated "If Beijing and Washington give us nothing it will be easy to put us down." Later in an Agence France-Press interview he asked for aid to form an independent Sihanoukist army and stated that he could raise an army "with as many as 100,000 men." [FBIS, 27 March 1981:H1]

The anti-Vietnamese forces in Laos are far fewer in number than those in Kampuchea. In 1981, these forces received some notice when former Lao Premier Phoumi Nosavan agreed to lead the movement, but his record gives him little credence as a leader. Nosovan stated there were approximately 20,000 anti-Vietnamese guerrillas in Laos and that since September 1980 Lao and Kampuchean forces had been collaborating. The meeting that initiated the collaboration supposedly was also attended by FULRO* representatives, tribal rebels from Central Vietnam. [FBIS, 24 July 1981:I1]

How effective are these forces as military units? Effective enough to cause some 200,000 Vietnamese troops to be stationed in Laos and Kampuchea. Could these resistance forces militarily expel the Vietnamese? Probably not, even with substantial Chinese and American aid. One estimate of the total number of anti-Vietnamese troops is sixty-five thousand, it could be much lower.**[Ibid., p. 11] Prince Sihanouk has stated he could raise a large force, yet his forces are the smallest of the three factions.

Military aid could perhaps make a difference in any attempt to reach a political compromise between the Heng Samrin regime, the Vietnamese, and the Sihanoukist coalition. Ample

*Front Uni Pour La Lutte de Races Opprimees.

**This estimate includes 30-40,000 Khmer Rouge guerrillas. A more recent estimate puts their total at 20-30,000. [Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 July 1982:10-11]

military supplies might raise the level of violence somewhat, changing the style as well as the cost of the war. Most attacks by the anti-Vietnamese forces are hit and run--blowing up buses, damaging rail lines--most major actions are initiated by the Vietnamese. The guerrillas have no defense against Vietnamese artillery. More and heavier weapons will be required if the anti-Vietnamese forces wish to change the nature of the war.

Support for Sihanouk and the possibility of his return to power could undermine the legitimacy of the Vietnamese installed Samrin government and pressure the Vietnamese to accept some form of coalition. The Prince is still popular with the peasants. Far Eastern Economic Review reported that "The mere name of Prince Norodom Sihanouk... seems to cause the Vietnamese more political problems than all the activities of the paras."* [Quinn-Judge, 9 April 1982:30] He has the international recognition to attract Western aid and Chinese support. The Vietnamese are wary of accepting any compromise or coalition involving Sihanouk because they might face similar demands for concessions in Laos--loosening their control of the Indochinese buffer states. [Turley, 1980:110] American support could improve Sihanouk's bargaining position.

The Vietnamese face other problems in the Kampuchean war that American aid could greatly exacerbate. In April 1981

*American trained Kampuchean paratroopers fighting against the Vietnamese.

the Vietnamese 341st Division was relieved of duty in the area it had been stationed north of Phnom Penh because of its high desertion rate and substandard performance. Most of the troops in the Division were from South Vietnam. [Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 April 1981:9] The problem is not new. Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea are poorly supplied and forced to grow and scrounge most of their food. Desertions, especially among southern troops, have been frequent. Approximately 3000 Vietnamese soldiers crossed into Thailand in 1980. [McBeth, 13 June 1980:43-44]

A Vietnamese captain who defected to Thailand reported low morale among the troops and decreasing cooperation from the Kampuchean people. Food shortages have been reported by many defectors and several have related it to the famine conditions that exist in Vietnam. [FBIS, 10 July 1981:J3; 29 July 1981:J2] American aid to the guerrillas would intensify the fighting, causing more casualties, increasing the shortages in Vietnam, and creating even greater supply problems for the troops in the field.

The political elements of the hardline approach are as follows:

1. provide diplomatic support, i.e., vote in the United Nations for the Sihanouk coalition to receive aid and retain the Cambodian seat in the name of the Khmer Rouge.

2. continue to make Soviet involvement in Vietnamese misdeeds an international issue, e.g., chemical warfare in Kampuchea.

Diplomatic and military support for the anti-Vietnamese forces increases the political problems for both the Russians and Vietnamese. A widened war in Kampuchea would further damage the Soviet image in the region. The Vietnamese cannot sustain a high level of combat without Soviet support. The Vietnamese might feel pressured, in the face of an expanded military effort and a more serious political challenge, to increase their use of chemical weapons and make more breaches of the Thai border--acts which cause a negative world reaction and serve only to sustain Vietnam's isolation from the West and ASEAN.

