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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California**



THESIS

NAVAL COALITION BUILDING WITH THE GCC STATES

by

Samuel Fletcher de Castro

December 2002

Thesis Advisor:

James A. Russell

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NAVAL COALITION BUILDING WITH THE GCC STATES

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

The resources of the Persian Gulf are vital to United States national interests. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has gradually increased its military presence in the region. The Arab-Israeli conflict coupled with the increase in military presence that has characterized the American security posture in the Persian Gulf region has contributed to the a negative view of the U.S. by the Arab public. In the post September 11, environment the U.S. should seek to decrease its presence in the region while maintaining the ability to support national goals. Advancements in technology and improvements in interoperability with coalition partners achieved through transformation will enable the U.S. Navy to build effective coalitions with the GCC navies to support American objectives in the Persian Gulf in a Nixon Doctrine fashion from over the horizon.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the end of the World War II, the United States has gradually increased its military presence in the Persian Gulf Region. This presence coupled with the Arab-Israeli conflict has fueled resentment toward American foreign policy by the Arab public.

While American interests in the Persian Gulf have not changed since the United States first became involved in the region, the approach to the pursuit of these interests has shifted with every president. The Nixon Doctrine's reliance on the internal political environment of Iran directly lead to increased naval presence in the Persian Gulf during the Carter and Reagan Presidencies. The Gulf War in 1991 during the Bush Administration marked the peak of American military presence in the region. Since the end of the Gulf War the United States national security posture in the region has supported a large military presence throughout the Persian Gulf.

In the post-September 11 environment, the U.S. must devote resources including naval assets to homeland security. The increased situational awareness, interoperability with coalition forces, and the development of a common operational picture that integrates interagency, Department of Defense and other national assets created, as a product of transformation will enable the United States Navy to maintain a virtual presence in the Persian Gulf. This virtual presence will manifest

itself in the form of Arab navies from the GCC linked to a web based command and control network operated by the United States. The improved common operational picture coupled with improvements in the ability to strike will enable the U.S. Navy to decrease its presence in the Persian Gulf to operate from over the horizon and free up assets for homeland security.

Improvements to interoperability that result in a robust operational picture that stem from transformation will enable the United States Navy to coordinate the GCC navies to achieve multilateral effects. This suzerain control will promote cooperation without violating or threatening any of the GCC states' sovereignty.

Analysis in this thesis suggests the United States attempt to reduce its military presence in the region. By engaging the navies of the GCC to help improve their readiness and build effective coalitions, the U.S. can achieve its regional goals vis-à-vis a Nixon Doctrine type of approach. The GCC navies, linked to and coordinated by U.S. forces from over the horizon can achieve multilateral effects and ensure American national security in the region.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of WWI, the Persian Gulf Region's resources have brought it to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. The end of the Second World War marked a turning point in the Middle East; the devastating effects of the war on the British economy led to the United States steadily increasing its involvement in the region. This coupled with a myriad of approaches by the United States to implement policy in the region has led to a military build up and presence that culminated with the presence of over 500,000 troops during the Gulf War in 1991.¹ Since then, a continued military presence coupled with the effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict has led to a growing disenchantment of American policy in the region.² At no other time in history has Arab public disapproval of the United States been as strong.³ The attacks against the Khobar towers, the USS COLE and the World Trade Center in February of 1993 marked a progressive campaign mounted against the United States, which culminated in the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.⁴ Today the United States and the United States Navy face unprecedented challenges in advancing American policy

¹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War*, (New York, Little, Brown and Company: 1995) ix.

² Eric Rouleau, "Trouble in the Kingdom." Foreign Affairs July/August 2002: 77.

³ Zogby, John. "The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll." Zogby International. Utica, N.Y. 11 April 2002. On <https://zogby.com> accessed 02 December 2002. 1.

⁴ Grenville Byford, "The Wrong War." Foreign Affairs July/August 2002, 42.

objectives in the region. As suggested by public opinion polls the Arab public scrutinizes every action taken by the United States through the lens of betrayal, mistrust, and conspiracy.

The thesis suggests that American Naval involvement with the navies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states will enhance American policy execution in the Persian Gulf Region. These military to military relationships will help build trust, improve the readiness of the GCC navies enabling them to perform missions to enhance stability in the region. This, in turn will reduce the need for U.S. presence in the gulf, and help promote a positive view of the United States by helping to promote security without threatening the sovereignty of any of these states. By engaging in Naval coalition building, following the principles of transformation, the United States can achieve its security goals in the region, while at the same time reducing U.S. presence on the ground. The improved situational awareness provided by the integration of military capabilities and improved interoperability between U.S. and coalition forces in the transformation process will enable the United States to return to an "over the horizon"⁵ approach to maintaining security in the region. In returning the United States security posture in the region to an over the horizon approach, the task of protecting the forces that remain there will be much easier. In the current environment of mistrust and dissent to U.S. policy in the region, the United States. will face some resistance to the implementation of U.S. policy. This

⁵ Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A Higgott, Kim Richard Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict," Political Science Quarterly, Volume 106, Issue 3 (Autumn 1991) 396.

resistance stems from the American relationship with Israel as well as the desire of the ruling regimes to stay in power.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-created the Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC in 1981 for collective defense against aggression in the Persian Gulf region.⁶ Although this thesis addresses working with the member states of the GCC it does not suggest working with the GCC states within the framework or confines of the GCC. The GCC through its own admission has had little success in accomplishing regional goals. This thesis argues that the United States Navy, while working within the series of bi-lateral agreements⁷ with individual GCC states must work to achieve multilateral effects. The bi-lateral nature of the agreements with these states can act as an impediment at times but also can give the United States flexibility to curtail coalitions of the willing to achieve specific goals.⁸ As a result, these bi-lateral agreements will provide the United States with the best vehicle to promote and advance U.S. policy in the region.

The U.S. Navy's role in the region should focus on developing a web based common operational picture and a command and control network between the United States and

⁶ Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council, Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press: 1988) xiv.

⁷ Interview with CDR Jonathan Christian USN, The Joint Staff, J-5 Middle East, The Pentagon, Washington D.C., 26 June 2002.

⁸ George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (Washington D.C.: GPO 2002) v.

the states of the GCC.⁹ Web based command and control allows the United States to coordinate efforts without violating the sovereignty of any of these nations. Although, the GCC states typically have small navies, the development of technologies and the pursuit of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) through transformation will have a force multiplying effect and enable the United States to promote U.S. policy vis-à-vis a Nixon Doctrine¹⁰ type approach. In other words, the GCC navies would fulfill many of the missions currently executed by the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf. This type of approach could overcome one of the GCC's greatest hindrances since their inception: the fear that cooperation could lead to sacrificing the individual states' sovereignty in order to promote common goals.

The inherently "Joint" nature of any future use of military force and of naval coalition building in the region, demands the United States continue to build up infrastructure that can support the deployment of its forces and equipment to the region. Through exercises, the United States can help to promote the construction of such facilities and test them in order to ensure they are capable of supporting large deployments to the region.

With the build up of infrastructure and naval coalitions, the United States can work to uphold commitments and already established policy objectives while decreasing the physical presence of U.S. forces in the

⁹ Department of Defense. "Executive Summary" from Network Centric Warfare. Report to Congress, September 2001 iv.

¹⁰ Richard Nixon, 1999, Victory without War. (New York: Simon and Schuster: 1988) 122.

region, while maintaining the ability to deploy quickly to the region to react to any crisis. The thesis argues that the political and cultural environments of the GCC states support this approach.

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II. THE EVOLVING POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Today in the wake of the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the Persian Gulf Region dominates the news and remains a primary focus of American foreign policy. The War on Terrorism, a top priority in the National Security Strategy, has led the United States to military action in Afghanistan and Yemen, and debate over invading Iraq.¹¹ The current situation has evolved over many years starting with the conclusion of World War I. After the conclusion of WWI a series of agreements, lead to the physical shaping of the Middle East by the British and French. After World War II brought devastation to the British economy, American involvement in the Middle East gradually increased,¹² eventually leading to the presence the United States maintains today. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 coupled with the feeling of betrayal felt by the Arabs in the aftermath of WWI, has created resentment and mistrust of the West throughout the Arab world.

The increased involvement of the United States in the region is a by-product of the three consistent policy objectives maintained throughout the presidencies from Truman to the current Bush administration. These goals: the support of Israel, the containment of the Soviet Union (communism), and the free flow of oil have changed, gradually shifting in response to world events. After the

¹¹ Michael Hirsh, "Bush and the World." Foreign Affairs September/October 2002: 23-23.

¹² Hesham Islam, "American Interests in the Persian Gulf." The Roots of Regional Ambitions, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey ,Ca 1992 . 6.

collapse of the Soviet Union, the containment policy shifted to the maintenance of "stability" in the region through engagement and enlargement.¹³ American primacy in the region developed in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The current National Security Strategy plainly explains the pursuit of American primacy in the post September 11, 2001 environment by building "defenses beyond challenge."¹⁴ The focus on oil and support of Israel, while shifting in execution has not changed in desired end state.

A. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE GULF REGION

After the conclusion of WWII, the Truman administration set the stage for our current involvement in the region. Israel's birth, the start of the Cold War, and demand for oil all helped shape Truman's policy in the region. Truman's standoff with the Soviet Union in Iran worked to contain Soviet expansion while planting the seeds of American hegemony and primacy in the region.¹⁵ During the war, President Roosevelt met with Stalin and Winston Churchill in Iran. While the inter-allied declaration that came from that meeting promised Iran that it would maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the United States saw Iran's future as secondary to the preservation of its cooperation with the Soviet Union.¹⁶ After the war, however American policy radically changed toward Iran because of the fear of Soviet expansion and oil.

¹³ Walter A. McDougal, "Back to Bedrock." Foreign Affairs March/April 1997: 134.

¹⁴ George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (Washington D.C.: GPO 2002) 29.

¹⁵ George Lenczowski, "The Truman Presidency." American Presidents and the Middle East, (Durham, N.C., Duke university Press: 1990) 13.

¹⁶ George Lenczowski, "The Truman Presidency." 8.

In 1950, the United States viewed the events taking place in internal Iranian politics as having the potential to negatively affect the United States if the Iranian communists of the Tudeh party came to power.

U.S. officials had become alarmed about...Iran,...that it might become a 'second china.'...a major effort had to be made...to prevent the Tudeh party from coming to power and delivering Iran into Soviet hands.¹⁷

To contain the Soviet Union, the United States supported the Shah's appointed Prime Minister, Mussadiq in order to minimize the effects of the ongoing oil crisis brought on by Britain's reaction to Iran's nationalization of their oil industry.¹⁸ In trying to maintain their hegemonic position in the region, Britain tried to oppose Mussadiq by pressuring him to not nationalize the Iranian oil industry, convincing the oil companies of the world to boycott Iranian oil and when these did not work, they attempted to covertly overthrow him. The United States viewed the events in Iran differently and publicly supported Mussadiq, seeing him as a counterweight to the Tudeh party. Seeing that a protracted oil crisis might weaken the U.S. economy and threaten U.S. and Western security, Truman's administration pursued a policy of supporting Mussadiq, opposing British efforts to overthrow him, and attempting to reach an agreement that would satisfy both parties and minimize disruption of the world

¹⁷ Mark Gasiorowski, "U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the Mussadiq Era." The Middle East and the United States 2nd ed. David W. Lesch, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) 54.

