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THE CULTURE AND CONFLICT REVIEW



Strategies for Ending Insurgencies: Inclusive Versus Suppressive Policies

James L. Fuemmeler and David A. Anderson, 6/1/2012

Introduction

From 1989 through 2008, 117 of the 124 active armed conflicts around the world were intrastate insurgencies (Kegley, 2010: 378). Insurgencies are predicted to remain the major form of conflict in the coming decades. When an insurgency^[1] establishes itself, what is the most effective approach to ending it while maintaining a functioning government and minimizing the loss of life by all parties involved? Through the assessment of six counterinsurgency (COIN) country case studies, this research sets out to determine whether more inclusive government policies^[2] produce better outcomes in combating insurgencies than more suppressive^[3] policies. Particular focus is placed on whether enacted policy achieved the desired end state, relatively quickly, with the fewest number of casualties.

The primary assessment data used for this study is derived from Paul, Clarke, and Grill's 2010 research, which was drawn heavily from Connable and Libicki's 2010 work. Connable and Libicki studied 89 separate country cases to determine the different ways that insurgencies end (Connable and Libicki, 2010: 180, 215-218). In their study, Paul, Clarke, and Grill developed a list of 'good' and 'bad' practices in the conduct of COIN operations via country surveys. Many of their survey questions' results apply to this study and are displayed in later tables. In both studies the conflicts involved fighting between states and non-state actors seeking to overthrow the government or to take territorial control of a region within the country. The studies did not exclude influences from outside actors who may have assisted either side by way of arms, sanctuary mediation, etc. Regardless, outside influences do not affect the ability to measure the inclusiveness of government actions. In all cases, at least 1,000 people were killed over the course of each conflict studied with at least an average of 100 deaths per year experienced by the insurgents and government/populous (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010: 6).

The case studies were selected based on four considerations. First, the country conflicts had to be already resolved. Second, they had to fairly represent those resolved by suppressive or inclusive means. Third, they had to come from a wide range of geographical locations. Finally, they had to represent a cross section of conflict results (e.g., those won by governments, by insurgents, and those ending with mixed results. The cases selected for this study are Algeria v. Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (1992-2004: Government won); Turkey v. Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (1984-1999: Government won); Nicaragua v. Somoza (1978-1979: Insurgents won); Kosovo (1998-1999: Insurgents won); Kampuchea (1978-1992: Mixed result); and El Salvador (1979-1992: Mixed result).

Methodology

The case studies themselves are first individually summarized, followed by a chronology of significant events and research data presented in supporting tables. The first table in each country case study is a timeline of relevant historical events. The second table in each case exhibits applicable aggregated questionnaire findings derived from Paul, Clarke, and Grill's study. In their study, the insurgencies were often broken into phases. The phased results for this study have been aggregated into single "Yes" or "No" outcomes in order to qualitatively assess individual country results. The third table represents possible inclusive actions taken by the host government. Inclusive actions were broken into four categories. "Held negotiations," which is self-explanatory, included within this category are cease-fires. "Legislative changes," which represents the governments' efforts, through removal or adding of laws, to

address insurgent concerns (e.g., eliminating a ban against the use of a language). “Insurgent representation,” represents the government’s accommodation/acceptance of insurgent political groups participating in the political process. “Withholding the use of force” represents the governments’ refusal to use military means to end the insurgency. Also included in this category is the offering of amnesty to insurgents. The fourth table reflects “conflict outcomes.”

Tables 1 and 2 have been color-coded to indicate their inclusive policy connections with the inclusive policy categories in Table 3. The non color-coded information contained in Tables 1 and 2 is either inclusive or suppressive in nature and collectively influenced answers to the inclusive policy categories depicted in Table 3. Table 4 represents final outcome data (e.g., length of insurgency in terms of time and total number of deaths).

Case Studies

1: Nicaragua (Somoza) 1978-1979.

