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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE KANTIAN PEACE AND GREEK-TURKISH
RELATIONS**

by

Emmanouil Peteinarakis

June 2007

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Donald Abenheim
James Wirtz

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THE KANTIAN PEACE AND GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis applies the principles of Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* to a study of the historical relations between Greece and Turkey. According to Kant, three principal elements – democracy; economic interdependence; and international organizations and international law – interact to promote peaceful relations among states. This thesis analyzes these three elements in respect to the relationship between Greece and Turkey throughout history.

The thesis concludes that Kant's three elements have been influential in Greek-Turkish relations. Historically, the two states' interdependence has, in general, had a positive effect. But it is the conjunction of the three elements as evidenced mostly through the European Union that suggests the most peaceful future for the two states.

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This thesis is dedicated to my daughters and, in their name, to the new generations of both Greece and Turkey, whom a better and more peaceful future will support.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines Greece and Turkey's bi-lateral diplomatic and strategic relationship within the context of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant's 1795 treatise, *Perpetual Peace*. Kant argues that the basis of international peace consists of three elements: republican constitutions; "cosmopolitan law," embodied in free trade and economic interdependence; and international law and organizations. While each of the three elements may individually promote peace, when they are developed together, the resulting interaction raises the probability of peaceful relations among states.

Kant's theory of democratic peace suggests that democracies rarely fight one another and are reluctant to use the threat of force against one another. Democratic leaders are thus more constrained in the use of violence than non-democratic ones.¹ Today's liberal democratic states are capitalistic promoting trade and the free market. As a consequence, the development of economic relations between states has a positive effect on their foreign policies. Violent statecraft is less probable because it is less cost effective. As a state's economic interdependence becomes deeper, the need for international organizations or regimes to regulate the relations of such nation-states becomes more beneficial. The more such organizations and regimes are developed and the more states rely on them for their specific interests, the more pacific their influence. To comply with the norms of these institutions, states are more likely to try and find a cooperative solution to their disputes.

For more than fifty years, Greece and Turkey have had a turbulent relationship. The tension between them, which some describe as a mini-Cold War, began in its most modern form with the emergence of the Cyprus problem in the mid-1950s, while the island was still under British rule. Since then, the confrontation between them has occasionally come very close to war. At ten year intervals there has been some event that

¹ Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 40.

might have initiated violence. Thus, traditionally, the policies the two states followed were policies of confrontation, since from the perspective of the states' decision makers, a zero-sum mindset dominated their approach to bi-lateral relations.

Since the beginning of this century and the rise of the European Union as a powerful political force, however, these tense relations have entered a new phase and the likelihood of confrontation became more remote. As early as 1999, Greece evidenced a new policy toward Turkey when it not only ceased its blockage of Turkey's European Union candidacy, but also actually promoted it. This policy, combined with the two countries' mutual public expressions of sympathy for the victims of two disastrous earthquakes that affected both of them, initiated an era of *détente*.

But this rapprochement has not resolved their main issues of dispute. Long-standing issues still on the table include: Greece's intention to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve miles, which Turkey declared a *casus belli* in 1995; the Cyprus problem; and Turkey's claims regarding the status of the Aegean Sea and the orientation of the Continental Shelf.² More recently, minority rights also have been added to the dispute agenda. In play is also the strategic effect of the Iraq war and the singularization of Turkey between the hammer of NATO and the West and the anvil of regional chaos to the south east.

Given these circumstances, this thesis answers one main question: How well do Greek-Turkish relations fit the theory of Kantian Peace? A number of contingent questions also are addressed. How does democracy influence the two states' bilateral relations? What are the economic relations between the two countries and how do these affect their politics? How and to what extent have international organizations and regimes been influential in the policies developed by the two states? How has the lack of participation in some international organizations and regimes affected them? What are the future prospects, in relation to the development of the three Kantian elements, of Greece and Turkey's bilateral relations? And, finally, is there one element more significant than the others and, if so, at what level?

² Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Web site: http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/, (accessed April 17, 2007).

The two-hundred-year-old ideas that this thesis adapts and uses to evaluate current policies are of significant interest in today's world. The achievement of peace and stability is often the main goal of societies. For many years, the realist theory of the inevitability of war dominated Greek-Turkish relations. The two governments' skepticism about the intentions of the other side prevented them from visualizing a better future through different policies. Thus, the tension between them was maintained.

Now, however, it is important to examine how the Kantian theory of peace works, because the rapprochement of the two states seems to be based on those basic ideas. The analysis presented here will show the reasons for the relaxation of tension between Greece and Turkey and will explain the existing unresolved problems. In this way, the thesis contributes to the general understanding of the initiatives policy-makers of the two countries should adopt to promote peaceful settlements. The emergence of a truly Kantian peace between Greece and Turkey could be a paradigm for other states with similar bilateral disputes in the broader area of South-East Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

The first chapter describes how prominent liberal scholars explain the three elements that comprise the Kantian peace. It also describes the major realist opposition to liberal theory and the most recent theories about the influence of the elements of the Kantian peace in international relations.

Chapter II is a short analysis of Greek-Turkish disputes. It describes the historical reasons of the conflict, which are closely related to the development of each state's nationalism. It also describes the current issues in dispute

In Chapter III presents an analysis of the influence of the three elements of Kant's theory in Greek-Turkish relations. It first describes the development of each state's political system influenced the course of the countries' bilateral relations. It then describes the economic development of each state and their bilateral economic relations. Finally is presented the effect that specific predominant international organizations have in Greek-Turkish relations.

In the final chapter, the thesis concludes by a reassessment of the material at hand and some tentative conclusions as concerns the subjects of theory as well as policy in a region of Europe and its glaxis that longs for peace and prosperity on an enduring basis.

II. KANTIAN PEACE

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the ideal of peace as a guide to statecraft. The question of war and peace in the Aegean forms a leading theme of a history that is replete with human suffering. The presence of the past in Europe is universal, yet this fact cannot determine the fate of nations in the present and future, where the virtues of peace surely eclipse the appeal of power and conflict. The issue that has determined man's evolution has been political and armed conflict. Thus, the majority of history books seem often to focus more on human conflicts than on human achievement of peace.

Political science tries to explain human behavior and the reasons that lead political entities to war. For many years, it is war, not peace, that has been its main topic. Relatively recently, a shift occurred and peace studies began to emerge. One of the most influential and earliest studies of this type is Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace*.³ According to Kant, if three elements – “republican constitutions,” “cosmopolitan law” embodied in free trade and economic interdependence, and international law and organizations – are developed adequately on a global scale, peace among nations will be eternal.⁴

This chapter explores these three elements according to Kantian liberal theory. The chapter also presents realist theorists' arguments opposing Kant's theory and describes the development of more recent influential theories about the role of those three elements in international relations.

³ Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay” (1795), in *Kant's Principles of Politics*, W. Hastie, ed. & trans., Edimburg: T&T Clark, 1891, The Online Library of Liberty, 5, http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Kant_0056.pdf, (accessed February 20, 2007).

⁴ Bruce Russett, and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, 29.

B DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Democracy as a system of government first emerged twenty-five centuries ago in ancient Greece. But this system is not directly related to the form of government referred to as democracy today. The ancient Greek notion of democracy arose through a philosophical discourse, which has been mostly forgotten over the course of history. The emergence of the contemporary notion of a democratic system derived from the evolution of the modern state and the nation-state in the period from the 13th until 18th centuries. The gradual transformation of the medieval feudal system to a more centralized form of government strengthened the authority of the king at the expense of the feudal estates.

In England, the nobility, the church, and the mayor of London opposed the English king's oppressive use of his authority, and eventually, the great land barons devised the *Magna Charta Libertatum*. The famous Magna Carta is a charter of liberties to which the English barons forced King John to give his assent on June 15, 1215, at Runnymede. The document constitutes a fundamental guarantee of rights and privileges. Although, it had little important historical significance at the time, the form in which it was adopted was revolutionary.⁵ It restricted the authority of the king and initiated an era of parliamentary governance in Europe. Through time, the English gained privileges from Magna Charta that Hagen Schulze summarized under five headings: freedom of the press, the *Habeas Corpus* Act, public tribunals, jury trials, and parliamentary representation.⁶

Other European states created their own parliamentary systems on the basis of the medieval estates. Such formed the basis for the break through of the estates généraux in the French Revolution. Nonetheless, democracy remained limited to Western Europe and its evolution gradual until the 20th century. Indeed, democracy did not achieve its contemporary form until the second half of the twentieth century. As described by Robert Dahl and Bruce Stinebrickner, its basic characteristics comprise seven essential institutions of polyarchic or democratic systems.

⁵ Hagen Schulze, trans., Yuill E. William, *States, Nations, and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present*, Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2002, 22–23.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 76. The Habeas Corpus Act prevents arbitrary arrests.

1. Control over final decisions about government policy is vested in elected officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in frequent, fair, and free elections in which force and coercion are absent or quite limited.
3. Virtually all adults have the right to vote.
4. Most adults also have the right to run for public offices in these elections.
5. Citizens possess a right, effectively enforced by government officials, to freedom of expression, including criticism of and opposition to the leaders or party holding top government offices.
6. They have access, and an effectively enforced right to gain access, to sources of information that are not monopolized by the government of the state, or by any other single group.
7. They possess an effectively enforced right to form and join political organizations, including political parties and interest groups.⁷

These seven essential institutions of a democratic state have as a parallel outcome: the development of additional rights and freedoms within society. These freedoms and rights include the freedom of religion, judicial procedures that prevents easily conviction of criminal suspects, and the right to privacy. Although these characteristics are not necessary for a governmental system to be characterized as polyarchic or democratic, they are seldom absent from this type of government.⁸

These rights are neither promoted nor protected in the same way in an authoritarian political system. In a non-polyarchic system, the existence of autonomous groups that have the ability to influence the government also is limited. As a consequence, policy-making by non-pluralistic governments relies mostly on senior members of the government , whereas in pluralistic systems, it relies on bargaining and negotiations. What essentially distinguishes democracies from non-democracies is the reliance of the former on persuasion and the latter on coercion.⁹

⁷ Robert Dahl, and Bruce Stinebrickner, *Modern Political Analysis*, 6th ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003, 79–80.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 84–85.

⁹ *Ibid.*

1. The Role of Democracy in Kant's Perpetual Peace

Although Kant is considered one of the major theorists of liberalism, he also accepts the basic elements of realism. In his analysis of how “perpetual peace” may be achieved he accepts states as major actors. Kant finds that “A state of Peace among men who live side by side with each other is not the natural state. The state of Nature is rather a state of War.”¹⁰ Yet, his contribution to liberal theory begins from this point, because he proposes, contrary to realists that such peace is feasible.

In “The First Definitive Article in the Conditions of Perpetual Peace” Kant supports the pacific role of a so called Republican Constitution.¹¹ He argues that citizens in a republican state are more reluctant to accept war actions than is the ruler in a non-republican state. In their case, this policy implies serious consequences: “to have to fight in their own persons; to supply the costs of the war out of their own property; to have sorrowfully to repair the devastation which it leaves behind; and, as a crowning evil, to have to take upon themselves at the end a burden of debt which will go on embittering peace itself, and which it will be impossible ever to pay off on account of the constant threatening of further impending wars.”¹² This reluctance to go to war on the part of the citizens of a republic represents a fundamental premise of liberal theory about the bottom-up view of politics where decision-making has to take into account societal demands.¹³

According to Kant, the term “republic” means a separation of powers between the judicial and the legislation branches of a state. In this system, the “political society has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order.”¹⁴ A

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay” (1795), in *Kant's Principles of Politics*, W. Hastie, ed. & trans., Edimburg: T&T Clark, 1891, The Online Library of Liberty, 5, http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Kant_0056.pdf (accessed February 20, 2007).

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Andrew Moravcsick, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51: 4 (Autumn 1977): 516–517.

¹⁴ Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *The American Political Science Review* 80:4 (December 1986): 1157.

republican governance system makes states more skeptical in waging wars. And gradually, through the creation of a federation of same-minded states and the continuous broadening of the federation until the inclusion of the last state, they will establish the “perpetual peace.”¹⁵

The theory that Kant expressed became broadly known during the twentieth century by the well-known term “Democratic Peace.” Empirical studies show that democratic states rarely fight one another. This does not mean that democracies never fight. Democracies fight, but they will most probably fight with non-democracies. Furthermore, they have a tendency to ally together as they did during WWII.

Bruce Russett provides two models that explain about the behavior of states according to their political system: the Cultural/Normative Model and the Structural/Institutional Model.¹⁶

a. The Cultural/Normative Model

Decision makers have a tendency to act under the norms that have been developed in relation with other states that are related to their domestic politics. They also expect the same behavior from the decision makers in other states.

According to this model, violence between democratic states will be rare because compromise and nonviolence are at the root of decision makers’ domestic policies and should be reflected in their diplomacy. The rights and existence of a state are respected; democracies act under the norm of peaceful resolution and expect other democracies to follow the same policy. This behavior is stronger when the democratic system is stable and established. If one of the members of a dyad of democratic states is unstable, the possibility of conflict increases.

¹⁵ Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *The American Political Science Review*, 1158.

¹⁶ Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 35, 40.

Violence between non-democracies or between democracies and non-democracies is more frequent because, in non-democracies, the use of violence is part of the domestic political behavior of decision makers. As a consequence, the threat and use of violence are expected to be common in international relations. Furthermore, democracies may act violently to avoid exploitation of their norms by non-democracies.

b. *The Structural/Institutional Model*

According to this model, violence between democratic states will be rare because, in democratic states, policy making is based on compromise among political actors. Public opinion must support the decision to engage in hostilities. This procedure prevents rash action by the policy makers and makes the decision for conflict resolution less likely. Since the existence of the same behavior by the policy makers of the opposing democratic state is expected, the fear of a surprise attack is absent.

Violence between non-democracies or between democracies and non-democracies is more frequent because, in non-democracies, the policy makers are less constrained by domestic factors. According to Bruce Russett, they “can more easily, rapidly, and secretly initiate large-scale violence.”¹⁷ This possibility of surprise attack leads policy makers of opposing democratic or non-democratic states to use violence to eliminate the possibility of falling victim to a surprise attack. Furthermore, the efforts by the leaders of non-democracies to gain more concessions from democratic states by exploiting the constraints faced by democracies can lead democracies to act violently.

2. *Realist View*

Realists argue that “democratic peace” is not a theory. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, refers to it as a “thesis.”¹⁸ The libertarian Christopher Layne explains that it is just a “proposition or a hypothesis,” because “the causal relationship between the

¹⁷ Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 40.

¹⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *International Security* 25:1 (Summer 2000): 6.

independent variable,” which is the “democratic political structures at the unit level,” and the independent variable, which is “the asserted absence of war between democratic states,” is not adequately explained.¹⁹

Realist assumptions about international politics, according to Hans Morgenthau, are based on the notion that the “world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature.” It is a “world of opposing interests and of conflict among them,” where “moral principles can never be fully realized, but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts.” Thus it “aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good.”²⁰

Waltz argues that realism suggests that, “If there is a distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it.”²¹ According to that theory, the anarchical world system of states is actually a self-help system in which “those who do not help themselves, or who do less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer.”²² There is competition and conflict among states that is not affected by domestic structures. In international politics, the option for a loser to accept an unwilling outcome does not exist as it does in national politics. Defeat in international competition may lead from “constraints on autonomy to occupation to extinction.”²³

Those using these assumptions consider democratic peace theory as flawed. Realists provide their own explanation for the lack of war among democratic states over the last two centuries. Layne finds, for example, that the number of democracies between 1815 and 1945 was very small, and because war is rare, it did not happen for democracies

¹⁹ Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” *International Security* 19:2 (Autumn 1994): 5, n.1.

²⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, revised by Kenneth W. Tompson, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993, 3–4.

²¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979, 117.

²² *Ibid.*, 118.

²³ Layne, “Kant or Cant,” 11.

to fight each other.²⁴ By contrast, John Mearsheimer writes that in the post–WWII era, peace in Europe was the result of “the bipolarity of the distribution of power on the Continent, the rough equality in military power between those two polar states, and the appearance of nuclear weapons.”²⁵

Realist criticism of democratic peace theory focuses on the notion that there is no guarantee of moral behavior on the part of Kant’s democracies, especially to intervene in the affairs of other states which Kant had rejected. Thus, Waltz concludes: “If the world is now safe for democracy, one has to wonder whether democracy is safe for the world.”²⁶

C. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Over the last two centuries, new theories about state relations have developed. One of the most debated concepts is the notion of interdependence, which has taken the form mostly of economic interdependence. According to Mark Crescenzi, notion of interdependence raises two questions: “Does economic interdependence lead to peace or conflict between nations? When two countries enter an economic relationship characterized by interdependence, are they constrained in their military behavior, or are they adding one more source of discord?”²⁷

1. Kantian Interdependence

Kant was one of the main theorists to promote the idea of interdependence as a way to reduce conflict. In the “Third Definitive Article in the Conditions of a Perpetual Peace,” he refers to cosmopolitan law, which “shall be restricted to conditions of universal hospitality.”²⁸ To Kant, the meaning of hospitality, according to Michael

²⁴ Layne, “Kant or Cant,” 39.

²⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security* 15:1. (Summer 1990), 11.

²⁶ Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 13.

²⁷ Mark J.C. Crescenzi, “Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict,” *The Journal of Politics* 65:3 (August 2003): 809–811.

²⁸ Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, Online Library, 7, http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Kant_0056.pdf (accessed February 20, 2007).