¹⁸ George Lenczowski, "The Eisenhower Presidency." 35.

oil market.¹⁹ While Truman realized the importance of the world oil market and how it affected the United States economy, his administration politically maneuvered to establish American primacy in the region by countering the British plan to oppose Mussadiq and by opposing the Tudeh party.²⁰

Seeing Soviet expansion as both a military and economic threat, Truman initiated an approach based on containing the Soviet Union. His approach manifested itself in the Eastern Mediterranean and the near East. The administration forced the Russians to withdraw troops from Iran and to give up demands for boundary concessions and base rights from Turkey. In addition, the Administration supported the government of Greece against an externally supplied communist insurgency and made the presence of the Sixth Fleet in waters surrounding Turkey and Greece a permanent fixture of the post war world.²¹ The Truman Doctrine committed the United States to building the militaries of Iran and Turkey while supporting the government in Greece to contain the Soviet Union. In return, Iran was expected to maintain hegemony over the Persian Gulf keeping sea-lanes open and ensuring the free flow of oil to the world oil market.²² The Truman Administration generalized its obligations to Greece and Turkey into what appeared to be a worldwide commitment to

¹⁹ Mark Gasiorowski, "U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the Mussadiq Era." 55.

²⁰ Mark Gasiorowski, "U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the Mussadiq Era." 55.

²¹ John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.) 22.

²² John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. 22.

resist Soviet expansion wherever it appeared.²³ The Truman Doctrine formed the groundwork and the base from which all U.S. presidents have pursued foreign policy in the Middle East since its inception.

Four main events in the Middle East shaped Eisenhower's policy throughout his presidency: The Iranian oil crisis, the Suez crisis, the civil war in Lebanon, and the revolution in Iraq.²⁴ In 1951, the Iranians nationalized their oil producing assets and facilities run by the British company Anglo-Iranian Oil Company or AIOC.²⁵ As a result, of British actions, the oil companies of the world refused to buy Iranian oil. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq increased oil production to replace that oil lost by the embargo placed on Iran. This policy isolated Iran and increased American dependence upon fewer states in the region for oil while simultaneously irking the remaining states. Attempting to remain neutral throughout the crisis, the United States attempted to mediate between the two sides but was unsuccessful. While this oil crisis did not originate from American involvement in the region, it did involve Britain, and in 1952, the U.S. cut off military aid to Iran to show solidarity with the British.²⁶

A few years earlier in 1948, the United States initiated a naval presence in the region that has remained and expanded to this day. First, Admiral Richard C. Connolly, Northeastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Commander-in-chief based in London (CINCNELM), created Task

²³ John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. 22.

²⁴ George Lenczowski, "The Eisenhower Presidency." 31.

²⁵ George Lenczowski, "The Eisenhower Presidency." 32.

²⁶ George Lenczowski, "The Eisenhower Presidency." 33.

Force 126 on January 20, 1948. It consisted of tankers in the Gulf to take on oil to meet the increasing dependence of the U.S. Navy on refined Gulf petroleum products. In 1949 the command was named Middle East Force, and in 1951 a rear admiral was placed in its command. Since then the U.S. Navy has maintained a permanent presence in the Gulf and operated from Bahrain, the site of a major British base. U.S. naval vessels also frequently visited Ras Tannura and Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. This presence reflected the U.S. policy of promoting expansion of Gulf oil production to meet the higher demand in the West.²⁷ The four crises encountered during the Eisenhower Administration contributed to the American decision to maintain this new naval presence.

While the civil war in Lebanon did not effect oil, the U.S. decision to land U.S. Marines under the guise of the Eisenhower Doctrine showed American resolve in checking Soviet expansion. Discussion of action in Lebanon, given its location in the Levant many miles from the Persian Gulf may seem peripheral to this thesis, however in checking the Soviets the United States ensured American hegemony in the region. The Levant as the home of Israel continues to play an active role in events in the Persian Gulf. A similar resolve to contain the Soviets throughout the following presidencies and checking Iraq's aggression in 1991 led to the eventual presence the U.S. maintains in the region today.

²⁷ Sami G. Hajjar. "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects." U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. March 2002. 16-17.

Years later, with American commitments increasing around the world, the United States focused on influencing the Middle Eastern states that bordered the Soviet Union in the South.²⁸ In trying to reduce American involvement around the globe, President Nixon created the Nixon Doctrine; describing it, he said it consisted of three propositions:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.²⁹

The Nixon administration shaped its policy toward the Middle East based on its assessment that the region's resources were vital to the United States. While it did not counter the hegemonic legacy of the Truman or Eisenhower doctrines, it aimed to reduce the physical presence of American forces spread throughout the world. As the largest oil producers in the region, Nixon's

²⁸ Nasser H. Aruri, "U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict." The United States and the Middle East, A Search for New Perspectives. Ed. Hoosang Amirahmadi. (Albany: State University of New York Press: 1993) 92.

²⁹ Richard M. Nixon, radio-television address, November 3, 1969 in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1982) 298.

Administration saw Iran and Saudi Arabia as the "Twin Pillars"³⁰ that could support American Policy in the region. The Twin Pillars Policy led to economic and military support for the two countries and continued through to the Carter Administration.³¹

The Middle East dominated President Carter's foreign policy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, and the Iranian crisis all commanded the President's attention.³² As a candidate for President, he emphasized his view on the importance of the Middle East in debate.

As a presidential candidate, he had stated during a debate with President Ford that if any country should ever again impose an embargo on oil against the United States, he would consider such a move "an economic declaration of war, and would respond instantly in kind."³³

Seeing the Arab oil embargo of 1973 as blackmail rather than a weapon of the Arab states used to retaliate against the United States for supporting Israel during the 1973 War,³⁴ he remarked to many resentful American leaders "the greatest nation on earth was being jerked around by a few desert states."³⁵

³⁰ Gary Sick, "The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment." The Middle East and the United States 2nd Ed. David W. Lesch, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) 278.

³¹ Sami G. Hajjar "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects" (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College: March 2002) 17.

³² George Lenczowski, "The Carter Presidency," 158.

³³ George Lenczowski, "The Carter Presidency," 159.

³⁴ George Lenczowski, "The Carter Presidency," 159.

³⁵ George Lenczowski, "The Carter Presidency," 159.

President Carter's involvement in the Middle East led to the creation of the Carter Doctrine. From Truman to Eisenhower and eventually to Carter a system of countries constituting the Northern Tier designed to check Soviet expansion to the South had gradually grown in the guise of a series of agreements. The countries involved in this system were: Greece, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. By virtue of the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines as well as multilateral (Baghdad Pact, 1955) and bilateral (1959) agreements, these countries became links in the protective security chain the United States had forged in the area. Afghanistan and Iraq were two exceptions in this regional alliance system. After Iraq's revolution in 1958, it defected and chose to follow a neutralist, partly Soviet-tilted policy.³⁶ It was in this environment coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that President Carter responded to in the State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, he pledged the defense of the Persian Gulf saying:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force.³⁷

To justify this tough stance Carter pointed to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saying:

A successful take-over of Afghanistan would give the Soviets a deep penetration between Iran and Pakistan, and pose a threat to the rich oil fields of the Persian Gulf and to the Crucial

³⁶ George Lenczowski, "The Carter Presidency," 203-204.

³⁷ George Lenczowski, "The Carter Presidency," 206.

waterways through which so much of the world's energy supplies had to pass.³⁸

Conceived during the Nixon administration the Twin Pillars policy, rested American security on the pillars of Saudi Arabia and Iran, however after the Iranian revolution of 1979, whose fallout would plague Carter until the last day of his presidency, one of those pillars fell. The resulting hostage crisis coupled with the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan revealed the weakness of the overall strategy.³⁹ By design, the strategy depended upon an internally stable Iran. The idea of supporting American interests on internal stability of states in the region continues to hinder policy making today.

Seeing Saudi Arabia as unable to support the needs of the United States alone, Carter decided that U.S. military intervention offered the best solution. The result was a unilateral effort by the United States to maintain the security of oil supplies from the region. Under Carter, the United States developed "a Rapid Defense Force (RDF) to provide strategic mobility to the Persian Gulf Region and Korea."⁴⁰

Under President Reagan, U.S. military presence in the region grew and the relationship with Iran became more hostile. He deactivated the RDF at the end of 1982 and on the following day, January 1, 1983 replaced it with U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). USCENTCOM's area of

³⁸ George Lenczowski, "The Carter Presidency," 206.

³⁹ Gary Sick, "The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment." 279.

⁴⁰ Sami G. Hajjar, "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects." 17.

responsibility included Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, The People's Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen Arab Republic, Jordan, Red Sea, and the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.⁴¹

A few months later, during the Iran-Iraq war when Iran threatened to block the straight of Hormuz President Reagan said:

I do not believe the free world could stand by and allow anyone to close the Straights of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to oil traffic through those waterways.⁴²

Later in the year, diplomatic relations with Iraq resumed, this coupled with the United States' addition of Iran to the terrorist list pushed Iran further from the U.S.⁴³

The reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers served to confirm President Reagan's conviction to keep the Straights of Hormuz open and to keep the Soviet Union, which had offered to charter Kuwaiti tankers out of the Persian Gulf.⁴⁴ In clarifying American policy in the Gulf, which

⁴¹ Sami G. Hajjar, "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects." 17-18.

⁴² George Lenczowski, "The Reagan Administration," 246.

⁴³ George Lenczowski, "The Reagan Administration," 246.

⁴⁴ Sami G. Hajjar "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects" 19. Hajjar mentions that from March 7, 1987 when the reflagging started to 1990 the United States conducted 489 missions, escorting reflagged tankers through the Gulf to Kuwait and back through the Straights of Hormuz during Operation Earnest Will.

had come under attack in the U.S. Congress⁴⁵ President Reagan described the American approach in three parts:

1. Bringing ever-increasing international pressure to bear for a negotiated end to the war and to stop its spillover.
2. Steadfastly continuing to help our friends, the nonbelligerent nations of the Gulf, to defend themselves against Iranian threats; and
3. Prudently pursuing cooperative efforts with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and other friends to protect against jeopardizing freedom of nonbelligerent navigation.⁴⁶

President Reagan's policy increased American presence in the region but did not shift away from any other previously established policies.

B. THE GULF WAR EFFECT

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath has led to the greatly increased presence the United States maintains today. With Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the threat of an invasion of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and coalition partners demonstrated, through their action to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait, the importance of the Gulf Region and its effect on world economies.

⁴⁵ President Reagan made this statement on September 24, 1987 after a series of armed clashes had taken place in the region between Arab states and the U.S. On May 17, 1987 the USS Stark was attacked by an Iraq F-1 and a U.S. Navy Helicopter had attacked an Iranian warship, Iran Ajr while it was laying mines in the Gulf. By the end of the year there were further incidents including an Iranian Silkworm attack on an American Flagged Kuwaiti tanker, Sea Isle City for which the U.S. responded by attacking a number of Iranian oil platforms.

⁴⁶ George Lenczowski, "The Reagan Administration," American President and the Middle East. 248-249.

On August 8 1990, President Bush announced the focus of U.S. policy in the region in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait summarized in four points:

1. The complete and unconditional withdraw of Iraq forces from Kuwait.
2. The restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.
3. The commitment of the United States to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.
4. The protection of lives of US citizens overseas.⁴⁷

While these four points did not specifically address the importance of oil in U.S. policy, President Bush did say in a series of press conferences between August 2 and August 8 how important Middle Eastern oil was to the United States. On 2 August 1990 Bush said "we are dependent for close to fifty percent of our energy requirements on the Middle East," the next day he warned that the "long-run economic effects [of the invasion] on the free world could be devastating." 8 August 1990 he addressed the nation saying that the U.S. "could face a major threat to its economic independence."⁴⁸

Although, American hegemony or primacy in the region had manifested itself in the containment of the Soviet Union, President Bush soon began to discuss the context a new "World Order." Although, he did not use the word "primacy" or discuss "military defenses beyond challenge,"⁴⁹ as the current administration, President Bush's National

⁴⁷ Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order (New York: Cassell, 1999) 94.