The increased costs of a more intense struggle in Cambodia would lead to increased domestic shortages and a reduction of the already low standard of living endured by the Vietnamese citizens. Greater internal repression might be required within Vietnam, leading to an increase in the number of refugees. All of these effects are possible if the United States extends political and military support to the anti-Vietnamese coalition.

An increase in the intensity and worldwide attention given to the Kampuchean conflict could find the Soviets in conflict with their European clients. Already displeased with the support they are pressured into providing, the East European nations might attempt to pressure Moscow, with such leverage as they have, to settle the conflict rather than continue supporting Vietnam's war in Kampuchea. In this

perspective, Vietnam is just another unwelcome addition to an already expensive number of external commitments such as Cuba that the East Europeans support.

In sum, a hardline American option would attempt to overstress the Soviet economy by increasing the costs of its external commitments. In Europe the tactic would be to deny further credit to the Eastern bloc and to limit East-West trade as much as possible. The tactic in Indochina would be both economic and military: deny aid to Vietnam and support the anti-Vietnamese forces in Laos and Kampuchea. Political pressure could be applied by making major issues of the chemical warfare in Indochina and Afghanistan, refugee problems in Indochina, and the internal repression associated with the Soviet and Vietnamese regimes.

2. Low Key

The objective of this alternative approach is to weaken Soviet-Indochinese ties using diplomacy and economic aid and trade supported by a strong but not overbearing American military presence in the region. The major elements of this option would be:

1. direct humanitarian aid to Indochina, e.g., foodstuffs, and normalization of relations with Vietnam;
2. increased economic, diplomatic, and military support for ASEAN, including the possibility of an American security guarantee;
3. solidification of our relationship with China, i.e., more trade and aid, military assistance;

4. support for liberalizing steps in East European nations such as those attempted in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Four assumptions support this option. First, the basis of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship is Vietnam's extreme dependence on the Soviet Union--when that dependence is reduced or their goals diverge sufficiently, the relationship will quickly deteriorate. Second, the Vietnamese mean what they say, i.e., their troops will leave Kampuchea when the threat they perceive from China is alleviated. Third, the Taiwan issue can be resolved in a manner satisfactory to both the Nationalist and mainland Chinese. Fourth, Japan and the United States can make it in China's interest to negotiate a treaty with Vietnam.

Vietnam's autonomy is suspect in light of its almost complete dependence on Soviet aid, yet their sustained dedication to that autonomy is the most vital assumption of this approach. Jean Lacouture, author of Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography, describes the Vietnamese as having "A desire for autonomy which has remained unimpaired throughout the cruel vicissitude of the war [and] is not likely to be weakened by the burdensome difficulties of the peace." [1973:571]

Many experienced observers feel that the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship is not a durable one. The cultural differences between the Vietnamese and the Russians and the fiercely independent nature of the Vietnamese are cited as the most likely causes of the eventual split. Vietnam's leaders know that Vietnam is a pawn in the larger game of

the Sino-Soviet conflict and the global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Vietnamese have not forgotten that the Soviets cordially received President Nixon at the height of the 1972 Christmas bombing of Hanoi.* They were dismayed at recent Soviet peace overtures to the Chinese, made at the same time China was branded as Vietnam's "direct and most dangerous enemy." [Chanda, 2 April 1982:14-15]

Vietnam has attempted to lessen its dependence on the Soviet Union by endeavoring to establish closer relations with the United States. Several times improved relations seemed to be close at hand, only to be delayed by America's normalization with China and then indefinitely postponed following Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. One analyst wrote in 1978 "Vietnam is determined to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. in order to lessen her dependence on the Soviet Union as well as to head off U.S.-Chinese collaboration against Hanoi." [Porter, 1978:230]

The United States can take several steps unilaterally that would give Vietnam some flexibility in its relationship with the Soviets. The first step would be to begin normalization of diplomatic relations. The United States accomplished little by waiting until 1933 to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and less by waiting thirty years after the 1949 Revolution to normalize relations with

*The bombings broke a deadlock in American-Vietnamese negotiations and led to the Paris Accords of 1973.

the Peoples Republic of China. Withholding normalization will not moderate Vietnamese actions and denies the United States access to the country and the opportunity to at least establish a dialogue. Most importantly, Vietnam will always have some influence on the rest of Indochina. The United States cannot alter that fact by non-recognition.

