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ON THE CORRECT HANDLING OF "AMERICAN IMPERIALISM"

MICHAEL THOMAS CORGAN

1975

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ON THE CORRECT HANDLING OF "AMERICAN IMPERIALISM":

An Examination of the Dispute Between the Soviet Union and China over Soviet Policies Taken with Respect to the United States, 1956-1963, As a Cause of the Sino-Soviet Split

by

MICHAEL THOMAS CORGAN

A Degree Project
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Public Administration
In the Graduate School of Public Affairs
University of Washington
June, 1975

Thesis
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I INTRODUCTION

Predicting the course of international relations of any country or bloc of countries is always a perilous enterprise. But few in 1956 would have predicted that within seven years (6 September 1963) the editorial boards of Renmin Ribao (PEOPLE'S DAILY) and Hongqi (RED FLAG) would publish an article on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) saying, among other things, "The facts of the past seven years have amply proved that the road taken by the leadership of the CPSU is the course of allying with imperialism against socialism, allying with the United States against China, allying with the reactionaries of all countries against the people of the world."[1] Furthermore, this statement was not made at a closed meeting, but publicly and with impunity. This was barely the beginning of the surprising open dispute that would increase in acrimony and scope. The dispute would include liquidations of those suspected of sympathizing with the other country's aims, and even armed border clashes. Now, over ten years later, both countries retain troop masses on their mutual border, and the hardening of the split seems a fact of international life.

There were a few American and Western observers who did think a split was possible and even inevitable. Edgar Snow, in a Saturday Evening Post article written six months before the revolutionary armies of Mao defeated Chiang Kai-chek's

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[1]As quoted in Keesing's Research Report, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York, 1969) p. 59.

forces, said that "Soviet Russia would not hold effective domination over the extremely nation-conscious Chinese."[2] For, he added "the Chinese look on their country as the potential focus of a new federation of Eastern socialist states."[3] Dean Acheson also felt that a rift between Mao and Stalin was inevitable, and argued for the United States's withholding recognition until such should occur.[4] These views were in a distinct minority, however. To most writers, the alliance between Moscow and Peking seemed to be as monolithic as it was claimed to be.

The recent overtures of the United States toward the Chinese People's Republic provide dramatic evidence of the appreciation of how fundamental the split has become. Perhaps the United States could choose to officially ignore Communist China while she was perceived to be either under Moscow's dominion or at least acting in conjunction with Soviet policies. When it became clear that the dispute was no temporary rift, but a deep-seated cleavage in the much-touted unity of international Communism, the United States had the opportunity and occasion to seek establishment of direct and official contact. Previously, the United States had been constrained to deal with China through the embassy in Warsaw. Albania, North Korea, and Cuba may be officially ignored, but a nuclear

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[2]"Will China Become a Russian Satellite?," Saturday Evening Post, Vol.221 No.41 (9 April 1949), p. 30.

[3]Snow, p. 149.

[4]Present at the Creation (New York, 1970), p. 428.

power may not be.

The implications of the nuclear power each possesses make the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China one of the gravest international rivalries ever experienced in the modern world. The very question of nuclear armaments itself is one of the major factors in the split. Many other factors in the split also carry connotations of momentousness and magnitude. The longest mutual border in the world lies between the two countries. The written record of border disputes between Russian and Chinese goes back three centuries to 1649, and each country still maintains a large army on this juncture of fraternal socialist states. The history of Chinese-Russian enmity itself goes back several more centuries before the border disputes. The most feared invaders of Russia have come from the East. There is, in the Russian mind (and most influential Soviets are Russian), an association of the Chinese with the Tartar occupation, and China holds that millions of square miles of Soviet territory are properly Chinese.

If geographical, historical, and ethnic differences did not contribute enough potential points of contention between the two nations, there were a number of political and national points of possible contention to supply the grounds for conflict. One of these factors was the very different ways in which the two governments had come to power. The Soviets took over a revolution already begun. The Party was the effective agent, whereas the army was always under suspicion. Unfortunately for it too, its first leader was Trotsky. The Chinese, on the other hand, won their revolution through an

army which became the party. Noteworthy also is the fact that the guidance and advice the Chinese received in their revolution from the Comintern (i.e. Moscow) was almost always wrong, if not outright destructive.

Personalities of leaders, more of a factor in totalitarian states than elsewhere, also provided a point of conflict. Khrushchev's flamboyant personal approach to politics was in contrast to the style set by Stalin which had become, up to 1945 at least, the only model for Communist leaders. Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and the cult of personality could not have endeared him to Chairman Mao under the best of circumstances, and at worst could be construed as an attack on Mao, which later it was.

Most importantly, a precedent for a split in the ranks of international Communism had been established by Yugoslavia. Milan Bartos, the Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations, wrote presciently in 1950, "the dispute between the USSR and Jugoslavia is only a manisfestation of a much broader problem, that is, the problem of relations between the Soviet Union and all other countries which since the war have embarked on a course of radical social transformation (China now belongs to this group). [The dispute introduces] an entirely new element into the substance and picture of international relations."[5]

On the other hand, there were also important and obvious

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[5]"Jugoslavia's Struggle for Equality," Foreign Affairs, Vol.28 No.3 (April 1950), p. 429.

factors working to keep the countries together. Both shared an ideology, both were anti-(Western)imperialist, and China was economically dependent on the Soviet Union for her industrialization, or so it seemed. If any of these factors, the glue of relationship, were to change, it should follow then that the relationship would also change under the pressure of the antithetical forces listed above.

It is the thesis of this paper that the reason the split did occur has fundamentally to do with how the Soviet Union, and principally Nikita Khrushchev, responded in its foreign and domestic policies to what it perceived to be two challenges posed by the United States in the 1950's and 60's. The first challenge posed by the United States was in the field of international relations. The simple fact was that Soviet attempts to expand communist influence had to take into account American nuclear arms (then superior) and the possibility of their use to resist obvious and overt Soviet expansion. The second American challenge was inherent in the obvious material superiority to Soviet society of a supposedly decadent capitalist society.

Khrushchev developed foreign and domestic policies to meet these challenges. The policies proved to be mutually supporting: peaceful coexistence in order to reduce the threat of nuclear war (but <u>not</u> wars of national liberation), and increased emphasis on consumer goods and agricultural production. Unfortunately, these policies also proved to be extremely hard to reconcile to some of the classic Marxist-Leninist prescrip-

tions for class warfare and world revolution. Perhaps the Soviet leaders thought this task could be achieved without too much difficulty, for as Vladimir Weidle has observed, the language of ideology in the Soviet Union has proved more durable than the ideology itself.[6] But, in the end, the intellectual acrobatics required to advance peaceful coexistence and nationally-oriented domestic production as a primary goal for a socialist state proved too much for the more-revolutionary-than-thou Chinese. Peking rightly saw policies it regarded as ideologically unsound indicative of a change in Soviet attitudes toward supporting Chinese interests.

Peter Van Ness, in a study of Chinese foreign policy, argues "The principal issue dividing the two powers through the early 1960's was Russia's conciliatory attitude toward China's great enemy, the United States, and Soviet willingness often to cooperate with the United States in efforts to maintain the status quo against China's radical assaults on it."[7] In the summer of 1963, when the Moscow-Peking debate came out into the open, the Chinese said much the same thing themselves. In July the CPR government charged that "the policy of the Soviet Union is one of... allying with the United States to oppose China."[8] In August the charges were made more specific,

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[6] Russia: Absent and Present (New York, 1961) p. 118.

[7] Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 1971) p. 64.

[8] "Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons and Proposing a Conference of the Government Heads of All Countries of the World" (7/31/63) in Peter Berton, The Chinese-Russian Dialogue: March-August 1963 (Berkeley, 1963) Vol. I, p. 7/31, 1.

"The real aim of the Soviet leaders is to compromise with the United States in order to seek monetary ease and to maintain a monopoly of nuclear weapons and to lord it over the socialist camp."[9] (my emphasis).

How to contend with the nuclear-backed military power of the American and American-supported armed forces in promoting world communism, how to overcome the continuing material superiority of the American economy, in short, how to deal with the United States formed a major part of the cause of the Sino-Soviet split. A collateral issue concerned the nature of leadership in the communist world and had been touched off by the de-Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union. This second major issue in the dispute, though, is really related to the first. While the reasons for the de-Stalinization campaign may never be fully known, one of the most plausible ones advanced is that the Soviet Union had reached something of an impasse in its objectives of winning countries away from Western influence. To seek new methods of operation, to depart from Stalin's ways, it was inevitably necessary to repudiate Stalin. The results of the policy to accomplish this of course went far beyond the leadership's expectations.

The Chinese may be charged with overreacting to Soviet tactical shifts in policies which did not portend fundamental re-orientations of outlook, or it may be argued that the Chinese were unduly paranoiac about their relations with all occidental powers, but a reading of Soviet policy statements of

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[9]"Comment of Chinese Government on Soviet Statement of August 3," (8/15/63) in Berton Vol.I, p. 8/15, 9.

the period 1956 to 1964 - from the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) until Khrushchev's removal - tends to bear out Chinese accusations more often than not. In all this, the United States was not considered by the Chinese (until later and mostly for rhetorical purposes) to be actively promoting the split. Rather, the role of the United States was that of a catalyst - causing but not actually taking part in the interaction that led to the split.

An examination of the statements of Soviet leaders from 1956 to 1963, and particularly those of Nikita Khrushchev, will show how frequently and deeply considerations of the United States figured in Soviet policies, whether foreign or domestic. Initially, there was no adverse response from the Chinese, but as Soviet attention focused on its great capitalist rivals, Chinese actions and their statements revealed their fears of being excluded from the Soviets' concerns. The plan of this paper is to show those Soviet policies and statements concerning the United States which proved to be so upsetting to the Chinese, and then to show how the Chinese reacted to them.

There were two basic aspects of Soviet views about the United States. First, Soviet writings regularly depicted the United States as the most advanced capitalist country and therefore, rare disclaimers notwithstanding, the yardstick against which the most advanced socialist country must measure its economic progress. The United States was also the rival to beat in an international economic competition. Public statements of such domestic and international competition re-

vealed a basis other than that of ideology for the determination of Soviet domestic and economic policy. In trying to overtake the United States economically, the Soviet Union produced a "goulash communism" of material prosperity which could have little relation to the goals of programs of a Chinese People's Republic still struggling toward industrialization and trying to feed an enormous population.

The second aspect of the Soviet view of the United States was that of a coegual nuclear superpower. This overwhelming armament advantage put the two countries in an exclusive club with a membership of just two. The history of Russia in international politics has special relevance here. Most historians, Russian and Western, would agree that Czarist Russia's ruling circles had a general sense of being inferior to the Western European countries. Although differences between Russia and the West may have been deliberately accentuated by Russian leaders in some areas, e.g. language and religion, it is equally significant that Peter the Great built his capital, St. Petersburg, on his empire's Western boundary and the nobility of Russia preferred to speak French. Czarist Russia's history of dealings in the various alliances and congresses does not show a record of astuteness and success, nor even self-confidence.

Even after the October revolution the Soviet Union was relegated to an inferior status, apart from its material weakness, by the simple fact of the initial non-recognition of its government. When it did establish diplomatic relation with other nations its ambassadors were, in the spirit of the new

classless society, given only the title of polpred (polnomochniy predstavitel'- authorized spokesman)[10] by the Soviet Union, and thus assured of protocol ranking below every other country's diplomats. The emergence of the Soviet Union after World War II as the unquestioned leading landpower of the Eurasian "world-island" and shortly after as a nuclear power too, put it in a position of preeminence which it had been denied for more than three centuries.

If the people of the United States had been reluctant to assume a world leadership role, Soviet leaders saw vindication of the revolution and all of Russia's subsequent turmoil in their new station in the community of nations. Alexis deTocqueville's prediction of the United States and Russia ruling the destinies of the globe seemed to have come true.[11] That this Soviet outlook also had foundations in traditional Russian great-power chauvinism as well as propagation of the world proletarian revolution would come to be appreciated in Peking more than anywhere else.

Having achieved a position of parity with the United States as the only power that seemed to matter, the Soviet Union was determined to maintain that position as a minimum goal. The ultimate goal was to surpass the United States as a world power and gain unquestioned ascendancy in the community of nations. The Soviet foreign policies developed in support of these goals involved several immediate objectives.

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[10]The transliteration system used throughout is the modified Library of Congress system. In documentation, however, transliterations of the source are used.

[11]Democracy in America, Vol.I (New Rochelle, 1965) pp.430-31.

One was neutralizing the West's strategic position advantages manifested in the many overseas US bases, the so-called "capitalist encirclement." A second was the encouragement of a reduction of US military forces and preparedness. Permitting the Korean War was one of the greatest foreign policy blunders of the Soviet Union. The strengthening of Western anti-Communist resolve it produced was part of the damage which had to be undone. NATO and its counterparts elsewhere now forced the Soviets into expensive reactive moves. The reaction to Stalin was in part due to his failure to deal successfully with the United States.

A third objective of Soviet policy also began now to take shape, limiting spread of nuclear weapons. The international picture could be complicated, and the position of leadership of either country challenged by the appearance of another large country with nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Both countries appreciated this. In the Unites States, Henry Kissinger elaborated the complexities of multipying the number of nuclear powers in what he called the "nth" country problem.[12] The Soviets' official ideology, and hence their policy positions, were grounded in the dialectic of thesis-antithesis. Soviet (Russian) obsession with chess as a paradigm of power relations likewise conditioned them to look at the world situation as a zero-sum game, i.e. two rivals, capitalism and communism, winner take all. A tri-partite world order was difficult for them to talk about, let alone imagine.

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[12] Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957) passim.

Both sides sought to avoid it.

A. Avtorkhanov, a graduate of the School of Red Professors in Moscow, identifies three factors determining Soviet foreign policy. These are 1) the fundamental and unchanging substantive factors (political, ideological,etc.), 2) the transitory and derivative variable factors (peace, "coexistence," self-determination, etc.), and 3) natural interests.[13] The first of these factors remained ostensibly unchanged throughout the period. One has only to remember Khrushchev's famous "We will bury you" statement to recall what ultimate Soviet objectives were. What did change was the relative emphasis given to the second and third factors. "Peaceful coexistence" occupied a prominent place in almost every foreign policy statement. And Soviet "natural interests" were now seen to be acutely involved in any US-USSR conflict where the potential for nuclear warfare was involved. The Chinese did not follow along with these shifts in Soviet foreign policy.

Foreign policy considerations influence, and are in turn influenced, by considerations of domestic policy. If the Soviet Union was to overtake the United States, it had a long way to go. The Soviet economy had never really gotten started during the trials and errors of the 1930's. The shift to war production all but eliminated any gains made by economic stability. The Western areas of the Soviet Union had been so devastated by World WarII that the process of rebuilding las-

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[13]"Factors Determining Soviet Foreign Policy," Problems of Soviet Foreign Policy (Munich, 1959) p. 1.

ted into the mid-fifties. Now, some forty years after the revolution, and after enduring the privations of forced industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and the losses of war, the people of the Soviet Union were coming to expect more of the amenities of life. Certainly Khrushchev thought so.

Two objectives of Soviet domestic policy complemented each other: provide more consumer goods for the people, and demonstrate to the world the superiority of a socialist economy in doing so. To a great extent, these objectives were compatible with the foreign policy objectives of convincing the United States to 1) relinquish its overseas bases, and 2) reduce its military establishment. A single theme of "peaceful coexistence" could provide the framework for the accomplishment of all of them. This same theme could also provide the rationale for Soviet arguments for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

To incorporate these objectives of foreign and domestic policy into a program that would also allow the Soviets to pursue the traditional Marxist-Leninist goals of advancing the world prolitarian revolution and building an international classless world order was Nikita Khrushchev's task. The Sino-Soviet split is evidence of how successful the Chinese leadership thought he was.