Doyle, “does appear to include the right of access and the obligation of maintaining the opportunity for citizens to exchange goods and ideas without imposing the obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all cases under liberal constitutions).”²⁹ Furthermore, and especially for economic interdependence, Kant claims, according to Russett and John O Neal, that:

The *spirit of commerce* sooner or latter takes hold of every people, and it can not exist side by side with war. And of all the powers (or means) at the disposal of the state, *financial power* can probably be relied on most. Thus states find themselves compelled to promote the noble cause of peace, though not exactly from motives of morality. And wherever in the world there is a threat of war breaking out they will try to prevent it by mediation.³⁰

Doyle proposes that the development of international markets has a pacifying effect because it removes from state policy makers the obligation to make difficult decisions about production and distribution. The interdependence that is created by trade and the “international contacts of state officials have as an outcome the creation of transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation.”³¹ Doyle also explains that modern liberal beliefs accept that “international financiers and transnational and transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of accommodation.”³²

2. Neoliberal Institutional Interdependence

During the years immediately following the end of WWII, the idea of interdependence became more fashionable. The main representatives of this theory, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who can be categorized from a theoretical perspective as neoliberal institutionalists, initiated a round of debates by their book, *Power and Interdependence*.³³ Their main concept is that traditionalists could not adequately explain

²⁹ Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” 1158.

³⁰ Russett and O Neal, *Triangulating Peace*, 128.

³¹ Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” 1161.

³² Ibid.

³³ Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977.

conflict. Thus, their theory of interdependence is an alternative explanation that is based on the costs of relationships, an issue that leaders take into account during the process of decision making. Interdependence exists when the costs have a sufficiently high value that restricts autonomy.³⁴ In their definition of “sensitivity interdependence” and “vulnerability interdependence,” Keohane and Nye explain the decision-making process. Vulnerability does not allow decision makers to have a flexible policy, since the options they have for a specific situation are limited. Given such a restricted condition, a use of force may be their only alternative. On the other hand, sensitivity, although it also implies costs, has asymmetry, a “source of power.” Sensitivity, therefore, provides adequate alternative options without creating a desperate situation for the state.³⁵

Keohane and Nye’s definition of “complex interdependence” embodies assumptions that diverge from realism. The main characteristic of “complex interdependence” is that “actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist and in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy.”³⁶ In contrast to liberals who suggest that interdependence on its own causes peace, Keohane and Nye argue that when conditions exist that closely resemble complex interdependence, then the likelihood of war resulting from interdependence is very low.

3. Realist Interdependence

Realist theorists provide the main critique of the liberal and neoliberal theories of interdependence. Realists accept that interdependence exists, but they disagree about the pacific role it may have. Their argument is that when states are interdependent, they try to reach a level of autarchy. Waltz is the main proponent of this argument. Waltz suggests that “Among states, the state of nature is a state of war,” one of the fundamental assumptions of realist theory.³⁷ The inequality of interdependence between states is a

³⁴ OKeohane, and Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* 9.

³⁵ Ibid., 18.

³⁶ Ibid., 24.

³⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979, 101.

negative factor of their cooperation, so the question for them is not “Will both of us gain?” but rather “Who will gain more?”³⁸ Since it is very unlikely that the gains will be equal, this will create a feeling of insecurity between them and will prevent them from more extensive cooperation. Moreover, he rejects the idea of sensitivity interdependence and suggests that interdependence mainly takes the form of vulnerability.³⁹

In the last two decades, theorists have worked to gather evidence to support their theories. Each school asserts that the theories they support have been proven through empirical studies. These efforts have generated debates and critiques about the methodologies and results of competing research programs and their results.⁴⁰ New theoretical approaches are now emerging to fill the middle ground between these two opposing theories.⁴¹

Economic interdependence is a fact, and no school of thought denies its existence. Debate concentrates on the influence that economic interdependence may have on international relations.

D. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The notion that international organizations would promote peace dates back as far as the thirteenth century. But their evolution did not begin until the early nineteenth century with the Congress of Vienna in 1814. A real expansion occurred during the

³⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 5.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 139–46.

⁴⁰ For discussion and debates of these studies, *see*, among others: Erik Gartzke, Li Quan, and Charles Boehmer, “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict,” *International Organization* 55:2 (Spring 2001); Erik Gartzke, and Li Quan, “Measure for Measure: Concept Operationalization and the Trade Interdependence–Conflict Debate,” *Journal of Peace Research* 40:5 (2003): 553–571; John R. Oneal, “Measuring Interdependence and its Pacific Benefits: A Reply to Gartzke & Li,” *Journal of Peace Research* 40:6 (2003): 721–725; Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*; Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” *Journal of Peace Research* 33:1 (February 1996): 29–49; Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollin, “The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future Research,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:6 (December 2001): 834–859.

⁴¹ Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” *International Security* 20:4 (Spring 1996).

twentieth century when the thirty-seven IGOs that existed in 1909 increased to 132 in 1956 and 293 in 1990.⁴² According to Russett, Oneal, and David Davis:

An IGO can be defined as a formal, continuous institution established by treaty or other agreement between governments, long-range in nature, multilateral (the Union of International Associations specifies three or more member states), with a secretariat and more-or-less regular meetings, and an 'international legal personality' with legal standing.⁴³

1. International Organizations and International Law in Kant's Theory

Kant's "Second Definitive Article in the Conditions of Perpetual Peace" promotes the cooperation of liberal states in a universal federation. He explains that a peace treaty is adequate for the end of a specific war but it does not provide guarantees for the establishment of a generally peaceful condition among states. He accepts as the supreme authority of the state because "every nation is the judge of its own cause."⁴⁴ He does not refer to an international constitution, because states have "already within themselves a legal Constitution and have thus out-grown the coercive Right of others to bring them under a wider legal constitution according to conceptions of Right."⁴⁵ Although for Kant, the creation of a Nation of States would be the ideal, he recognizes that for the achievement of a more peaceful world, it is more feasible to create a Federation of States.

Although men could form a state that will prevent them from fighting each other, this cannot be achieved between states, according to Kant, because no state recognizes a

supreme legislative power which will secure [its] Rights and whose Right [it] will also secure; – then there is no intelligible basis upon which any security for such Rights could be founded unless it were a surrogate of the union embodied in Civil Society. And this can be nothing but a *free*

⁴² Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–85," *International Organization* 52:3 (Summer 1998): 442–443.

⁴³ Russett, Oneal, and Davis, "The Third Leg," 443.

⁴⁴ Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, Online Library, 7, http://olldownload/libertyfund.org/EBooks/Kant_0056.pdf (accessed February 20, 2007).

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Federation of the State, which Reason must necessarily connect with the idea of the Right of Nations if there is anything further to be in connection with it.⁴⁶

The idea of a free federation of states represents the will of states to cooperate through the logic of international law and international organizations (IGOs). Although international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) may be influential in promoting peace, the fact that they are driven mostly by individuals or private organizations does not permit them to represent the will of states.

Doyle suggests that Kant's thoughts about international law and the federation of states probably referred to a "mutual non-aggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement."⁴⁷ Today it is believed that IGOs' promotion of peace is based in their functions, which fall into six categories:

1. Coercing Norm Breakers
2. Mediating among Conflicting Parties
3. Reducing Uncertainty by Conveying Information
4. Problem Solving
5. Socialization and Shaping Norms
6. Generating Narratives of Mutual Identification.⁴⁸

Russett, Oneal, and Davis also find that, apart from the direct effects that IGOs have in promoting peace, they also may indirectly reduce the possibilities of conflict by promoting democracy and interdependence.⁴⁹ The increase in economic activities of the citizens of liberal democratic states which develop higher volumes of interdependence creates the need for the development of the proper institutions which will regulate and

⁴⁶ Kant, *Perpetual Peace*.

⁴⁷ Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 80:4 (December 1986): 1158.

⁴⁸ Russett, Oneal, and Davis, "The Third Leg," 445–447.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 447.

facilitate trade and investment. In other words, international law and institutions are established by citizens of democratic states pursuing their interests throughout the world.⁵⁰

International organizations and international law are interrelated. The former are a form of expression of the latter. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), a Dutch scholar, jurist, and diplomat, is accepted by many as “the father of the law of nations” for his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (On the Law of War and Peace). Although his influence has fluctuated over time, many of his doctrines survive in contemporary notions of international law, defined by Barry Carter as “the distinction between just and unjust war, the recognition of the rights and freedoms of the individual, the doctrine of qualified neutrality, the idea of peace, and the value of periodic conferences between the rulers of states.”⁵¹

Grotius’s *De Jure Belli* falls between Hobbes’s notion that states are free to act in the international arena pursuing their goals without moral or legal restrictions and Kant’s moral views about the cosmopolitan society. Grotius suggests that states are the main actors in an international society, where they are bound by the rules of that society.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the idea of an international society referred mostly to European society, but during the twentieth century the notion expanded into a concept of a world society.⁵² The formation of this society would be the result of the will of states for the existence of a world order that maintains the common interests.⁵³

⁵⁰ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 157.

⁵¹ Barry Carter, Phillip R. Trimble, and Curtis A. Bradley, eds., *International Law*, 4th ed., New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003, 10–11.

⁵² Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 2nd ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1977/1995, 23–25.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 51.

2. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism

Functionalism and neofunctionalism present a more specific approach to the pacific effects of international organizations and political integration. Their approach finds that there is a qualitative distinction between politics and administration.⁵⁴

Functionalism and neofunctionalism suggest that common needs can lead people to unification and more pacific relations. David Mitrany, a leading scholar of functionalism in the twentieth century, suggests that political segregation hampers peoples' efforts toward and need for cooperation. Thus, he proposes an "international house-building," whereby international politics will become clearer and more easily adopted. His analysis concludes that a loose association of states, like the United Nations, which "rest[s] upon national separateness ... is inadequate in scope and uncertain in working."⁵⁵ Mitrany criticizes the ideal of creating a federal system because it would lead to a different type of nationalism. Federations may be competitive with other political entities and thus they provide little evidence that they may contribute to peace.⁵⁶ A functional approach "emphasizes the common index of need," in contrast to the federal (or constitutional) approach which "emphasizes the individual index of power."⁵⁷ Following this approach, with the creation of a large number of international organizations where states can be members in more than one and where the administrative experts have a dominant role, could lead to a "world government."⁵⁸ A basic functional hypothesis is that, since people's "loyalties are created by functions," the transfer of functions to the international level may also shift loyalties to that level.⁵⁹

Neofunctionalism, although it follows the basic lines of functionalism, differs in that it emphasizes regional integration rather than world integration. As Ernst Haas points

⁵⁴ Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization*, Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1964, 9.

⁵⁵ David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization," *International Affairs* 24:3 (July 1948): 351.

⁵⁶ Mitrany, "The Functional Approach," 352.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 356.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 358.

⁵⁹ Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, 22.

out, “voluntary groups coming from a regional setting are much more likely to achieve integration than an organization consisting of representatives from the entire globe.”⁶⁰ Neofunctionalism also suggests that the “spillover effect” from a specific sector will lead to integration in other sectors.

3. Realist View

Realism provides the major critique of the pacific role of international law and institutions. According to Mearsheimer, the anarchical international system of states is a “brutal arena” where states try to take advantage of one another. Thus, although states may cooperate, this behavior is limited because the international rules affect “state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power.”⁶¹ Mearsheimer argues that states are aware of relative gains among them and cheating by others, two issues that are highly related to the fundamental assumption of realists about the balance of power.⁶² Cooperation is a result of the politics of self-interest rather than the common interest. Institutions are a creation of the most powerful states to preserve order, which favors their predominance in the international system ⁶³

4. Reply to Realist BeliefAn argument used by realists to refute the power of international law and organizations to affect states’ behavior concerns their lack of binding force. Waltz argues, for instance, that “most international law is obeyed most of the time, but strong states bend or break laws when they choose to.”⁶⁴ Christian Reus-Smit, however, challenges that realist skepticism and identifies three main problems in the realist argument:

1. Lack of explanation of the growing body of law
2. Lack of explanation of how law constrains strong states

⁶⁰ Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, 22.

⁶¹ John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994/95): 7–13.

⁶² Prisoners’ dilemma under the realists’ assumptions leads to defect.

⁶³ Mearsheimer. “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 13.

⁶⁴ Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 27.

3. Lack of explanation of how weak states and other actors use the law to shape outcomes.⁶⁵

William Slomanson provides a metaphorical explanation of states' behavior in relation to international law:

The national decision to voluntarily observe International Law is premised on self-interest and the survival instinct emerging at various international intersections. Self-interested States recognize that it is in their best interest to comply with the mutual expectations of International Law. Like most motorists, who observe almost all traffic laws almost all of the time, national interests are served best by a prevailing international order.⁶⁶

International organizations and international law have been continuously developing during the 20th century. This fact by itself proves the importance that they have in international relations although that different schools of thought have different explanations about their influence and purpose.

E. CONCLUSION

While Kant admits that states are the main actors in the international arena and that war and conflict comprise a fact of human relations, he nonetheless suggests in *Perpetual Peace* that peace in the world is feasible. Such an idea was bold in the age of reason and the era of the wars of the cabinets in the 18th century and it seems equally as bold in the early 21st century. Yet, the record of the construction of "Europe" argues for the likely efficacy of this radical idea.

Democracy is a form of governance that constrains people to decide in favor of war *because* they are aware of its costs. Democracy promotes transparency and predictive state behavior, which allows opponent democracies to act less violently. On the other hand, realists believe that domestic structures do not influence international politics. The world overall comprises an anarchical state system within which self-interest prevails and balance of power is the norm.

⁶⁵ Christian Reus-Smit, "The Politics of International Law," in Christian Reus-Smit, ed. *The Politics of International Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 17.

⁶⁶ William R. Slomanson, *Fundamental Perspectives on International Law*, 5th ed., Canada: Thomas Wadsworth, Thomas Learning, 2007, 57.

For Kant, the development of economic and trade relations has a pacific role in international relations. And while the pacifying effect of economic interdependence has no moral motives, it constrains people from choosing war, since the economic costs are unfavorable.

Realists believe that economic interdependence has a negative effect on international relations. It adds one more parameter for conflict because it is almost never equal and relative gains are states' major concern.

Neoliberal institutionalists are positioned between those two theoretical approaches. They believe that interdependence may promote peace in the event that it takes the form of sensitivity, where states have more than one political option. On the other hand, when interdependence takes the form of vulnerability, it may lead to conflict.

Kant, however, admits that "perpetual peace" is not a condition that can be easily achieved. The creation of a pacific federation of liberal republican states is the goal, although he also admits that a global state would be the ideal type of world governance. Liberals believe that the development of international organizations that address international law among states restricts states from arbitrary political behavior. Functionalists and neo-functionalists also support the pacifying role of IGOs. Yet they suggest a different theoretical explanation. They propose that the development of administrative structures in which technical expertise plays a crucial role comprise the influential parameters in peaceful relations. Realists argue that IGOs are strong state constructions in the effort to support the international balance of power. Thus, they obey international law according to their national interests.

But theoretical debates have no value if they cannot be proved in practice. Russett and Oneal claim in their study, *Triangulating Peace*, that each Kantian element individually "makes a statistically significant, independent contribution to peaceful interstate relations." And the "magnitude of their combined effect is . . . particularly striking. The likelihood of a dispute falls by 71 percent if all three variables are increased simultaneously above their baseline rates."⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Russett and Oneal *Triangulating Peace*, 193.

Kantian theory is supported by contemporary relations between France and Germany. During the last two centuries, the European continent was a battlefield that resulted in the deaths of millions of people. During that era, France and Germany were enemies and their foreign policies were dominated by mistrust of one another. After the end of WWII, the will to heal the wounds of war and fear of Soviet communism drove European states closer to one another. The efforts to create a European Defense Community in the 1950s were not successful, however, because of France's lingering fear of a German resurgence.⁶⁸ As a result, cooperative efforts were diverted to the economic field.

The European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor of the European Economic Community and later the European Union, was based on the perspective of French officials that their policy toward Germany should be based on economic association rather than political antagonism.⁶⁹ This shift in French policymakers' foreign policy did not mean that their fears of Germany were alleviated immediately.⁷⁰ Through extensive economic and political cooperation, the two states, under EC/EU organization, merged their economic and military institutions. Today, the possibility of war between them is considered to be nonexistent.

The gradual erosion of enduring rivalries in Western Europe creates a hope that the development of the three Kantian elements may have a positive influence in other areas of the world beset by traditional conflicts. One of these "hot" areas is Southeastern Europe, where relations between Greece and Turkey can be characterized as an enduring rivalry.

⁶⁸ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargaining Reconsidered*, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, 35.

⁶⁹ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005, 22.

⁷⁰ The fall of Berlin's Wall and the reunification of Germany renewed the feelings of German threat and initiated secret diplomatic efforts from France to avert this procedure. See Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, 407–8.

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III. GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE PAST

A. INTRODUCTION

Greek-Turkish relations present something of a paradox in contemporary international relations. Although Greece and Turkey have been allies since the early 1950s as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there has been a gradually escalating tension in their bilateral relations. The rhetoric and arguments used by both nations in their international interactions have focused on their national interests and national rights. During the last forty years, those policies brought the two states close to war in almost every decade. Efforts to reduce the tension have not yet been sufficient to mitigate the causes of their mutual hostility. The tensions affecting Turkey connected with the crisis in the Middle East and the future construction of Europe suggest a link to the evolution of Greek-Turkish conflict.

In 1999, a rapprochement occurred, initiated by a Greek shift in policy in regard to Turkey's European Union candidacy. Together with the peoples' sympathetic response to the disastrous earthquakes that hit both countries that same year, this change initiated diplomatic move toward detente between them. Yet, the rapprochement had no positive impact in terms of ending the issues keeping the two states apart.

Analysts and scholars from both countries continue to debate the political and legal aspects of the controversy. The histories of the two states and their national identities have determined the perceptions they hold of themselves and their neighbors.

Those perceptions influence both the general populace and the political elite thinking about relations between Greece and Turkey. This chapter describes the development of Greek-Turkish relations. Its purpose is not to analyze the legal or political status of the bi-lateral relationship, but to provide a third perspective that will help the reader to understand the deeper reasons for tension across the Aegean.