⁴⁸ Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order. 95.

⁴⁹ George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 29.

Security Strategy inferred that the United States established the rules of conduct for international relations for the rest of the world to follow, emphasizing the importance and the role of the United Nations.⁵⁰ President Bush talked about the rules of conduct in this new order.

Iraq has violated and taken over the territory of a country which is a full member of the United Nations. That is totally unacceptable, and if it were allowed to endure, then there would be many other small countries that could never feel safe.⁵¹

Later elaborating on the subject, implying the bi-polar nature of the cold war shaped the manner in which states would interact he said:

We've worked for decades to develop our international order, a common code and rule of law that promotes cooperation in place of conflict. That order is imperfect, we know that. But without it peace and freedom are impossible. The rule of law gives way to the law of the jungle.⁵²

Although President Bush discussed the increased role of the United Nations in this New World Order, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the shift from the bi-polar nature of the cold war led the rest of the world to see this new World order as one headed by a hegemonic United States.⁵³

⁵⁰ President George H.W. Bush, quoted in Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order. 95.

⁵¹ President George H.W. Bush, quoted in Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order. 95.

⁵² President George H.W. Bush, quoted in Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order. 95.

⁵³ Joseph S. Nye, "The Changing Nature of World Power." Political Science Quarterly. Vol 105, Issue 2 (Summer 1990) 188.

This new strategic vision did not last long, partly because the Bush administration was voted out of office in 1992, and because much of the rest of the world interpreted the "new world order" as hegemony in international affairs by the United States in and out of the U.N.⁵⁴

The Bush administration's response to the invasion of Kuwait in the context of the American efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict showed the interdependence of the Levant and the Persian Gulf region. Saddam Hussein attempted to link his withdraw from Kuwait to the Israeli withdraw from the Occupied Territories. If Saddam had been successful in this approach, he would have been able to resolve the conflict that the United States had been unable to solve. This would have not only helped the Palestinians but would give legitimacy to the use of violence as a means to advance policy in the Middle East. Saddam had three criteria for his withdrawal: withdrawal of US forces from Saudi Arabia and their replacement by Arab forces under UN authority; the lifting of sanctions; and, 'the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the Occupied Arab territories in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.'⁵⁵ As a result, President Bush insisted on Saddam's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait to avoid rewarding him for his actions.

⁵⁴ Sami G. Hajjar "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects." 6.

⁵⁵ Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order. 95-96. The author argues that President Bush's actions in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could be explained by examining three considerations: oil, the New World Order and the author's third consideration: America's relationship with Israel.

The Gulf War led to the forward deployment of American forces that the United States continues to maintain today. One of the most common criticisms by the Arab public of American foreign policy in the Middle East is America's support for Israel.⁵⁶ Saddam Hussein tried to exploit this common complaint to legitimize his actions throughout the Arab world. His actions demonstrate the link between the United States' policy toward Israel and its policy toward the rest of the region.

During the 1990s, President Clinton continued to support the established policies in the Persian Gulf region of maintaining the free flow of oil, supporting Israel, and maintaining American hegemony.⁵⁷ With the rejection of the idea of a "new world order" by the rest of the world, the Bush administration left office issuing a National Security Strategy in 1993 that did not include the idea, instead it referred to the future as an "Age of Democratic Peace."⁵⁸ The following year, the Clinton administration announced its own strategy in the forms of "Engagement and Enlargement." The United States was to exercise global leadership by selectively engaging those challenges affecting U.S. interests, and seeking to enlarge the circle of democratic countries in the world.⁵⁹ President Clinton's policy in the Persian Gulf region came in the form of

⁵⁶ Zogby, John. "The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll." Zogby International. Utica, N.Y. 11 April 2002. On <https://zogby.com> accessed 02 December 2002. 1

⁵⁷ William Jefferson Clinton, United States, President, National Security Strategy of the United States 1994-1995, Engagement and Enlargement. (Washington D.C., Brassey's: 1993) 105.

⁵⁸ George H.W. Bush, United States, President, National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990-1991. (Washington, Brassey's (US), Inc.: 1990.) 11.

enforcing sanctions on Iraq,⁶⁰ increasing the American security footprint in the region, Dual Containment of Iraq and Iran and a dedicated effort to address the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁶¹ In theory, the Clinton administration's approach to Dual Containment enabled President Clinton to dedicate the majority of his efforts toward pursuing Peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Unfortunately, the Dual Containment policy failed due to the false premises upon which it was based.⁶²

In 1993, the Clinton administration announced the Dual Containment policy designed "to confront the 'rogue' threat in the Gulf."⁶³ Dr Martin Indyk, then senior director for Middle East Affairs of the National Security Council, described the central concepts of the policy.

Interdependence between the eastern and western halves of the region: thus, containing the threats posed by Iraq and Iran in the east will impact our ability to promote peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the west; similarly, promoting Arab-Israeli peace in the west will impact our ability to contain the threats from Iraq and Iran in the east; and our success in both realms will affect our ability to help friendly governments create a better life for their peoples than that offered by proponents

⁵⁹ Sami G. Hajjar "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects." 7.

⁶⁰ Martin Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East" Soref Symposium 18 May 1993. 8.

⁶¹ Sami G. Hajjar "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects." 7. Also see Martin Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East." Soref Symposium 18 May 1993. 6.

⁶² F. Gregory Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment." Foreign Affairs. March /April 1994. 57

⁶³ Sami G. Hajjar "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects." 7.

of violence.⁶⁴

Unfortunately, there were a number of flaws to this policy. First, the Clinton Administration tried to pursue a policy dependent upon the actions of Iraq and Iran, two countries with regimes hostile to the United States.⁶⁵ It is impossible for the United States to affect the balance of military power between these two countries if the United States could not arm either one to balance their military strength. Second, the Arab public throughout the region saw the policy as an "Israel first" policy that would promote the interests of Israel above those of the Palestinians.⁶⁶

The Clinton administration's Dual Containment policy coupled with Engagement and Enlargement manifested in engagement, forward presence, and rapid response.⁶⁷ With its roots in the Carter administration's RDF, this policy continues today in a vastly increased footprint in the region.

C. CONCLUSION

Since the end of World War II, policies enacted by the Presidents of the United States have gradually led to the presence of U.S. military forces in the Gulf today. The Truman and Nixon Doctrines relied heavily on the internal security of states in the Persian Gulf, specifically on the Shah of Iran. When the Twin Pillars policy failed because

⁶⁴ Dr. Martin Indyk quoted in: Sami G. Hajjar "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects." 9.

⁶⁵ F. Gregory Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment." 57.

⁶⁶ F. Gregory Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment." 57.

⁶⁷ William Jefferson Clinton, United States, President, National Security Strategy of the United States. 106.

of the Iranian revolution, the United States increased its military presence in the region. Later, the Gulf War marked the greatest presence in the region as the United States worked to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. President Clinton's flawed "Dual Containment" policy also relied upon the internal environment of states in the region. Finally, engagement has worked to build the complex presence the U.S. maintains today.

The policies designed over the years to contain the Soviet Union worked to establish American primacy in the region,⁶⁸ which has never been a formally declared national goal of the United States. However, the current Bush administration's National Security Strategy supports American primacy by directing the U.S. military to maintain superiority, and by stating the United States will lead coalitions to advance U.S. goals.⁶⁹ The current security posture in the region is composed of four parts: ensuring access to host nation facilities for ongoing operations and contingencies through bilateral agreements; pre-positioning of military equipment; building host nation self defense capabilities through foreign military sales, training and joint exercises and providing a continuously deployed forward U.S. military presence in the region.⁷⁰ These parts stem from the constantly evolving set of policies initiated during the Truman administration. These policies promoted American policy in the region, but they also

⁶⁸ Stephen G Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective." Foreign Affairs. July/August 2002. 21.

⁶⁹ George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 25-29.

⁷⁰ Sami G. Hajjar "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects." 19-21.

contributed to the backlash against the United States in the form of the attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993, the Khobar Towers, the attack on the USS COLE (DDG 67), and culminated in the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center on 11 September 2001.

There must be a change in this posture, which will continue to promote the interests of the United States while reducing the threat to the United States resulting from the hatred invoked by U.S. policy in the region.⁷¹ The building of naval coalitions in the region in the context of the defense department's transformation enabled by a revolution in military affairs will promote the security posture in place while enabling the United States to reduce its physical presence on Arab soil. Through improvements in technology, the United States can pursue its national security agenda by working with the GCC navies and not relying on the internal workings of any of these states.

⁷¹ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." Foreign Affairs. November/December 2002. 73.

III. AMERICA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL HINDERING COALITION BUILDING WITH THE GCC STATES

The U.S. relationship with Israel negatively and indirectly affects its relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Other factors, however negatively affect America's ability to execute its foreign policy in the region.

The Clinton administration's engagement and enlargement policy designed to promote democracy in the region was met with resistance in the GCC. The reasons for resisting the development of democracy parallel the reasons for resisting naval coalition building. First, there is a weak cultural impetus for the development of democracy in the region. The Arab states have no cultural, socio-political, or economic history, which supports democracy.⁷² In fact, their rentier structures supported by their political cores inhibit the development of democracy or other changes which might negatively affect the internal security of these states. Building strong and capable naval forces would require these states to divert defense funds away from forces, which provide internal security to their regimes or divert funds away from their constituents, to whom these governments distribute their funds.⁷³

Second, the states of the region are wary of any U.S. involvement in the region seeing it as imperialism. They see the United States as a Western power more likely to

⁷² Giacomo Luciano, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the States and Democratization," 132.

⁷³ Giacomo Luciano, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the States and Democratization," 132.

break promises than to keep them. The Arab view of Israel as both an imperialistic power and a vestige of Western imperialism in the region shape their opinions of American Middle East policy.⁷⁴ Third, the GCC states use the American relationship with Israel as a potential counter-weight for U.S. demands preventing the United States from influencing the domestic and military environments of these states.⁷⁵ Finally, the ruling elites of the GCC states use the American relationship with Israel to distract their own populations to halt any desire for internal political change.⁷⁶ The factors listed above show the United States' relationship with Israel has less influence on the United States' ability to promote American policy in the region than the history, cultural and social structures of the GCC states. To promote American foreign policy objectives in the region to include naval coalition building, the United States must overcome strong forces of resistance rooted deeply in the culture and socio-political structures inherent to the region.

A. WEAK IMPETUS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE GCC

The impetus for the development of democracy in the region is weak due to the political economies, the weaknesses in the states inherent their rentier structures and their cultures. The entire region will resist democracy for these reasons that have nothing to do with the United States' relationship with Israel. A drive to promote democratic development in the region could

⁷⁴ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism," Foreign Affairs. November/December 2002. 79.

⁷⁵ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." 79.

⁷⁶ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." 80.

destabilize these states. The regimes' tenuous hold on power forces them to work to maintain the status quo rather than accept democracy.⁷⁷

The first obstacle to democratic development in the GCC states lies in the resistance to change presented by the social orders established by the ruling regimes to consolidate their power. In Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabis preach a form of Islam that says the Koran and the Prophet are the only true sources of Islamic direction and guidance.⁷⁸ The Wahhabis' strong connection with the past and linkage to the Prophet helps lend prestige and legitimacy to their order. They promote the "purity" of this form of Islam. Using Islam as a lever to maintain their power and legitimacy the Saudi Royal family has made an alliance with the Wahhabi clerics establishing a social order the clerics dominate.⁷⁹ The Wahhabis preach about the legitimacy of the Saudi Royal family's rule in exchange for societal power over everyday Muslim life in Saudi Arabia such as marriage and women's rights. For the Saudi Royal family, maintaining the Islamist nature of the country keeps them in power.