In January of 1978, the Nicaraguan government was suspected of orchestrating the murder of the editor of a leading Nicaraguan newspaper, leading to increased support from dissatisfied citizens for the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). With growing support, the FSLN was emboldened to carry out a raid on the capital on August 23, 1978. The government responded with brutal attacks against insurgent-controlled areas and extended suppressive violence across civilian populations. Indiscriminate bombings and attacks by the government gained support for the FSLN from the population and caused the withdrawal of support for the government by the international community (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010 (Case studies): 5-7). The growing strength of the insurgency and the government’s willingness to meet them with extreme violence led to an insurgents’ victory.

Table 1-1: Case Study Chronology

10-Jan-78	Chamorro assassinated for newspaper report. 30k+ mobs form and turn into nationwide revolt. Response by government is martial law in some area.
Early Feb-78	Town of Masaya renames plaza in honor of Chamorro. National Guard disrupts ceremony and is driven off.
26-Feb-78	National Guard attacks Masaya with heavy weapons fire and aerial bombing. 200 were residents killed and 1 FSLN member.
3-Mar-78	Revolt in Leon. Same response as in Masaya. Hundreds killed.
26-Mar-78	Revolt in Dariamba. Same response as in Masaya. Hundreds killed.
23-Aug-78	FSLN attack national Palace, take more than 2,000 hostages and gain multiple concessions from Somoza, including the releasing of prisoners and safe passage out of country.
1-Sep-78	National Guard overruns Matagalpa to quell discontent. 50 civilians killed.
9-Sep-78	FSLN attacks and overruns N.G. stations in 6 cities.
	In response, Somoza declares martial law nationwide and censors the press.
Sep-oct-78	N.G. starts attacking cities with insurgents in them. Surrounds and pounds with artillery and air attacks, both explosive and incendiary. 1500-2000 people killed.
Early Oct-78	Mediations begin after government regains control of cities. Government reduces censorship restrictions and eases curfews. Government will not agree to rewriting of constitution.
Early Nov-78	FSLN gives up on mediations and resumes armed struggle.
Late Nov-78	Somoza proposes general amnesty for insurgents who lay down their arms. FSLN growing in strength and don't take offer.
9-Apr-79	FSLN capture Esteli. N.G. moves in and bombs the city. FSLN retreats. 1000 dead, 80% civilian.
30-May-79	FSLN announces a final military offensive to begin and calls for civilian support. They get it.
Jun-79	N.G. gives up control of the North to consolidate forces.
Early June	FSLN moves into capital. Government continues indiscriminate attacks. 9k dead by mid-June. Government drives FSLN out of capital.
25-Jun-79	FSLN overruns Masaya.
Early Jul-79	FSLN gains control of Rivas in the south and establishes supply lines.
13-Jul-79	FSLN controls all routes into capital and suspends offensive.
18-Jul-79	Somoza cedes power to rebel junta.

(Booth, 1985: 159-182)

Table 1-2: Country Assessment

COIN force avoided excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	N
Free and fair elections held	N
Government respected human rights and allowed free press	N
COIN force employed escalating repression	Y
COIN force employed collective punishment	Y
Amnesty or reward program in place	N
Amnesty program reduced number of insurgents	N
Insurgents' claimed grievances substantially addressed since onset of conflict	N
COIN force did not employ culturally inappropriate outsiders for a significant fraction of operations	Y
Indigenous forces conducted majority of COIN operations	Y
External support to COIN from strong state/military	N
External support to insurgents from strong state/military	N
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of government	N
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	N
Insurgent win	Y

(Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010: Spreadsheet Data).

Table 1-3: Inclusive Actions Taken by Government

Hold negotiations	Y
Legislative Change	N
Insurgent representation	N
Withhold use of force	N

Created by the authors

Table 1-4: Outcomes

Length of Insurgency (in months)	11
Insurgency recused (if government win or mix outcome) If Y, how long between insurgencies (in months)	N
Total deaths	35,000
Government	1,000
Insurgents	3,000
Civilian	31,000

(Correlates of War, accessed 16 March, 2012)

2: Kampuchea (Cambodia) 1978-1992.

