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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

MODELLING OF A MULTILEVEL SECURE TACTICAL COMBAT COMPUTER SYSTEM

by

Claudio Augusto Bailly Andersen Cavalcanti

June 1986

Thesis Advisor:

Uno R. Kodres-

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Modelling of a Multilevel Secure Tactical Combat Computer System

by

Claudio Augusto Bailly Andersen Cavalcanti Lieutenant Commander, Brazili'an Navy B.S., Escola Naval, 1970

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This work is an analysis of the use of a multilevel secure computer system to execute tactical combat applications programs. Using the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base, currently under evaluation by the Department of Defense Computer Security Center, applications and test programs were written and implemented in order to expose some characteristics of the system.

Using a Janus/Ada compiler with the necessary library alterations for the Gemini machine, a simple weapons application program was implemented in a system designed to simulate a tactical environment where classified material can be handled in spite of the different levels of security held by the operators that can access the system.

The loss in performance due to the secure operating system's overhead is estimated in order to establish the tradeoffs in performance gains due to parallel processing capability of the multiprocessor system.

THESIS DISCLAIMER

The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed during this research are not completely validated. Although every effort has been made in order to make the programs free of computational and logical errors, the time available was not sufficient to perform a fully reliable job. Documentation and software used in this work were supplied by the manufacturers of the microcomputer used, in a preliminary format with updates being received throughout the research period.

Some terms used in this thesis are registered trademarks of commercial products. All trademarks appearing in this thesis will be listed below following the firm holding the trademark:

- Gemini Computers Inc. Monterey, California. Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base. GEMSOS
- RR Software Inc. Madison, Wisconsin.
 Janus/Ada development package.
- INTEL Corporation, Santa Clara, California.
 INTEL

Multibus

APX-286

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

This thesis investigates the use of a multilevel secure computer system in a tactical combat environment. The specific application of the system proposed is to perform the duties of a real-time system with the extra ability to handle sensitive information in a trusted manner.

A real-time system is defined as:

A system that reacts as to affect the environment in which it is operating. It is a collection of devices, controlled by a stored program of instructions. This program acts as the regulating element in a feedback loop, which then forms part of a system. [Ref. 1: p.1]

Sensitive information is defined as a collection of data that cannot be accessed but by those who have specific authorization.

The type of environment where a secure tactical system can be implemented is shown in Figure 1.1 , which depicts a hypothetical section of the operation's room of a combat ship.

The tactical program executed by this specific system requires some secret data, in order to produce the desired results. The system should allow the tactical program to access the secret data, make the necessary computations and transfer the result to the desired peripheral. The operator who "drives" the tactical program should not have direct





access to the secret data. The eventual access to the secret data, i.e. to update some parameters, should be allowed only to operators with secret clearance or above.

Another important aspect of a tactical secure combat system is that the tactical program needs to be maintained by on-board technicians, who might not have secret clearance. If a "free" access to the secret data is allowed, a skillfull maintainer with some corrupt intentions, can easily produce a "patch" which will extract the sensitive information and transfer to a printer or a display. This dangerous picture is very much likely to exist and in fact, such a problem ocurred two years ago on board of an aircraft carrier, involving the geographic positions of U.S. Navy's nuclear submarines.

In order to avoid the necessity to clear all the maintainers on-board to secret level, some sort of independence should exist between the modules of a tactical program. The modules should be able to receive different security labels that cannot be changed by on-board maintenance. The modules authorized to be maintained on board should be re-integrated into the system with no changes to the security parameters.

Since tactical environment automatically calls for speed, all the necessary security techniques must not create too much overhead to the overall performance.

This research was performed in conjunction with the Naval Postgraduate School's AEGIS Modelling Group. This group is sponsored by the AEGIS Combat System Project Office to conduct research in the area of combat system development.

To summarize the problems discussed in this section we can state the following requirements for a tactical secure combat system:

- The system will execute tactical programs that uses sensitive information;
- The access to the sensitive information should be controlled;
- 3) The tactical programs need to have an on-board -maintenance by technical personnel with no clearance to the sensitive information;
- Changes to the security parameters should not be possible unless by authorized personnel;
- 5) There should be no large overhead due to the security aspects of the system.

B. PROPOSED SOLUTION

This thesis proposes the use of a multilevel secure computer system to execute the tactical combat program. The secure computer system would be the "heart" of the proposed system, executing the application program specifically designed for each different situation. The multilevel secure computer system, based upon the security level of the operator currently logged on, would perform different kinds of functions. The capacity of labeling the modules of

execution in a multilevel secure computer system would allow the isolation of sensitive modules, thus protecting them against unauthorized users.

An schematic view of the proposed solution is shown in Figure 1.2.

Here, an application program would be delivered to the ship's system containing five independent modules. Module 1 is the "master" module, which controls the execution of the whole system and performs the synchronization between modules. It would not be permitted to maintain this module on-board. Modules 2 and 3 contain algorithms to process inputs and outputs and some intermediate calculations. Those modules can be maintained on-board. Module 4 accesses the secret data, and cannot be maintained on-board. Module 5 contains the secret data, and cannot be maintained on-board although alteration of some specific fields can be done by an authorized operator.

When an unclassified operator logs on, the master module will activate modules 2 and 3, which will execute and call module 4 to access the secret data. The secret data is then, handled only by module 4 which provides the result of the operation requested by modules 2 and 3, but will never transmit the information read from module 5.

When a "secret" operator logs on, the master module will activate directly module 4, which accesses module 5, but this time the information read is transferred to the



Figure 1.2 A Secure Processes Interaction

operator whose "secret" classification level authorizes access to the information.

There are several systems being currently evaluated by the Department of Defense to operate as a multilevel secure system. The Gemini Trusted Multiple Computer Base is the one used in this research. This system is still undergoing development and so, some restrictions were imposed.

C. THESIS FORMAT

This thesis is composed of five chapters ordered in a sequence to provide the reader with a presentation of the problem, some background information in secure systems and then introduce the design and the implementation of a system to execute tactical secure combat programs.

Chapter I presents the problem and the solution in a generic format.

Chapter II describes the concepts of multilevel security and provides some detailed information about the microcomputer used in this research, the Gemini Trusted Multiple Computer Base.

Chapter III discusses the actual design of the application program for the proposed system.

Chapter IV covers the implementation and testing of the application program using the Gemini system. Some information about loss in performance due to overhead caused by security checks is included in this chapter.

Chapter V analyzes the results, proposes some techniques for the development of applications programs and suggests some follow-up research.

••

II. <u>SECURE SYSTEMS</u>

A. TRUSTED COMPUTER

1. <u>Background</u>

There is not to date an unique and generally accepted definition for a trusted computer system. Depending on the origin (i.e., business or government), the requirements can be quite different and sometimes they even conflict between each other. The Department of Defense, with the purpose to define parameters for any work in the area of secure systems, has elaborated a document which is entitled DOD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria and was published in 1983 [Ref. 2]. This document established guidelines for the test and evaluation of any new system involving security aspects. It contains all the information necessary to anyone involved in research with trusted computer systems.

One of the important concepts described in this publication, which has direct effect in the analysis executed in this thesis, is the establishment of two basic types of security policy: Mandatory (sometimes called Nondiscretionary) and Discretionary Security.

Mandatory Security is defined by the following direct quote.

Security policies defined for systems that are used to process classified or other specifically categorized

sensitive information include provisions for the enforcement of mandatory access control rules. That is, must include a set of rules for controlling access based directly on a comparison of the individual's clearance or authorization for the information and the classification or sensitivity designation of the information being sought, and indirectly on considerations of physical and other environmental factors of control. The mandatory access control rules must accurately reflect the laws, regulations, and general policies from which they are derived. [Ref. 2: p.72]

As it can be understood from the definition above, the mandatory policy is expressed by a lattice of access classes. The mandatory policy establishes that the control of the accesses is based on an access level determined by the user's security clearance and this policy cannot be modified or bypassed within the system. The mandatory policy, furthermore, establishes the limits for the discretionary security, which is an additional set of constraints on access to information, based on some particular constraint, like the military "need-to-know" policy.

The Discretionary Security is the second type of security policy established by the DOD document and it is expressed by direct quote which follows.

Security policies that are defined for systems that are used to process classified or other sensitive information must include provisions for the enforcement of discretionary access control rules. That is, they must include a consistent set of rules for controlling and limiting access based on identified individuals who have been determined to have a need-to-know for the information. [Ref. 2: p. 73]

There will be certain situations where although the elements of a group, involved in an analysis or a research project may have the same clearance, the manager wants to limit the type of information which each one should access. This can be done in order to extract different and unbiased opinions and observations. The discretionary policy is the tool to provide this access granularity without affecting the mandatory rules.

2. The Threats

The attractive field of computer technology has had in the past few years one of the fast and impressive developments ever observed in a new science. This has lead to a proliferation of computers and networks so that it is improbable to find today any company or organization that does not use some kind of a computer system.

Among all the information stored, some is classified, and so, need special care. The few and basic security controls first used were considered sufficient to limit the access to classified information. The machines were physically isolated and locked. Some more sophisticated systems had a software coded control. As it has always happened in human history, there is always a conflict of interests and there is almost no limit to the human desire and dedication. So, the computer "hackers" entered the scene and there has been a lot of break-ins widely reported by the press, in many types of computer

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systems. The control processes had to be improved and the break-in techniques improved concurrently!

The only very low break-in probability technique ended up to be the enclosure of the peripheral, which permits access to the classified information, in a tightly secured vault. Evidently this is not a satisfactory solution. In some tactical applications, for instance, the operators might have no secret clearance, but the data the tactical program uses, is secret. A bright and "interested" operator can use this situation to create a software patch, for example, which although transparent to the normal operation of :the system, will extract some of the classified information that is stored somewhere.

3. Proposed Technology

Research centers and universities have conducted a great amount of work and fortunately, some very good results are now available to be implemented. The security kernel technology [Ref. 3] has been considered the driving force for the building of trusted computer systems and several products have implemented and improved this technique in an effort to turn the products into practical, simple to use, and most of all, secure systems.

To determine if a system is secure or not, is a very difficult task, starting with the problem to establish the criteria to evaluate the performance. The Departament of Defense is preparing a document which will contain the

details of such an evaluation criteria and this analysis is not considered in this work.

The employment of secure products by potential customers is usually not considered until some harmful break-in happens, mainly because the practicality of its use has not been demonstrated yet. In the tactical environment there are extra concerns like timing, adaptability and realtime applicability that have to be demonstrated together with the secure capabilities, in order to integrate these products into a combat system.

The Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base using the Gemini Multiprocessing Secure Operating System (GEMSOS) is claimed by its manufacturers to fulfill the tactical requirements with secure aspects, and this was the machine used in this research.

B. THE GEMINI SYSTEM

1. <u>General</u> .

The Gemini Multiprocessing Secure Operating System (GEMSOS) was designed for the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base, in order to have the system to operate at the B3 [Ref. 2] level of classification, although the ultimate goal is to meet the class A1, the highest level defined. The system is currently under evaluation by the Department of Defense Computer Security Center for certification to the B3 class. The system was developed

based on the security kernel technology [Ref. 3] like all trusted systems are, and the main idea was to provide an off-the-shelf product, using state of the art, hardware components and software engineering techniques. The main characteristics of the system are [Ref. 4]:

- Can operate with up to eight Intel APX-286 based microcomputers in parallel, giving a great processing power. The microcomputers communicate through shared memory segments providing high throughput, and the GEMSOS minimizes bus contention by locating data and code in the local memory of each processor, whenever it is possible.
- 2) The multiple microcomputers are capable of multiprocessing and multiprogramming. The GEMSOS can multiplex processes to a single processor or distribute processes to several processors, so that both parallel and pipeline processing is possible.
- 3) Concurrent computing is independent of the programming language used, since the GEMSOS provides its own primitives to manipulate the abstracts <u>eventcounts</u> and <u>sequencers</u>, in order to support communication and synchronization among processes.
- 4) A variety of I/O devices and storage, which include fixed disks, high density floppy diskette drives and non-volatile memory, can be directly connected to the Multibus. Each RS-232 interface board can handle up to eight devices.
- 5) The system includes some other features like a real time clock, data encryption device (NBS-DES algorithm), a system unique identifier to prevent covert channels, and a non-volatile memory to store passwords and encryption keys.