The chapter presents a historical review of the national formation of both Greece and Turkey because their histories are closely related. Next, it analyzes the development of their national identity. National history and the emergence of a national identity are closely related. In closing, the chapter describes the contemporary issues of dispute that have arisen during the last half of the twentieth century that remain unresolved today.

B. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

The Greek–Turkish relationship dates back at least a thousand years, long before the modern Greek and Turkish nations existed. At the time, the Byzantine Empire, the eastern part of what was then the Roman Empire, was predominantly Greek-Christian. But the defeat of the Byzantines in 1071 in the battle of Manzikert allowed Turkish-speaking tribes from central Asia to establish themselves in Anatolia, also known as Minor Asia, which is now Turkey. Over the next four centuries, a continuous expansion by the Ottomans, the dominant tribe, led to their capture of Constantinople, which later became known as Istanbul. This marked the end of the Byzantine Empire and its replacement by the Ottoman Empire that extended across much of the same territory.⁷¹

The modern history of Greece is directly related to the fate of the Ottoman Empire, the so called “eastern question,” and its successor-state, Turkey. Their relationship, which originated in the eruption of the Greek revolution for independence in 1821, was based on two key factors. One was the emergence of modern nation states and nationalism in Western Europe, which also led to the emergence of Greek nationalism as part of a greater trend in Europe as a whole. Another important factor was the gradual weakening of the Ottoman Empire. This decline, together with the interference of the era’s Great Powers –Great Britain, France, Austria, and Russia –were the decisive factors that allowed the establishment of the Greek state a decade later.⁷²

⁷¹ Brian W. Beeley, “The Greek-Turkish Boundary: Conflict at the Interface,” in *Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World*, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1978), 353.

⁷² George Andreopoulos, “State and Irredentism: Some Reflections on the Case of Greece,” *Historical Journal* 24:4 (December 1981): 950.

The great transformations that took place in Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries influenced dramatically the newly formed nation state of Greece and the eclipse of the Ottoman Empire. The continuous wars involving the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, which culminated in World War I, and the industrialization of Western Europe, created an imbalance of power. Greece gained territories in which the Greek-speaking Christians were the majority, at the expense of the Ottomans. With the end of World War I came the end of the Ottoman Empire. Greece, as an ally of *Entente* gained new territories in Thrace and on the western coast of Anatolia, which had a large Greek-speaking Christian population.⁷³

The final development in this history was a war (1919–1922) between Greece and the new state of Turkey, successor of the Ottoman Empire. The ultimate defeat of Greece allowed the Turks to go to the negotiating table with a high level of self-confidence and to renegotiate the Paris suburb treaty, i.e. Sevres Treaty.⁷⁴ Thus, in 1923, the Lausanne Treaty, between the Great Powers, Turkey, and the Balkan states, oriented new borders and provided for the national orientation of each state.⁷⁵ As a result, a large number of population exchanges (i.e. ethnic cleansing) were initiated, especially between Greece and Turkey. Although Greece was not in favor of this exchange, the fact that it had been defeated in the last war weakened its diplomatic influence. About 1.2 million Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox, mostly from Anatolia, were moved to Greece, and about 500,000 Muslims from Greece moved into Turkey.⁷⁶ The settlement of the Lausanne Treaty allowed a relatively small minority of Greeks to remain in Istanbul, together with the Christian Orthodox Patriarchate, and an almost equal number of Muslims to remain in western Thrace. These exchanges led to a relative homogeneity among the overall Greek population and the elimination of most of the non-Muslim populations in Turkey.

⁷³ Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990, 9.

⁷⁴ Sevres Treaty (1920), though never ratified, left the Turks with a small territory in central and eastern Anatolia and gave the Great Powers excessive control of the Straits of Dardanelles. For a critique of the treaty, see Philip Marshall Brown, "From Sevres to Lausanne," *American Journal of International Law* 18:1 (January 1924): 113–116.

⁷⁵ The contemporary borders between Greece and Turkey on the mainland and also on the Aegean Sea, except the islands of Dodecanese, were oriented by the Lausanne Treaty.

⁷⁶ These represented 20 percent of the total population of Greece (Beeley, 359).

In the aftermath of the Lausanne Treaty, concessions by the leaders of the two states, Eleftherios Venizelos of Greece and Mustafa Kemal of Turkey, promoted the political development of a Greek–Turkish friendship. The following decades were therefore characterized by relatively good relations. Greece entered WWII on the side of the Allies, while Turkey remained neutral. As a result, Greece received the islands of Dodecanese in the southeast Aegean, which were previously under Italian domain, as a reward for her contribution to the war. This was the last territorial rearrangement in the region.

After 1952, the unproblematic relations between the two countries, which were rooted in the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty and the Venizelos–Kemal rapprochement, were further bolstered by the participation of both states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But the era of détente in their bilateral relations ended during the mid-1950s when the Cyprus problem arose in the wake of the British ejection from Egypt.

The population in Cyprus, which was then under British rule, was a mixture of Greek and Turkish origin. The Greek-Cypriot independence movement raised Turkish fears of a change in the balance that had been established between the two states by the Lausanne treaty. The British employed Turkish elements against the Greek nationalists on Cyprus. During the next decade, there was an escalation of tension between Greece and Turkey. Because of official and unofficial pressure from Turkey, the Greek minority in Istanbul grew smaller and smaller. Finally, in 1974, after a Greek junta failed to establish a new government that would lead to the island’s unification with Greece, Turkey invaded and there was a de facto partition of the Island.⁷⁷

Since the crisis in Cyprus, tension between the two states has increased. Efforts to relax the tense situation proved fruitless until 1999 when a rapprochement occurred, initiated primarily as part of Turkey’s attempt to become a member of the European Union. There also was spontaneous outpouring of support from average Greeks and

⁷⁷ For a short history of the development of the Cyprus problem, see, among others, Thanos Veremis, “Greek Security: Issues and Politics,” Adelfi Paper No. 179, 1982, 10–14.

Turks for the plight of the other following the disastrous earthquakes that hit both countries in 1999. Yet, the rapprochement did not succeed in bringing an end to the controversy.

C. NATIONALISM IN GREECE AND TURKEY

1. The Origins of Greek Nationalism

The Greek national idea was imported from the West. And the newly emerged western-European states' nationalist notions were, in turn, decisive in the way Greeks perceived "Greek-ness." Initially, the term "Greek" was used disparagingly to define the Orthodox Christians, who had retained paganistic elements from ancient Greece among their beliefs and certain rites. With the rise of classicism and nationalism in Britain and France in the eighteenth century, ancient Greece was back in fashion among the educated middle class and those who fostered cultural nationalism on the continent of Europe. The varying national consciousness that developed in Europe led to a greater understanding of others' national identity as well. Inevitably, the question of what had happened to ancient Greece became directed at and focused on the region of its historic geographic location. The fact that western-European nationalists used ancient Greece as a model led to a belief in the existence of a Greek nation.⁷⁸

These were the ideas that influenced the Greek-speaking intellectuals and the merchants of the Ottoman Empire who came in contact with them during their educational endeavors or their travels to Western Europe during the late eighteenth century. Efforts to build a Greek nation were not directed at the development of a territorial ethnic state, but rather at the creation of an ethnic feeling that would recover the nationalist pride of the ancient Greeks.

This essentially ethnic movement, which led to an uprising against the Ottoman Empire, was influenced by two other factors. One was the Russia's effort to promote

⁷⁸ Nicolas Prevelakis, "The Spirit of Greek Nationalism: The Greek Case in the Light of Greenfeld's Conceptual Framework," 8, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/N.Prevelakis.paper.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2007).

itself as the successor of the Byzantine Empire and the patron of the Orthodox Christians. Another factor was the social conflict between brigands and notables. Out of that revolution came the emergence of the Greek state.

Initially, Greek nationalism was basically a civic and individualistic movement. Anyone who had been born in Greece and was a Christian was accepted as Greek. Thus, domestic and religious factors were the prerequisites for acquiring a Greek identity. Later, irredentist ideas gradually promoted an effort to organize the country and to relieve the internal tensions. The Great Powers' sense of betrayal and pressure from the Greek-speaking population of the Ottoman Empire led to the notion of a "Megali Idea," or Great Idea. Its goal was the liberation of Greek-speaking population and, more loosely, the reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire. As religion became a critical factor, Greek nationalism gradually shifted to an ethnic-collectivistic type aimed at the expansion of the state and the liberation of the Christian-Orthodox "hellenophones" (Greek-speaking population).⁷⁹

This new form of nationalism influenced the policies of Greece and led to a continuous effort to achieve the Megali Idea's goals. Until 1922, Greece was in a process of expansion through wars especially in the years prior to 1914. Following the disastrous war of Asia Minor against Turkey, however, the Lausanne Treaty (1923) initiated the decline of irredentist nationalism in Greece.⁸⁰ Given the exchange of population, the rhetoric about the liberation of Greeks abroad did not have the same basis as before and gradually lost its influence on the politics of the country.

It was not revived until the rise of the Cyprus problem in the 1950s, which involved a population mix of Greeks and Turks. Since the island was then a British colony, no provisions were made for it in the Lausanne Treaty. The independence of the island from the British rule in 1960 did not solve the problem. One final act that may be

⁷⁹ Nicolas Prevelakis, "The Spirit of Greek Nationalism: The Greek Case in the Light of Greenfeld's Conceptual Framework," 11–12.

⁸⁰ Thanos Veremis, and John Koliopoulos, "The Evolving Content of the Greek Nation," in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore C. Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou, *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, ELIAMEP, Portland: Frank Cass, 2003, 16.

characterized as Greek irredentism was the unification effort attempted by the dictatorial government of Greece in 1974. This effort, however, did not represent the will of the Greek people.

The turning point for the Greek nationalist movement was the accession to European Community/European Union membership in the early 1980s. Since then, Greeks have slowly started to view their identity through the new perspective of a European identity. Yet, the Greek policy and the emotional reaction of Greek society to the Macedonian Question, which reemerged with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, show that the past is still an influential factor in Greeks' notions of ethnic identity. Although Greece has not claimed any territorial changes, the feelings of pride that bestirred Greek nationalism are still strong.

2. The Origins of Turkish Nationalism

Turkish nationalism is rooted in the Ottoman Empire and its eventual collapse in the 20th century. Although it emerged during the same period as Greek nationalism, it followed a different path of development.

The Ottoman Turks identified themselves as Muslims who were loyal to the Ottoman Dynasty. Even during the nineteenth century, the term "Turk" often was used to refer to the peasants or nomads of Anatolia, and was used to differentiate Turks from non-Turks.⁸¹

The weakness of the empire in relation to the Western powers and its loss of territories initiated an internal search for reforms that would allow the empire to become competitive and strong. The doctrine of Ottomanism that developed was aimed at integrating all the different communities of the empire into a single Ottoman nation. With a patriotism essentially borrowed from Western nationalism, Ottomanism was "based on allegiance to dynasty, state and homeland."⁸²

⁸¹ David Cushner, "Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey," *Journal of Contemporary History* 32:2 (April 1997): 219.

⁸² *Ibid.*

The invigoration of separatist movements by the non-Muslim population of the Empire during the nineteenth century led it to re-emphasize its Islamic characteristics. This new orientation of the Empire's identity was called Islamism. Both Islamism and Ottomanism were assumed to refer to all the citizens of the Empire.

During the last decades of the century the Ottoman Empire was under extreme pressure from the Great Powers, who were striving to gain influence in Ottoman territories. The separatist movement was becoming even stronger. Ottomanism and Islamism were made the scapegoats by the military and the intellectual elite who aimed to save the Empire and demanded significant reforms. This became a new movement, called Turkism, whose goal was to unify the Turkish-speaking population. But Turkism soon divided into two different branches: Pan-Turkism and Tyranism. The former aimed at the political unification of the Turkish-origin population around the world; the latter sought a broader political unification of all the Turkish-speaking population.⁸³

Turkism originated with a group of intellectual elites who had learned of nationalism from Europe, a form of nationalism that was not only patriotism but also had variations that related to culture and race. An extensive literature published in Europe, a new scholarship of Turkology, and contact with the exiled Turkish-speaking population of Russia all strengthened the formation of Turkism. As David Cushner writes this new notion of "the Turk" suggested that, "rather than being a name for the despised nomad or peasant, [it] was the proud title of an independent nation (or 'race,' as it would often be referred to in the nineteenth century), spread over vast areas, with a long and glorious history and its own contribution to human civilization."⁸⁴

The new nationalistic idea was supported by the Young Turks who during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire had gained power. Influenced by German nationalism on the one hand and August Conte and Emil Durkheim on the other, it lent a divine meaning

⁸³ Tyranism has also created a false idea of the relation of the Hungarian and Finish languages to the Turkish; see Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995, 29–56.

⁸⁴ Cushner, 220.

to the nation. Since the non-Muslim population was striving to separate from the state, their economic and physical elimination became the goal of the Young Turks.⁸⁵

The next step in the development of Turkish nationalism was Kemalism, named for the reformer of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal. Kemal realized that Turkey needed to reconstruct itself by internalizing an ideology that supported the homogeneity of the state. Although in Turkey, technically, all members of the republic were equal, Muslims (including the Kurds) were said to be the “real” Turks. Yet, Islam lost its political weight and came simply to mean affiliation to the state. Non-Muslim communities such as the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were therefore not included in this elitist community.

When Kemal’s ideas became the doctrine of the new nation state, members of the state had to be secular and Western-oriented.⁸⁶ Kemalist nationalism is still dominant in Turkish society and the polity, although some extreme forms of Pan-Turkism have arisen over time and succeeded in gaining political status and government positions.⁸⁷ In the process, two fundamental issues that animate the government’s internal policies are a fear of the dissolution of the state and concerns about how to protect its coherence.⁸⁸

3. Perceptions of the Other

The evolution and development of Greece and Turkey are closely related to the development of the nationalist beliefs in each state and have made relations between the two states more complicated. Over time, each state has formed a perception of the “other” that has greatly influenced their bilateral relations. Textbooks, historiography, and other literary works have promoted these perceptions. To Greeks, Turks are a barbaric enemy that enslaved the nation for many years, acting violently and unethically. Turks have a mirror image of Greeks as a people who are violent, unfaithful, unreliable, cunning, and

⁸⁵ The Armenian “genocide,” which is related to this effort, is a historical reality that Turkey refuses to accept; see Stephan Astourian, “The Armenian Genocide: An Interpretation,” *History Teacher* 23:2 (February 1990): 133, 137–138.

⁸⁶ Cushner, 222.

⁸⁷ Since 1965, Turkey’s Nationalistic Action Party has succeeded in bringing the Pan-Turkism ideology into the mainstream of Turkish politics (Landau, 170).

⁸⁸ In regard to the *denigration of Turkishness* debate, see the Turkish Penal Code, Article 301, at: <http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=ENGEUR440352005> (accessed March 23, 2007).

whatever slurs one might imagine. As a result of these perceptions, each state promotes a selective history that favors its own views. Both sides also refer to specific historical facts through a form of nationalistic filtration.⁸⁹

D. GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTES

The notions and feelings of the public in both states reflect the beliefs of their respective political elites. Thus, the current issues embodied in the Greek–Turkish dispute reflect those internalized beliefs and influence the rise and escalation of tension in their bilateral relations. Until recently, all attempts to deal with these disputes have had a negative outcome. Although a shift in Greece’s foreign policy has occurred as a result of Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union, which has created a more positive climate, the underlying issues are still at stake.

The issues can be divided into three categories: Cyprus, Aegean Sea and minority issues.

1. Cyprus Problem

The Cyprus problem emerged during the 1950s and is largely considered the *casus belli* of the current Greek–Turkish controversy. After Cyprus gained its independence from British rule in 1960, the two communities on the island – one Greek, one Turkish – became hostile to each another. The hostility was rooted in the Greek-Cypriots’ promotion of *Enosis*, unification with Greece. Turkey believed that if *Enosis* occurred, the balance of power between Greece and Turkey would be seriously changed. The Turkish community also believed that, in the Constitution, a solution had already been arranged that favored the Greek-Cypriots.

During the next two decades, the confrontation between the two communities became an open dispute that culminated in 1974 in a Turkish invasion and a division of the island. This followed a Greek Junta attempted coup against the government of Cyprus

⁸⁹ Hercules Millas, “National Perception of the ‘Other’ and the Persistence of Some Images,” in Mustafa Aydin, and Kostas Ifantis, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean*,. New York: Routledge, 2004.

that was supposed to lead to Enosis.⁹⁰ Since then, there have been many efforts to solve the problem, but today, the island is still divided, and it is the Turkish army that safeguards the division.

2. Aegean Sea

The second issue involves the status quo of the Aegean Sea, the Archipelago between the Greek and Turkish mainland. The Aegean dispute began to intensify during the 1970s, as the oil crises of that decade increased both Greek and Turkish concerns about the exploitation of the Aegean. Turkey realized that the arrangements made fifty years earlier that were supposed to maintain the status quo in the region no longer favored Turkish interests. In sum, the Aegean dispute comprises five different, interrelated issues.

a. The Sovereignty of the Continental Shelf

Greece considers the delimitation of the Continental Shelf as a legal dispute between the two countries.⁹¹ The Greek government argues that, since it is essentially a legal problem, it should be resolved by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Turkey argues, however, that it should be resolved by negotiation between the two states.

b. The Territorial Sea

Greece maintains that it and the islands' coastline extends out to six nautical miles of territorial sea. The Greek government has declared that, according to the Law of the Sea, Greece has the right to extend that to twelve miles. Turkey, which already has twelve miles of territorial sea as its northern and southern coastal lines and six miles as its western coastal line that borders the Aegean, has declared that any

⁹⁰ Bahcheli, 39, 95–96.