The second step would be the offer of American humanitarian aid without preconditions. This step would undermine one of Hanoi's major propaganda tools, i.e., blaming internal problems on the machinations of the United States. If Hanoi would accept such aid without unreasonable preconditions, sufficient American aid would help reduce Vietnam's dependence on the Soviets.

Despite Russian aid, Vietnam's economy is a shambles. Its military efforts in Kampuchea have failed to provide security and today Vietnam remains isolated from the West and the aid offered by that community. Since January 1982 Vietnam has taken several steps to improve its status in the West. Nguyen Co Thach, Vietnam's Foreign Minister, recently visited nations in Western Europe on a good will tour designed to procure aid and improve Vietnam's image. [Chanda, 19 February 1982:20-22; 16 April 1982:17-18] Thach has announced some new steps Vietnam is willing to take that appear more moderate than their position several years ago. He stated Vietnam would consider joining ASEAN "if ASEAN countries agree" and has reaffirmed that Vietnam would withdraw from Kampuchea if a treaty could be signed with

China. He also stated Vietnam would agree to a partial withdrawal if there was an agreement with Thailand and indicated a willingness to establish a demilitarized zone along the Thai-Cambodian border subject to international supervision. [FBIS, 6 May 1982:K1]

Thach's proposals do not offer anything drastically new; however, they may be a sign that the Vietnamese leadership retains some of the pragmatism it showed under Ho Chi Minh. Internally the Vietnamese have taken some pragmatic steps, albeit born of necessity, to recruit party members who are technically competent and efficient managers as well as ideologically safe. Many Party members have been purged and, much as it did following the land reform fiasco of the fifties, the leadership placed at least part of the blame for Vietnam's many internal problems on Party shortcomings.

In Le Duc Tho's address to the Vietnamese Party Congress in March 1982 he stated:

> "The recent shortcomings in economic work have clearly shown that after defining the general line and the economic line, the party should have adopted a socio-economic strategy to serve as the guideline for determining economic structures and building socio-economic plans satisfactorily. It should also have adopted a correct management system to ensure that the lines are reflected in real life and, on this basis, are implemented ever more profoundly." [Address VCP Cong., FBIS, 9 April 1982: K1]

The implication is that the party is fallible, mistakes have been made, and the leadership acknowledges them. This internal criticism and signs of some external moderation indicate

that the Vietnamese may still be realists and adaptable--traits that might be exploited by the United States in any attempt to reach a settlement in the region.

Vietnam has repeatedly stated it would withdraw its troops from Kampuchea if the Chinese will sign non-aggression treaties with the Indochinese states. The Chinese are willing to negotiate with Vietnam but so far the meetings have produced nothing. The Chinese say that Vietnam must withdraw its troops from Cambodia in order for relations to improve and the Vietnamese have stated they will not withdraw until the treaty is signed, i.e., China accepts the situation. This standoff might be marginally affected by unilateral American action--improve relations with China and perhaps, through aid and an increased United States military presence in Asia, reduce Chinese fears of facing the Soviets without allies.

Chinese and American policies toward Vietnam are similar. Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang has stated that pressure of every type would be exerted by China on Vietnam to come to the conference table. [FBIS, 5 February 1981:J3] The Chinese maintain military pressure along Vietnam's northern border and have offered arms, training and sanctuary to Lao and Cambodian guerrillas. [Nations, 8 May 1981:12] It is quite likely that a sustained Vietnamese invasion of Thailand would prompt the Chinese into another attack on North Vietnam.

In June 1981 the American Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrook stated that Vietnam would not change its

policies even if it did get what it wanted "So we will seek, if we can, to find ways to increase the political, economic, and, yes, military pressures on Vietnam, working with others and ways which will bring about, we hope, some changes in Hanoi's attitude toward the situation." [Chanda, 26 June 1981: 10-12]

Presently there is no clash between American and Chinese goals in the region. China wishes to force Vietnam to reappraise its interests, loosen its ties with the Soviet Union, and return to its traditional independence from both Moscow and Beijing. The overall goal is to eliminate the threat on its southern border. [Tucker, 1980:104] America would like to stabilize the region by resolving the Kampuchean issue; i.e., get the Vietnamese to withdraw, stop the flow of illegal refugees, and errode the Soviet presence in the region. The rough agreement in aims between the United States and China represents an opportunity for concerted action in negotiations with Vietnam; however, a third critical partner could help set the tenor of those negotiations: Japan.

