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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF WINDOW'S® VIRTUAL
MEMORY INCORPORATING THE SYSTEM'S PAGE-
FILE**

by

Jared M. Stimson

December 2008

Thesis Advisor:

Second Reader:

Chris S. Eagle

George W. Dinolt

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**FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF WINDOW'S® VIRTUAL MEMORY
INCORPORATING THE SYSTEM'S PAGE-FILE**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE

from the

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ABSTRACT

Computer Forensics is concerned with the use of computer investigation and analysis techniques in order to collect evidence suitable for presentation in court. The examination of volatile memory is a relatively new but important area in computer forensics. More recently criminals are becoming more forensically aware and are now able to compromise computers without accessing the hard disk of the target computer. This means that traditional incident response practice of pulling the plug will destroy the only evidence of the crime. While some techniques are available for acquiring the contents of main memory, few exist which can analyze these data in a meaningful way. One reason for this is how memory is managed by the operating system. Data belonging to one process can be distributed arbitrarily across physical memory or the hard disk, making it very difficult to recover useful information. This report will focus on how these disparate sources of information can be combined to give a single, contiguous address space for each process. Using address translation a tool is developed to reconstruct the virtual address space of a process by combining a physical memory dump with the page-file on the hard disk.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. CYBER CRIME

Security experts say that there was an alarming rise in the number of sophisticated attacks recorded in 2006. They were made possible, partly, due to a large increase in the number of vulnerabilities identified in popular software applications because last year brought a sharp increase in the number of software security vulnerabilities discovered and actively exploited by attackers. In 2006, Microsoft Corp. issued 97 security related patches that the company designated "critical", meaning attackers could use them to exploit vulnerable machines. In comparison, Microsoft issued only 37 critical updates in 2005. Also, fourteen of last year's critical flaws were "zero day" threats, meaning Microsoft first learned about the bugs only after they were already being exploited.

Another alarming development is the level of sophistication attackers are now using to develop their attacks. Some exploits are able to reside exclusively in volatile memory without ever accessing the hard drive. When a piece of software can do this it will leave no evidence on the system once it is shutdown. One exception to this is if pieces of the process are paged to the disk. However, at the time of writing the paging file structure is not fully understood. Research has been done to increase the information that the paging file can provide, but further investigation is required to understand what can be obtained using it. The harsh reality is that without evidence of its activity and origin, authorities have no way of stopping these attacks. Also, researchers fear that attacks will become even more advanced in 2008. "Criminals have gone from trying to hit as many machines as possible to focusing on techniques that allow them to remain undetected on infected machines longer," Symantec's Weafer said.

Some software security vendors suspect that a new Trojan horse program, dubbed "Rustock.B" by some anti-virus companies, may serve as the template for future malware attacks. The program modifies itself slightly each time it installs on a new machine to evade detection by anti-virus software. In addition, it hides in the deep in the Windows[®] operating system, creates invisible copies of itself, and refuses to run under common malware analysis tools to resist identification and analysis by security researchers. "This

is about the nastiest piece of malware we've ever seen, and we're going to be seeing more of it," said Alex Eckelberry, president of Clearwater, Florida-based security vendor Sunbelt Software. "The new threats that we saw in 2006 have shown us that the malware authors are ingenious and creative in their methods. Unfortunately, those attributes aren't ones we would normally consider laudable in the context of criminals."

B. MOTIVATION

Computer Forensics is a field concerned with the use of tools and techniques to locate and collect digital evidence to be used in court. Evidence might be collected during and after a crime or misuse. [1] Such evidence may be found in both logical (files, caches, buffers, etc.) and physical places (hard disks, CDs/DVDs, removable media, main memory, etc.). While collecting evidence, Anzaldua, Godwin, and Volonino state the best practice is to unplug a computer or remove a laptop's battery, so as to preserve the exact contents of a disk for later investigation without introducing changes to the system. Using the operating system shutdown alters log and temp file states; furthermore, a shutdown may trigger a logic bomb and a possible data wipe. [1] However, this approach has a problem; it does not preserve active system memory. A portion of the volatile memory can be found in the remnants of the operating system swap file, but this is not enough to reconstruct the state of the system. Thus, there is a push to find a way to collect a forensic image of memory without significantly altering the state of the system.

From the Order of Volatility listed in RFC 3227, the first item of volatile data that should be collected during live-response is the contents of physical memory. [1] Although the specifics of collecting particular parts of volatile memory, such as network connections or running processes, have been known for some time, the issue of collecting, parsing, and analyzing the entire contents of physical memory is a relatively new endeavor. The most important questions when looking at memory are: why collect the contents of RAM, how is it useful, and what is missed when it is not analyzed?

Some investigators collect the contents of RAM in hope of finding something not on the hard drive, such as strings or passwords, and malware analysts look to memory when dealing with malware because it is often encrypted or obfuscated in such a way that static analysis is extremely difficult. Finally, rootkits can hide processes, files, Registry

keys, and even network connections from the tools usually used to enumerate them, however, analyzing the contents of RAM can reveal these hidden items. The image may also contain information about processes that have since exited, but still reside in memory. When pages of memory are used by a process and the process terminates, these pages are marked as free, but the data is not overwritten until the pages need to be reused.

As physical memory analysis grows, more investigators will pursue this as a viable source of valuable information. However, what is currently lacking is a tool which can merge the various sources that make up a virtual address space into a format that can be later analyzed in an efficient manner. [1] This report will investigate what data is stored and where it can be recovered from. In order to do this, it will examine the virtual memory system used by the Windows[®] XP Operating System so that a tool can be developed.

C. OVERVIEW

Inspired by the thesis by John S. Schultz at NPS titled “Offline Forensic Analysis of MICROSOFT[®] Windows[®] XP Physical Memory” [7], this thesis will expand upon the work done by Schultz to create an open source tool to analyze Windows[®] XP physical memory dumps for digital forensic evidence. This section begins with a short overview of the current state of cyber crime and the motivation behind this report. Chapter II opens with the current state of computer forensics and the moves on to show how to collect the contents of physical memory and the page-file. In Section III, the Windows[®] Virtual Memory system is explained, showing how it is possible to recover information from a Windows[®] XP memory image. This includes an examination of virtual to physical address translation and the paging system, and how to navigate the virtual address space. Section IV introduces the important structures resident in memory, and how they can be analyzed to find useful information. Once the contents of memory are understood, the software used to automate the analysis of the image is covered in Chapter V. Finally, a summary of the findings of this report and recommendations for further work are given in Section VI.

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II. COMPUTER FORENSICS

As attacks become more sophisticated, it is necessary to advance the latest tools and techniques used in forensic science to meet the increasing demands of investigators. In cyber crime investigations, the crime scene may consist of many computers perhaps spanning several networks. A cyber criminal may affect a system locally or remotely. Where as a local attacker may leave physical evidence, a remote attack from the Internet can come from anywhere in the world and will leave only electronic evidence. In either case, digital forensic evidence can be gathered from the criminal's computer, the victim's computer, or both. This digital evidence can be broadly grouped into two categories, volatile and non-volatile.