When and where did the split begin? Although nothing they said at the time would indicate it, the Chinese later asserted that "the difference began with the 20th Congress of

the CPSU."[14] The Soviets too considered this Congress as "a turning point in international relations"[15] and most analysts would agree that this most dramatic of all Congresses, which included the famous secret speech, marks the departure point. Before turning to the beginning of the chronology of the division between Moscow and Peking, it is necessary to consider the kinds of evidence that are available to the researcher and to mention some of the ideological and political factors that give the controversy its particular form.

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[14] "The Origin and the Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," (9/6/63), in Berton Vol.II, p. 9/6, 2.

[15] /Editorial/ International Affairs, January 1956, p. 5. Hereafter cited as IA. This Soviet English language publication is not to be confused with the similarly named publication of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London).

II THE LANGUAGE AND THE BACKGROUND OF THE DEBATE

The study of any country's diplomatic and foreign policy documents requires recognition of the modes of diplomatic thought, the customary blandness and circumlocutions of official statements, and an understandable reluctance on the part of the writers of such documents to deal in absolutes or finalities in expositions of immediate positions or policies. The problems of Soviet studies are made another order of magnitude more complex by the systematic employment of the special rhetoric of Communist ideology and Marxian dialectic.

Sir William Hayter, for six years British ambassador in Moscow, speaks the "habitual untruthfulness, this lying on principle."[16] The principle is the dialectical notion that a statement may be potentially true. That is, if according to Marxian view of history or science something will likely happen, it is perfectly permissible in an effort to convert the masses for a Communist to say that it has happened. Stalin's proclamation of the triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union in 1936 is an example. The techniques and guidelines of interpreting these esoteric communications, part of what Robert Conquest calls the "black art of Kremlinology" are best set forth in the chapter "Questions of Evidence" in his Power and Policy in the USSR.[17]

Individual words or phrases themselves pose problems in

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[16] Russia and the World: A Study in Foreign Policy (New York, 1970) p. 14.

[17] New York, 1967, Chapter 3.

understanding Soviet statements. Many words have particular meanings with respect to ideology. A major category involves labeling of incorrect thinkers. Since there can be only one true Marxist-Leninist faith, all else must be heresy or deviation and has to be identified so the faithful may be warned of error and heretics condemned. A multitude of such categorizations exist. Generally, those who follow a conservative line are opportunists, reformists (i.e. those working within the existing systems), capitulationists, etc. In such terms do the Soviets nowstand accused by Peking. Those who insist on immediate and revolutionary action are dogmatists, adventurists, sectarianists, etc. This is how the Soviets accuse the Chinese.

Every sphere of Communist activity has ideologically loaded words. Promotion of "heavy industry" connotes a hard line and militaristic outlook, whereas "light industry" connotes consumer goods production. "Medium machine building" denotes nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.

There are also words and phrases favored by Soviet leaders which carry particular impact because of their associations in the purely Russian literature and culture. Nathan Leites has produced several works of his content analysis of elite articulations.[18] For example, he shows that the image of the grave or burial is reserved for opponents. The Germans who invaded Russia are in their graves; the Russian defenders have merely fallen.

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[18]The most fully developed presentation of Leites's methodology is to be found in A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe,Ill., 1953).

In addition to determining the sense of Soviet statements there is a problem of the enormous profusion of them as well as their length. Speeches are measured in hours. The Soviet passion for bigness, gigantomania, as it is called, is no more evident than in speeches and reports. Repetition is certainly one of the most favored rhetorical devices followed closely by profuse illustration, examples, and resumes of past events. Hayter probably summed up the whole problem of Soviet sources best when he wrote:

> The Soviet official language is hard, dry, inhuman, mechanized, full of mis-named abstract concepts doing duty for arguments. The same pompous phrases occur again and again in every official speech, making them impossible to listen to and almost impossible to read. Somewhere in all this dross there is sometimes embedded a nugget of new thought, but it is hard to excavate or even identify. Reading between the lines is necessary, of course, but the reader or listener is so battered by the hail of clichés that he hardly retains enough alertness to detect the one small sentence which is meant to hint, cryptically, at a policy switch, or a movement forward.[19]

Like Polonius, one must "by indirection, find directions out."

A more familiar problem lies in translation of the language itself. Words and phrases do not always translate exactly, and

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[19]Hayter, Russia and the World, loc. cit.

the resulting ambiguities may be put to use for the purpose of propaganda or deception. In the 1950's, Soviet magazines would print photographs of groups or gatherings in which persons were deleted from the photograph or added from other photographs.[20] Since the Russian word for photo (foto) is both singular and plural, the Soviets may have been literally accurate while deceiving. The word zagovorit' has two meanings: to start to talk (about something) or to chatter incessantly (about something). Translation in the first sense when the second is intended may give a neutral coloration to a statement that is hostile, and vise versa.

The assessment of the relative importance of the many Soviet statements is also a problem. To an extent, the problem is ameliorated by the fact that all publications must pass the state censorship, Glavit. Therefore, virtually all that is published can be said to have official sanction. Generally, publications from writers or organizations, such as the Institute for International Relations or the Academy of Social Science, under the auspices of the Central Committee of the CPSU are of particular importance. Certain individuals have special authority, e.g. Boris Ponomarev who is author of the only one-volume history of the CPSU in Russia and who is a member of the Central Committee of the Party. On a day-to-day basis, Pravda is the most important newspaper since it is the party's official organ, whereas Izvestiia is the organ of the government.

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[20] Current Soviet Policies, Vol.1, ed. Leo Gruilow (New York, 1953) p. 53.

There are even more precise clues to a statement's importance. Controversial subjects or articles announcing new policy lines usually appear on the inner pages of the journal rather than on the front page. Unsigned articles are more authoritative than signed articles because the former imply collegiality and are harder to repudiate than articles attributed to a single source.

Moving up the hierarchy of sources, the pronouncements and speeches of government leaders are obviously more important in an authoritarian state than any interpretive material which has a way of becoming rapidly dated. In the years under consideration, 1956 to 1964, the speeches and writings of Khrushchev himself are the most important sources. By US standards, a large number of speeches are given so the particular audience may not be indicative of the importance of a speech. Speechmaking is the usual way of disseminating government policy. The foreign or domestic situation of the particular moment rather than the audience or occassion will often be seen to determine a speech's subject. Khrushchev's speeches illustrate this very well. For an example, although speaking to a reception at the Soviet-Indian Friendship Society in Bombay, after a few amenities he said "Let us turn to the problem of German unification."[21] Clearly this was the main topic of his speech.

There is one speech regularly given which surpasses all others in importance as an indication of Soviet policy, pro-

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[21] International Affairs, January 1956, p. 194.

grams, and goals. This is the otchetnii doklad, the report of the Central Committee to the Party Congress. It is "probably the single most authoritative official statement of Soviet policy available to the non-Communist world."[22] Given at the beginning of each Congress by the party leader, or as at the XIXth Party Congress in 1952 by the heir apparent, Georgi Malenkov, it is the keynote address but a good deal more. It is a combination of State of the Union address and Papal Encyclical. Divided into three parts - the Soviet Union, the international situation, and the Party - it reviews the events since the last Congress concerning each area, analyses, trends, and influences in each area. Each section is concluded by an enumeration of tasks to be accomplished.

Two considerations must be borne in mind in studying an otchetnii doklad. First, it is or ought to be formulated according to Marxian dialectic and therefore defines correct positions to be taken by all loyal communists and excludes all varient or alternative positions. Second, as it is given by the leadership, it is meant as a directive rather than a persuasion or suggestion. Almost always the rest of the Congress is spent on deciding the consequences and implementation of the otchetnii doklad. Analysis of the relative amount of attention given to each item and comparison with previous doklads is essential for the detection of shifts and new directions in Soviet policy.

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[22]See the unpubl. diss. (Fletcher, 1959) by Brewster C. Denny, "The Soviet Evaluation of the Instruments and Intentions of Post-War American Foreign Policy, 1952-1956," p. 29.

In the examination of Soviet materials of the Khrushchev era, finally, there are two anomalies which show the extent to which Khrushchev's personal idiosyncracies marked his regime. One is the famous Secret Speech at the XXth Party Congress which denounced Stalin and the kult lichnosti (cult of personality). The other is Khrushchev Remembers,[23] an unauthorized but authentic record of Khrushchev's reminiscences about his career and first secretaryship. The singularity of these documents lies in an emphsis on personalities which is wholly alien to the Marxian idea that the forces of history, not individuals, are that which shape events. Never before, nor likely ever again, has a ruling communist party explicitly repudiated one of its leaders, or has a leader provided a personalized account of his time in office. This is not to say these documents are more important than the otchetnii doklads, but they do deserve special attention.

The problems of evaluating and interpreting Soviet source material are forbidding, but the work is essential for that understanding of the Soviet policy which must be incorporated in American policy formulations. In The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II, Adam Ulam points out that "at no other time /the late fifties/ did the Soviets make it so difficult for an outsider to perceive or even guess what they were after."[24] He argues, however, that while much of the cold war confrontations were the results of misperceptions of

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[23] ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston, 1970).

[24] The Rivals (New York, 1971) p. 284.

the adversary's policies, "There was one unpardonable dereliction and that was not to know."[25] (emphasis in original)

The use of Chinese sources in this paper has the more limited purpose of illustrating the subject and the acrimony of the charges made against the leadership of the CPSU by Peking. The same cautions appropriate to Soviet materials apply in attempting to discern the real meaning of official Chinese statements. Two factors make the handling of Chinese source materials somewhat easier. There are simply fewer of them, and Peking made a greater effort than Moscow during the period to get its viewpoints widely disseminated in translation. It is not the point to show that Peking's charges were actually true, there is an obvious distortion of relations between Moscow and Washington, but rather these charges revealed what the Chinese feared and why they felt they must find their own way.

The Sino-Soviet split occured in the particular context of international relations of the nineteen fifties and early sixties. The United States figured prominently in the rhetoric and debate surrounding it and was a major factor in causing the split. There are also a number of factors having to do with territorial claims and with relations between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) which figure in the dispute and will be briefly outlined here.

Governmental contacts between China and Russia go back to the middle of the seventeenth century, and one of the first

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[25]Ibid., p. 101.

state transactions was the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. By this treaty the Czar recognized Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia and gave up claims to territory north of the Amur River. Over the next two centuries Russia's strength relative to China grew enormously and, in 1858, the Czar's expansionism saw the retaking of the territory north of the Amur. By 1860 Vladivostock (which translates, significantly, as "ruler of the East") and the territory east of the Ussuri River was Russian. In 1896 the Russians built the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria to Vladivostock, established bases at Port Arthur and Dairen, and so took control of the Liaotung penninsula. In 1921 the independent Mongolian People's Republic was proclaimed, although in a treaty in 1924 the embryonic Soviet Union did concede to the Kuomintang government that Mongolia was an integral part of China.

The Japanese, who had already taken Port Arther in 1904, made further encroachments into the area with the takeover of Manchuria in 1931 and forced the Soviets to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1935. The Soviets, in spite of the 1924 treaty, concluded a defensive alliance with Mongolia in 1936 and had troops stationed on the Chinese-Mongolian border by 1938. Meanwhile, armed clashes had occured between the Soviet and Japanese troops on the Manchurian border. Almost unnoticed was a small Soviet garrison in Sinkiang supporting the then pro-Soviet warlord General Sheng Shih-ts'ai. The General's increasing demands and exigencies of the military situation on the Russian western front in 1943 forced the

garrison's withdrawal. These Soviet troops had supported the man who had Mao Tse-tung's brother executed.

The conference at Yalta made concessions to the Soviets' claims on China. Stalin in return recognized Chiang Kai-shek as the ruler of China. A treaty extracted from their erstwhile Chinese ally of eleven days in 1945 gave the Soviets a guarantee of Mongolian independence, joint management of the Chinese Eastern Railway for thirty years, and a thirty year lease for a naval base at Port Arthur with the Soviets responsible for its defense (i.e. allowing the presence of ground troops and aircraft as well as ships).

In the ensuing civil war between Chiang and Mao, the Soviet Union was remarkably slow to recognize the government of a fraternal communist party. It was not until 1 October 1949 that Stalin withdrew recognition from the Nationalist government and extended it to Mao. One of the first mutual actions undertaken by the two governments was the renegotiation of the August 1945 Treaty. The final agreements, which were reached only after two months negotiation, provided for a mutual defense pact, the Soviet cession of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Dalny, Port Arthur, and the granting of credits to the Chinese by the USSR.[26] As a sign of the mutual confidence in each others economies, the amount of credits to be given had to be specified in US dollars.

The Korean War introduced a new and portentous element into the Sino-Soviet relations. Regardless of whether Moscow or Peking had encouraged Kim Il-sung, it was the Chinese who

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[26]The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 3rd ed. (New York, 1972) p. 241.

pulled Moscow's chestnuts out of the fire. The Soviets were undoubtedly surprised by the degree of US commitment where none had evidently been expected, and thus did not have any immediate fallback plans in case of reverses. Incredibly, when the Soviets supplied the equally unprepared Chinese with arms, they sold the weapons to their allies. If the Korean War suggested a new relation between China and the USSR, the death of Stalin made it virtually certain. But a new relationship would still have to be expressed in terms of the familiar, shared ideology which had no precedents or prescriptions for international relations between Communist states.

It would be impossible to attempt a survey of even the highlights of the dogma and ideology of so comprehensive a system as Marxism-Leninism purports to be. Some features of the ideology have particular relevance to the Sino-Soviet dispute as it concerned the problem of dealing with the United States, and these will be outlined here.

One of the most fundamental Marxist-Leninist tenets of state relations was the historically determined, inevitable, and implacable antagonism between capitalism and socialism. Furthermore, the final confrontation was almost always spoken of as being violent. Lenin's earlier writings, particularly Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, dwell on this. In speaking of the conflict growing between bourgeois and proletarian interests at the beginning of the century he asked,"When the relation of forces is changed,how else,under capi-

talism, can the solution of contradictions be found, except by resorting to violence?"[27] (emphasis in original) Later, writing on the eve of the Russian revolution in August 1917, he asserted that, "The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution."[28] After the Russian revolution and the loss of several parts of the Czarist empire, Lenin modified his policies to allow for the Soviet's weakness. In this circumstance, extreme Soviet weakness, "peaceful coexistence" was permitted with capitalist neighbors. This formulation was the occasion for the split with Trotsky. Lenin died before the full implications of his thinking on the matter could be explored.

Josef Stalin assumed among other things the mantle of leading theoretician for the party. One result of Stalin's work in this area was the publication in 1925 of a systematized exposition of the five contradictions inherent in capitalism that had been identified by Lenin in the course of his writings. These contradictions exist between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the imperialist countries and their colonies, imperialists on the winning side of World War II (or any such war), and imperialists on the losing side, imperialist winners versus each other, and the USSR (i.e. socialist countries) and the capitalist world.[29]

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[27]Lenin, Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York, 1939) p. 96.

[28]Lenin, State and Revolution (New York, 1971) p. 20.

[29]Stalin, Collected Works, Vol.7 (Moscow, 1925) pp. 269-295.