⁹¹ Official site of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Differences/Continental+Shelf/> (accessed February 12, 2007).

expansion of Greece's territorial sea will be a *casus belli*.⁹² In making this claim, Turkey reasons that the Aegean is a semi-closed sea and thus any expansion of Greece's territorial sea would prevent Turkey's direct access to international waters.⁹³

c. Air Space

Since 1931, Greece has maintained a paradoxical ten miles of national air space along the Aegean, although its territorial waters are only six miles. Since 1975, Turkey has contested this, as Tozun Bahcheli mentions, "by periodically sending its aircrafts up to six miles from the coast of the Greek Aegean islands,"⁹⁴ Since 1974, Turkey has also refused "to submit flight plans for her military aircraft, when they fly to the international airspace of Athens FIR, arguing that the Chicago Convention does not apply to national aircraft."⁹⁵ Greece not surprisingly regards both these situations as violations of its national airspace and the Air Traffic Rules.

d. Grey Zones

During the mid-1990s, Turkey began questioning the sovereignty of some Greek islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean Sea, claiming that, because they were not mentioned specifically by name, they "were not ceded to Greece by international treaties."⁹⁶ Greece argues, however, that according to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, "Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkey's

⁹² Andrew Wilson, *The Aegean Dispute*, Adelfi Papers 155, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979/80, 5.

⁹³ Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, 141–143.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁹⁵ Official site, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/> (accessed February 12, 2007).

⁹⁶ Official site, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece/GreeceLinks/Islands_Islets_And_Rocks.htm (accessed February 12, 2007).

sovereignty.”⁹⁷ In early 1996, this dispute brought the two states close to war and is regarded by some Turkish scholars as probably the fundamental issue driving conflict in the Aegean today.⁹⁸

e. Demilitarization of Eastern Aegean Islands

Turkey, recalling the 1923 Lausanne Treaty of the Straits, the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, accuses Greece of illegally militarizing the Eastern Aegean Islands.⁹⁹ But Greece claims that the 1923 Lausanne Treaty for the Straits was replaced by the 1936 Montreux Treaty and that Turkey was not even a participant in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. Furthermore, Greece argues, the Turkish deployment of a large military force on the coast of Asia Minor just across from the eastern Aegean islands, together with Turkey’s threat of a *casus belli*, gives Greece, according to the United Nations Charter, a legitimate right to defend itself.¹⁰⁰

3. Minorities

Disagreements about minorities are rooted in the historical wounds of that continue to shape public and elite perceptions in the two nations. This category comprises issues that affect some of the states’ minorities, specifically, the Greek minority in Istanbul and the Muslim minority in western Thrace. The rhetoric used by both states refers primarily to violations of human rights. Periodically, whenever there is tension between the two states, this issue appears on the front pages of newspapers.¹⁰¹ Lately, Turkey has placed the issue directly on the agenda for discussions by both countries.*E*

⁹⁷ Official site, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁹⁸ Kut Sule, “To Aigaio stin Tourkiki Exoteriki Politiki” [The Aegean to the Turkish Foreign Policy], in Sonmezoglu Faruk, *Analysi tis Tourkikis Exoterikis Politikis: Mythos kai Pragmatikotita* [Analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy: Myth and Reality], Athens: Infognomon, 2001, 358–360.

⁹⁹ Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*, 146–147.

¹⁰⁰ Official site, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/> (accessed February 12, 2007).

¹⁰¹ Oran Baskin, “Tourkiki Exoteriki Politiki kai Dytiki Thraki” [Turkish Foreign Policy and Western Thrace], in *Analysi tis Tourkikis Exoterikis Politikis* [Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy], 407–412.

E. FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES

Both states' responses to disputes can be characterized as reflecting typical realist policies. For example, the security dilemma in the Aegean has caused both to race for military armament. As a result, the military expenditures on both sides are among the highest in respect to their GDP in the region and among NATO members. "Zero-sum" perceptions dominate the policy-makers concerns. Whenever one tries to achieve a substantial gain in the international arena, the other tries to cancel it. Tension caused by NATO exercises and organizational functions has appeared repeatedly on the agenda for several years. Turkey refused the inclusion of specific islands in the Aegean in NATO military exercises, and, in response, Greece refused to participate. In the early 1980s, Turkey tried to benefit at the expense of Greece during negotiations for the re-entrance of Greece into the military structure of NATO.¹⁰² Greece, on the other hand, for many years vetoed economic help from the European Community and the European Union to Turkey, the Customs Union, and, in general, the overall procedures for Turkish accession to European institutions.¹⁰³

F. CONCLUSION

Greeks and Turks have long had a close association with one another. Both countries' national identities, cultures, and ideologies have come out of a struggle to create a unified state. Their national identities have been formed through the wars they have fought, and their national pride is in part based on this martial tradition. Thus, their perceptions of themselves and of their neighbor continues to influence their bilateral relations today. Since the national interests of the two states seem to be in frequent conflict, arrangements introduced seven decades ago that were supposed to produce stability to the region are now inadequate. Many issues of disagreement that have arisen during the last thirty years are still at stake, and the feelings of mistrust that each state has

¹⁰² Kenneth Mackenzie, *Greece and Turkey: Disarray in NATO's Southern Flank*, Conflict Studies, The Institute for the Study of Conflict 154, 1983, 11.

¹⁰³ See Alexis Heraclides, "The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Toward Resolution and Reconciliation," in Aydin and Kostas, *Turkish-Greek Relations*, 67-72.

for the other are a very strong contributing factor to their poor relations. Although many efforts were made in the past to begin negotiating procedures, no positive outcome has emerged.

Nonetheless, in 1999, a new era began when a shift in Greece's foreign policy created the incentives for a rapprochement between the two states. The peoples' expression of sympathy after the disastrous earthquakes of that year showed that the nationalistic bitterness that had been cultivated for years was not so strong anymore. Some of the low-level policies that the states have followed since then have been a welcome positive development in their bilateral relations. And scholars and politicians alike have expressed expectations that those policies would gradually expand to a other diplomatic and political relations between the two countries. But a necessary prerequisite for such a development is that the beliefs and the notions that each party has toward the other have to change. Indeed, since policy makers are influenced by the opinions of the general populace, a procedure targeted at the broadening of public knowledge about the countries' common history seems essential to achieving a mutual goal of improving relations.

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IV. KANTIAN PEACE IN PRACTICE

A. INTRODUCTION

Kant, in his work entitled *Perpetual Peace*, suggests that the development of democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations and international law may promote peace among states. Yet, this is an ideal set of conditions in international relations. These three elements of the Kantian peace have just recently occurred in human history. They emerged the last two centuries. The spread of these ideas has occurred during the second half of the 20th century.

This chapter will determine if the three Kantian elements are present in Greek-Turkish relations.. Initially, the chapters explores development of the political systems of each state and the role they played during the international crises that occurred between the two states in the second half of the 20th century. The development of the Greek and Turkish economies will be explored and the economic ties that exist between them will be identified. The last section of the chapter will describe the bilateral relations between the two states and their relationships with three important international organizations: the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European Union.

B. DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Greek-Turkish relations have been turbulent for many years. The tension between them arose from their diverse national interests and history as nation states. This section begins by analyzing the development of the political system of the two states. It then discusses the effect that domestic politics has had on their bilateral relations, especially during the crisis that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century.

1. The Evolution of Greece's Political System

Although the great powers of the era believed that Greece would be a kingdom, soon after its independence in the first half of the nineteenth century, Greece developed a parliamentary political system. Yet, the political system that developed was based more

on the struggles among the elite for power than on popular demands. Thus, patronage, rather than service in the public interest, became a dominant political practice. Nevertheless, “majoritarian rule” became stronger. By the end of the century, the so-called Constitutional Monarchy of the early years had become a Crowned Democracy. State institutions, according to Fotini Bellou, “were just about on a par with those functioning in advanced countries like Britain and France.”¹⁰⁴

Events during the first three decades of the twentieth century were a decisive factor in the set back that occurred in the evolution of the Greek political system. Although Greece more than doubled in size, the fact that it had to fight continuous wars – the Balkan wars, World War II, and the disastrous war in Asia Minor, which resulted in a huge wave of more than a million refugees from Turkey -- created political instability. The continued existence of the monarchy had long been questioned, which that led to a schism in the populace in 1915. From 1922 until 1936, more than twenty coups and coup attempts were initiated by military officers, both royalists and republicans. This cleavage determined the political scene until 1936 when a parliamentary dictatorship was established by Ioannis Metaxas.¹⁰⁵

The years following World War II were characterized by a second Greek schism. At the insistence of the British, the monarchy was reestablished in Greece, although the general populace and Greek politicians were not in favor of this development.¹⁰⁶ The civil war of 1946–1949 between communists and loyalists introduced another polarizing factor.¹⁰⁷ This new cleavage dominated political life in Greece until mid 1980. In

¹⁰⁴ Fotini Bellou, “The Political Scene: Consolidating Democracy,” in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou, *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, Portland: Frank Cass, 2003, 156.

¹⁰⁵ Bellou, “The Political Scene,” 157.

¹⁰⁶ Theodore A. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983, 9.

¹⁰⁷ Dimitris Keridis, *Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization*, NATO Fellowship Final Report, Cambridge, June 1999, 33.

general, however, there was no real class struggle. Instead, as Dimitris Keridis argues, the political parties were mostly “the products and the carrying agents of the two great historical conflicts of 1915 and 1946–1949.”¹⁰⁸

U.S. interference in Greece’s political life began at Yalta, with the inclusion of Greece in the West’s sphere of influence. Britain was unable to support this strategy, while the Soviet Union threatened Greece’s political status. From 1947 until 1974, the American influence on the political scene was more than obvious in Greece. Especially during the 1950s, according to Theodore Couloumbis, “U.S. preferences were reflected on matters such as election laws, specific composition of cabinets, and in personnel selection and promotion to key positions in the armed forces, intelligence agencies, and security services.”¹⁰⁹

But the right-wing governments of the 1950s were challenged by the rise of the center-left during the 1960s. Political tension between the palace, which was striving to gain power against politicians, and among the political coalitions, dominated the 1960s. Finally, in April 1967, a coup by young army officers, known as the Colonels, abolished democracy. The rhetoric they used presented their action as a necessary act against the communist threat facing the country. Yet, no such threat actually existed. The Communist party was divided into two factions: one pro-Soviet, the other pro-European. The major motivation of the coup was in reality a fear that the center-left would gain more power in the elections to be held the following month.¹¹⁰

In December, following the failure of a monarchist counter-coup, the king fled into exile. The military junta then established a repressive regime that lasted for seven years. It found no sympathizers among the population. In 1973, large-scale student demonstrations erupted which resulted in a brutal response from the regime. The Turkish

¹⁰⁸ Dimitris Keridis, *Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization*, NATO Fellowship Final Report, 34.

¹⁰⁹ Couloumbis, *United States, Greece, and Turkey*, 18.

¹¹⁰ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 155–163.

invasion and partition of Cyprus in the summer of 1974, a reaction to a Greek-led coup against Makarios, the president of Cyprus, was the junta's final act.¹¹¹

Since then, Greece has enjoyed an era of continuing democratization. Konstantinos Karamanlis, a gifted and strong politically right-wing personality, was affirmed in two consecutive elections and led the country for the rest of the decade. His decision to legitimize the communist party, which had been outlawed since 1947, was a major step toward democratization. That decision, together with the abolition of the monarchy after a referendum which rejected it by 70 percent, were the major events that helped Greece overcome the political schisms of 1915 and 1949-1949 dividing the populace.¹¹²

Karamanlis also tried to accelerate Greece's accession in the European Economic Community (EEC). Richard Clogg writes that his efforts focused on three main issues: "the deterioration in relations with Greece's traditional patron, the United States, safeguards for her newly re-established democratic institutions, and protection against the Turkish threat."¹¹³

The real test of Greece's new democratic system was the smooth transition of power to Andreas Papandreou's socialistic party, PASOK, in 1981.¹¹⁴ The party represented the center-left, which had been out of power for about fifty years (with a few short-time exceptions).¹¹⁵ The fear at the time that a new junta would arise never came true, and until today, democracy in Greece remained unchallenged. During the years following the fall of the junta, Greece's democracy developed. Its first real step toward modern democratization (Europeanization) occurred in 1996 when the PASOK

¹¹¹ Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, 164–165.

¹¹² Bellou, "The Political Scene," 161.

¹¹³ Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, 177.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹¹⁵ Keridis, *Political Culture and Foreign Policy*, 35.

government, under the leadership of Kostas Simitis, tried to bring Greece into closer compliance with the European Union's political and economic standards.¹¹⁶

This new era also was characterized by a new decision-making in Greek foreign policy. Previously, individuals dominated this process and a populist approach to foreign policy did not support Greece's national interests. The reforms that were introduced reorganized the foreign affairs decision-making process. The Governmental Council of Foreign Affairs and Defense (KYΣEA) became the main institution responsible for setting foreign policy. Yet, the major reform that came out of Greece's democratization was a provision in the 2001 constitutional reform that established the National Council of Foreign Affairs, which includes representatives from all the parliamentary parties.¹¹⁷

In sum, the establishment of democracy in Greece has been difficult. The cleavages of the twentieth century stigmatized the country's political system. Since 1974 and the fall of the colonels' junta, however, a modern democracy has developed. The European Union's role in fostering this reform proved decisive: it was both guarantor and a model for the process of democratic reform.

2. The Evolution of Turkey's Political System

Turkey's political system is the product of major historical events in the early twentieth century. Mustafa Kemal's predominance in laying the foundations of the Turkish state dominated its political evolution in the 1920s and 1930s. This evolution attained a high level of popular acceptance; Kemalism remains influential today.

Kemal emerged as the leader of Turkey during its war of independence. But his dominance did not go unchallenged. During the early 1920s, he established his primacy

¹¹⁶ Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "To Mondelo Schediasmou Exoterikis Politikis stin Ellada: Prosopa enandi Thesmon" [The Planning Model of Foreign Policy in Greece: Personalities vs. Institutions] in Panagiotis Tsakonas, *Syghroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Mia Synoliki Proseggisi* [Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy: An Overall Approach], Vol. 1, Athens: I Sideris, 2003, 126–127.

¹¹⁷ Vasilis Gikas, "Kathorismos ke Efarmogi tis Ellinikis Exoterikis Politikis," [Determination and Implementation of Greek Foreign Policy] in Panagiotis Tsakonas, *Syghroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Mia Synoliki Proseggisi* [Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy: An Overall Approach], Vol. 1, Athens: I Sideris, 2003, 53–59.

against the principal leftist movements. In this effort, his unchallenged authority over the army proved very helpful. When Turkey became a republic in 1923, he was elected its first president by the national assembly.¹¹⁸

Kemal's first move was to transfer the capital from Istanbul to Ankara, in an attempt to weaken the traditional political forces of the Ottoman Empire. Kemal's main goal was to achieve a European level of modernity by reforming the traditional hierarchical political system. Two strategic political acts – the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 and the establishment of a new republican constitution – severed forever Turkey's ties with the past.¹¹⁹

The political system that Kemal introduced, however, was more of an authoritarian one-party regime than a democratic system.¹²⁰ It was rooted in the beliefs of the Young Turks about reformist planning. As Eric Zürcher puts it:

when the choice was between a democratic system with a slower pace of reform and an authoritarian one with more opportunities for radical measures, the second alternative won out because what counted for the Young Turks in the end was the strengthening and survival of the state, *democracy* (or “constitutionalism” or “national sovereignty”) *being a means to that end, not an end in itself*.¹²¹

As an ideology, Kemalism is generally a flexible concept because it was never defined in detail. According to Zürcher, its program as declared in 1931, consisted of six main principles: “republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism (or reformism).”¹²²

After Kemal's death in 1938, a step toward a more representative democratic system was taken. İsmet İnönü, who had been Kemal's right-hand man since the 1920s, became the new president. İnönü followed a cautious policy in foreign affairs and

¹¹⁸ Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003, 85.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 85–86.

¹²⁰ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004, 176.

¹²¹ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 173 (italics added).

¹²² Ibid., 181. By populism it is meant the superiority of the state over any class. Revolutionism suggests the continuing process of state-controlled change. Statism is the predominance of state in economic matters.

attempted to maintain internal political stability.¹²³ But the economic difficulties that Turkey faced during the 1940s created considerable social discomfort. And, in an effort to relax the political tension, Inonu introduced political reforms allowed for a multi-party political system. Development in this direction also was a response at the end of World War II and pressure from the West, especially from the Americans, through the Marshall Plan. The leftist parties soon became outlawed during the Cold War. Thus, Turkey's political system became a dual-party system, consisting of the Republican People's Party (RPP), founded by Kemal, and the Democratic Party (DP), founded by RPP defectors.¹²⁴

When the Democratic Party won the election in 1950 and the transition of political power was smooth and untroubled, it strengthened the general feeling of liberalization in the country. In an effort to further its political gains, Aydin Menderes, the leader of the party, relaxed the government's repressive attitude toward religion. He also expanded the restrictive control of the press, the universities, and the judicial sector.¹²⁵

As a result of this changing environment and the country's economic problems, political life during the 1950s in Turkey was generally quite tense. And on May 27, 1960, a military coup d'etat erupted, just as a government report was to be released about the links between the Republican People's Party and the army. The coup abruptly changed the political scene in the country. In October, free elections returned Turkey to a democratic process, and a new, more liberal constitution was introduced. For the first time, however, through the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) the army gained a constitutional role in the government.¹²⁶ Since then, the NSC has become a part of Turkey's political life.

During the next decade, the political scene in Turkey was characterized by a broadening of political representation. New political parties emerged both from the right

¹²³ Ahmad, *Turkey*, 96–97.