Non-volatile electronic evidence can be recovered after a system is powered off and is found on hard disks, USB flash drives, and removable media. It is in non-volatile media where most of the electronic evidence originates. System logs, malicious code, internet browser cache, e-mails, and deleted files are all forms of non-volatile evidence. Network logs may contain TCP session logs indicating the source IP address from where the attack originated. The malicious code may be analyzed to determine what the attacker did to the system and analysis of the hard disk can also lead to the recovery of deleted files, which may contain evidence. E-mail and browser history can show the criminal's intent, expose any accomplices, and even give evidence as to how the attack occurred.

However, a careful cyber criminal may permanently erase any incriminating evidence from non-volatile media, making its recovery impossible. In the case of a compromised computer running malicious code, there is other evidence that can be useful; evidence in volatile memory. Unlike data stored on hard drives, evidence found in main memory contains useful information about each running process, such as create times of various system objects, exit times, open files, executing code, and child process. However, it disappears once power is removed from the system. This type of evidence is useful if a malicious program is running on a live system, because unlike the files on the hard drive, this evidence cannot be erased from memory as long as malicious code is

running. If the investigator can capture the state of the system as closely to the way it was when the incident occurred, then through careful analysis evidence can be taken from the system. The ultimate goal is to be able to completely reconstruct the state of the system using the memory and hard disks. If this can be accomplished then the crime scene can be reconstructed and analyzed in a controlled environment, making gathering evidence more reliable.

A. CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS

There are many places where digital evidence might be found within a computer system. One procedure for incident response is to immediately remove power from the system and take it to a computer forensics lab. [15] On the other hand, if the system is powered off before volatile storage such as physical memory is captured its content is lost. Once a computer system is in the lab, a write blocker is used to further prevent writing to the disks. Once that is in place, forensic copies of the system's hard disks are made and future analysis is carried out using the copies rather than the original disks. [13] A forensic copy is an exact copy which does not alter the contents of the source disk. This is done so that the results of the investigation can be reproduced and verified by independent investigators. Write blockers may be implemented using software after the system has been booted; however the safest method is a hardware device installed between the hard disk and the mother board.

A forensic investigation needs to be carried out fairly quickly because the evidence is usually needed for a court case, and if the evidence is not found in time it becomes useless. As hard disk capacities increase, investigators need to focus their efforts in order to find useful evidence. Fortunately, the contents of physical memory may be able to provide investigators important evidence or insight as to where to find it on the disk; thus reducing the amount of time and manpower needed for an investigation. As physical memory analysis expands, more investigators will pursue this as a viable source of valuable information. Unfortunately, what is currently lacking are extensive tools which can merge the various sources that make up a virtual address space in to a format that can be later analyzed in an efficient manner.

B. DUMPING PHYSICAL MEMORY

According to guidelines, digital evidence should be collected in order from the most volatile to the least. [13] This means that the one of the first things an investigator should do is copy the contents of RAM from all computers at the scene that are still running. The problem is that nothing should be done which might compromise the state of the suspect device. This reasoning is sound; however, this rule may be relaxed as long as the impact of the imaging technique is considered in the investigation. [16] There are several methods to acquire physical memory and this section provides an overview of the various options available as well as the technical aspects related to each.

1. Hardware Devices

In the last few years, there has been research into alternatives to software-based acquisition. These techniques have the advantage of gaining direct access to the memory via DMA that can copy the entire contents of RAM without modifying it. In addition, they can copy it very quickly while halting the processor, which eliminates the risk of data changing during the imaging process.

In February 2004, Brian Carrier and Joe Grand published “A Hardware-Based Memory Acquisition Procedure for Digital Investigations,” in the Digital Investigation Journal. This paper proposed the idea of using a hardware expansion card named Tribble to acquire the contents of physical memory. [2] It dumps physical memory in a manner that does not introduce new software to the system and does not rely on the operating system. This allows an investigator to retrieve the contents of volatile memory without starting a new process or running potentially malicious code. The paper introduced a prototype which can be installed in a PCI slot and copies the contents of the RAM to external media. A hardware device such as the Tribble is unobtrusive and easily accessible. The major limitation with a device such as this is that if not installed prior to an incident it is ineffective for incident response. [2] Currently, the Tribble device is not commercially available; however, other hardware devices do exist, but they are only available to security professionals.

Research performed by Maximillian Dornseif has shown that it is possible to access memory through the Firewire interface. At PacSec in November of 2005, he presented a paper, “Owned by an iPod” where he demonstrated how a firewire device can read/write active memory within a Mac, BSD or Linux machine. At Ruxcon 2006, Adam Boileau presented “Hit by a Bus: Physical Access Attacks with Firewire” where he enabled the targeting of a Windows[®] XP machine. Utilizing a Linux box with firewire support he revealed several hacks using live memory reading and writing against Windows[®] XP. However, firewire collection presents some problems. First, there may not be firewire ports available on the computer and second, plugging in a firewire device might require the operating system to activate the port, which may alter the state of the system and if not done properly, may crash the system. The primary issue is that the concepts and tools available for firewire memory imaging are still immature and need more research before they will become widely acceptable. Active memory and live data collection are still new to the field of digital forensics and have issues regarding reliability and analysis. As recently as BlackHat in February 2007 in DC, Joanna Rutkowska demonstrated how to defeat firewire based memory imaging utilizing a low level program, in the CPU. [6] Thus, the desire to collect a snapshot of the state of the system should not overshadow the value of preserving the integrity of the data collected. [6]

2. Software Methods

When using software acquisition the imaging program must first be loaded into memory, which alters the memories contents and possibly displaces data. Also, the program could rely on libraries that may have been subverted by the attacker. It is possible that the program could receive false data from corrupted system files since the software accesses physical memory through the operating system. Thus, with software alone, it is not possible to obtain a snapshot of physical memory completely unaffected by such tools. However, an undisturbed snapshot is not always necessary for forensic analysis of memory because useful forensic evidence can be extracted from a physical memory image captured with a software tool. [3] Since there are no native tools on Windows[®] XP to dump the contents of system memory, a third-party program must be

used. One such tool is George Garner's variant of the GNU *dd* utility [3]. The *dd* program copies data in blocks from one file to another. In the case of Garner's version, the input file is `\\.\PhysicalMemory`, which represents the device name for physical memory in Windows[®]. This, however, is no longer available on Vista, the newest version of Windows[®]. It is important to use the `noerror` option when reading from memory to ensure all readable blocks of data are copied because without this option, the *dd* program will stop after a read error. [3] As for the output file, it is recommended that no output file is specified in favor of piping the output of *dd* to *netcat* with the command line. The *netcat*[18] program can be used to send and receives data over a network connection, this allows physical memory to be copied and sent directly to an external computer connected to the network so the data is not saved to the local hard disk. A newer variant of *dd* is now available called *KnTDD* from GMG Systems, Inc. and is part of KnTTools which provides advanced memory acquisition and analysis capabilities[19].