The Gemini system allows the development of applications programs using theoretically any language supported by the CPM-86 operating system. Some additional files, which will change the utility library associated with the programming language, has to be provided with the Gemini

system. As the decision was to generate application software using the Janus/Ada computer language, the actual coding of this work had to wait the delivery of the Janus/Ada environment software and documentation, which happened in late March. There are special features for the Gemini Janus/Ada environment that cannot be easily adapted from a normal Janus/Ada code and these will be pointed out later in this work. The current implementation of Janus/Ada on GEMSOS still does not include the ability to use a Janus/Ada process as the initial Ring 1 process and some limitations result from that.

The claimed ability to handle different hardware configurations is an important characteristic of the Gemini system. If the system is going to be used in real tactical applications, this certainly is an important aspect.

2. Resource Management Concepts

A set of resource management services that can be invoked by an application program is provided by the GEMSOS, in order to provide the customer with tools to control the performance of the particular implementation under development. The application program uses what is called a service call, which can be treated as a subroutine call, with arguments being passed and returned. These service calls are called gate calls, since they make certain security checks to allow the flux of data. The actual details of each call is specific to the language being used

and is supplied in the GEMSOS interface library provided with each compiler (Janus/Ada in this study).

The GEMSOS kernel is divided into three basic management areas, which are: segment management, process management and device management.

a. Segment

Segments are discreet and logical objects (entities) that contain all the information to be manipulated in a Gemini system. The segments of concern to the applications programmer are the code, data and stack segments.

The GEMSOS kernel allows some application program to move data within the system in such a way as to be immediate available to a particular process or not. There are eight different calls provided for this management. These calls will handle the movement, creation and termination of data as well as the transfer of the necessary information to the Kernel's mandatory security model, which will deny or accept the request for service. The segment manager controls a "Known Segment Table" (KST), where the segment numbers are related to the system-unique identifier of the segment usable by the memory. The segment when created, will receive a tag associating it to a particular collection of segments, called a volume, which is the unit of secondary storage. A volume can be treated as separate entity and so be called by a process. A detailed

description about each of the segment management calls is contained in [Ref. 5].

b. Process

The management of a process includes the actual management and the synchronization between processes.

(1) <u>Management</u>. When created, each process is uniquely identified by code, stack and data segments and at the same time, a fixed amount of resources is assigned to it. There are four primitives to manage a process.

(2) <u>Synchronization</u>. Once a segment is created in an application program, an eventcount and a sequencer are automatically associated with it. These two abstract objects have the same name as their owning segment. The process can then be synchronized with other processes by means of four primitives supported by the kernel, which are: advance, await, read and ticket.

c. Device

The Gemini system treats the management of devices in a very peculiar way, which is, to reside most of the functions dealing with I/O management in the code at the application level. This design is two-fold. It reduces the size of the kernel making verifications easier, but it also makes the I/O applications software more difficult to be coded. There are six calls to handle a device. The I/O device controller is treated as a process, which is then synchronized with the segments eventcounts and sequencers to

perform the desired functions. More information about device management, process management and synchronization, can be found in [Ref. 5].

3. The Operating System

The Intel APX-286 supports four protection levels and GEMSOS uses them as four hierarchical rings to enforce the security layering. They are numbered from 0 to 3, 0 being the most privileged one. The mandatory and discretionary policy are supported in rings 0 and 1 respectively. The mandatory policy, as already mentioned, cannot be modified and is represented as a lattice of access classes in the distributed kernel contained in ring 0. This distributed kernel in ring 0 will virtualize processors, storage, I/O and objects (processes, segments and devices). Ring 1 supports the discretionary policy and any other security requirements. The supervisor, which is built on the kernel, uses the virtualized objects to perform the normal functions of an operating system. The other two rings, 2 and 3, are used by the programmers for the development of applications.

The implementation of a reference monitor [Ref. 3] is the base of the GEMSOS. All the access by the active entities, subjects, to passive entities, objects, has to be mediated by the reference monitor as shown in Figure 2.1.

All these checks are performed by the security kernel located in ring 0. The subjects are processes

allowed to perform in a specific domain, and objects are pieces of information that are observed or modified. Both have security labels assigned to them. The result of the comparison between the security labels of the subjects versus the objects, is what decides if the transaction is approved.



Figure 2.1 The Functions of a Reference Monitor
Security label is a tag that represents the access class of an entity. This access class is defined as having two components: a compromise level and an integrity level. There are properties that establish the criteria for an access to be granted based on the compromise and integrity protection enforcement rules. These properties are listed in [Ref. 4: pp. 16,17] and are summarized here as follows: Compromise Properties.

- If a subject has "observe" access to an object, the compromise access component of the subject must dominate the compromise access component of the object.
- 2) If a subject has "modify" access to an object, the compromise access component of the object must dominate the compromise access component of the subject.

Integrity Properties.

- If a subject has "modify" access to an object, then the integrity access component of the subject dominates the integrity access component of the object.
- 2) If a subject has "observe" access to an object, then the integrity access component of the object dominates the integrity access component of the subject. Compromise can be related to the secure distribution

of information, and integrity to the secure modification of information. "Dominates" in the above properties, means access level greater than or equal to the referred entity.

The number 1 property of both compromise and integrity protections are the traditional security policies which are called simple security properties. They state that in order to observe/modify some information one has to

have a clearance at least equal to or greater than the information referenced.

The number 2 property, on the other hand, is not usual and it is called the *-property (star property). The purpose of this protection is to avoid an indirect observation or modification of an entity by an "inferior" one. In the compromise situation, for example, a secret process could modify an unclassified file if this protection did not exist. This "modification" could easily be the transmission of secret data that the secret process has access, to the unclassified file. In the integrity situation, it prevents a secret process of observing an unclassified file, and this observation could be "read some data and include it in your computation", which will allow the secret process to be influenced by an unclassified user. In [Ref. 6] there are some more comments about the types of attacks (Trojan Horse) that can result if these properties are not enforced.

Ring integrity is enforced, in addition to all those properties already mentioned, in the Gemini system. It means that, subjects can only access objects with equal or greater ring number, which enforces the hierarchical structure of the rings.

The rigid observance of the properties mentioned above, would transform the simple task of distributing messages (when they have different access classes), into a

very complicated and resource consuming procedure. As the Gemini system is a multilevel system, this would be the case. In order to avoid this problem, the *-property for compromise and integrity are relaxed within a certain range of security levels. The process, which has certain flexibility in order to execute some trusted activities, is called "trusted" subject, and it is up to the application programmer that his "trusted" process does not violate the security policies. In GEMSOS, the implementation of "trusted subjects" are in the form of multilevel subjects and they are trusted within a range, demarcated by their maximum and minimum access classes. As mentioned already, only subjects guaranteed not to improperly observe or modify information, should be created as multilevel subjects. Extreme caution should be emphazised when interfacing with devices.

The range of access classes for devices, should be chosen depending on the physical location in which they operate. Devices can be single level or multilevel, and the classification is based on the data they manipulate, whether they have a security label attached to it or not.

The security properties of single and multilevel devices are the following [Ref. 4: pp. 21,22]:

Single-level Devices.

- To receive ("read") information: Process maximum compromise }=Device minimum compromise Device maximum integrity }=Process minimum integrity
- 2) To send ("write") information: Device maximum compromise }=Process minimum compromise Process maximum integrity }=Device minimum integrity

Multi-level Device.

- To receive ("read") information: Process maximum compromise }=Device maximum compromise Device minimum integrity }=Process minimum integrity
- 2) To send ("write") information: Device minimum compromise }=Process minimum compromise Process maximum integrity }=Device maximum integrity
 - 4. The NPS configuration

The Gemini system used during this research has the

following configuration:

- 1) one Intel APX-286 microcomputer
- 2) two 1.2 Mbyte floppy disk drives
- 3) one RS-232 interface board with a maximum of eight ports

This system proved to be sufficient for the execution of some preliminary processes like the ones presented in this thesis. However, the amount of time expended during compilation, linking and sysgening and the constant swapping of floppy disks due to the floppy disk drive environment was a big constraint.

III. TACTICAL SYSTEM DESIGN

A. DESIGN ISSUES

1. <u>Objectives</u>

The primary objective of this design was to develop a model which would demonstrate the use of the Gemini Trusted Multiple Computer Base in a tactical combat environment. Based on the requirements for a tactical secure combat environment listed in the introductory chapter, the model shown in Figure 3.1 is presented.

In this model, the Gemini computer would be used to receive • the encoded data from a tracker radar, and transmit some positioning information to a weapons device. The actual devices being controlled in this model, are irrelevant at this point. The application program executed by the Gemini computer would make use, for the computation of the results, of some stored information classified as secret. This can be better understood, if we suppose that the tracker radar is tracking an incoming missile, and the desired response, is the firing of a chaff burst as a defensive procedure. During the computation phase, the program has to access data about our own ship which might be classified. The operator controlling the tactical picture cannot have direct access to his data. However this data has to be updated eventually by some authorized operator.



Figure 3.1 Tactical Combat Model

In addition to all that, the system has to have a very fast response, and the steps of execution (reception of radar data, computation of results, transmission of position) have to be precisely synchronized.

2. <u>Hardware Simulation</u>

The construction of the model described in the previous section, would be ideal, since the attachment of different devices to the Gemini computer would be tested. Response time, encoding input techniques and many other aspects would be revealed. This should be part of a followup research.

As a preliminary research, the development of the application program was considered the main task.

The complete model, will then be simulated as follows: One terminal attached to a serial port is going to simulate the radar input. The values sent to the "main" process will be generated by software. Another terminal will perform the same simulation of the weapon to be driven, showing on the screen the transmitted values. The "main" process will make use of the secret data stored in another segment, simulating a secondary storage.

These simulations will not disturb the development of the application program. The processes to be created in order to perform the simulations described above, would be necessary in the complete model as well. The main

difference would be in the code itself, since the processes would be executing controlling functions.

B. SOFTWARE DESIGN

The application software for this system was designed using the modular programming construction technique. In the particular case of the system used, which had a floppy disk environment, this technique was very useful, because the modules could be compiled separately. Unfortunately, the testing of the modules cannot be done separately, when the modules execute calls to the GEMSOS. To prepare a program to be executed in the Gemini computer, which is going to be explained in a further section, takes about 15-17 minutes, and the main process (the parent process) has to be included always, since the creation of processes and synchronization are coded in the main process.

The application software was then divided in four application programs:

- "THEMAIN", the parent process, containing the initialization, creation of processes, synchronization and deletion of processes(log off).
- "RADAR", a child process, performing the simulation of the radar inputs, and the transmission of data to the parent process.
- 3) "COMPUTE", a child process, which receives data from the "RADAR" process, execute some computations, and tramsmit the results to the "CHAFF" process.
- 4) "CHAFF", a child process, which will receive data from the "COMPUTE" process, and will simulate the positioning of a weapon.

1. The Parent Process

This is the controlling process for the wholesystem. The creation of the child processes is established in this module, together with the security parameters and the synchronization scheme. This module has to be designed and coded by a programmer cleared to the maximum level of security to be used, since he will decide the levels for each of the child processes to be created. The coding of the child modules, will be given to different programmers, depending upon the security level of the module.

The general algorithm for a parent process is shown in Figure 3.2.

Package body THEMAIN is

begin

perform initialization; create segment to be parent; create segment to perform synchronization; create processes; loop call child 1; call child 3; call child 3; call child 2; exit when some condition; end loop; delete processes; end THEMAIN;

Figure 3.2 Package THEMAIN

There are some other procedures, to transfer data to and from the child processes, not shown here. They can be found in the program listing in Appendix A.

2. The Child Processes

These processes will perform some defined function which has been determined by the software manager. The actual details of implementing the code are left to the programmer in charge.

In our application program, the child modules execute the general algorithm described in Figure 3.3.

This is just a general algorithm, and the full listing of each module used in the application program developed in this research, is shown in Appendix A.