The alliance with the Wahhabi clerics represents the sort of "core" alliance the non-democratic regimes in the GCC have formed to solidify their power. This sort of alliance concentrates political power in a governmental center or core and limits the scope of possible reform in a

⁷⁷ Giacomo Luciano, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the States and Democratization," 152.

⁷⁸ Ira M. Lapidus. A History of Islamic Societies. (New York: Cambridge University Press: 1988) 673.

⁷⁹ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, 7th ed. (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press: 2002) 230-233.

manner, which parallels what has been named the "revolutionary paradox." The revolutionary paradox is characterized by limits restricting possible reforms imposed on regimes, that have come to power in a revolutionary manner. These limits stem from power sharing between ruling elites and with a revolutionary core that enables a regime to rule but at a political price. The ruling regimes of the GCC states rule without the broad society-based mandate to rule. As result, these governments face two types of obstacles to reform, change, developing foreign policy, or to embracing democracy. First, the existing power centers, in the societies these ruling regimes rule force them to make arrangements or face crippling resistance. This limits their ability to make, but the shallowest of reforms. Second, a limited popular mandate makes their hold on power tenuous, and makes the power centers created in the course of reforming society threats to the new order. Weighing the desire to maintain power against the desire to reform, these governments cripple, or, in the case of the GCC states, never start to institute a reform agenda. The GCC states have created a network of praetorian institutions to maintain their power but limit their ability to reform.⁸⁰ The praetorian institutions take the form of either political institutions or internal security forces. The security forces may feel threatened by the desire of the regime to develop strong naval forces or forces with strong ties to other nations. The people who make up the political institutions, do not want to lose their place in the political order. For

⁸⁰ Leon B Scratow. Unpublished essay. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002.

example, in Qatar the chief of state is Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. He is head of state, minister of defense, and commander in chief of the armed forces. His brothers hold the other two positions in the executive branch of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.⁸¹ It seems unlikely the chief of state would be able to initiate reforms that would eliminate his brothers' positions or power. This revolutionary paradox exists in the GCC states independently of U.S. foreign policy in Israel, and acts to hinder any attempt the United States makes to promote democracy or any other policy in the region.

Although, the U.S. relationship with Israel adversely affects America's ability to promote democracy in the GCC states, these states, with their distributive structures will inherently resist the development of democracy irrespective of American policy.⁸² The political cores of these states will work to maintain power at the expense of improving overall conditions within their states and for their peripheral social and political sectors. In other words, American policy, and the United States' relationships with other states has no impact when examining the relationship between the center and the periphery within the societal structures of these states. In the 1960s, the social structure in Egypt paralleled that of the current GCC states. For this reason, I will show how Joel S. Migdal's analysis explains the inherent resistance to development that exists in the GCC states as it did in Nasser's Egypt.

⁸¹ "Qatar." "CIA-The World Fact Book 2002-Qatar." www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/qa.html accessed 12 December 2002. 6.

⁸² Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." 80.

Gamal Abdul Nasser faced obstacles created as a by-product of his rise to power as he attempted to institute land reforms in Egypt in the 1960s. To institute his reforms he created the instruments that impeded his own progress. Migdal explains saying:

The pre-Revolutionary social structure came to influence deeply the disposition of land and other benefits of the reform. In the end, this social structure limited the growth in state strength and helped shape the nature of politics within the institutions of the state. Thus society transformed the state.⁸³

Nasser failed in many of his efforts to reform because of his primary focus to remain in power. As a result, Nasser blamed external actors for his failures; among them were the United States and Israel. Like Nasser, the regimes in the Persian Gulf States will be forced to limit their own attempts to reform to remain in power. While the ruling regimes in these states may desire to build strong naval coalitions, they may be limited by their societal obligations. It is arguable that all of these states classify the information about their bi-lateral agreements and exercises with the United States secret to keep their praetorian cores from knowing about the exact nature of their relationships with the U.S. Saddam Hussein and his Republican guard units form a similar core of power, which eliminates any sort of potential for reform in Iraq. Although, Iraq is beyond the scope of this paper, the example of Saddam Hussein clearly depicts the self-imposed limits from the revolutionary paradox, which parallels the governmental dispositions in the GCC states.

⁸³ Joel Migdal, Strong States and Weak Societies, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) 185.

Beyond the structural limits to the promotion of democracy in the regions stemming from the distributive nature of the GCC states, the culture and history of the region does not support naval coalition building, or any naval development.

While the Clinton Administration promoted the spread of democracy,⁸⁴ it must be remembered that democracy grew out of the Enlightenment and is rooted in the idea of autonomy of the individual, an idea the governments in Persian Gulf region have never embraced. Although these states were exposed to the West, they failed to learn about this "enlightenment thinking."

The tragedy is that Arabs,...have never had systematic access to the modern advances rooted in 'the legacy of the Enlightenment, an ideological revolution that led to the debunking of medieval and reformational cosmologies and the undermining of feudal forms of political authority and theistic forms of moral authority.'⁸⁵

While Western culture broke away from the past characterized by feudalism, and rule legitimized through religion, to move toward secularism; the Arab Muslims did not since Islam rejects the idea of popular sovereignty. The Arabs never broke away from using the sacred to legitimize and mask arbitrary rule:

The Muslims did not think of the phenomenon of modernity in terms of rupture with the past, but rather in terms of renewed relation with the

⁸⁴ William Jefferson Clinton, United States, President, National Security Strategy of the United States 1994-1995, Engagement and Enlargement. (Washington D.C., Brassey's: 1993) 76.

⁸⁵ Fatema Mernissi Islam and Democracy Fear of the Modern World. (Cambridge, Ma, Perseus Publishing: 2002) 46.

past. They didn't think about the phenomenon of modernity in terms of progress, but in terms of renaissance-thus, after all, in terms of magic or myth. In a majority of cases the Muslim approach, the approach of religious and political thinkers, was just the reverse of the principles implied by correct understanding of Enlightenment thought.⁸⁶

In the manner Western culture values progress, development, growth, change and the future, Muslim society values connections with the past. This is still true today, and the Arabs see democracy as a product of the West that threatens their ties with the past. The Arabs associate democracy with the infidels who turn away from the past. From this alone, it is clear there is a weak impetus for the development of democracy in the region. In a similar manner, historically the GCC states have never maintained strong navies. To do so, may be viewed as embracing Western values.

B. AVOIDING THE SECOND GREAT BETRAYAL

Arabs of the GCC states have mistrusted the West since the conclusion of the First World War, when the Sikes Picot Agreement took precedence over promises made to Sharif Hussein of Mecca by Sir Henry McMahon in "the Great Betrayal."⁸⁷ Seeing the Balfour Declaration, the creation of the state of Israel and the United States' immediate recognition of Israel⁸⁸ as products of this betrayal, the

⁸⁶ Fatema Mernissi Islam and Democracy Fear of the Modern World. (Cambridge, Ma, Perseus Publishing: 2002) 47

⁸⁷ William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, (Boulder, CO. Westview Press: 2000) 153-155. See also Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. A Concise History of the Middle East, 7th ed. (Cambridge, Ma: Westview Press: 2002.) 193-210.

⁸⁸ George Lenczowski, "The Truman Presidency," American Presidents and the Middle East. (Durham, N.C. Duke University Press: 1990) 26.

Arabs continue to be suspicious of the United States. Wary of a second Great Betrayal and seeing the United States' support of Israel as a continuation of the first, the GCC States are likely to reject any attempt to promote naval coalition building as yet another aspect of Western imperialism and the betrayal's continuation.

Seeing Israel as the last vestige of hard imperialism, the governments and the citizens of the Persian Gulf states are wary of any potential influence the United States may have on change within their countries.⁸⁹ They view this sort of influence as cultural imperialism. In the environment of globalization, American culture and influence have the potential to penetrate every level of Middle Eastern society. The democratic ideals infused in American society such as equality, popular sovereignty and women's rights are also a part of American foreign policy. Although in the Persian Gulf, the United States tends not to overly assert the promotion of these ideals they are still inherent in American policy. While American policy makers are aware that these ideals are not necessarily well received in the region, they must be a part of what the United States does in order to be legitimate in the eyes of the American public. Martin Indyk, who served as Special Assistant to the President and as Senior Director for Near East and South Asia on the staff of the National Security Council in 1993-1995 explains how the Clinton administration implemented the support of democracy in the region.

The United States did not ignore political reform

⁸⁹ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." Foreign Affairs. November/December 2002. 79.

entirely; it just tinkered with it on the margins. The Clinton administration supported the right of women to vote in Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait (in the case of Kuwait, granting that right was defeated by Islamic fundamentalists)...It supported successful efforts by the kings of Morocco and Jordan to co-opt their political oppositions into government and parliament. And it made significant effort to support democratic reforms in Yemen in the hope that, over time, change there might spur similar reforms in the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. But when it came to the mainstays of U.S. interest in the Arab world, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Washington left well enough alone.⁹⁰

Here Indyk describes how the Clinton administration tactfully implemented the promotion of democracy trying to avoid any destabilization. The administration chose to promote democracy in those countries where a loss in stability caused by a loss of internal security would have little or no impact on the United States. In contrast, the United States did not promote democracy where a loss of stability could negatively affect the economy of the United States. As a result, the promotion of democracy became a secondary goal behind maintaining stability in the region. Although the promotion of democracy was secondary in importance to the maintenance of stability, the Clinton administration was able to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the American public and apply indirect pressure on Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The populations of the GCC states may see American foreign policy as cultural imperialism, or a subtle attempt to establish dominance or hegemony over the region. They

⁹⁰ Martin Indyk. "Back to the Bazaar." Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2002. 75.

may also see the United States using American ideals to invade Muslim society. The United States uses McDonalds, Coca-Cola, and other American products to establish a foothold in the Persian Gulf, from which it can subtly influence Muslim culture and sway public opinion. These influences, in the eyes of the regimes in power could weaken the political control of the ruling elites by influencing the populations to become more "American" and seek leaders that are more amenable to the United States. In other words, these regimes see the United States trying to influence their populations to overthrow their rulers.⁹¹ The influence on the domestic markets, through arms sales could lead, to the U.S. making demands upon the ruling regimes in these states as well. While the Arab navies play a smaller role than the armies and air forces in their respective states because they do not provide internal security, coalition building and interaction with American forces may be perceived as leading to increased American influence on their states. Again, the Arabs see this sort of influence as imperialism.

The GCC states are so wary of imperialism and violations of their sovereignty by other Arab members of the GCC that they have failed to achieve goals they originally set out to accomplish when the GCC was established in 1981.⁹² In December 2001 Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah summed up the limited progress of the GCC saying:

⁹¹ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." Foreign Affairs. November/December 2002. 76.

⁹² Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council, Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press: 1998) xiv.

We are not ashamed that we have not been able to achieve the objectives we sought when we set up the GCC 20 years ago... We have not set up a unified military force that deters enemies and supports friends. We have not reached a common market, or formulated a unified political position on political crisis. Objectivity and frankness require us to declare that all that has been achieved is too little and it reminds us of the bigger part that has yet to be accomplished...We are still moving at a slow pace that does not conform with the modern one...Our too great attachment to the traditional concept of sovereignty is the biggest stumbling block hindering unification efforts.⁹³

While the United States struggles to promote democracy in the region, Abdullah's comments show these states resist the plans and policies they have formally agreed to implement with other Arab states. This resistance shows that these states resist any changes resulting from pressures from external sources. If they resist changes resulting from agreements with other, Arab states then it should not come as a surprise that these states would resist any American policy, which appeared to violate their sovereignty. Also, since they resist this type of pressure to change from Arab states, it is arguable that they would resist any policy they deemed as a threat to their sovereignty showing there is no connection between the U.S.' support for Israel and promoting American policy in this region.

