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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN
COUNTERTERRORISM: UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES**

by

Tayfun Erbay

December 2012

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Maria Rasmussen
Arturo Sotomayor

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**THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN COUNTERTERRORISM: UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
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ABSTRACT

In the last decade, terrorism has been one of the top threats for many countries. During this period, military organizations in many of these countries have been utilized as a counterterrorist instrument. Leading countries in the current war on terror, namely the U.S. and the UK, have used their armies, with all of their high-tech weapon systems, against nonstate threats armed with AK-47s and RPGs. Yet in spite of these efforts, a military victory against terrorism seems elusive. In many of these countries, the use of the military created unintended consequences that led to new problems, which have attracted the attention of academia and policymakers. The goal of this thesis is to explore these problems caused by the use of the military in a counterterrorism role.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|---|
| APC | Armored Personnel Carrier |
| CGS | Chief of General Staff |
| COS | Chief of Staff |
| CLF | Commander of Land Forces |
| DYH | Derry Young Hooligans |
| ERP | People's Revolutionary Army |
| ETA | Euskadi Ta Askatasuna |
| FRU | Force Research Unit |
| GOC | General Officer Commanding |
| IAF | Israeli Air Force |
| IDF | Israeli Defense Forces |
| IRA | Irish Republican Army |
| MOD | Ministry of Defense |
| NI | Northern Ireland |
| NICRA | Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association |
| PIRA | Provisional Irish Republican Army |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| RAF | Royal Air Force |
| RUC | Royal Ulster Constabulary |
| SAS | Special Air Service |
| SITREP | Situation Report |
| TCG | Tasking and Coordination Group |
| UDA | Ulster Defense Association |
| UVF | Ulster Volunteer Force |

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I dedicate this work to Second Lieutenant Cengiz Evranos, who gave his life in the service of our country.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The goal of this thesis is to explore the unintended consequences of using the military in a counterterrorism role. Since 9/11, countries have increasingly employed the military to fight terrorism. Is it possible to conceive of negative effects that the use of the military in counterterrorism has brought to civil society, militaries, or terrorist organizations?

In the last decade, terrorism has been one of the top (if not the premier) threat for many countries. During this period, military organizations in many of these countries have been utilized as a counterterrorist instrument. Leading countries in the current war on terror, namely the U.S. and the UK, have used their armies, with all of their high-tech weapon systems, against nonstate threats armed with AK-47s and RPGs. The U.S. and UK are not alone in using their militaries in counterterrorism tasks. Other countries such as Israel and Russia also use their militaries against terrorists. Yet in spite of these efforts, a military victory against terrorism seems elusive. In many of these countries, the use of the military created unintended consequences that led to new problems, which have attracted the attention of academia and policymakers.

From an academic perspective, the main discussion about the use of military in counterterrorism revolves around the issue of effectiveness. In other words, are military organizations effective against terrorism? And when, or in which circumstances, and against what kind of terrorist groups are the military successful or unsuccessful? All cases of terrorist violence have their own context. While some terrorist organizations are primarily domestic, others are international in their effects. While some groups seem to want a high fatality rate, others have less ambitious goals. Nevertheless, governments all around the world that face terrorist threats have relied on their militaries without much consideration to these differences. As a result, there is a need to distinguish between the cases in which the military option has a potential for success, and the ones in which militaries are much more likely to create problems than to solve them.

From a policy perspective, the use of the military in counterterrorism presents a number of problems. In the case of counterterrorist campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military coalitions fighting against terrorism find themselves against irregular adversaries that hide and operate among the civilian population. This creates additional complexities in the already entangled atmosphere of the battlefield, and requires militaries to be extremely careful about minimizing civilian casualties. In addition, contemporary democratic practice requires military institutions to be accountable to their governments, and occasionally to allied powers and to the international community. In this complex environment, governments face the dilemma: how can they fight against terrorism but stay within the rule of law and the democratic values upon which all governments are founded? As a result, there is a need to discuss if the military is a suitable instrument that governments can use in finding a way out of this dilemma.

Another important consideration is that, in the past, a militarized counterterrorist response paved the way for authoritarian rule. Military coups in Brazil in 1964 and Argentina in 1976 had their roots in their militaries' engagement in domestic counterterrorism roles and missions. Consequently, it is also important to understand how the engagement of militaries in unconventional missions like counterterrorism may negatively affect civilian control of the military.

The analysis of the use of the military in counterterrorism has the potential to showcase the weaknesses of many recent policies by countries like the United Kingdom and the United States. The Bush administration and the cabinet of Prime Minister Tony Blair made nearly all of the important decisions about the fight against terrorism, and the most important decision was to give military leaders enormous latitude. Barack Obama, Gordon Brown, and now David Cameron made no major changes in policy direction. For the U.S. and the UK, the main instrument of the fight against terrorism is still the military, and no major change in this regard seems likely in the near future. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda still sustains its existence in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. Neutralizing Al-Qaeda in these countries requires a number of political, economic and social reforms, and the military option does not give much hope of accomplishing these. Moreover, the military option created important unintended consequences that made the

fight against terrorism much harder. As Stephan M. Walt has indicated, the policies of the U.S. and its allies caused the direct or indirect deaths of many Muslims, which in turn antagonized Muslims all around the world. According to Walt's study, U.S. policies in the past 30 years have caused at least 288,000 Muslim fatalities, mostly in the Middle East. It does not mean that Saddam Hussein and the Taliban had no responsibility in these fatalities, but the perception in the countries where Al-Qaeda finds support is that the U.S. is directly responsible for this high number of deaths.¹ This perception is clearly helping terrorist organizations to recruit, and in turn makes their neutralization much harder than before.

Therefore, for all the countries that engage terrorist organizations with their militaries, it is extremely important to be aware that the use of the military in counterterrorism may create the conditions that help nourish terrorism rather than diminishing it.

A. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Armed conflicts have always created unintended consequences. Although military establishments put counterterrorist operations under the title of "low intensity conflicts," it does not mean that problems that militaries create while dealing with terrorism are fewer than the complications of traditional high-intensity interstate conflicts. This study hypothesizes that the use of military organizations in counterterrorist missions generates unintended consequences on three different levels: 1) civil society and politics, 2) military institutions and 3) terrorist organizations. In other words, militarizing counterterrorism policies yields suboptimal results in terms of social legitimacy, military professionalism and recruitment means.

¹ Stephen M. Walt, "Why they hate us (II): How many Muslims has the U.S. killed in the past 30 years?" *Foreign Policy*, November 30, 2009, accessed November 7, 2012, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/30/why_they_hate_us_ii_how_many_muslims_has_the_us_killed_in_the_past_30_years

1. Impact on Terrorist Organizations

All counterterrorist campaigns seek to put an end to the existence of terrorist organizations, but the history of counterterrorism is full of examples of policies that states apply, but which create results opposite to those intended. With their tendency to use excessive or illegal force, militaries are one of the main factors that lead to these undesirable results. First of all, militaries are very good at arousing the emotion of revenge that terrorists use highly effectively to fill their ranks. As Martha Crenshaw indicated, “if a single common emotion drives the individual or group to terrorism, it is vengeance...”² Therefore, retaliation is one of the possible effects of excessive military force, which can include escalation. Terrorist groups develop an instinct for organizational survival after they manage to survive their initial years. When faced with the high level of violence that military forces usually create, this instinct leaves terrorists with no other option but to respond with the same level of violence.

The most important consequence of military involvement in counterterrorism is the increase of group cohesion. When terrorist organizations lose their members in conflict, this has a potential to strengthen the feeling of comradeship among the remaining members. Moreover, when faced with lethal state repression, terrorists are forced to go underground, which in turn leads them to lose their connections to the outside world. Losing the connection to the outside world makes terrorists become more dependent on their organization and their comrades. As a result, militaries may create an environment that strengthens terrorist organizations by improving the group cohesion.

2. Impact on the Military

It is clear that fighting against a terrorist organization is much different than fighting a conventional foe. Because of this huge difference between fighting terrorism and conventional war, and because of the tendency of militaries to prepare themselves for a fight between states, militaries are required to make fundamental changes in their organizational structures and in the ways that they normally fight in order to counter

² Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism Past and Present,” in *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles W. Kegley (Ann Arbor: Prentice Hall, 2003), 102.

terrorism. Those changes in the military may cause a diminishing effectiveness in the conventional fighting abilities. Militaries who fight terrorists risk being unable to fight against conventional state adversaries.

Another issue involves resources. There is a trend in the Western world to decrease military expenditures. This creates a priority problem for militaries all around the world. What should get funded? As militaries need new capabilities and new training programs to effectively engage terrorism, this complicates the existing budgetary squeeze. In other words, states with small military budgets may be forced to choose either a military with conventional duties or a military dealing only with counterterrorism.

3. Impact on Civil Society and Politics

Although civil society does not directly participate in armed conflicts, it usually suffers more than the combatants. This is also true for counterterrorist campaigns. One important casualty for the civilian side comes in the shape of losing their supremacy in the ruling of their country. The classic question of civil-military relations (i.e., who guards the guardians?) becomes more serious in some countries that use their militaries in their fight against terrorism, because militaries develop roles that in normal times belong to civilians.

Another problem caused by fighting terrorism with militaries is the militarization of politics. Politics involves finding solutions to the problems of the society. Terrorism is also a political problem and needs to be dealt with via political solutions. But if militaries and violence take priority over political solutions for a long period of time, there may grow a tendency in society to deal with all political problems through the use of arms.

The third problem is about the potential support of a certain group for the terrorist cause. If a terrorist organization claims to fight for the rights of a certain group, the use of the military, with its tendency to apply excessive force, can lead to the radicalization of the members of this group. Some otherwise neutral civilians may be encouraged to become active members or supporters of terrorist groups. There are examples of terrorist organizations like ETA that actually provoke the repressive actions of governments as a part of their strategy to recruit more people to their ranks. Militaries are equipped with

weapon systems that have a high potential to create collateral damage. Militaries also have different intelligence structures from the one that is needed in counterterrorist operations. These weaknesses make militaries highly likely to injure or kill people with little or no connection to terrorism. In the end, relatives or friends of those innocent people usually become attractive targets for terrorist organizations in their recruitment efforts.

The last problem related to society can be called the legitimacy problem, and it also stems from the potential of military organizations to use excessive force. States blame terrorist organizations because of their use of illegal force. But if states use force with no regard for legality, then they risk being morally equivalent to the terrorist organizations. In those cases when states fail to adhere to the rule of law, they risk losing their status of victim and lose the legitimacy of their fight against terrorism, both domestically and internationally.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

As the main purpose of this study is to find unintended consequences of using the military in counterterrorist missions and roles, there is a need to analyze the literature on the subject of effects of state policies. Unfortunately, there is scant work specifically focusing on the unintended consequences of state policies regarding terrorism, but Robert Jervis' classic book *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* clearly shows that, whatever the subject, state policies usually fail to bring the results they had intended.³ It is no different for counterterrorist policies. As Sir Michael Howard indicates, after a terrorist attack occurs, the attitude of "something must be done" takes precedence over everything, both among politicians and in society.⁴ In those cases, Crenshaw indicates the possibility that "...government's response to terrorism will

³ Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 61-66.

⁴ Quoted in Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, (London: Frank Cass, 2006), 90.

diminish democracy more than the acts of terrorism itself.”⁵ Public pressure usually leads policymakers to decide what to do against terrorism in a short period of time and with no real analysis of possible consequences.

According to Jervis, this kind of decision-making process is usually based on linear thinking, and linear thinking fails to find solutions to complex problems of political and social life like the problem of terrorism. Jervis argues that society and nature are pervaded by “systems.” Two main characteristics of systems are that: (1) “a set of units or elements interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system” and (2) “the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts.”⁶ Accordingly linear thinking, which tries to tackle problems as if elements in the system can be dealt with in isolation, fails to bring intended results and sometimes make problems even worse. After 9/11 and in the following political tumult, the so-called “War on Terror” and the “Bush Doctrine” took shape through just such linear thinking. According to the doctrine, global terrorism spread from politically and economically unstable countries like Afghanistan and Iraq.⁷ The cure for this problem was the promotion of democracy and free markets in these countries through the use of force and preventive war, namely the military option. According to the National Security Strategy of 2002, promotion of democracy and free markets would “make the world not just safer but better.”⁸ After nearly 10 years of effort, it is clear that the fundamental assumptions of this linearly shaped strategy are full of mistakes, and as Jervis suggests, the security of the United States and its allies has suffered.⁹ Consequently, there is a need to expand Jervis’ finding about how state policies bring unintended consequences for the subject of terrorism.

⁵ Martha Crenshaw, “Introduction,” in *The Consequences of Counterterrorism*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010), 2.

⁶ Jervis, *System Effects*, 6.

⁷ Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (2003): 367.

⁸ *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), I, 1.

⁹ Jervis, “The Bush Doctrine,” 383.

Research in counterterrorism requires a clear understanding of the importance of defining terrorism as it shapes the perception of the public and their representatives. The international community has failed to develop a definition of terrorism that meets with universal acceptance. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman identify more than 100 different definitions for the phenomenon of terrorism,¹⁰ and in a more recent study, they were able to decrease this number to twenty-two.¹¹ Nevertheless, it is clear that there are huge differences between academia and governments in defining what constitutes terrorism. As the purpose of this work is to make an academic assessment of the effectiveness of the use of armed forces in counterterrorist operations, the author will use a definition that will facilitate the research by creating an objective and unbiased understanding of terrorism. English's definition of terrorism is one that serves this purpose by answering the question of what is terrorism:

Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political aim; it can involve a variety of acts, of targets, and of actors; it possesses an important psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximizing political communication and achievement; it embodies the exerting and implementing of power, and the attempted redressing of power relation; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and as such it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage.¹²

This definition offers a solid foundation for a fruitful discussion for assessing the effects of using armed forces in counterterrorism missions by preventing an implied pejorative understanding of terrorism.