Package CHILD body is

begin
 receive data from parent;
 perform calculation;
 execute simulation;
 pass data to parent;
end CHILD;

Figure 3.3 Package CHILD

As it was mentioned before, the child processes can be maintained separately, as long as the synchronization part of each module is not changed. If a module is to be labelled as secret, the maintenance can be restricted to Authorized personnel. The preparation of the complete program to be executed in the system, will be done by a user with the necessary level of security.

C. SOFTWARE DESIGN GOALS

The configuration used for this research had some restrictions, as already mentioned, and among them, the amount of time necessary for each development step represented considerable difficulty. The GEMSOS calls using the Janus/Ada language are yet under development. A preliminary version of the Janus/Ada software library and manuals were received in March 86. Due to these reasons, the following sequence of steps has been established for the development of the application program:

- 1) Demonstrate the attachment and detachment of a terminal.
- Demonstrate an application program which samples an input device, performs calculations, and presents the result, all synchronized sequentially.
- Extract some information about overhead caused by some GEMSOS calls.
- Synchronize the application program via a real-time clock.
- Label one of the child processes as secret, and test the access for different operators.

This research was performed in cooperation with another student, Major Miguel Reyes, Peruvian Air Force, who has one more quarter to work on this system. Hopefully, the steps not accomplished by this thesis would be demonstrated in his work.

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· IV. IMPLEMENTATION ON GEMINI SYSTEM

A. GEMSOS LIBRARY

When developing Janus/Ada application programs to run on GEMSOS, the standard I/O and file type utilities provided with the normal Janus/Ada compiler, cannot be used. Instead, the GEMSOS gate calls provided by the manufacturers, have to be used. As the Janus/Ada environment provided for use with the GEMSOS, is not complete yet, some of the utilities necessary for the development of the application program had to be constructed. Four packages were built to modularize the procedures, functions and declarations necessary for the present application: MANAG, GEMIO, CRPROCE, TABLES.

1. Package MANAG

This package includes the procedures necessary for the management of segments and terminals. To create a segment, a number of parameters should be passed to the GEMSOS call CREATE_SEGMENT. These parameters are then explicitly passed in this procedure.

Any device to be used by the Gemini system needs to be attached. This applies to the screen terminal as well. The GEMSOS call ATTACH_DEVICE, has a specific configuration parameters which are used with terminals. The same applies for the GEMSOS call DETACH_DEVICE. Two procedures were then

built, in such a way that some parameters which are constants for terminals do not have to be passed.

2. <u>Package GEMIO</u>

This package is designed to be the I/O package for the Gemini system. The procedures included here, are the ones found to be necessary up to this point of the research. Evidently, many more have yet to be developed, in order to have a comprehensive I/O package. Some of the procedures included in this package were taken from the demonstration program supplied by the manufacturers of the Gemini computer.

3. Package CRPROCE

In order to create a process, the general algorithm presented in Figure 4.1 has to be applied.

Package body CREATE A PROCESS is

begin

makeknown the mentor segment specify the address for the process stack specify the address for the process mentor specify the address for the trap segment calculate the stack size create the segment for the stack makeknown the segment for the stack swap in this segment create the segment for data makeknown the segment for data swap in this segment complete the record for the CREATE_PROCESS call call the GEMSOS CREATE_PROCESS

Figure 4.1 Package CRPROCE

As it can be seen from Figure 4.1, the creation of a process involves a large number of steps. The size of this procedure alone, justifies the construction of a package containing just this procedure.

4. Package TABLES

The purpose of this package is to concentrate a great number of the declarations necessary for the implemented application program. Since, as already mentioned, the utilities programs coded in Janus/Ada have not yet all been delivered, some procedure to supply the parameters necessary for the create and makeknown calls, had to be built. For the time being, a simple loop that will generate fixed numbers is what will be used. A correct procedure, which will look for the next free number to allocate, should be done in the future. This package has a preliminary procedure to load access classes yet to be tested.

B. PROCESS STRUCTURE

1. Pathname Convention

Since all information in the Gemini system is stored in segments, some method to make reference to these segments is needed. A pathname is the shorthand method used for this purpose of aliasing a segment. It consists of a sequence of entry numbers that together define all of the mentor segments to a particular segment. The pathname "3,8"

indicates that the target segment is at entry 8 of its mentor segment, which itself has entry 3 in the system mentor segment. Pathnames may be up to 5 entry numbers long in the present implementation.

The pathname is used during the generation of a program to run in the secure environment, and it will be explained in the next sections.

2. Ring 1 Environment

The current implementation of Janus/Ada on GEMSOS does not allow the use of a Janus/Ada process as the initial Ring 1 process. The Ring 1 Login and the Ring 1 Loader provided have to used in order to run Janus/Ada programs.

Another restriction imposed by this preliminary version is that, the file R1TRAP.CMD, which contains the trap handler and debugger, has to be <u>sysgened</u> (to be discussed later), at entry six off the system mentor segment. Figure 4.2 shows the Ring 1 environment segment naming hierarchy. The segments which have fixed "positions" in the ring 1 structure are shown in Figure 4.2, which are:

- SSAT- System Segment Aliasing Table; containing the bootstrap and kernel segments.
- 2) V1loader- Ring 1 loader code segment.
- 3) Vilogon- Login process code segment.
- 4) NV.DS at 5,0- Shared segment for loader processes.
- 5) NV.DS at 5- Appliccation Root
- 6) R1trap- Trap entry and debugger



Figure 4.2 Ring 1 Structure

The entry of concern for the applications programmer, is entry number 5. In the current implementation, this is the position were the application program should be located.

3. Application Program Environment

The application program developed in this research, is composed of four segments. The mentor segment for the code segments (the application mentor) will be at entry 5

off the system mentor. The mentor segment for the stack and data segments will be at entry 5 off the application mentor. The parent process will be located at entry 0 off the application mentor. The child processes will be located at entries 7, 8 and 9 off the application mentor. This scheme can be better explained by the diagram in Figure 4.3.



Figure 4.3 Application Program Structure

The entries used for this structure, were chosen with no special reason. Other combinations could have been chosen. The only restriction is to position the parent process at entry 0 off the application mentor.

These entry numbers are treated as paths, when referenced. So, entry 7 off entry 5 off the system mentor, is called 5,7. This will be used in the file with the commands for the sysgening phase. Those entries have to be passed as parameters during the creation and makeknown of segments.

For the application program developed, a segment for the purpose of executing the synchronization was created, and will be located at entry 6 off the application mentor.

4. <u>Process Synchronization</u>

Process synchronization is accomplished using the eventcount of the synchronization segment (5,6), and the eventcount of the stack segment of each child. Advancing each eventcount in turn, the parent process would prepare each child to execute its code, as soon as the parent makes an AWAIT call. The child, would then, after execution, advance the eventcount of the syncronization segment, which is the one being read by the parent process. This scheme would be repeated and the synchronization between all processes is achieved. The actual sequence of synchronization used in the programs developed, can be seen in the programs' listing in Appendix A.

C. GENERATION OF A SECURE PROGRAM

To prepare programs to run in the Gemini Secure Operating System (GEMSOS) environment is much more complicated than running a Janus/Ada program in a non-secure environment. There are some specific calls the program has to make, in order to be recognized by the GEMSOS, and gain access to the security kernel. The programs are compiled and linked like normal Janus/Ada programs. The command (CMD) files, will then be put in the secure environment. To assign the security classification and prepare the programs to run in a secure environment, a secure volume must be created by running the operating system generation program (SYSGEN). Execution of the SYSGEN program will include the application programs into a segment structure, which will then be transformed into a bootable executable program.

The SYSGEN program reads a submit file to identify the segment structure. This submit file, for the current implementation, will have the format as in Figure 4.4.

Except for the application.cmd and the child.cmd files, all the other segments are to be sysgened exactly as described in Figure 4.4. The submit file used to SYSGEN the application program implemented is listed in Appendix E .

File : Application.ssb

bs:ld3.cmd ks:k0.cmd ks:k1.cmd ks:k0h.cmd ks:k2.cmd cs:v1loader.cmd;2; ds:v1login.cmd;2,10; ds:nv.ds;2,5; ds:nv.ds;5; ds:application.cmd;5,0; ds:child1.cmd;5,7; ds:child2.cmd;5.8; ds:r1trap.cmd;6; end ·

Figure 4.4 Submit File

D. LOSS IN PERFORMANCE

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In order to achieve a secure environment, we have developed our program using four different processes, which can have different access classes. During the execution of the secure program, the operating system will perform security checks each time a process is brought into execution and each time a segment is accessed. Evidently, some overhead, in comparison with a non-secure system, exists. A test program was developed in order to extract the preliminary measurements of such a overhead.

1. Test Program

The same structure used in the application process developed, was used in this test program.

The algorithm used in the main program is described in Figure 4.5.

Package body TOTIME is

Figure 4.5 Package TIME

When the procedure to execute calculations with no calls is activated, the program will perform a simple arithmetic calculation 30000 times. These calculations will be performed by the main process, after the creation of all child processes, and with values already in the main process, so there are no GEMSOS calls.

When the procedure to perform calculations with one call is activated, the program will activate two processes: CALC1 and STODISP. The STODISP process will supply one value to the CALC1 process. CALC1 process will receive this value and perform the same arithmetic calculation as before 30000 times as well. The actual value passed by one process to the other is irrelevant, and it is there just to provoke a call to the operating system during the transmission of the value. The result of the calculation will be displayed by the STODISP process.

Finally, the procedure to perform calculations with call—in every loop is activated. The program will then activate CALC2 and STODISP processes. Process CALC2 will perform the same calculations as before, but this time will include in every loop of the computation, a transmission of data between the STODISP and CALC2 segments.

Because a loop statement is being used to control these tests, two measurements are taken at the first step (calculations with no GEMSOS calls), in order to estimate the contribution of the loop control code to the overall time taken by the calculation.

All those steps are measured and analysed.

2. Performance Results

The results obtained from the test program are the following:

 With no GEMSOS calls, 30000 operations => 3.33 seconds.

- With four (4) GEMSOS calls, 30000 operations =/ 3.28 seconds.
- 3) With four (4) GEMSOS calls for each operation, 300 operations => 23.8 seconds.

At the first step, no GEMSOS calls, another measurement was taken, doubling the number of operations and maintaining the same loop number, in order to estimate the time delay contribution of the loop control. The time measured was 6.03 seconds, which shows that the actual operations take 2.7 seconds, and the loop control is responsible for 0.63 seconds. Since we execute the loop 30000 times, it is possible to estimate the time delay for each, loop to be 21 µseconds. The times measured show that each mult/div operation, which there are 12 on each loop, is using 7.5 µseconds, which is the expectable time delay for a APX-286 CPU.

The time measured during the execution of the second step, the same number of operations plus four GEMSOS calls, did not show any appreciable difference.

At the third step, where there are four GEMSOS calls on each loop, and the loop is executed 300 times, the time measured was 23.8 seconds. As the test executes the loop 300 times, each loop uses 79 milliseconds. Assuming the same loop delay time as before, each loop control uses 21 µseconds, and the time delay of the actual calculations is (12 x 7.5 µseconds) 90 µseconds. Therefore, as four GEMSOS

calls are executed in each loop, each call uses an average of 19 milliseconds.

These preliminary measurements are far from complete, but the results obtained can be considered as a design parameter to be expected when the security environment is used with the Gemini system.

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V. APPRECIATION OF RESULTS

A. GENERAL COMMENTS

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The development of application programs to execute in the Gemini microcomputer proved to be much more time consuming that it was anticipated. Testing and debugging of the programs could not be done using the techniques and skills normally used when working with non-secure systems. Some factors can be listed as the major ones which contributed to this problem. They were:

- 1) " new terms and concepts that had to be completely understood before attempting to use the system
- preliminary version of the manuals provided, which are still being updated and developed
- 3) preliminary version of the library programs which do not include yet, most of the common needed procedures
- the system used was configured with two floppy disk drives.