After the Gulf War, President George Bush promised to address the Palestinian issue in response to Arab coalition support in fighting against Iraq. The resulting Madrid

⁹³ Crown Prince Abdullah quoted by Looney, Robert E. In "The Gulf Cooperation Council's Cautious Approach to Economic Integration." Middle East Insight. July/August 2002

Peace conference offered some hope for resolution to the conflict, but ultimately failed.⁹⁴ Seeing this attempt to solve the problem, as another broken promise, it makes sense the Arabs are wary of any U.S. involvement in the region.

C. THE ISRAELI COUNTERWEIGHT

While the United States' relationship with Israel does not directly influence the American relationship with the GCC, these states could use it as a potential counterweight to U.S. demands. Seeing the U.S. demands as external threats to their regimes, they use the policy in Israel to deflect American attempts to implement policy. While the U.S. may try to promote American policy in the region, the ruling regimes can point to the regime in Israel and argue that the Israelis are un-just due to their treatment of the Palestinian Muslims and that Israel is the last vestige of Western imperialism in the region. To the GCC states, the Israelis engage in imperialistic expansion in the West bank and represent European imperialism from the Great Betrayal.⁹⁵ As an "ethnocracy" as opposed to a democracy, Israel supports the "non-democratic seizure of the country by one ethnic group:" Jews.⁹⁶ For this, the United States' foreign policy appears to be hypocritical. If U.S. policy is hypocritical in Israel, then the promotion of any American policy in the Persian Gulf region is also

⁹⁴ Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, A History with Documents. 4th ed. (New York, Bedford/St. Martin's: 2001) 407-408.

⁹⁵ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., "The Roots of Arab Bitterness." A Concise History of the Middle East. 7th ed. (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press: 2002) 193-210.

⁹⁶ Oren Yiftachel, 'Ethnocracy': The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine. Middle East Report. Summer 1998. 1.

hypocritical. Therefore U.S. policy does not serve the "lofty goals" inherent in American democracy. Instead, the United States seeks to encourage democracy or for the purposes of this thesis, naval coalition building, in the region to advance imperialistic goals. To reject the United States' efforts on these grounds makes sense for the survival of the ruling regimes.

While the current Bush administration has pushed for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power,⁹⁷ the leaders of the Persian Gulf States have argued that resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict should take precedence. The Arabs focus on using the situation in Israel as a counter weight to American policy makers from promoting American foreign policy. This has the effect of weakening American hegemony in the Persian Gulf by not allowing the United States to have a free hand in policy implementation in the region. The Arabs do not reject the American policy in a confrontational manner; they simply work to delay its implementation.⁹⁸ This approach appeases internal unrest and anger for American policy and keeps the United States at bay. A recent article in Ha'aretz, shows the Iraqi issue has been at the center of the dispute between the Bush administration and U.S. allies in the Arab world. The U.S. argues that Iraq is the main threat to regional stability, while the Egyptians and Saudis argue that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict poses the greatest danger, and have demanded that the Americans restrain Prime Minister

⁹⁷ Patrick E. Tyler, "Security Council Votes, 15-0, For Tough Iraq Resolution; Bush Calls it a 'Final Test', Clock Ticks for Hussein." New York Times 9 November 2002: A1.

⁹⁸ Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." Foreign Affairs. November/December 2002. 74.

Ariel Sharon.⁹⁹ The Saudis and the Egyptians work to hold off the United States because the internal unrest created by dissatisfaction with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more directly threatens their regime stability than the external threat from Iraq. In addition, the United States' eagerness to take on the Iraqis guarantees their protection from Saddam.

D. THE ISRAELI DISTRACTION

The United States' relationship with Israel negatively affects U.S. relations in the Persian Gulf because it indirectly threatens to decrease the internal security of the Persian Gulf states. The ruling elites of the GCC states couch their internal security in their abilities to appease the populations of their states and preventing them from violently overthrowing their regimes. The ruling regimes in the GCC point to American policy in Israel to distract their populations from criticizing them. These populations view American support of Israel as support for a country that oppresses and kills Palestinians. To these populations, when the ruling regimes of these states engage in political, military, and economic activities with the United States, then these regimes support the United States: the supporter of Israel. Therefore, these regimes support the oppression of Palestinians and Western imperialism as well. Again, this explains why the bilateral agreements with the United States and all naval exercises are kept secret. In response to the perceived threat to their internal security, the GCC states condemn

⁹⁹ Aluf Benn, "Analysis/Abdullah's proposal takes everyone by surprise." Ha'aretz, English Edition online: www.haaretzdaily.com, accessed: 29 May 2002.

American foreign policy either through words or through actions, hindering its execution.

The GCC states use the United States' relationship with Israel to distract their populations to avoid making internal political changes and as a type of political relief valve to release excess internal political pressure from them. As Nasser, used excuses for his failures that pointed to forces external to Egypt, so too will the Persian Gulf States. Rather than wait for the failure of reforms, these states will use the United States' relationship with Israel to preempt any attempt to promote American foreign policy within their borders.¹⁰⁰ These regimes will point to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a problem that must first be "fixed" by the United States. In an interview in the New York Times Hosni Mubarak of Egypt suggested the United States needed to address its 'bad image' in the Arab world by demonstrating a stronger commitment to the creation of a Palestinian State. The New York Times argues the government of Egypt is among several in the Arab world under pressure from the young and the unemployed to do more to ease economic hardship either through more democracy or greater devotion to Islam. For these malcontents, Egypt's ties to the United States bring only a repugnant association with American support for Israel. During the interview, the Egyptian leader brushed aside questions about the need for greater openness and democracy in the Arab world, refusing to discuss the trial of a prominent political activist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, and asserting that, in Egypt, "we have all kinds of

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democracy."¹⁰¹ During this reported interview Mubarak used the Arab-Israeli conflict as a counter weight to external U.S. pressure for the development of democracy, simultaneously distracted internal forces from the "the young and the unemployed" within his country through his comments about democracy.

E. CONCLUSION

The relationship between the Persian Gulf states' ruling regimes and their populations is distributive: the governments do not tax their people, they simply "buy them off" by distributing money collected through external sales of oil (rents).¹⁰² Understanding that their populations could revolt against their rule, the ruling regimes in the GCC states focus a great deal of effort on maintaining internal security. These regimes maintain security forces to provide protection to the ruling elites and do not tolerate anti-governmental movements. This sort of alliance with a "security force" limits the possibility for reform in the region in what has come to be called the revolutionary paradox.

The GCC states: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar need support from the United States to maintain external security. By establishing a military relationship with the United States, which provides a free ride on American protection from external threats, these states do not need to invest large amounts of money into their own militaries. These regimes are free to spend the money they would normally

¹⁰¹Patrick E. Tyler and Neil MacFarquhar "Mubarak to Press Bush on a State for Palestinians." New York Times, 4 June 2002: A1

need to invest in defense on projects that help appease their constituents. In contrast, the presence of American military forces in these states acts to upset the populations of these states because of their opposition to American support for Israel. The populations of the GCC states view the United States as a supporter of Israel and as infidels. Moreover, the presence of infidels in the Arabian Peninsula violates the popular notion that infidels should not occupy the Arabian Peninsula.

On the governmental level, American support for Israel does not upset the Persian Gulf states. The most important focus of all of the regimes in the region is to remain in power. It seems in these societies where the ruling elites function in the distributive structure, public opinion would not weigh heavily enough to shape foreign policy. However, the ruling elites show they are extremely sensitive to public opinion as long as the regimes continue to associate with the United States for collective external security and rents. For example, recently Saudi Arabian public opinion influenced Crown Prince Abdullah's visit to the United States, driving him to meet with the President, in Texas at President Bush's ranch rather than in Washington. By not going to Washington, Crown Prince Abdullah symbolically showed the people of Saudi Arabia that he does not support the foreign policy of the President.¹⁰³

¹⁰²Giacomo Luciano, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the States and Democratization." 152.

¹⁰³Aluf Benn, "Analysis/Abdullah's proposal takes everyone by surprise."

The ruling elites in the GCC states must initiate internal economic reforms to narrow the gap between them and their populations. To promote economic reform these states need to work away from their rentier or distributive structures. This may prove to be the greatest hurdle for these states to overcome. This sort of structure enables the ruling elites to govern without much consent from their populations. However, the social orders in their states and the alliances they have made with them to ensure the longevity of their reigns limit their ability to reform. To shift away from this system to a more open or democratic system these governments would need to tax their populations. It seems that the populations making this sort of shift would be resistant to this change. While this sort of change may be tumultuous, strong naval coalitions can help maintain the free flow of oil to the world oil market and minimize the negative effects of the internal reform process.

Since September 11, 2001 it is difficult to argue that the United States should support stability over the development of democracy in the Persian Gulf States. Saudi Arabia produced 15 of the 19 hijackers who flew the planes into the World Trade Center and Pentagon¹⁰⁴ as well as the leader of the entire organization, which was responsible for the attacks. If the Saudi Royal family can create, an environment in their state that fosters enough hatred of them to motivate their citizens to attack the Royal Family's perceived backers in that sort of manner, then the manner in which the United States Navy engages in

¹⁰⁴Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." 73.

coalition building must reflect sensitivity to this environment.

IV. PATRON CLIENT NETWORKS IN COALITION BUILDING

The political environment of the Persian Gulf region maintains elements of its tribal history. Patron client networks are common in Arab and Islamic culture and stem from the tribal traditions of the region. Examining this sort of social structure can help show how the U.S. Navy can approach coalition building with the GCC states. The U.S. Navy's strength in order of battle and technology enables it to interact with GCC navies in a hegemonic manner that parallels the way the conquering Arabs, who spread the Arab Muslim empire after the death of Muhammad, interacted with the indigenous populations of conquered lands.

The Arab States have a history of patron client networks established in society stemming from the time of the Ottoman Empire. Historically these informal organizations headed by notables existed as the vehicle to act between an individual and the state. Patrons have provided their clients with services normally provided by a government or access to government services that their clients could not access alone. In addition, the GCC states have a history of coexistence under the British suzerain. The U.S. Navy can and does provide access to services not available to the Arab navies on their own. The U.S. Navy provides training and doctrine that are normally unavailable to the GCC navies. Given naval forces of the GCC states do not provide internal security for their governments, coupled with the history of notables throughout Arab society, the U.S. Navy has the opportunity

to engage these Arab navies in the role of a patron, without threatening the internal security of the GCC states.

A. ARAB NAVAL HISTORY, A HISTORY OF MEDIOCRITY

The Arab states have little or no tradition of naval power. Arab military strength in the form of Armies came from their faith in Islam and how they embraced the religion as a motivating tool. Throughout history, Arab navies have suffered defeats at the hands of European powers: Portugal, Spain, France, and Britain.

Traditionally, Arabs have not maintained standing naval forces in the Persian Gulf. Throughout history, the Arabs and Ottomans built naval forces for specific conquests but did not maintain standing fleets. Their maritime interests focused more on trade than on naval capabilities; while they did engage in naval battles in the Mediterranean their Persian Gulf operations supported trade in the Indian Ocean.