3. Hibernation

Hibernation is used to save the contents of volatile memory to disk in a file called the `hiberfil.sys` which allows the system to power down without permanently losing that data. Since the system uses this file to restore the state of the system, some useful information might be available in the hibernation file. It is also possible that that hibernation could be a useful way to acquire the contents of memory, since no additional programs would have to be loaded. Unfortunately though, there are several problems associated with using hibernation. First, when the system is hibernated it writes data to a file, `hiberfil.sys` and if this file exists it will be overwritten, therefore the old file should be copied from the system before the system is hibernated. Second, enabling hibernation on systems where it is disabled requires changing the state of the machine, which increases the risk of changing data. Microsoft Windows supports a "suspend to disk" mode. Nicolas Ruff and Matthieu Suiche developed a library, called Sandman, which allows reading and writing the hibernation file. They recently presented their results at PacSec 07 [20].

Hibernation could come in handy in a forensic investigation. You just have to send the computer to sleep in order to preserve the most important parts of its main

memory on disk. The presentation outlines the format of the hibernation file. It also briefly discusses the variations between different OS versions and mentions the compression algorithms involved. With the help of the Sandman library the hibernation file could be converted into a raw memory dump and possibly also into a crash dump (because the CPU state is preserved, too). Unfortunately the library is not available to the public yet.

C. ACQUIRING THE PAGE-FILE

Even more pages can be recovered if the examiner has access to the page-file for each system. Using the page-file might also allow the examiner to use more information in the memory image. In order to use the page-file effectively, however, it must be acquired at the same time as memory acquisition. By default, Windows[®] uses only one paging file, *%SystemDrive%\pagefile.sys*, but the true locations and filenames for paging files should be found using the registry. Capturing the page-file is difficult on a live system as traditional file copying utilities cannot open them. When the system is running the files are in use by the operating system and may not be opened by another process. It would be beneficial for first responders to have a program to capture both physical memory and the paging file in one step, but this will require further research. To acquire the page-file mount the drive in a guest operating system and copy the page-file. The examiner must be careful to use a write blocker so that no changes are made to the source drive. The delay between capturing a memory image and the paging file may create inconsistencies that could hinder analysis. Power to the system should be secured immediately after obtaining the memory image in order to freeze the page-file in a state as close to the state it was in when the image was obtained.

III. WINDOWS VIRTUAL MEMORY

The Windows[®] operating system creates a private virtual memory space for each running process using the memory manager. The memory manager is used to map a process' virtual address space to the system's physical memory or RAM. All modern operating systems use some form of Virtual Memory (VM) system to give each process a large address space while preventing it from gaining access to data belonging to other processes. [5] The basic concept behind virtual memory is relatively simple. For each process, the operating system maps virtual addresses to physical memory because RAM has less storage space and is more expensive than a hard disk. The memory manager creates data structures called page tables which the CPU uses to translate virtual addresses into physical addresses. Each virtual address is associated with a system-space structure called a page table entry (PTE), which contains the physical address to which the virtual address is mapped. [16] For example, Figure 3-1 shows how three consecutive virtual pages are mapped to three pages that are not physically contiguous.




Figure 3.1 Mapping Virtual Addresses to Physical Memory (x86) [From 5]

If the operating system runs out of space in physical RAM, some data is paged out to make room. The paged data is maintained on the system's hard drive. [5] If a page is not mapped into physical memory, the operating system marks the page as invalid. Any access to this page causes a page fault, which then causes the OS to copy the contents of the page from secondary storage into memory.

To implement VM, Windows[®] maintains a large amount of data. It needs to know if data is in RAM or on the disk. Maintaining this information for each byte of an address space would require more memory than the address space itself and for this reason Windows[®] breaks the address space into 4KB pages (or 4MB if large pages are enabled) and maintains this information in page tables. A page table entry (PTE) consists of the physical address of the page if the page is mapped to RAM and also some attributes of the page. [15] The VMM used by Windows[®] XP allows each process to access a full 4GB of virtual addresses, translating those virtual addresses into physical addresses. [5] Within each virtual address space, there is a portion dedicated as user space and a portion reserved for the operating system. User space is for application code, global variables, the process stack, and dynamically linked libraries (DLLs) and it spans from virtual address 0x00000000 to 0x7FFFFFFF. The system address space is accessible by all processes and is for use by the operating system. It ranges from 0x80000000 to 0xFFFFFFFF and contains the necessary information for system management of the virtual memory, including the page directory and the page table entries (PTEs) used for virtual addresses translation.

A. VIRTUAL ADDRESS TRANSLATION

Windows[®] uses virtual addresses to abstract the memory storage system from the rest of the operating system and other programs. The operating system presents each program with a large private virtual address space and each time a program references a virtual address the operating system translates that virtual address into a physical address and retrieves the requested data. If the data is not in memory, it loads the data from the disk. During memory analysis, the examiner needs to use this same translation process, but without help from the operating system. Windows[®] on an x86 system uses a two-level page table structure to translate virtual addresses to physical addresses. [5] A 32-bit

virtual address is interpreted as three separate components—the page directory index, the page table index, and the byte index—that are used as offsets into the structures that describe page how the page is mapped, as illustrated in Figure 3-2. The page size and the PTE width dictate the width of the page directory and page table index fields. For example, on x86 systems, the byte index requires 12 bits to describe the location of all 4096 bytes in each page.




Figure 3.2 Translating a Valid Virtual Address (x86-specific) [From 5]

The page directory index is used to locate the page table in which the PTE is located. The page table index is used to locate the PTE, which, contains the physical address to which a virtual page maps. The byte index indicates the proper address within that physical page. Figure 3.3 shows the relationship of these three values and how they are used to map a virtual address into a physical address.




Figure 3.3 Components of a 32-bit Virtual Address on x86 Systems [From 5]

Address translation is generally a three stage procedure. Every process on a Windows system maintains a DirectoryTableBase variable. On an x86 systems this value is stored in the CR3 register when the process is running. This value contains the base

address of the table of Page Directory Entries (PDE) for that process. For each virtual address, a PDE is specified using a few bits from the original virtual address. The PDE is used to find the base address of a page of Page Table Entries (PTE). The PTE is designated using this base address and some more bits from the original virtual address. The PTE in turn points to the base address of the page in physical memory where the data is stored. The final address in physical memory is the base address of this page plus the remaining bits from the original virtual address. The least significant bit in a PDE or PTE entry is the Valid or V bit. When this bit is one the entry is said to be 'valid' and bits 12-31 of the entry contain the Page Frame Number (PFN) used in the next part of the address translation. In a PDE, the PFN points to the page containing the PTE. In a PTE, the PFN points to the page containing the memory indicated in the original virtual address. On the other hand, when the V bit is zero the entry is said to be 'invalid' and a different set of rules must be used to find the data in question.

1. Page Directories

Each process has one page directory; a page the memory manager uses to map the location of all page tables for that process. The physical address of the process page directory is stored in the kernel process (KPROCESS) block, but it is also mapped virtually at address 0xC0300000 on x86 systems. The CPU knows the location of the page directory page because a special register (CR3 on x86 systems) that is loaded by the memory manager contains the physical address of the page directory. Each time a thread begins execution that is not part of the current process this register is loaded with the address of the new process' page directory. Context switches between threads in the same process don't cause the address to be reloaded because all threads within the same process share the same address space. The page directory is composed of page directory entries (PDEs), each of which is 4 bytes long and describes the state and location of all the possible page tables for that process. On x86 systems, 1024 page tables are required to represent the full 4-GB virtual address space. The process page directory that maps these page tables contains 1024 PDEs. Therefore, the page directory index needs to be 10 bits wide. Because Windows[®] provides a private address space for each process, each process has its own set of page tables to map its private address space. [5] However, the page

tables that map system space are shared among all processes. To avoid having multiple page tables describing the same virtual memory, when a process is created, the page directory entries that describe system space are initialized to point to the existing system page tables.