The Janus/Ada gate calls for the Gemini Secure Operating System (GEMSOS), are not yet very well explained in the manuals provided. As such, any time a new call was to be tested, in order to increase our understanding of a new concept, the complete process of preparation of a program to run in a secure environment had to be executed. Since this process involves the access to a large number of files, the fact that the system used floppy disk drives, imposed a time delay of at least 7 minutes.

As discussed in Chapter III, in order to prepare a program to run in the secure environment, the operating system generation program (SYSGEN) had to be executed, which would create a secure volume containing the program segment. Before running the system generation program, the application program had to be compiled and linked in the normal way.

After the creation of the secure volume, the system has to be reinitialized with the secure application program volume. If a problem is found in the execution of the program, the system will either execute an interrupt trap halt." indicating the processor's register contents, or sometimes will halt completely not giving any indication on the screen. The error then, must be corrected before any further progress can be achieved. After the correction has been made, the preparation process has to be repeated completely to check if the modification was successful. The average amount of time from compilation to the final run of a program, was found to be between 15 to 17 minutes for the application programs developed in this research.

The use of the modular programming technique is very important for the compilation and linking phases, but as the preparation of the secure program has the "sysgening" phase, where all the modules have to be included, the modularity does not bring great advantages to the preparation phase.

Improved versions of the Gemini system will certainly become available in the near future, which will reduce significantly the effects of these problems. System libraries will be expanded, making the process of writing programs to be run in the secure system less complicated and time consuming.

B. SYSTEM OPERATION

The system designed proved the possibility of using a secure computer system as the main building block in a tactical computer system. The ability of handling different and somewhat independent processes, easily synchronized by the "calls already provided by the operating system, was demonstrated by the model implemented. The actual code of the modules used do not represent any real application, but only exemplifies that they can be independently developed. and integrated into a complete system.

Due to the problems already discussed in the previous sections, the amount of time for this research, was not sufficient to proceed with the next step scheduled, which was, to label one of the processes as secret and then limit the access based on the security level of the operator logged on the system.

The use of the system clock to control the synchronization between the different processes involved in

the application program could not be completed in time to be included in this thesis.

The overhead analysed has shown that an average of 19 miliseconds is used for each GEMSOS call, where synchronization and security checks are performed. This time delay has to be taken into account when the tactical system is designed, but certainly it is not a high price to pay in order to be able to develop a system with a large number of security possibilities available.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

In this thesis, a model of a tactical combat system was developed to demonstrate the possibility of using a multilevel secure computer system in this environment. The Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base used in this research, proved to be able to synchronize the execution of independent processes which will give the capability of assigning different security labels to these processes.

Although it has not been possible to achieve all the desired goals proposed when this thesis was first planned, the concepts and research done, will certainly facilitate any further work to be done in this new area.

Most of this research was done in conjunction with another student, Major Miguel Reyes, working with the same ... microcomputer, which to a certain extent guarantees that the

results here obtained are completely known by a follow-up researcher.

The unit testing of application program modules should first be accomplished on development systems which have existing tools for testing the logical correctness and real time performance. A specially trained "lead programmer" should take the unit tested modules and incorporate these into a system's program which synchronizes the units and produces the necessary communications between the units in a secure systems environment. The art of systems integration programming in a secure environment requires an in-depth understanding of GEMSOS functions as well as the real-time performance of the system.

APPENDIX A

APPLICATION PROGRAM LISTING

This application program is compiled and prepared for execution in the manner discussed in Chapter III. The program consists of four packages, each one generating a separate command (CMD) file. The packages to be sysgened as child processes are designed to have procedures which can be altered without modifying the overall synchronization of the application program.

This package controls the operation of the complete -system with ar1, alibj, agate, manag, tables, gemio, alib, crproce; package body THEMAIN is use ar1, alibj, agate, manag, tables, gemio, alib, crproce; -- constants STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO R : CONSTANT integer := Ø; IO PORT : CONSTANT integer := 0; -- 0 port for main program -- variables init : r1 process def; --necessary for all kernel calls ch_table : r1_param; ch_level : user_level; seg_mode : seg_access_ : seg access type; ch_tab : r1_parameters; ch_lev : level_record; w_class : access_class; class : access_class; rd_class : access_class; in_choice : string; pass_rad : radar_input; pass_chaf : chaff_out; mentor : integer; entryx : integer; def_seg : integer; def_off : integer; def_size : integer; size : integer; success : integer; seg_number : integer; synchr_seg : integer; choice : integer; evc value : integer; procedure INITIALIZATION is begin -- attach serial port for writing attach_tew (IO_PORT, STDIO_W); -- attach serial port for reading

attach_ter (IO_PORT, STDIO_R);

-- load parameters to create up to 4 children

load param to 4 chld(init, ch table);

--load access classes for Top-Secret, Secret, Confidential and Unclassified .

load_access_class (init, ch_level);

-- prepare class for accessing main terminal

w_class := init.resources.min class;

end INITIALIZATION;

procedure STACK AND SYNC CREATION is

begin

-- creating segment for stack(parent).Will be unclassified -- so as to obey compatibility property : segment compromise -- must dominate mentor compromise.

```
mentor := init.initial_seg(2);
entryx := 5;
class := init.resources.min_class;
size := 128;
```

cr_segment(init,mentor,entryx,size,class,success);

if success /= Ø then
 put_succ("success stack parent ",success,w_class);
 put_ln (STDIO_W,w_class,"");
end if;

-- makeknown this segment

seg_mode := r_w; seg_numter := 31;

if success $/= \mathcal{Q}$ then

```
put_succ("success makeknown
stack parent",success, class);
put_ln (STDIO_W,w_class,"");
```

```
end if;
-- creating synchronization segment . Will be Top-Secret.
      mentor := init.initial seg(2);
      entryx := 6;
      class := init.resources.min class;
      cr segment(init,mertor,entryx,size,class,success);
      if success /= @ then
           put_succ("success sync is",success,w_class);
put_ln(STDIO W.w class.");
            put_ln(STDIO W,w class,""
      end if;
-- makeknown this segment
      seg rode := r w;
      seg_number := 51;
mk_segment(init,mentor,entryx,seg_number,seg_mode,success);
      if success /= \emptyset then
           put_succ("success mkknown sync",success,w_class);
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,");
      end if;
      synchr seg := seg number;
-- swapin this segment
      swapin segment(seg number,success);
      if success /= \emptyset then
           put_succ("success swapin sync",success,w_class);
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,"");
      end if;
end STACK AND SYNC CREATION;
procedure PROCESS CREATION is
begin
     put_ln(STDIO W,w class, "Begin Process Creation");
     type_any_key_to_continue(w_class);
-- start creating processes in the system
-- process 1 == > Radar
-- process 2 == \ Compute
-- process 3 == > Chaff
```

-- NOTE : -- all processes with unclassified acess class -- next version to have process 3 changed to Top-Secret in order ---to access Secret data. for i in 1..3 loop ch tab := ch table(i); ch_lev := ch_level(4); to create process(init, ch tat, ch lev, i, synchr seg, success); end loop; end PROCESS CREATION ; procedure MENU (selection : out integer) is -- Present option to run tactical program or alter data field -- Data field to secret in next version begin put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, "Fun Tactical Program == > < any key >");
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, "Alter Data Field $== > \langle A \rangle$ "); put ln(STDIO W,w class, Fxit Program < E >");= = 5 get_str(STDIO_R,rd_class,ir_choice);
if in_choice = a or in_choice = "A" then selection := 1; elsif in_choice = "e" or in_choice = "E" then selection := 2; else selection := 3; end if; end MFNU; procedure ALTER is tegin put ln(STDIO W,w_class, "Not implemented yet"); : end ALTER; procedure RECEIVE_FM_RADAR is

```
begin
     def seg :=
        lib_mk_sel (ldt_table,ch_table(1).seg number data);
     def of \overline{f} := 0;
     def_size := radar_input'size /8;
     move_tytes(def_seg,def_cff,get_ss(),
                               pass rad ADDRESS, def size);
end RECEIVE FM RADAR ;
procedure PASS TO COMPUTE is
begin
     def seg :=
         lib mk sel(ldt table, ch table(2).seg number data);
     def off := 0;
     def size := radar input size /8;
     move bytes
(get ss(),pass rad ADDRFSS,def seg,def off,def size);
end PASS TO COMPUTE ;
procedure RECFIVE FM COMPUTE is
begin
     def seg:=lib mk sel(lxdt table,
                            ch txable(2).segx number data)x;
     def off := Ø;
     def_size := chaff_out'size /8;
     move_tytes(def_seg,def_off,get_ss(), pass_chaf ADDRFSS
                                        ,def_size);
end RECEIVE FM COMPUTE ;
procedure PASS TO CHAFF is
tegin
     def_seg :=
           lib mk sel(ldt table,ch table(3).seg number data);
     def off := ?;
     def size := chaff out'size /8;
     move_bytes(get_ss(),pass_chaf ADDRESS,
                                def seg,def off,def size);
end PASS TO CHAFF;
procedure RUN is
```

```
pass rad.flag z := false;
  outer : locp
       inner : for i in 1..3 loop
             advance(ch table(i).seg_number_stack, success);
                     read evc(synchr seg.evc value.success);
                     await(synchr seg.evc value+1.success);
                     if i = 1 then
                          receive_fm_radar;
                          if pass rad.flag_z then
                               exit outer;
                          end if;
                          pass_to_compute;
                     elsif i = 2 then
                          receive_fm_compute ;
                          pass to chaff;
                     end if;
               end loop inner;
               loop outer;
          end
end RUN;
procedure SELF_DELETION is
begin
     for i in 1...7 loop
          advance(ch table(i).seg numter stack, success);
          read_evc(synchr_seg,evc_value,success);
          await(synchr_seg,evc_value+1,success);
     end loop;
end SFLF_DFLFTION;
procedure DELETE PROCESS SEGMENT is
begin
   for i in 1..3 loop
          child_delete(i-1, success);
   terminate segment(ch table(i).seg number stack, success);
   terminate_segment(ch_table(i).seg_number_data,success);
   terminate segment(ch_table(i).seg_number_code,success);
   delete segment(ch table(i).mentor_stack, i, success);
   delete segment(ch table(i).mentor data, i+4, success);
    delete segment(ch table(i).mentor code, i+6, success);
   end loop;
```

end DELETE_PROCESS_SEGMENT;

tegin
```
procedure DELETE MENTOR SYNC is
begin
     delete_segment (init.initial_seg(2), 6, success);
     terminate_segment (51, success);
     delete segment (init.initial_seg(2), 5, success);
     terminate segment (31, success);
end DELETE MENTOR SYNC ;
procedure DELETION ALL is
tegin
     self deletion;
     delete process segment;
     delete mentor sync;
end DELETION ALL ;
procedure PREVENT TRAP is
begin
     success := Ø;
     while success = \emptyset loop
         success := Ø;
     end loop;
end PREVENT TRAP ;
-- ##############
                         begin
     init := get r1 def();
     lib set bracket(1,1,1,init.resources.min_class);
     initialization;
     stack_and_sync_creation;
     process creation;
     100p
          menu(choice);
          case choice is
              when 1 => alter;
              when 2 => EXIT;
              when 3 => run;
         end case;
     end loop;
     deletion all;
prevent_trap;
end THEMAIN ;
```