¹²⁴ Zurcher, *Turkey*, 208–214. DP established officially in January 1946.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 222–234.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 245. The role of the NSC was supposed to advise the government in external or internal security issues. Members of NSC are the President or the Prime Minister who chaired the council and the Chiefs of Staff of the military branches together with the related ministers.

and from the left, which resulted in most of the subsequent governments to be based on coalitions. But the political openness of the 1960s also created much political turmoil. As Feroz Ahmad describes it, “Anti-Americanism polarized society into a conservative Right and a nationalistic and radical Left.”¹²⁷

The 1960s was an unstable era for Turkey. This political tension gradually emerged as violence. The government’s inability to control the political strife resulted in intervention, once again, by the military. On March 12, 1971, the military leaders sent a memorandum to the president threatening to take over the administration of the country if the politicians failed to form a strong government.¹²⁸ When the government fell, a transitional “above parties” government was formed that used martial law in troubled areas and massive arrests to try and restore law and order.

In 1973, the general elections returned the country to a parliamentary government, but the inability of the major political parties to form a self-contained government resulted in their dependence on small radical parties.¹²⁹ This situation led in turn to bargaining among the political parties, which only produced further political instability. As Couloumbis points out, “between January 1971 and December 1979 there were 12 minority coalition and service ... governments.”¹³⁰

The political violence and the unresolved social and economic problems of the late 1970s led the military to intervene again on September 12, 1980.¹³¹ This time, the military took control of the country’s entire administration structure. Former politicians were denied their civil rights and, as the general political repression spread, there were excessive human rights violations. Despite this weak humanitarian record, the new regime tried to implement a neo-liberal economic transformation and to link the state to the IMF.

¹²⁷ Ahmad, *Turkey*, 130. Anti-Americanism is related to the American intervention which prevented military actions of Turkey in Cyprus in 1964 and to the Cuban Missile Crisis which revealed that a large part of Turkey was seeing by NATO planners as expendable.

¹²⁸ Couloumbis, *United States, Greece, and Turkey*, 58.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 153.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 154.

In 1982, the new president, General Kenan Evren, leader of the coup, brought offered a referendum on a new constitution. Although it was supposed to protect the rights and liberties of individuals, it actually created a backlash. It strengthened the power of both the NSC and the president and limited the freedom of the press and of trade unions. As Zurcher shows, it also provided that individual rights could be “annulled, suspended, or limited on the grounds of a whole series of considerations, including the national interest, public order, national security, danger to the republican order, and public health.”¹³²

Under these conditions, the country reentered a democratic process in 1983, which was closely controlled by the NSC. During the remainder of the decade, Turgut Ozal, the prime minister, tried to implement further democratization. Nonetheless, the 1980s were characterized by the rise of the Kurdish problem and political Islam, and extensive clientism and patronage by the state.¹³³

During the next decade, Turkish political life continued to develop. With the continuing rise of the Kurdish problem and political Islam, the military strengthened its political power. Thus, the so-called “internal threat” became part of the general concept of defense; provisions for intervention by the military during crisis periods became legitimized. As Tulin Ongen concludes, it was the era of a “military republic.”¹³⁴ In 1997, the military’s augmented authority became obvious when it intervened by mobilizing broad sections of the society against the government, which was led by Islamists. The military intervention eventually resulted in the government’s stepping down.¹³⁵

By the late 1990s, the prospect of a Turkish European Union candidacy and accession became the catalyst for serious democratic reforms. The Copenhagen political criteria demanded the Turkey achieve “stability of its institutions, guaranteeing

¹³² Zurcher, *Turkey*, 281.

¹³³ Tulin Ongen, “Political Crisis and Strategies for Crisis Management: From ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ to ‘Low Intensity Instability,’” in Nesecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, eds., *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002, 67–70.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹³⁵ Zurcher, *Turkey*, 300–301.

democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.”¹³⁶ After the 1999 European Union council in Helsinki, especially, Turkey began a process of continuous democratization and liberalization. Yet the European Union Commission’s 2006 Progress Report on Turkey criticized its inadequate reforms in sectors such as civil rights and freedom of expression, civil-military relations, the judiciary, and administration.¹³⁷

The development of Turkey’s political system has several unique characteristics. During the twentieth century, Turkey was a turbulent state striving to maintain its political basis in Kemalist principles. Clientism eventually dominated the political parties and society as a whole. The social and economic problems of the state allowed the emergence of the military as a political actor. After 1999, the prospect of membership in the European Union initiated a transformation process, recent developments suggest that political forces react to changes that lead to the loss of privileges. The political debates that erupted over the election of the president in spring of 2007 and the interventionist political rhetoric of the military increased the political tension in Turkey. The government proposed constitutional reforms which, if they are finally implemented without any intervention, will probably extricate the political system from its past.¹³⁸

3. Domestic Politics in Greek-Turkish Disputes

In the history of Greek-Turkish relations, disputes between the two countries have often resulted in a high level of tension and a potential for armed conflict. Since the emergence of the Cyprus problem in the mid 1950s, stability and peace in the region has been threatened. In the confrontations between the two states, their political systems have played a decisive role.

¹³⁶ Copenhagen Criteria, found at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/activities/atwork/documents/dgenlargementbrochure/tsld005.htm (accessed February 18, 2007).

¹³⁷ Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf (accessed February 18, 2007).

¹³⁸ For the recent political crisis in Turkey, see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6615627.stm> (accessed May 22, 2007).

Tensions in Cyprus in the mid 1960s reached especially dramatic levels. In 1964, only America's intervention prevented Turkey from invading. During the 1960s, , the political systems in Greece and Turkey were unstable, and a military coup in Greece in 1967 worsened the situation. In addition, nationalistic feelings, which had dramatically increased in both states, and the support given to the two communities by their motherlands heightened the already flammable political situation in Cyprus.

The Greek junta increased the political tension even more. Makarios's government in Cyprus was not favored by the Colonels. As Couloumbis explains, the Greek junta wanted to

remove Cyprus from the "embarrassing" status of a second Hellenic state where parliamentary freedoms and political rights were being respected. Nicosia, according to the colonels, where a number of anti-junta Greek language daily papers were circulating freely, was serving as a magnet of anti-regime Greeks and as a staging area of future anti-Greek junta agitation.¹³⁹

In an effort to eliminate this discomfort, the junta tried three times to kill Makarios without success.¹⁴⁰

When the Greek dictator, Georgios Papadopoulos, was replaced in late 1973 by another military officer, Demetrios Ioannides, it worsened the situation. Ioannides, a shadowy personality in the junta, who was the head of the military police, organized a Greek intervention in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 in an effort to overthrow Makarios and to establish a military regime.¹⁴¹ As a result of this political intervention, the Turkish military invaded the island, which led to its de facto partition. Turkey had initially requested the intervention of the guarantor states. But the unwillingness of Britain and of course Greece to intervene was viewed by the Turkish government as a green light to act unilaterally to resolve the situation.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Couloumbis, *United States, Greece, and Turkey*, 54.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁴² Couloumbis, *United States, Greece, and Turkey*, 91; Couloumbis suggests in note 37, that "had Britain agreed to this Turkish suggestion, developments in Cyprus might have remained under control."

The military government in Greece apparently did not expect such an outcome. Nevertheless, it decided to proceed in a general military mobilization and war against Turkey. The fact that this did not happen was due to the refusal of the military commanders to obey the orders and instead to demand the restoration of democracy.¹⁴³

After the fall of the junta in Greece, the new government worked to strengthen and secure the new-born democratic system and tried to defuse the possibility of war with Turkey. The advance of Turkish forces on the island after the deadlock of peace-talks in Geneva in August failed to prompt a military reaction from Greece.¹⁴⁴

In 1976, a crisis erupted between Greece and Turkey. Tozun Bachtzeli argues that the Turkish government was responding to the opposition's accusation that it was "not pressing Turkish claims to the Aegean vigorously" when it announced "in February 1976 that a Turkish research ship ... would conduct seismic research in disputed waters."¹⁴⁵ And, in August, the Turkish research ship *Hora* (later named *Sismic I*), escorted by Turkish Navy warships, conducted seismic research for three days along the Greek-claimed continental shelf. In response, the Greek political opposition to the socialist party demanded the sinking of the ship.¹⁴⁶ In an effort to relax the tension, the Greek government acted less aggressively. Karamanlis, the prime minister, preferred to proceed to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice at The Hague.¹⁴⁷

An almost identical situation occurred in the next decade. In March 1987, tension between the two states about the continental shelf reached a crisis. Greece's decision to proceed in its search for oil in areas outside its territorial waters prompted Turkey to send a research ship to the Aegean. Both states mobilized their military forces and there was great fear that the confrontation would escalate into armed conflict. Clogg writes that the response of the prime minister of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, was to declare "that all

¹⁴³ See Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*, 98; Couloumbis, *United States, Greece, and Turkey*, 94; Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, 168.

¹⁴⁴ Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, 169–170.

¹⁴⁵ Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, 134.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, 176.

necessary measures would be taken to safeguard the country's sovereign rights."¹⁴⁸ Greece tried to internationalize the crisis by informing the Warsaw Pact and ambassadors from its North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners about the situation. Finally, Turgut Ozal, the Turkish prime minister, decided to withdraw the Turkish ship into Turkish territorial waters, while Greece decided to avoid drilling oil in disputed areas.¹⁴⁹

The next crisis that occurred between Greece and Turkey was in late 1995. An accident involving a Turkish ship initiated a dispute about the status of the small island of Imia (called Kardak by the Turks) in the eastern Aegean. The escalation of the crisis soon brought the naval forces of the two states into the area. As they mobilized their military forces, the possibility of an armed conflict seemed high. The Greek government, looking for a way to relieve the tension, asked the United States to mediate. This action had a positive effect; the two states withdrew their forces from the area.¹⁵⁰ Kostas Simitis, the Greek prime minister, suggested that the Turkish actions were strongly related to the political instability that Turkey was facing during this period and that, according to the Turkish press, it was an effort by the Turkish military to support the government.¹⁵¹

Since then, no major crisis has emerged between the two states, although disagreements still exist. Incidents like the collision between a Greek and a Turkish military aircraft, which resulted in the death of the Greek pilot, failed to create much pressure on either side to escalate confrontations or accidents.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, 191.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 192. The decision of the Turkish Prime Minister to withdraw the Turkish ship was also related with fears about the influence that a crisis like this might have in EEC prospect. See Konstantina Mpotsiou, "I Ellino-Turkikes Scheseis 1974–2000: Istoriki Anadromi" [Greek-Turkish Relations 1974–2000: Historic Reference] in Panos Kazakos, Panagiotis Liargkovas, Notis Marias, Konstantina Mpotsiou, and Katerina Polychronaki, *I Ellada kai to Evropaiko Mellon tis Tourkias* [Greece and the European Future of Turkey], Athens: I. Sideris, 2001, 159.

¹⁵⁰ Simitis, *Politiki gia Mia Dimiourgiki Ellada: 1996–2004*, 71.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 61.

¹⁵² See the Greek, Turkish, and international press for 5/23/2007 about the collision and the rhetoric and acts of the two governments.

The Cyprus problem arose during an era when the democratic institutions in both states were weak.¹⁵³ It escalated and ended in armed conflict when Greece was under a military, non-democratic regime. Since then, whenever a crisis has emerged, escalation has been avoided by wise government decisions. Yet, the existence of relatively weak democratic governments has had a negative effect. Tension in the countries' bilateral relations may be used as a political tool in domestic politics. Especially in Turkey, the crises of 1974, 1976, and 1996 were closely related to the domestic political tension. Greece, which has developed a more liberal, Western-type democracy, seems less willing to exploit negative bilateral relations as a tool in domestic politics.

C. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN PRACTICE

By the end of World War II, Greece had entered a new, difficult period. A five-year civil war between the pro-communist Democratic Army and the government's National Army initiated an era of instability. The United States' fear of communism led it to support Greece through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. These programs established the background for Greece's economic policy and reconstruction efforts for the following decade. Greece's medium- and long-term economic plans, which were created in conformance with the Marshall Plan, were its initial movements toward economic development and stability in the post-war era.¹⁵⁴

In the years that followed, Greece reached the economic level of the pre-war era and by the mid-fifties achieved a rapid growth rate. Yet, the policies that followed constituted a paradox. According to Pakos Theofanis and Susanna-Maria Pleologou, "On the one hand we have a declaration of faith toward the Free Market Economy and the precedence of the private sector, and on the other hand we have an extensive,

¹⁵³ Turkish political instability and competition, which was highly related to party fragmentation, influenced dramatically the political decisions in Turkey. Although that the crisis tried to be used as a political advantage by the coalition government of Bulet Etsevit, finally it fall-apart a few months later. See Fiona Adamson, "Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis," *Political Science Quarterly* 116:2 (Summer 2001): 295–296.

¹⁵⁴ Pakos Theofanis and Susanna-Maria Paleologou, "The Development of Greek Economy: A Political Economy Perspective," in Christos Kollias and Gulay Gunluk-Senesen, *Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation, A Political Economy Perspective*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003, 52.

multilateral, and resourceful state intervention in the functioning economy.”¹⁵⁵ That state intervention was intended to attract foreign investments and to protect the capital of the economic elites of the country. These elites did not let Greek governments adopt policies that would resolve specific difficulties that firms, industries and regions were confronting.¹⁵⁶ This reluctance to threaten the interests of the privileged, together with the international economic events of the 1970s, led to a decline in the Greek economy’s performance during the 1980s and the early 1990s. High inflation rates, weak balance of payments, large and growing trade deficits and high unemployment rates characterized the Greek economy during this era.¹⁵⁷

Although Greece’s accession to the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1981 caused regional and structural funds to flow in the country, it did not prompt strong economic development. The new socialistic government that took power in the mid 1990s, and the efforts to join the European Monetary Union (EMU), were the turning points in contemporary Greece’s economy. The reforms that were implemented led the country to the *Eurozone* and today to its status as the second most developed country after Israel in the broader region.¹⁵⁸

In the twentieth century, the Turkish economy was based on three factors that had their roots in the early years of Mustafa Kemal’s establishment of the republic: a mixed economic framework, a policy of industrialization, and economic nationalism.¹⁵⁹ The difficulties resulting from the global economic depression of the 1930s also affected Turkey. The efforts of the government to stabilize the economy led to the creation of a mixed economic framework through the creation of state economic enterprises. This led

¹⁵⁵ Theofanis and Paleologou, “The Development of Greek Economy: A Political Economy Perspective,” 54.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁵⁸ Koliass Christos, “Ikonomia ke Amyna sto Diethnes Systema: H Periptosi tis Elladas” [Economy and Defence in International System: The Greeks’ Case], in Tsakonas, Panagiotis, *Syghroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Mia Synoliki preseggisi* [Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy: An Overall Approach], Athens: I Sideris, 2003, 215–217.

¹⁵⁹ Okyar Osman “Development Background of the Turkish Economy, 1923–1973,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10:3 (August 1979), 326.

to a monopolistic state. Social, political, and cultural factors dictated the spread of the industry to various areas of the country outside of Istanbul where it was already developed. Fears of foreign power intervention, inherited by Turkey from the era of Ottoman Empire, created hostile feelings about foreign capital. This together with political tendencies for self-sufficiency and national pride were the main factors of the economic nationalism that prevented foreign investments.¹⁶⁰

During the post-WWII era, Turkey became a multiparty state. It developed both a working and a middle class and, through the Marshall Plan, it received economic aid. The need for economic reform was part of the political debate during the 1960s. The global changes of the 1970s did not affect Turkey significantly and, as a result, the growth rates of the Turkish economy were generally moderate in relation to the global trends.¹⁶¹

A shift to a more liberal economy was initiated in the 1980s by the government that came into power by a military coup. According to Sungur Savran “the Turkish economy and polity [began to prepare for] the new path of capital accumulation predicated on a deeper integration with the world capitalist economy,”¹⁶² World Bank and International Monetary Fund programs supported the liberalization of the economy through structural adjustment programs.

This shift in Turkey’s economic strategy also supported its European Community prospects. Yet, a lack of the political reforms that the European Community required for new membership, together with European interest about the eastern European countries prevented Turkey from achieving accession status during the 1980s and 1990s. The turning point in European Union–Turkish relations was a decision at the 1999 European Union Helsinki summit during which Turkey was offered pre-accession status with accession negotiations to begin in 2005.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ Osman “Development Background of the Turkish Economy, 1923–1973,” 327–330.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 341.

¹⁶² Sungur Savran, “The Legacy of the Twentieth Century,” in Balcan N. and Savran S., *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology, and State in Turkey*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002, 15.

¹⁶³ For the EU–Turkey relations, see “Turkey and Europe” in Stephen F. Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*. Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 2003, 45–70.

Today, Turkey's economy is on a path of reform in an effort to satisfy the European Union criteria. Serious developments have been made towards the structural transformation of the economy. But issues including Turkey's low per-capita income, unemployment, a large agricultural workforce, regional disparities, a slow pace of privatization, and reforms in economic legislation are still at stake.¹⁶⁴

1. Low Politics Agreements

Greece and Turkey's disputes have of course influenced their bilateral economic relations. For many years the political tension had a negative effect on their development of bi-lateral economic relations. But the new era that began in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit increased Turkish optimism about the prospect of European Union accession.¹⁶⁵ At the level of low politics, the summit bilateral agreements produced a rapprochement between the two states. Most of these intergovernmental agreements affected bilateral economic relations and, together with the customs-union protocol that Turkey signed with the European Union, favor the development of trade and economic dealings between the two countries. The accord included:

1. Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Tourism
2. Agreement on Economic Cooperation
3. Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology
4. Agreement on Maritime Transport
5. Agreement on Cultural Cooperation
6. Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Customs Administrations
7. Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments
8. Agreement on Cooperation on Environmental Protection

¹⁶⁴ For more details, see the "Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey, 2006 Progress Report," Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 8/11/2006, SEC (2006) 1390.

¹⁶⁵ Panagiotis Liargovas, "Greek-Turkish Economic Relations," in Kollias and Gunuluk-Senesen, *Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century*, 132-133.