American interests would be well served by including Japan as a partner in any efforts to improve relations with China or find a solution in Indochina. Japan is an Asian power that has long term interest in the area's development and stability. Japan today enjoys reasonably good relations with many Asian states and has the economic resources to support those relations with practical assistance.

In the ten years of Sino-Japanese rapprochement there have been many joint economic undertakings and the process is slowly expanding. The two nations have held diplomatic consulations to discuss the problems in Asia, including Indochina. In the latest Sino-American disagreement over Taiwan, the Japanese Foreign Minister offered to play a role in promoting better relations between the United States and China and he indicated that the Japanese government would "exert its efforts toward better U.S.-Chinese ties when the Japan and Chinese Prime Ministers exchange visits later this year." [FBIS, 26 March 1982:C2] Although the Foreign Minister later ruled out any mediation role for Japan in the dispute, the proposal itself indicates that Japan feels close enough to both parties to attempt such mediation. The Japanese also acknowledged that any rift between the United States and China would have serious consequences for Japan. [FBIS, 14 April 1982:C1]

Japan has also established limited economic contacts with the nations in Indochina. There is a Japanese Council of Trade with Kampuchea and a memorandum was signed in 1980 whereby Japan would import Cambodian kapok. Other items are under consideration for import such as lumber, natural rubber, and spices. A Japanese machinery and trade fair is scheduled to be held in Phnom Penh in 1983. [Ogura, 1981:17] Under United Nations auspices Japan will provide economic development aid to Laos totalling 220,000 dollars in 1982. [FBIS, 24 February 1982:C4]

Japanese support would add credibility and legitimacy to any Indochinese settlement and to any wider effort to promote non-superpower dominated regionalism. Japan has the third largest industrialized economy in the world behind the United States and the Soviet Union. They could be important partners in helping to meet China's requests for cooperation in energy, industrial, and technological development: cooperation steps outlined as some of those necessary to improve Sino-American relations. [Huan, 1981:35-53] A partnership between the United States, Japan, and ASEAN offers the best chance of promoting peaceful, continuous development in both North and Southeast Asia, development which is the best defense against either Soviet or Vietnamese intriques.

ASEAN is another essential element in any long range Southeast Asian settlement. The association has developed considerably since its formation in 1967. One of the biggest factors in welding its cohesion was the removal of American power from Indochina and the realization that the threat posed by Vietnam and the Soviet intrusion would have to be met under the conditions of the Guam Doctrine. An important part of its development has been its increasing status as an economic organization. Strobe Talbott, diplomatic correspondent for Time magazine, wrote of ASEAN.

> "it has generally used its influence in ways favorable to the economic and political interests of the industrialized democracies. ASEAN has helped to stimulate brisk trade and

> growing prosperity among the non-Communist nations of the Pacific Basin. The organization has also served as a point of contact between American's allies in the region and the Non-alligned Movement, since its members include three nonaligned states (Singapore, Maylaysia, and Indonesia) as well as two with defense ties to the United States. [Solomon, 1981:104-105]"

Other Pacific powers have taken a significant interest in ASEAN economic matters. The June 1982 meeting of ASEAN Ministers will be followed by another meeting that will include Japan's Foreign Minister plus ministers from the United States, Canada, Australia, and officials from the European Community. [FBIS, 18 February 1982:C1]

Despite internal divisions, ASEAN has maintained a relatively united front on the Kampuchean issue. They demand that Vietnam withdraw its forces from Kampuchea and refuse to recognize the Samrin regime. ASEAN has exerted considerable pressure in the United Nations to insure the Samrin government did not occupy Kampuchea's seat in the General Assembly. They also demand that Kampuchea become a neutral and independent state. [Solomon, 1981:243]

The internal divisions in ASEAN over the Kampuchean issue should not be overlooked. Thailand, as the nation closest to the Vietnamese threat, is the most adamant in demanding Vietnam's withdrawal. Singapore and Indonesia are as skeptical of China as they are of the Vietnamese and feel that China represents the long term threat. Both nations contain a significant population of overseas Chinese which have been a serious source of domestic unrest in the past.