-- This package simulates the sampling of a tracker radar, as an input to a tactical system with ar1, manag, gemio, strlib, agate, tables, alib, alitj; package body RADAR is use ar1, manag, gemio, strlib, agate, tables, alib, alibj; -- constants STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO_R : CONSTANT integer := Ø; IO PORT : CONSTANT integer := 6; INIT_DIST : CONSTANT integer := 10000; INIT BEAR : CONSTANT integer := 290; CR : CONSTANT integer := 13; -- variables init : r1_process_def; w_class : access_class; miss_rec : radar_input; success : integer; evc ch val : integer; def_seg : integer; def off : integer; def size : integer; procedure GET_TRACK is -- simulate tracking of a missile -- constants begin miss rec.radar1 := miss rec.radar1 - 50; if miss rec.radar1 < 2000 then miss rec.radar2 := miss_rec.radar2 - 1; end if; put_str(STDIO_W,w_class, "RANGE"); put dec(STDIO_W,w_class,miss_rec.radar1); put str(STDIO_W,w_class," BFARING "); put_dec(STDIO_W,w_class,miss_rec.radar2); put_str(STDIO_W,w_class,char_to_str(character'val(CR))); if miss rec.radar1 < 600 then miss rec.flag z := true; end if;

```
end GFT_TRACK;
procedure PASS TO PARENT is
begin
     def_seg := lib_mk_sel(ldt_table,init.initial_seg(3));
def_off := 0;
     def size := radar input size /8;
     move bytes(get ss(), miss rec'ADDRESS, def seg, def off, def siz
end PASS TO FARENT ;
-- MAIN PROGRAM
begin
     init := get_r1_def();
-- attach terminal to write
     attach tew(IO PORT,STDIO_W);
     w class := init.resources.min class;
-- attach terminal to read
     attach ter(IO PORT.STDIO R);
    put ln(STDIO W,w class," R A D A R ");
-- Advance the eventcount of the synchronization segment
-- path 5.6 , plsn 51 , passed to child as ch seg list(2).
-- Will be recognized in child as init.initial_seg(2).
     advance(init.initial seg(2), success); -- this
                                                        will
                   permit creation of processes to go on
     read_evc(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val,success);--
stack to sync
     await(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val+1,success);
     control sent back to creation of processes.
    miss rec.flag z := false;
     miss_rec.radar1 := INIT_DIST;
     miss rec.radar2 := INIT BFAR;
     100p
          get_track;
                                -- get track information
          pass to parent;
          advance(init.initial seg(2), success);
          read_evc(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val,success);
          await(init.initial_seg(C),evc_ch_val+1,success);
          if miss rec.flag z then
```

miss_rec.radar1 := INIT_DIST; miss_rec.radar2 := INIT_BEAR; end if; end loop; advance(init.initial_seg(2),success); -- detach and deletion detach_device(STDIO_R,success); detach_device(STDIO_W,success); self_delete(init.initial_seg(2),success);

end RADAR;

....

This package performs the actual computations with ar1, manag, gemio, strlib, agate, tatles, alib, alib; package body COMPUTE is use ar1, manag, gemio, strlib, agate, tables, alib, alitj; -- constants STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO R : CONSTANT integer := 0; IO PORT : CONSTANT integer := 3; CR : CONSTANT integer := 13; -- variatles init : r1 process def; w class : access class; rad in : radar_input; : chaff_out; cha out ship_rec : ship param; def_seg : integer; def_off : integer; def_size : integer; success : integer; evc ch val : integer; procedure RECEIVE FM_PARENT is begin def_seg := lib_mk_sel(ldt_table, init.initial_seg(3)); def off := Ø; def size := radar input size /8; move tytes (def seg, def off, get ss(),rad in ADDRESS,def size); end RECEIVE FM PARENT; procedure PASS TO PARENT is begin def seg := lit mk sel(ldt table, init.initial seg(3)); def off := Ø; def size := chaff out size /8; move bytes(get ss(), cha out ADDRESS, def_seg,def_off,def_size); end PASS TO PARENT ; procedure CALCULATION is

begin put_str(STDIO W,w class, "Computing ... "); put_str(STDIO_W,w_class,char_to_str(character'val(CR))); cha out.chaff1 := ((rad_in.radar1/1002)*ship_rec.param1)+75; cha_out.chaff2 := (rad_in.radar2/10) + 30; end CALCULATION ; -- MAIN FROGRAM tegin ship_rec.param1 := 2; init := get_r1_def(); -- attach terminal to write attach_tew (IO_PORT,STDIO_W); w class := init.resources.min class; --attach terminal to read attach ter(IO PORT.STDIO R); put ln(STDIO W,w class," C O M P U T E "); -- advance eventcount of synchro segment path 5.6 plsn 51 -- passed to child as cb seg_list(2). -- Will be called in child as init.initial seg(2)advance (init.initial seg(2), success); read evc(init.initial seg(0), evc ch val, success); await(init.initial seg(0).evc ch val+1.success); cha_out.flag_z := false; 100p receive fm parent; calculation; calculation, if rad_in.radar1 < 1500 then if rad_in.radar1 < use (cmpto W.w class,");</pre> put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,"");
put_str(STDIO_W,w_class," F I R E ";; end if; pass to parent; advance(init.initial_seg(2), success); read_evc(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val,success); await(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val+1,success); end loop;

advance(init.initial_seg(2),success);

-- dettach and delete .

detach_device(STDIO_R, success); detach_device(STDIO_W,success); self_delete(init.initial_seg(2), success);

end COMPUTE ;

**

-- This package simulates the driving of a weapon device -with ar1, manag, gemio, agate ,strlib, tables, alib, alibj ; package body CHAFF is use ar1, manag, gemio, agate ,strlib, tables, alib, alitj ; -- constants STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO R : CONSTANT integer := 0; IO_PORT : CONSTANT integer := 5; CR : CONSTANT integer := 13; -- variables : r1 process_def; init w_class : access_class; cha_cont : chaff_out; def_seg def_off : integer; : integer; def_size : integer; success : integer; evc_ch_val : integer; procedure RECEIVE FM PARENT is tegin def_seg := lib_mk_sel(ldt_table,init.initial_seg(3));
def_off := 0; def size := chaff out size /8; move bytes(def seg,def_off,get_ss(), cha cont'ADDRESS, def size); end RECEIVE FM PARENT ; -- MAIN PROGRAM begin init := get r1 def(); -- attach terminal to write attach_tew(IC_PORT,STDIO_W); w class := init.resources.min class; --attach terminal to read attach ter(IO PORT,STDIO R); put ln(STDIO W,w class, "C H A F F ");

```
-- advance eventcount of sync segment path 5,6 plsn 51
-- passed to child as ch seg list(2).
-- Will be called in child as init.initial seg(2)
     advance (init.initial seg(2), success);
     read_evc(init.initial_seg(Ø),evc_ch_val,success);
     await(init.initial_seg(@),evc_ch_val+1,success);
     cha cont.flag z := false;
     100p
           receive fm parent;
          put str(STDIO W,w class, "BEARING ");
          put_dec(STDIO_W,w_class,cha_cont.chaff1);
put_str(STDIO_W,w_class," FLEVATION ");
          put dec(STDIO W.w class.cha cont.chaff2);
   put_str(STDIO_W,w_class,char_to_str(character'val(CR)));
          advance(init.initial_seg(2) , success);
          read evc(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val,success);
          await(init.initial seg(@),evc ch val+1,success);
          if cha_cont.flag_z then
    ÷..
                put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,"");
                put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class," P A R K E D ");
                cha cont.flag z := false;
          end if;
     end loop;
     put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,"");
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class," P A R K E D ");
     advance(init.initial_seg(2), success);
-- dettach and delete
     detach device(STDIO R, success);
     detach device(STDIO W.success);
     self delete(init.initial seg(2).success);
end CHAFF ;
```

<u>APPENDIX B</u>

LIBRARY PROGRAMS LISTING

These packages were built in order to concentrate all common procedures used for the application program developed in this research. They are far from complete, although they establish the organization necessary to develop secure applications programs. Some of the procedures included in this library were taken from the demonstration program supplied by the manufacturers of the Gemini computer.

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-- Specification for the MANAG package -- Contains procedures to handle segments with agate, agatej, ar1, util; package MANAG is use agate, agatej, ar1, util; procedure CR_SEGMENT (init : in r1_process_def; mentor : in integer; entrx : in integer; size : in integer; class : in access_class; success: out integer); procedure MK_SEGMENT (init : in r1_process_def; mentor: in integer; entrx : in integer; number : in integer; mode : in seg_access_type; success : out integer); procedure ATTACH_TEW(IO_PORT : in integer; LDEV : in integer); -- attach to write; IO_PORT is physical device ; LDEV is logical device procedure ATTACH_TER(IO_PORT : in integer; LDEV : in integer); -- attach to read; IO PORT is physical device LDEV is logical device

end MANAG;

This package has procedures to handle segments and terminals --with agate, agatej, ar1, util; package body MANAG is use agate, agatej, ar1, util; -- Constants for device slots. STDIO_W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO R : CONSTANT integer := 0; IO FORT : CONSTANT integer := 0; -- port zero for main process entrx : in integer; size : in integer; class : in access class; success : out integer) is -- Create segment call cr_seg_str : create_seg_struct; tegin cr seg str.mentor := mentor; cr_seg_str.entryx := entrx; cr_seg_str.limit := size; cr_seg_str.class := class; create_segment(cr_seg_str, success); end CR SEGMFNT; procedure MK SEGMENT (init : in r1_process_def; mentor : in integer; entrx : in integer; number : in integer; mode : in seg_access_type; success : out integer) is -- Makeknown segment call seg rec : mk kn struct;

seg_ret_rec : mk_kn_return; begin seg_rec.mentor := mentor; seg_rec.entryx := entrx; seg rec.seg number := number; seg_rec.seg_mode := mode; seg rec.prot level := tyte(1); --ring 1 protection seg rec.gate number := NULL INDEX; --no gate seg_rec.gate_prot := tyte(\$\overline{\overlin}\overlin{\overlin{\verline{\overlin}\overlin makeknown segment (seg_rec, seg_ret_rec, success); end MK SEGMENT; procedure ATTACH TEW (IO PORT : in integer ; **LDEV** : in integer) is attach serial port writing mode : attach_struct; success : integer; regin mode.dev name := siow; mode.siow_rec.dev_num := io_port; --physical device --device itself to be mode.siow rec.dev type := io; used mode.siow rec.dev id := LDEV; --logical device mode.siow_rec.mr1 := byte(16#04D#); --device configuration mode.siow_rec.mr2 := byte(16#03E#); mode.siow_rec.io_mode := asrt rts; attach_device(mode, success); end ATTACH TEW; procedure ATTACH_TER(IO_PORT : in integer; LDEV : in integer) is attach serial port for reading. mode_r : attach_struct; success : integer; tegin mode_r.dev_name := sior; mode_r.sior_rec.dev_num := io_port;

mode r.sior rec.dev type := io; mode r.sior rec.dev id := LDEV; mode r.sior rec.mr1 := byte(16#04D#); mode_r.sior_rec.mr2 := byte(16#03E#); mode r.sicr rec.io mode := asrt dtr; mode r.sior rec.delim active := FALSE; mode_r.sior_rec.delimiter := tyte(13); mode_r.sior_rec.maximum := 1; -- only reads one character at a time. attach device(mode r. success); end ATTACH TER; procedure b24_FRM_INTEGER (in_val : integer; b24_val. : cut b24_type) is -- to convert an integer into a b24 type variable (3 bytes) begin b24 val.tyte2 := byte(@); b24 val.byte1 := hi(in val); b24_val.byte0 := lo(in val); end b24 FRM INTFGFR; end MANAG;

with agate, agatej, strlib; package GEMIO is use agate, agatej, strlib; ldev : in integer; procedure PUT_LN (w class : in access class; str : in string⁻); procedure GET_STR (ldev : in integer; r class : out access class; str : out string); procedure PUT STR (ldev : in integer; w class : in access_class; str : in string⁻); procedure PUT DEC (ldev : in integer; w_class : in access_class; dval : in integer); procedure PUT_SUCC(in_str : in string; dec val : in integer; w class : in access class); procedure TYPE ANY KEY TO CONTINUE (w class : in access class) ; procedure BLK_SCR (ldev : in integer; w class : in access class);

end GFMIO;