9. Agreement on Combating Crime, especially terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking, and illegal immigration.¹⁶⁶

These were followed by a continuation of other agreements and protocols, mostly involving economics:

1. Protocol on Technical, Scientific, and Economic cooperation in the field of Agriculture
2. Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation
3. Agreement on Standardization, Evaluation, and Testing
4. Agreement on Cooperation in Health Sector

2. Bilateral Trade¹⁶⁷

Turkey's volume of bilateral trade has risen in the last decade. Gradually, the volume increased from 585.2 million U.S. dollars in 1996 to 846 million in 2000, 1.391 million in 2003, and 2.124 million in 2005. In 2006, it is estimated that it reached 2.7 billion. As these statistics show, the countries' bilateral trade has increased by almost 500 percent during the last decade.

Although these economic developments do not suggest that the two countries can be regarded as fundamental economic partners, their future economic collaboration appears promising. According to 2006 economic statistics, Greece is the twelfth most popular trade destination for Turkish products, consuming 2.2 percent of its exports and is twenty-ninth in regard to Turkish imports, sharing 0.8 percent. Turkey has an even more important role in Greek trade, since Greece is rated as eleventh among the countries from which Turkey imports, with a share of 2.6 percent, and fifth among the countries that Turkey exports to, with a share of 5.3 percent.

¹⁶⁶ Official Web site of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html (accessed April 17, 2007).

¹⁶⁷ The sources of the statistics are, for Turkey: the Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade <http://www.dtm.gov.tr/ead/english/Ekolar/STA.htm> (accessed April 17, 2007), and for Greece: the Panhellenic Exporters Association: http://www.pse.gr/xls/ImpExpCountry_11_06_Euro.xls (accessed April 17, 2007).

Estimates are that Turkey's bilateral trade with Greece will reach levels of 3 to 4 billion dollars by the end of the decade.¹⁶⁸ Although trade does not by itself create conditions of integration, it should not be underestimated as a factor that influences foreign policies. The four member-states of the European Union that opposed the accession of Cyprus before the resolution of the Cyprus Problem were the largest economic trade partners of Turkey in the European Union.¹⁶⁹ In the event that trade between the two countries reaches higher levels and constitutes a significant percentage of their total trade, the changes would have to be made to accommodate common economic interests would be dramatic.

3. Investments by Bi-National Corporations

During the last decade, Greek investments have risen dramatically in Turkey. Greek firms have realized that the more than 70 million people that make up Turkey's domestic market offers the prospect of large economic benefits. The reforms introduced in recent years in Turkey, especially the new laws that favor foreign investments, make Turkey an attractive destination for foreign direct investment.¹⁷⁰ Although the European Union report on this sector suggests that more reforms need to be implemented, the steps that have been made are positive and encourage Greek firms to invest in Turkey.

Greek direct investments in Turkey have exceeded 450 million Euros, even without taking into account a huge investment by the National Bank of Greece. Officially, about a hundred and thirty Greek firms have direct investments in Turkey.¹⁷¹ The highest investment by far is the National Bank of Greece's effort to gain control of the Turkish Finance Bank, which reached a final level of 2.8 billion dollars. Although this step by the National Bank was criticized as a risky step, the fact that it was taken, demonstrates that the finance sector is becoming highly influential in the development of

¹⁶⁸ Marias Notis, "Diapragmateuomenoi tin Eirini" [Negotiating Peace] in Kazakos Panos et al., *I Ellada kai to Europaiko Mellon tis Tourkias* [Greece and the European Future of Turkey], Athens: I Sideris, 2001, 101.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹⁷⁰ Turkish Treasury Web site: <http://www.hazine.gov.tr/indexe.htm> (accessed April 17, 2007).

¹⁷¹ Necmi Ugurlu, Turkish attaché of commerce in Athens, Web site: http://www.grtnews.com/gr/publish/article_760.shtml (accessed April 17, 2007).

economic interdependence. In the aftermath of this deal, other Greek banks showed an interest in investing in the financial and banking sector of Turkey, and today, two other Greek banks have control of Turkish banks.¹⁷² The importance of the financial market is strengthened also by the fact that the Greek–Turkish Chamber of Commerce and the Izmir Chamber of Commerce have decided to create the Business Aegean Bank. With an initial capitalization of 100 million Euros, it will provide consultation and support to Greek and Turkish business and also help the implementation of European projects.¹⁷³

These investments in the financial sector are expected to encourage firms from other sectors to invest in Turkey. As the president of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce has said, “Turk businessmen believe that we can cooperate together in many sectors, like tourism, energy, agricultural, and food industry.”¹⁷⁴ Greek firms also have an opportunity to use Turkey as the initial point in their expansion to the markets of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Energy is another strategic sector in which the two countries have shown some common efforts. Turkey has recently begun developing a large network of pipelines for the transfer of oil and gas from the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Because Turkey is the final destination of these energy sources, this new development makes it a significant global player as an energy supplier. At this point, Turkey’s cooperation with Greece and Greek companies is vital. One of the larger, if not the largest, commercial shipping fleets globally is Greek, and the need to transfer energy sources to a demanding global market makes bilateral cooperation inevitable.¹⁷⁵ In addition, Greece and Turkey

¹⁷² *I Parousia tis Ethnikis stin Tourkia* [The Presence of National in Turkey], Kathimerini, 1/11/07.

¹⁷³ Panagiotis K. Koutsikos, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Greek-Turkish chamber of Commerce, Web site http://www.uehr.panteion.gr/gtcc/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26 (accessed April 17, 2007).

¹⁷⁴ Eleftherotypia, Enet, 5/4/2006 http://www.enet.gr/online/online_text/c=114.dt=04.05.2006.id=57591324 (accessed March 6, 2007).

¹⁷⁵ Necmi Ugurlu, Turkish attaché of commerce in Athens http://www.grtnews.com/gr/publish/article_760.shtml (accessed April 17, 2007).

have signed an agreement for the construction of the Southern European Gas Pipeline, which will provide Europe with gas from Azerbaijan through Turkey and Greece, with and a final destination in Italy.

Tourism is another sector with great potentiality for cooperation between the two states. During recent years, the number of Greek tourists visiting Turkey has multiplied and tourism is now a significant source of income for many Turkish businesses. The rise in Greece's per capita income and the proximity of the two states has contributed to this outcome. Thus, many Greek and Turkish firms are seeking ways to cooperate and develop common tourist packages, especially in the cruise sector serving the Aegean area.¹⁷⁶

Although foreign direct investment and bi-national corporations have been developing, it has not been in a balanced way. Turkish investments in Greece are few and many Turkish businessmen complain that they are facing difficulties with investing in Greece due to bureaucratic problems. The new investment law that the Greek government enacted in 2006 is expected to solve this problem, which should make Greece more attractive for foreign direct investment from Turkey.¹⁷⁷

4. Privatization

Privatization is considered a fundamental process for an economy if it intends to be competitive in the globalized market of the twenty-first century. For Greece, the process initiated during the mid 1990s was an effort at achieving European Monetary Union criteria. Today, large sectors of the states' business communities have been privatized or are proceeding toward this goal. In Turkey positive steps also have been made in this effort. Yet, the latest European Union Commission's report about Turkey's progress in achieving European Union membership criteria shows that there are still significant steps that it must take: "Restrictions on foreign ownership still exist in the

¹⁷⁶ Necmi Ugurlu, Turkish attaché of commerce in Athens.

¹⁷⁷ Panagiotis K. Koutsikos, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Greek-Turkish chamber of Commerce:
http://www.uehr.panteion.gr/gtcc/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26
(accessed April 17, 2007).

areas of civil aviation, maritime transport, road transport, ground handling, services, yachting, broadcasting, electricity, financial corporations, private employment offices, tourism, education, and defense sectors.”¹⁷⁸ The question is to what extent the two countries will allow the other side’s involvement in investments of strategic importance. Mercantilist considerations about the influence and the effects that foreign investments may have are still strong in both states.

Turkey considers reciprocity a prerequisite for the involvement of foreign investment in critical sectors. Officials of the Turkish government have declared that Greek financial interests may buy stocks of national businesses if the Greek side is ready to provide Turkish firms with the opportunity to invest in stocks of Greek governmental businesses that will be privatized in the future.¹⁷⁹

5. Mutual Investments and Cooperation in Third Countries

The results of the cooperation and tighter economic relations may lead to the development of more intense economic interactions. These economic interests recognize the common benefits that can be produced by cooperation and investment in third countries in the broader region of the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. This will give them an opportunity to cooperate through the development of collaborative enterprises.

Most of these common efforts between Greek and Turkish firms have focused on the Balkan region, especially in the sector of construction. European Union funds also can be used to support common Greek–Turkish investments. The prospect of an economic integration of Turkey in the European Union creates a significant economic prospect of benefit and supports the interests of enterprises from both countries.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey, 2006 Progress Report, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 8/11/2006, SEC (2006) 1390, 27.

¹⁷⁹ Marias Notis, “Diapragmateuomenoi tin Eirini” [Negotiating Peace], in Kazakos Panos et al., I *Ellada kai to Europaiko Mellon tis Tourkias* [Greece and the European Future of Turkey], Athens: I. Sideris, 2001, 105.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 105–107.

Apart from the Balkans, the construction sector has made significant deals in other regions. The most prominent of these is the consortium of the Greek AKTOR and the Turkish ENKA, which has undertaken a huge project for the construction of a city in Oman, with a cost of 20 billion dollars.¹⁸¹

Businessmen from both sides were ready to deal cooperatively on such projects, but they are waiting for the development of the proper political climate. The fact that both sides have asked their governments to separate their economic relations from the bilateral problems is characteristic of the effort in business circles for self-governance.¹⁸²

For many years, Greek–Turkish disputes rooted in historic developments, national interests, and nationalistic views dominated South-Eastern Europe. Realist notions which were the norm in their bilateral relations prevented the development of adequate economic cooperation. This condition changed after the 1999 shift of Greece’s foreign policy toward a more liberal perspective that supported Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union.

The development of low politics through mostly economic agreements initiated a new era in their bilateral relations. The economic figures show a stable rise in trade. And though it has not yet reached a level that would suggest that the two countries are strategic economic partners, it does allow for optimistic predictions. So far, foreign direct investment from Greece has been the more dynamic economic factor, especially in the financial sector.

But the lack of equivalent Turkish foreign direct investment in Greece suggests an asymmetrical balance in dependency which may increase Turkey’s reluctance to promote further reforms. The Turkish reference to reciprocity for the procedure of privatization reveals their worry about this asymmetry. The development of common economic efforts in the construction and energy sectors, however, gives both sides an opportunity to have symmetrical participation in an economic endeavor.

¹⁸¹ Capital Link Inc.: <http://www.capitallink.com/prs/prg2.php3?reid=37680> (accessed March 6, 2007).

¹⁸² Marias Notis, 107.

Overall, economic interdependence between Greece and Turkey is at a low level, but it is on the rise. The fact that economic interests in both states suggest that the bilateral problems should be separated from the economic relations is an indication that the economic sector has a tendency to intervene in foreign policy issues. If economic interdependence increases, there is a possibility that a “spill-over” effect may occur in terms of diplomatic relations in the future.¹⁸³

D. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The number of international inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) increased dramatically during the twentieth century. Today, the nature of their influence and power around the world varies greatly; they do not all share the same specific goals or organizational structure. Nonetheless, all of them are supposed to promote international cooperation, a function that is regarded as fundamental to international order and peace.

During the second half of the twentieth century, three IGOs became dominant: the United Nations (UN), the NATO, and the European Union. All three emerged after the disastrous WWII and in a way are related to its outcomes. Yet, the three organizations have fundamental differences. The UN is a global organization whose main goal is to promote peace. NATO emerged as an alliance against the Soviet threat and though, since the fall of communism, it has sought to develop a broader profile, collective security is still its basic goal. The European Union, initially an economic organization, has continued to develop and has transformed into a supranational organization, with political, economic, judicial, and defense structures.

During the last fifty years, Greek-Turkish relations saw a dramatic deterioration. A number of times, the two states' disputes escalated to the point that armed conflict seemed unavoidable. Most of their disputes arose after both countries became members of the UN and NATO.

¹⁸³ The spill-over effect is a neo-functional hypothesis about international integration, which suggests that “dissatisfaction generated by unexpected performance ... in a sector for which specific common goals have been set will result in the search for alternative means for reaching the same goals.” See Philippe C. Schmitter, “Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration,” *International Organization* 23:1 (Winter 1969), 161–166.

1. United Nations

The founding of the United Nations was the world community's second attempt in the twentieth century, to establish a global institution that would prevent countries and peoples from fighting each other. The moral dimension of the institution is outlined in the words of the Preamble to the UN Charter. The respect for international norms expressed in international law and respect for international law itself are fundamental to this organization. Since the creation of the UN, however, the world has faced numerous conflicts which suggest that the essential goals of the UN have not yet been achieved. The UN has been accused of inefficiency and of being an anachronistic organization.

In regard to Greek–Turkish disputes, the involvement of the UN has had two aspects. One is the Cyprus problem. The other is related to international law.

a. Role of the UN in the Cyprus Problem

Early in the 1950s, before Cyprus gained its independence from British rule, Greece sought to internationalize the efforts of the Greek Cypriots for independence and unification with Greece. But international politics prevented Greece's efforts from succeeding. The world was divided into a bipolar system and the influence of that bipolarity was reflected in the council of permanent UN members where the East and the West were striving for dominance. The British and U.S. interests in the Middle East did not favor UN interference which they believed would give the Soviets an opportunity to interfere in the region.¹⁸⁴ Thus, Great Britain and the United States both exerted a negative influence on the Greek efforts and promoted a solution through secret negotiations. Meeting in Zurich and London, Greece, Turkey, and Britain reached agreements that led to the formation of a Cyprus Constitution in 1960 and the island's independence.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Van Coufoudakis, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question," *The Western Political Quarterly* 29:3 (September 1976): 459–460.

¹⁸⁵ Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990, 40–47.

Thus, since 1960, Cyprus, as an independent state, has had a representative in the United Nations. This new era in Cyprus governance, however, created tension between the two island communities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which led finally to UN intervention. The involvement of the UN in the Cyprus problem falls into three categories: the UN peacekeeping operations, the UN's internationalization of the problem, and the UN's mediation efforts.

(1) UN Peacekeeping Operations on the Island of Cyprus. In 1964, intrastate political disputes erupted between the two Cypriot communities. The constitutional arrangements that provided each party with a veto had resulted in the creation of a deadlock in the functioning of the state. And proposals introduced by the Greek-Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios, for reforms that he believed would lead to a more viable and practical Constitution, escalated the debate into a conflict. Soon, the Turkish-Cypriot contingent abandoned the government and declared that the Constitution was dead.¹⁸⁶ Eventually, the UN established a peacekeeping force in Cyprus, the UNFICYP, which, though initially established for only three months, is still stationed on the island after forty-three years.¹⁸⁷ Its role, to prevent conflict and preserve the peace between the two communities, was made especially difficult by the mixed population. Following the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the de facto partition of the island, UNFICYP's role shifted to a control of the so-called green zone, which divided the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Zones. One of the results of that role-shift is that the Turkish Cypriots came to believe that the real peacekeeping force was the Turkish army.

(2) The UN Role in the Internalization of the Problem. The internationalization of the Cyprus problem, is closely related to the UN's peacekeeping operations. Oliver P. Richmond notes that:

¹⁸⁶ Oliver P. Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot communities and the United Nations*, Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1998, 78–79.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, xxiii.

The Security Council recognition which established UNFICYP on March 1964 provided the (Greek) Cypriot government with the legitimacy and therefore international recognition though its reference to the “government of Cyprus.”¹⁸⁸

The UN wanted to have a reliable political entity to deal with. The internationalization of the problem, however, was counterproductive because it led the Turkish-Cypriots to turn to Turkey for help. According to Richmond, “It was in this manner,” Richmond criticizes, “that Security Council Resolution 186 set up a series of internal and external dynamics that would result in Turkish involvement in Cyprus.”¹⁸⁹ The international community throughout the Cold War was primarily interested in preventing escalation of the conflict that could threaten the Cold War equilibrium, not in providing a viable solution to the problem.

(3) Mediation of UN. The UN, through mediation and the good offices of the Secretary General, has attempted to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. Before the Turkish invasion, these efforts focused on the 1960s constitutional establishment. After 1974, the Security Council and the General Assembly made frequent and veiled references to the continued interference of Turkey, but it continued negotiations on the basis of the new reality. The new reality, Richmond notes, had created a “balance of sorts between the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot military strength and the Greek-Cypriot legality.”¹⁹⁰ This situation enabled the two parties to have different expectations of the UN organization, according to Richmond, which together with the “obstacles to the peacemaking process of its own making, and its indirect involvement in the issues of the dispute, prevented the organization from finding a viable solution.”¹⁹¹ Numerous direct and indirect UN-sponsored efforts for negotiations have been initiated since 1974. Yet, the different perspectives of the two sides have prevented a resolution of

¹⁸⁸ Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, xx.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, xxi.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, xxiii.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, xix.

the problem.¹⁹² In 2004, the last and most hopeful effort by the UN to introduce a settlement to the problem, the Anan Plan, was rejected by 75 percent of the Greek Cypriots in a referendum.¹⁹³ Since then, while new efforts at mediation between the two sides have been initiated, no positive outcome has yet emerged.

b. UN and International Law

The second aspect of the UN involvement in Greek-Turkish relations is related to international law. The UN charter declares: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”¹⁹⁴ Yet Turkey has said many times that the expansion of Greece’s territorial waters to twelve miles would be viewed by Turkey as a *casus belli*.¹⁹⁵ Turkey’s rationale is that such an event would be a violation of its national interests. Turkish officials seem to be suggesting that a country’s national interest overrides its obligation to act in a legitimate fashion as part of the international community. Thus, Turkey refuses to sign the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) because it is against Turkey’s interests in the Aegean Sea. This view derives from the notion that the situation in the Aegean is unique and for this reason should be treated differently. Greece, on the other hand, has attempted to use the UN to show that Turkey is an international troublemaker and does not respect international law.¹⁹⁶ For many

¹⁹² For a brief reference to these efforts, see Carol Migdalovitz, “Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, The Library of Congress, Order Number: IB89140, May 19 2005, at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB89140.pdf> (accessed May 9, 2007).