They would prefer to see Chinese influence completely out of Kampuchea and are more willing to accept the Samrin regime as a condition for having good relations with Vietnam. The Vietnamese have continued to foster ASEAN unity, however, first through their invasion of Kampuchea and secondly by their indiscrete violations of the Thai border.

American support for ASEAN accomplishes at least two objectives. First, it lends credence to the major non-Communist organization in Southeast Asia--"it is strategic imperative for the U.S. to foster the further development of ASEAN and to cultivate the best possible relations with its members." [Solomon, 1981:105] Second, contributing to the prosperity of the people of ASEAN states is probably the best defense against further Communist subversion or radicalization of the existing governments. "Self-effacing" support for ASEAN has been and should remain a central focus of America's Asia policy. [Ibid., p.105]

Obviously the United States has encountered serious image problems in the past two decades. Today, especially in Europe but also in Asia, there are those who blur both the images and perhaps the objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union. Recent demonstrations in Europe condemned not only President Reagan but were against American policy in general. Josef Joffe, senior editor of the West German weekly Die Zeit, has written.

> "Yet today it is no longer quite clear who the enemy is. Somehow it seems immaterial that one superpower has dealt

> a heavy blow to the status quo by invading a neutral country, whereas the other, even if haphazardly, has been trying to restore it. Both are no longer quite rational, both are seemingly conspiring to rob Europe of the fruits of detente." [1981:837]

American policy in Asia and Europe must make clear who the enemy is and why. Support for ASEAN, partnership with Japan and Western Europe, and support for attempts to liberalize in Eastern Europe are all part of the low key approach. Each helps to build and to maintain an image of the United States that is substantially different than that of the Soviet Union.

3. Minimal Involvement

The low key option represents a series of steps less controversial than those advocated in the hardline but no less demanding in terms of time, interest, and resources committed by the United States. The third option involves far less commitment than either of the first two and demands no significant near term change in the situation in Indochina.

The object of this option is to have the problems in the region resolved by the nations directly involved, i.e., China, Vietnam, ASEAN, Laos, and Kampuchea, with minimum American policy input. The United States would maintain its present military force level in Asia, stand by its decision to neither normalize relations nor provide aid to Vietnam, and fulfill its security commitments to Thailand and the Philippines. Beyond these commitments, however, America would not involve itself in the region. Two important facts support this option: 1. America does derive some benefits

from the present situation, and; 2. virtually no observer of Indochinese affairs predicts the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship will last.

China and ASEAN support have enabled the anti-Vietnamese forces to wage both a political and military battle in Laos and Cambodia without any significant help from the United States. The Chinese have delivered arms to Son Sann's Khmer Serie forces and to the Khmer Rouge. Without Chinese aid it is very doubtful armed resistance would continue. [Nations, 8 May 1982:12-13] A Thai National Security Council official stated recently that although the Khmer forces had suffered several defeats in the last few months they were far from defeated. Although incapable of military victory, the anti-Vietnamese Khmers currently tie down a large number of Vietnamese troops and absorb Soviet and Vietnamese resources without any significant American aid.

Maintenance does not imply neglect. The commitments discussed above would be fulfilled, arms sales, trade, and economic assistance to ASEAN would increase. Issues such as the 'yellow rain' should continue to be exposed and condemned. Major initiatives, however, such as diplomatic normalization with Vietnam and offering humanitarian aid, would not be undertaken.

C. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

In summary let us examine how and how much each policy option affects the goals of the Soviets and Vietnamese.

First we will recapitulate the goals of both nations. The Soviet Union has five goals it is attempting to fulfill through its presence in Indochina. The first and perhaps most important is to contain China by posing a legitimate threat to its southern border. The second goal stems not only from the Soviet's China policy but relates to the global competition between the Soviets and the United States: access to facilities in Indochina for Soviet military forces, especially naval. The last three goals support the growing Soviet role as a superpower: establish itself as a regional power, gain access to trade and raw materials, and establish strong state to state relations with the individual Indochinese states.

The Vietnamese have both external and internal goals. Their most important external goals are to counter the perceived threat from China and to eliminate any remaining threats in Indochina. To this end, Vietnam would also like to gain recognition of the Heng Samrin regime as the legitimate government of Cambodia. The Vietnamese would like to improve their relations with the West and non-Communist Asian states. The ultimate goal of improving relations is to increase the amount of aid available to develop internally.