This package contains procedure to handle I/O with agate, agatej, strlib; package tody GEMIO is use agate, agatej, strlib; STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO R : CONSTANT integer := 0; procedure PUT LN (ldev : in integer; w class : in access class; str : in string) is put a string on device ldev with cr and lf out buf : string(82); success : integer; wt sio : wt seq struct; size_str : integer; CR : CONSTANT integer := 13; LF : CONSTANT integer := 10; begin out buf := str; size str := length(str); out_buf := out_buf & char to_str(character val(CR)); out buf := out buf & char to str(character val(LF)); wt sio.device := ldev; wt sio.data off := out_buf'ADDRESS + 1; wt_sio.data_seg := get_ss(); wt_sio.count := size_str + 2; wt sio.class := w class; write sequential(wt sio, success); end PUT LN; procedure GET STR (ldev : in integer; r class : out acress class; str : out string) is get a string from device ldev. in tuf : string(82); success : integer; rd_sio.: rd_seq_struct; rd_ret : rd_seq_return; size str : integer;

```
BEGIN
    rd sio.data off := in buf ADDRESS + 1;
    rd sio.device := ldev;
    rd sic.data seg := get ss();
    read_sequential( rd_sio, rd_ret, success );
in_buf( 0 ) := character val( rd_ret.count );
    str := in_buf;
    r class := rd ret.class;
end GET STR;
procedure PUT STR ( ldev : in integer;
                      w class : in access class;
                           str : in string ) is
     put a string on device ldev.
____
out buf : string;
success : integer;
wt sio : wt seq struct;
size_str : integer;
begin
    out_tuf := str;
    size str := length( str );
    wt sio.device := ldev;
    wt_sio.data_off := out_buf'ADDRESS + 1;
    wt_sio.data_seg := get_ss();
wt_sio.count := size_str;
    wt sio.class := w class;
    write sequential( wt sio, success );
end PUT STR;
procedure PUT_DEC(
                        ldev : in integer;
                     w_class : in access class;
                        dval : in integer ) is
-- put
        the string equivalent of a integer on the terminal
screen.
out_buf : string( 10 );
hegin
    out buf := Int to str( dval );
    put_str( ldev, w_class, out_buf );
end PUT DEC;
```

procedure PUT_SUCC(in_str : in string; dec val : in integer; w class : in access class) is print a string and an integer on device attached in slot STDIO W (should be a serial terminal). ----begin put_str(STDIO_W, w_class, in_str); put_dec(STDIO_W, w_class, dec_val); put_ln(STDIO_W, w_class, ""); end PUT SUCC; procedure TYPE ANY KEY TO CONTINUE(w class : in access class) is rd str : string; rd_class : access_class; begin put_str (STDIO_W,w_class, " type any key to continue"); get str (STDIO R, rd class, rd str); put ln (STDIO-W, w_class,rd_str); end TYPE ANY KEY TO CONTINUE ; procedure BLK SCR (ldev : in integer; w_class: in access_class) is -- clear screen and home cursor out buf : string; success :integer; wt_sio : wt_seq_struct; ESC : CONSTANT integer := 27; E : CONSTANT integer := 45; begin out_buf :=char_to_str(character'val(ESC)); out_tuf :=out_buf & char_to_str(character'val(F)); wt sio.device := ldev; wt_sic.data_off:=out_buf'ADDRESS + 1; wt_sio.data_seg:=get_ss(); wt sio.count:=2;

wt_sio.class:=w_class; write_sequential(wt_sio,success);

end BLK_SCR;

end GEMIO;

•••

-- This package contains declarations for the -- application programs with agate, ar1; package TABLES is use agate, ar1; MAX PROC : CONSTANT integer := 4; MAX LEVELS : CONSTANT integer := 4; : CONSTANT integer := 1; TOP SECRET SECRET : CONSTANT integer := 2; : CONSTANT integer := 3; - CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED : CONSTANT integer := 4; type R1 PARAMETERS is record entry_stack : integer; mentor_stack : integer; seg_number_stack : integer; entry_code : integer; mentor_code : integer; seg_number_code : integer; entry_data : integer; mentor_data : integer; seg_number_data : integer; evn_count : integer; evn count data : integer; end record; type R1 PARAM is array (1..MAX PROC) of r1 parameters; type LEVEL RECORD is record : access_class; mir : access class; max end record; type USER LEVEL is array (0..MAX_LEVELS) of level_record; type SHIP PARAM is record param1 : integer; param2 : integer; param3 : integer; flag z : toolean; end record; type RADAR INPUT is record

radar1 : integer; radar2 : integer; radar3 : integer; flag_z : boolean; end record; type CHAFF_OUT is record chaff1 : integer; chaff2 : integer; chaff3 : integer; flag_z : boolean; end record; type TEST MESSAGE is record rec1 : integer; rec2 : integer: result : integer; flag : boolean; end record; procedure LOAD_PARAM_TO_4_CHLD (init : in r1 process def; ch_para : out r1_param); procedure LOAD_ACCESS_CLASS(init : in r1 process def; usr access : out user level);

end TABLES;

This package loads the parameters for the segments Also loads security parameters with agate, ar1; package body TAFLES is use agate, ar1; procedure LOAD PARAM TO 4 CHLD (init : in r1 process def; ch para : out r1 param) is ___ load the segments specifications INITIAL : CONSTANT integer := 31; NEXT_NUMBER FREE : CONSTANT integer := 40; prep : r1_parameters; begin for i in 1..4 loop prep.entry_stack := i; prep.mentor_stack := INITIAL; prep.seg_number_stack := INITIAL + i; prep.seg_numter_code := INITIAL + i + 4; prep.entry_code := i + 6; prep.mentor code := init.initial seg(2); prep.entry data := i + 4; prep.mentor data := INITIAL; prep.seg number data := NEXT_NUMBER_FREE + i - 1; ch_para(i) := prep; end loop; end LOAD PARAM TO 4 CHLD ; procedure LOAD_ACCESS_CLASS (init : in r1_process_def; usr access : out user level) is ---load user security levels ___ usr level : level record; BEGIN usr level.min.compromise.int ? := 0; usr_level.min.compromise.int1 := 0; usr_level.min.integrity.int0 := 0; usr_level.min.integrity.int1 := 21504; usr level.max.compromise.int2 := 6;

usr level.may.compromise.int1 := 0; usr_level.max.integrity.int0 := 0; usr level.max.integrity.int1 := 21504; usr access(TOP SECRFT) := usr level; usr level.min.compromise.int@ := 0;usr_level.min.compromise.int1 $:= \emptyset;$:= Ø; usr level.min.integrity.intØ usr_level.min.integrity.int1 := 21504; usr level.max.compromise.intØ := 4; usr level.max.compromise.int1 := Ø; usr level.max.integrity.int0 $:= \emptyset;$:= 21504; usr level.max.integrity.int1 usr access(SECRET) := usr level; usr level.min.compromise.int0 := 0; usr level.min.compromise.int1 := 0; usr level.min.integrity.int0 := 0; .usr_level.min.integrity.int1 := 21504; usr level.max.compromise.int0 := 2; usr level.max.compromise.int1 := 0; usr level.max.integrity.int0 := 0; usr level.max.integrity.int1 := 21504; usr access(CONFIDENTIAL) := usr level; usr level.min.compromise.int0 := 0; usr_level.min.compromise.int1 := 0; usr level.min.integrity.int0 := 0; usr_level.min.integrity.int1 := 21504; usr level.max.compromise.int0 := 0; usr level.max.compromise.int1 := 0; usr level.max.integrity.int0 := 0; usr_level.max.integrity.int1 := 21504; usr access(UNCLASSIFIED) := usr level; end LOAD ACCESS CLASS; end TABLES;

end CRPROCE;

. ...

This package contains the procedure to create ___ processes with agate, agatej, ar1, alib, alibj, gemio, manag, tables; package body CRPROCE is use agate, agatej, ar1, alib, alibj, gemio, manag, tables; -- Constants for device slots. STDIC W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO_R : CONSTANT integer := Ø; IO PORT : CONSTANT integer := 0; -- port zero for main process procedure FILL INIT(init : in r1_process_def; ch init : out r1_process_def; ch_access : level_record) is -- fill in the initial process record of a child process. -- · called by to_create_process begin ch init.cpu := init.cpu; ch_init.num_cpu := init.num_cpu; ch init.num kst := init.num kst; ch init.root access := init.root access; ch init.s seg := 3; ch_init.resources.priority := init.resources.priority; --same as parent. b24 frm integer(60, ch init.resources.memory); ch init.resources.processes := 2; ch init.resources.segmnts := 100; _ _ _ _ this will be modified with the specific access class of ___ each process ___ ch_init.resources.min_class := ch_access.min; ch init.resources.max class := ch access.max; ch init.ring num := byte(1); ch_init.sp2 := 0; end FILL INIT; procedure TO_CREATE PROCESS(init : in r1_process_def; ch_par : in r1_parameters; ch_access : in level record;

proces : in integer; synchr_seg : in integer; success : out integer) is -- process creation chld seg : r1 seg struct; -- r1 addr array for child's segment ch_init : r1_process_def; -- r1 process def for child seg_rec : create_seg_struct; -- used to create stack segment segi mkn : mk kn struct; -- used to make known stack segment segl_ret : mk_kn_return; crt_rec : r1_cp_struct; -- create process structure ch_seg_list : seg_array; w_class : access_class; evc_value : integer; stack size : integer; seg_mgr_bytes : integer; def_off : integer; def seg : integer; r1_def_size : integer; -- constants for determining stack size r1 stack size : CONSTANT integer := 16#FFF#; vect size : CONSTANT integer := 4; BEGIN w_class := ch_access.min; seg1_mkn.mentor := ch_par.mentor_code; seg1_mkn.entryx := ch_par.entry_code; seg1_mkn.seg_number := ch_par.seg_number_code; seg1 mkn.seg mode := r_e; seg1_mkn.prot_level := byte(1); seg1 mkn.gate number := NULL INDFX; -- no gate makeknown segment(seg1 mkn, seg1 ret, success); if success /= 0 then put_succ("success value_is ",success,w_class); put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,); end if; address spec for child's stack ____ chld_seg.seg_number := ch_par.seg_number_stack; chld_seg.seg_mode := r_w; chld seg.swapin := TRUE;

chld_seg.protect := byte(1); crt rec.r1 addr array(2) := chld seg; address spec for child's code chld_seg.seg_number := ch_par.seg_number_code; chld seg.seg mode := r e; chld seg.swapin := TRUF; chld seg.protect := byte(1); crt_rec.r1_addr_array(1) := chld_seg; address spec for child's mentor chld seg.seg number := synchr seg; chld_seg.seg_mode := n_a; chld seg.swapin := TRUE; chld seg.protect := byte(1); crt rec.r1 addr array(2) := chld seg; address spec for trap handler segment ___ chld_seg.seg_number := init.initial_seg(4); chld_seg.seg_mode := r_e; chld seg.swapin := TRUE; chld_seg.protect := byte(1); crt rec.r1 addr_array(4) := chld_seg; address spec for child's data chld seg.seg number := ch par.seg number data; chld seg.seg mode := r w; chld seg.swapin := TRUE; chld_seg.protect := byte(1); crt_rec.r1_addr_array(3) := chld_seg; fill the order in which the segments will be passed ch_seg_list(0) := ch_par.seg_number_stack; ch_seg_list(1) := ch_par.seg_number_code; ch_seg_list(2) := synchr_seg; ch_seg_list(3) := ch_par.seg_number_data; ch_seg_list(4) := init.initial_seg(4); calculate required stack size. ----(in the future will calculate based on data in "CMD" ----