¹⁹³ UN Web site: <http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/> (accessed April 12, 2007).

¹⁹⁴ Chapter I, Article 2, Charter of the United Nations: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (accessed May 3, 2007).

¹⁹⁵ See Andrew Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute,” Adelfi Papers No. 155, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979/80, 5; Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, 142; official Web site of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Turkish+claims/Greek+Territorial+Waters+-+National+Airspace/> (accessed March 3, 2007).

¹⁹⁶ After a crisis in the Aegean about the continental shelf, “On August 10, 1976, the Greek government requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council on the grounds that Turkey’s recent and repeated violations of the Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean had endangered international peace and security” (Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*, 142).

years, Greek politicians have focused on the legal status of this bilateral dispute, in which Turkey emphasizes the political aspect and the need for bilateral negotiations that will include all aspects of the dispute.¹⁹⁷

The International Court of Justice has been used only once in Greek–Turkish relations. In 1976, Greece unilaterally applied to the court to make a judgment about the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean and requested interim measures of protection in the meantime. But the court indicated that it did not have the right to make just a judgment since Turkey did not recognize its jurisdiction.¹⁹⁸ Nonetheless, the court recognized that the dispute has a legal basis and can be resolved through legal measures.¹⁹⁹ Because the International Court of Justice does judge the political aspect of a dispute, Greek officials declared that they consider the International Court of the Law of Sea as the appropriate institution to judge naval disputes.²⁰⁰

Greek–Turkish disputes have created a difficult situation for the international community. In their creation of the UN, the member states believed that they had provided an organization that would promote peace and stability and help solve political disputes under a legal umbrella.

Greece has refused to negotiate with Turkey for many years because it thought that doing so would legitimize Turkey’s claims. Turkey, by contrast, refuses to do as Greece asks and proceed to the international courts. Turkey believes that by doing

¹⁹⁷ See official Web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece/GreeceLinks/Turkeys_Views_Regarding_The_Settlement.htm (accessed March 03, 2007); Van Coufoudakis, “Greek–Turkish Relations, 1973–1983: The View from Athens,” *International Security* 9:4 (Spring 1985), 210–213.

¹⁹⁸ See Alona E. Evans, “Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey) (Jurisdiction),” *The American Journal of International Law* 73:3 (July 1979): 493–505; Leo Gross, “The Dispute Between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean,” *American Journal of International Law* 71:1 (January 1977): 31–59.

¹⁹⁹ Charis Tzimitras, “Diethnes Dikeo ke Syghroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki” [International Law and Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy], in Tsakonias Panagiotis, *Syghroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Mia Synoliki Proseggisi* [Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy: An Overall Approach], Athens: I. Sideris, 2003, 73.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 80–82.

so it would lose, since Greece's argument is more legitimate from a legal standpoint. And thus, the Turks suggest that the two states should solve their problems at the negotiation table.

According to the UN Charter, negotiation is one means that states can use in their efforts to solve disputes peacefully.²⁰¹ However, for many years, especially during the 1980s, Greece refused to either negotiate with Turkey because Greek officials claimed that would legitimize the Turkish claims.²⁰² So Greece continued to seek a solution through the UN, since it believed that, as a relatively weak state, that organization could better protect Greece's national interests.

Nonetheless, in 1999, the Greek view of the dispute with Turkey shifted dramatically, and an effort was made by the two states to negotiate their disputes. Some have argued that this tactical shift was not, however, an outcome of the influence of the UN, but of the European Union. Indeed, the existence of the UN, its principles, and its norms, has not so far helped resolve the problem. Rather, its positive influence can be seen mostly in the lack of escalation of the conflict and the fact that the procedures of negotiation have provided a forum where the two parties could come closer together and learn to understand the views of the other.

In addition, the UN has consistently decided not to implement sanctions against Turkey, although that it recognized through resolutions the illegality of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The reality that the UN has not succeeded so far in acting decisively to solve the issues of dispute between the two states is primarily a result of the political concerns of the organization. The balance of international power that the Security Council represents has proven to be a decisive factor in the culture of the

²⁰¹ "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice" (UN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 33): <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (accessed May 3, 2007).

²⁰² See Tzimitras, "Diethnes Dikeo ke Syghroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki" [International Law and Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy], 77; Christos Rozakis, "To Diethnes Dikeo ke i Litourgia tou stis Ellinotourkikes Scheseis" [International Law and Its Function in Greek-Turkish Relations], in Konstantinos Arvanitopoulos and Marilena Koppa, *30 Chronia Ellinikis Exoterikis Politikis: 1974–2004* [30 Years of Greek Foreign Policy: 1974–2004], Athens: Livanis, 2005, 158–159.

organization. As a result, Greece has also applied to other organizations, especially the European Community, for a more effective institutional system that would promote a solution to the Greek–Turkish disputes.

2. NATO's Role in the Greek-Turkish Disputes

During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was undoubtedly a safeguard of peace in Western Europe. Yet the role that it has played in regional conflicts is more open to question. Some argue that, especially in Greek–Turkish disputes, NATO has provided a new venue to air disagreements.

The NATO accession of Greece and Turkey was a result of U.S. policy.²⁰³ The Soviet threat that Greece faced in the north from Bulgaria and that Turkey faced on its north-eastern and northern borders from the USSR was the main reason that the United States supported their NATO membership. Thus, though most of the European members were initially against it, in 1952, both states became members of the alliance.²⁰⁴

Almost immediately, the Cyprus problem erupted, which was the starting point of the contemporary Greek–Turkish problems. From a realist perspective, it appears that the two states now felt secure from the Soviet threat and shifted their interests from the Cold War to national regional strategies. At the time, the constitutional solution that Britain had achieved for an independent Cyprus showed little evidence of viability. As a result, there was an increase of Greek and Turkish political activity that increased the tension between the two states.²⁰⁵

And the development of those tense conditions threatened in turn the cohesion of the alliance. In response, Ronald Krebs acknowledges, the U.S. secretary of state, John

²⁰³ The U.S. predominance in NATO was a decisive factor in the Alliance. Thus for many scholars and politicians, NATO policy is close related with U.S. policy. Here, it is accepted that in Greek-Turkish disputes the political will of NATO is represented mostly through U.S. rhetoric.

²⁰⁴ Apart from the U.S., Italy was a supporter of the accession of Greece and Turkey in the alliance. Britain, Denmark, Norway, and the Benelux countries were reluctant to accept such an enlargement due to fear that “they might be drawn into an unwanted conflict.” See Fotios Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*, Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, Portland, 2003, 33.

²⁰⁵ Atrocities by both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the island and the riots in Istanbul against the Greek minority were related directly or indirectly to these political actions.

Foster Dulles, urged the two states to abandon their current problematic tactics “for the sake of coalition” and to adapt “their national objectives to the greater good of the free world,” meaning the alliance’s goals.²⁰⁶ Behind these promptings lay a threat that U.S. aid would otherwise be terminated. But during the next decade the tension in the island did not relax. In 1964, Turkey informed the United States that it intended to invade the island. The United States responded strongly, threatening that Turkey would lose the protection of NATO if it invaded Cyprus.²⁰⁷ This U.S. reaction in the name of the alliance caused Turkey to abandon the planned invasion and thus avoid a potential Greek–Turkish war.

Disputes continued. A coup against the government of Cyprus, promoted by the Greek military government, resulted in Turkey’s invasion and the division of the island. Many scholars in Greece and the bulk of public opinion blamed the United States and NATO for not averting this outcome and for the indirect support of the Greek junta by the United States.²⁰⁸ Others believed that NATO had averted an escalation of the conflict and prevented a Greek–Turkish war.

In the years that followed the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the disputes between the two states became broader. In 1987, during a crisis about oil exploitation of the Aegean, the two states mobilized their military forces. In response, Fotios Moustakis writes, permanent NATO “representatives convened an emergency session to call for non-resource to force” and suggested that the two nations proceed in negotiations for a relaxation of their bilateral disputes.²⁰⁹ An effort was made in 1988 in Davos, Switzerland, by the prime ministers of the two states to create a climate of mutual trust,

²⁰⁶ Ronald R. Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict, *International Organization* 53:2 (Spring 1999), 361.

²⁰⁷ Ibid. Lyndon Johnson’s diplomatic note to the prime minister of Turkey stated: “I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of NATO allies.”

²⁰⁸ Greek anti-Americanism is strongly related to these beliefs. For the debated role of the U.S. in the 1967 military coup in Greece, see William Blum, *CIA: A Forgotten History*, London: Zed Books, 1986, 243–250; and Stephen G. Xydias, “Coups and Countercoups in Greece 1967–73,” *Political Science Quarterly* 89:3 (Autumn 1974): 520–528.

²⁰⁹ Moustakis, *Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*, 43.

but it failed to last overtime. In 1996, the two states again came close to war during the Imia/Kardak crisis, a dyad of disputed islands.²¹⁰ This time, as the prime minister of Greece, Simitis, has pointed out, direct U.S. mediation helped to relax the tension.²¹¹ A step toward better relations among the two states occurred at the NATO Summit in July 1997 in Madrid, when “the Greek and Turkish leaders, with the support of the U.S. and NATO General Secretary J. Solana, made a pledge to respect each other’s rights and avoid the use of force against one another in the future.”²¹²

Yet, the role of NATO in the bilateral dispute also has a dark side. The alliance lacked (and still lacks) the organizational procedures for internal conflict-resolution. Additionally, even though NATO prevented some disputes or the escalation of existing disputes, it has not succeeded so far in helping to resolve the problems. As a consequence, Greek officials believing that NATO had failed to provide useful security guaranties, sought alternatives from the European Community and the West European Union.²¹³

The military help that the United States provides to support the southern flank of NATO has also been a disputed issue.²¹⁴ NATO itself also has become a source of antagonism between the two states. From 1977 until 1980, Turkey vetoed the Greek efforts to reenter the military structure of the alliance, and refused the inclusion of specific islands in NATO exercises.²¹⁵ Greece, in response, boycotted allied military exercises in the Aegean.²¹⁶

²¹⁰ After this crisis the issue about the “Grey Zones” in the Aegean emerged.

²¹¹ Kostas Simitis, *Politiki gia Mia Dimiourgiki Ellada: 1996-2004* [Policy for A Creative Greece: 1996–2004], Athens: Polis, 2005, 58–74.

²¹² Moustakis, *Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*, 47.

²¹³ Panayotis Tsakonas, and Antonis Tournikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The ‘Expectations-Reality Gap,’” *Security Dialogue* 34:3 (September 2003): 307.

²¹⁴ Greece felt that Turkey had a greater strategic consequence for the U.S. and that it was a victim of favoritism; see Ronald R. Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict,” 363. The arms embargo by the U.S. against Turkey after the invasion in Cyprus lasted for four years due to the pressures of the Greek lobby in the U.S.

²¹⁵ Recently, a NATO exercise was canceled due to Turkish claims about the status of a Greek island..

²¹⁶ Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism,” 365.

In sum, NATO has had a multi-faceted role in the Greek-Turkish dispute. It provided a forum where Greek and Turkish leaders, officials, and military officers can discuss bilateral issues and further their understanding of each other's views. NATO also provided a venue for U.S. officials to dampen existing disputes. NATO's provision of security against the Soviet threat probably allowed the emergence of Greek and Turkish national strategies. Krebs concludes that the impact of, the "alliance[']s arms transfers" and the "alliance itself – its forums and its benefits – became an object of contest" and as a result broadened the issues under dispute which it lacked the capability to solve.²¹⁷

3. European Union and Greek- Turkish Relations

The European Union is a unique organization. Mark Trachtenberg insists that its creation was strongly supported by the United States who saw it as a "third great power block" between the United States and the Soviet Union.²¹⁸ As the Cold War developed, U.S. officials saw the threats that had arisen. And, in an effort to safeguard the new world status, they promoted closer cooperation among the European states in the belief that that would prevent them from fighting each other and would provide a first line of defense against the Soviet threat.²¹⁹

The failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, Andrew Moravcsik argues, "crushed the hopes that the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCC) ... would lead automatically to deeper integration."²²⁰ Yet, this failure initiated a shift in the efforts for European integration toward an integration focused on economics, which led to the development of the European Economic Community (EEC). The gradual institutional development of the EEC resulted in its transformation within the European Community (EC) and, later on, in the European Union. The initial specialized economic arrangement was transformed into an organization with the three pillars – economic,

²¹⁷ Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism," 369.

²¹⁸ Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, 149.

²¹⁹ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963*, 146-150.

²²⁰ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, New York: Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988, 86.

political, and judicial – and a common currency, with global influence, and with many states striving to enter the “club” that it now represents.²²¹

Greek-Turkish relations are closely connected with the European Union, since Greece is a member of the union and Turkey is a candidate state. Both states sought to create ties with the EEC soon after its foundation.

a. Greece and the EU

Greece, was the first “third country” to sign the Association Agreement with the EEC in 1961, which included a provision for full membership.²²² A military coup in 1967 froze Greek relations with the European Community until 1974 when democracy was reestablished. The following year Greece applied for full membership. Ioakimidis notes that there were four main reasons for Greece’s application,

1. To stabilize its democracy through the European institutional framework
2. To strengthen its independence and security in the region and in the international system, especially against Turkey after its invasion of Cyprus. Greece also sought to relax its dependence on the United States.
3. To develop and modernize the Greek economy
4. To contribute to the European integration process.²²³

Initially, the European Commission’s suggestion was that Greece should have a pre-accession status. Yet, the fear of political instability in Greece allowed negotiations for full membership to begin in 1976. They ended three years later with Greece as the tenth member of the EEC.²²⁴

The new socialistic government of Greece that took power in 1981 initially developed a negative policy against further European integration. Yet, between 1985 and 1995, Greece shifted that policy as it reevaluated the positive economic and

²²¹ For the gradual development of European integration, see Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, 3rd ed., Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

²²² Panagiotis K. Ioakeimides, “I Symmetochi tis Elladas stin Evropaiki Enosi” [The Participation of Greece in the European Union], in Panagiotis Tsakonas, *Syghroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Mia Synoliki preseggisi*, Vol. 2, Athens: I. Sideris, 2003, 538–539.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid., 540.

political benefits of the European Community. Greece realized that following a negative policy would marginalize it in relation to future European developments. Thus, Greece supported further political integration and a broadening of the sectors in which the European Community is involved. But Greece's national policy did not parallel the policies that the other members of the European Community were following. Greek policies, especially against the dissolution of Yugoslavia, proved to be more nationalistic and less realistic, which led the country's marginalization by the other European Union members.²²⁵

1996 was a turning point in Greece in relation to the European Community. The new socialistic government of Kostas Simitis initiated a new era, which can be characterized as an era of emancipation of Greece in Europe. The reformist plan that developed had as a goal the modernization of the Greek economy and the enhancement of its institutional status in the European Community. This goal also required the modernization of Greek foreign policy. The successful participation of Greece in the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2002, together with the other members of the European Union, was a decisive factor. Greece became a part of the "hard core" of the Union.²²⁶

The most surprising change in Greece's policies was the shift in favor of Turkey's candidacy in the European Union at the 1999 meeting in Helsinki. Greece realized that the "veto policy" that it had adopted opposing Turkey's relations with the European Union did not support Greece's national interests and only preserved the tension between the two states. The realist approach of *zero-sum* gains that had been followed for about five decades intensified the mistrust between them and reinforced the negative perceptions that Turks had of Greece.

²²⁵ Ioakeimides, "I Symmetochi tis Elladas stin Evropaiki Enosi," 543–547; see also, Panagiotis K. Ioakeimides, "To Mondelo Shediasμου Exoterikis Politikis stin Ellada" [The Planning Model of Foreign Policy in Greece] in *Syghroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Mia Synoliki preseggisi*, Vol. 1, Athens: I. Sideris, 2003, 122–123.

²²⁶ Ioakeimides, 549. For the reasoning of the post-1996 policies of Greece, see Kostas Simitis, *Politiki gia Mia Dimiourgiki Ellada: 1996–2004* [Policy for A Creative Greece: 1996-2004], Athens: Polis, 2005.

The new policy toward Turkey sought to bind it to a process of Europeanization that Greece believed (and still believes) would support Greek interests.²²⁷ Greek officials convinced that the Europeanization (democratization) of the political, social, and economic system of Turkey will diminish Turkey's aggressive policy toward Greece.²²⁸

b. Turkey and the EU

Turkey's relations with the European Union can be traced the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal. Kemal's views about Turkey's future were based on a European-style of modernity. In 1963, Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the EEC which included a provision for full membership in the future. That agreement, together with an Additional Protocol signed in 1970, were the basis for future economic and trade relations between the European Community and Turkey, whose goal was a Customs Union between the EEC and Turkey with an anticipated time frame between 1980 and 1995.²²⁹

Political and economic issues during the 1970s and early 1980s, however, prevented further progress in Turkey's relations with the European Community. The current protectionist strategy and economic crisis in Turkey in 1977, together with a military coup in 1980, slowed down the process. During this period, Stephen Larrabe and

²²⁷ See the presentation by the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgios Papandreou, "I. Sinodos tou Elsinki" [The Helsinki Summit], *To Vima*, 12/5/1999, at <http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/Document.aspx?d=6&rd=7739474&f=1360&rf=1307380017&m=2829&rm=22527389&l=2> (accessed May 9, 2007)

²²⁸ For an analysis of the creation of a "pluralistic security society in the Aegean," see Notis Marias, "Diapragmatevomenoi tin Eirini: I apofasi tou Elsinki gia tin Evropaiki prooptiki tis Turkias Ypo to Fos Theorion tis Oloklirosis" [Negotiating Peace: The Helsinki Decision for the European Prospect of Turkey Under the Light of Integration Theories], in Panos Kazakos, Panagiotis Liargkovas, Notis Marias, Konstantina Mpotsiou, and Katerina Polychronaki, *I Ellada kai to Evropaiko Mellon tis Tourkias* [Greece and the European Future of Turkey], Athens: I. Sideris, 2001, 54–72.