1. Theoretical Perspectives in the Field of Counterterrorism

Ideally, states should be able to track suspicious acts by individuals who are trying to launch a terrorist organization, and should be able to contain these acts. In

¹⁰ Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), 119–58.

¹¹ Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 32–37.

¹² Richard English, *Terrorism: How to Respond* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 24.

reality, states are rarely able to do that. Administrations make their counterterrorism decisions in a reactive fashion, after a terrorist attack takes place and after it grabs the attention of the public. Counterterrorism decisions are reactive because terrorism is clandestine and the groups that practice it are small and unpredictable.¹³ Those characteristics also creates serious challenges for governments in terms of finding a balance between protecting the rights and liberties of their people and protecting their lives from the threat of terrorism. As a result, many scholars in the field of terrorism, with a desire to find a solution to this problem, tried to tackle questions like: what types of measures are governments able to use against terrorism? Are those measures in accordance with the rule of law? And are they effective or not? Those questions in turn created two basic models of counterterrorism: the criminal justice model and the war model.

The criminal justice model views terrorist action as a criminal act and proposes to fight it with respect to the rule of law.¹⁴ Proponents of this school claim that this model is more appropriate for liberal democracies that face a terrorist threat. This claim stems from the idea that if a liberal democratic country does not pay attention to the rule of law, it risks losing its legitimacy by undermining the authority of law, which is the basis of constitutional democracy.¹⁵ In this model, police forces together with the judiciary become the leading instruments of government in conducting the counterterrorism effort. In some cases, these instruments are supported by emergency legislation.¹⁶ Supporters of this model claim that police forces' closeness to civilian society, because of the nature of their duty, makes them much more suitable for a counterterrorist force as terrorists perform most of their actions among civil society.¹⁷

¹³ Fernando Reinares. "Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy, and the Threat of Terrorism," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 44 (1998): 351.

¹⁴ R. D. Crelinsten and A. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty Five Year Balance Sheet," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (1992): 334.

¹⁵ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 44.

¹⁶ Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Analysing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Communication Model," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14 (2002): 89.

¹⁷ Arie Perliger, Badi Hasisi and Ami Pedahzur, "Policing Terrorism in Israel," *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 36 (2009): 1280.

Although it is clear that this model has a better chance of protecting the basic values of liberal and democratic countries, its main deficiency is that there are not many studies that use empirical evidence and prove the effectiveness of the criminal justice model in neutralizing terrorist organizations with speed. Rather, most scholars seem to support the model with a normative instinct.

The alternate to the criminal justice model is the war model. This model views terrorism as a threat to the existence of the state and proposes to use military force and intelligence agencies with little or no respect to the level of aggression.¹⁸ In other words in this model, as terrorist organizations try to overthrow the current political power structure, they are met with overwhelming force, and military forces are the most appropriate instruments in applying the desired level of force.¹⁹

This approach is pretty much the standard response of an illiberal state to terrorist violence. Russia's counterterrorism measures against Chechen separatists in 2000s are a perfect example of the application of the war model in a domestic context.²⁰ The United States, although not an illiberal state and not as indiscriminate as the Russians, began to rely heavily on its military apparatus against terrorist acts with the Reagan administration's air strikes against Libya in 1986.²¹ This stance continues today, as can be seen from the current war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The main defect of this model is that it is highly controversial for a liberal democracy to use it, as there is a risk of losing the moral and legal high ground, which gives the states the advantage of legitimacy over their challengers.²²

Moreover, the main instrument of this model, the military, has an historical tendency to act autonomously when conducting its operations and that makes the issue of legitimacy more serious because of the lack of civilian control of counterterrorism

¹⁸ Crelinsten and Schmid, *Western Responses to Terrorism*, 310.

¹⁹ Peter C. Sederberg, "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (1995): 299.

²⁰ Geraint Hughes, "The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies," *Strategic Studies Institute* (2011): 25.

²¹ Crelinsten and Schmid, *Western Responses to Terrorism*, 316.

²² Perliger, Hasisi and Pedahzur, "Policing Terrorism," 1279.

measures. The classic literature in civil-military relations tries to find the perfect balance between democratic civilian control of militaries and military effectiveness. Samuel Huntington argues that high levels of military professionalism lead to better civil-military relations.²³ Morris Janowitz, on the other hand, argues that the organizational style of military heavily influences civil-military relations.²⁴ For the purposes of this study, arguments that link the threat environment to civil-military relations are especially worth considering. According to some scholars in the field of civil-military relations, militaries' engagement with missions like counterterrorism, especially in a domestic context, lead to a lack of civilian control over the military. Michael Desch and Alfred Stepan both argue that focusing on internal security problems like counterterrorism weakened the civilian control of the military and led to military rule in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Chile between the 1960s and the mid-1980s.²⁵ Stanislaw Andreski also supports that argument by proposing that it is much easier for the civilians to control militaries that focus on conventional missions like interstate conflicts.²⁶ Charles J. Dunlap even talks about the possibility of an American Coup in the future by indicating the negative effect of the current trends on the U.S armed forces (continued expansion in missions like counterterrorism and nation-building).²⁷

Earlier, it was suggested that to respond to terrorism and other non-traditional missions with the armed forces may weaken the military's abilities in conventional war fighting. Gian P. Gentile, critical of the U.S. military's counterterrorism and nation-building missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, summarizes his point by indicating: "If a rifle company commander sits down and reads the Army's high-profile doctrinal manuals, he

²³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1957), 74.

²⁴ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1971), 7-16.

²⁵ Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore; London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 30-36; Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Alfred Stepan (Yale University Press, 1976), 47.

²⁶ Stanislaw Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 202.

²⁷ Charles J. Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters* 22 (1992): 4.

learns to be an occupier, a policeman, and an administrator—but not a fighter.”²⁸ Matt M. Matthews and Avi Kober propose a similar argument by linking the Israel Defense Forces’ humiliating battlefield defeat at the hands of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006 to its focus on counterterrorist operations since Israel’s invasion of Palestinian lands in 1987.²⁹ Dunlap mentioned another negative consequence of using the armed forces in non-conventional missions with regards to resources. According to him, using armies in missions other than conventional ones creates a perverse effect by diverting resources and focus from the original duties of the military like combat training and war fighting.³⁰

On the other side of this discussion, retired soldiers like John A. Nagl and Peter Mansoor argue that, at least for the U.S. military establishment, the focus must be on eliminating terrorism because it poses the greatest threat for the Western world right now.³¹ The main problem with these arguments is that discussions mainly revolve around the armed forces of the United States and cannot be generalized to other countries, which are engaged in counterterrorism operations, too.

In addition, as Crelinsten and Schmid indicate, although use of force against terrorists can be effective in destroying their coercive capabilities in the short term, there is also a high probability of creating cycles of violence and counter-violence, revenge and counter-revenge or creating more political leverage for terrorists by creating public sympathy, which in turn provides a new recruitment ground for terrorist organizations.³² As Maria Rasmussen indicates, in the case of Spain, ETA used these cycles of violence as a part of their strategy and named it as action-repression-action spiral.³³

²⁸ Gian P. Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 52 (2009): 28.

²⁹ Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, Long War Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 63; Avi Kober, “The Israeli Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31 (2008), 14.

³⁰ Charles J. Dunlap, “American Military Coup,” 4.

³¹ Peter Katel, “Rise in Counterinsurgency,” *CQ Researcher* 18, no.30 (2008): 697-720; John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 222.

³² Crelinsten and Schmid, *Western Responses to Terrorism*, 311.

³³ Maria Rasmussen, “Argentina: The End of Terrorism Through State Terrorism,” (paper presented at 4th International Conference on Terrorism: “The End of Terrorism. Lessons from a Comparative Perspective,” Zaragoza, Spain, November 15-16, 2010), 18.

Another side effect of the war model is that if the state fails to adhere to the rule of law and applies tactics like the “dirty war” in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s, this can create a counterproductive effect and cause increased group cohesion in terrorist organizations. According to Moyano, this is mostly because terrorists develop a perception that the organization defends them from the dangers of the conflict, and also because of their insistence on honoring the sacrifices of their fallen comrades.³⁴

Although the criminal justice and war models help scholars in shaping their arguments and research in the field of terrorism, in real life they do not exist in their purest form. Most of the countries apply parts of both models in a mixture that best applies to their specific contexts.³⁵

C. METHODS AND THESIS OVERVIEW

Nearly all countries in the world maintain armed forces to counter threats to their national interests. The critical question is whether terrorism should be in the mission definition of militaries or not. If the answer is yes, under what conditions should this happen? What if militaries fail to eliminate the threat of terrorism?

In order to find out the unintended consequences that militaries create while trying to achieve acceptable results against a terrorist threat, the author will focus on case studies in which state policies against terrorism failed to bring the intended results even after a long period of time. The first focus will be on the case of the British Army in Northern Ireland (1969–2007), because it is a unique case in which the state changed its policy from a war model to a criminal justice model. This change paved the way for success against the IRA. A discussion of the initial responses of the British government to the IRA in the 1970s will help to identifying the weaknesses of using the military, and it will also help to understand how the change in counterterrorism policy to the criminal justice model helped to find a way out of terrorism.

³⁴ Maria José Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 158.

³⁵ Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp, “A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(2001): 2.

Next, the case of Israel against Palestinian terrorism will be examined, as it will particularly show that militaries that focus heavily on counterterrorism missions lose their effectiveness in conventional fighting. The focus will especially be on the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah that took place in 2006.

Data and information gathering will mostly rely on secondary sources because these will provide much better background information and offer less biased analysis of the cases being analyzed. The author will also use some government reports as primary sources, especially while trying to assess the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies.

The thesis will consist of four chapters. Chapter I provided general background information about the counterterrorist policies implemented by governments and about their possible unintended consequences. Chapters II and III will look at the cases of Northern Ireland and Israel, respectively. In both these cases, the focus will be on the negative effects of militarized counterterrorism. In Chapter IV, all the findings of the study will be gathered to discuss the consequences of using the military in counterterrorism missions and roles.

II. THE BRITISH ARMY IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Northern Ireland was the scene of a sectarian conflict and terrorist campaign between 1968 and 2007. One of the main actors in this scene was the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The split that took place in the IRA in 1970 led to the formation of the Provisional IRA (PIRA), and since then the PIRA has been the foremost terrorist group in the conflict between the terrorists and government forces. Other terrorist groups like Real IRA on the Catholic/Nationalist side and the ones like Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) or Ulster Defense Association (UDA) on the Protestant/Loyalist side also took part in the conflict. Government forces usually ignored these other terrorist groups (especially the ones on the Protestant side) because they did not pose any significant threat against the police or the army. Therefore, the counterterrorist efforts of government forces usually took place against the activities of the PIRA, which sought to establish an all-Ireland state on the island by expelling the UK from Northern Ireland. It is important to note that, even though the start of the “Troubles” was largely due to the civil rights protests organized by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), the goal of PIRA’s terrorism campaign always focused on reunification of the island. In relation with that, it is appropriate to identify the conflict in Northern Ireland as an ethnic inter-communal struggle between two different identities (i.e., the Protestants and the Catholics).³⁶

The United Kingdom was mainly a conciliator between these two entities. Nevertheless, as a result of the terrorist attacks, the UK government found itself in the middle of a counterterrorist campaign, which lasted for more than three decades. The British Army was one of the main actors of the government’s counterterrorist effort. Since its deployment to Northern Ireland in August 1969, the Army stayed in the center of many controversies. Although deployed to bring an end to the problems in the island, the army itself became a part of the problem especially during the peak of the conflict in the beginning of the 1970s. This chapter will primarily focus on the inefficiencies of the British Army as a counterterrorist force in Northern Ireland. Secondly, the positive effect

³⁶ James Dingley, “Northern Ireland and the ‘Troubles’,” in *Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland*, ed. James Dingley (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 10.

of the British government's decision to give police forces primacy in the counterterrorist campaign will be analyzed. The findings of this chapter prove that British Army's leading role in the counterterrorist campaign in the beginning of 1970s played an important role in the escalation of the conflict, and only after giving primacy to the police forces in the middle of 1970s did the UK start to pave the way to success against the terrorist threat.

Events that led to the deployment of the British Army had their roots in history. The island was partitioned into two pieces after 26 counties in the south formed the independent Ireland in 1922. Six counties in the north stayed as a part of the UK and were governed by a local parliament, which is usually referred as "Stormont." In the elections that followed, Protestants won the 40 of 52 seats in Stormont and in order to sustain the advantage they gained against the Catholics in the state structure, they started to use the powers of the government. The aim was to prevent Catholics from gaining political power and influence, which would possibly lead to unification with Ireland. Unionists best expressed their aim with the motto of "No Surrender."³⁷

The discrimination against the Catholics gradually increased and started to become unbearable in the beginning of the 1960s. The most important problem was economic deprivation. It was much harder for a Catholic to find a job in government or the private sector than it was for a Protestant. In addition, traditional industries of Northern Ireland like shipbuilding and textiles were in decline. There were also problems in government housing as a result of discrimination. Nevertheless, Stormont was unwilling to address these problems due to fear of losing the Protestant supremacy in the region. Catholics responded to the discrimination by forming the NICRA in 1967. The NICRA followed the example of civil rights movements in the United States. The organization assembled marches to protest discriminatory policies of Stormont and demand social reform.