2. Page Tables

The process page directory entries point to individual page tables. Page tables are composed of an array of PTEs. The virtual address's page table index field (as shown in Figure 4) indicates which PTE within the page table maps the data page in question. On x86 systems, the page table index is 10 bits wide, allowing you to reference up to 1024 4-byte PTEs. However, because 32-bit Windows[®] provides a 4-GB private virtual address space, more than one page table is needed to map the entire address space. To calculate the number of page tables required to map the entire 4-GB process virtual address space, divide 4 GB by the virtual memory mapped by a single page table. Recall that each page table on an x86 system maps 4 MB of data pages. Thus, 1024 page tables (4 GB/4 MB) are required to map the full 4-GB address space. Valid PTEs have two main fields: the page frame number (PFN) of the physical page containing the data or of the physical address of a page in memory, and some flags that describe the state and protection of the page, as shown in Figure 3.3.




Figure 3.4 Valid x86 Hardware PTEs [From 5]

3. Individual Bytes

Once the memory manager has found the physical page in question, it must find the requested data within that page and this is where the byte index field comes in. The byte index field tells the CPU which byte of data in the page you want to reference. On x86 systems, the byte index is 12 bits wide, allowing you to reference up to 4096 bytes of data (the size of a page). So, adding the byte offset to the physical page number retrieved from the PTE completes the translation of a virtual address to a physical address.

B. THE PAGING SYSTEM

Ideally, when a process reads from, or writes to, a location in its virtual address space, that address is available in physical memory for immediate use. The working set is the set of virtual pages currently in main memory. But a system is not capable of providing enough physical addresses in main memory to map to every address of each process's virtual address space. When a thread references a virtual page that is not in the working set, a page fault occurs. The page fault triggers the memory manager to load the desired page into memory and update the working set to include the newly loaded virtual page. This is a valid page fault and is normally transparent to the user. An invalid page fault is a request for data that is not accessible and will usually result in a system crash.

If there is a need to free space in RAM, then parts of code and data that are not currently needed can be transferred to the hard disk in the page-file. This file is generally called `pagefile.sys` and is usually stored in the root directory of the primary drive; however one should check the system settings for its actual location. The format of the page-file is very simple, and can be treated the same as memory. It is simply a contiguous block of data which can be referenced by the same offsets as used for physical memory. Because of the constant swapping of pages, the total address space of virtual memory is rarely contained entirely within physical memory, nor is it ever constant.

Only the parts of the program and data that are in active use need to be in physical memory. Thus, parsing and analyzing the contents of a RAM dump in isolation without the page-file will not provide a complete view of memory. This is because pages that have been swapped out to the page-file are not utilized in the memory analysis. To

overcome this Nicholas Maclean published his thesis work, Acquisition and Analysis of Windows Memory [13], in the spring of 2006. He explains the inner workings of the Windows[®] memory management system and provides an open-source tool written in Python called vtop to reconstruct the virtual address space of a process. Jesse Kornblum also released his work referred to as the “Buffalo” paper or by its full title, “Using Every Part of the Buffalo in Windows Memory Analysis” early in 2007 [8]. In this paper, Jesse demonstrates how more data can be recovered using invalid Page Table Entries.

C. INVALID ENTRIES

Just because an entry is invalid, doesn’t mean that the data it references is inaccessible. [8] One can follow the same rules as the operating system to access the data in question; however, it is still possible that the data was never loaded into memory and thus is truly inaccessible. When a page is removed from memory it is marked as invalid. An invalid PTE or PDE will always have its least-significant bit set to zero, but there are a number of reasons for it being invalid each of which uses a slightly different format and each invalid PDE or PTE fits into one of six categories: Page-file, Demand Zero, Transition, Prototype, Zero, or Unknown. Below we describe each of these in detail.

1. Page-File

If both the P and T bits in an invalid PTE or PDE entry are zero, the entry points to a frame in one of the paging files. Windows[®] can support up to 16 paging files, so the page-file number, PageFileNumber, is given in bits 1-4. The offset of the desired frame in the page-file, PageFileOffset, is in bits 12-31 of the invalid entry. [8] The true offset in the paging file is the value of bits 12-31 from the entry plus some bits from the original virtual address. Note that both PDEs and PTEs can point into the Page-file. For a PDE Page-file entry, PageFileOffset uses bits 12-21, shifted right 12 places, from the original virtual address being referenced. For a Page-file PTE entry, PageFileOffset uses bits 0-11 from the original virtual address.

2. Demand Zero

Like a page-file entry, Demand Zero entries have zeros in the T and P bits. But when the PageFileNumber and PageFileOffset are both zero, the operating system has marked the requested page as Demand Zero and would return any request for it with a page of zeros.

3. Transition

When the T bit in an entry is one and the P bit is zero, the page is said to be in Transition. [8] This means that the page has been modified but not yet written back to the disk. Even though a page was in transition, the page was still in active memory and can therefore be retrieved by an examiner. Just like a valid entry, the page frame number is given in bits 12-31 and can be used to continue the address translation process.

4. Prototype

In a PTE, when the P bit is one, the entry is a pointer to a prototype page table entry. Note that when P is one, the value of the T bit is part of the prototype's index. The entry contains an index number that can be used to compute the virtual address of the prototype PTE. Prototype PTEs are used when more than one process is using the same page in memory. [8] Prototypes are created when the operating system needs to invalidate the page in question. This is to avoid having to update all of the processes using the page each time the page is moved. Instead, they direct each process using the page to point to the same prototype. The prototype then points to the page's true location. When a page in question is moved, the memory manager only has to update the one prototype. The PTE stored by each process acts like a shortcut or symbolic link to the true PTE. Each Prototype PTE should be in one of the six states listed below.

- Active: The V bit is one. The page was in memory and can be accessed using the Page Frame Number in the prototype PTE entry.
- Transition: The V bit is zero and the T bit is one. The page was in Transition, but can be accessed in the memory image using the Page Frame Number in the prototype PTE entry.

- **Modified No-Write:** Like a transition prototype PTE, but the Dirty bit, bit six, is also one. The page can be accessed in the memory image using the Page Frame Number in the prototype PTE entry.
- **Page File:** The V, T, and P bits are all zero. The data are stored in the page file.
- **Demand Zero:** The V, T, and P bits are zero along with the PageFileNumber and PageFileOffset. The page should be satisfied with all zeros.
- **Mapped File:** The P bit is one. The operating system would retrieve the requested data from the original file on the disk. The author does not know how to use the value from these prototype PTEs. [8]

5. Zero

If the entry is zero, there is no information available for the page in question. Specifically, the page has been committed, but has not yet been accessed. That is, the operating system has allocated the page but has not read from or written to it. In this situation, the page does not contain any information relating to the process of which it belongs. However, it may still contain residual information from a process that has released the page for reuse by another process. Some processes will zero out a page that is allocated or fill it with random data; but this is not always the case. If these pages do contain data from another process the investigator will not be able to tell where the data came from without more information which can be obtained through a more in-depth analysis of the memory image.