Contradictions are not merely philosophical abstractions to the Marxist ideologue. They are the stuff of history and all as potentially violent as any revolution can be. Twenty-seven years after writing about contradictions, Stalin had had a chance to test and revise his opinions on this facet of ideology and its implication to international relations. There are signs he may have been changing his attitudes, however slightly, to allow for a less belligerent approach to the contradictions between capitalism and socialism. Writing in his last tract, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, he argued that contradictions between capitalist countries themselves had grown stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.[30]

Stalin also used the phrase "peaceful coexistence," though always enclosed in quotation marks or set off in the text, rather frequently. It can be further argued that a softening of approach toward relations with Iran in 1952 and the Soviet proposal of a re-unified, re-armed but neutral Germany in that same year showed a change in the direction of Soviet policy. On the other hand, Stalin had also discussed rather candidly what he thought of the ultimate chances for peace and "peaceful coexistence."

> "What is most likely is that the present-day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing a particular war, in its temporary preservation of

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[30]Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (Moscow, 1952) p. 40.

> a particular peace, in the resignation of a bellicose government and its supersession by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be good. Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough, because, for all the success of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force - and consequently the inevitability of wars will also continue in force.
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> To eliminate the inevitability of war it is necessary to abolish imperialism."[31] (emphasis in original)

That statement and Soviet activities in relation to the Korean War argue against any amelioration of Stalin's views on war. If he had been in the process of changing his mind, like Lenin, he died before a new direction could be established. Certainly his successors felt that new ways must be sought to deal with the United States, and this meant explicit or implicit repudiation of Stalin's methods.

It should be evident that the ideological positions on the inevitability of strife between capitalism and communism thus far presented have been complicated by having to deal with the idea, in some form, of peaceful coexistence. It should be no surprise that in a belief system which holds the

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[31]Stalin, Economic Problems, p. 41.

unity of opposites as one of its tenets. This idea which seems antithetical to the notion of an inevitably violent world conflict is also a product of Lenin's. The ensuing split with Trotsky along with the failure of social revolution in Germany led Lenin to write the tract on which the Soviets were to rely so heavily for ideological rectitude in their dispute with the Chinese.

"Left-Wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder is a tactical manual born of experience in dealing with the capitalist bourgeois enemy and lays open the way for the greatest flexibility, especially in the conduct of foreign policy. Lenin began by pointing out to the parties which had failed to win revolutions in 1918-20 what was lacking. "The revolutionary parties must complete their education. They have learned to attack. Now they must realize that this knowledge must be supplemented by the knowledge of how to retreat properly."[32] To these parties he contrasted the experience of his own Bolshevik party which had "ruthlessly exposed and expelled the revolutionary phrase-mongers, who refused to understand that one had to retreat, that one had to know to retreat."[33] He then proceeded to give specific guidance on how Communists should act in various situations of power, or lack of it, in which they might find themselves. On dealings with non-communists he admonished, "to reject compromises in general, no matter of what kind, is childishness."[34] In setting limits

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[32]Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder (New York, 1940) p. 13.

[33]Ibid, p. 14. [34]Ibid, p. 22.

to compromise he observed that "all dividing lines in nature and society are mutable."[35](emphasis in original)

Lenin of course never abandoned his ultimate goal or his contempt for the enemy. His aim was to ensure that all tactics were available to the communist revolutionary.

> The more powerful enemy can be conquered only by exerting the utmost effort, and by necessarily, thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest, "rift" among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries..., by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional. Those who do not understand this do not understand even a particle of Marxism.[36]
> (emphasis in original)

Lenin concluded that assurance of final victory for fraternal communist parties, hence the whole communist movement, lacked only one ingredient. That was an understanding of the "necessity of displaying the utmost flexibility in their tactics."[37] This flexibility of tactics suited the personal style of Khrushchev well, especially in his attitude toward and dealings with the United States. It also was a major contribution to the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Conditions conducive to the split have been found in many

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[35]Ibid, p. 51. [36]Ibid, p. 53. [37]Ibid, p. 82.

other areas too: the rivalry for control of peoples in the border regions who were neither Slavic nor Sinic, racial antagonism, and the zeal of the recently victorious Chinese contrasted to the bureaucratized Russian revolutionaries. Soviet and Chinese literature clearly show, however, that these considerations all entered the debates after it had begun. In March of 1963 the Chinese enumerated a long list of points of dispute in a letter to the CPSU but concluded that the fundamental difference remained in the question of how to conduct "the struggle against imperialism headed by the United States."[38]

At the time of Stalin's death and after, Soviet concern for dealing with the United States focused on Europe, the question of US bases, German rearmament, and the possibility of nuclear war. Whether or not it was evident to Stalin, his successors certainly recognized that an impasse in dealing with the West had been reached, and even had there been someone capable of carrying them off, the foreign policy methods of Stalin were no longer getting results. Once the question of who would rule in the Kremlin was settled, that man would have to decide how to deal with the United States. "Left-Wing" Communism could provide a means to escape the rigidities of Stalin's doctrinaire, not to say paranoiac, policies. There was now a new if unrecognized parameter for Soviet policy making. Mao was now the elder statesman of International Communism and would have to be consulted on the directions major

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[38]David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York, 1964)p. 379.

policies would take. As we shall see, this did not happen at the XXth CPSU Congress.

III A TURNING POINT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

XXth PARTY CONGRESS

It is with a good deal of justification that the Soviet writers have styled the XXth Party Congress of the CPSU as a turning point in international relations, although it is doubtful that any irony was intended. This Congress formalized the break with the past, but some signs of this break with the Stalinist policies appeared as soon as the succession struggle was settled in favor of Khrushchev and Bulganin in early 1955. Kremlin-watchers began to note that occasions for referring to Stalin's memory or leadership were being bypassed without that accustomed mention. Military victories of World War II were being spoken of without the obligatory acknowledgement that it was Stalin's military genius which had authored them. The first dramatic departure from the style of the old regime, though, was the personal diplomacy of Bulganin and Khrushchev.

The Geneva conference of 1955 marked the first time since the Congress of Vienna that a Russian leader had attended a conference of heads of state not surrounded by his own troops. As yet, this was only a new method in Soviet diplomacy. A new direction was signalled by the trip of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma, and Pakistan in the late fall of 1955. This evident shift of Soviet interest to the Indian sub-continent was reminiscent of a Czarist foreign policy tactic; frustration in one area led to a renewed effort in a dif-

ferent area. In this case the scene of immediate operations shifted from Europe to India, but many familiar policy themes would be heard nonetheless.

On 21 November 1955 both Bulganin and Khrushchev addressed the Indian parliament. Bulaganin, speaking first, apprised the audience of the reason behind the trip, viz. to gain 'neutral' support (such an oxymoron would not bother a Marxist) against the United States. Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union had many purposes including the "effort to promote peace and ease international tension."[39] With particular reference to Europe, Bulganin stated that the Soviet Union was "opposed to the policy of forming military blocs and favored the liquidation of blocs already formed."[40] A major portion of the speech was then devoted to the Soviet Union's efforts at peace-making in Europe.[41] This was being brought to the attention of the Indian parliament because, as Bulganin somewhat patronizinly informed it, "There is a grand process of awakening of the peoples of the East to political life."[42]

Khrushchev's speech followed. After a panegyric to life in the Soviet Union, it turned to the familiar excoriation of the United States. "Certain elements in some countries are

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[39]"Speeches of Bulganin and Khrushchev on Tour of India, Burma, and Pakistan," International Affairs, January 1956, p. 177. In consideration of the length of most Soviet statements, frequent citations will be given to aid in location of specific remarks.

[40]Ibid, p. 179. [41]Ibid, p. 180. [42]Ibid, p. 185.

still trying to carry on the notorious "positions of strength" policy [i.e. Dulles], the policy of holding up the threat of atomic waepons."[43] Three days later at a speech to the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society in Bombay, Khrushchev was again at work on familiar and quite European themes. He accused unnamed western powers of being responsible for hurling the armed forces of Hitler Germany against the USSR.[44] The conclusion of his speech was the usual sort of bellicosity in Soviet speeches. "And so we say to the gentry who are expecting the Soviet Union to change its political program: 'Wait until the crab whistles!' ...We have never abandonoed, and never will abandon our political line which was mapped by Lenin."[45] There was added, however, the new element, "We have to live on one planet. Living means coexisting."[46]

This reference to the common fate of mankind on a small planet faced with the possible horrors of a nuclear war was a new theme in Soviet policy statements. Even this early some Soviet foreign service personnel in the field in Southeast Asia saw the possibility of conflict between China and the Soviet Union over the differing perceptions of foreign policy requirements. One, Alexander Kaznacheev, saw the journey of Bulganin and Khrushchev as an attempt to gain support among neutral nations - and their local communist parties - for the new Soviet foreign policy direction. He concluded that an open conflict between Moscow and Peking was inevitable because of their differing perceptions of how to deal with the

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[43]Ibid, p. 194. [44]Ibid, p. 195. [45]Ibid, p. 195. [46]Ibid, p. 196.

West.[47]

The Soviet leaders courted India by referring to it as the other great Asian power besides China. Judging from the rhetoric, the purpose of this reference was not to develop a counterpoise to an imagined Chinese threat, but to enlist an ally against the Western powers. Whatever the reason, the equation with socialist India cannot have pleased communist China. But the Soviets, although they were now seeking new openings in the Near East, Middle East, and India, were still preoccupied with European problems. Throughout all the rhetoric and pronouncements of Moscow in the period leading up to the XXth CPSU Congress, there run the dominant and familiar themes of fear of West German re-armament, necessity for dismantlement of NATO, and the threat of a nuclear war touched off by a European confrontation. There was also, however, a barely perceptible shift of emphasis toward the paramount necessity for avoiding nuclear war.

The lead editorial in the first edition of International Affairs for the new year, entitled simply "1956," gave more specific indications of the course of Soviet policy to be formalized at the XXth Party Congress. Not only the Soviet Union, but the Chinese People's Republic, "a Great Power of a new type," were "advancing along a new path of historical development."[48] Here, as for a number of years to come, the assumption was made that China as well as the East European satel-

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[47]Alexander Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy (New York, 1962) pp. 126-131. Kaznacheev was a political officer in Burma.

[48]"1956," IA, January 1956, p. 5.

lites would simply follow the line laid down in Moscow even as they had under Stalin.

The Sixth Five Year Plan, already disseminated before the Congress in draft form in the Soviet Union, was discussed in the editorial. The Plan's aims were to raise the living standards of the Soviet people, to provide the direction for overtaking the most advanced capitalist countries, and to strengthen the forces working for an international detente.[49] The editorial then turned to the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India. This visit was not only a success for the Soviet foreign policy but a "great victory for peace and international friendship."[50] Throughout 1955 it had been the Soviet Union which led the way toward promoting peace, increasing cooperation between all governments, and in working to "create an atmosphere of mutual confidence."[51] If the new Five Year Plan and the policies suggested by the style and rhetoric of the Indian visit seemed to suggest a possible departure from the course of promoting world revolution, in theory at least, above all else the party congress a few weeks away would confirm it.

The XXth Party Congress of the CPSU was held from 14 to 25 February 1956.[52] In duration and number of delegates it did not differ significantly from the XIXth Party Congress, but in style and substance it was a world away. The first

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[49]Ibid, p. 6. [50]Ibid, p. 13. [51]Ibid, p. 7.

[52]This and all subsequent information on the dates and numbers attending Party Congresses is taken from John S. Reshetar's The Soviet Polity (New York, 1972) pp. 131-137.

portent of things to come occurred at the opening of the Congress during the period reserved for a silent pause in memory of departed comrades. The name J. V. Stalin was simply included with the names of two minor foreign party officials. Nothing else was said.

The "turning point in international relations" was the otchetnii doklad and its revelation of new Soviet domestic and foreign policy lines. The dramatic changes that transpired are best revealed by comparison with the otchetnii doklad of the XIXth Party Congress. The doklad in 1952 was given by Malenkov, with Stalin looking on, and was only one-forth the length of the doklad at the XXth Party Congress. The XIXth Congress version was bellicose throughout and revealed a siege mentality: the section on the Soviet military was four times as long as that of the XXth Congress. And always and everywhere the name Stalin appeared. In all three sections the mood was somber. The first foreign policy task was to "continue the struggle against the preparation and unleashing of another war."[53] In the section on the internal situation of the USSR, emphasis was on heavy industry, economizing, and military preparedness. The only specific mention of the United States in the doklad was mere observance of the fact that the atom monopoly had been broken. The section on the party called for more self-criticism and sterner discipline. The XIXth Party Congress ended with concluding remarks by Stalin himself, and these ended with the cry, "Down

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53Current Soviet Policies, Vol.i, p. 106.

with the warmongers!"[54]

Nikita Khrushchev delivered the otchetnii doklad at the XXth Party Congress and the break with the past was at once proclaimed in the introduction. "The Party has boldly exposed shortcomings in various spheres of economic, state and Party activities, smashed obsolete ideas and resolutely swept aside everything that had outlived its time and was hindering our progress."[55] Indeed much had changed in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death, and outside changes were noticed as well. "We are confident that within a short time, historically speaking, Great China will become an industrial country and its agricultural production will reach a high level on the basis of cooperatives."[56] There was no hint that a rival had been born. China was on the path of reaching the same level as the Balkan countries. "The Soviet Union... is doing everything to help the fraternal peoples of China establish a powerful industry of their own,"[57] but Khrushchev also added "it is no longer necessary for each socialist country to develop all branches of heavy industry."[58] This did not explicitly rule out the possibility of China's receiving nuclear weapons, but it certainly precluded any assistance to China or the other communist countries for the development of delivery systems.

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[54]Ibid, p. 236.

[55]Current Soviet Policies, Vol.2, ed. Leo Gruilow (New York, 1957) p. 29.

[56]Ibid, p. 30. [57]Ibid, p. 30. [58]Loc.Cit.

It is clear that the Soviets still assumed that Moscow could set the course of foreign relations for international communism without consulting its fraternal allies. In fact, at a party early in his regime, Khrushchev once stated in a toast something to the effect that the United States and the USSR were the only countries that mattered.[59] Such sentiments were to find increasing voice in Soviet pronouncements of the Khrushchev era.

In the internal situation section of the introduction of the doklad Khrushchev advised the Soviets to improve their own techniques by studying "the best that capitalist countries' science and technology have to offer."[60] There were of course routine criticisms of the capitalist world which led to a revealing glimpse of how important Khrushchev regarded China. "Capitalism is steadily moving toward new economic upheavals,"[61] and the most important problem facing the working classes in the capitalist countries was the prevention of a new war.[62] These impending upheavals and sentiments of the working classes were responsible for "signs of a certain sobering up appearing among influential Western circles."[63] Also changing modes of Western thought was the fact that, as the Soviet Union generously allowed, "People's China and the independent Republic of India have joined the ranks of the Great Powers."[64] Further,

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[59]Sir William Hayter, The Kremlin and the Embassy (London, 1966) p. 43.

[60]Current Soviet Policies, Vol.2, p. 31.

[61]Ibid, p. 32. [62]Ibid, p. 33. [63]Loc.Cit. [64]Ibid, p. 33.

it was the Soviet Union, as opposed to the United States, which enjoyed the "deep confidence and love /of/ the broad masses of the Eastern countries."[65] Such patronizing, while correctly stating the relative economic strength of these countries to the Soviet Union , could not have been calculated to flatter nations that were two or three times as populous. Neither can the Chinese have been pleased to be ranked in Soviet estimation with a non-Marxist neutral regime.