Bernard Lewis highlights the weaknesses of the Ottoman navy describing the conflict with Portugal.

The danger was real and growing. When the Portuguese...at the end of the fifteenth century...opened a...route between Europe and Asia...the sultan of Egypt...paid little attention, but a sharp decline in his customs revenues focused his attention more sharply on this new problem. Egyptian naval expeditions against the Portuguese...were...unsuccessful..

The Ottomans now took over this task, but fared little better. Their efforts to counter the Portuguese at the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea

were at best inconclusive.¹⁰⁵

Lewis then argues that the Ottomans were simply not interested in naval development.

Ottoman naval weakness was further demonstrated when "it exposed Egypt to invasion by Napoleon in 1798."¹⁰⁶

Unsuccessful in naval warfare the Ottomans focused on trade throughout the empire.

Products from Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea helped make the empire a flourishing center of international trade.¹⁰⁷

British interests in the Persian Gulf region stemmed from their interests in maintaining ties with India. Later, in consolidating trade with Iran,

The English helped...expel the Portuguese from the Persian Gulf port of Hormuz and to create Bandar 'Abbas as a new port for Persian-Indian Ocean trade.¹⁰⁸

After losing control of the region for a short period;

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the English reestablished their supremacy in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 13-14.

¹⁰⁶ Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, (New York, Cambridge University Press: 1998) 615.

¹⁰⁷ Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 328.

¹⁰⁸ Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 291.

¹⁰⁹ Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 291.

This period known as "pax Britannia" lasted over 150 years until the British withdrew from the region in 1971.¹¹⁰ During this period, the British suzerain did not feel threatened by the weak Arab navies.

Our concern is only with maritime commerce in the Gulf...it matters not to us whether one power or another holds dominion over its shores.¹¹¹

The Ottoman Empire posed the greatest threat to British control of the region. However the focus of this competition was Kuwait where the Ottomans intended to project military power via

The envisioned terminus for the proposed Berlin-Constantinople-Baghdad railway system.¹¹²

The only way the Arabs could test British rule was on land. Unchallenged at sea, the British ruled the Persian Gulf.

B. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF SUZERAINTY

After the death of Muhammad, Islam spread at a ferocious rate. The religion served as the driving force that led to the expansion of the Arab-Muslim empire. One of the reasons for the rapid expansion of Islam was the Arabs' utilization of suzerainty to govern conquered lands. The rate of expansion and success of the Arab-Muslim Empire

¹¹⁰Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council, A Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press: 1988) 16-17.

¹¹¹In 1834 the Governor-General of the Supreme Government in Calcutta describing British interests in the Persian Gulf in : Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council, A Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. 17.

¹¹²Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council, A Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region 17.

parallels the rapid expansion of the Ottoman as well. These empires expanded over vast masses of land in short periods. The application of suzerainty marked the expansion of both empires. In examining the use of suzerainty, cultural attributes of the Arabian navies will be revealed, which will aid in the shaping of coalition building in the region. The U.S. Navy can utilize suzerainty in coalition building in the region.

Arab control of conquered lands took the form of suzerainty. This instituted a system that did not change the autonomy of existing rulers, relieving the Arabs of a great deal of administrative responsibilities while adding to the empire. If the Arabs had not instituted the use of suzerainty, their expansion would have slowed in order to establish new governments for their conquered subjects. Ultimately conquered peoples' lives changed very little after being conquered which reduced the potential for revolution and increased stability within the empire.

Like the Arab-Muslim Empire, the Ottoman Empire spread rapidly over large areas. Given that the Ottoman Empire was also a Muslim empire, its expansion closely matches the Arab-Muslim empire's expansion. Like the Arabs, the Ottomans utilized suzerainty to rule over their new conquests without the having the burden of presiding over the everyday governmental tasks specific to each region.

The Ottoman Empire's use of suzerainty manifested itself in the millet system of government. In this system, the Ottomans did not force their subjects to convert to Islam although they could if they desired to. They were able to maintain their religious practices, autonomy as a

community and customs.¹¹³ Like the Arabs, the Ottomans used this system to govern without the burden of being overly involved with local matters. This sort of arrangement helped maintain the rapid pace of expansion experienced in the Ottoman Empire.

This pattern of external domination and suzerain rule established during the earliest Muslim empires continued throughout the period of British naval domination of the Persian Gulf. The states surrounding the Gulf had been ruled through the Ottoman suzerain; therefore, when the British became the regional hegemon, their use of suzerainty to rule fit with accepted practice in the region. Today the United States has replaced the British as regional hegemon. However the security posture of the in the region reflects a more controlling approach and a lesser suzerain relationship between the U.S. and the GCC states. By moving over the horizon, U.S. naval forces can coordinate the efforts of the GCC navies in a suzerain fashion.

C. PATRON CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

One difference between the Ottoman and the Arab-Muslim Empires was in the complex social structure of the Ottoman Empire that gave rise to patron client networks, which did not exist in the Arab-Muslim Empire. In the eighteenth century, as the Ottoman system of rule took root in the cities, local Ottoman families and groups, rose to power. In consolidating their power, these "notables" were able to pass their power on from one generation to the next. As a result, these notables played a significant role in Ottoman

¹¹³ Lapidus, Ira M. A History of Islamic Societies. 324.

urban politics. Albert Hourani, explains that this type organization arises under certain conditions. The first condition exists when relations of personal dependence define societal order. For example, the artisan in the city who produces mainly for patrician patrons, and the peasants in the countryside, who produce mainly for the land owner, either because they cannot otherwise finance themselves or because the landowners hold the key to the urban market. The second condition exists, when urban notables dominate society. These great families, which (like those of medieval Italy but not like medieval England and France) reside mainly in the city, draw their main strength from the cities. Their position in the cities enables them to dominate a rural hinterland. Finally, the notables have some freedom of political action.¹¹⁴

The politics of notables replaced the function of tribes in Arab society as it modernized and as people moved from the countryside to the cities. As people moved from the tribal rural environment to the cities, the patriarchal ties that helped identify and define a person and their place in a tribe became less important.¹¹⁵ The rise of notables marked a change in the definition of "belonging" from familial to one of common interest. As long as the U.S. Navy can provide the GCC navies with training and coordination the U.S. Navy will share common interests with the GCC navies and can function as a sort of Persian Gulf "notable." As the dominant hegemonic power in the region, the U.S. and its navy hold the key to sea control.

¹¹⁴Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables" 87

¹¹⁵Dale F. Eickelman, "What is a Tribe?" in The Middle East and Central Asia, Chapter 6, Part III Constructed Meanings 136

Notables either provided services to their clients, or provided access to them.¹¹⁶ The U.S. Navy can act as a naval patron and provide the GCC navies training and doctrine while utilizing web-based command and control to coordinate coalition forces and make them interoperable.¹¹⁷ Web based command and control would, in effect be a form of suzerainty. Unlike the British, who simply dominated the region without regard for indigenous navies, the U.S. Navy stands in a position to enhance Arab naval capabilities.

Separating the proposed patron-client relationship between the U.S. and GCC navies from American suzerain rule, may seem difficult. However, the patron-client relationship, which to some extent already exists, facilitates suzerain rule. The clients, in this case the GCC navies, enhance their capabilities which enables them to act in U.S. interests in return for a decreased U.S. naval presence. Confidence in the Arab navies' ability to support American national security goals will then enable suzerain control and coordination via a web based command and control network.

The interaction between patron and client is one of quid pro quo.¹¹⁸ A relationship, in which a client desires to follow a patron, is preferable to a coercive one. In

¹¹⁶Guilain Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East, (Albany, New York, State University of New York Press: 1993) 16.

¹¹⁷The U.S. Navy has identified this system as "FORCEnet," which will integrate multiple platforms and sensors. Although Forcenet represents the future of Naval transformation it has not been developed yet and may not come to fruition. As a result I choose to not use the term Forcenet in this paper. Identified in: Clark, Vern, ADM, Chief of Naval Operations in "Sea Power 21," US Naval Institute web page: www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm, accessed 4 Nov 2002.

¹¹⁸Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a, (Austin, University of Texas Press:1987) 9.

the case of the GCC states and the United States, one must examine why the GCC navies, would want the U.S. as a patron. True, it seems the benefits of improved doctrine, tactics, and access to technology and information might appeal to these weaker navies but there may be other reasons as well. The interaction between the U.S. and the GCC states may be a "power-wielder-power-recipient"¹¹⁹ relationship. The quid pro quo nature of the relationship reveals the GCC states gain power through association with the U.S. Navy and can by intertwining their interests with the U.S., the GCC states can decrease American presence in the Gulf. An examination of the GCC's followership of the U.S. during the Gulf War, states

The manifestly illiberal, non-democratic, and sexist nature of the political formations of the Gulf states suggests that the broader normative vision about the universal aspirations of humankind articulated by President Bush is hardly shared by those in the Gulf...Perhaps more importantly, there was a marked ambivalence in these states, widely shared by both governors and governed alike, about the desirability of an American military presence in the region and a preference, particularly in Saudi Arabia, to keep American troops "over the horizon."¹²⁰

While the GCC states may be willing to support coalitions with the U.S. to gain the benefits of American naval power, it is more likely that they simply want to reduce U.S. presence in the region and keep U.S. forces

¹¹⁹Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A Higgott, Kim Richard Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict," Political Science Quarterly, Volume 106, Issue 3 (Autumn 1991) 396.

¹²⁰Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict," Political Science Quarterly. 401.

over the horizon. Either way, effective coalition building is possible.

Recent public opinion polls conducted by Zogby International and Gallup in the Middle East provide additional reasons for the GCC states' willingness to join naval coalitions with the U.S. A poll conducted in ten nations asking about the "Impressions of America" in April 2002 reveals a strong dislike for American foreign policy in the Middle East.¹²¹ Of the ten nations, three are in the GCC: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. The most important conclusion from the poll shows that negative Muslim views of the U.S. are directly linked to U.S. policies in the Middle East. The Palestinian issue draws the greatest criticism because it is viewed as the "most important" in the nations polled.¹²² The United States received single digit favorable ratings on U.S. policy towards Palestine and the Arab World by every Arab nation polled except the UAE where a 15% favorable rating was earned. Demonstrating the interdependence of the Levant and the Persian Gulf Region over 83% of those polled in the GCC: Saudi Arabia(90%), UAE(83%), and Kuwait(94%) held negative views of U.S. policy toward the Palestinians.¹²³ Finally, those polled in these same countries; show a general dislike for the American led efforts to fight terrorism. While the negative views of the War on Terrorism were not very strong in the UAE(48%), it was not

¹²¹ Zogby, John. "The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll." Zogby International. Utica, N.Y. 11 April 2002. On <https://zogby.com> accessed 02 December 2002. 1.

¹²² Zogby, John. "The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll." Zogby International. 16.

¹²³ Zogby, John. "The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll." Zogby International. 23.

overwhelmingly positive either. Saudi Arabia(57%) and Kuwait(65%) showed a stronger disapproval rate. ¹²⁴

The above polling data seem to indicate the Arab public would not support naval coalition building with the U.S. However, since coalition building could lead to a decreased U.S. presence in the region, it could be publicized in a favorable manner. In addition, while public opinion does matter to these regimes, the rentier nature of their governmental structures gives them the freedom to interact with the U.S. in this manner without consent from their populations. Finally, an over the horizon posture, enabled by the integration of Arab naval assets into a common operational picture coordinated via a web based command and control network, could positively affect Arab public opinion by decreasing the amount of U.S. forces in the region.

D. NAVIES IN ARAB STATE DEVELOPMENT

The GCC states field small naval forces. The distributive nature of the Arab states is inherently weak. Therefore, they maintain strong internal security forces in the form of armies and air forces to help perpetuate the ruling regimes' tenuous hold on power. As a result, for these states naval power is exogenous to their national security concerns.