6. Unknown

It is still possible that the status of the address is unknown and in this case the entries are put in this category and disregarded. [8]

Until recently, the only investigation performed on physical memory was similar to the analysis performed by system administrators on crash dumps to find out the cause for a crash. Theoretically, the contents of physical memory can show everything about the state of the system at the time the memory dump was taken (open files, running processes, network connections, logged on users). However, the analysis of the complete image of physical memory and page-file is able to reveal much more information. [8] When a process terminates, the pages of memory which were allocated to it are marked as free by the memory management system, but the actual contents of these pages are not

overwritten until the memory is used. This means that this portion of memory actually contains data which is logically no longer part of the system. [9] This data may prove invaluable to a forensic investigation as it will be totally invisible to conventional crash dump analysis and the only way to recover it, is by means of an in depth forensic analysis of physical memory. [9]

IV. PROCESS BASICS

Windows stores information about each process in an EPROCESS kernel structure. The EPROCESS structures for all processes are stored in the address space of the System process. Once the base address of the EPROCESS block is known, values can be read by adding that offset and reading the value. Of the 4GB virtual address space allocated to the process, only the 1st 2GB of the virtual address space are available for the process to write to, with the 2nd 2GB used as shared system memory (although this can be changed to 3GB for the process and 1GB for the system using a boot option) [5]. This means that by looking up all virtual addresses ranging from 0x00000000 to 0x80000000 (0-2GB) all memory writable by that process can be produced.

A. EPROCESS STRUCTURE

The executive process (EPROCESS) block is the most important structure in memory for forensic analysis because it is the starting point of any further investigation of that process. All EPROCESS blocks are part of a doubly linked list, which includes blocks for active processes, although it is not uncommon to encounter exited processes in the list. This happens when an exited process is still opened as a handle by another active process; an exited EPROCESS block is deleted only when the last handle to the process is closed.

Each process on a Windows system is represented as an executive process, or EPROCESS, block. This EPROCESS block is a data structure in which various attributes of the process, as well as pointers to a number of other attributes and data structures relating to the process, are maintained. Because the data structure is a sequence of bytes, each sequence with a specific meaning and purpose, these structures can be read and analyzed by an investigator.

B. EXECUTIVE THREAD

Threads are entities within a process that represent executable code of the process. Every process starts with a single thread, which may spawn other threads. Multiple threads allow a process to do several tasks in parallel, with each thread doing a separate task. This is also more efficient because when the Operating System switches threads in the same process it does not cause a VM context switch.

Windows represents a thread by the executive thread (ETHREAD). Threads are important to forensic analysis because threads are scheduled for execution not processes. A thread's creation and exit times are stored in its ETHREAD block. The initial execution address for a thread is also stored in the ETHREAD block.

C. SEARCHING FOR PROCESSES

Now the problem is to find a pattern which reliably identifies the objects. This section describes the data structures representing processes and threads. It notes constant values and formulates rules which build upon pairs of offsets and values. [14] Other rules will be derived from functional requirements of the operating system.

Below we describe an algorithm for a scanner that will identify process and thread objects. [14] The scanner advances through the whole dump file at a step width equal to the kernel's memory allocation granularity. At every position the scanner looks for a valid process and thread structure by reading in the data and parsing it. This object is then evaluated based on a rule set.

1. Constraints

Values used to find valid process structures: [14]

Pcb.Header.Type != 0x03

Pcb.Header.Size != 0x1b

Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0] == 0

Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0] % 0x1000) != 0

Pcb.ThreadListHead.Flink < KERNEL_OFFSET

Pcb.ThreadListHead.Blink < KERNEL_OFFSET

WorkingSetLock.Event.Type != 0x01

WorkingSetLock.Event.Size != 0x04

V. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION

A. IMPLEMENTATION

The scanner was implemented in C using Notepad as the text editor and gcc as the compiler. It has been tested in cygwin[™] [21] running on Windows[®] XP SP2. The system we developed and tested with is an Intel P-III 1.1 Ghz laptop with 512 MB of RAM. We needed no flags or modules other than those listed in the header file in Appendix A. Simply compile using a standard gcc command with the header located in the same directory as the source file.

B. USAGE

Below we provide a reprint of the “usage” string printed by the scanner we implanted.

```
Usage statement: ./eproc.exe option <imageFile>
-l Walk active process list: ./eproc.exe -l <imageFile> <pAddress>
-s Scan image for process structures: ./eproc.exe -s <imageFile>
-t Translates Virtual Address: ./eproc.exe -t <imageFile> <pAddress>
<vAddress>
-d Dump process information: ./eproc.exe -d <imageFile> <pAddress>
-i Identify Operating System: ./eproc.exe -i <imageFile> -verbose
-p Gets the number of pages in memory : ./eproc.exe -p <imageFile>
<pAddress>
-m Dump Process Memory: ./eproc.exe -l <imageFile> <pAddress>
<pageFile>
```

C. FEATURES

1. Walk Active Process List

In conducting an investigation, after the preliminary data collection is complete the investigator will start the off-line analysis. Using this tool the first thing that the investigator should do is to get a process listing using the active process list. The command line to do this would look like: `./eproc.exe -l <imageFile>` It will

search for the System process, which is the active process head, starting at the beginning of the file, using the same mechanism that is used to scan the image for process structures and will traverse the list once it is found. Starting at the active process list head, System process on Windows, the tool follows the forward links (Flinks) and backward links (Blinks). They are pointers to the process before or after the current process in the active process list. Optionally if the physical address of the System process is known it can be entered at the command line after the path to the image file and the program will begin its search at that address. The closer you get the less time it will take to find the system process.

One weakness with this method is that it will not find processes that have been removed from the active process list by DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation) [17]. Such processes can be hidden because a device driver or loadable kernel module has access to kernel memory and can modify objects in the kernel memory space in a reliable fashion in order to hide objects such as processes. In order to hide a process using object manipulation you must first locate the EPROCESS block of the process that you want to hide, then change the process behind it in the list to point to the process after the process you are trying to hid. Finally, change the process after it to point to the process before the one you are trying to hide. [17] Now, the active process list points around the hidden process and it is not reported when the system returns the active process list.

The process continues to run because scheduling in Windows[®] is thread based and not process based. [17] So while the process is not reported by the Operating System, it continues to schedule the processes threads for execution without adverse affect to the system. [17] However, even though this function may not list all of the processes that could be running on the system it is a good initial listing and will show processes that have not been unlinked and still may look suspicious, but are not sophisticated enough to remove themselves from the process list. It also creates a baseline to compare the results from a full memory scan. Any discrepancies between the listing and the scan indicate areas that could use further investigation.