Although these marches took place peacefully at first, they caused a growing fear in the Protestant population that the movement could lead to unification with Ireland. Loyalists started to organize violent attacks on the marches in the end of 1968. The

³⁷ UK Ministry of Defence, *Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland* Army Code No. 71842 (2006), 2-2.

violence between the two groups escalated during the summer of 1969. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the police force of the island, and its reserve force B Specials were in many cases overwhelmed by the intensity of these riots and clashes. Moreover, Catholics were blaming the RUC and especially the B Specials for taking sides with Protestants during these events. Catholics were largely right in their allegations about the RUC and B Specials because, as part of the discrimination, the majority of these forces were Protestants, and a considerable number of police were in a very close relation/sympathy with loyalists and the idea of loyalism.³⁸

The Apprentice Boys March of Protestants in Londonderry that took place on August 12, 1969 was the event that brought the British Army to the streets of Northern Ireland. Although Stormont was aware of the possibility of violence between Nationalists and Unionists, the government had decided to allow the march to take place with the fear of political backlash. Though half of the 3,000-strong RUC were in Londonderry to control any possible violence, when what later became known as “Battle of the Bogside” started, it soon became clear that it was out of RUC’s capacity to contain the violence between the two communities.³⁹ Stormont used all its security capabilities to suppress the uprising, which spread to the other parts of the country during the process, before demanding the use of military from the British government. In response, the 1st Battalion the Prince of Wales’s Own Regiment of Yorkshire moved to Londonderry in the early evening hours of 14 August 1969 and became the first Army unit to deploy to the streets of Northern Ireland. A spokesman in Whitehall promised that the soldiers would be back in their barracks in a couple of days. In August 1969, the number of British troops in Northern Ireland was 2,700 in three brigade areas. The number reached its highest at 30,300 in July 1972.⁴⁰

³⁸ Desmond Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984*, (London: Methuen, 1985), 11.

³⁹ UK Ministry of Defence, *Operation Banner*, 2-3.

⁴⁰ Alistair Irwin and Mike Mahoney, “The Military Response,” in *Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland*, ed. James Dingley (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 200.



Figure 1. Northern Ireland⁴¹

⁴¹ From Huntingdon College website, <http://fs.huntingdon.edu/jlewis/syl/ircomp/MapsIreland.htm> (accessed November 13, 2012).

The mission of the Army was to establish a barricade in areas that connected Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods, therefore preventing clashes between the two communities. Public reaction to the soldiers' presence on the streets was mostly positive. Catholics viewed the military as a protection from Loyalist attacks. A Private from the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment described how the initial stages of military operations were like a honeymoon:

We used to do observations from the top of Divis Flats—always tea and coffee from the Catholics. We had a position down on the peace line, and every morning at 6:30 this little old lady used to travel across with a fully cooked breakfast for two of us, every morning...At Christmas we were invited out for dinners and on every step there was a bottle of whiskey to take back to the boys....At that stage I had no fear. Things were good.⁴²

Unfortunately, the honeymoon period did not last long. Military and political leaders made a couple of serious mistakes in important turning points. When coupled with the tactics of the Republicans, these mistakes led to one of the most lethal and complicated terrorist campaign in history.

A. FALLS ROAD CURFEW

The first big mistake took place in the predominantly Catholic Falls Road area of Belfast. On Friday, July 3, 1970, a RUC unit and two platoons of troops conducted a search for arms that started at 4:30 pm and was nearly over by 5:30 p.m. after the units found a cache of small arms. A couple of minutes later, a large riot erupted in protest of the search operation. Republicans had viewed the event as an attempt to render the Catholic community defenseless against Protestant attacks. Protesters used bricks, stones and small arms fire against the Army units, and the Army replied with CS gas (tear gas), and small arms fire. The overall military leader in Northern Ireland at that time was General Ian Freeland. As the General Officer Commanding (GOC), he was commanding all troops in Northern Ireland. In an attempt to control the escalating violence, the GOC imposed a "curfew" in the area. The curfew lasted for thirty-four hours and, while continuing to fight against rioters, soldiers also conducted searches in houses that they

⁴² Thomas Hennessey, *The Evolution of the Troubles: 1970-1972* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 6.

suspected of harboring weapons and ammunitions. The Army's conduct during the curfew, with its tendency to use excessive force and not respect persons' private lives and property, created enormous animosity towards the military among the Catholic community. The soldiers had fired 1,454 rounds and had used around 1,600 cartridges and cans of CS gas.⁴³ A study of arrests of curfew breakers also revealed that none of them had any kind of criminal offences related to terrorist activities.⁴⁴

The Army's tendency to use firearms during the events caused several innocent civilian casualties. William Burns was standing at his doorstep together with one of his neighbors and was merely watching the events when he was shot dead by soldiers' fire. An Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) struck Charles O'Neill, aged 36, while he was trying to communicate with soldiers. Zbigniew Uglik, a 24-year-old freelance journalist, also was shot dead by the Army when he was mistaken for a gunman. In all, four civilians were killed and sixty-eight injured during the events.⁴⁵

In addition to innocent civilian casualties, misbehavior while conducting searches in houses helped to alienate Catholics from the British Army. Mrs. Marry McCann of Plevna Street accused soldiers of "dashing into her house and ripping up the linoleum on the kitchen." She added: "They smashed the windows, wrenched the locks off the doors and then pulled the staircase down." Seamus Kennedy from Granville Street blamed the soldiers for ordering his twin sisters out of their beds.⁴⁶

According to the Army, the responsibility for the innocent people's sufferings lay on the gunmen and their violent behavior against the soldiers. Although the Army had a different perspective about the events, the damage had been done and after "Falls Road Curfew" the Catholic community was no longer on friendly terms with the Army.

Behind the soldiers' misbehavior was the influence of viewing the operation as a battle or war. The Army's focus was to end the violence immediately. Therefore, it

⁴³ Tony Geraghty, *The Irish War* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998), 37.

⁴⁴ Colm Campbell and Ita Connolly, "A Model for the 'War Against Terrorism'? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew," *Journal of Law and Society* 30 (2003): 358.

⁴⁵ Hennessey, *The Evolution of the Troubles*, 42.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

focused on control over territory as in traditional military operations and, to achieve this aim, soldiers applied brutal and suppressive actions against whoever seemed to try to stop their actions. After all, in an Army report to London, the events were described as “a battle.” For the soldiers, mistakes were only natural in battle.⁴⁷

The Curfew had both political and diplomatic repercussions. On the political level, many moderate Catholics started to identify themselves with the Republican movement. A Catholic from Downpatrick commented: “As a Catholic I cannot but feel bitter that...an immeasurable amount of suffering has been visited on my co-religionists...this time by the very forces which initially were called in to protect them.” An elderly woman said: “They will never beat the Irish. They will never beat us like that.”⁴⁸ In thirty-four hours, the Army’s “cordon/curfew/search” operation had created an important propaganda and recruitment instrument for Provisionals specifically and for the Republican cause generally. On the diplomatic level, demands of some Catholic politicians like Paddy Devlin asking for the intervention of Ireland to protect Catholics caused tensions between Dublin and London. Ireland’s Minister of External Affairs, Patrick J. Hillery, paid a secret visit to the Falls Area on July 6; this visit also infuriated London and he was blamed for diplomatic discourtesy for visiting the area without informing British officials.⁴⁹

The legality of the Curfew was also questionable. In a meeting in Parliament after the events, Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials declared: “No formal curfew was imposed...Restrictions on movement were imposed in the interest of the safety of the population as a whole and to restrict the operations of armed criminals.”⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the Army’s situation report (SITREP) for the day acknowledged the curfew by saying: “at 2200 hours curfew orders issued for the Falls Area, this curfew to remain until further orders.”⁵¹ The Army was operating in Northern Ireland under the common law.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 44-45.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 44-45.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 45.

⁵⁰ Campbell and Connolly, “1970 Falls Curfew,” 352.

⁵¹ Ibid., 353.

According to the common law, in case of a riot or an insurrection every subject including soldiers and police had a right and legal duty to use force to stop the rioters. Yet the common law did not authorize security forces to impose curfews. The only legal basis that gave permission to a curfew was the “Special Powers Regulations” of the Stormont government. According to the 19th article of these regulations, Stormont had a statutory power to impose a curfew in Northern Ireland. The GOC had not requested from Stormont the authority to impose a curfew in the Falls Area under these regulations and had taken the decision by himself. As the common law did not allow the GOC to do so, and the Stormont did not authorize it under the Special Powers Regulations, the curfew imposed over the Falls Area was illegal.

The Falls Road Curfew, with its negative effect on the Catholic community, was mainly a result of insufficient legal frameworks and the mistakes of inexperienced and untrained military forces that were not suited to work in an urban environment with an original police duty. The event caused enormous changes in the relations between the Army and the Catholic community. One soldier described this change:

The week before the curfew, I would actually march my troops unarmed into the Falls to a Catholic church to go to church to show that we had confidence in [the Catholics]. We were unarmed and we marched down the road and into the church. A week later it was a reverse situation. I don't believe the Army would have marched down since that day, unarmed down the road.⁵²

Unfortunately, it was not the last mistake of the British Government and security forces and the circumstances went from bad to worse. PIRA started to escalate its campaign against the security forces during the rest of 1970 while using propaganda opportunities like the Falls Road Curfew to increase its ranks. The number of incidents and deaths were clearly showing the escalation. While there were 73 shooting incidents in 1969, it was 213 in 1970. The number of bombing incidents had risen from 10 to 170 and the number of deaths had nearly doubled from 14 to 25.⁵³

⁵² Quoted in Maria José Moyano Rasmussen, “The Military Role in Internal Defense and Security: Some Problems,” The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School Occasional Paper #6, 1999, 20.

⁵³ Irwin and Mahoney, “The Military Response,” 202-203.

Brian Faulkner, Stormont Prime Minister since March 23, 1971, was under enormous political pressure because of the deteriorating security situation. The Protestant community demanded much more robust security measures from the government. In response, Faulkner declared in a speech in Stormont on May 25: “At this moment any soldier seeing any person with a weapon or seeing any person acting suspiciously may fire either to warn or may fire with effect, depending on the circumstances and without waiting for orders from anyone.”⁵⁴ This declaration caused disturbances among the Catholic population and they labeled it as a formal policy of state repression. PIRA also used the declaration for propaganda purposes whenever a civilian was killed in disputed circumstances, by saying that it was because of Army’s “shoot to kill” policy. As the political rhetoric toughened against the terrorist attacks, the PIRA increased the intensity of its attacks against the security forces and against the symbols of the Protestant community and the Protestants themselves.

B. INTERNMENT

When the PIRA reacted violently to the annual Protestant parades that started in the beginning of July 1971, Faulkner started to view the option of internment as the only other major counterterrorist instrument in his arsenal. Internment had worked during the 1956–58 IRA campaign and many Unionist hardliners were thinking that it would work again. In 1957, the internment had been applied in both the south and north of the island and had indeed been effective in reducing the level of violence during that time; however, Dublin was not in a position to support internment this time. Dublin’s lack of support was seriously undermining the possibility of success because it was easy for the Republicans to go and find refuge in the southern side of the border.

General Harry Tuzo had replaced General Freeland in March 1971 and had been the GOC NI for nearly four months when Faulkner started to pressure him for the internment. He was openly against the internment because he thought he was in a position to reduce violence by using alternative strategies like larger cordon and search operations or greater restriction on border traffic. In a conversation with the Chief of

⁵⁴ Hennessey, *The Evolution of Troubles*, 99.

General Staff (CGS) Sir Michael Carver, he stated: “he did not recommend internment on military grounds: he considered it militarily unnecessary.”⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the worsening security situation was forcing Faulkner to use internment. By the beginning of August 1971, there had been over 300 explosions, 320 shooting incidents and over 600 people had been treated in hospital for injuries caused by terrorist incidents. Under these conditions, London gave green light to “Operation Demetrius” (the codename for the internment operation) on August 5.⁵⁶

The Army was responsible for the implementation of Demetrius. The RUC was to provide the list of names; 3,000 soldiers would then detain those named from their houses, with the hope of finding them sleeping in their beds peacefully. As it did in classic conventional operations, the Army Headquarters in Northern Ireland (also known as Lisburn) prepared a detailed plan for the execution of the operation and rehearsed it beforehand. Although these rehearsals did not include soldiers actually going out on streets and walking around their assigned houses, it created some unusual activities that were more than enough for Republicans to understand that internment was close. Statements by politicians and the discussion about internment in the press had also helped Republicans to be alert for an immediate internment operation. Therefore, when Operation Demetrius started at 4:15 a.m. on Monday, August 9, the most important terrorists were not sleeping in their beds waiting for the Army. Three hundred and forty-two people were arrested and the number of Protestants among them was zero. The fact that no Protestant was arrested that day disturbed the Catholic community enormously and further alienated them.

Although some government officials claimed that the internment and the following interrogation of internees saved many lives, it was a fact that the number of deaths had increased after the introduction of internment. In the following week, twenty people died and it was almost equal to the number of deaths that took place during the

⁵⁵ Ibid., 120.