The relative sizes of their internal security forces when compared with the sizes of their navies show that the forces that provide internal security receive the majority

¹²⁴Zogby, John. "The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll." Zogby International. 25-26.

of their regimes' defense resources.¹²⁵ In addition, examining the details of American Foreign military sales to the GCC states shows a much greater emphasis on army and air force procurement. For example, briefs provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense's office reveal significantly greater interest in army and air force equipment. Most of the interest in naval systems revolves around communications systems. The limited interest in the Harpoon missile system, shows the intention of packaging it for launch from air platforms. Only Oman and Bahrain have shown interest in procuring American naval vessels.¹²⁶

Since the GCC states show that most of their interest lies in maintaining internal security; why should they develop naval forces at all? The answer may lie in an examination of state development. Since many of the states in the Middle East were created at the end of the First World War, their development has been influenced by "a web of international norms and institutions"¹²⁷ established in Europe and throughout the rest of the world. Ian Lustick argues the GCC states continuously focus on internal security because they are led by

A raft of regimes strong enough to suppress dissidents but too weak and insecure to risk intimate forms of cooperation with their

¹²⁵A comparison of the "Fielded forces" of Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia provided on the milnet web page reveals greater army and air force capabilities than naval capabilities. www.milnet.com accessed 7 September 2002.

¹²⁶Kwietowski, Karen, LTCOL USAF. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Interview Wednesday 26 June 2002.

¹²⁷Joel S. Migdal, Strong States and Weak Societies, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press: 1988.) 12.

neighbors.¹²⁸

While the context of Lustick's argument lies in explaining why no great power has emerged in the Middle East, he shows these regimes dedicate a great deal of energy to "suppressing dissidents." In addition the international community has forced "norms" of behavior upon the states of the Middle East that have acted to keep autocratic regimes in power and to prevent any states from using military force to expand their country.

International norms and great power policies have been responsible for blocking the emergence of a great power in the Middle East by deterring or preventing state-building wars from being fought to successful conclusions across existing Middle Eastern boundaries.¹²⁹

These constraints help explain why there is no great Middle Eastern power, and in turn why the GCC states are weak. While the "norms" of the international system have prevented the development of a great power in the Middle East, "norms" of state development have also driven the GCC states to build navies.

Martha Finnemore, discussing state development, points out that states are "continuously evolving" and "states are what they do."¹³⁰ In the case of the GCC states, they have a history of maritime trade from the time of the Ottoman

¹²⁸ Ian S. Lustick, 'The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political 'Backwardness' in Historical Perspective," International Organization 51, 4 (The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Autumn 1997) 654.

¹²⁹ Ian S. Lustick 'The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political 'Backwardness' in Historical Perspective," 661-662.

¹³⁰ Martha Finnemore, "Defining State Interests," National Interests in International Society. (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press: 1996) 4.

Empire and "pax Britannia." Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that these states believe they have maritime interests and must have a navy to protect them. Although navies are generally expensive to maintain, and it may not appear to make sense for these states to try to maintain naval forces, they do because

Systems of norms and social conventions will circumscribe any calculations of rational utility maximization in important ways... Contributors... investigate the role of norms, identities, and social realities in weapons acquisition patterns, weapons taboos, humanitarian intervention, the dynamics of specific alliances, and military postures in specific countries.¹³¹

In other words, while it may not seem rational for the GCC states to maintain navies, they do so because that is what states do. In addition, if their neighbors have navies, then they too must have navies.

E. CONCLUSION

In supporting its foreign objectives in the Middle East of containing the Soviet Union, or maintaining "stability" (American primacy) in the region and supporting the free flow of oil to the world oil market, the United States has helped maintain the economies of the GCC states. Mainly distributive or rentier, these states rely on the rents from oil revenue and foreign investment to maintain their economies.¹³² U.S. Naval presence in the Persian Gulf has directly contributed to regional stability by deterring aggression and has helped maintain oil prices throughout

¹³¹Martha Finnemore, "Defining State Interests," National Interests in International Society. 17

¹³²Giacomo Luciani, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization" 131.

the world. As a result, the GCC states have had a "free ride" on the back of American power."¹³³

An analysis of the economic impact of forward-engaged naval forces in the Persian Gulf was conducted in preparation for the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. "The analysis shows linkage between oil prices and naval crisis response."¹³⁴ Examining the affects of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 on the Oil-future market the analysis shows

With the advent of a crisis, however, future availability of oil is in doubt and traders attach an uncertainty premium to their asking price.¹³⁵

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, oil prices increased immediately. The first forces to arrive in theater capable of sustained action to deter further Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia were the Eisenhower and Independence Carrier Battle Groups, which arrived in the region within one week on 8 August.¹³⁶ Comparing the increase in oil prices immediately after the Iraqi invasion and "the moderated prices after the response," the analysis estimated "the total worldwide impact of naval crisis

¹³³Robert Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire" Strategy and Force Planning. 3rd ed. Eds. The Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport, RI, Naval War College Press: 2000) 182.

¹³⁴Robert E. Looney, David A. Schrady, and Ronald L. Brown. "Estimating the Economic Benefits of Forward Engaged Naval Forces," Interfaces 31: (4 July-August 2001) 74-86

¹³⁵J. Gabilon "Analyzing the forward price curve" in Managing Energy Price Risk, (London: Risk Publications, ENRON Capital and Trade Resources: 1995) in Looney, Schrady and Brown. 76.

¹³⁶Robert E. Looney, David A. Schrady, and Ronald L. Brown. "Estimating the Economic Benefits of Forward Engaged Naval Forces," Interfaces 31. 81.

response to have been \$83.6 billion."¹³⁷ The U.S. Navy's presence significantly affected the economies of the GCC states and the rest of the world.

As the dominant naval power in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. has the opportunity to lead naval coalitions with the GCC states. The relative strength of the U.S. Navy coupled with the weak Arab navies parallels the difference in strength between the Arab armies that carried Islam throughout vast empires. Rather than use this difference in power for conquest, the U.S. Navy can exploit this difference in strength and capabilities to train the Arab navies. This training coupled with suzerainty made possible by web-based technologies can enable the U.S. Navy to act as a patron for the GCC navies without violating the sovereignty of the GCC states. As their patron, the U.S. Navy can provide access for the Arab navies to training, exercises, and the development of doctrine, improved technology, and interoperability. Improved interoperability between the U.S. Navy and GCC naval units could lead to a coalition able to achieve multilateral effects. While Arab public opinion may not favor the advancement of U.S. policy in the region; working with the U.S. Navy could lead to a decreased presence, which in turn could improve Arab public opinion.

¹³⁷Robert E. Looney, David A. Schrady, and Ronald L. Brown. "Estimating the Economic Benefits of Forward Engaged Naval Forces," Interfaces 31: 83.

V. NAVAL COALITION BUILDING AND TRANSFORMATION

Coalition building and the integration of coalition forces to produce multilateral effects is a cornerstone of transformation. One of the key concepts of transformation: full spectrum dominance, in a naval context, implies being everywhere simultaneously. The U.S. Navy cannot achieve this sort of physical presence alone or with coalition partners. However, through web-based integration of coalition forces, their platforms, and sensors the U.S. Navy can achieve a virtual presence. This will enable rapid responses to any crisis in the Persian Gulf, producing the desired dominant and multilateral effects. To achieve the desired multilateral effects of naval coalition building with the navies of GCC states the United States must overcome resistance to this sort of cooperation inherent in the GCC. Historically, the GCC has failed to achieve high levels of cooperation due to their fear of violations of state sovereignty.

A. The NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) repeatedly states the U.S. will pursue its national security objectives with coalition partners, the U.S. will lead these coalitions, and the military will transform to meet the challenges of the future with unparalleled strength. Emphasizing the importance of coalition building, the NSS states:

We (the U.S.) will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain and curtail our enemies' efforts

to acquire dangerous technologies.¹³⁸

Clearly stating the U.S. will work with other nations, naval Coalition building directly supports this overall strategy. In the opening statement to the NSS, President Bush discusses the force-multiplying effect of coalition building saying:

Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.¹³⁹

Again, the President emphasizes the importance of coalition building with respect to legitimacy and achieving stated goals of the United States.

Today the U.S. finds itself in the unique position as the only superpower in a unipolar world; "a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence."¹⁴⁰ While no other country can match the United States' military strength, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 reveal the U.S.' vulnerability as well as "a deep vein of global anti-American resentment."¹⁴¹

Naval coalitions of the willing¹⁴² can directly contribute to the execution of the foreign policy of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf. Through the conduct of

¹³⁸George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office: September 2002.) v.

¹³⁹George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office: September 2002.) vi.

¹⁴⁰George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. iv.

¹⁴¹Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective," Foreign Affairs. Jul/Aug 2002. 21.

¹⁴²George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. vi.

exercises, the U.S. Navy can improve relationships with the navies and governments of the GCC states. These improved relationships will strengthen the bonds between those states and the U.S. by developing trust and credibility through the continuous focus of improving readiness of all GCC naval forces. Through the establishment of trust and credibility the U.S. will more easily "implement its strategies by organizing coalitions."¹⁴³

Finally, the NSS directs the military to transform to "build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge."¹⁴⁴ Through transformation, the U.S. can maintain its dominant position in the world by deterrence. By maintaining technological advantage inherent in transformation over the rest of the world the U.S. can ensure the decisive defeat of any potential adversary.

B. TRANSFORMATION

The Secretary of Defense has initiated the transformation of the military. Naval coalition building with the GCC states can help the U.S. Navy achieve many of the transformational goals. There are:

Six transformational goals: first to protect the U.S. homeland and our bases overseas; second, to project and sustain power in distant theaters; third, to deny our enemies sanctuary, making sure they know that no corner of the world is remote enough,...to protect them from our reach; fourth, to protect our information networks from attack; fifth, to use information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces so they can fight

¹⁴³George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 25.

¹⁴⁴George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 29.

jointly; and sixth, to maintain unhindered access to space, and protect our space capabilities from enemy attack.¹⁴⁵

First by joining the U.S., coalition forces can multiply the effects of a U.S. force. In addition, coalition forces may free up U.S. naval assets for other missions including homeland defense. Second, by operating with U.S. forces and sharing tactical and operational information coalition forces can aid the U.S. in sustaining forces in the Persian Gulf. Third, by linking and sharing information with U.S. naval forces, coalition forces can add to the overall tactical and operation picture helping to deny enemies sanctuary by increasing U.S. force awareness. While coalition forces can not be expected to help protect U.S. networks from attack, they are inherently joint and if they can link with U.S. forces, they can help the overall joint force.

C. NET CENTRIC WARFARE

The U.S. Navy's Transformation Roadmap states that "FORCEnet,"¹⁴⁶ the application of the net-centric warfare concept,¹⁴⁷ will form the base on which naval transformation will build. This web-based tool will be a culmination of:

Sensors, networks, decision aids, weapons, and supporting systems integrated into a single

¹⁴⁵ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military." Foreign Affairs. May/June 2002. 26.

¹⁴⁶ ADM Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, "Power and Access...From the Sea," Naval Transformation Roadmap. 1-2.