The insurgency in Kampuchea began as an attack on the Khmer Rouge government by Vietnam, which created a small military force of Cambodian exiles and supported the group with 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers. Vietnam was frustrated with numerous cross-border incursions by Kampuchea and wanted to end the harassment. The Vietnamese forces smashed the Khmer Rouge and drove them from the cities of eastern Cambodia. The Khmer refugees received support and sanctuary from the Thai government and reconstituted the hills and jungles of western Cambodia for an extended insurgency against the Vietnamese forces (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010 (Case studies): 28-29). Vietnam reacted against growing insurgent forces with a massive armed offensive and conscripted thousands of civilians to do manual labor erecting a defensive border. Vietnam eventually withdrew its forces due to expense, leaving a puppet regime behind. The international community stepped in to ensure elections took place and the puppet regime and the Khmer Rouge were voted out of positions of power in the 1993 elections (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010 (Case studies): 30-32). The overly suppressive practices by the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnam proxy government, led to both losing the support of the people.

Table 2-1: Case Study Chronology

7-Jan-79	Phnom Penh seized by Vietnamese forces and declare formation of People's Republic of Kampuchea
1-Feb-79	Refugee waves arrive at Thailand border
Jul-79	Opening in Phnom Penh of first political prison (25000 prisoners will enter between 1980 and 1984) 14 more follow.
1980-1989	Starvation becomes rampant for years following as Vietnamese led government cuts off rural areas from food and takes rice harvest from farmers with little to no compensation, transporting some of it to Vietnam.
1980-1989	Vietnamese acts of vandalism begin Destruction of property and theft
1980-1989	Vietnamese experts regulate urban education that is Vietnamese structured
1980-1989	Religion, clothing and travel heavily regulated
?	Chemical weapons used against guerrillas and endanger civilians
Autumn-1982	Legalization of settlement of Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia
12-Nov-82	First treaty signed by puppet government in Phnom Penh giving territory to Vietnam
1983	Conscriptions begin for forced labor of Cambodian citizens to clear land and build roads create barrier along Laos and Thailand border. Malaria and land mines major threat to forced laborers. Lumber cleared is sent to Vietnam.
	Thailand border. Malaria and land mines major threat to forced laborers. Lumber cleared is sent to Vietnam.
1984-1985	All resistance camps are captured and destroyed along Thai border.
Spring 1989	Liberal measures begin such as restoration of Buddhism, land ownership and more freedom in movement
26-Sep-89	Official withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops and advisors from Cambodia
30-Oct-89	Curfew established in Phnom Penh
May-June 90	Purges in Phnom Penh government
1-May-91	Cease-fire among four Cambodian parties
23-Oct-91	Paris Treaty on Cambodia
Jan-92	Politically motivated assassinations in Phnom Penh
Feb-92	Serious fighting begins between Khmer Rouge and Phnom Penh troops
12-Oct-92	Khmer Rouge refuses to participate in elections
23-27 May 93	Constituent elections take place

(Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010: Spreadsheet Data).

Table 2-2: Country Assessment

COIN force avoided excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	N
Free and fair elections held	N
Government respected human rights and allowed free press	N
COIN force employed escalating repression	Y
COIN force employed collective punishment	N
Amnesty or reward program in place	Y
Amnesty program reduced number of insurgents	N
Insurgents' claimed grievances substantially addressed since onset of conflict	N
COIN force did not employ culturally inappropriate outsiders for a significant fraction of operations	N
Indigenous forces conducted majority of COIN operations	N
External support to COIN from strong state military	Y
External support to insurgents from strong state military	Y
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of government	Y
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	N
Mixed outcome	Y

Table 2-3: Inclusive Actions Taken

Hold negotiations	N
Legislative Change	N
Insurgent representation	N
Withhold use of force	N

Created by the authors

Table 2-4: Outcomes

Length of Insurgency (in months)	156
Insurgency recus (if government win or mix outcome) If Y, how long between insurgencies (in months)	N
Total deaths	200,000
Government	40,300 (Cambodia + Vietnam)
Insurgents/Civilian	159,700

(Correlates of War, accessed 16 March, 2012)

3: El Salvador 1979-1992.