2. Scan Image for Process Structures

Once the investigator has a listing of the active processes the next step is to scan the image for process structures. This is the mechanism that is used to find the active process head when walking the list; however the list function stops scanning once the System process is found and uses the linked list to find processes. The following command will allow the investigator to scan a memory image: `./eproc.exe -s <imageFile>` The scan may take several minutes to complete depending on the system on the size of the memory image. The results of the scan provide the investigator with a list of every block of data that fits the process structure using expected values in specific locations. The algorithm scans the memory image at an 8-byte interval because processes are 8-byte aligned and compares each chunk of data to a process structure. If values in specific fields match then a valid process is found.

The advantage to this is that it will find all process structures that are in the memory image regardless of whether they have been removed through DKOM or have been recently exited as long as the structure is still in memory and still meets the criteria that describe a valid process structure. The disadvantage to this method of gaining process information is that it is slow and on large images will take significantly longer than walking the list if you need quick results. Comparing the results of both a listing and scan will provide the best results for investigators and give them a reference point to direct further investigation.

3. Information Provided from Process Lists

The useful information provided from the list and scan functions are the image name and size which are provided in order to provide descriptive information to the investigator for future reference:

- Each process name, which can sometimes provide the investigator an idea as to the function of the process and whether it is a process that is suspect or not,
- Pid and PPid give information as to which process spawned the current process which is useful in determining where the processes originated,

- Time created can be used to determine a timeline of events in an investigation,
- Offset in image is important for further investigation because this is necessary input for the functions that work on specific processes,
- Page directory base address this is also useful information for manual analysis and is used by the tool for address translation.

The information provided in the listing provides broad overview of what was running on the system and can give clues as to where to investigate further.

4. Translates Virtual to Physical Address

Another feature is the ability of the program to translate a virtual address to a physical offset in to the memory image. A command that will achieve this is: `./eproc.exe -t <imageFile> <pAddress> <vAddress>` The examiner may want to use this feature to aid in any manual analysis of the memory image. The procedure for this is to enter the flag then the address to the process of which the address is taken then the address to be translated. As of now it does not work for addresses that have been paged.

5. Dump Process Information

Now that the investigator has an idea of which processes need further investigation, the next step is to get the process image data from memory. This function takes the offset to a process structure as its argument and overlays a process structure to the data. An example command is: `./eproc.exe -d <imageFile> <pAddress>` If the data found at the address provided fits the valid process format it prints information about the process including its DOS Header, File Header, Optional Header, and Section data. The information provided by this function is most useful when combined with a manual analysis on the image. One feature under development is the ability to carve out the data referenced in the headers and specific sections for further analysis. If there is not a valid process structure found at the offset given, the program prints: “no valid process found”.

6. Identify Operating System

Normally the investigator will already know the Operating System the image was taken from, but it may be useful to identify the Operating System for verification. A command to identify the Operating System of an image is: `./eproc.exe -i <imageFile> -verbose` Also, the verbose option returns information about the Kernel image that may prove to be useful in the investigation. This function will print out the version of windows that the image was captured from. It does this by locating the Kernel Base Address and comparing it to addresses known to be used by common Operating Systems [14].

7. Gets the Number of Pages in Memory

Statistics relating to the number of valid and invalid pages referenced in the page directory is useful in determining memory usage and if a process was exhibiting suspect behavior. The command to get the memory usage of a process is: `./eproc.exe -p <imageFile> <pAddress>` to get these statistics the scanner simply counts the number of valid and invalid addresses are in the page table for the specified process. Once a valid process is found, the page directory can be found using the process structures provided in appendix A. With the location of the page directory the rest of the virtual to physical translation information is found using the proper translation method.

8. Dump Process Memory

Now that the investigator has found the process that is suspect the next step is to retrieve its memory space from the memory image and the page file. To do this the command would be: `./eproc.exe -l <imageFile> <pAddress> <pageFile>` this function takes the image file and optionally a page-file and dumps the processes memory space to a file in its own folder. The file and folder will be named with the process name and the PID (process id). In order to reduce the amount of space required it does not dump global pages from the system shared memory space. The algorithm used to find the data and output it to a file goes through all of the virtual addresses in the page tables and translates them using either the valid address translation method or the invalid address translation method. For invalid addresses if the address flags indicate it is in the page-file

it retrieves the page from the page-file if it is provided. The output function simply writes the pages to the output file in the order they appear in the page tables. This puts the pages in ascending order based on the virtual address of the page. A second file is produced that contains the virtual addresses listed in the same order as the dump file so that they can be later matched to the corresponding page from memory. A useful function would be a mechanism to search the dumped file and would be useful and aid the investigator in advanced analysis. This would make it easier to reconstruct memory space and look at specific parts that may need further investigation. One feature that is being explored is the ability to find and dump specific parts of the process image, such as specific DLLs or all or part of the process executable.

D. TESTING

This program was tested using memory captured dd.exe. The system was a Laptop running Windows XP Service Pack 2 with 512 MB of RAM. The page-file was obtained by shutting down the system by removing the batteries and booting the system with Backtrack [22] to allow access and to ensure the integrity of the file. The results of the test runs can be found in Appendix C.

VI. SUMMARY

This report has shown that during the forensic process, as much attention must be paid to volatile memory as to the more traditional sources of evidence. It should no longer be standard practice for the contents of memory to be destroyed in the interest of the integrity of the data on the hard disks. Different techniques are either available now or will be available in the near future for acquiring memory images. Once a memory image has been taken it is possible to locate pages that would not normally be available to the investigator by incorporating information in the process's page directories. Currently this tool retrieves the pages in the order they appear in the page directories, it would be better to sort them in order of virtual address, however this is still in progress. Another feature under development is the ability to analyze the data it produces. There are few tools currently available which can analyze this data, however, it can be done manually and automated tools are under development. The release of the *Volatility* framework will hopefully allow developers to add to this toolbox easily. It is expected that in the near future, full suites of memory analysis software will be available, and the investigation of memory will be viewed with the same importance as any other areas of computer forensics.

A. FUTURE WORK

This paper has attempted to expand the amount of information available to an examiner conducting Windows[®] memory analysis. The current implementation of this tool extracts process data in its entirety and saves it in one consolidated file. One area that needs to be addressed is the ability to extract specific parts of a process such as only the executable or specific DLLs. This would facilitate an investigator's search and allow more time for analysis. Another area that needs further development is the robustness of options available that will allow the user to more easily conduct data retrieval and analysis. Although demonstrating that more information is available when using robust address translation, there are still many opportunities to increase the amount of recoverable data in a memory image. This will hopefully allow for more advanced

programs to be produced which could, for example analyze data structures and variables within process space and produce visualization systems for displaying the contents of memory in readable ways.

There is also much more information available to the investigator by looking for other types of data structures. Future developments will be able to find loaded DLLs, open file handles and which thread is accessing the files, encryption keys, and open sockets just to name a few. All of this information will be useful to the investigator in recreating the scene of the digital crime. Knowing if there were open sockets, threads executing, and which files were being accessed at the time of the incident give the investigator invaluable information as to the type, method, and extent of damage that may have occurred. All of this information is available to some extent, but to take full advantage of the information it provides it needs to be organized and analyzed in meaningful ways.