In the section on the international situation, Khrushchev's attention turned to the main problems, the European situation and US-Soviet relations. The first foreign policy task of the Soviet Union was to seek an improvement in relations among the Great Powers in order to offset a Washington-Bonn axis which was now emerging and increasing the danger of war.[66] To this end "the establishment of firm friendly relations between the two largest powers of the world - the USSR and the United States - would be of tremendous value in strengthening world peace... "We want to hope that our peaceful aspirations will be more correctly appraised in the United States and that matters will take a turn for the better."[67] The new slogan would be not "Let's Arm" but "Let's Trade."[68]

This program was a long way from the violent abolition of imperialism as the only way to peace. But then Russians had come a long way from their revolution, as the Chinese had not from theirs. Even more, Khrushchev denied that the Soviets "have interfered or plan to interfere in the internal affairs

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[65]Ibid, p. 34. [66]Ibid, p. 35. [67]Ibid, p. 35. [68]Loc.Cit.

of countries where the capitalist order exists."[69] This concession to capitalist, particularly US, interests seemed to contradict another expressed policy of promotion of "wars of liberation" in developing countries which, having been former colonies, were part of the capitalist order.

The principle of peaceful coexistence also took on coloring quite different from the one of tactical necessity Lenin had formulated in the early 1920's. It was now "one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy of the Chinese People's Republic"[70] as well as the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries. Khrushchev flatly declared "There are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way."[71] Further, war was not "merely an economic phenomenon" nor a "fatalistic inevitability."[72] Contradictions, and the resulting wars were, or had been held by Marxists, as the way in which the social order would be renewed. New forces, however, were now at work. Khrushchev even guardedly allowed "much that is unique in socialist construction is being contributed by the Chinese People's Republic."[73] There was, more importantly though, a growth of sentiment for peace in the working classes of all countries. So strong had this become that "in many capitalist countries... the working class [in conjunction with certain peasantry, intellectuals, and patriots] has an opportunity... to turn the parliament from an agency of bour-

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[69]Ibid, p. 37. [70]Ibid, p. 37. [71]Loc.Cit.

[72]Loc.Cit. [73]Ibid, p. 37.

geois democracy into an instrument of genuinely popular will."[74] Khrushchev concluded this first section of the doklad by pointing out that the first task of the Soviet Union in foreign policy was the furtherance of peace and peaceful coexistence.[75] Clearly there had been a decided change in the tone of Soviet policy toward the United States. One reason for the near reversal in assessment of foreign policy priorities, i.e. from preparation for the inevitable war to advocacy of peaceful coexistence, was that Khrushchev seemed to have a more rational fear of nuclear war than did Stalin. He also saw that Stalin's belligerent policies toward the United States were winning neither territory nor friends for the Soviet Union. There had to be more, though, to prompt such heretofore heretical statements as that US-USSR relations could be friendly, war between capitalist and socialist countries was not inevitable, or that parliamentary means alone could effect the transition to socialism. Lenin's "Left-Wing" Communism provided the means to bring about such ideological change, but the motive, as we shall see, had a great deal to do with Khrushchev's desire to bring the good life to the Soviet Union. This would come to be called "goulash communism." The Sixth Five Year Plan amply demonstrated Khrushchev's intent and gave the standard the Soviet Union would use to measure its progress - US economic production.

The section of the otchetnii doklad on the internal situation of the USSR dealt largely with the already circulated

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[74]Ibid, p. 38. [75]Ibid, p. 38.

draft of the Sixth Five Year Plan. Some highlights of that plan will be given here and will show the preoccupation with US achievements and a new emphasis on non-military production. The USSR's "principal economic task" was "To overtake and surpass the most highly developed capitalist countries in per capita output."[76] As at earlier Congresses, light (i.e. consumer goods) and food industries were given last place in a field of twenty-one industrial areas, but now specific targats were set. Although the advance of the economy was to be "primarily of heavy industry" this emphasis was required and was explained for solving the task of creating an abundance of consumers' goods."[77] One means that would be employed in effecting this increase sounded much like the capitalists' profit motive, as it .. called for increased "personal material interest of workers in the results of their work."[78]

In the field of agriculture, Khrushchev - always proud of his closeness to the soil - revealed ambitious economic plans and made the most definite of plans for overtaking the United States. He bagan by informing all governmental agriculture agencies that they had been following "a clearly wrong path."[79] His solution involved, among other things, cultivation of hitherto fallow marginal lands, the "virgin lands" program. In research he acknowledged that the United States was much more advanced and that the Soviet Union had to buy hybrid corn seed from the United States of America.[80] He was plainly annoyed by the chronic low productivity of Soviet

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[76]Ibid, p. 18. [77]Ibid, p. 26. [78]Ibid, p. 19. [79]Ibid, p. 43.
[80]Ibid, p. 46.

agriculture. "much more labor is expended in our country than in the U.S.A. to produce a centner of milk or meat."[81] The avowed challenge was to surpass US agriculture. How different this was from the Chinese who were setting about communization as their main agricultural goal.

In the third section of the doklad on Party affairs, a rather oblique repudiation of Stalin was the subject. "It was of cardinal importance to restore and strengthen in every way Lenin's principle of collective leadership."[82] The cult of the individual had "led to serious defects in our work."[83] Khrushchev's conclusion to this section and the whole doklad itself showed he knew how dramatic and upsetting his new ideas were likely to be regarded. In anticipation of ideological criticism he warned, "He who thinks that communism can be built exclusively on propaganda, without practical day-to-day efforts to increase the output and raise the well-being of the working people, will find himself slipping down the path of Talmudism and pedantry."[84]

The whole tone and substance of the otchetnii doklad showed clearly that the United States was the country most on Khrushchev's mind. It was the United States with whom the Soviet Union must reduce tensions so as to ease the burden defense spending placed on the Soviet economy. And it was against the US economy that significant Soviet accomplishments would ultimately have to be measured. As for other fraternal socialist countries, including China, their economic problems

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[81]Ibid, p.47 [82]Ibid, p. 56. [83]Loc.Cit. [84]Ibid, p. 60.

were their own. There was little suggestion that help from the Soviet Union was forthcoming. The speeches on following days were rather routine, and as always, supportive of the otchetnii doklad. Malenkov, on the way down and now Minister of Electrification, dutifully promised that in the new Five Year Plan, Soviet electrical power production would surpass the U.S.A.'s.[85]

Soon all would be overshadowed by the dramatic Secret Speech. The Soviet Union would never be the same again; the genie was out of the bottle. Why the denunciation of Stalin had to be so explicit and elaborate remains a mystery unless one accepts the argument that a policy revision so great was contemplated that a complete break with the past had to be effected. Otherwise, Beria and his "Chekists" could have been convenient scapegoats. Years later Khrushchev would admit that such a strong castigation of one man rule could well have been taken as a criticism of Mao Tse-tung. The speech is remarkable, not only for its iconoclasm, but for its absence of Marxist grounding. It was also a uni-lateral de-thronement of the man all communists had looked to as a leader. This, as much as anything, would cause problems for Moscow. Unfortunately for Western analysts, references to foreign affairs, if any, appear to have been deleted from the version of the Secret Speech made available to the West.

The XXth Party Congress ended a few days later and the Communist world, and the Western world for that matter, was

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[85]Ibid, p. 80.

never the same again. It was, as advertised, a turning point in international relations. The most immediate reactions on the international scene were the uprisings in Eastern Europe, but there were far more profound consequences for the Soviet Union. As the Sino-Soviet split reached an open controversy, the Chinese would identify the XXth Party Congress and particularly the new foreign policies and the Secret Speech as "the first step along the road of revisionism."[86] In 1956, however, all of the fraternal parties applauded the work of the Congress. Mao is reported to have said that Khrushchev had opened everyone's eyes.

In the West, the big news was the de-thronement of Stalin and the few facts and the widespread speculation about the Secret Speech almost obscured the import of Khrushchev's other policies as enumerated in the ochetnii doklad. One of the more astute and careful Western observers who saw the significance of both the de-Stalinization and the new policies as well was G.F. Hudson. Like others, his major attention was given to the Secret Speech. The de-Stalinization would not have been so difficult for Mao to take, Hudson argued, had not Peking also recognized that the Soviet Union was trying to outflank China in Southeast Asia[87] (see Kaznacheev's remarks at the beginning of this chapter). In any event, there was obviously " no longer a unified direction of the world com-

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[86] "Whence the Differences?" People's Daily, 27 Feb. 1963 as quoted in Floyd, p.376.

[87] G.F. Hudson, "Moscow and Peiping: Seeds of Conflict?", Problems of Communism, Vol.5 No.6 (Nov-Dec 1956), 19.

munist movement as there used to be."[88]

Hudson considered how the Soviet Union's new domestic policies might affect its relations with China. "Changes of economic policy providing for concentration on the production of consumer goods might ease the economic and social strains of the Soviet Union," he wrote, "but they must mean a reduction of the Soviet capacity to provide for the urgent needs of China's industrial expansion."[89] The Soviet Union had made a clear departure from Stalin's policies not only in domestic concerns but in foreign affairs also. Khrushchev felt that some sort of understanding must be reached in the contest for supremacy with the United States that would effectively preclude a nuclear war. This would have the effect of allowing the Soviet economy to be partially re-directed to outproduce the US economy in consumer and agricultural goods.

It was becoming evident to some observers that the new Soviet policies, constructed with the United States primarily in mind, were being unfavorably regarded in Peking. Indeed, these policies could even be construed as threatening. And the Chinese experience with Western nations was not one that would inspire trust.

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[88]Ibid, p. 23.

[89]G.F. Hudson, "Mao and Moscow," Foreign Affairs, Vol.36 No.1 (October 1957), p. 82.

IV THE NEW DIRECTION

Soviet academicians and political scientists were quick to incorporate the new themes of the XXth Party Congress into their writings. International Affairs, the official Soviet English language international relations journal, published an editorial in March 1956 on "The Contribution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU to the Treasure House of Marxism-Leninism."[90] The editorial stressed the peaceful nature of the new competition with capitalism. The idea of any Soviet interference in the internal affairs of another country was scoffed at. The Soviet economy was to overtake the capitalists' as quickly as possible so that higher standards of living would be realized.[91] The editorial also foresaw that Soviet policy moves would be dismissed as an instrumental tactic following precepts outlined in "Left-Wing" Communism, i.e. temporary policies to gain some mass allies. "Peaceful co-existence is not a tactical maneuver," the editorial protested, "it is the general line of foreign policy of the Soviet Union."[92]

The idea of peaceful coexistence became the predominant theme in the policy statements for the rest of the year. The Soviets went to great length to advertise this. The supposed success in establishing the 'peace zone' in Europe, of which Khrushchev had spoken at the Party Congress, was advanced as one of the reasons for the dissolution of the Cominform.[93]

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[90] IA, March 1956, pp. 5-16.

[91] Ibid, p. 6. [92] Ibid, p. 11. [93] Floyd, p. 235.

Peaceful coexistence was even included in the orthodox prescription for relations between fraternal socialist countries and for countries friendly to them, e.g. India. This formulation (originated by China, incidentally) was promulgated as the Five Principles of International Relations. They were: 1) respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) non-aggression, 3) non-interference in internal affairs on economic, ideological or political grounds (this a month before Hungary!), 4) mutual benefit and equality, and, of course, 5) peaceful co-existence.[94] The campaign to promote this line was orchestrated to coincide with and support another policy objective, the dismantlement of overseas US bases.

The earliest international repercussions to the CPSU's "turning point of international relations" came in Eastern Europe in the form of rebellions in Poland and then Hungary. The Soviet response in Hungary was overwhelming, once the Soviets decided to act. At the height of the Red Army's invasion of Hungary there were more Soviet tanks in Budapest than Patton had had in his entire Third Army a dozen years earlier. In Poland more subtle tactics were employed. What accounts for the difference in treatment of the Polish and Hugarian situations? The Chinese later said that Khrushchev followed their advice?[95] The Soviets did consult with the Chinese be-

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[94]E. A. Korovin, "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," IA, May 1956, p. 46.

[95]Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (Bloomington, Ind., 1972) p. 81.

fore the invasion of Hungary, but it is not safe to conclude, in spite of later Chinese claims, that it was Peking's promise of support which allowed the Soviets to move so boldly against the second satellite uprising.

There are three factors aside from the specific ingredients of each rebellion which enabled the Soviets to take the action they did in Hungary in 1956 with less risk of war than might have been supposed. The Soviet invasion took place on 30 October 1956, one day after the French and British-sponsored Israeli invasion of the Sinai. World attention was not shifted to European events until the Soviets had achieved their fait accompli. Next, the strategic importance of Hungary to the Soviet Union was different from that of Poland because of the geography. Even supposing the Polish government would have wanted to leave the socialist camp, she would still be surrounded by the Soviet Union, Czechoslavakia, and East Germany. But a non-aligned Hungary would leave a gap, albeit a small one, in the line of East European satellites buffering the Soviet border.

One more important difference, also geographical, would certainly have figured in the Soviet equation. Hungary is land-locked, and any confrontation of Soviet forces by NATO powers would mean challenging the numerically superior Red Army. Poland, on the other hand, had a flank open to the sea, and the Soviet Navy of 1956 was not the equal of the army in terms of its strength with respect to the NATO navies. Looking ahead, it will be instructive to keep these same factors

in mind when considering Soviet response to the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1958.

The revolt in Hungary and near-revolt in Poland re-introduced, for a while, a more militant note to Soviet commentary than had been common at the XXth Congress. "New socialist homelands have appeared /viz. China/ whose defence, like the defence of the Soviet Union, is the supreme international duty of the working people of the world."[96] It was even apparently necessary to add what would have gone without saying a few years earlier, "The role of the Soviet Union as the leading force of the world socialist system is quite natural."[97] The theme of relaxation of tensions was not abandoned, however, the commentary also noted that in recent troubling events, Hungary and Suez, it was the socialist countries under Soviet leadership which had maintained "the struggle for a detente" with the United States.[98] In an interview in November of 1957 Khrushchev asserted that "The winding up of military bases abroad is one of the most important issues in solving the problem of disarmament and the relaxation of international tensions."[99]

The Moscow Declaration of November 1957 saw the height of this resurgence of old-style communism. There was no talk of sober Western statesmen, but rather of unspecified "belli-

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[96]G. A. Deborin, "A Turning Point in International Relations," IA, September 1957, p. 47.

[97]Ibid, p. 48. [98]Ibid, p. 50.

[99]"Khrushchev Interview," IA, November 1957, p. 15.

cose imperialist maniacs."[100] As far as ideological movements, "the main danger at present is revisionism... however dogmatism and sectarianism can also be the main danger at different phases of development in one party or another."[101] This relatively hard line was the result of the Chinese collecting debts for their support of Soviets in the Eastern European troubles. The Chinese later charged that, but for their insistence, there would have been no condemnation of imperialism at all.[102] The Chinese had also argued for the supremacy of the Soviet Union in the international communist movement. In view of differences between the two countries later to be revealed, China's support of Moscow's claim to leadership even after de-Stalinization and increased Soviet contacts with the United States seems inconsistent unless one credits the notion that Mao had in mind taking over an intact communist community rather than a splintered one.

A Sino-Soviet partnership, for such Moscow had allowed it to become by seeking Peking's support for its actions in controlling Poland and Hungary, continued through the summer of 1958. A Moscow-Peking hard line was especially manifest against Yugoslavia, but when the subject came to the United States, Khrushchev was more restrained. The Soviets had displayed a specialized technical virtuosity in the Sputnik launchings. The implications such feats had for delivery of nuclear weapons were obvious, but, compared to what Stalin

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[100] Floyd, p. 248.