file header -- but now just use constant.) seg_mgr_bytes := (stack_header'SIZE/8) + (init.num kst * (kst entry'SIZE/8)) (kst_header'SIZE/8); stack size := r1 stack size + vect size + seg mgr tytes (r1 process def'SIZE/8); create and make known child's stack segment seg_rec.mentor := ch_par.mentor_stack; seg_rec.entryx := ch_par.entry_stack; seg_rec.limit := stack_size - 1; seg rec.class := ch access.min; create segment(seg rec, success); if success $/= \emptyset$ then put_succ("success value_chsta is ",success,w_class); put_ln(STDIO W,w class,""); end if; seg1_mkn.mentor := ch_par.mentor_stack; seg1 mkn.entryx := ch par.entry stack; seg1 mkn.seg number := ch par.seg number_stack; seg1_mkn.seg_mode := r_w; seg1_mkn.prot_level := tyte(1); seg1_mkn.gate_number := NULL_INDFX; seg1_mkn.gate_prot := byte(Ø); makeknown segment(seg1 mkn, seg1 ret, success); if success /= 0 then put_succ("success value mksta is ",success,w_class); put_ln(STDIO W,w class, "); end if; swapin segment(ch par.seg number stack, success); if success $/= \emptyset$ then put succ("success value swapsta "is ,success,w class); put ln(STDIO_W,w_class,""); end if; create and make known child's data segment ---seg rec.mentcr := ch par.mentcr data;

```
seg rec.entryx := ch_par.entry_data;
    seg rec.limit := test message'size/8;
    seg rec.class := ch access.min;
    oreate segment( seg rec, success );
    if success /= 0 then
       put succ("success value chdat is ",success,w_class);
       put ln(STDIO W,w class, "");
    end if;
    seg1 mkn.mentor := ch par.mentor data;
    seg1_mkn.entryx := ch_par.entry_data;
    seg1 mkn.seg number := ch par.seg number data;
    seg1_mkn.seg_mode := r_w;
    seg1_mkn.prot_level := tyte( 1 );
    seg1_mkn.gate_number := NULL_INDFX;
    seg1 mkn.gate prot := byte( 0 );
    makeknown segment( seg1_mkn, seg1_ret, success );
   if success /= Ø then
       put succ("success value mkdat is ",success,w class);
   put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,"");
end if;
    swapin segment( ch par.seg number data, success );
    if success /= 3 then
       put_succ("success value_swadat is ",success,w_class);
       put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, ");
    end if;
    fill in childs r1 process def
____
    fill init( init, ch init, ch access );
-- determine segment and offset of r1 process def initial
record
    def seg := lib mk sel(
                              ldt_table,
                                  ch par.seg_number_stack );
    def off := stack_size - ( vect_size + seg_mgr_bytes +
               r1 process def'SIZE/8 );
---
     move ch init into proper place in child's stack segment
    r1_def_size := ( r1_process_def SIZE )/8;
    move_bytes( get_ss(), ch_init'address, def_seg, def_off,
r1 def size );
```

fill in remainder of create_process_structure crt rec.ip := 128; -- skip command file header (80 hex) crt rec.spx := def off; -- set childs stack pointer crt_rec.sp1 := stack_size - (vect_size + seg_mgr_tytes); crt rec.sp2 := Ø; -- no ring 2 stack crt rec.vec seg := 0; -- r1 address array element Ø crt_rec.vec_off := stack_size - vect_size; crt rec.child num proces-1;. := crt rec.priority := ch init.resources.priority; crt_rec.memory := ch_init.resources.memory; crt rec.processes := ch init.resources.processes; crt rec.segmnts := ch init.resources.segmnts; crt rec.min class := ch_init.resources.min_class; crt_rec.max_class := ch_init.resources.max_class; read event count so we prepare for synchronization "read_evc(synchr_seg,evc_value, success); create the process create process(crt rec, success); if success /= Ø THEN put_succ(" create process success = ", success, w class); end if; await(synchr_seg, evc_value+1, success); -- blocks and await -- "goto" process created end TO CREATE PROCESS ;

end CRPROCE;

APPENDIX C

TEST PROGRAM LISTING

This program was developed following the general format of the application program in Appendix A. The preparation of this program to execute in the secure environment is done in the same way as the application program.

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This package controls the operation of the test margorq - with ar1, alib, alibj, agate, strlib, manag, tables, gemio, crtroce; package body TOTIME is use ar1, alib, alibj, agate, strlib, manag, tables, gemio, crproce; -- constants STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO_R : CONSTANT integer := 0; IO PORT : CONSTANT integer := 0; -- 2 port for main program PEL : CONSTANT integer := 7; -- variables : r1_process_def; init --necessary for all kernel calls ch_table : r1_param; ch_level : user_level; seg_mode : seg_access_type; : r1 parameters; ch_tab : level_record; ch-lev 👘 w class : access class; class : access class; rd class - : access class; in_choice : string; test_rec : test_message; mentor : integer; : integer; entryx def_seg def_off : integer; def_off : integer; def_size : integer; : integer; size success : integer; seg number : integer; synchr_seg : integer; choice : integer; evc_value : integer; procedure INITIALIZATION is begin -- attach serial port for writing attach tew (IO_PORT, STDIO_W); -- attach serial port for reading

attach_ter (IO_PORT, STDIO_R);

-- load parameters to create up to 4 children

load_param_to_4_chld(init, ch_table);

--load access classes for Top-Secret, Secret, Confidential and Unclassified .

load access class (init, ch_level);

-- prepare class for accessing main terminal

w class := init.resources.min_class;

end INITIALIZATION;

procedure STACK AND SYNC CREATION is

tegin

-- creating segment for stack(parent).Will be unclassified -- so as to obey compatibility property : segment compromise -- must dominate mentor compromise.

```
mentor := init.initial_seg(2);
entryx := 5;
class := init.resources.min_class;
size := 128;
```

cr_segment(init,mentor,entryx,size,class,success);

```
if success /= 0 then
    put_succ("success stack parent ",success,w_class);
    put_ln (STDIO_W,w_class,"");
end if;
```

-- makeknown this segment

seg_mode := r_w; seg_number := 31;

mk_segment(init,mentor,entryx,seg_number,seg_mode,success);

```
if success /= Ø then
```

```
-- creating synchronization segment .
     mentor := init.initial seg(2);
     entryx := 6;
     class := init.resources.min class;
     cr segment(init,mentor,entryx,size,class,success);
     if success /= \emptyset then
           put_succ("success sync is",success,w_class);
           put ln(STDIO W.w class, ");
     end if;
-- makeknown this segment
     seg mode := r w;
     seg number := 51;
mk segment(init,mentor,entryx,seg number,seg mode,success);
    _if success /= Ø then
           put succ("success mkknown sync", success, w_class);
           put ln(STDIO W.w class,"");
     end if;
     synchr_seg := seg_number;
-- swapin this segment
     swapin segment(seg number,success);
     if success /= \emptyset then
          put_succ("success swapin_sync",success,w_class);
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,");
     end if;
end STACK AND SYNC CREATION;
procedure PROCESS_CREATION is
begin
     put ln(STDIO W,w class, "Begin Process Creation");
     type_any_key_to_continue(w_class);
-- start creating processes in the system
-- process 1 == > Store and Display
-- process 2 == > Calc1 -> one field passed
-- process 3 == > Calc2 -> field passed every loop
```

```
for i in 1..3 loop
            ch tab := ch table(i);
            ch lev := ch level(4);
            to_create_process(init,ch_tab,
                       ch_lev,i,synchr_seg,success);
      end loop;
end PROCESS CREATION ;
procedure MENU (selection : out integer) is
-- Fresent option to execute each timing program
begin
      put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, Execute with no GEMSOS calls");
      put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, 12 mult/div 30000 times");
     put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class," => < 1 >");
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,"Execute passing data 4 times");
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,"12 mult/div, 30000 times");
      put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class," => < 2 > );
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,"Fxecute passing data p/ loop");
      put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, 12 mult/div, 300 times");
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, => < 3 >");
      put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class,
                                                             => < 4 >");
      put ln(STDIO W,w class, "Exit
      get_str(STDIO_R,rd_class,in_choice);
if in_choice = "1" then
      selection := 1;
elsif in_choice = "2" then
                            2;
3
            selection :=
      elsif in choice = '
                                then
            selection := 3;
      elsif in choice = "4" then
            selection := 4;
      else
            selection := 5;
      end if;
end MENU;
procedure START is
tegin
      put ln(STDIO W,w class," Prep to time ... ");
      type_any_key_to_continue (w_class);
end START;
procedure FINISH is
```

```
begin
     put str(STDIO W.w class.
                           char to str(character'val(BEL)));
     put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, "S T O P ");
type_any_key_to_continue(w_class);
end FINISH;
procedure RECFIVE_FM_STO is
begin
     def seg :=
        Iib[mk_sel (ldt_table,ch_table(1).seg_number_data);
     def off := 0;
     .def size := test message size /8;
     move_bytes(def_seg,def_off,get_ss(),
                               test rec'ADDRESS.def size);
end RECEIVE FM STO ;
procedure PASS_TO_CALC1 is
begin
     def_seg :=
          lib mk sel(ldt table, ch table(2).seg number data);
     def off := Ø;
     def_size := test_message'size /8;
     move bytes
(get ss(),test rec'ADDRESS,def seg,def off,def size);
end PASS TO CALC1 ;
procedure RECEIVE FM CALC1 is
begin
     def seg:=lib_mk_sel(ldt_tatle,
                            ch table(2).seg number data);
     def off := 2;
     def size := test message'size /8;
     move bytes(def seg.def off.get ss().
                               test rec'ADDRESS.def size);
end RECEIVE FM CALC1 ;
procedure PASS TO CALC2 is
begin
     def seg
                :=
        lib_mk_sel(ldt_table,cb_table(3).seg number data);
     def_off := 0;
```
```
def size := test message'size /8;
     move bytes
(get_ss(),test_rec'ADDRESS,def_seg,def_off,def_size);
end PASS TO CALC2 ;
procedure RECEIVE FM CALC2 is
begin
     def seg:=lib mk sel(ldt table.
                           ch table(3).seg_number data);
     def off := Q;
     def_size := test_message'size /8;
     move bytes(def seg,def off,get_ss(),
                                 test rec'ADDRESS,def size);
end RECEIVE FM CALC2 ;
procedure PASS TO STO is
begin
    _def_seg
              :=
        lib mk sel(ldt table.ch table(1).seg number data);
     def off := 0;
     def size := test message size /8;
     move tytes(get ss(),test rec'ADDRESS,
                                 def seg,def off,def size);
end PASS TO STO ;
procedure CALC NO CALLS is
FIRST : CONSTANT integer := 10000;
SECOND: CONSTANT integer := 520;
begin
     start;
     for i in 1... 30200 loop
          test_rec.result := (( 10020 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
          test rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
          test_rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
          test rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
     end loop;
     finish;
     put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, now do the
                                             same
                                                    operation
twice");
     put_ln(STDIO W,w class, calculate the loop control
time");
    start;
```

```
for i in 1... 30000 loop
           test rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
           test rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
           test_rec.result := (( 12000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
test_rec.result := (( 12000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
                                  10000 / 500 ) * 300 )
10000 / 500 ) * 300 )
           test_rec.result := ((
                                                           / 130;
           testTrec.result := ((
                                                          / 120;
                                  10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 120;
           test rec.result := ((
           test rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
     end loop;
     finish;
end CALC_NO_CALLS;
procedure CALC ONF PASS is
tegin
     start;
     advance(ch_table(1).seg_number_stack,success);
     read evc(synchr seg.evc value, success);
     await(synchr_seg,evc_value+1,success);
     receive fm sto;
    ~ pass to calc1;
     advance(ch table(2).seg number stack, success);
     read_evc(synchr_seg,evc_value,success);
     await(synchr_seg,evc_value+1,success);
     receive fm calc1;
     pass_to_sto;
     finish;
     advance(ch_table(1).seg_number_stack, success);
     read evc(synchr seg, evc value, success);
     await(synchr seg.evc value+1, success);
end CALC ONE PASS;
procedure CALC PASS ALL is
begin
     start;
     for i in 1...300 loop
           advance(ch table(1).seg number stack, success);
           read evc(synchr seg.evc value, success);
           await(synchr_seg,evc_value+1,success';
           receive_fm_sto;
           pass to calc2;
           advance(ch table(3).seg_number_stack, success);
           read evc(synchr seg.evc value.success);
           await(synchr_seg,evc_value+1,success);
           receive fm calc2;
           pass to sto;
```

```
end loop;
     finish;
end CALC PASS ALL ;
procedure SELF_DELFTION is
begin
     test_rec.flag := true;
     for i in 1...3 loop
          def seg :=
         lib mk sel(ldt table,ch table(i).seg number data);
          de\bar{f}_o\bar{f}f := 0;
          def_size := test_message'size /8;
          move_bytes (def_seg,def_off,get_ss(),
                            test rec'ADDRESS.def size);
          advance(ch_table(i).seg_number_stack, success);
          read evc(synchr seg.evc value.success);
          await(synchr seg, evc value+1, success);
          put succ("self deleted ",i,w class);
    "end loop;
end SELF DELETION:
procedure DELETE PROCESS SEGMENT is
tegin
     for i in 1..3 loop
     child delete(i-1, success);
    terminate segment(ch table(i).seg number stack, success);
    terminate segment(ch tatle(i).seg number data, success);
    terminate_segment(ch_table(i).seg_number_code,success);
    delete segment(ch table(i).mentor stack, i, success);
    delete_segment(ch_table(i).mentor_data,i+4, success);
    delete segment(ch table(i).mentcr code,i+6,success);
    put succ("deleted ".i.w class);
     end loop;
end DFLFTE_PROCFSS_SEGMFNT;
procedure DELETE MENTOR SYNC is
begin
     delete_segment (init.initial seg(2), 6, success);
     terminate segment (51, success);
     delete_segment (init.initial seg(2), 5, success);
     terminate_segment (31 ,success);
```

```
end DELETE MENTOR SYNC ;
procedure DELFTION ALL is
begin
     self deletior;
     delete_process_segment;
     delete mentor sync;
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class, 0. K. ");
end DELETION_ALL ;
procedure PREVENT TRAP is
begin
     success := Ø;
     while success = 0 \log p.
          success := Ø;
    end loop;
end PREVENT TRAP ;
-- ########
                                  MAIN
                     .
begin
     init := get r1 def(); --must be the first statement
     lib set bracket(1,1,1,init.resources.min_class);
     initialization;
     stack_and_sync_creation;
     process creation;
     test rec.flag := false;
     100p
          menu(chcice);
          case choice is
               when 1 => calc no_calls;
               when 2 => calc_one_pass;
when 3 => calc_pass_all;
               when 4 \Rightarrow exit;
               when 5 \Rightarrow null;
         end case;
     end loop;
     deletion_all;
     prevent trap;
end TOTIME ;
```