Dictator led El Salvador faced a challenge from the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The insurgency began the conflict against an oppressive, feudal government whose military's only successes were against civilians. The Salvadorian government, with United States support, survived long enough to gain legitimacy through elections and improvements in human rights policies. During the long conflict, the Salvadorian government made democratic changes and improved its human rights practices. With revisions to the constitution, limits on the military, amnesty to the insurgents, and the transition of the FMLN to a political party, El Salvador ended its insurgency successfully (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010 (Case studies): 37-41).

Table 3-1: Case Study Chronology

10-Jan-81	FMLN offensive against all main garrisons fails to take or cause mass casualties.
Oct 79- Mar 82	1786 civilian deaths from military/paramilitary attack against Political Civilian Groups. Death squads and uncontrolled military.
Apr-80	FMLN radio campaign to end current government begins
83-90	FMLN assassinated average of 40 civilians each year
	Constituent Assembly elections held. 54 civilian deaths from military/paramilitary attacks against Political Civilian Groups
1982	
1983	44 civilian deaths from military/paramilitary attacks against Political Civilian Groups
1983	Total deaths 6,639
1984	Presidential election. Duarte elected. More concerned with human rights and negotiated end. Total deaths 4,274
1985	Midterm/ municipal elections. 21 civilian deaths from military/paramilitary attacks against Political Civilian Groups
	Total deaths 3,036
1986	Total deaths 1,709
1987	Total deaths 1,484
1988	Midterm/ municipal elections. 8 civilian deaths from military/paramilitary attacks against Political Civilian Groups
	Total deaths 2,875
1989	Presidential election of Alfredo Christians. 41 civilian deaths from military/paramilitary attacks against Political Civilian Groups
	Total deaths 2,875
1989	FMLN presents 12 point proposal pledging to disarm if allowed to participate in elections
	Christiani signs Teja Declaration calling on FMLN to end armed hostilities while government pledges to reintegrate members and promote social justice and human rights
7 Aug 89	
8ep-89	Talks begin between government and FMLN. Secret results produced
16-17 Oct 89	Costa Rica talks between government and FMLN where both agreed to principle of civilian controlled military and representative government.
Oct-89	Bombing of National Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers. Kills 8 and wounds 35
Nov-89	FMLN launch offensive into San Salvador. Government soldiers murder six priests and two women
1990	4 civilian deaths from military/paramilitary attack against Political Civilian Groups. Total deaths 1,525
	UN mediated talks lead to Caracas Agreement. Two phase agenda to reform constitution, military, judiciary, electoral system and then disarmament, and reintegration of forces and reorganization of FMLN into a legal political party.
21 May 90	
Apr 90 - 31 Dec 91	Negotiations advance under UN watch
30 Apr 91	Agreement made on constitutional changes per Caracas Agreement
1991	Midterm/ municipal elections
16 Nov 91	FMLN declare unilateral truce and government follows with same in December. Formal cease-fire and separation of forces soon followed
16 Jan 92	Mexico City peace accords signed

(MacLeod, 2006: 20-27), (McClintock, 1998: 53-154)

Table 3-2: Country Assessment

COIN force avoided excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	N
Free and fair elections held	Y
Government respected human rights and allowed free press	N
COIN force employed escalating repression	Y
COIN force employed collective punishment	Y
Amnesty or reward program in place	Y
Amnesty program reduced number of insurgents	N
Insurgents' claimed grievances substantially addressed since onset of conflict	Y
COIN force did not employ culturally inappropriate outsiders for a significant fraction of operations	Y
Indigenous forces conducted majority of COIN operations	Y
External support to COIN from strong state military	Y
External support to insurgents from strong state military	N
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of government	Y
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	N
Government COIN win	Y

(Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010: Spreadsheet Data).