[101] Ibid, p. 249.

[102] Berton, Vol.II "Origin of Differences," p. 9/6, 10.

might have done with such an advantage or what the Chinese did want Khrushchev to do, there was a relatively modest tone to Soviet statements referring to the feat.

In an interview in January of 1958 Khrushchev demonstrated this moderation, contenting himself the observation that "as for the military side of the problem /balance of forces/ the successful launching of the Sputniks with the help of the intercontinental ballistic rocket speaks for itself and scarcely needs any extensive comment."[103] In a re-election speech to his electoral constituency in March of 1958, he told his audience that Soviet planners might well pay more attention to working conditions than to Sputniks.[104] In May he told an audience in Cairo, "While rejoicing at these /space/ achievements of Soviet science and engineering, we do not want in any way to humiliate the United States, still less to insult it," and added, "I should very much like to be correctly understood in the United States. We do not doubt in any way the United States' achievements in industry, science, and engineering."[105] Mao had earlier exulted that the East Wind had prevailed over the West Wind, but Khrushchev did not seem so sure of his superiority. The Chinese were becoming impatient with the Soviet failure to exploit what seemed an obvious military advantage. As will be seen below, the Chinese tested Soviet resolve in the Fall of 1958 and made one last appeal to Soviet revolutionary spirits in the Spring of 1960.

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[103]Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (New York, 1960) p. 24.

[104]Ibid, p. 163. [105]Ibid, p. 382.

An interesting exchange between Tito and Khrushchev showed the latter's estimate of the existing strategic balance. When the Soviets took Yugoslavia to task for seeking US aid, the Yugoslavs promptly retorted that so had the Soviets. In a speech in Moscow Khrushchev replied: "Rest assured, Comrade Tito, that Khrushchev did not ask for handouts. He spoke as equal to equal."[106] Events in the Summer of 1958, one of which occurred only a few days after his 13 July speech were to demonstrate that Khrushchev did in fact feel equal and not superior to the United States, Sputnik notwithstanding.

The revolution in Iraq brought the Mid-East to a boil, and the American response was a quick placement of troops in Lebanon and the deployment of the US Sixth Fleet into the eastern Mediterranean. The Soviets seemed caught off guard and could only talk of sending volunteers to Iraq and maneuver troops inside the Soviet Union. Khrushchev sent a rather mild note to President Eisenhower. "We address you not from a position of intimidation but from a position of reason. We believe at this momentous hour it would be more reasonable not to bring the heated atmosphere to a boiling point; it is sufficiently inflammable as it is."[107]

Peking was not impressed by Khrushchev's tame response to US actions. The Chinese and Soviet actions in this crisis provide one of the first indications that fundamental policy

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[106]Ibid, p. 601.

[107]As quoted in D. S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961 (New York, 1964) p. 198.

differences existed between the two communist states. On 23 July, Khrushchev accepted an Eisenhower proposal to discuss the Mid-East crisis in the Security Council. Then from 31 July to 3 August, Khrushchev made a visit, his second, to Peking. A joint communique after the meeting spoke of a "complete identity of views" and generally denounced "sabre-rattling imperialist maniacs."[108] On his return to Moscow, Khrushchev withdrew his acceptance of a Security Council summit and demanded the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.[109] The obvious influence that Peking had, for the moment, over Khrushchev must have made Mao and other Chinese leaders question the nature of Khrushchev's resolve.

Robert North argues that the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in September was engendered by Peking to demonstrate to themselves and anyone else, once and for all, exactly where the Soviets stood with respect to the methods for dealing with the United States.[110] If so, the answer was not long in coming. During the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu the Soviet government did not make any serious threats to the United States until after it became obvious that no major commitment of forces was being planned. Only then began the ritual denunciations of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek and his "clique" (the word always associated with him: Soviet propaganda, does have an ear for euphony). Typical of Khrushchev's rather mild post-crisis statements on Taiwan was one given to a Brazilian jour-

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[108] Keesing, p. 15.

[109] Ibid, p. 15.

[110] Robert North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stanford, 1963) p. 280.

nalist days after the crisis. "/The/ United States must stop interfering in the internal affairs of the Chinese People's Republic and withdraw all its forces from the Taiwan area." No "or elses." Khrushchev enumerated some of the items of dispute between the United States and China but added "but we consider that these differences and clashes should not lead to war."[111]

Why did the Soviets demonstrate so clearly their unwillingness to come to the aid of a threatened fraternal socialist state? In the first place, the Soviet Union was not threatened and the Soviets were not about to risk confrontation with the United States in a war over someone else's territory. They never have; Korea shows that well enough. Even if Soviets had perceived a potential threat to the USSR, the geography of the situation permitted the United States to deploy the one element of force which was markedly superior to its Soviet counterpart, the United States Navy. Short of all-out war, the Soviets could not respond to the situation by military means with any confidence of superiority. And Nikita Khrushchev did not want to risk a nuclear war, especially over some disputed waters off the Chinese coast.

The reuniting of Soviet and Chinese interests which events in Eastern Europe had forced in late 1956 was at an end. It ended because Moscow and Peking held such contrary views of both the military strength and resolve of the United States and the consequences of a nuclear war. Khrushchev and the

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[111]Khrushchev, For Victory, p. 671.

Kremlin leadership had seen their painfully constructed Soviet state nearly destroyed by Nazi Germany. There was something to lose. His experiences in the war and his subsequent frustrations in attempting to overtake the United States' economy put Khrushchev in a position to appreciate American technology as Mao, steeped in the modes and ways of agrarian Asia, never could.

The Soviets had first-hand experience with nuclear weapons, and perhaps the size of their own weapons had given them pause. Robert Conquest has suggested that a fifty megaton blast was enough to penetrate into the "ideological bone curtain" of Soviet heads, but not yet enough to have an impact on the Chinese.[112] Mao could lose half his population in nuclear war and still be left with three hundred million people. There was no industrial base to lose. The question of what to do about the United States was a fundamental point of departure.

Several Soviet books on international relations published in 1958 reveal that the essential course of Soviet policy after the XXth Party Congress had not been changed by the disruptions in Eastern Europe nor by the Mid-East or Taiwan Straits crisis. The Minister of Agitation and Propaganda, L. F. Ilichev, edited one work in which the faithful were informed that "only sectarians and dogmatists /like the anti-party group/ are not able to understand that, in the present

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[112] Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York, 1966) p. 63.

conditions of living Marxism-Leninism in action, the struggles of communism are manifested in the conversion to life of the decisions of the XXth Party Congress."[113] Ilichev himself restated this argument in the terms of "Left-Wing" Communism the following year, and used it in a context that made it clear he now also considered the Chinese as sectarians and dogmatists.

A book by Academician M.A. Kapitsa on the history of Sino-Soviet relations, aside from ritual protestations of historic and firm friendship, contained a rather interesting analysis of each's contributions to the Korean War. The combined response of the two fraternal socialist powers was, of course, "a clear demonstration of brotherly solidarity" in the face of US aggression.[114] Yet the author still felt called upon to explain why it was that hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers had fought and died outside their homeland while only a comparative handful of Russian advisors were in Korea. The reason for such a disproportionate commitment of Chinese manpower was that it was Chinese and not Soviet airspace that had been violated by US aircraft.[115] If the Chinese had aided the North Koreans by committing large numbers of troops, he reasoned, the Soviets had made an equal contribution by their protests and

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[113] S. Sanakoev, "Novy Tip Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii," in Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii (Moscow, 1958) pp. 147-48. All translations from Russian language sources are mine.

[114] M.A. Kapitsa, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia (Moscow, 1958) p. 396.

[115] Ibid, p. 398.

and speeches at the United Nations. Kapitsa made no mention of the Soviets selling the the Chinese the rifles with which they fought. This casual equation of Soviet words with Chinese lives in the fight against US imperialist aggression underscores the fundamentally different attitudes of the two countries toward the proper way to deal with the United States.

V XXIst PARTY CONGRESS - THE ROADS DIVERGE

The XXIst Party Congress of the CPSU met from 27 January until 5 February 1959. It was an extraordinary Congress because it did not elect a new Central Committee. Khrushchev meant to prolong the life of the Central Committee which had overridden his ouster by the "anti-party" group. The whole tone of the pronouncements of this Congress, especially when compared with its predecessor, is one of caution, consolidation, and moderation. The ochetnii doklad was in large part devoted to explaining why a new Seven Year Plan was replacing the existing Five Year Plan which had only run two years. Ostensibly, the reason was that new, and unspecified, technological advances had now made longer-range planning possible. It was also noted, though, that the new plan had been drawn up so as to be capable of fulfillment "without overstrain."[116] Clearly the economic competition with the United States was straining Soviet resources. The "triumphs" of the Soviet economy since the XXth Congress were noticeably not compared with US figures. The Soviet target dates for surpassing the US economy in total volume and per capita production were pushed back several years,[117] and later in the doklad, Khrushchev even denied that he was using the United States as an economic yardstick. However, he did quote Western and particularly US sources on the successes of previous Soviet economic planning.

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[116] Current Soviet Policies, Vol. 3, ed. Leo Gruilow (New York, 1960) p. 50.

[117] Ibid, p. 30ff. [118] Ibid, p. 57.

In the section of the doklad on the international situation Khrushchev took a rather conciliatory approach toward the United States. The Taiwan Straits crisis was dissassociated from any Soviet actions and Khrushchev, while on the subject of Asia, called for the extension of an atom-free "zone of peace" to the "Far East and the entire Pacific Basin as well as Europe,"[119] (original emphasis). It was only later revealed by the Chinese that Khrushchev had promised them nuclear arms in 1957. To Mao, the promised weapons must now have seemed merely a bargaining chip in the conduct of US-Soviet relations.

Turning his attention specifically toward the United States, Khrushchev reasoned that "we should not go to war because of our divergent views."[120] Then came an even more strikingly unideological statement. "Our two countries have never had and do not have any territorial claims against one another. There are no grounds for clashes between our peoples, yet the relations between the USSR and the U.S.A. have long been abnormal."[121] one logical inference Peking might reasonably draw from this statement was that Moscow felt it was more likely that there were grounds for clashes with China than with the United States. Finally, Khrushchev noted, as a sign of what the US-Soviet relationship could promise, that the trade of the Soviet Union with the United States and Western Europe had tripled from 1950 to 1958.

On Party matters, the unspoken but well understood impli-

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[119]Ibid, p.59. [120]Ibid, p. 60. [121]Ibid, p. 61.

cations of the Chinese "Great Leap Forward" were dealt with. Khrushchev denounced the ideological errors of such undertakings somewhat obliquely. "The transition from the socialist stage of development to the higher phase /viz. communism/ is a logical process that one cannot arbitrarily violate or bypass."[122] Still, the Soviets were required to answer the challenge of greater ideological purity posed by the Chinese Communists. Surpassing the United States in economic development could certainly not be realized by such experimentation with Utopian forms that Peking was sponsoring so, to combat this ideological offensive of the Chinese, it became necessary for Moscow in turn to formulate some specifics on the attainment of communism. These specifics would provide the ideological rationale for Moscow's course. The answer developed, as expressed in the doklad, was that all countries would reach communism more or less at the same time.[123] And that time would be when the Soviet Union did, not before. There were no short-cuts. The emphasis on material production rather than ideologically pure procedures would continue in the Soviet Union. Mao issued a statement praising Khrushchev's "correct leadership" at the Congress but said nothing about the proposed atom-free zone.[124]

In the year 1959, two main irritants to Sino-Soviet relations were the Soviet Union's neutrality in the Sino-Indian border disputes and, equally, Khrushchev's visit to the United States. The very fact of his presence in the heartland of the

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[122]Ibid, p. 64. [123]Ibid, p. 68. [124]Ibid, p. 112.

imperialist arch-foe spoke more than any words could about the Soviet leader's view of and un-Marxist fascination with the United States. But some words of Khrushchev were to be simply too much for Peking. On his return to the Soviet Union on 28 September, he told a crowd at the Moscow airport that "President Eisenhower of the United States has displayed wise statesmanship in assessing the present international situation,... he has displayed courage and willpower."[125] Of course this praise of Eisenhower was designed to underscore the importance of Khrushchev himself in his countrymen's eyes. He was demonstrating that he, and he alone, of all socialist leaders could deal with and was trusted by the leadership of the Soviet Union's nuclear adversary. The Chinese were not impressed, and later said that "no considerations of diplomatic protocol can explain away or excuse Khrushchev's tactless eulogy of Eisenhower and other imperialists."[126]

Two days after his return to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev was in Peking for his third visit there and it was likely that he was asked by Mao why it had been necessary to speak of the leader of the capitalist gangsters in such a way. Terse and noncommittal communiques from Peking about the talks between the two leaders showed that no reconciliation had been effected this time. Even while Khrushchev had still been in the United States the Chinese had pointedly removed the pro-Soviet Defense

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[125] Khrushchev, For Victory, p. xv.

[126] Keesing's, p. 20.

Minister, Marshal Peng.

The dilemma now faced by Khrushchev was summed up by G.F. Hudson as one growing out of the revolutionary mission imposed by communism and the increasing embourgeoisement of the Soviet Union.[127] It was necessary at the same time to preach "peaceful coexistence" to the West and anti-imperialism to the Party at home and the other fraternal parties abroad. Pressure could be put on Khrushchev to produce results in diplomatic activities that were now beyond his capability since he had all but renounced war as a means of policy (he never ruled out "wars of national liberation"). His response was to seek an increase of production of material goods at home; stymied on the diplomatic front he would try for success on the economic front. As Hudson had observed before, however (see above, p. 48), this left little hope for contributions to China's economic development.

In January of 1960, Pravda published Khrushchev's comments on his recent annual report to the Supreme Soviet. There was a striking reversion in style and substance to the ochetnii doklad of the XXth Congress. The Soviet economy was again being compared directly with the US economy over which it had acquired "a considerable edge... in rates of industrial development."[128] In terms of an old cliche, the Soviet Union was outproducing

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[127] G.F. Hudson, "Russia and China: The Dilemmas of Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39 No. 1 (October, 1960) p. 3.

[128] Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), Vol. XII No. 2, p. 5.

the United States in butter as well as guns. In fact, as far as Soviet planners were now concerned, "the only argument concerns how many times faster we are moving than the United States of America and how long it will take us to catch up with that country."[129] In the area of international relations, Khrushchev compared the existing situation favorably with 1952-53, the last years of Stalin. Progress had been satisfactory in "the noble cause of creating trust in the relations between the U.S.A. nad the Soviet Union."[130] The most important task for Soviet foreign policy was to "so arrange matters that the inevitable struggle between them /capitalist and socialist powers/ takes the form exclusively of a struggle between ideologies, of peaceful rivalry - of competition"[131] (emphasis added). What had happened to the inevitability of violence in that struggle? The answer to that question was that one "must not now repeat mechanically what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said about imperialism many decades back."[132]

The U-2 incident did not seriously weaken Khrushchev's increasingly firm conviction that it was the United States and the Soviet Union who alone would decide the course of international affairs. "The Soviet Union and the United States are great world powers. History itself has assigned them that role. How the international situation develops from now on...

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[129]Ibid, p. 5. [130]Ibid, p. 6. [131]Ibid, p. 16.