⁵⁶ Peter Taylor, *Brits: The War Against the IRA* (London: Bloomsbury, 2001), 66.

first half of the year. It did not take much time even for the soldiers to understand that the internment had created a total fiasco. The commander of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, stated:

It was a complete disaster. It turned a large number of the nationalist population, who at that time had been firmly on our side and very sensibly so, against us. To my simple mind, as a regimental soldier, it was lunacy. What it did was to put a few people inside who probably did not matter very much and it did not intern the people who did matter.⁵⁷

One of the main problems that caused internment to be a total failure was the lack of intelligence. Since the Army's deployment to Northern Ireland in 1969, the RUC was on the sidelines and had lost its capability to produce intelligence about the terrorist activities. In addition, the Army had not been able to create an intelligence structure that would cover the intelligence vacuum created by the inefficiency of police. Therefore, the list of suspects that became the basis of internment was relying on old data. The Army knew the lists were doubtful, but they had nothing better to go on. As the arrests started it became apparent that intelligence at hand was really poor. One of the suspects was a 77-year-old man who had been in the IRA campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s. Another was blind, and another in Armagh area had been dead for four years. In some cases, soldiers found out that the man they tried to find was living next door to the address they first tried and understandably these mistakes caused antagonism towards the military.⁵⁸

The other big mistake was the lack of supervision over what the Army did with the arrested people. The interrogations that took place after the internment were under the sole control of military technicians and there were no supervision from senior officers or politicians. Military intelligence specialists are trained for extracting information from prisoners of war (POW). They usually focus on learning information like the unit of the POW, formation of the units, their positions, their leaders and the overall morale of the units. The information extracting process is swift as time is of essence in using the gathered information. Therefore, the interrogation techniques that the Army used were not sensitive to the political situation. During the interrogations, the Army used what is

⁵⁷ Taylor, *Brits*, 67.

⁵⁸ Hamill, *Pig in the Middle*, 60.

called the “Five Techniques,” which included wall-standing, hooding, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and drink. The Army had developed the techniques after soldiers were subjected to similar behaviors when they were interrogated as POWs by the Chinese or North Koreans during the Korean War. Only eleven of the arrestees had been subjected to these techniques, but when the word got out that the Army had tortured people while interrogating them, it became a total embarrassment for the British government.

Torture allegations forced the British government to conduct two inquiries about the techniques that were used during the interrogations. The first inquiry concluded that there was no torture or brutality but there had been a “measure of ill-treatment.” The second one concluded that the techniques that interrogators used had been extremely effective in extracting information.⁵⁹ The Irish government was not satisfied with the results of the British inquiries and took the case to the European Court of Human Rights. In its verdict, the court ruled that Britain was guilty of “inhuman and degrading treatment.”⁶⁰ Overall, Operation Demetrius ended up as one of the biggest mistakes that the British government and the Army did during all of the counterterrorist campaign in Northern Ireland. After the internment, the Catholic community felt much more isolated and the PIRA had a better environment to rule in this isolated atmosphere. As a result of growing animosity toward the British government and the British Army in the Catholic community, the PIRA started to act as an alternative to the current governing structure. They collected protection money, allocated houses to people on Housing Executive estates, gained money through providing transportation with the fleet of black taxis, and even provided sports and social centers. They established their own justice system by using acts like tarring-and-feathering, kneecapping, and murder. In the end, the internment led the British government to further lose its legitimacy in the eyes of Catholics, and the PIRA was more than ready to fill this legitimacy gap.

⁵⁹ Taylor, *Brits*, 71-72.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 74.

C. BLOODY SUNDAY

At the end of 1971, the Army was far away from establishing a secure environment in Northern Ireland. When compared to 1970, shooting incidents had risen from 213 to 1,756, bombing incidents had risen from 170 to 1,515 and the number of deaths including both civilians and security forces had risen from 25 to 174.⁶¹

The third grave mistake of the British government and the Army took place on January 30, 1972 in Londonderry. On that Sunday, 1 Parachute Regiment of the British Army killed thirteen people, seven of them under 19 years old, and injured another thirteen, including one woman.⁶² This event (later to be known as “Bloody Sunday”) started as a peaceful march of the NICRA. The main aim of the march was to protest the government’s internment policy. It was also a challenge to the Stormont’s authority over the region as the government had put a ban on marches since August 9, 1971 and had renewed the ban at the beginning of 1972.

The military planned to contain the march in a certain area in order to prevent any violence flaring up between the Catholics and Protestants. Nevertheless, the Army expected a confrontation with the Derry Young Hooligans (DYH). The Commander of Land Forces (CLF) in Northern Ireland, Major General Robert Ford, described the DYH in a memo sent to his superior GOC General Tuzo:

[DYH] are gangs of tough teenage youths permanently unemployed, have developed sophisticated tactics of brick and stone throwing, destruction and arson. Under cover of snipers from nearby buildings, they operate just beyond the hard-core areas and extend the radius of anarchy by degrees into additional streets and areas.⁶³

Derry’s Protestant community was extremely disturbed by the acts of DYH and the CLF thought that if the DYH chose to riot against the military at the end of the march, this would give the Army a very good opportunity to identify and arrest its ringleaders, therefore crushing the backbone of the Hooligans. General Ford brought the 1 Parachute

⁶¹ Irwin and Mahoney, “The Military Response,” 202-203.

⁶² Hamill, *Pig in the Middle*, 91.

⁶³ Taylor, *Brits*, 87.

Regiment from Belfast to conduct the arrest operation. One reason for the selection of the 1 Para was that it had a reputation as tough on protesters in its operations in Belfast; the CLF hoped that this reputation had reached Derry and therefore would cause a level of deterrence over the rioters.⁶⁴ The plan was that the Royal Green Jackets were going to contain the march, and when the Hooligans started to attack the soldiers and became separated from the harmless civilians, 1 Para was going to come in and arrest the leaders of the DYH.

The march started rather peacefully in a sunny afternoon. The number of marchers was around 5,000. As the crowd closed in to William Street where the Army had placed a barrier, the mood suddenly changed from peaceful to violent. The hooligans took positions in front of the march and started to throw stones and bricks at the soldiers manning the barricade. Brigadier General Patrick MacLellan was the commander of British troops in Derry at the time of the operation, and he was the one who gave the order that started the arrest operation of 1 Para. He ordered the arrests after he became totally convinced that the rioters were separated from the peaceful marchers.

From this moment on the accounts of events differ greatly as both the Nationalists and the Army told a different story. The marchers and some bystanders alleged that the Army was not fired at, while the Army and some other witnesses like Guardian reporter Simon Winchester indicated that a wire-cutting party of soldiers were fired at by a possible IRA sniper from the Rossville Street flats which overlooked the Republican dominated areas of the city. While it is not totally clear who fired the first shot that day, what is clear is that the soldiers of 1 Para shot twenty-six people in highly controversial circumstances. It was not only the soldiers who were shooting. As 1 Para entered the scene, terrorists fired at them with their revolvers and sub-machine guns. Nevertheless, there was no evidence that any of the victims were armed and firing back at the soldiers at the time of shooting. Although the terrorists deserved to be blamed for using the

⁶⁴ Hamill, *Pig in the Middle*, 87.

civilian crowd as a screen while they were trying to shoot soldiers, the public and political perception of Bloody Sunday was that it was a massacre of innocent civilians and a huge blunder for the British Army.

1 Para's aggressive attitude during the incident was the main reason that created this blunder for the Army. The soldiers of the battalion clearly viewed the area as a military battle zone and regarded the rioters as their enemy. An army officer described the attitude of 1 Para:

The Paras are trained to react fast and go in hard. That day they were expecting to have to fight their way in. It was very tense. In those street conditions it is very difficult to tell where a round has come from. Once one was fired, that section, quite frankly, lost control.⁶⁵

A Para soldier who actually been there that day and fired shots at people who he believed as terrorists defined the mindset of his unit before and during the events:

The weapons were ready cocked. We were ready to go. As far as I'm concerned, we were under fire. It changed from an ordinary 'scoop-up' arrest operation to 'hey, someone is trying to kill me! Let's find out who it is and do the job back.'⁶⁶

That is the attitude that you would expect from a Parachute soldier in a hostile environment. He does not consider himself as a crowd control element; he just looks for targets, identifies targets according to his judgment and simply shoots them. Lieutenant Colonel Derek Wilford was the commander of 1 Para Battalion at the time of the events. He also acknowledged the military mindset during the events in an interview: "Quite honestly, I owned the Bogside in military terms, I occupied it."⁶⁷ This military attitude is obviously detrimental, especially in urban environments. Tony Geraghty explains why it is so harmful:

In wartime, missiles, machine-guns, even artillery are used to destroy a sniper. On a civilian battleground, the real victory is in the minds of people afterwards. Front-line soldiers, trained for a sacrificial role behind enemy lines [like the parachute soldiers], dedicated to taking as many as

⁶⁵ Ibid., 93.

⁶⁶ Taylor, *Brits*, 98.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 100.

possible of the enemy with them before they die, are not the best choice for urban warfare against terrorists dressed as civilians, a war fought in a jungle of moral subtleties.⁶⁸

In all the mistakes that the British government and the Army made in Northern Ireland, Bloody Sunday was the gravest of all. It not only gave the PIRA an enormous boost in terms of support and recruits, but also in the eyes of the members of PIRA, it legitimized their killings. It also led to the disbandment of the Stormont government and imposition of direct rule of Northern Ireland by the British government on March 28, 1972. In a good way, it also caused British politicians and soldiers to understand that a military solution to the problems of Northern Ireland was impossible. One young officer who served in Northern Ireland during events like Internment and Bloody Sunday affirmed this belief:

I suspect for the majority of soldiers at my level in those days, it was the realization that probably we were not going to win by just a military solution alone. Indeed at that time we thought we were still winning. But certainly I think with the outcry of 'Bloody Sunday' with the deaths of so many civilians, and the international storm of protest that that caused, we realized, I think, that a solution by military means alone was no longer possible, even if it was desirable in the first instance.⁶⁹

After "Bloody Sunday," violence in Northern Ireland reached its all-time highest levels. The number of shooting incidents rose from 1,756 in 1971 to 10,631 in 1972. The number of bombing incidents rose almost 20% compared to 1971 and reached 1,853. The number of deaths rose from 174 in 1971 to 470 in 1972.⁷⁰ In order to establish an acceptable level of law and order, on July 31, 1972, the military started Operation Motorman, which lasted until December 1, 1972. For this operation, the military made its largest troop concentration since the end of the Second World War. Over 28,000 soldiers took part in the operation.⁷¹ The number of troops in the island was increased by

⁶⁸ Geraghty, *The Irish War*, 63.

⁶⁹ Taylor, *Brits*, 108.

⁷⁰ Irwin and Mahoney, "The Military Response," 202-203.

⁷¹ UK Ministry of Defence, *Operation Banner*, 2-9.

reinforcements coming from Britain and Europe. Motorman helped to decrease the level of violence in the region significantly, but was unable to stop all terrorist activities of the PIRA.

As happened in Operation Motorman, the British government often needed to reinforce troop levels in Northern Ireland to contain violence when it seemed to be getting out of control. These reinforcements came either from mainland Britain or from the units that were stationed in Europe under NATO missions. As a result, the British Army got distracted from its original mission, which was the defense of Europe under NATO. Initially, the Army leadership viewed this as an opportunity for the infantry to sharpen their fighting skills. Nevertheless, it was not only the infantry that were assigned to this mission in Northern Ireland. Armor, artillery and engineers also needed to join the campaign and as the campaign got longer, it started to distract the British Army from its original missions. The sources and the training time that needed to be used for improving conventional war fighting skills were used for developing police type skills and resources went to the acquisition of crowd control equipment. As a result, commitment of troops to Northern Ireland had some adverse effects over conventional fighting skills of the British Army. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the British Army proved itself as a conventional fighting force when it won the victory against Argentina in the Falklands War of 1982.⁷²

D. POLICE PRIMACY

The fundamental step in marginalizing terrorist activities was the British government's decision in 1977 to give the police primacy in fighting terrorism. By that time, both the British side and the Republicans understood that the conflict was not going to end through violent means solely. Accordingly, PIRA had started to increase its political activities and the British politicians had started to take more initiative in shaping the strategy against the terrorists. Police primacy largely came as a result of this rising level of influence of civilians in policymaking. Under this new policy, the government viewed the activities of terrorists as criminal acts rather than military ones. By doing so,

⁷² Rasmussen, "The Military Role," 31.

the Army had the chance to reduce its profile in the region and started to get rid of its reputation as an occupying force. As a result, PIRA lost the ability to portray its activities as a liberation war between two armies. Police primacy brought other advantages, too. As the police force was much closer to the local population, it had a better chance to obtain useful intelligence. Unlike soldiers, police stayed in the area of operation permanently and built relations with the local community. These relations, in time, turned into intelligence links. Close proximity to people also helped the police to track the mood on the ground. In the meantime, with the police doing much of the counterterrorist missions, the possibility of British soldiers dying in operations decreased. In turn, the British government had the chance to implement policies more freely without any domestic pressure caused by the death of soldiers. Lastly, by putting police forces on the forefront of counterterrorism efforts, the government aimed to create an image of normality. Without such an image, it would be too hard for politicians to search for a political solution to the problems in the region. The police primacy made its impact in decreasing violence with great haste. The number of shooting incidents dropped from 1,908 in 1976 to 1,081 in 1977. Bombing incidents halved from 1,192 to 535, and number of deaths decreased to 112 in 1977 from 297 in 1976.⁷³

The police primacy, however, did not mean the end of the Army presence in the region. After June 1977, the government intended to use them largely for undercover work and left conventional law enforcement duties to the police. In spite of this intention of the government, the military continued to have its say over the security policies and maintained its primacy in some Republican dominated enclaves and in rural areas like South Armagh. In this new police primacy phase, the military continued to undermine the overall counterterrorist effort with some of its actions. For instance, the military refrained from coordinating its undercover operations and intelligence with the RUC because of the fear that the information would end up in wrong hands and any operation would be compromised. Unwillingness of the military to coordinate with the police led to some really serious mistakes. On one occasion in July 1978, a patrol of four Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers (the SAS had been publicly committed to operations in Northern

⁷³ Irwin and Mahoney, "The Military Response," 202-203.