Table 3-3: Inclusive Actions Taken

Hold negotiations	Y
Legislative Change	Y
Insurgent representation	Y
Withhold use of force	N

Created by the authors

Table 3-4: Outcomes

Length of Insurgency (in months)	153
Insurgency recurs (if government win or mix outcome)	N
If Y, how long between insurgencies (in months)	
Total casualties	69,000
Government	25,000
Insurgents / Civilian	44,000

(Correlates of War, accessed 16 March, 2012)

4: Turkey (PKK) 1984–1999.

The PKK was an outlawed party denied its existence by the Turkish Constitution. The PKK fought for existence in outlying Kurdish villages against a very oppressive Turkish government that isolated villages from insurgents and aggressively pursued PKK members. The government forcibly evacuated uncontrollable villages and collateral damage was heavy during engagements. The PKK was also responsible for many civilian deaths and enforced mandatory conscription into the militant group. Turkey continued to increase pressure on the PKK and became even more indiscriminate in their attacks on insurgent areas. The government also attacked PKK sanctuaries across the borders of other states. Eventually, the PKK leader was captured and agreed to act as a peace broker. The conflict ended for a short time, but the PKK revitalized itself and continues its movement against the Turkish government (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010 (Case studies): 87-92).

Table 4-1: Case Study Chronology

15-Aug-84	PKK begins war with attacks on Serranli and Erak
1985	Turkey military establishes itself in the southeast to oust PKK from villages.
mid-85	Turkey arms villagers and pays them to resist PKK.
1987	State of emergency declared in southeast provinces
June 1987	PKK rebels kill 24 Kurdish women and children in attack on Pinarik village
May 1988	PKK signs nonaggression pact with Talabani that fall apart a year later
1990-2000s	Forced evacuations and attacks on villages drives between 300,000 and one million Kurds from their homes to slums in western cities.
March 1990	Mass demonstrations break out against the state followed by the killing of 13 PKK rebels near Sivri. Approximately dozens 1,00s and shoot 6.
June 1990	HEP is founded as the first legal Kurdish political party in Turkey
April 1990	Government denies giving regional governor power to censor all publications miss-reporting events in the emergency rule region.
by 1991	Turkish security forces using torture on Kurdish detainees, and threatening violence against those not joining village guard system.
March 1991	Ocalan declares 25 day unilateral cease-fire and extends it in April. Turkish forces continue to attack PKK. Ceasefire officially ended in June.
April 1991	Turkey lifts law banning spoken and written Kurdish and Kurdish names, but still restricts the language from broadcast and education.
October 1991	22 deputies from HEP elected in Turkish national elections
1992	Turkish security forces up indiscriminate attacks. Shoot demonstrators. Example is Simak in August. Turkey forces go on 3 day shooting spree that leaves 22 townspeople dead and 70% of houses and shops ruined.
October 1992	Turkey and Iraqi forces launch an assault on PKK bases in Northern Iraq. PKK survives after attacks finish weeks later.
March 1993	PKK offers a limited ceasefire
May 1993	PKK kill 33 unarmed Turkish soldiers
1993-1994	Turkish military begins even more aggressive campaign against PKK including the blockading of villages and then shelling and firing upon them.
July 1993	HEP is banned
1994	Turkey forces enter Iraq 9 times to attack PKK strongholds and Kurdish villages
March 1994	Immunities of six Kurdish parliamentarians are lifted in order to try them for links to PKK
March 1995	Turkey conducts 6 week operation in northern Iraq against PKK. Unsuccessful.
By 1996	Around 3,000 villages had been forced to evacuate by the Turkish government to prevent the PKK from using them.
1997	Turkey lifts state of emergency in three provinces in the southeast
April 1998	Turkish forces capture PKK commander Sakik in Iraq
October 1998	Turkey threatens Syria with attack if they don't hand over PKK leader Ocalan. Ocalan flees.
15 Feb 1999	Ocalan captured by Turkish forces in Greek embassy in Kenya
May 1999	Ocalan given death penalty
August 1999	Ocalan isolated on island prison and calls on PKK to suspend fighting
June 2004	PKK breaks unilateral cease-fire and takes up arms again
2005	P.M. Erdogan promises to handle Kurdish question with democracy, not military.