²²⁹ Panos Kazakos, "Evropaikes Prootikes tis Turkias" [European Prospects of Turkey], in Panos Kazakos, Panagiotis Liargkovas, Notis Marias, Konstantina Mpotsiou, and Katerina Polychronaki, *I Ellada kai to Evropaiko Mellon tis Tourkias* [Greece and the European Future of Turkey], Athens: I. Sideris, 2001, 254.

Ian O. Lesser argue, Ankara oriented “its policy more toward Washington than Brussels” while, in the mean time, the “EC’s goals and competence expanded significantly.”²³⁰

Turkey regenerated its interest in the EC during the 1980s and in 1987 applied for membership. The application was finally rejected in 1989, because Turkey emphasized only the economic spectrum of the EC without recognizing the shift of its interest to political issues.²³¹ Yet EC–Turkey relations gradually improved, and in 1995 a Customs Union Agreement was finally signed.

During the last years of the twentieth century, the relations between the EC and Turkey became tense. At the Luxemburg Summit in 1997 the EC refused to give Turkey the status of a candidate state, which it provided to a number of states in Central Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, proving once again that political motivations were decisive for the Community.²³² This outcome outraged the Turkish political elites who declared that from that time on Turkey would refuse to have a political dialogue with the European Union.²³³ Yet in 1999, in Helsinki, the European Union did finally recognize Turkey as a candidate state.

The membership criteria of the European Union, known as the Copenhagen Criteria, required Turkey to meet the same conditions as the rest of the candidate states. They were established at the European Union summit of 1993. In addition to the economic aspects of the criteria, the political requirements mandated that candidate states achieve a stable democracy, maintain the rule of law, guarantee human

²³⁰ Stephen Larrabe and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, RAND Corporation, 2003, 48.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

²³² Ioannis N. Gregoriadis, “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever,” *SAIS Review* 26:1 (Winter 2006), 148.

²³³ Panos Kazakos, “Evropaikes Prootikes tis Turkias,” 257.

rights, and protect minorities.²³⁴ Since then, they have added criteria that suggest that Turkey should resolve her differences with Greece and that both states should proceed to a settlement in Cyprus.²³⁵ In December 2004, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey.²³⁶

c. The EU Role in Greek-Turkish Relations

The role of the EU in Greek-Turkish relations occurs at two governmental levels. First, the European Union has a direct affect on Greek-Turkish relations and the balance of power between the two countries. The most obvious achievement leveling this regard was Greece's accession to membership in the European Union before Turkey. Greece's accession early in the 1980s resulted in the transfer of significant funds to Greece. These funds helped Greece to keep up in its arms race with Turkey, at least until the mid 1990s, without burdening significantly its own economy. Yet, the economic obligations that also arose from its membership in the European Union proved that the arms race was at a deadlock. But it did provide Greece, as a member of the Community, with extra diplomatic power, which it used against Turkey. Greece's diplomatic power thus counterbalanced Turkey's military strength.

Until the late twentieth century Greece followed a foreign policy against Turkey that was based in a *zero-sum* gain. Greece's use of the veto in the European Union proved to be a powerful tool which led to the recognition of Cyprus as a candidate

²³⁴ The Copenhagen Criteria that must be fulfilled by a state to become a member of the Union are: **Political criteria:** The applicant country must have achieved stability of its institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; **Economic criteria:** It must have a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; **Criteria of the adoption of the acquis:** It must have the ability to take on the obligations related to of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. Copenhagen Criteria, found at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/activities/atwork/documents/dgenlargementbrochure/tsld005.htm (accessed January 20, 2007).

²³⁵ Stephen Larrabe and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, 51.

²³⁶ EU-Turkey relations, EurActive, found at <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678> (accessed November 7, 2006).

state in 1995. After that success, Greece lifted its veto against the Turkish Customs Union.²³⁷ This was a tremendous achievement, since today Cyprus is a member of the EU while Turkey is still involved in the accession process.

The Helsinki decision also had a direct affect on the relations between the two states. Exploratory talks between the two states had begun in 2002 to find a solution to their disputes.²³⁸ This began an era of détente which resulted in a state of rapprochement. Turkey declared it had no territorial claims against Greece.²³⁹ The Cyprus problem also seemed to enter a new phase in which Turkey became more conciliatory.

Yet, the exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey about the Aegean never reached a final common conclusion. The so-called UN Anan plan, which proposed a resolution of the Cyprus problem, was rejected by the Greek-Cypriots in a referendum. And the island remains divided today. The direct *binding* capability of the European Union was apparently weak, since Turkey received accession status in 2004 without either the Greek-Turkish problems having been resolved or a judgment having been reached at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Nevertheless, the indirect affect that European Union has had on Greece and Turkey is a factor that receives strong support. The *Europeanization* process, which the two states have begun, is believed by many scholars and politicians to be a decisive procedure that will ease the tension between them.²⁴⁰ About the term, *Europeanization*,

²³⁷ Panos Kazakos, “Evropaikes Prootikes tis Turkias” [European Prospects of Turkey], 255.

²³⁸ Panagiotis Tsakonas, “Koinonikopoiontas ton Antipalo: I Elliniki Stratigiki Exisoropisis tis Turkias ke I Ellinoturkikes Sxesis,” [Socializing the Enemy: Greek Strategy of Balancing Turkey and Greek-Turkish Relations], in *Syghroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Mia Synoliki preseggisi*, Vol. 2, Athens: I. Sideris, 2003, 122–123.

²³⁹ Statement of the 1999 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Ismael Cem. See Notis Marias, “Diapragmatevomenoi tin Eirini: I apofasi tou Elsinki gia tin Evropaiki prooptiki tis Turkias Ypo to Fos Theorion tis Oloklirosis,” 45.

²⁴⁰ See among others, Panagiotis Tsakonas, “Koinonikopoiontas ton Antipalo: I Elliniki Stratigiki Exisoropisis tis Turkias ke i Ellinoturkikes Sxesis”; Taric Oguzlu, “The Future of Turkish-Greek Relations,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, found at http://www.turkishpolicy.com/default.asp?show=winter_2005_Oguzlu#_ftn1 (accessed May 7, 2007); Kostas Simitis, *Politiki gia Mia Dimiourgiki Ellada: 1996–2004*, 74–99; “Karamanlis yper Turkias gia EE,” [Karamanlis in favor Turkey about EU], Kathimerini, 5/10/07.

scholars have varying opinions. They do agree, however, that the term is not just about transforming their economic structures and participation in the different institutions of the Union.

Europeanization is a process that affects the basic political, social, and economic structure of states. The European Union represents a broad spectrum of norms and believes that the adoption of these norms will not only gradually become common to the member states, but also will influence the candidate states. Democratic principles, a respect for human rights, and the rule of law become the culture not only of the elites but also of common citizens. These factors effect the abolition of the use of force among the member states.²⁴¹

The evolution of the *Europeanization* of Greek foreign policy lasted about two decades. Greece's shift to a more realistic policy against Turkey began in 1995, but the real shift happened in 1999. Since then, Greek officials have steadily promoted the European prospects of Turkey, because they believe that process will produce a more democratic state. Through democratization and the development of Turkey's economy, they believe that the Turkish society, both its elite and its grass roots, will shift gradually to a more Westernized liberal culture.

Since 1999, many political, economic, and social reforms have been adopted by Turkey. But, as the example of Greece has shown, the procedure of *Europeanization* takes time. The European Commission's 2006 evaluation of Turkey's progress revealed a number of issues that require further improvement.²⁴²

Since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Greek-Turkish relations have been on a different path. Although no obvious, significant change has occurred in regard to the issues of dispute, the two states have developed a network of contacts between

²⁴¹ For an analysis of the Europeanization process, see Notis Marias, "Diapragmatevomenoi tin Eirini: I apofasi tou Elsinki gia tin Evropaiki prooptiki tis Turkias Ypo to Fos Theorion tis Oloklirosis."

²⁴² Commission of the European Communities, 2006 Turkey Progress Report, Brussels, 11/8/06, found at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/Nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf. (accessed February 18, 2007).

governmental officials, businessmen, and NGOs. Even the rhetoric that both states use is less aggressive than in the past, something that could not have been achieved without the European Union's influence.

A dramatic increase of international inter-governmental organizations occurred during the twentieth century. As the world changed, so did states' willingness to cooperate and coordinate their relations. Yet the organizational structure of International Governmental Organizations influences their effectiveness. This structure reflects specific views about the nature of international relations. The UN and NATO have been the projects of a realist point of view. This is why their fundamental organizational structure has not changed, although especially after the fall of communism they have tried to represent a broader, deeper spectrum of politics. The European Union, however, is based on a different school of thought, one that arose through the disaster of World War II. The paths that it follows strive to make a change. The continuous, yet difficult procedure of transformation from an economic community to a political union has affected not only its member states but also the candidate states. The European Union demands but also creates specific political behaviors.

Greek-Turkish relations have been influenced by International Governmental Organizations. NATO and the UN had mostly a stabilizing effect in specific crises, rather than promoting cultures of peace. They also have not effectively promoted international law. In contrast, the European Union, through the criteria for membership it has developed, seems to have a more persuasive role. The economic benefits and the democratic norms that the European Union represents are decisive factors in the Europeanization process. Greece has changed its absolute policies of the past in foreign affairs. Turkey also has been more skeptical in the way it promotes its claims in the Aegean, since respect for international law is a prerequisite for membership.

International Governmental Organizations have had a positive effect on Greek-Turkish relations. Both states have benefited, or expect to benefit, from their membership, especially when the International Governmental Organizations have the ability to transform the political culture.

V. CONCLUSION

A state at peace is a noble achievement. One has only to consider the marvel of the channel tunnel between the frontiers of such former mortal enemies as Britain and France to see the truth of this assertion. Yet, history shows that humans habitually fail to act in a noble way, often resorting to disastrous wars. The philosopher, Immanuel Kant, wrote his treatise, *Perpetual Peace*, to illustrate how peace could be better promoted among states. The philosophical background of Kant's theory has a clear and emphatic moral dimension. According to Kant's liberal ideas, the development of democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations and international law will not only contribute to a more peaceful world, but also may serve as a theological approach in international relations. It might also be argued, however, that Kant's theory is more a *wish* than an explanation of states' behavior.

The realist school of thought rejects Kant's theory and suggests that, among states, a balance of power must be maintained to guarantee state survival. More specifically, realists suggest that economic interdependence is often a factor in disputes because it increases states' vulnerability to potential opponents and serves as a source of disputes. Moreover, international organizations and international law, realists argue, are the creations of strong states in an effort to preserve the balance of power, they are not independent forces in world politics.

Other theories, which have developed recently and are situated theoretically between those two, attempt to explain international behavior and the effects of economic interdependence and international governmental organizations.

This thesis asks the basic question: Have the three elements of Kantian peace had a positive influence on Greek-Turkish relations? Greek-Turkish relations have been characterized by a history-based enmity, which increased during the second half of the twentieth century because of a clash between their national interests and goals. As a result, both countries' populations and political elites came to mistrust the other and are characterized by a generally negative opinion of their counterparts in the other state.

These notions and feelings were decisive factors in the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. In almost every decade of the last fifty years, a crisis erupted and threatened to conclude in war. Relatively recently, since 1999, a rapprochement has created hopes that there is a possibility of a peaceful resolution of their disputes. This thesis examines these historical developments in the context of Kant's three elements.

During the post-WWII era, the domestic politics of both Greece and Turkey were turbulent with the struggle for democracy beclouded by the legacy of the 19th century, the cold war, and civil-military conflict. Moreover, in this same period, various issues of dispute emerged which were based in the respective, conflicted national interests. Although the two states had official democratic political systems, they were not sufficiently mature and stable. As Russett shows, the possibility of war between two states is higher when one has a non-democratic system. Moreover, there is a higher possibility of war among democracies when one is less stable than the others. In 1974, when an armed conflict, though not a war, occurred on Cyprus, Greece had a military regime. But, after the fall of the junta, the new democratic government avoided aggressive policies, a political decision that supports Kant's theory of democratic peace.

The fact that the emancipation of the Greek democratic system lasted about two decades after the fall of the junta, in contrast to the Turkish political system's lack of stability and the institutions of a Western-style democracy, raises questions about the ability of its contemporary political system to contribute to more peaceful bilateral relations with Greece.

An unstable democratic political system, in which political partition is a dominant condition, may be influenced negatively by the nationalistic feelings of its populace. In such cases, the political parties may become hostages of public opinion which in turn are manipulated by the parties in an effort to support their political survival. Such were the conditions that existed during most of the crises that emerged between Greece and Turkey.

A country's economic conditions and development also may be issues that influence its international relations. During the post-WWII era, Greece and Turkey had

not yet developed specific economic ties. Yet, the oil crises of the 1970s became catalysts in the deterioration of their bilateral relations. The realist-based notions that dominated their policies until the end of the century escalated the intensity of the dispute, as the exploitation of the Aegean Sea became the main basis of conflict.

Since 1999, however, the decision of Greek and Turkish officials to promote issues of “low politics” has resulted in a gradual expansion of economic ties between the two states. While the economic numbers of this new development have not yet reached hoped for levels, there is now interdependence (resulting in some cases sensitivity and in some cases vulnerability) between Greece and Turkey. And the continuous year-by-year increase in trade between them shows that there is a decided trend toward continued interdependence. The states’ private sectors also now seek to exploit the benefits of economic cooperation. For this goal to be reached, however, more relaxed bilateral relations are necessary. As a consequence, leaders of the economic circles of both states began to ask their governments to separate their national policies from the economic policies. The higher the numbers of the economic ties go, the most probable that those voices calling for bilateral relaxation will be heard.

Another requirement for economic development is internal political stability. Some economic factions in Turkey voiced their demands for a relaxation of the political tension in spring 2007, during the election campaign for the presidency. This shows that the economy may indeed be a factor that influences domestic politics toward stability, which may in turn affect international politics.²⁴³

International inter-governmental organizations also have a role in international relations. Yet, as this thesis has shown, not all international governmental organizations have the same level of influence.

The UN is a product of a “realist” world, since its structure supports the balance of power of the post-WWII era. In regard to Greek-Turkish relations, it did not succeed in promoting peace between the two countries. Nor did its peace operations in Cyprus succeed in preventing the 1974 armed conflict. And so far, its mediation has not achieved

²⁴³ See BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6604643.stm> (accessed May 24, 2007).

a positive outcome that could lead to the resolution of the political problem. Moreover, the UN resolutions, which are supposed to be based on international law, have failed to bring a change. Since none of the sanctions addressed Greece and Turkey, they continue to interpret international law in ways favorable to their own national interests.

NATO is also a product of a “realist” world. Its foundation occurred during the confrontation between East and West of the Cold War. NATO might have even helped the emergence of confrontation between Greece and Turkey. Both states, feeling secure under the alliance’s umbrella, shifted their interests to more regional issues. And the modernization of their military capabilities supported their hostile policies.

Granted that NATO focused on the Soviet threat, it lacked a dedicated organizational structure for the prevention or resolution of internal conflicts. Also, the policies adopted by the alliance sought to protect its cohesion, regardless of the political systems of its members. Such policy further reflected British and U.S. statecraft in the eastern Mediterranean in the period from the 1950s until the 1990s. What is worse, NATO became just another venue for the confrontation between Greece and Turkey.

In contrast to the UN and NATO, the European Union had a more dynamic effect on Greek-Turkish relations. What differentiated the European Union was its continuous transformation. From an economic community it has become a supranational political union that influences states at many different levels of the national policies. The economic liberalization that the European Union demands has as a prerequisite the elimination of state interference. This has resulted in the liberalization of state institutions and norms which, in effect, supports economic cooperation and interdependence.

Other prerequisites of European Union membership are that candidate states have internal stability, meaning they are stable democracies, and that they promote regional stability. Thus, immediately after the fall of the junta, when it was striving to enter the European Economic Community, Greece tried to lessen its aggressive profile in its disputes with Turkey. Instead of confronting Turkey as the political opposition demanded during the crisis of 1976, the Greek government sought a solution through the UN.

The marginalization that Greece faced in the European Union during the 1980s and early 1990s was due to its absolutist policy, which was based on a “realist” view of international relations. Greece even treated the prospect of Turkish membership as a tool to pressure Turkey. Yet, Greece did not use its veto power against the procedure for Turkey’s candidacy, even though Turkey had not accomplished the criteria proposed at the Helsinki summit. Greece expects that the continuous progress of Europeanization in Turkey will have a positive spill-over effect resulting in more relaxed bilateral relations.

The Europeanization of candidate and member states has been a positive procedure, but not an immediate one. During the last three decades, this procedure has helped Greece transform politically, economically, and even culturally. The same affect is expected in Turkey. It began in 1999 when Turkey was accepted as a candidate state.

In sum, the author of this study argues that the three elements of Kantian peace have had a positive effect on Greek-Turkish relations. Yet Kantian peace is an ideal condition in which states behave according to liberal beliefs. For years, Greece and Turkey followed realist policies, confronting one another via a *Machtpolitik* that harkened back to the early 20th century. To create a better relationship these nation-states must believe in, and follow, liberal ideals. The most influential factor in such political behavior and culture seems to be the European Union, which promotes directly and indirectly the Kantian elements of peace.

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