Ireland in 1976, although a number of SAS soldiers had been secretly serving there since 1969) shot and killed 16-year-old John Boyle after mistaking him as a terrorist. One day before the incident, John Boyle had found a weapon in a graveyard next to his family's fields and had informed his father about the presence of the weapon. After his father contacted the police about the situation, the police decided to ambush the place in case someone came to collect the weapons. Police informed the SAS about the situation and a SAS patrol set up the ambush together with a detective constable, near to the graveyard on the same night. The police informed the family about the ambush in the morning but it was too late. Young John Boyle had returned to the site out of curiosity and, unaware of the ambush, was shot dead by the SAS troops. The soldiers also arrested the boy's brother and father, after they arrived to the scene and the Army announced that three terrorists had been stopped by an Army patrol. When the mistake was realized, the RUC made the explanation that Boyle family had no connection to any terrorist organization. In the following trial of soldiers for murder, both the military and police blamed each other for the mistake and as a result the relations and coordination between both sides deteriorated. In the end, again the overall counterterrorism effort suffered and the Catholics blamed the government for introducing a new kind of law: the "SAS law."⁷⁴

Coordinating intelligence between the police and the military has also been a problematic issue, both before the police primacy and after. The army had established 14 Intelligence Company in 1973 to gather intelligence, to recruit and to run informants. In 1976, SAS joined the intelligence structure and in 1981 the Force Research Unit (FRU) was tasked with the issue of identifying and recruiting agents. The RUC, especially after the police primacy in 1976, augmented its capabilities in intelligence gathering. The coordination between these different intelligence organizations was attempted in various ways. In the early 1970s, the coordination was established by Joint Operations Centers. Effective coordination was only established near the end of the 1970s by the appointment of a "Director and Controller of Intelligence" and by the establishment of "Tasking and Coordination Groups" (TCG) in each Brigade area. These TCGs increased the level of

⁷⁴ Hamill, *Pig in the Middle*, 230.

coordination by bringing the representatives of different intelligence organizations together in every different operational area.

Nevertheless, the level of coordination and cooperation between the military and police remained far from being perfect. The military long remained reluctant to accept police primacy. Police primacy also caused tensions in civil-military relations. Military leaders criticized politicians for being soft against the terrorists with the policy of police primacy and, when the security situation seemed to worsen after events like the murder of Lord Mountbatten in 1979, the GOC Sir Timothy Creasey pressured the government to return to Army primacy and tough measures like internment.⁷⁵ Between 1969 and 1993, security forces in Northern Ireland killed 348 civilians, 194 of whom had no connection to any terrorist organization. Of these 348 killings, 297 were committed by the military. Only two soldiers have ever been convicted for any of these disputed killings, due to legislations that are highly protective of disputed actions of security forces. By violating one of the most basic democratic principle that all citizens are equal before law, consecutive British governments throughout the “Troubles” both damaged their legitimacy in the eyes of some parts of the population and indirectly legitimized violent acts of the terrorists by leaving no channel for people to seek and find justice for the loss of their loved ones other than resorting to violence.⁷⁶

The British Army officially ended its operations in Northern Ireland in January 2007. Throughout its long deployment, the military had never been able to totally eliminate the terrorist threat caused by the PIRA and the British government had to publicly announce that it could not militarily defeat the PIRA. The military only managed to contain the terrorists at a certain level but PIRA remained as a threat. Moreover, the PIRA can be said to have achieved considerable success against the Army by managing to remove the Stormont parliament, by creating the perception of itself as defender of Catholics, by making large parts of the Catholic community view the Army as an enemy, and by provoking a cycle of action and overreaction especially in the early 1970s.⁷⁷ The

⁷⁵ Tuck, “Northern Ireland,” 171.

⁷⁶ Rasmussen, “The Military Role,” 33-34.

⁷⁷ Tuck, “Northern Ireland,” 178.

conflict in Northern Ireland ended after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The end came largely as all parties to the conflict restrained themselves from using force to find solutions to their problems, problems that had always been inherently political.

E. CONCLUSION

When the Army first deployed to the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969, the problem seemed simple. Violence had reached a level that the local police force was unable to contain it by itself; therefore, there was a need for reinforcements. The Army was the solution to this urgent problem. During the initial years of the conflict, successive British governments failed to supply the Army with a consistent overall strategy. The British politicians tried to achieve a position of impartiality between the Catholics and the Protestants, but failed to find a balance between the political and military factors. In the lack of political guidance, the Army had to take the responsibility of shaping the political and military policy for the province. In the end, the Army became a problem by itself as it started to become the primary tool of the British government in the face of rising violence caused by terrorist activities.

First of all, the Army, with its tendency to use excessive force and with its view of counterterrorism operations as a war, triggered events like the “Falls Road Curfew” and “Bloody Sunday.” The Army’s tough attitude towards terrorists worked to the advantage of PIRA by alienating the Catholics, and increased the support and recruits that the PIRA took from the Catholic community. A soldier from 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment described the reasoning behind being tough in counterterrorism operations: “Our philosophy was that a guy cannot throw a stone if he is running away from you and therefore we used to get stuck into them.”⁷⁸ This kind of attitude eventually led to a spiral of violence and around 1972, Northern Ireland nearly became ungovernable. With the increasing number of casualties from the Army, soldiers started to view every rioter as an enemy and dealt with them accordingly. One soldier noted: “I do not care what anybody

⁷⁸ Christopher Tuck, “Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter-Insurgency,” *Defense and Security Analysis* 23 (2007): 173.

says, we were at war and against an enemy that was good ... you could feel the hatred. It was like an animal, like something from Hell. And we hated them too with the kind of hatred I never thought could get into me because I am quite a nice bloke.”⁷⁹ Another soldier from the Royal Green Jackets mentioned how the Army had lost its temper in the face of rising violence: “I do not think we differentiated nearly enough between those who were the terrorists and those who were normal members of the population, and I think we paid very little regard to the impact that our operations would have on the majority of population.”⁸⁰ The attitudes toward the British soldiers among Republicans were likewise. Pat Cox, an avid Nationalist, described his perception of the conflict: “After all, we did not invite the British here. They came by force of arms many hundreds of years ago. They maintain their presence by force of arms and they will have to be removed by force of arms.”⁸¹ In the end, the Army with its tough attitude towards the Catholic community became a symbol of hatred amongst them, and as a result the conflict escalated to unimaginable levels.

The second problem was the lack of coordination between the Army and police and between the military leaders and politicians. Many times, military leaders and politicians could not agree on the strategy to deal with the PIRA. As most of the problems on the surface were security related, the military demanded a bigger say in the shaping of security policy and regarded military power as the fundamental way of dealing with the terrorists. Politicians usually were much aware of the political character of the conflict and knew that any solution that would bring peace to Northern Ireland was going to be a political one. In the beginning of the 1970s, there was no effective civilian control over the military in shaping the overall strategy in Northern Ireland and the military leaders, as they were naturally expected to do so, tried to solve the problems by using military power extensively. As the British government and politicians become much more involved with Northern Ireland as a result of the rising level of violence, they

⁷⁹ Ibid., 173.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 173.

⁸¹ Brendan O’Brien, *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 59.

looked for a solution in a less militarized and more politicized way and Republicans started to engage in normal political processes. The cooperation between Army and police was also problematic, usually due to organizational politics and personality clashes. Many military officials also believed that some of the RUC officers had their allegiance to the Unionist cause and therefore refrained from working closely with them with a fear of possible information leaks to Unionist groups.⁸²

Lastly, the problem of the intelligence structure remained among the most important causes of serious mistakes in Northern Ireland. As the RUC became marginalized in directing the security policy in 1969, the Army had to create its own intelligence structure and gather information from an environment that was largely alien to military units. In order to have timely and useful information, the Army and later Special Air Service (SAS) and RUC Special Branch developed new intelligence units and tactics. In the face of an inflation of intelligence organizations, there appeared a need to coordinate all these efforts. Only after the establishment of TCGs in late 1970s, did an effective intelligence structure take shape in Northern Ireland.⁸³

The findings from the Northern Ireland case support the main arguments of this study. The repressive actions of the British military helped the terrorists in recruiting and in further radicalizing the attitudes of existing members. The British military also had to devote an enormous part of its force to the conflict in Northern Ireland and had to ignore its main duty of defending Europe through NATO at that time. Nevertheless, it proved that it maintained its ability to fight and win conventional wars in the Falklands War in 1982. In addition, the highly autonomous position of the military with regards to counterterrorism policymaking in the early 1970s caused strains in the civil-military relations when civilian politics regained the initiative in policymaking in the middle of the decade. It can be said that there might have been worse problems in civil-military relations, if Britain had not been an established democracy. Lastly, Britain faced the threat of losing its image as a country respecting human rights after the incidents in

⁸² Paul Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32 (2009): 467.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 176.

which the military used excessive force. As a result of these incidents, the legality of the counterterrorism actions of the government was put into question, both domestically and internationally.

Overall, the use of military in Northern Ireland failed to normalize the security situation, especially at the beginning of the 1970s when the military was given a free hand in choosing and applying policies. The Army's tendency to use excessive force, its lack of intelligence about the region, and its unwillingness to cooperate with civilians and other security forces led to serious mistakes. Because of these mistakes, large parts of the Catholic community overtly or covertly supported the PIRA and some of them chose to become part of it. In the end, while the intended aim was to put an end to violence, the introduction of British Army to Northern Ireland led to more deaths and troubles.

III. THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES IN COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

The Israeli Parliament decided in March 2007 to name the July 12-August 14, 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel the Second Lebanon War. In this 34-day long war, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) failed to prevent almost 4,000 rockets from hitting northern Israel. As Uri Bar-Joseph, a prominent authority on Israeli security issues, mentioned: “For the first time since its establishment in 1948, the IDF failed to achieve one of its most fundamental goals—the defense of Israel’s hinterland from enemy attacks.”⁸⁴ How come one of the best fighting armies of the world failed to defend its country against an adversary that is not capable of fielding more than a couple thousand fighters?

This chapter will explain this outcome and other unintended consequences caused by the military’s heavy involvement in counterterrorism through an analysis of the IDF’s transformation of mission priorities in the last 25 years. This analysis reveals that the IDF’s heavy focus on policing missions in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the last quarter century severely impeded its capability of fighting large-scale joint force operations. In addition, in some cases military actions helped terrorist organizations rather than eliminating them.

A. ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE *INTIFADAS*

Since its foundation in 1948, Israel and its citizens have been the targets of countless numbers of terrorist attacks, both inside and outside the Israeli territories. As early as 1950, these terrorist attacks caused 50 civilian casualties. The number rose to 97 the following year and to 182 in 1952.⁸⁵ Against this terrorist threat, Israel’s main strategy was to conduct reprisal raids against the known bases of terrorists, which were

⁸⁴ Uri Bar-Joseph, “The hubris of initial victory: The IDF and the Second Lebanon War,” in *Israel and Hezbollah: An asymmetric conflict in historical and comparative perspective*, ed. Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 147.

⁸⁵ Sergio Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a conventional army* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 47.

mainly located in the neighboring Arab countries. The aim of these raids was to deter Arab countries that were supporting terrorists in their countries by making them pay a heavy price for this support. The then Chief of Staff (COS) of the IDF, Lt. Gen. Moshe Dayan, summarized this strategy in these words:

We cannot guard every water pipeline from explosion and every tree from uprooting. We cannot prevent the murder of a worker in an orchard or a family in their beds. But it is in our power to set a high price on our blood, a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army or the Arab government to think worth paying.⁸⁶

In spite of this persistent terrorist threat, the focus of the IDF stayed heavily on training and acquiring weapons for a conventional interstate conflict. The IDF and the policymakers named the terrorist threat as an “on-going” concern and did not let these concerns overshadow the primary threat posed by the presence of large and hostile Arab armies all along the Israeli borders.⁸⁷ While addressing the *Knesset* on October 21, 1985, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin stated the secondary or low-priority position of terrorism for Israel by saying: “[terrorism] hurts, it is annoying and disruptive, but it does not constitute a threat to the country’s very existence.”⁸⁸ Nothing, even the 1982 Lebanon War, which was an offensive movement that aimed to give a deadly blow to the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon, seemed to effect the position of the Israeli security establishment in putting the conventional threats ahead of all others.

However, the large-scale public riots that started in the occupied territory of the Gaza Strip in December 1987, which was called the *intifada*, created a new security environment that no longer permitted the IDF and the Israeli government to treat the threat of terrorism as a low-priority security concern. What started in the large Jabalya refugee camp as a funeral-protest after the death of four Palestinians in a traffic accident with an IDF tank turned into an all-out civilian rebellion, and dragged all of Israel—its government, its armed forces—into a quagmire. The rebellion soon increased its intensity

⁸⁶ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 48.