(Marcus, 2007: 80-310), (Lundgren, 2007: 48-81)

Table 4-2: Country Assessment

COIN force avoided excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	N
Free and fair elections held	N
Government respected human rights and allowed free press	N
COIN force employed escalating repression	Y
COIN force employed collective punishment	Y
Amnesty or reward program in place	Y
Amnesty program reduced number of insurgents	-
Insurgents' claimed grievances substantially addressed since onset of conflict	-
COIN force did not employ culturally inappropriate outsiders for a significant fraction of operations	Y
Indigenous forces conducted majority of COIN operations	Y
External support to COIN from strong state/military	N
External support to insurgents from strong state/military	Y
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of government	N
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	N
Government/COIN win	Y

(Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010 (Case studies): 87), (Marcus, 2007: 308-310), ("Turkey", 2000)

(-) Inconclusive result

Table 4-3: Inclusive Actions Taken

Hold negotiations	N
Legislative Change	Y
Insurgent representation	Y
Withhold use of force	N

Created by authors.

Table 4-4: Outcomes

Length of Insurgency (in months)	180
Insurgency recus (if government wins or mix outcome)	Y
If Y, how long between insurgencies (in months)	58
Total casualties	30,000-40,000 (†)
Government	5,882
Insurgents	25,139
Civilian	5,424

(Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010 (Case studies): 87), (Marcus, 2007: 308-310), ("Turkey", 2000)

(†) Reported deaths are disputed due to mismatch between Turkish claims of PKK killed and PKK reported casualty counts. These numbers come from an address by the Turkish President in a U.S. Dept. of State Report.

5: Algeria (GIA) 1992–2004.

The Algerian government cancelled elections in 1992 due to fear of certain victory by the Islamic Salvation Front. The GIA led popular protests that quickly became violent and turned into a terrorist campaign in the capital. The Algerian government responded with a military policy including the arming of local militias who committed arbitrary killings. The GIA began urban bombings and village massacres, condoning the seizure of property, kidnapping and rape. The government responded with indiscriminate attacks of its own, but the GIA was so much greater in its disregard for human rights, that the population soon turned its support toward the government as the lesser of two evils. Algeria offered two periods of amnesty and reduced the role of the militia. These actions combined with more precise military strikes led to the end of the GIA as a serious threat by 2004 (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010 (Case studies): 168-173).

Table 5-1: Case Study Chronology

January 1992	Army generals cancel elections
1992-1998	642 massacres occur led by GIA and security forces. Security services cause between 6,146 and 10,000 'disappearances'
1992	Government arms local militias to battle insurgency. Leads to indiscriminate killings
Fall of 93-Jul 95	3 attempts for peace made between politicians of Algerian government and Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). All fail from military leader kick-back and GIA members pledge for no reconciliation.
1995	General Zeroual 'elected' president
1996	New constitution consolidates government's power, partly by banning political parties based on religion
1997-1998	GIA declares war against Algerian civilians and leads a series of massacres.
1999	Presidential election held. More moderate President announces civil concord initiative that includes a limited amnesty
April 1999	Part of GIA breaks off to form GSPC
1999-2005	Tens of thousands of political prisoners released
2001	GIA and GSPC reject amnesty
2004	Hundreds of military officers (involved in 1992 coup) removed from service
Jan 2005	Government claimed arrest of GIA leader and death of his deputy signaled organization's disintegration
2005	Reconciliation charter approved increasing presidential power, limited amnesty, and further restricting religious political parties
Mar -Sep 2006	Further amnesty provided
2007	large section of GSPC joins a, -Qa'ida as QICM and joins international fight
	Generally, the GIA has been extremely violent in its methods and indiscriminatory in its attacks. The Algerian government focused first on a
	military solution and armed young civilians and created militias who often enacted atrocities of their own. Eventually, the political powers
	gained control over the military wing and enacted political solutions as support for the GIA continued to diminish.