-- This Package simulates the store process in the test -- program with ar1, manag, gemio, agate, tables, alib, alibj; package body STODISP is use ar1, manag, gemio, agate, tables, alib, alib; -- constants STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO_R : CONSTANT integer := 0; IO PORT : CONSTANT integer := 3; -- variables init w_class : r1 process def; : access class; test_rec : test_message; def seg : integer; def_seg def_off : integer; def_size : integer; success : integer; def_size evc_ch_val : integer; procedure RECEIVE FM PARENT is begin def_seg := lib_mk_sel(ldt_table, init.initial_seg(3)); def off := 0; def size := test message size /8; move_bytes(def seg,def off,get ss(),test rec'ADDRESS. def size); end RECEIVE FM PARENT; procedure PASS TO PARENT is tegin def_seg := lib_mk_sel(ldt_table, init.initial_seg(3));
def_off := 0; def size := test message size /8; move bytes(get ss(), test rec'ADDRESS, def_seg, def_off, def size); end PASS TO PARENT ;

```
-- MAIN PROGRAM
begin
     init := get r1 def();
-- attach terminal to write
     attach_tew (IO_PORT,STDIO_W);
     w class := init.resources.min class;
--attach terminal to read
     attach ter(IO PORT.STDIO R);
     put ln(STDIO W.w class, STORAGE AND DISPLAY READY ");
-- advance eventcount of synchro segment path 5,6 plsn 51
-- passed to child as ch seg list(2).
-- \hat{W} ill be called in child as init.initial seg(2)
     advance (init.initial_seg(2),success);
   read_evc(init.initial_seg(2),evc_ch_val,success);
     await(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val+1,success);
     lcop
          pass to parent;
          advarce(init.initial_seg(2),success);
read_evc(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val,success);
          await(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val+1,success);
          receive fm parent;
          advance(init.initial_seg(2), success);
          read evc(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val,success);
          await(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val+1,success);
          receive_fm_parent;
          if test rec.flag then
               exīt;
          end if;
     end loop;
     advance(init.initial seg(2), success);
-- dettach and delete
     detach_device(STDIO_R, success);
     detach device(STDIO W, success);
     self delete(init.initial seg(2), success);
end STODISP ;
```

-- This package performs one of the timing tests with ar1, manag, gemio, agate, tables, alib, alibj; package body CALC1 is use ar1, manag, gemio, agate, tables, alib, alibj; -- constants STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO R : CONSTANT integer := Ø; IO PORT : CONSTANT integer := 5; -- variables : r1_process_def; init : access_class; w class test rec : test message; : integer; def_seg defoff : integer; def_size : integer; success : integer; evc ch val : integer; procedure RECEIVE FM PARENT is begin def seg := lib mk sel(ldt table, init.initial seg(3)); def off := Ø; def size := test message'size /8; move bytes(def seg,def_off,get_ss(), test_rec'ADDRESS.def size); end RECEIVE FM PARENT; procedure PASS TO PARENT is tegin def seg := lib mk sel(ldt table, init.initial seg(3)); def off := \emptyset ; def_size := test_message'size /8; move bytes(get ss(),test rec'ADDRESS, def seg.def off.def size); end PASS TO PARENT ; -- MAIN PROGRAM

```
begin
     init := get_r1 def();
-- attach terminal to write
     attach tew (IO PORT, STDIO_W);
     w class := init.resources.min_class;
--attach terminal to read
     attach ter(IO PORT,STDIO R);
     put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class," CALC ONE PASS READY ");
-- advance eventcount of synchro segment path 5,6 plsn 51
-- passed to child as ch_seg_list(2).
-- Will be called in child as init.initial seg(2)
     advance (init.initial seg(2), success);
     read evc(init.initial seg(0).evc ch val,success);
     await(init.initial seg(0),evc ch val+1,success);
    ...
     100p
          receive fm_parent;
          if test rec.flag then
                 evit;
          end if;
          for i in 1...30000 loop
         test_rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) /
test_rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) /
                                                            100;
                                                            122;
         test_rec.result := (( 12020 / 500 ) * 300 ) /
                                                            122;
         test_rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) /
                                                            122;
          end locp;
          pass to parent;
          advance(init.initial_seg(2), success);
          read evc(init.initial seg(0), evc ch val, success);
          await(init.initial seg(0), evc ch val+1, success);
     end loop;
     advance(init.initial_seg(2), success);
-- dettach and delete
     detach device(STDIO R, success);
     detach device(STDIO W.success);
     self_delete(init.initial_seg(2), success);
end CALC1 ;
```

with ar1, manag, gemio, agate , tables , alib, alibj; package body CALC2 is use ar1, manag, gemio, agate , tables , alib, alibj; -- constants STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO R : CONSTANT integer := Ø; IO PORT : CONSTANT integer := 6; -- variables init : r1 process def; w_class : access_class; test_rec : test_message; success : integer; evc ch val : integer; def_seg : integer; def_off : integer; def_size : integer; procedure PASS_TO_PARENT is begin def_seg := lib_mk_sel(ldt_table,init.initial_seg(3)); $def_off := 0;$ def_size := test_message'size /8; move_bytes(get_ss(),test_rec'ADDRESS, def seg,def off,def size); . end PASS TO PARENT ; procedure RECEIVE FM PARENT is tegin def seg := lib mk sel(ldt_table, init.initial_seg(3)); def off := Ø; def size := test message size /8; end RECEIVE_FM_PARENT; -- MAIN PROGRAM

```
begin
     init := get r1 def();
-- attach terminal to write
     attach tew(IO PORT,STDIO W);
     w_class := init.resources.min_class;
-- attach terminal to read
    attach ter(IO PORT.STDIO R);
  put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class," CALC2 PASS EVERY LOOP READY");
-- Advance the eventcount of the synchronization segment
-- path 5.6 . plsn 51 . passed to child as ch seg list(2).
-- Will be recognized in child as init.initial seg(2).
    advance(init.initial_seg(2), success); -- this will
  permit creation of processesto go on
    iread_evc(init.initial_seg(0),evc ch_val,success);
                                         -- stack to sync
    await(init.iritial seg(Ø),evc ch_val+1,success);
      control sent back to creation of processes
    100p
         receive fm parent;
         if test rec.flag then
               exit;
         end if;
         test rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
         test_rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
         test_rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
         test rec.result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
         pass to parent;
         advance(init.initial seg(2), success);
         read_evc(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val,success);
         await(init.initial_seg(0),evc ch_val+1,success);
    end loop;
    advance(init.initial_seg(2),success);
-- detach and deletion
    detach device(STDIO R, success);
    detach_device(STDIO_W, success);
     self delete(init.initial seg(2).success);
```



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<u>APPENDIX D</u>

SIMPLE ACCESS PROGRAM LISTING

This program presents a very simple program, with the purpose to show the basic steps necessary to be able to access the secure system. Different from non-secure systems, the terminal is not automatically a part of the system, and as shown in this program, a GEMSOS gate call is necessary to include a terminal in the system.

.....

-- Sample program to access the system pragma rangecheck(off); pragma debug(off); pragma arithcheck(off); pragma enumtab(off); WITH agate, ar1, alibj, util, manag ,gemio; PACKAGE BODY alo IS USE agate, ar1, alibj, util, manag ,gemio ; -- Constants for device slots. STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1; STDIO_R : CONSTANT integer := 0; IO PORT : CONSTANT integer := 0; -- port zero for main process -- Variables used by main program. w class : access class; -- AGATE init : r1_process_def; -- AR1 mentor : integer ; entrx : integer ; size : integer ; success : integer; class : access class ; seg_mode : seg_access_type ; --AGATE seg numter : integer ; -- MAIN BFGIN init := get r1 def(); -- AR1 lib set bracket(1, 1, 1, init.resources.min class); attach serial port for writing. ----attach tew(IO PORT, STDIO W); --MANAG w class := init.resources.min class; put_ln(stdio_w,w_class, "HELLO COMPLICATED WORLD"); -- attach serial port for reading. attach ter(IO FORT, stdio r); -- MANAG put_ln(stdio_w,w_class , "now I will create a segment"); type_any_key_to_continue (w_class);

```
-- creating segment for STACK (parent)
   mentor := init.initial seg(2);
   entrx :=5;
   size :=1023;
   class := init.resources.min class;
  cr_segment(init, mentor, entrx, size, class, success);
                                I will
   put_ln(stdio_w,w_class, now
                          make the segment known ");
   type any key to continue (w class);
-- makeknown segment created
  seg mode := r w;
  seg_number.:= 31;
mk_segment(init, mentor, entrx,seg_number,seg_mode,success);
  put_ln(stdio_w,w_class," Ate logo (good bye)");
-- infinite loop to prevent trap.
  success := Ø;
  while success = @ loop
     success := Ø;
  end loop;
end alo;
```

```
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```

<u>APPENDIX E</u>

SUBMIT FILES LISTING

This appendix presents the submit files used for the sysgening of the application program, the testing program and the simple access program.

•••

	SUBMIT	FILE	FOR	APPLICATION	PROGRAM	•
ts:ld ks:k2 ks:k1 ks:k2 cs:v1 ds:v1 ds:v1 ds:nv ds:r1 ds:cc ds:ch ds:c1	13.cmd J.cmd J.cmd J.cmd J.cmd Loader Loader J.ds;2,5 Lemain.co dar.cmd Laff.cmd trap.cm	. cmd; 2 cmd; 2, 2 cmd; 2, 2 cmd; 5, 6 l; 5, 7; cmd; 5, 8 l; 5, 9; nd; 6;	101 10; 3;			
end						

....

-- SUBMIT FILF FOR TEST PROGRAM

ts:ld3.cmd
ks:k0.cmd
ks:k1.cmd
ks:k2.cmd
cs:v1loader.cmd;2;
ds:v1login.cmd;2,10;
ds:nv.ds;2,5;
ds:nv.ds;5;
ds:totime.cmd;5,0;
ds:stodisp.cmd;5,7;
ds:calc1.cmd;5,6;
ds:calc2.cmd;5,9;
ds:r1trap.cmd;6;
end

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	SUBMIT	FILF	FOR	SAMPLE	PROGRAM -	-
bs: ks: ks: dddde ddde	eld3.cmd k2.cmd k2.cmd k2.cmd v1loade v1loade v1login nv.ds;2 nv.ds;5 alo.cmd r1trap.o	r.cmd; .cmd;2 ;5; ;5,0; cmd;6;	2;			-

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