⁸⁷ Stuart A. Cohen, “How Did the *Intifada* Affect the IDF,” *Conflict Quarterly* 14 (1994), 7.

⁸⁸ Quoted in Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency*, 48.

and spread to the West Bank. In the first year of the *intifada*, a total of 314 people died, most of them Palestinians.⁸⁹ From 1988 to 1993, 421 Israelis were killed by Palestinians while at least 1,385 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces during the same period.⁹⁰ While many of the attacks against Israeli civilians and security forces were less than serious incidents such as stone throwing, the Israeli fatalities caused by terrorist attacks undertaken by newly emerging radical Islamist terrorist groups like Hamas and the rising number of fatalities of Palestinians caused by the actions of security forces forced the IDF to change its perception towards the *intifada*. In order to suppress this rebellion, the IDF started its largest operational commitment in the beginning of 1988, which has not ended yet.

The IDF's transformation from a conventional minded force to a riot control apparatus started rather reluctantly. The IDF leadership treated the *intifada* as another short-lived demonstration that had taken place in the territories before, and as happened before, used military units in a hurried fashion without giving them any kind of constabulary training whatsoever. Talented officers also refrained from taking command positions in the units assigned in the territories. This refrainment showed the lower importance given to counterterrorist missions by the Israeli officer corps in comparison to conventional missions.⁹¹

This reluctance diminished slowly and the ongoing resistance of the Palestinian public compelled the IDF to increase the quality of its officer corps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The focus of operations started to shift by the middle of 1988 from conventional duties to missions like imposing curfews, administering prisons for the detention of terrorists and suppressing public protests. The IDF also established and manned checkpoints in places connecting the Territories to Israel to prevent terrorists from entering Israel.⁹²

⁸⁹ "Fatalities in the First *Intifada*," B'Tselem The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, accessed November 8, 2012, http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables

⁹⁰ Raja Halwani and Tomis Kapitan, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Philosophical Essays on Self-Determination, Terrorism and the One-State Solution* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 146.

⁹¹ Cohen, "*Intifada*," 9.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 9-10.

Until the beginning of the *intifada*, Israel had followed the principle of minimal contact in the Territories. With this principle, Israeli leadership sought to lower the chance of friction between Israeli officials and Palestinians to prevent the image of occupier as much as possible. In line with this principle, before the beginning of the *intifada*, the IDF had preserved the security in the Territories with only one brigade, mainly consisting of reserve soldiers.⁹³ Nevertheless, the *intifada* and the rising role of the IDF in suppressing it forced the IDF leadership to increase the amount of troops substantially. The then IDF COS Dan Shomron indicated that in the beginning of 1988 “there were more troops in Gaza alone than had been used to occupy all the Territories in 1967.”⁹⁴ In sum, the *intifada* had forced the IDF to focus both mentally and physically on counterterrorism.

The changing nature of strategic calculations made it impossible for the IDF to abandon its fight against terrorism mainly caused by the events in the Territories. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Israeli leadership had welcomed the seizure of the Territories on the grounds that it would serve as a barrier between Israel and its Arab neighbors in a possible future conflict. Nevertheless, the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 decreased the likelihood of such a conflict and strategic value of the Territories lessened accordingly. Because of this strategic situation, the IDF kept control of the Territories with a very low number of troops, and dedicated most of its time and resources to conventional missions.⁹⁵

Along with the beginning of the *intifada*, strategic calculations and perception of threats started to change significantly among the policymaking circles in Israel. As the severity of terrorist attacks intensified, the Israeli political leadership and the public changed their understanding of terrorism from an “on-going security concern” to an “existential threat.” Viewing terrorism as an existential threat had a huge impact on the

⁹³ Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency*, 74.

⁹⁴ Cited in Don Peretz, *Intifada: Palestinian uprising* (London: Westview Press, 1990), 45.

⁹⁵ Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency*, 52.

mission prioritization of the IDF. After the *intifada*, it became politically and strategically nearly impossible for the IDF to consider fighting against terrorism a secondary issue.⁹⁶

Shifting priorities from conventional threat to terrorism forced the IDF to make changes to its war fighting style, at both the operational and the tactical level. Operationally, the IDF lost its aggressive, offensive, *blitzkrieg* style operations to an attritional warfare, which demanded a long-time commitment of military and economic resources. Since its establishment in 1948, the IDF had fought its wars in quick and decisive manner, and the effectiveness of this operational style had proved itself as very effective in the fights against Arab states in 1948, 1967 and 1973. Israeli leaders wanted to apply this method to quell the *intifada* in the opening months. Then Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin wanted from the IDF to end the demonstrations with a “swift display of overwhelming force.” Nevertheless he quickly realized that rather than a *blitzkrieg* style operation, it was an attritional warfare that Israel was facing.⁹⁷ Eventually, the IDF, although reluctantly, started focusing much more on the fight against terrorism. Substantial resources and training time were diverted from conventional missions to counterterrorism missions. Then Head of the IDF’s Central Command (March 1991- March 1993) Maj. Gen. Danny Yatom acknowledged this shift of time and resources:

Firstly, it was very difficult to divide resources, time, units for those two missions, which in many aspects, are contradictory, because if you wanted to prepare a unit for the next war, you should have given the unit the time and assets to conduct large-scale maneuver exercises, but if at the same time you needed the units to be deployed in Judea and Samaria [i.e., the West Bank], the units were no longer able to conduct the regular training programs. So, no doubt there were many disturbances.... No doubt, many training programs shortened and in many cases we had to just stop some of them.⁹⁸

The change of attitude in the operational level became even more serious when senior military leaders with large-scale combat experience retired near the end of 1990s.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 52.

⁹⁷ Stuart A. Cohen, *Israel and its Army: From cohesion to confusion* (London: Routledge, 2008), 46.

⁹⁸ Quoted in Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency*, 92.

Without the presence of experienced soldiers in conventional fighting in higher levels, the IDF became accustomed to fight against terrorism and focused on satisfactory achievements with an emphasis on minimal loss of soldiers rather than aiming for a decisive victory.⁹⁹

Dealing with terrorism also affected the IDF on the tactical level. To adjust to the new circumstances, the Israeli Army established new units that were designed to suppress demonstrations. These units were equipped with riot control equipment and started to use plastic bullets. The tactics and procedures that the IDF used during the *intifada* were very different from the ones that Israeli soldiers learned in military schools. The confusion that the *intifada* caused on the tactical level was evident in the words of Capt. (Res.) Noam Wiener:

...I remember specifically sitting in officer school and we talked about different types of battle—offense, defense and ambushes, retreat, pursuit of the enemy—we tried to think what arrests in the West Bank are, and they did not really fit. They are not offense, because you do not attack to withhold territory, they are not a raid, because it is not somewhere you go, attack and then retreat and try to make a maximum effect. I thought that it did not match any of the regular military schemes, because it is not a military job, it is police work.¹⁰⁰

As a result, when the *intifada* ended with the signing of Oslo Peace Accord on September 13, 1993, the IDF was operationally and tactically on a much different path than the one that it had been on December 1987. Nevertheless, even the Oslo Peace Process final-status talks, which started after the signing of Oslo Peace Accord, did not mean an end to the terrorist attacks that Israel faced. Aware of this threat, the military leadership kept its focus on getting ready for counterterrorism missions. It would not take long to put these preparations to a test.

The final-status talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel Government ended with a failure, and the visit of Ariel Sharon (at the time head of the Likud Party) to the Temple Mount Mosque on September 28, 2000 ignited the second *intifada*, which is

⁹⁹ Cohen, *Israel and its Army*, 50.

¹⁰⁰ Quoted in Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency*, 110.

often called the *Al-Aqsa intifada*. The level of violence in the *Al-Aqsa intifada* was much higher than in the first one. The tactics that the terrorists used this time were much more fatal. They included such methods as suicide bombings, short-range rocket and mortar attacks, roadside bombings and sniping. Due to the rising level of violence of the terrorist attacks, the IDF started to use much more lethal weapon platforms such as F-15I and F-16 aircraft and AH-64-A Apache and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters mostly in “surgical” air strikes. Artillery barrages and naval bombardment were other new counterterrorism measures that the IDF started to use with second *intifada*. Due to the increasingly bloody nature of the conflict, the number of fatalities raised enormously. The number of people who died in the first two weeks of the second *intifada* was equal to the number of deaths that took place in the first four months of the first one. Overall, 3,659 Palestinians and 1,063 Israelis died during the *Al-Aqsa intifada*.¹⁰¹ Together with the *Al-Aqsa intifada*, the operational and tactical changes in the IDF started to speed up again.

In order to decrease the casualty figures suffered against terrorist attacks especially in urban areas, the IDF upgraded its Tze’elim National Training Center in the Negev Desert. The aim was to improve the fighting abilities of Israeli soldiers in urban areas like the ones in the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁰² The IDF also started to use *Merkava* main battle tanks in order to improve protection of infantry units.¹⁰³

As it happened in the first *intifada*, most of the IDF units were required to remain continuously in the Territories throughout the years between 2000 and 2005. Consequently, Israeli soldiers did not have the chance to receive the training they needed to refine their fighting skills. An Israeli conscript spends 17 weeks a year in training, but since the beginning of the second *intifada*, they continuously served in the Territories and did not have this period of training.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency*, 105-108.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 115.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 109.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 154.

When the Second Lebanon War started on July 2006, 33 years had passed since the great victory that the IDF achieved against the Arab states in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the IDF of 2006 was nowhere near the IDF of 1973.

B. THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah terrorists infiltrated the border between Lebanon and Israel and kidnapped two IDF soldiers and killed three others. To divert attention from this operation, Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets and mortars to the Israeli side of the border. The Israeli side responded to these with large-scale air and artillery bombardment. In a short period of time, these limited actions escalated into a war lasting 34 days.

Prior to the conflict in Lebanon, the IDF had planned for a coordinated air and ground operation to oust Hezbollah from southern Lebanon and to disarm it. The name of the air operation plan was Ice Breaker (Shoveret Hakerach), and the ground invasion plan had been named Mey Marom. Then Chief of Staff of the IDF Lieutenant General Dan Halutz rejected the ground plan believing that the air campaign would be enough to achieve the aim of ending Hezbollah both militarily and politically.¹⁰⁵

At the start of the campaign, the main goal of the IDF was to neutralize rocket launchers and command and control centers of Hezbollah. In accordance with ICE BREAKER, Halutz also wanted to hit counter-value targets (enemy's population and economic centers) to compel the Lebanese government to pressure Hezbollah to stop its attacks into Israel territory. The Israeli government refused the demand on the grounds that it would damage the public support to the pro-western government of Lebanon and lead to its collapse.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Matthews, *Caught Unprepared*, 36.

¹⁰⁶ Kober, "The Second Lebanon War," 2.



Figure 2. Map of Theater (The Second Lebanon War)¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ From Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ13Ak01.html (accessed June 13, 2012).

On the night of July 13, the IDF seemed to be the winner of this short exchange against Hezbollah, because the Israeli Air Force (IAF) had managed to destroy most of the long-range rocket launchers and had seriously damaged Hezbollah command centers located in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut. When Halutz called Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to inform him about the success of the air campaign, he said: “all the long-range rockets have been destroyed. We’ve won the war.”¹⁰⁸ Apparently he was wrong. The next day the Lebanese government asked for a ceasefire, but the Israeli side refused with the intention of damaging Hezbollah seriously and breaking its backbone. As Avi Kober indicated, “In Clausewitzian terms, once the IAF completed its missions during the initial stages of the war...Israel reached the culminating point of the attack.”¹⁰⁹ From this moment on everything went worse for the Israeli side.

After the initial air campaign of the IAF, Hasan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, sent a taped message to the press. He addressed the Israelis: “You wanted an open war, and we are heading for an open war. We are ready for it.” Augustus Richard Norton, a retired U.S. Army officer and a former UN observer in southern Lebanon, later attracted attention to a special moment in this taped message when Nasrallah told listeners to look to the sea and there was a perfectly timed explosion on the horizon. The explosion caused by a C-802 Noor guided missile hitting the INS Hanit (a Sa’ar 5-class corvette of the Israeli Navy). The missile attack inflicted four casualties. As Norton indicated, this was a signal to the Israeli side that Hezbollah was very well prepared for this war.¹¹⁰

As the results of the IAF’s air strikes failed to bring the result of stopping rocket attacks and neutralizing Hezbollah as a force in Lebanon, the political and military leadership of Israel decided to use ground forces. The first large-scale ground incursion started on July 17. Soon, the Israeli units realized that they were in a different conflict from the ones that they had against terrorists in the Territories.

¹⁰⁸ Matthews, *Caught Unprepared*, 37.

¹⁰⁹ Kober, “The Second Lebanon War,” 4.

¹¹⁰ Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 136.

The main difference was that Hezbollah fighters did not abandon their positions after the initial contact with Israeli soldiers as they did in the past; instead they fought tenaciously to hold their positions. They even managed to surround the elite Maglan unit. The commander of the IDF's northern sector had to send reinforcements to save the unit.¹¹¹ Hezbollah fighters used a well-designed tunnel system to defend their positions. They combined this tunnel network with effective small arms, anti-tank and mortar fire, inflicting several casualties and damaging or destroying armored vehicles of Israeli units.