(Ashour, 2009: 114- 132), (Naylor, 2006: 258), (Project Ploughshares)

Table 5-2: Country Assessment

COIN force avoided excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	N
Free and fair elections held	N
Government respected human rights and allowed free press	N
COIN force employed escalating repression	Y
COIN force employed collective punishment	N
Amnesty or reward program in place	Y
Amnesty program reduced number of insurgents	Y
Insurgents' claimed grievances substantially addressed since onset of conflict	N
COIN force did not employ culturally inappropriate outsiders for a significant fraction of operations	Y
Indigenous forces conducted majority of COIN operations	Y
External support to COIN from strong state/military	Y
External support to insurgents from strong state/military	N
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of government	N
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	N
Government/COIN win	Y

(Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010: Spreadsheet Data).

Table 5-3: Inclusive Actions Taken

Hold negotiations	Y
Legislative Change	N
Insurgent representation	N
Withhold use of force	N

Created by the authors

Table 5-4: Outcomes

Length of Insurgency (in months)	156
Insurgency recurs (if government win or mix outcome) If Y, how long between insurgencies (in months)	N Insurgency takes a different name and internationalizes. Deaths drop dramatically after 2005.
Total casualties	200,000
Government	No reliable data found
Insurgents/Civilian	No reliable data found

(Blanche, 2006: 25), (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010 (Case studies): 87)

6. Kosovo 1998-1999.

Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic sowed the seeds for an Albanian insurgency with his ethnically oppressive policies. A shadow government was formed in the Kosovo region as well as an armed insurgency organization (KLA). The KLA began launching small scale attacks in 1996 and the Yugoslav forces began an ethnic cleansing campaign. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled across neighboring borders as the government targeted civilians and conducted multiple massacres. The KLA was not capable of facing Yugoslav forces on its own and owed its survival much to the assistance of NATO air strikes and the campaign NATO began against Yugoslav forces in March of 1999 (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010 (Case studies): 282-287). The KLA formally disbanded in September 1999 and Kosovo eventually gained autonomous control under Albanian leadership (O'Neill, 2002: 146).

Table 6-1: Case Study Chronology

February 28 1998	Serbian units carry out violent repression in Drenica until June, killing more than 300
March 1998	Albanians elect shadow government
March 3-5 1998	First serious fighting between Serbian forces and KLA. Jashari family is massacred by Serbian forces. 58 civilians are killed.
June 1998	Yugoslav Army launches its counter offensive
September 1998	By end of September, more than 1000 Albanians and Serbs dead from conflict and tens of thousands of Albanians abandoned villages for mountains
October 13 1998	Milosevic agrees to OSCE observers in Kosovo and aerial monitoring by NATO
October 27 1998	Serbian forces withdrawn en masse from Kosovo.
January 15 1999	Racak massacre. Serbian forces kill 45 Albanians
February 6, 1999	Negotiations begin in France
March 18, 1999	Negotiations fall apart. Serbs refuse to final agreement
March 24, 1999	NATO begins bombing Yugoslavia.
March 30, 1999	Milosevic offers to withdraw forces from Kosovo for suspension of bombing campaign. His offer was rejected. Through June 9 Milosevic makes mult. offers for a cease-fire, but is denied
June 9, 1999	Serb forces agree to withdraw from Kosovo
June 10, 1999	NATO suspends air campaign. Responsible for over 1,000 civilian casualties.
June 18, 1999	Kosovar-Albanians begin revenge against Serbians remaining in Kosovo
Sep 20, 1999	KLA formally disbands

(Kosovo, 1999: 35-44), (Nation, 2003: 225- 226), (O'Neill, 2002: 145-146), (Zolo, 2002: 188-195)

Table 6-2: Country Assessment

COIN force avoided excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	N
Free and fair elections held	N
Government respected human rights and allowed free press	N
COIN force employed escalating repression	Y
COIN force employed collective punishment	Y
Amnesty or reward program in place	Y
Amnesty program reduced number of insurgents	N
Insurgents' claimed grievances substantially addressed since onset of conflict	N
COIN force did not employ culturally inappropriate outsiders for a significant fraction of operations	Y
Indigenous forces conducted majority of COIN operations	Y
External support to COIN from strong state military	N
External support to insurgents from strong state military	Y
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of government	N
External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	Y
Mixed outcome	Y

(Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010: Spreadsheet Data).