Hibernation may prove to be a useful method of acquiring memory, but more research needs to be done to make this a reliable tool in the forensic investigator's tool box. The ways in which Windows fetches, compresses, and stores memory are not fully understood, and it is not clear if any other operations are performed during the hibernation process. Researchers have had some success in reverse engineering the proprietary algorithm used to hibernate systems running Windows[®], however there is not enough evidence to show that the methods they use yield the results required by forensic analysis. Furthermore, this method requires that hibernation be enabled prior to the incident which limits its usefulness to certain cases. Another consideration is that hibernation is a process operated by the system that is in question and it may be compromised possibly yielding unreliable results. If the system has been compromised nothing running on the system can be trusted.

Firewire has been designed to access memory through DMA, which should lend it towards memory acquisition with minimal impact on the target system. Research has shown that this is possible on Windows[®] XP systems, but has yet to produce a viable solution which would be suitable for incident response. While in some cases this may be an acceptable method, the investigator must introduce new hardware to the system thus

changing its state. Whenever the investigator changes the state of the system by introducing new hardware, one cannot rule out the possibility that it will be recognized alerting the intruder and allowing for the destruction of evidence.

A multitude of applications relating to and stemming from this research can be found in incident response, data recovery, computer forensics, and cyber crime investigation. These are all interrelated, but each one is its own independent research area with unique difficulties and opportunities. The field of memory analysis can be used to determine what was happening on a system at the time the memory image was taken, to find encryption keys and possibly reconstruct deleted files. The ultimate result of research is to completely reconstruct the state of a live system from a memory image and hard disk. The ability to do this is like being able to freeze a crime scene and completely reconstruct it in a controlled environment, possibly even while the criminal is still present. Further research will lead to greater understanding of computer systems leading to tools that will aid solving cyber crimes and convicting suspects.

The final area of future research and possibly the most important when it comes to catching and convicting criminals is the admissibility of evidence obtained in the Court of Law. Once the investigator has used the information to solve the crime it must then be used in court to convict the suspect. As of now, the tool is simply an evidence acquisition tool used to diagnose symptoms of a system that appears to be compromised and only a small piece of the overall investigation. However, in the future there will have to be some way to prove that the dump came from the system in question, that it has not been compromised, and be able to provide conclusive evidence that a crime was committed and that the suspect did indeed commit the crime in question. Not only must the tools used by an investigator do this, but it must do it in proven, repeatable ways.

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APPENDIX A. WINDOWS STRUCTURES

A. WIN32STRUCTS.H

```
/*
Name Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer [7]
File win32structs.h
Version 1.0
Author John Schultz

```

```
Description Console Program which enumerates the processes running on a
Windows PC. The program reads an offline copy of the
physical memory for all the information gathered about the
running processes.

```

```
*/

```

```
#include<sys/cdefs.h>
```

```
#ifndef __WIN32STRUCTS_H
#define __WIN32STRUCTS_H
```

```
__BEGIN_DECLS
```

```
/*Each struct is defined based on that given by the Windows(R) Kernel
Debugger with few exceptions, which are noted*/
```

```
struct _unnamed {
    /* +0x000 */ long double var01;
    /* +0x00a */ long double var02;
    /* +0x014 */ long double var03;
    /* +0x01e */ long double var04;
};
```

```
struct LIST_ENTRY {
    /* +0x000 */ void *Flink;
    /* +0x004 */ void *Blink;
};
```

```
struct UNICODE_STRING {
    /* 0x000 */ unsigned short Length;
    /* 0x002 */ unsigned short MaximumLength;
    /* 0x004 */ unsigned short *Buffer;
};
```

```
struct STRING {
    /* 0x000 */ unsigned short Length;
    /* 0x002 */ unsigned short MaximumLength;
    /* 0x004 */ char *Buffer;
};
```

```
struct DISPATCHER_HEADER {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned char Type;
    /* +0x001 */ unsigned char Absolute;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char Size;
```



```

    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char    Inserted;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long    SignalState;
    /* +0x008 */ struct LIST_ENTRY WaitList;
};

struct KEVENT {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
};

struct KDEVICE_QUEUE {
    /* +0x000 */ short            Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short            Size;
    /* +0x004 */ struct LIST_ENTRY DeviceListHead;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long    Lock;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned char    Busy;
};

struct KDPC {
    /* +0x000 */ short            Type;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char    Number;
    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char    Importance;
    /* +0x004 */ struct LIST_ENTRY DpcListEntry;
    /* +0x00c */ void             *DeferredRoutine;
    /* +0x010 */ void             *DeferredContext;
    /* +0x014 */ void             *SystemArgument1;
    /* +0x018 */ void             *SystemArgument2;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long    *Lock;
};

struct MMWSLE_HASH {
    /* +0x000 */ void             *Key;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long    Index;
};

struct MMSUPPORT_FLAGS {
    /* +0x000 */ int Sessionspace : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int BeingTrimmed : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int SessionLoader : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int TrimHard : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int WorkingSetHard : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int AddressSpaceBeingDeleted : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Available : 10;
    /* +0x000 */ int AllowWorkingSetAdjustment : 8;
    /* +0x000 */ int MemoryPriority : 8;
};

struct MMWSL {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long    Quota;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long    FirstFree;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long    FirstDynamic;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long    LastEntry;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long    NextSlot;
    /* +0x014 */ void             *Wsle; /*points to MMWSLE*/
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long    LastInitializedWsle;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long    NonDirectCount;
    /* +0x020 */ struct MMWSLE_HASH *HashTable;
    /* +0x024 */ unsigned long    HashTableSize;
};

```

```

    /* +0x028 */ unsigned long      NumberOfCommittedPageTables;
    /* +0x02c */ void                *HashTableStart;
    /* +0x030 */ void                *HighestPermittedHashAddress;
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long      NumberOfImageWaiters;
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long      VadBitMapHint;
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned short     UsedPageTableEntries[768];
    /* +0x63c */ unsigned long      CommittedPageTables[24];
};

struct MMSUPPORT {
    /* +0x000 */ long long          LastTrimTime;
    /* +0x008 */ struct MMSUPPORT_FLAGS Flags;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long      PageFaultCount;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long      PeakWorkingSetSize;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long      WorkingSetSize;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long      MinimumWorkingSetSize;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long      MaximumWorkingSetSize;
    /* +0x020 */ struct MMWSL       *VmWorkingSetList;
    /* +0x024 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   WorkingSetExpansionLinks;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long      Claim;
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned long      NextEstimationSlot;
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long      NextAgingSlot;
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long      EstimatedAvailable;
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long      GrowthSinceLastEstimate;
};

struct FAST_MUTEX {
    /* +0x000 */ long              Count;
    /* +0x004 */ void              *Owner;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long     Contention;
    /* +0x00c */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Event;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long     OldIrq;
};

struct CURDIR {
    /* 0x000 */ struct UNICODE_STRING DosPath;
    /* 0x008 */ void                *Handle;
};

struct PEB_LDR_DATA {
    /* 0x000 */ unsigned long      Length;
    /* 0x004 */ unsigned char      Initialized;
    /* 0x008 */ void              *SsHandle;
    /* 0x00c */ struct LIST_ENTRY   InLoadOrderModuleList;
    /* 0x014 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   InMemoryOrderModuleList;
    /* 0x01c */ struct LIST_ENTRY   InInitializationOrderModuleList;
    /* 0x024 */ void              *EntryInProgress;
};

struct KSEMAPHORE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ long              Limit;
};

struct KGDTEENTRY {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short     LimitLow;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short     BaseLow;
};