Faced with the inefficiency of regular units against entrenched positions of Hezbollah, Olmert and Halutz had no chance but to call up reserve forces on July 21. On the same day, Israel had to demand an emergency resupply of precision-guided munitions from the U.S., as the IAF had used all of its stocks and had failed to achieve the aim of stopping Hezbollah from firing rockets into the Israeli territory.¹¹²

In an attempt to control the ground positions that Hezbollah used to fire its short-range Katyushas, Halutz ordered the northern sector commander Lt. Gen. Udi Adams to capture the town of Bint Jbeil and wanted him to accomplish this mission by using only one battalion. Adams tried to increase the amount of troops, but Halutz rejected. The attack started on the morning of July 26 with heavy artillery fire. As the first units started to pour into the town at 0530, they came under intense fire from all around. Hezbollah fighters successfully maneuvered to flanking positions and hit the Israeli units from these positions by using direct and indirect fire.¹¹³ At the end of the day, the IDF had suffered 36 casualties, nine dead and 27 wounded.¹¹⁴ Dissatisfied with his performance, Halutz removed the northern sector commander Adams from his position and assigned Major General Moshe Kaplinsky to lead the ground effort in the north.

¹¹¹ Matthews, *Caught Unprepared*, 44.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 45.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹¹⁴ Anshel Pfeffer, "It was all so very fast-the shooting, the shouting," Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 28 July 2007, <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=29773> (accessed 13 June 2012); "Deadly Battles In Bint Jbeil: Fallen Soldiers' Stories," Ynetnews.com, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3282017,00.html> (accessed 13 June 2012).

On the first day of August, the reserve forces gathered around the border areas. As they started to get into fighting in Southern Lebanon, it became very soon evident that they were seriously lacking in discipline and training. A reservist from Jerusalem confessed that:

In the past six years I've only had a week's training. Soon after we arrived, we received an order to seize a nearby Shi'ite village. We knew that we were not properly trained for the mission. We told our commanders we could control the village with firepower and there was no need to take it and be killed for nothing. Luckily we were able to convince our commander...For the last six years we were engaged in stupid policing missions in the West Bank. Checkpoints, hunting stone-throwing Palestinian children...the result was that we were not ready to confront real fighters like Hezbollah.¹¹⁵

By August 5, the IDF had deployed more than 10,000 soldiers in southern Lebanon, but Hezbollah was still holding to their positions in the towns of Maroun al Ras and Bint Jbeil and rockets were still hitting Israeli neighborhoods.¹¹⁶ On August 11, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1701, which called for a "full cessation of hostilities..."¹¹⁷

Olmert and the Defense Minister Amir Peretz decided to send more ground forces into southern Lebanon to establish a buffer zone at the northern side before the conflict come to a total end. This last-minute assault led to additional disasters for the IDF.

Upon receiving the order to move northwards, the airborne reserve division entered the town of Dibel on August 11. When the Hezbollah fighters engaged the division with small arms fire upon entering the town, some 110 reserve soldiers entered buildings around to find cover.¹¹⁸ This was a tactic that the IDF forces used when they were fighting against terrorists in the Territories. The tactic was very effective against

¹¹⁵ Uzi Mahnaimi, "Humbling of the Supertroops Shatters Israeli Army Morale," *TimesOnLine*, 27 August 2006, <http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/?p=5147> (accessed June 13, 2012)

¹¹⁶ Matthews, *Caught Unprepared*, 51.

¹¹⁷ "Security Council Calls For End To Hostilities Between Hizbollah, Israel," United Nations Security Council SC/8808, 11 August 2006, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm> (accessed June 13, 2012).

¹¹⁸ Kober, "Second Lebanon War," 16.

lightly armed Palestinian terrorists, but this time the enemy had anti-tank guided missiles. Two Hezbollah antitank missiles hit the building and killed 9 and wounded 31 IDF soldiers. The habits that the IDF soldiers made during years of policing missions against Palestinian terrorists were proving to be extremely detrimental for the conventional fighting abilities of the IDF. Before the ceasefire went into effect on August 14, the airborne reserve division had managed to move only one mile northwards.¹¹⁹

Another instance around the region of Wadi al-Saluki revealed the current situation of the long-feared IDF armored units. When 24 tanks of Brigade 401 entered the area, they supposed that the infantry units of Division 162 had cleared the area from Hezbollah fighters, which quickly proved to be wrong. As the leading two tanks entered the town, they found a collapsed building blocking the main road. While they were trying to figure out what to do, an explosion from an IED or mine collapsed the road. Immediately after the explosion, the entire column left under a swarm of antitank missiles. At the end of the shooting, 11 of the 24 Merkava tanks had been hit by anti-tank missiles. One important detail showed how much the IDF had lost its conventional fighting abilities. During hours of fighting in Wadi al-Saluki, all tank crews had failed to use their smoke screens to protect themselves from the missiles. It was pretty normal, as they did not need them for years against stone-throwing Palestinian children.¹²⁰ A total of 400 tanks joined the fight in southern Lebanon; 48 were hit.¹²¹

Heavy involvement of the IDF in Israel's counterterrorist effort not only debilitated its conventional fighting ability but also undermined the overall counterterrorism campaign in other ways.

First of all, because the IDF used excessive force and caused civilian casualties in most of its operations, the attitudes of Palestinians towards terrorism changed dramatically. While Palestinian support to suicide attacks was around 25% during the

¹¹⁹ Matthews, *Caught Unprepared*, 52.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 64.

1990s, it was about 75% during the first two years of the *Al-Aqsa intifada*.¹²² In addition, Palestinians became much more inclined to favor military operations in their struggle against the Israelis. When the IDF operations intensified during 2002 and 2003, the percentage of Palestinians supporting the continuation of military operations against Israeli targets reached about 70%, up from around 35% at the end of 1990s.¹²³ The rising level of violence also galvanized support for military action among the Israeli population. In 2002, around 75% of the Israelis favored the military option in controlling Palestinian terrorist activities.¹²⁴

Second, arbitrary killings of Palestinian civilians by the IDF inspired retaliatory motivations, especially among young Palestinians. This desire for vengeance in large part turned into suicide attacks against Israeli targets. Nafez al-Nether admitted the role of vengeance by saying he wanted to avenge the blood of Palestinians killed by Israel before detonating himself and killing several Israeli soldiers on July 9, 2001. It was no surprise that one of these Palestinians whom Nafez avenged was his own brother Fayez, who died during the first *intifada* in clashes in the Jabalya refugee camp.¹²⁵

Third, by replying to Palestinian terrorist attacks in an equal or much more violent way, the IDF worked to the advantage of radical groups like Hamas that seek to become popular among Palestinians by trying to create a popular image of the protector of the people. Largely due to this perception among the population, Hamas managed to win the elections in January 2006 by receiving around 39% of all votes.¹²⁶

Fourth, the active role that the IDF played in the policymaking process with regard to counterterrorist effort caused problems in civil-military relations. The role played by the civilians in devising counterterrorist strategies largely remained marginal

¹²² Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 55.

¹²³ "Tracking Palestinian Public Support for Armed Resistance during the Peace Process and Its Demise," Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre, accessed November 13, 2012, http://www.jmcc.org/documents/JMCC_Armed_Resistance_December2011.pdf.

¹²⁴ Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency*, 108.

¹²⁵ Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second *Intifada*: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26 (2003): 73.

¹²⁶ "Tracking Palestinian Public."

since the beginning of the first *intifada*. In critical matters like the peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israel during the 1990s, it was the IDF general staff's strategic planning division that shaped the political position of the Israeli government. After Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister in 1996, he declared that he viewed it as detrimental for the IDF to be involved heavily with political matters. When Netanyahu tried to prevent military officials from taking place in political discussions, senior officers criticized him publicly for doing that. Netanyahu become largely unsuccessful in establishing civilian supremacy over policy matters and lost elections against a former soldier Ehud Barak in 1999. Barak also had problems with the IDF when he chose to continue negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in 2000 in spite of the rising violence because of the second *intifada*. The military perceived the continuing struggle against terrorists as a war and found it irrelevant to further political negotiations. Major General Moshe Ya'alon, as then the head of the IDF Central Region Command, criticized the cabinet members and prime minister publicly for damaging the IDF's ability to win the battles.

C. CONCLUSION

The Israeli State faces a number of state and non-state threats. As a result of this, it is much more difficult for the Israeli political and military leaders to understand the character of conflict that they face. Clausewitz argued that:

The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.¹²⁷

The IDF treated Hezbollah as the adversary it faced in the Palestinian territories and paid the price for this mistake. As the former chief of the IDF's Operational Theory Research Institute, retired General Shimon Naveh, indicated:

¹²⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88–89.

... The IDF fell in love with what it was doing with the Palestinians...in fact it became addictive. You know when you fight a war against a rival who is by all means inferior to you, you may lose a guy here or there, but you are in total control. It is nice you pretend that you fight the war and yet it is not really a dangerous war....I remember talking to five brigade commanders....I asked them if they had an idea...what it meant to go into battle against a Syrian division? Did they have in mind what a barrage of 10 Syrian artillery battalions looked like?¹²⁸

General Naveh's words clearly show that the IDF officers and soldiers had distanced themselves from conventional fighting. Years of policing missions in places like Gaza or the West Bank made Israeli soldiers believe that they were fighting all the time and they did not need any other training to maintain their skills in conventional fighting, but this assumption was severely wrong and the IDF paid the price by losing 114 of its soldiers.¹²⁹ Nearly six years have passed since the end of the Second Lebanon War, and there are still discussions about the winners of the conflict. Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus among the Israeli politicians and soldiers that the IDF's conventional fighting abilities are not anywhere near the standards of the once-feared IDF of the 1970s.

¹²⁸ Quoted in Matthews, *Caught Unprepared*, 63.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 64.

IV. CONCLUSION

Since the French Revolution, use of force has been the standard response of states to terrorism. The use of the term “terrorism” dates back to the Jacobin reign of terror between March 1793 and July 1794.¹³⁰ The main instrument that states have used in that regard has been their military force. Yet it would be unfair to blame only politicians or rulers for their repressive responses to terrorism because they usually only act in accordance with the popular passion and anxiety that shape in the public as a result of terrorist attacks. In some cases, military response brought success and in others failure; but frequently, using military force brought enormous unintended costs regardless of the end result. History has showed that such repressive reactions to terrorism have been largely ineffective and failed to gain the upper hand against terrorist organizations.

As Audrey Kurth Cronin notes, terrorism picks at the vulnerable seam between domestic law and foreign war and therefore it becomes harder for policymakers to decide how to treat it either as criminality or warfare. Political leaders tend to view the military option as more appropriate for both cases—criminality or warfare—because military, unlike police, seem to have the required capabilities to work in both of these areas.

Aware of this tendency, many terrorist organizations have used a state’s military reaction to their attacks as part of their strategies in achieving their overall goals. Cronin identifies three terrorist tactics that use state action at their core. First is provocation. In this strategy, terrorists provoke the state to do something that would eventually undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. An example of the application of provocation strategy can be seen in the acts of the Russian group Narodnaya Volya. They attacked the representatives of the tsarist regime to provoke a brutal response that would in turn inspire a peasant uprising. The second strategy is polarization. In this strategy, terrorists try to use repressive actions of the state to further polarize societies that are already fragmented. By doing that, terrorists seek to eliminate the possibility of fragmented societies finding a middle ground, and as a result establish two different

¹³⁰ Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 115.

entities with their own state structure. LTTE of Sri Lanka is a good example of a terrorist organization that used polarization as a strategy. The last strategy is mobilization. With this strategy, terrorist groups aim to recruit new members and rally masses for their causes. The attack of Palestinian terrorists in the 1972 Munich Olympics is an example of the use of mobilization strategy. Terrorist groups usually use a combination of all of these tactics and states have fallen into these strategic traps mostly because they used military force and repressive measures as their main counterterrorist instruments.¹³¹

In fact, in the past, some authoritarian regimes with extremely repressive measures have been able to be successful against these terrorist tactics. Nevertheless, a closer look at some of the cases where states use extreme measures (e.g., Argentina against leftist groups or Russia against Chechen terrorism) shows that, even in these cases, the long-term consequences have been largely negative in spite of the short-term success against the terrorist groups.

In Russia's case, it took nearly 13 years for Russians to stop terrorism, even with total disregard for democratic values and human rights. The conflict between the Russians and Chechens took place in two phases. The first phase started in 1994. In the background of the conflict was Chechnya's demand to declare its independence from the Soviet Union, following the dissolution of the Union at the end of the Cold War. President Boris Yeltsin refused to recognize the Chechen state and sent around 2,500 troops to confront Chechen fighters. Nevertheless, the Russian parliament overruled the President's decision to use force and as a result Russian soldiers withdrew from the region. Three years later, Russians returned to Chechnya because of a series of bus hijackings and kidnappings and, this time, Yeltsin was determined to finish off the Chechen problem. The result was a total bloodbath. Although the figures are highly disputed, casualty figures for Russian soldiers were anywhere from 5,500 to 14,000. The suffering of Chechen civilians was much greater. Although these figures are also disputed, at least 50,000 civilians died and as many as 300,000 Chechens became refugees in a nation of under a million.¹³² Contrary to the expectation of Russians,

¹³¹ Ibid., 118-119.