Vietnam faces critical agricultural and manufactures problems. Improving agriculture is a number one priority and one means of improvement and therefore a major goal is to strengthen

party cadres in terms of training and dedication in order to strengthen economic and political controls. The cadres are also seen as a major means of accomplishing the goal of integrating and socializing the recently conquered south. These goals should serve as a reference as we examine the potential affects of the three policy options presented.

The intensified Indochinese conflict envisioned in the hardline option would have a very negative effect on the Vietnamese goals of increasing agricultural and industrial production, broadening its sources of aid, improving relations with the West, and gaining acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime in the United Nations. Vietnam does not have the resources to achieve its domestic goals and fight a major conflict in Kampuchea; Vietnam is not able to improve its domestic situation with the military commitment it already supports.

Soviet strategic goals remain unaffected by a more costly war in Kampuchea. Access to Vietnam's port and airdrome facilities would not be threatened and initially the Soviet's overall position might be enhanced by Vietnam's increased aid requirements. The war in Kampuchea allows the Soviets to fulfill the goal of containing China by serving as a major source of conflict between China and Vietnam.

Most regional Soviet goals would be difficult to achieve in the environment created by the hardline approach. Economically, the Soviets would face greatly increased demand for

aid and have less and less resources available to fulfill them. The Soviet standing in the region would suffer from any expanded conflict that increased the refugee and security problems that already exist in ASEAN. Soviet attempts to become a regional economic power are hampered by both a lack of valuable goods to trade and the onus of supporting Vietnamese aggression. The only regional goal that might benefit would be the Soviet attempt to establish closer state to state relations with Laos and Cambodia because both states would become even more dependent on Soviet bloc aid.

The low key option would help fulfill Vietnam's domestic economic goals by freeing some of their resources for development and by helping to relieve some of the pressures on their society, i.e., hunger. Normalization of relations with the United States and humanitarian aid would fulfill Vietnam's goals of broadening its sources of aid and improving relations with the West.

Soviet goals would be jeopardized by any American action that reduced Vietnam's dependence on the Soviet Union. The Soviet position might be undermined if America could use the low key option to change Vietnam's perception of the threat posed by China and the United States. Humanitarian aid from the United States coupled with normal diplomatic relations would undercut one of Vietnam's prime propaganda ploys to cover the failures of the leadership: collusion of the U.S.-Beijing hegemonists.

The maintenance option might serve to deny Vietnam any improvement in its relations with the West, denying it the opportunity to broaden its sources of aid. The option would have little other affect on Vietnam's domestic goals than to lengthen the time it will take to achieve them. The goals of dominating Indochina and gaining acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime would be unaffected because the maintenance option leaves the initiative on these issues to the regional powers.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Indochina has become an important part of the Soviet Union's Asian collective security system. Considerable resources have been committed to each of the Indochinese states, especially Vietnam, in an effort to solidify Soviet relations with each state and to accomplish the strategic goals of containing China and challenging the United States.

The benefits the Soviets derive from their position in Indochina do not come without costs. The object of this thesis has been to examine the resources committed by the Soviets to Indochina and to what extent they affect their options in Europe. A significant economic tradeoff has been shown to exist between Soviet commitments to Indochina and their ability to control Eastern Europe through economic means. The tradeoff is potentially decisive. The billions of dollars expended in Vietnam might have eased or prevented the current financial crisis in the Eastern bloc countries. The Soviet Union could have used the resources to develop its own economy or to provide aid to Eastern Europe, aid those nations have turned to the capitalistic West to obtain.

The Soviets have moreover, incurred regional political costs. Neither ASEAN nor Japan is pleased with the Soviet military presence in Indochina, and one crucial consequence could be the partial or total rearmament of Japan. Little

tradeoff, however, appears to exist between Soviet actions in Indochina and the European perception of the Soviet threat. The refugee, chemical warfare, and Kampuchean issues were reported by the West European media but had no visible affects on government policy or pronouncements.*

The tradeoffs between Soviet commitments in Indochina and those in Europe have been used analytically to help formulate three policy options designed to erode the Soviet position in Indochina.

Which policy option best serves the interests of the United States: globally, regionally, and domestically?