¹⁴⁷ Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," Strategy and Force Planning. 3rd ed. Ed. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty. (Newport, R.I. Naval War College Press: 2000) 497.

comprehensive maritime network.¹⁴⁸

The integration of the coalition forces into FORCEnet will enable the United States Navy to maintain a common operational picture with coalition forces enabling the U.S. to dedicate only those assets necessary to execute the mission. A web-based approach to coalition building with the GCC navies offers numerous advantages and can help achieve multilateral effects without violating the bilateral agreements that exist between the U.S. and the GCC states and between the member states of the GCC themselves.¹⁴⁹

An inherent advantage of web basing is that it facilitates the wide dispersion naval forces. By controlling access of coalition partners to web based information, the U.S. can allow shifting coalitions to function seamlessly, while synchronizing the execution of multiple tasks or sequential operations in which coalition partners may only be willing to participate in specific phases of an operation or can not participate due to constraints. For example, a coalition partner may provide data on a surface vessel in the Persian Gulf; this partner may be unable to execute the specific mission with regard to this contact due to political constraints but may be able to push information acquired from indigenous sensors to the common operational picture. Then, a second coalition partner, by pulling the information from the web

¹⁴⁸ADM Vern Clark, Chief of naval Operations, "Power and Access...From the Sea," 2.

¹⁴⁹Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988) 205.

pushed there by the first coalition partner may then be able to execute the desired mission.

A web-based approach enables the U.S. to achieve asymmetric fighting effects by providing a common picture to coalition partners. This asymmetry can help synchronize the battle rhythm of the coalition, to multiply its force. By allowing coalition, partners to push and pull information to and from the web the coalition force can produce persistent surveillance of the entire Persian Gulf to track movements of potential adversaries enabling rapid engagement.

C. THE JOINT VISION

Inherently Joint, Naval coalition building supports the "Joint Vision." Joint Vision 2020 says to accomplish the objectives from the President; future joint forces must realize full spectrum dominance:

The ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.¹⁵⁰

Through web-based command and control, the U.S. Navy can exploit multiple sensors, agencies, and platforms to achieve a decisive tactical advantage over any adversary. In addition, web basing provides the U.S. with the flexibility to fight with coalition partners or fight unilaterally.¹⁵¹ Web-basing will enable the GCC naval

¹⁵⁰Chairman , Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Full Spectrum Dominance" in Joint Vision 2020 (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 2002) 6.

¹⁵¹George W. Bush, United States, President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 6.

coalition partners, with their limited capabilities to become a part of the common operational picture and benefit from the U.S. interagency resources. Any input they can push to the picture will enhance the coalition's situational awareness. Finally, web-basing will enable the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander to command from the Central theater or external to it, in the air, on land, or at sea. It also enables a JTF Commander to maintain a standing and continuous means of communicating guidance and direction to naval forces. By using web-basing as a collaborative tool to enable interagency integration, the U.S. can exploit its asymmetric capabilities.

D. DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

In order to implement the use of a web-based tool like FORCEnet to achieve the goals discussed in the National Security Strategy and Joint Vision 2020, the Joint Force must overcome a series of obstacles. Conducting frequent training and exercises will enable the JTF Commander to discover capabilities and limitations of working with U.S., interagency, and coalition partners. The JTF commander must know what capabilities are gained and lost through the addition and subtraction of different units in the common operational picture. The JTF commander must also recognize and understand the political and cultural environments of coalition partners to optimize their capabilities. Finally, the JTF commander will always have to struggle to achieve true interoperability between the U.S. and Arab naval coalition forces. If a JTF Commander can overcome interoperability problems between the U.S. and GCC navies, a coalition force working from a common operational picture

will have the potential to realize Dominant Maneuver¹⁵² to achieve precision engagement and Rapid Decisive Operations.¹⁵³

The U.S. Navy conducts frequent exercises and training with the Arab navies. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) web page states:

The U.S. Navy participates in over 40 joint naval and military exercises annually with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), other foreign allies and friends, as well as U.S. military forces in the region. Deterrence is the ultimate goal of this cooperative engagement, but preparing jointly as a team to quickly defeat any adversary remains a cornerstone of the Navy's strategy in the region should deterrence fail.¹⁵⁴

The page then goes on to list a few bilateral exercises that the U.S. Navy conducts with the Arab navies. The number of exercises should focus on accomplishing multilateral effects through web-based coordination and the development of common operational doctrine.

While web-based coordination may not yet be available, it may be possible to overcome this by coordinating coalition efforts through one American naval entity, which could conduct multiple bi-lateral exercises with the Arab states to create multi-lateral effects. For example, one Naval vessel or one staff could coordinate multiple

¹⁵²Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020. 20.

¹⁵³U.S. Joint Forces Command. "Toward a Joint Warfighting Concept: Rapid Decisive Operations," RDO Whitepaper Version 2.0, 18 July 2002. 9. The concept is defined for future joint operations. It describes the military element of an effects-based campaign against the broader backdrop of all instruments of national power being applied to reach our goals and protect our national interest.

¹⁵⁴USCENTCOM Web page: <http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/pages/engage.htm> Accessed 28 Cot 2002.

exercises simultaneously. Either way, there would be one unifying entity in the group shaping the overall direction of the exercises.

E. CONCLUSION

Naval Coalition building with the GCC states directly supports the National Security Strategy and Joint Vision 2020. Through transformation and exploiting Internet technology the U.S. can enable coalition partners to execute the missions of the U.S. Navy within the region, freeing U.S. naval assets to help with homeland security and other missions. Limited resources make it impossible to fully patrol every single square mile of the Persian Gulf, however GCC naval assets, held together through web based command and control could improve awareness and shorten response time to possible areas of crisis without violating the sovereignty of any of these states. A standing Joint Task Force headquarters will be necessary to administrate and maintain a web based common operational picture enabling effective naval coalition building between the U.S. and GCC navies. In addition, a permanent JTF will provide the continuity required to apply lessons from exercises in developing an effective doctrine designed to achieve multilateral effects and full spectrum dominance. Lastly, a permanent JTF will give the U.S. the flexibility to work within the framework of a coalition of the willing or act unilaterally to achieve foreign policy goals.

With "capabilities based" planning, the U.S. Navy is no longer confined to work within the two major theater war framework.¹⁵⁵ As a result, military tasks that demand

¹⁵⁵ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military." 24.

capabilities drive a flexible force structure.¹⁵⁶ Frequent exercises can enhance the Arab navies' capabilities to deter aggression by improving their readiness and training. Deterrence of aggression supports stability and in turn American primacy in the region. As well, the support of the free flow of oil to the world oil market can also be enforced or enhanced by training, exercising, and working with the navies of the GCC States to teach them how to protect sea lanes to aid American forces in controlling the sea.¹⁵⁷ This will help maintain the economies of the United States and its trading partners, which are more dependent upon oil from the region than the United States.

Finally, by enabling the GCC partners to push information to or pull it from a web-based operational net, the JTF commander can work around the threat of violating the sovereignty of any of the GCC states and achieve multilateral war fighting effects.

¹⁵⁶ Philip A. Dur, "Presence: Forward, Ready Engaged." Strategy and Force Planning. 3rd ed. Ed. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty. (Newport, R.I. Naval War College Press: 2000) 472.

¹⁵⁷ Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations in "Sea Power 21" describe the US Navy's missions of sea control, power projection, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift and forward presence. www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm, accessed 4 Nov 2002.

VI. CONCLUSION

Since WWII, the United States has played a vital role in the security of the Persian Gulf region. The American hegemonic presence in the region enables the United States to ensure the stability of the world's oil market by guaranteeing an uninterrupted supply of oil from the Persian Gulf region. Europe and the Far East purchase a higher percentage of their oil from the Persian Gulf region than the United States. If the United States continues to maintain a hegemonic presence in the region then in turn, the United States can maintain hegemony over the rest of the world.

U.S. foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf Region has evolved since the end of the Second World War. A series of presidential doctrines have supported three consistent national security goals: the support of Israel, the support of access to oil, and the enforcement of American hegemony in the region. While this third goal was usually couched in terms of containing Soviet expansion, the natural byproduct was American primacy.

Naval Coalition building with the GCC states could lead to a reduced U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf. By giving greater responsibility to the local states, while linking them with American sensors and databases the U.S. Navy could maintain a virtual presence from over the horizon. This approach would slightly relieve the United States' naval burden in the region while preserving the effects of the current American security posture, maintaining the free flow of oil to the world oil market,

and preventing any other nations from establishing a hegemonic presence in the region.

Maintaining the continuous supply of oil to the world oil market directly affects the American economy. As the American economy and population grow in the environment of globalization, it is imperative that the United States maintains the free flow of oil enabled by its presence in the region.

While U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf helps to ensure stability by deterring aggression in the region, it also adds to Arab public resentment of the United States. While American goals in the region have not significantly changed since their inception, Arab public opinion and economic constraints work to resist the perceived intrusive U.S. presence in the region. In support of U.S. interests in the region the US: works to ensure access to host nation facilities, prepositions military equipment, builds host nation self defense capabilities through foreign military sales, training and joint exercises and provides continuously deployed forward U.S. military presence in the region. The continuously deployed forces on the Arabian Peninsula are the single greatest source of resentment toward the United States. These land-based forces fulfill roles the United States Navy cannot fulfill due to limited resources and multiple tasking.

The naval component of the American security posture in the Persian Gulf fulfills a number of missions including: strike, surface warfare, subsurface warfare, Maritime Interdiction Operations or MIO and no fly-zone

enforcement in support of the sanctions against Iraq, naval presence or deterrence, and protection of the sea lanes. These missions all support the grand strategy in the region by maintaining stability, American hegemony, and the free flow of oil to the world oil market. Expanding and changing the role of coalition naval forces can alleviate the burden of stationing ground forces in the Persian Gulf region by United States. By implementing changes to the nature of naval coalitions with the states of the Persian Gulf region the United States can reduce the number of forces forward deployed to the region while maintaining hegemony and advancing American foreign policy objectives.

As the war on terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict continue, Arab public opinion of the United States continues to decline. It is imperative the U.S. seeks alternative ways of maintaining hegemony while reducing visibility to the Arab public. The United States cannot expect that the navies of the GCC to provide a sustained presence in the Persian Gulf in the same manner that an American Carrier battle group or an Expeditionary Strike Force can. However, these navies have the potential based on number of assets and geographical location to provide flexible and rapid responses to dynamic situations. They can supplement naval presence (deterrence), MIO, and protection of the shipping lanes. To test this approach the United States should continue to engage these navies in bilateral exercises that work to hone and flex the skills of these navies. The overall goals of these exercises should focus on achieving multilateral coalition effects to minimize the effects of the bilateral nature of the agreements between these states and the United States to

create a strong naval coalition presence. In addition, the exercises should focus on coalition naval forces working to achieve the same goals sought by the current security posture of the United States in the Persian Gulf region.

Cultural differences between the GCC states and the United States have driven the United States to form bilateral agreements with them rather than multi-lateral or collective defense agreements. Although the GCC was created for cooperative defense, it has failed to function as designed because the GCC states fear violations of their territorial and political sovereignty.

Finally, a web based approach to coalition building through transformation can help the U.S. achieve its long standing national security goals while reducing American presence in the region. In the past, the Nixon Doctrine and Dual Containment rested the national security goals of the United States on the internal politics of Arab states. In doing this the U.S. gave Arab populations the impression that the U.S. was propping up these autocratic and repressive regimes. The distributive or rentier structure of these states is inherently weak as the ruling regimes maintain a tenuous hold on their power. Unable to reform due to alliances they have made with their political cores, these regimes will try to use America's relationship with Israel to distract their disgruntled populations from destabilizing their regimes. The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrate the danger inherent in supporting these regimes. By building stronger coalitions through web-based technology, the U.S. can reduce the presence of U.S. forces in the region. This reduced presence, has the potential to

placate Arab anger toward the U.S. and in turn increase national security.

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