¹³² Ibid., 132

Chechen fighters proved themselves as a highly trained, disciplined force and fought effectively against Russian forces in spite of the latter's superior firepower. Russians failed to devise strategies against this competent force other than increasing the level of violence and engaging in inhumane activities such as raping, looting and random shooting of civilians. Nevertheless, Russians managed to gain control of Grozny in the middle of 1995 and Chechen fighters retreated to mountainous areas. At around the same time, Shamil Basayev, a leader of Chechen fighters, took 1,200 civilians hostage in a hospital in the Russian city of Budennovsk. Russian soldiers (including Spetznaz Special Forces) made three attempts to end this terrorist act by eliminating all the Chechen fighters in the hospital. They became unsuccessful; in addition, they caused more civilian casualties than the terrorists caused during the whole event. The crisis ended when the Russian government granted Chechen fighters safe passage back to Chechnya. The Budennovsk crisis showed Chechens' willingness to use terrorist tactics to reach their goal; after the crisis, the Russians decided to negotiate with the Chechens and as a result parties signed the Kasavyurt Accords. According to this accord, both sides agreed to end the violence in return for economic aid to the region and a referendum on the future of Chechnya to be held in five years.¹³³ The second phase of the conflict started when Basayev carried out incursions into neighboring Dagestan in 1999 with an aim to establishing an Islamic Republic there. Succeeding Boris Yeltsin as President, Vladimir Putin viewed the second part of the conflict as an opportunity to exact revenge for the first conflict and labeled it as a war against terrorism. In the face of overwhelming Russian military power, Chechens again started to use terrorist attacks against Russian civilians. In October 2002, Chechens captured a theater in Moscow and held 800 civilians hostage. Russian Special Forces used an anesthetic gas to incapacitate terrorists before raiding the theater; as a result, along with 49 terrorists, 129 civilians lost their lives. In another terrorist attack, Chechens captured a school and took around 1,100 hostages, most of them schoolchildren. In the firefight between the terrorists and Russian forces more than 300 civilians lost their lives.¹³⁴ As can be seen from both of these instances,

¹³³ Ibid., 133.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 134.

Russians replied to terrorist attacks with no regard to the protection of civilian life and applied some of the most repressive measures and tactics that a state can use against an adversary. Government controlled the media and limited the public's awareness about the real cost of the conflict by misinforming people with wrong numbers about casualties. In the end, Russia managed to end terrorism in Chechnya in 2007 because there were literally no Chechens willing to lead the fight against Russians or simply it was too hard for the terrorists to recruit because fighting against the Russians was nearly equal to signing one's own death sentence. It is unclear whether Chechens will stay submissive to Moscow in the future but it is clear that the repressive tactics that Russians used against Chechens led to the radicalization of other groups in the region that are unsatisfied with the government in Moscow. In some of the neighboring areas, like Ingushetia and Dagestan, groups with radical Wahhabi values have gained powerbase and continuing to pose threats for the future. In addition, young people of the region who witnessed nothing but violence throughout their childhood pose another threat with their possible willingness to use force in the future in order to avenge the loss of their loved ones. The Foreign Minister of Chechnya, Ilias Akhmadov, voiced his concern about the future:

It will probably be more horrible than you would like to think. Because the young generation which is now growing up and which hasn't seen anything but war and violence; who knows nothing except 'Mr. Kalashnikov'; who are brave to the point of insanity; who don't have a drop of mercy or regret because their relatives were killed in front of them, their sisters were raped, their houses were destroyed... These people have nothing.¹³⁵

Nevertheless, the Russian case shows that a government can end terrorism, if it is willing to destroy everything and kill everyone that terrorists need to survive.

The Argentina case is probably the most notable example of how an authoritarian government and the military can traumatize nearly all of the society while trying to end terrorism. The dirty war, which the military waged against left-wing groups after the coup d'état of March 24, 1976, caused the death or disappearing of anywhere between

¹³⁵ Matthew N. Janeczko, "The Russian Counterinsurgency Operation in Chechnya Part 2: Success, But at What Cost? 1999 – 2004," *Small Wars Journal*, November 2, 2012, accessed November 14, 2012, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-russian-counterinsurgency-operation-in-chechnya-part-2-success-but-at-what-cost-1999--->

8,000 to 30,000 people. In between 1976 to 1983, three successive military juntas ruled the country until the defeat of Argentina in the Malvinas-Falklands War against Britain. During that time, the military applied some brutal counterterrorist tactics such as abducting people and questioning them under severe torture and then killing and burying them in unmarked graves. The military's definition of terrorist was so widespread that many people with no record of violent or criminal behavior lost their lives in clandestine detention centers that were used to detain, interrogate and eliminate suspected terrorists. General Jorge Videla, who ruled the country until March 29, 1981, described terrorists as "not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization."¹³⁶

Terrorism and terrorist attacks gained prominence in Argentina around 1969 because of the social mobilization created by the disenchantment towards the military that was ruling the country since 1966. Nevertheless, the real roots of the conflict were in the 1950s. When the military staged a coup and deposed Juan Peron from power in 1955, it became highly problematic to satisfy the people who were avid supporters of the Peronist movement. Between 1955 and 1966, five presidents—three civilians and two generals—ruled the country. In 1966, General Juan Carlos Onganía seized the power after a coup but this time the military was planning to stay in power for a long time to make some fundamental changes both socially and economically in the country. When people realized the ineffectiveness of the new military rule, they started to support a resort to violence to remove the generals from power. In 1969, there were six terrorist organizations in Argentina and in 1974, after a couple of mergers, two terrorist organizations—Montenaros and People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)—were fighting against the military rule. At that moment, large parts of the population were in support of "terrorism" against the military. In a survey conducted in 1971, 45.5% of respondents living in Greater Buenos Aires area and 49.5% in the rest of the country viewed terrorism as "justified." In the elections of 1973, Peronist presidential candidate Héctor J. Cámpora

¹³⁶ Hughes, "Military's Role in Counterterrorism," 118.

managed to secure the 49.56% of the popular vote and that meant the military's failure in preventing Peronist ideas gaining supremacy in the country.¹³⁷

The election victory of Peronists led to the escalation of violence in two ways. First, the terrorist groups viewed the electoral success as a result of their violent actions and regarded use of force as a very effective way of making political change. Second, the military interpreted the return of Peronists to power and the rising influence of terrorism in the country as the powerful indicators of a revolution in the country. As a result, the military leaders justified in their minds that the military should use all kind of violent actions against this revolutionary movement to prevent the country from falling off the cliff. Largely as a result of this belief that terrorist violence and economic chaos were dragging Argentina to the brink of a revolution, the military seized power again in 1976.

After the elections in 1973, terrorist organizations decided to keep on their violent actions, believing that they were very close to achieving their aim of having a revolution in Argentina, and even increased the intensity of their attacks to make it much faster. As a result, while there were 352 terrorist incidents in 1972, this number reached 413 in 1973 and 807 in 1974.¹³⁸ That had been possible because terrorist organizations had increased their ranks as a result of the disaffection of people with the military rule and they had also had achieved enormous financial power through the ransoms that they got for kidnapping people (mostly the representatives of multinational corporations working in Argentina). With this enormous manpower and financial power in their hands, terrorists escalated the level of violence to a point that political and military leaders felt that terrorist violence could only be dealt with by extreme repressive measures.¹³⁹

From 1973 to 1976, the main counterterrorist instrument of the government was an organization called the Triple A (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance). The aim of the organization was simply to eliminate the opponents of the regime. The actions of Triple A were all state-sponsored and the members of the organization were largely drawn from

¹³⁷ Rasmussen, "Argentina: The End of Terrorism," 4-5.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 16.

the state's security apparatus (either military or police). Until the military coup of 1976, membership was limited to a chosen group of people but after the military took over power, nearly all security forces engaged in similar activities. As a result of this state terrorism, the military rule became successful in ending terrorism and exterminated both the ERP and Monteneros.¹⁴⁰

A closer look at the effects of these repressive measures of the Argentine government is helpful in understanding the possible effects of repressive measures in other cases. First of all, as the government increased the pressure over the terrorist organizations, they were forced to go underground to achieve survival. After going underground, terrorists became isolated from the larger population and were not able to recognize the decreasing level of support to violence in the general population after the elections of 1973. Instead, they kept on applying their tactics of “the more, the better,” which aimed to delegitimize the government in the eyes of the public by provoking it to undertake repressive actions. This tactic had worked before 1973 and the military rule had lost its legitimacy when it responded to terrorist actions, which large parts of population viewed as “justified” at that time. Terrorists kept on applying the same tactic with the hope of achieving the same result, but this time the public was not willing to justify terrorist actions; instead, they were willing to give normal politics a chance. Therefore, by cutting the link between terrorists and population through repressive measures that isolated the terrorist organizations, government indirectly caused terrorists to maintain violence for longer because they believed that the public supported their activities.¹⁴¹

Second, the isolation caused by the government action forced terrorists to view the terrorist organizations as a substitute for a normal family. As the bonds between members grew tighter, it became much harder for terrorists to abandon the group and leave other members—whom they viewed as surrogate family members—alone. Moreover, after losing their fellow comrades in their fight against the state, the remaining

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 21-24.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 17.

terrorists became much more willing to fight in order to avenge their loss.¹⁴² In the end, repressive actions largely led to the escalation of violence through strengthening organizational bonds.

Lastly, there is also the incalculable price that Argentine society paid as a result of the “dirty war” that the government waged in order to end terrorism. Loss of family members traumatized the lives of their relatives for years and, in the face of rising violence, the country suffered economically, which affected nearly all parts of the society.

The cases of both Russia and Argentina show that states are able to end terrorism when they do not care about losing their legitimacy and when they are willing to ignore the existence of anything related to human rights. Even in these cases, it is clear that bringing the end of terrorism through repression brings enormous costs in other areas.

This study tried to show these costs in the cases of two democratic countries. Both of these cases showed that using militaries in counterterrorism roles has a high possibility of creating drawbacks and unwelcome consequences.

First, in both Northern Ireland and Israel, the military forces became an agent of escalation of violence by antagonizing the civilian population. As Colonel Michael Dewar, a former British Army officer and a veteran of several Northern Ireland tours, noted, “No army, however well it conducts itself, is suitable for police work.”¹⁴³ As happened after Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland and after counterterrorist operations of the IDF in both *intifadas*, disputed killings of innocent civilians by the soldiers proved to be very good propaganda opportunities for terrorist organizations. These disputed killings worked to the advantage of terrorist organizations by increasing their chance of recruiting new members who wanted revenge for these “atrocities” caused by the military.

¹⁴² Ibid., 19.

¹⁴³ Michael Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London, UK: Arms and Armour Press 1997), 38.

Second, in each case the military needed to divert itself from its main duty, which is the defense of the country from external enemies. By using resources and time that was needed to prepare for a conventional war, both Britain and Israel risked a disastrous defeat if called upon to wage a war against an adversary fighting in a conventional way. In Britain's case, the military proved itself as capable of fighting conventionally in the Falklands War, but the IDF suffered humiliation against Hezbollah when the latter applied conventional tactics in the 2006 confrontation and inflicted enormous casualties against an IDF that had concentrated on counterterrorism missions for nearly 20 years.

Third, in Israel and Britain, counterterrorist campaigns that lasted for many years caused tensions over civil-military relations. As the counterterrorist policies got militarized, military leaders achieved supremacy over the shaping of policies and the civilian politicians were sidelined. In extreme cases like that of Argentina, these counterterrorism missions provided the military leaders with a pretext for subverting normal democratic rules and establishing dictatorial rules through military coups. In Britain and Israel, military leaders did not go as far as taking over the government. In fact, in the British case, civil-military relations improved as democratic civilian control of the military increased when the politicians became much more involved in the overall counterterrorist effort. This goes against the conventional wisdom that internal missions erode the civilian control over the military. Nevertheless, both the British and Israeli generals showed that they tend to ignore other ways of solving problems and simply focus on military option to deal with terrorism when civilian politicians do not properly supervise them. Highly militarized policies against terrorism also caused societies to regard the military option in the long term as a viable choice for finding solutions to political problems. Israel is a good example of this case. As terrorist attacks increased their intensity in the beginning of the 2000s, Israel responded with lethal military counterterrorist operations, and this created a spiral of violence in the region, which in turn made the Israeli public much more supportive of military solutions.

Lastly, the use of military in counterterrorism caused legitimacy problems for each country, both domestically and internationally. In Northern Ireland, the British government failed to bring justice many times by not allowing trial of soldiers who were

suspects of causing innocent civilian deaths. Use of techniques like “deep interrogation” undermined the image of the UK as a democratic country that is respectful of basic human rights. Counterterrorist tactics used by the IDF largely ignored human rights issues and caused legal problems by causing many civilian casualties.

In spite of these negative consequences that the militaries caused in counterterrorism operations, many countries in the world keep on using their militaries in counterterrorism missions. The important issue for the countries that decide to use their militaries in counterterrorism is to decide about the end situation that they want to reach. Without a properly defined end situation, it is extremely hard to decide about the proper means of reaching that end. As can be seen from the cases in this study, the use of only military means fail to bring an end to the terrorism. In counterterrorism, means like economic power, diplomacy, intelligence and legal resources like police and judiciary are also at least as important as military means.

Liberal democracies need to be very precise in their use of force. They need to be careful in preserving constitutional order and preserve democratic values like the rule of law and the people’s right to live. The latter issue is important both in preventing terrorists from hurting the general public and in ensuring that innocent civilians are not hurt through state violence. In the end, both civilian politicians and military leaders should remember, before making any decisions about terrorism, that the most basic aim of any counterterrorist operation is to save lives.

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