The hardline option is likely to be perceived by our allies as unduly provocative. Leaders such as Helmut Schmidt, former Chancellor of West Germany, have publicly stated that there is little possibility of moderating Soviet behavior through trade sanctions or other acts such as stopping the flow of Western credit.** None of our European allies are in favor of isolating the Soviets; each has economic ties with the Eastern bloc and few believe the sanctions imposed would have any great effect. The Soviets could improve the climate for allied

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*This author found no evidence of a political tradeoff. More research would be required to determine if there was absolutely no governmental response from Western European nations; there were none that received a reasonable amount of publicity.

**Interview with Helmut Schmidt, This WEEK with David Brinkley, 6 June 1982, American Broadcasting Company news program.

cooperation against them by making an imprudent move such as invading Poland. Without such an unlikely step the American hardline option would receive little allied support. A unilateral American attempt to economically damage the Soviets through a trade embargo would result only in isolating the United States.

Intensifying the war in Kampuchea based on American aid would probably be unfavorable in the view of friendly governments in both Europe and Asia. ASEAN wants a political resolution of the conflict, not a war that could easily spillover into Thailand and further destablilize the region. There is the possibility Vietnam would decide to invade Thailand, risking another invasion of Vietnam by China and the possibility of a Sino-Soviet confrontation. [Solomon, 1981:243; Simon, 1979:1181] Although China has kept a low level of arms supplied to the Kampuchean guerrillas and maintains military pressure on Vietnam's northern border, it is not likely the Chinese leaders wish to have the level of conflict expand to the point where either the Vietnamese or the Soviets felt major steps were necessary to control the situation.

In short, the hardline option would receive little support in Europe, especially for the imposition of economic sanctions, and little support in either Europe or Asia for a wider conflict in Kampuchea.

Domestically the United States faces serious risks in any attempt to support a conflict in Southeast Asia. The media

reaction to El Salvador demonstates that the memory of Vietnam is still fresh. The application of any degree of American power is subject to considerable scrutiny and there is little reason to believe there is any public consensus for supplying arms to the predacious Khmer Rouge. The possibility of forming such a consensus could improve if Vietnam were to overtly threaten Thailand and the Khmer forces were to unite under an acceptable leader.

Globally the low key option is in tune with the policies of many of our allies. They quite understandably fear the consequences of confrontation tactics. The low key option calls for the United States and its allies to increase their penetration of the Soviet-created socialist world. The other aspect of the option, strong but not overbearing American and Allied military power, is equally acceptable. The low key option is a two track plan that involves (a) sufficient military force to contain and, if necessary, destroy Soviet and Vietnamese military forces in Asia and (b) diplomacy and economic aid to stabilize the region and reach an eventual rapprochement with Vietnam.

Regionally the low key option matches ASEAN wishes for a political settlement of the Kampuchean issue, while providing the added benefit of increased aid for the ASEAN nations. Japan, China, and ASEAN supported the formation of an anti-Vietnamese united front in Kampuchea. Their goal, however, was not to create a force capable of military victory but

to establish a non-Pol Pot/Khmer Rouge alternative to the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime. The idea of establishing an alternative meshes well with the diplomatic approach envisioned in the low key option.

The maintenance option supports the status quo and is unlikely to have any distinct global, regional, or domestic impact. The key disadvantage is that this option is essentially reactive--the initiative is left to the regional actors or the Soviets, who are hardly likely to have interests in mind. American interests might eventually be served by the forces already at work in the region and the global problems the Soviets already face trying to support their empire. The decision to opt for the maintenance rather than either the hardline or low key depends on the priority assigned to undermining the Soviet position in Southeast Asia.

The low key option (see p. 78) offers the best chance of success. Its major advantage is its reliance on one of the United States greatest strengths in relation to the Soviets: its ability to provide aid and trade benefits to all of Southeast Asia. A second advantage would be its appeal to both our Asian and European allies.

The last advantage is crucial at a time when growing minorities in the West claim a convergence in images of the United States and the Soviet Union. The elements of the low key option--diplomacy, humanitarian and development aid,

trade--will help convey the fact that the United States is a superpower dedicated to peace and the emergence of a stable world order. The other aspects of the low key option--improved relations with China, equal partnership with Japan, and support for ASEAN--will make it clear that the concept of world order favored by the U.S. does not mean military, political, or economic dominance by the United States. Finally, the low key option provides the opportunity to introduce Vietnam into the process of development begun by ASEAN and to undermine Soviet imperialism in Southeast Asia.

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*Note: FBIS = Federal Broadcast Information Service (All Asia and Pacific Series unless otherwise noted.)

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