[132]CDSP, Vol. XII No. 25, p. 8.

is in large part up to our two powers."[133]

In an article in Pravda commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the publication of "Left-Wing" Communism, peaceful coexistence with the United States was elevated from the status of a logical extrapolation from Lenin's thought to an implicit statement of the original text. "Some people mistakenly regard the policy of working for peaceful co-existence of countries with different political systems, of struggling to put an end to the arms race and to strengthen peace and friendship among peoples, and of talks between leaders of socialist and capitalist countries as a kind of departure from the positions of Marxism-Leninism." These are the "left-sectarian sentiments and tendencies against which Lenin's book is leveled."[134] Just as clearly it was the Chinese against whom the Pravda article was leveled.

In April of 1960 the Chinese also published an article on Lenin and it has been regarded by many, Zbigniew Brzezinski being one of the first, as the final appeal by Peking to Moscow to return to the paths of ideological righteousness, i.e. anti-imperialism. Published as an editorial by Hongqi (Red Flag), "Long Live Leninism" was far more than the celebration of the correctness of Lenin's thought that it appeared to be.[135] Screening out the conventional rhetoric, one finds the following argument developed in the article: "The Soviet Union has left...

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[133]Ibid, p. 7.

[134]N. Matkovsky, "On the Fortieth Anniversary of Publication of 'Left-Wing' Communism," CDSP, Vol. XII No. 24, p. 8.

[135](Editorial), "Long Live Lenism," Peking Review, Vol. III No. 17 (26 April 1960), pp. 6-23.

the United States behind, too, in technology."[136] Furthermore, Marx had shown that all technological advances must inevitably work to the overthrow of capitalism. This being so, the argument runs, the Soviet Union is now absolutely required by the dialectic of history to force concessions from the United States. Peaceful coexistence ought not to be communism's principal aim.[137] Brzezinski concludes, "the Chinese therefore felt duty-bound to infuse international communism with the will to prevail."[138]

What disturbed the Soviets most about the editorial was the comparatively nonchalant way the Chinese urged that "the proletariat... must prepare for... non-peaceful development of the revolution."[139] Most distressing of all was the apparent willingness of the Chinese to accept a world-wide nuclear war so that socialism could "build a beautiful future" on the "debris of dead imperialism."[140] The Kremlin replied immediately for too many of the leadership had seen Russia, their socialist Russia, laid waste by the Nazis. They were not willing to risk lightly a thermo-nuclear war with the United States.

In that same year, 1960, several books were published by the Academy of Social Sience and by the Institute for Foreign Relations under the auspices of the Central Committee CPSU which showed examples of the scholarship that was being encour-

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[136]Ibid, p. 7. [137]Ibid, p. 11.

[138]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39 No. 3 (April, 1961), p. 431.

[139]"Long Live Leniism," p. 19. [140]Ibid, p. 12.

aged to support the Soviet line toward the United States. A publication of the Academy of Social Sciences surveying US foreign policy from 1953-56 predictably condemned the policy but did so with significant omissions. The "militarization and expansionist course of US foreign policy" was primarily due to the need to bolster a sagging economy and ease unemployment. There was no mention, however, of any "capitalist encirclement" and the "positions of strength" doctrine was treated as an aberration specifically of John Foster Dulles and not, by implication of President Eisenhower.[141] A book outlining the Party's current program gave a new version of Khrushchev's position on the Taiwan Straits crisis that he had taken at the XXIst Party Congress two years earlier in 1958. It was now asserted that it was Soviet restraint as well as resolve that had produced the successful (non-belligerent) resolution of the crisis.[142] As for Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959, its central idea was to show that "the Soviet Union and the United States /would/ be able to live in peace and friendship, that there are no insurmountable obstacles to peaceful co-existence."[143]

Perhaps the most authoritative book to be published in the Soviet Union that year was Boris N. Ponomarev's History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which, curiously enough,

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[141] Nekotorye Voprosy Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, A.I. Schneerson and V.M. Kulakov eds. (Moscow, 1958), pp. 224-226.

[142] G.A. Deborin, "Mezhdunarodnoe Znachenie XXI C'ezda KPSS," in V Borbe Za Realizatsiiu Reshenii XXI C'ezda KPSS (Moscow, 1960) p. 393.

[143] Ibid, p. 409.

was the first authorized one-volume history of the Party ever published.[144] Two "bourgeois falsifiers," Professors Richard Pipes and John Reshetar, had published histories which were obviously unacceptable to the Kremlin. The importance of Ponomarev's work for an understanding of Sino-Soviet relations derives from his own role in and intimate knowledge of Party affairs. He was not only the Party historian and a Central Committee member, but had been responsible for raltions between the CPSU and parties of the non-bloc countries. It was on account of this position that he, along with Y. A. Andropov who was responsible for CPSU-bloc country party relations (and present head of the KGB), was employed by Khrushchev to present the Soviet Union's case in the no longer concealable disagreements with China at the Third Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party at Bucarest in June of 1960.[145] To win sympathy of delegates from the fraternal parties, Ponomarev prepared and distributed an eighty page circular letter outlining the Soviet position and catching the Chinese unprepared to reply. Although Ponomarev's letter was restricted in distribution to delegation heads, many of the Soviet perceptions of the current state of international relations are to be found in his CPSU history published about the same time as the Rumanian Communist Party Congress.

The major underlying Soviet foreign policy consideration

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[144] Moscow, 1960.

[145] The account of activities at this Congress is from Edw
New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking. (New York, 1963

was to avoid getting into nuclear war with the United States while trying to spread socialism. China had learned this in 1958 in the Taiwan Straits crisis. This Soviet policy led to the adoption and embellishment of some rather minor Leninist theses on peaceful coexistence. Much of Lenin's writing, unfortunately, had dealt with the necessity of war or violence to restructure society. To reveal Lenin as the advocate of peaceful coexistence, it was necessary to explain away Lenin's writings on war. Thus, "Lenin formulated his theses about the inevitability of wars in the epoch of imperialism at a time when first, capitalism was the only and all-embracsing world system, and second, when the social and political forces that had no interest in and were opposed to war were weak, poorly organized, and hence unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war."[146] But the balance of forces had now changed enough toward the socialist side that peaceful, not violent, revolution was the true Leninist policy. So it was possible now th argue that "During all the changes in the complex international situation /1953-1958/ the Party firmly followed the Leninist general line in the sphere of Soviet foreign policy - to ensure the peaceful co-existence of countries with different social and economic systems."[147] This, in brief, was the Soviet position offered to the national delegations at Bucarest. The Chinese were

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[146]Ponomarev, History of CPSU, p. 665.

[147]Ibid, p. 722.

not convinced, but were unprepared to give a detailed rebuttal.

It was the issue of peaceful coexistence which had proved the most intractable to the Chinese. As long as there were imperialists there would be the danger of war. No other reading of Lenin was possible to their thinking. Although the conference ended with the appearance of unity, the Soviets soon showed how far relations between the two countries had deteriorated. On 16 July 1960, the Soviets began the withdrawal of all their technicians working in China. They left taking their blueprints with them .[148]

In November of 1960 a conference of eighty-one Communist and Workers' Parties was held in Moscow. Here, for the first time, the dispute between China and the Soviet Union was formally brought into the forum of an interparty assembly and the fraternal parties were now asked to take sides in the internecine struggle. Moscow generally carried the day as the Declaration of the Conference was signed by all and the appearance of unity was preserved. Several statements in the Declaration of the Conference, a condemnation of revisionism, excoriation of US imperialism, and support of national liberation wars represented victories for Chinese viewpoints.[149] On the other hand, the re-emphasis of peaceful coexistence and many qualifying remarks throughout ensure that the Declaration, like so many other works in the Marxist-Leninist canon, would

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[148]Keesing, p. 29.

[149]Berton, Vol.II, "Origin of Differences," p. 9/6, 10.

be used by both sides to support their positions. This became evident immediately.

The new year, 1961, saw Khrushchev at a Kremlin party proposing a toast "to improving our relations with the United States of America, because an improvement in relations among all states of the world depends to a large extent on improvement in relations between our two countries."[150] It is hard to see how such an improvement could also have improved Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev's comments on the conference of eighty-one parties were given in a speech a few days later.

Khrushchev acknowledged one of the lines of the recent declaration, that imperialism still possessed great strength. But in that acknowledgement of imperialist strength lay one of the ambiguities characteristic of the declaration. To the Chinese it meant that imperialism, and specifically the United States, was not about to give up its evil reactionary ways even though military preponderance, demonstrated by Sputnik launches, was now in favor of the socialist camp. To the Soviets, on the other hand, it meant that imperialism was rotting away on the inside but still possessed "nuclear teeth." On the subject of war resulting from the contradictions of capitalism, Khrushchev observed "/a/ conclusion /that/ world war is an indispensible condition for the further intensification of the crisis of capitalism" would be "profoundly wrong."[151] In fact,"Prevention of a New War - the Question of

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[150] CDSP, Vol. XIII No.1, p. 2.

[151] "On Results of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties," CDSP, Vol. XIII No. 3, p. 4.

All Questions" was the title of a section of his remarks.[152] The fear of nuclear war with the United States was also played upon in providing the rationale for Soviet backing down on each of several ultimatums over Berlin. "We invariably seek to direct the development of events in such a way that, defending the interests of the socialist camp, we do not allow the imperialist provacateurs to start a new war."[153]

Solidarity and unity of the socialist movement were also stressed in Khrushchev's remarks. Deviations of both revisionism and dogmatism were denounced, but it was only against dogmatists and sectarians (i.e. Chinese) that the words of Stalin were invoked. As far as any disputes between parties, the CPSU could boast of its "invariable striving to strengthen ties of fraternal friendship with the CPC."[154]

Meanwhile Khrushchev, determined to have his scheduled summit meeting, made preparations to meet President Kennedy in Geneva in June of 1964. In order to impress on fellow Soviets the significance of his ability to handle Western statesmen, he began to speak favorably of Kennedy as he had done of Eisenhower in 1959. In May he spoke of "new leaders" who would take a "more sensible approach to the adjustment of international crisis."[155] Turning to specifics a few days later, he said "President Kennedy and I... must find a com-

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[152] CDSP, Vol. XIII No. 4, p. 2.

[153] Ibid, p. 10. [154] Ibid, p. 15.

[155] Khrushchev, Communism - Peace and Happiness for the Peoples, 2 Vols. (Moscow, 1963) p. 110.

mon language in our internal relations and work for peaceful co-existence."[156] Unless President Kennedy were to be converted to Marxist thought, any "common language" found would obviously have to include elements of capitalist thought. Peking, always ready to point up ideological deviations, would be only too ready to call any compromises to Moscow's attention. This did not seem to deter Khrushchev in the least. After the summit he continued in his praise of the capitalist leader and millionaire.

"President Kennedy /at the meeting/ appreciated the great responsibility devolving upon the governments of two such powerful states."[157] This theme was useful to show that he, Khrushchev, was the one man who had the measure of Western leaders, who could deal with them, find a common language as it were. This was of importance to all the world for "it is on the state of the Soviet-American relations that the international situation as a whole depends in many respects."[158] And these relations would be based on "mutual understanding and friendship not simply peace!"[159](emphasis in original) The Chinese may be pardoned for wondering where in Lenin's works "mutual understanding and friendship" was proposed as a basis for relations between socialism and imperialism.

The following month Soviet technicians were recalled from Albania,and Soviet-Yugoslav talks were begun. This was the beginning of a phase in the growing Sino-Soviet dispute in which attacks were made on proxies. When the Soviets

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[156]Ibid, p. 123. [157]Ibid, p. 240. [158]Ibid, p. 414. [159]Loc.Cit.

wished to criticize Mao and China they would say Hoxha and Albania. On the Chinese side, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union were denounced through attacks on Tito and Yugoslavia.

Since the XXth Congress, Khrushchev's policies, insofar as they involved his view of the United States, had two aspects; the idea of a shared world leadership with the United States, and a competition to surpass the American economy. The Mid-East crisis of 1958 and the U-2 incident were only temporary interruptions to Khrushchev's tendency to avoid direct military confrontations or their threat. He preferred to operate in what seemed to be the more predictable sphere of economic competition. One event taken as a particularly pleasing sign of the Soviet Union's economic progress was Yuri Gagarin's space flight. Khrushchev boasted at a reception for Gagarin that the USSR would soon surpass the economic level of the United States.[160] The Soviets, he said, had made a flight around the world, the Americans but a jump.[161] After the first flush of success had passed, Khrushchev regained a sense of perspective and reminded the Soviet people that the Soviet Union was, however, "as yet behind the U.S. in economic development."[162] The Soviet Union's striving to overtake the US economy was perfectly in line with peaceful coexistence. "Our desire to overtake is no threat," Khrushchev insisted.[163] Peking now had an answer to the challenge it had raised in "Long Live Leninism." As the Chinese had feared, Soviet technological achievements were, alas, no threat to the

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[160] Ibid, p. 84. [161] Ibid, p. 128. [162] Ibid, p. 304.
[163] Loc.Cit.

United States.

The XXth Party Congress of the CPSU had revealed a new Soviet approach to international and domestic problems. The directions taken in both areas turned on points involving the United States. In international relations the Soviets preached peaceful coexistence and were seeking some less threatening management of conflict with the United States, some form of detente (this word began to appear in Soviet English-language translations of their publications in 1956). In domestic affairs the Soviets wished simply to outproduce the US economy. These goals increasingly appeared to the Chinese to have less and less to do with Marxist-Leninist revolutionary action, a course to which they were officially deeply committed. In fact, this whole development of Soviet policy, as some Western observers saw, could only be perceived in Peking as a threat to China itself.[164] Rhetoric to that effect was not long in coming.

Events following the XXth Congress, particularly the revolts in East Europe, had forced the Soviets to rely on Chinese support and follow a course tolerated by Peking, but this was only temporary. The Taiwan Straits crisis showed just how far the Soviet Union was willing to tie its interests to China. As time passed, Khrushchev became convinced of the essential correctness of his policies even as Mao was convinced of their basic deviation. Both wanted to see a socialist world order. Khrushchev feared the consequences of engaging in a thermonuclear war with the United States. Mao did not. Khrushchev

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[164]Hudson, "Russia and China," p. 10.

respected and envied the American economic attainments. Mao did not. Their courses, irredeemably divergent, were set and would soon become a matter of public record.

VI THE XXIInd PARTY CONGRESS: THE ROAD TO COMMUNISM - VIA MOSCOW

The XXIInd Party Congress was held from 17 to 31 October 1961. Nearly four times as many delegates were present (4800) as were at either of the two previous Khrushchev congresses. It was a grand affair, his biggest as well as his last Party Congress. In brief, the XXIInd Congress did three things. It marked an affirmation of and return to the actions and policies of the XXth Congress, it served as the occasion for the presentation of a twenty-year program for the Party (the first new Party program since 1919), and it ratified the rift between the USSR and China. The motto of the Congress was taken from the new Party program: "The Road to Communism."

Before the Congress had even begun, however, there were those Moscow had chosen to leave by the wayside. The Albanian Party of Labour, although named in the list of fraternal parties acknowledged at the opening of the first session, had not been invited. Thus had the lines of dispute between the Soviet Union and China hardened. The debate was now expanded to include a wide range of issues affecting the two countries. The rhetoric of the debate, however, was still couched mostly in ideological terms. Each side was also openly seeking support from the other socialist parties, even parties not in power.

The shadow of Josef Stalin, dead eight years, was a living presence at the Congress It is not accidental that the two parties most determinedly opposed to the Soviets, China and Albania, were the ones most susceptible to the charges of one-man rule.