Table 6-3: Inclusive Actions Taken

Hold negotiations	Y
Legislative Change	N
Insurgent representation	N
Withhold use of force	N

Created by Authors.

Table 6-4: Outcomes

Length of Insurgency (in months)	16
Insurgency recurs (if government wins or mix outcome) If Y, how long between insurgencies (in months)	N
Total casualties	12,000
Government	800
Insurgents	400
Civilian	10,800

(Correlates of War, accessed 16 March, 2012), (Spiegel, 2000: 2204)

Analysis

Table 3 (Inclusive Actions Taken) represents aggregated data drawn from each case study in order to qualitatively assess the inclusiveness of government policy toward their respective insurgents. A percentage of inclusiveness value was assigned to each government in order to compare the case studies across time (Chart A), by total deaths (Chart B), and by deaths per month (Chart C). In order to determine each government's inclusiveness in terms of a percentage, the information from tables 1 and 2 was used to qualitatively derive inclusiveness of government policies in relationship to four inclusive policy categories contained in table 3. Each "yes" answer was given one point and each "no" answer was given a zero. Adding the values together and dividing by four (the number of inclusive variables used) provides the percentage of inclusiveness of each government's policy approach. Table 7.1 is an aggregation of inclusiveness and outcome data from tables 3 and 4 of each country case study for ease of comparison.

Table 7.1: Inclusiveness and Outcome Data

Government	% of Inclusiveness	Time (months)	Total Deaths	Deaths/month
Nicaragua	25	11	35,000	3,182
Cambodia	0	156	200,000	1,282
El Salvador	75	153	69,000	451
Turkey	50	180	35,000	194
Algeria	25	156	200,000	1,282
Kosovo	25	16	12,000	750

Chart A shows that inclusive policies do not necessarily reduce the length of an insurgency. This is true even in cases when inclusive policies included negotiations with insurgents and also when the government made legislative changes to accommodate insurgent' grievances.

Chart A: Inclusiveness v. Time




Chart B indicates that employing some degree of inclusive policy in addressing an insurgency generally results in fewer total deaths.

Chart B: Inclusiveness v. Total Deaths





Chart C does indicate that inclusive-minded government policies, on average, result in fewer deaths per month.

Chart C: Inclusiveness v. Deaths/month



Conclusion

Inclusive policies toward an insurgency could not be proven to reduce the total number of deaths when compared to the use of suppressive policies. Furthermore, the length of time that an insurgency lasts cannot be controlled solely by inclusive policies. The authors do not want these results to be taken as condoning the use of suppressive policies. In fact, Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010 determined that although suppressive practices performed by governments during counterinsurgency operations may prove successful in some phases of COIN operations, they ultimately led to insurgent success in all but two of their studied cases.

The unexpected finding that death rates per month are lower for inclusive-minded governments is significant and should be a research focal point going forward. Proving that there is a lower rate at which casualties occur through employing inclusive means would be a powerful tool to convince governments to employ them more often than suppressive policies when combating insurgencies. Further research should also be conducted to test the reliability of this study's results. This can be achieved by simply adding additional cases to the mix. Finally, these additional cases should include countries that did not exercise the use of military force. The fact that all the countries assessed in this study employed the use of force at some time may have skewed the outcome.

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1. This study defines insurgency as an "organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control," (FM 3-24, 2006: 1-1).
2. Inclusive policies are those by which the government recognizes the insurgents as other than criminals. This includes negotiations, cease-fires, amnesty offers, right to political groups and representation, power-sharing offers, and elections (Connable and Libicki, 2010: 180).
3. Suppression is defined as the government's use of deadly force, enactment of unfair laws against a group of people based on race, language, or other cultural aspects, or arresting people unlawfully and without proceeding with judicial action.

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