When Chou En-lai walked out of the Congress, he conspicuously and ostentatiously placed a wreath at Stalin's bust. Khrushchev, on the other hand, took the ultimate action against Stalin which was to have his body removed from the mausoleum and buried.

In a study of the significance and psychological connotations of the specific words and phrases used by Soviet leaders, Nathan Leites attaches particular importance to ideas and words associated with death and burial. Russians, even Bolsheviks, will not readily talk about themselves or their friends being buried or as corpses. That sort of talk is reserved for enemies.[165] The removal of Stalin's body from the Lenin mausoleum and its burial was an act of more significance, it was a greater repudiation than might at first have been appreciated in the West. For the Kremlinologist, though, less reading between the lines than usual was to be necessary at this Congress. The directions and implications of Khrushchev's policies were openly stated in the ochetnii doklad and the twenty-year Party program.

One of the more striking features of the doklad which Khrushchev delivered was the frequency of references made to programs, policies, and decisions of the XXth Congress. By contrast, the XXIst Congress was hardly even mentioned. That later Congress, as it became clear, represented only a temporary pause in the general course of events begun at the XXth Congress. Perhaps this is what Khrushchev had in mind when he said near the beginning of the doklad, "History does not develop in a straight

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[165]Nathan Leites, Kremlin Moods (Santa monica, 1964), pp. 10-13.

line, it has its zigzags and abrupt turns."[166] In the international situation section, Khrushchev pronounced himself, on the whole, pleased with how things had gone. "The Party propounded the important thesis /at the XXth Congress/ that wars between the states are not inevitable in the present epoch, that they can be prevented. The evnts of the past six years serve to confirm this too... those six years have been good years on a world scale."[167] There was a "growing fraternal rapprochment between the socialist countries"[168] that only the Yugoslavs, who had turned to revisionism, had thus far ignored.[169] The position of the US economy in world trade was, as always, reported on the decline.[170] And even though the United States had not mended its imperialist ways but clung to the use of "brutal force" as a foreign policy[171] and was working for German rearmament and encouraging German militarism[172] Khrushchev assured the delegates that the "struggle for general and complete disarmament is /still/ a major component of Soviet foreign policy."[173] The first task for the Party in the area of international relations was to ensure the "peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems."[174]

What Khrushchev had called "good years on a world scale" had seen, among other things, the withdrawal of all Soviet technicians and advisors from China. After Hoxha sided with

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[166]Documents of the XXIInd Party Congress, (New York, 1961) p. 6.

[167]Ibid, p. 12. [168] Ibid, p. 15. [169]Ibid, p. 38.

[170]Ibid, p. 25. [171]Ibid, p. 11. [172]Ibid, p. 26 ff.

[173]Ibid, p. 49. [174]Ibid, p. 62.

Peking, Soviet advisors were withdrawn from Albania. Only the easing of tensions with the United States could give sense to Khrushchev's statement. Surely Khrushchev could not have foreseen or desired the consequences that the new policies of the XXth Congress would have: the upheavals in Poland and Hungary, and the deterioration of relations with Peking. But by this doklad he was giving assent to the course events had taken. Thus he showed that he was more concerned about manipulating his relationship with Washington than maintaining a good relationship with Peking.

As might be expected, the section of the doklad on the internal situation of the Soviet Union received the major emphasis and was related at many points to the twenty year Party program. Whereas consumer goods had ranked last in the list of production goals,at the XXth Party Congress (although they were given their most prominent notice up to that point) now they were discussed first. "The Party is paying particular attention to greater output of foodstuffs, clothing, footwear - of everything man needs - to raise the living standards of the people."[175] It would be rash to say Khrushchev's trip to the United States had convinced him that being a military power was not inconsistent with massive production of consumer goods, but it must have had its effect. In fact, a year and a half later he would admit as much, but argue that US distribution of its goods was inequitable.[176] The Soviet Union, he

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[175]Ibid, p. 66.

[176]Khrushchev, Rech Na Sobranii Izbiratelei Kalininskogo Izbiratelnogo Okruga Goroda Moskui (Moscow, 1963) p. 25.

maintained, did not really want all the Hydrogen bombs it was building, "God save us from ever exploding these bombs over anyone's territory, no matter whose it may be. That is the most desired dream of our life."[177]

The goal of the Soviet economic competition was, as it had been ever since 1956, to surpass the United States. Not only were figures produced to show a favorable rate of industrial growth compared to the United States, but for the first time absolute production statistics of the two countries were compared.[178] Outproducing the United States was "the basic economic task of the Soviet Union" and its fulfillment would be an "historical victory."[179] There was only one sour note in all this bright promise. Agriculture and in particular Khrushchev's own "virgin lands" program had not gone well. Khrushchev, departing from the text of the doklad, addressed American journalists in the hall and said that someday they would regret making fun of the Soviet agricultural efforts.[180] The internal situation section ended on a positive note and with a shaft aimed at Chinese economics. To raise living standards and promote material requirements of the people was the purpose of the mature socialist system in the USSR.[181] (emphasis added)

The tone of the Party section of the doklad was a mixture of school-masterishness and criticism, but not for the CPSU.

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[177]Documents of the XXIInd Congress, p. 69.

[178]Ibid, p. 78. [179]Ibid, p. 79 [180]Ibid, p. 110.

[181]Ibid, p. 113.

Khrushchev began moderately enough; "Lenin teaches us to be realistc in politics," he said by way of preamble.[182] Then, after discussion of the recent activities of the CPSU, came the understatement of the Congress. The de-Stalinization begun at the XXth Congress had given rise to "temporary difficulties for the CPSU and the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties."[183] This was the prologue to a long denunciation of the Albanian leadership. Hoxha et al. were using methods as evil as Stalin's to rule their party.[184] Most grievous of all was their failure to understand that "Creative Marxism-Leninism does not tolerate stagnation of thought, the worship of formulas that do not accord with the real state of affairs."[185] For an example of "creative Marxism-Leninism" there was the new CPSU party program.

The new program, entitled "The Road to Communism," was the first new party program since 1919. This program carried the implicit assumption, elsewhere made quite explicit, that the model for all socialist countries was the model of communist construction of the Soviet Union. "any course steered toward the construction of socialism in isolation, separately from the world socialist community, runs counter to the objective laws of development of a socialist society."[186] This program, however, did not read like a blueprint for building the millenial communist society so much as a battle plan for

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[182]Ibid, p. 131. [183]Ibid, p. 146. [184]Ibid, p. 152.

[185]Ibid, p. 182.

[186]Khrushchev, Report on the Program of the CPSU (New York, 1961) p. 132.

overtaking the United States of America. "To achieve the world's highest productivity... in the final analysis, is the most important, the principal thing for victory of the new social system."[187](emphasis added) "The Soviet Union will surpass the economic level of the most developed capitalist countries and move into first place for production per haed of population, the world's highest living standard will be ensured."[188] Khrushchev admitted that the Soviet Union was still behind the United States in several areas of the economy besides production, e.g. real income and consumption, but this was because "unlike the United States we have had to pay for the war."[189] Sixteen years later the devastation of World War II was still fresh in Soviet memory. To win the struggle for economic supremacy, it would be necessary to "critically adopt all technically and organizationally valuable points available in the West," and one of the more important of these was "getting greater returns from capital investments."[190] One wonders if Khrushchev had been thinking of a stock market.

What did all this have to do with the fraternal socialist countries? What was the Soviet Union's economic success to bring to them? Very little it appeared, for the goal of overtaking the United States did not allow for much aid to fraternal socialist countries. "Peaceful economic competition is the chief arena of the contest between the socialist and capitalist systems. The outcome of this competition will be de-

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[187]Ibid, p. 40. [188]Ibid, p. 37. [189]Ibid, p. 90.
[190]Ibid, p. 96.

termined in tremendous degree by the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States of America."[191] Such a competition would leave only the most inferior of roles in it for China. Was this slighting of China's requirements a deliberate attempt to repress China? Probably not. The new Party program was a consistent and foreseeable progression from the new policies announced at the XXth Party Congress. It was a cause rather than an effect of the Sino-Soviet split.

There is an interesting sentence near the beginning of the program's text. "The triumph of the socialist revoluitions in China and a number of other European and Asian countries has been the biggest development in world history since October 1917."[192] In 183 pages of the program for building a communist society in the world, this is the only mention of China! Even Cuba received more attention. The Chinese were much more interested in another sentence near the middle of the text. "The draft program of the Party raises, and resolves, a new important question of communist theory and practice - the development of the dictatorship of the working class into a state of the whole people."[193] The Chinese could and did point to this as the ultimate indication of heresy by the Soviets: abandonment of the class struggle.

Khrushchev's own concluding remarks to the Congress provide the best evidence of how he perceived the state of the Soviet Union. He exulted that, because of the Soviet space achievements, there was now at last an area in which the United

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[191]Ibid, p. 129 [192]Ibid, p. 18. [193]Ibid, p. 104.

States must overtake the Soviets.[194] In dealing with the problems of fraternal party relations, specifically Albanian sectarians and dogmatists, he came close to publicly revealing the true principals of the split when he noted that "there is hardly onyone who can contribute to the solution of the problem more than the Communist Party of China."[195] As for the new Party program, one sentence said it very well: "The struggle between the two ideologies ...has shifted from the sphere of pure ideology to that of material production." Chou En-lai might have had something to say about the purity of Soviet ideology in the first place and about helping to resolve Soviet differences with Albania, but he had already walked out of the Congress.

Chinese and Soviet societies had drawn far apart as aptly characterized by T. H. Rigby's phrase "the embourgeoisement of the Soviet Union and the proletarianization of China."[196] There were the radically different approaches to solving domestic problems. For, example in agriculture there was the communization in China as opposed to the abolition of the central machine-tractor stations in the Soviet Union. These domestic divergences alone might have been expected to lead to arguments and debate over the correct course, but it was proper relations with the West and specifically with the United States that sparked the debate which followed immediately in the after-

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[194] Documents of the XXIInd Congress, p. 203. [195] Ibid, p. 215.

[196] "The Embourgeoisement of the Soviet Union and the Proleterianization of China," in Kurt London's Unity and Contradiction, New York, 1962.

math of the XXIInd Congress. The war by proxy became public.

After the Congress when the Chinese denounced Tito, they now meant Khrushchev. Khrushchev thundered against Albania when he meant China. A typical Soviet example: "Rejection of the principle of peaceful co-existence is typical of the most reactionary and adventurist wing of the bourgeois ideology and politics. It is even more typical that certain views held by modern dogmatists, who have also taken the line of negating Lenin's principle of peaceful co-existence, are contiguous with the extremely reactionary conception."[197] These dogmatists were the leaders of Albania who were also guilty of "extreme adventurism."[198] The facade of the proxy war was first broken by the Albanians when the Albanian newspaper Zeri i Populit, naming names, directly accused Tito of being the intermediary between Khrushchev and the American imperialists.[199]

The Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962 then gave the Chinese the opportunity to return to the charge of adventurism, compounded by capitulationism,against the Soviets. The Cuban episode seems markedly at variance with the general trend of Soviet policy toward the United States as followed from 1956 on. The apparent inconsistency is resolved if one accepts the thesis advanced by Adam Ulam that the Soviets did not intend to strike at the United States with the missiles but rather

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[197]A. Sovetov, "Who Stands to Gain from the Splitting Activities of the Albanian Leaders?" IA, January 1962, p. 18.

[198]Ibid, p. 19. [199]Floyd, p. 324.

use their inevitably required removal as a bargaining chip for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons in Europe.[200] This thesis is both highly plausible and accords well with previous Soviet policy towards the United States. If successfully carried out, such a gambit would have confirmed the Soviet's oft-made assertion that they, and they alone, knew how to deal with the arch imperialist rival.

As it turned out, the Cuban missile crisis, as an unforeseen by-product added a new item to the Sino-Soviet dispute, the border question. Briefly summarizing Dennis Doolin's explanation of events, this is what happened.[201] When the Chinese accused the Soviets of capitulating to the imperialists, Khrushchev retorted that the Chinese themselves allowed the imperialists to maintain "outhouses" in Macao and Hong Kong. The Chinese rebuttal to this was to call to question all illegal imperialist seizures and occupation of Chinese territory. Of course the largest area that the Chinese alleged to have been illegally taken by imperialist expansion was occupied by the Soviet Union north and east of the Ussuri and Amur Rivers. Khrushchev's remark at the XXIst Congress implying that a mutual border provided grounds for clashes (and the absence of a US-USSR mutual border should have meant better relations) was now to be fully borne in on him.

The Soviets themselves began to identify their opponent

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[200] Ulam, pp. 299-340.

[201] Dennis Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict (Stamford, 1965) p. 19ff.

in the dispute openly when on 7 January 1963 an unsigned editorial in Pravda identified the Chinese as the object of its ideological attacks.[202] All barriers were down. In February the Chinese published an editorial which was their first full account of the dispute.[203] The XXth CPSU Congress was identified as the starting point of the dispute with "its negative aspects, namely, the wrong viewpoints it put forward on certain important questions of principle relating to the international Communist movement." The most important of these wrong viewpoints was on the correct handling of the "united struggle against the common enemy, and above all, US imperialism."

The Central Committee of the CPSU itself took up the debate. In a letter to the Central Committee of the CPC, the CCCPSU agreed that "the rapacious nature of imperialism has not changed" but in view of the "radical qualitative change in the military-technical means of waging war resulting from thermanuclear weapons possessing unprecedented force," it was now evident that for all communists the "first emphasis" should be on "strengthening the great socialist community and its economic might" and "raising the standard of living of its peoples."[204] The letter carried a dire warning that "those who prize the interests of socialism and peace must do every-

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[202] Floyd, p. 346.

[203] "Whence the Differences Between Comrade Thorez and US," in Floyd, pp. 375ff.

[204] "Letter of the CCCPSU to the CCCPC" (30 March 1963) in Berton, Vol.I, p. 3/30, 4.

thing to frustrate the criminal designs of world reaction and to prevent it from unleashing a thermo-nuclear war dragging hundreds of millions of people down into the grave with it."[205]

The Chinese reply to this letter came in June and showed that they were unmoved by the Soviet arguments. The fundamental line of the international Communist movement, the reply asserted, "is the struggle against U.S. imperialism" and peaceful coexistence departs from "the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism"[206] The Chinese warned that "to entrust the fate of the people and of mankind to collaboration with U.S imperialism is to lead people astray."[207] Finally, asked the Chinese, "can peaceful transition be made into a new world-wide strategic principle for the international communist movement? Absolutely not."[208]

The signing of a partial nuclear test ban treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Summer of 1963 was, to Peking, the last straw. The treaty itself was denounced as a "dirty fraud" and had been arrived at only by means of "unprincipled concessions to imperialialism." Because of this "open capitulation" to the capitalists, the Chinese predicted for the Soviet leaders that "their ultimate collapse is in store."[209] The attack, reprinted in the Soviet press, then expanded to include a general analysis of recent policies of

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[205]Ibid, p. 3/30,5.

[206]"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" (14 June 1963), Berton, Vol. I, p. 6/14,3.

[207]Ibid, p. 6/14,7. [208]Ibid, p. 6/14,11.

[209]CDSP, Vol XV No. 34, pp. 3-4.

Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. Their real goal consisted in "becoming absolute in the socialist camp."[210] To that end "the Soviet leaders long before today began to enter deals with American imperialism, trying to bind China hand and foot."[211]

The Soviet response began by accusing the Chinese of "assuming the role of the right flank in the ranks of the American 'madmen'."[212] The remainder of the rebuttal, in effect, confirmed the Chinese charges about Soviet absolutist aspirations and deals with Americans. The Soviets held that it was sufficient for the defense of the socialist camp that the Soviets alone have nuclear weapons.[213] Concerning nuclear treaties with the Americans, the Soviets as the only socialist possessors of nuclear weapons could say haughtily, "we know what we're talking about."[214] The final jab at Peking was that the Chinese should learn from the example of the United States and the USSR how to exercise restraint in international relations.[215]

Each side accused the other of maintaining the split for its own advantage. When the Soviets protested that they had made new attempts after the XXIInd Congress to resolve differences, the Chinese scornfully replied "the 'new attempts' made after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU were aimed, not at improving Sino-Soviet relations and strengthening unity between fraternal Parties and countries, but on the contrary, at further ganging up with the U.S. Imperialists... in order to create

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[210]Ibid, p. 6. [211]Ibid, p. 7. [212]Ibid, p. 8.
[213]Ibid, p. 9. [214]Ibid, p. 10. [215]Ibid, p. 13.

a wider split in the socialist camp and the international Communist movement."[216]

A wider split had indeed been created. Philip Mosely, writing in October 1963, surveyed the state of Sino-Soviet relations and concluded that "the resentment of each other's domestic policies has played a major part in the process of mutual estrangement"[217] but "the basic and central dispute between Moscow and Peking revolves around their differing appraisals of the present balance of strategic power in the world."[218]

Nikita Khrushchev was removed from office less than a year later, in no small part because of his handling of the Chinese situation. Perhaps in celebration, the Chinese set off their first nuclear device the next day. But soon Peking attacked the new Soviet leadership's policies as "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev." In March of 1969 there were armed clashes of Chinese and Soviet border troops along the Ussuri River. Even the fact that each supported North Vietnam against the South Vietnamese and the United States has proved insufficient to restore any vestige of their former relationship. The best evidence of the existence of a fundamental split is that the two socialist states still conduct their affairs at governmental rather than Party levels.

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[216]"The Origin of the Differences," Berton, Vol.II, p. 9/6, 27.

[217]"The Chinese-Soviet Rift: Origins and Portents," Foreign Affairs, Vol.42 No.1 (October 1963), p. 12.

[218]Ibid, p. 17.

VII A NEW COLD WAR

The Sino-Soviet split has become one of the more uncomforable realities of present-day international affairs. Both traditional Western thought based on Aristotelian logic, and Marxism in all its variants based on the dialectic tend to view the world in dualistic, not to say Manichean, terms. The fact that the bi-polar world that emerged in the aftermath of World War II has become at least a tri-polar world, and more probably a polycentric one, is a fact that has proved quite difficult for all three nations - the United States, China, and the USSR - to grasp.

The Chinese in the early 1950's had just recently completed their long march to a successful revolution, and it was possible to observe in their statements and actions a revolutionary fervor, an elan vital, which had been diminished in the Soviet Union by the passage of time, the enormous sacrifices of World War II, and inescapable collisions with reality. The Chinese, from their viewpoint, could convince themselves that they had thrown back the Americans in Korea and were now ready for more successes. Averill Harriman characterizing the differences noted that "the Kremlin leaders have become much more cautious. They do not want everything they have built to be devastated by a nuclear war. Communist China, however, has a great deal less to lose.[219]

The viewpoint in the early 1950's from the Soviet position

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[219]W. Averill Harriman in Red China and the U.S.S.R. (Washington, 1963), p. 11.

was less sanguine. At the time of Stalin's death, Soviet foreign policy was not enjoying any significant success. The Korean War had proved a failure. NATO was the symbol of a hardened Western policy, and containment, for the moment, was effective. It was obvious to Stalin's successors, as it may have been to Stalin just before his death, that new policies were needed to demobilize and outmaneuver the West. In the USSR, the Soviet people were growing restive. There was evidence, the "Doctor's Plot," that new purges were being prepared. Malenkov, temporary victor in the struggle for leadership and seeking a new direction, advocated an emphasis on light industry and spoke of the end of civilization that might ensue from a nuclear war. It is a pithy commentary on Soviet politics in general and Khrushchev in particular that he was able to wrest control of the party from Malenkov by denouncing these positions and then assume them once he had come to office. It was the kind of maneuvering worthy of Lenin.

It is doubtful that Khrushchev foresaw the effect that his policies promulgated at the XXth Party Congress would have on the rest of the socialist camp. They were conceived in terms of and directed toward the relationship of the Soviet Union and the United States. Khrushchev wanted to be an equal of any American president with whom he might meet. To do this he would have to reduce the advantage which the United States held in its advanced deployment of forces at overseas bases. Equality also meant of course that he alone would speak for the socialist camp as he held the United States did for the capitalist camp. He wanted the Soviet Union to be a true

workers' paradise and outshine the United States in economic level, production, and standard of living. To accomplish this he had to divert priorities from strictly military expenditures. To accomplish both his foreign and domestic goals he had to eliminate the shadow and legacy of Stalin and the thesis of inevitability of a final all-out war between capitalist and socialist camps. All this required the sort of absolute and unquestioned leadership in the socialist camp that the Soviet Union enjoyed under Stalin. But Stalin's ways had in large part been disavowed and Khrushchev was to prove neither statesman, nor theoretician,nor agricultural and industial expert enough to make his scheme work.

When Khrushchev began to give expression to his new and less exhausting policy of dealing with the West, peaceful coexistence, the Chinese were skeptical and were in no way reassured by the de-thronement of Stalin. Increasingly, the Chinese became convinced that the Soviets meant to abandon the cause of world revolution and also their commitments to aid in development of China. But the logic of Marxian dialectic, abetted by a deep-seated xenophobia, forced the Chinese inevitably to the conclusion that since the Soviets were no longer following a correct path for international communism, the objective consequences of Moscow's action was to put it in collusion with Washington. Hence the veiled criticisms of Soviet policies evolved into open charges of collaboration or ganging up with the United States. This simply was not true.

For all his talk of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev

never said that he was opposed to a struggle between the two camps - a struggle which would end in complete political victory for the Soviet Union. Nor did he oppose war, per se, for he repeatedly endorsed - and supported - so-called wars of national liberation. What Khrushchev did wish to avoid was a specific kind of war, a thermo-nuclear war, because he could not be sure of the outcome. The West then had superiority in the means of such warfare. During the latter part of the 1950's the Soviets even conducted a "hate America" campaign while simultaneously preaching peaceful coexistence.[220] The Chinese did not see the same restraints on Soviet options that the Soviets themselves saw. When the Sputniks were launched the Soviet failure to translate such obvious technological advantage into immediate power politics actions convinced the Chinese that the Soviets had betrayed the revolution. Peaceful coexistence was only excusable as a tactical expedient for a weak nation, not a strong one.

In the West, on the other hand, there was an understandable hesitation on the part of most observers to see the new Soviet policies or the resulting strains in Sino-Soviet relations as portending anything like the split that occured. It would have been too much like wishful thinking. The Soviet's inability to foresee what was happening until the split was almost inevitable is equally understandable. The Soviets had not been used to giving much attention to Chinese perceptions and desires. Chou En-lai once chided Soviet officials that

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[220]Denny. op cit.

most high CPC officials knew at least some Russian but that none of the high CPSU officials knew any Chinese at all. The majority of official statements of the Soviets for a period from 1956 to 1963 show readily that the United States, and even a re-armed West Germany, were much more of the Soviets' minds than was China. A full content analysis of the doklads of the XXth, XXIst, and XXIInd Congresses would show something on the order of fifteen to twenty references to the United States for every one to China.

The split was not planned, it was the unforeseen development of Soviet policies which were calculated for their effect on the position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States and not for how they would be received by Peking or how much these policies seemed taken directly from the pages of Lenin's works.

Inevitably, examination of the split must deal with the question of whether or not the fundamental cause was an ideological dispute. Evidence to support the contention that the essential points of disagreement were ideological comes from the early arguments in the debates which were denunciations of opportunism, dogmatism, revisionism, and so on ad infinitum. The fact of the matter is that any dispute between the two powers for any reason would have been cast in ideological terms for both professed an official ideology that explained everything. Of course ideological exegesis had a way of being developed after the fact. To say that the dispute was ideological, then, is to comment on the language rather than

the substance of the issues.

Since the dispute became an open split in 1963, a number of other issues have entered into contention. Racial characterizations were frequently employed in the middle and late 1960's. The border questions raised after the Cuban missile crisis erupted into actual fighting in 1969. Even cultural policies have been the target of reciprocal condemnations. The Vietnam war, which might have been expected to provide a special opportunity to draw the disputants together, saw as much contention as cooperation in matters of aiding and advising Hanoi. All these factors, however, appeared later in the dispute and are derivative of the initial questions although each new factor added serves to keep a possible reconciliation further off.

One other factor in the dispute which may be of equal weight with the question of how to respond to the challenges of US military power and US economic accomplishemnts also dates back to the events at the XXth Party Congress. This factor is the question of authority in the Communist world. The Chinese objected to the de-thronement of Stalin,moreover, they objected to its being done unilaterally by the Soviets.[221] If arbitrary one-man rule from Moscow was to be repudiated for the new direction of international communism, should such a decision have been made arbitrarily by one man in the Kremlin, they later asked. Publicly, the Chinese went along at the time with Khrushchev's policies with respect to new ideas of leadership, but privately the Chinese cannot but have had ser-

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[221]"One the Question of Stalin," in Berton, Vol.2, p. 9/20, 2.

ious reservations. The same basis for criticizing Stalin would also permit criticism of Mao's cult of personality.

It was for reasons dictated by the struggle for supremacy in Kremlin leadership that Khrushchev made the Secret Speech when he did. And his decision to do so, to steal a march on his political opponents, was made during the Congress itself.[222] But even if these considerations had not prevailed, Khrushchev would still have had to effect some sort of repudiation of Stalin, however indirect, if he wished to follow through with the new foreign and domestic policies he had initiated before the Congress. Even this factor in the split, the leadership question, bears some relation to the question of those policies of Khrushchev which were based on his view of the United States.

The Sino-Soviet split is a complex phenomenon and no single-factor explanation can reasonably be offered as its cause. Nor was the dispute in any sense inevitable. Certainly Mao would have been dissatisfied to remain subordinate to a leader he must have regarded as his inferior; a new relationship of some sort was inevitable. But the decision to go separate ways could not have been made lightly in Peking. The Chinese leadership must have felt that they had no choice but to abandon what had looked like a nearly invincible alliance. In fact, the decision was made only after the Chinese perceived that Khrushchev would persist in his un-Marxist and fatal fascination with American nuclear power and the American pro-

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[222]For a concise summary of the internal political maneuvering in the Praesidium of the CCCPSU before the XXth Congress and which led to Khrushchev's making the Secret Speech see Conquest, Power and Policy, pp. 263-287.

duction of consumer and agricultural goods.

As this study has shown, the Soviet references to the necessity of avoiding nuclear confrontation with the United States and of producing a workers' paradise to surpass capital achievements hardly ever abated once they had begun in 1956. Even such incidents as the Mid-East crisis of 1958 and the U-2 incident had only temporary and slight effects on the course of these Soviet policies. The Chinese confined the initial public expression of their misgivings to oblique criticisms of certain right-wing ideological deviations. As Soviet strength relative to the West appeared to grow - the East wind prevailing over the West wind - but Soviet assertions did not, the Chinese became more explicit about what was most bothersome to them. The Soviets were exhorted to assume vigorous leadership by the challenge of "Long Live Leninism," and when that failed, less than three years later, the Chinese journals were openly accusing the Soviets of collaboration with the United States.

China has had a history of having its future decided by powers who did so without reference to Chinese interests. The CPC leadership's deepest fear was that even their closest ally and socialist partner would again do so with their most powerful enemy. Moscow, on the other hand, simply did not take into account as previously it had never really needed to, how its policies would be received in Peking. Robert North summed up the situation very aptly: "It was not inevitable that disputes over how to deal with the United States would cause a

Sino-Soviet split. What was inevitable was that when such a split did occur this dispute would figure most prominently."[223]

What has resulted from this schism in the orthodoxy of the international communist movement is a world in which bipolarity is now and perhaps forever gone as the international order, and a new balance of power has emerged. It is no accident that the present American Secretary of State is most thoroughly grounded in the modes of diplomacy of the nineteenth century Europe of Metternich and Bismarck. It may be that in this new world order the original causes of the Sino-Soviet split have no more than academic interest in view of the continued addition of more divisive factors. The question that is worthy of consideration concerns the effect on Sino-Soviet unity if both should perceive the United States to be no longer strong enough or willing to pose a credible deterrent to initiation of nuclear war.

The United States did not consciously contribute to initiation of the Sino-Soviet split except as it presented a resolute and visible resistance to the machinations of international communism's progressive acquisition of yet more states. The Soviets recognized the determination and appreciated the power whereas the Chinese did not. If that resolution should fail or that strength should appreciably decline then the original reason for the split will have passed. The major obstacle will have been removed for the Chinese and Soviets once again to restore unity and make common cause.

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[223]North, p. 279.

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A SELECT CHRONOLOGY OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1949-1963

2 October 1949	Soviet Union recognizes Chinese Peoples Republic.
14 February 1950	USSR and CPR sign "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistence" but only after two months of discusions.
5 March 1953	Stalin dead.
15 June 1953	Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resume diplomatic relations.
29 Sep.- 11 Oct. 1953	Khrushchev visits Peking. Agrees to return Port Arthur, give loan of 520 mil. rubles, return East Siberian RR to Chinese control, and end joint stock companies.
8 February 1955	Malenkov resigns.
14 - 25 February 1955	XXth Party Congress of CPSU.
18 April 1955	Cominform dissolved.
15 September 1956	China recognizes Yugoslavia.
Oct.-Nov. 1956	Polish riots, Hungarian revolt.
14 November 1957	Moscow Declaration. Peking line incorporated denouncing imperialism.
23 - 30 July 1958	Mid-East Crisis.
31 July - 3 Aug. 1958	Khrushchev's second visit to Peking.
29 August 1958	Chinese begin communes.
September 1958	Taiwan Straits crisis.
27 Jan. - 5 Feb. 1959	XXIst Party Congress of CPSU (Extraordinary).
Aug. - Sep. 1959	Sino-Indian frontier clashes.
15 - 28 Sep. 1959	Khrushchev visits United States.
30 Sep. 1959	Khrushchev visits Peking for third time. Very cool reception.
16 June 1960	"Long Live Leninism" published in Hongi (RED FLAG).

20 - 25 June 1960	3rd Congress of Rumanian CP in Bucarest.
July - August 1960	Soviet technicians leave China.
3 - 4 June 1960	Summit at Vienna, Kennedy and Khrushchev.
17 October 1960	XXIInd Party Congress of CPSU begins.
23 October 1960	Chou En-lai walks put of congress and leaves Moscow.
27 October 1960	Congress ends.
31 October 1960	Stalin's remains removed from Lenin's mausoleum.
November 1960	Conference of 81 Parties in Moscow. Soviet line promulgated over Chinese objection.
5 - 14 December 1960	Soviets and Albanians recall embassy staffs.
22 - 28 October 1962	Cuban missile crisis.
January 1963	Soviets and Chinese begin open, explicit denunciations of each other.
25 July 1963	Partial nuclear test-ban treaty signed by United States and USSR. China announces formation of Moscow-Washington axis of neo-Nazis.

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