```

```

    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long    HighWord;
};

struct KIDENTRY {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short    Offset;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short    Selector;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned short    Access;
    /* +0x006 */ unsigned short    ExtendedOffset;
};

struct HANDLE_TABLE {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long    TableCode;
    /* +0x004 */ struct EPROCESS *QuotaProcess;
    /* +0x008 */ void             *UniqueProcessID;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long    HandleTableLock[4];
    /* +0x01c */ struct LIST_ENTRY HandleTableList;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long    HandleContentionEvent;
    /* +0x030 */ void             *DebugInfo;
    /* +0x034 */ long             ExtraInfoPages;
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long    FirstFree;
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long    LastFree;
    /* +0x040 */ unsigned long    NextHandleNeedingPool;
    /* +0x044 */ long             HandleCount;
    /* +0x048 */ unsigned long    Flags;
};

struct OWNER_ENTRY {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long    OwnerThread;
    /* +0x004 */ long             OwnerCount; */
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long    TableSize;
};

struct OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short    Length;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char    UseDefaultObject;
    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char    CaseInsensitive;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long    InvalidAttributes;
    /* +0x008 */ void             *GenericMapping;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long    ValidAccessMask;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned char    SecurityRequired;
    /* +0x01d */ unsigned char    MaintainHandleCount;
    /* +0x01e */ unsigned char    MaintainTypeList;
    /* +0x020 */ void             *PoolType;
    /* +0x024 */ unsigned long    DefaultPagedPoolCharge;
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned long    DefaultNonPagedPoolCharge;
    /* +0x02c */ void             *DumpProcedure;
    /* +0x030 */ void             *OpenProcedure;
    /* +0x034 */ void             *CloseProcedure;
    /* +0x038 */ void             *DeleteProcedure;
    /* +0x03c */ void             *ParseProcedure;
    /* +0x040 */ void             *SecurityProcedure;
    /* +0x044 */ void             *QueryNameProcedure;
    /* +0x048 */ void             *OkayToCloseProcedure;
};

struct ERESOURCE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct LIST_ENTRY SystemResourcesList;
};

```

```

    /* +0x008 */ struct OWNER_ENTRY      *OwnerTable;
    /* +0x00c */ short                   ActiveCount;
    /* +0x00e */ unsigned short          Flag;
    /* +0x010 */ struct KSEMAPHORE       *SharedWaiters;
    /* +0x014 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER *ExclusiveWaiters;
    /* +0x018 */ struct OWNER_ENTRY      OwnerThreads[2];
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned long           ContentionCount;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned short          NumberOfSharedWaiters;
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned short          NumberOfExclusiveWaiters;
    /* +0x030 */ void                    *Address;*/
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned long           CreatorBackTraceIndex;
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long           SpinLock;
};

struct SEGMENT {
    /* +0x000 */ struct CONTROL_AREA *ControlArea;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long       TotalNumberOfPtes;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long       NonExtendedPtes;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long       WritableUserReferences;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long long   SizeOfSegment;
    /* +0x018 */ long                SegmentPteTemplate;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long       NumberOfCommittedPages;
    /* +0x020 */ /* struct MMEXTEND_INFO */void *ExtendInfo;
    /* +0x024 */ void                *SystemImageBase;
    /* +0x028 */ void                *BasedAddress;
    /* +0x02c */ long                u1;
    /* +0x030 */ long                u2;
    /* +0x034 */ long                *PrototypePte;
    /* +0x038 */ long                ThePtes[1];
};

struct CONTROL_AREA {
    /* +0x000 */ struct SEGMENT      *Segment;
    /* +0x004 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    DereferenceList;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long        NumberOfSectionReferences;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long        NumberOfPfnReferences;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long        NumberOfMappedViews;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned short       NumberOfSubsections;
    /* +0x01a */ unsigned short       FlushInProgressCount;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long        NumberOfUserReferences;
    /* +0x020 */ long                unnamed;
    /* +0x024 */ struct FILE_OBJECT    *FilePointer;
    /* +0x028 */ /*struct EVENT_COUNTER*/void *WaitingForDeletion;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned short       ModifiedWriteCount;
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned short       NumberOfSystemCacheViews;
};

struct SUBSECTION {
    /* +0x000 */ struct CONTROL_AREA *ControlArea;
    /* +0x004 */ long                unnamed;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long        StartingSector;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long        NumberOfFullSectors;
    /* +0x010 */ /*struct MMPTE*/void *SubsectionBase;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long        UnusedPtes;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long        PtesInSubsection;
    /* +0x01c */ struct SUBSECTION    *NextSubsection;
};

```

```

struct SEGMENT_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ void *BaseAddress;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long TotalNumberOfPtes;
    /* +0x008 */ long long SizeOfSegment;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long NonExtendedPtes;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long ImageCommitment;
    /* +0x018 */ struct CONTROL_AREA *ControlArea;
    /* +0x01c */ struct SUBSECTION *Subsection;
    /* +0x020 */ /*struct LARGE_CONTROL_AREA*/void *LargeControlArea;
    /* +0x024 */ /*struct MMSECTION_FLAGS*/ void *MmSectionFlags;
    /* +0x028 */ /*struct MMSUBSECTION_FLAGS*/ void
*MmSubSectionFlags;
};

struct SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS {
    /* +0x000 */ void *DataSectionObject;
    /* +0x004 */ void *SharedCacheMap;
    /* +0x008 */ void *ImageSectionObject;
};

struct SECTION_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ void *StartingVa;
    /* +0x004 */ void *EndingVa;
    /* +0x008 */ void *Parent;
    /* +0x00c */ void *LeftChild;
    /* +0x010 */ void *RightChild;
    /* +0x014 */ struct SEGMENT_OBJECT *Segment;
};

struct OBJECT_TYPE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct ERESOURCE Mutex;
    /* +0x038 */ struct LIST_ENTRY TypeList;
    /* +0x040 */ struct UNICODE_STRING Name;
    /* +0x048 */ void *DefaultObject;
    /* +0x04c */ unsigned long Index;
    /* +0x050 */ unsigned long TotalNumberOfObjects;
    /* +0x054 */ unsigned long TotalNumberOfHandles;
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned long HighWaterNumberOfObjects;
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long HighWaterNumberOfHandles;
    /* +0x060 */ struct OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER TypeInfo;
    /* +0x0ac */ unsigned long Key;
    /* +0x0b0 */ struct ERESOURCE ObjectLocks[4];
};

struct OBJECT_HEADER {
    /* +0x000 */ long PointerCount;
    /* +0x004 */ long HandleCount; /*
    /* +0x004 */ void *NextToFree;
    /* +0x008 */ struct OBJECT_TYPE *Type;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned char NameInfoOffset;
    /* +0x00d */ unsigned char HandleInfoOffset;
    /* +0x00e */ unsigned char QuotaInfoOffset;
    /* +0x00f */ unsigned char Flags;
    /* +0x010 */ /* struct OBJECT_CREATE_INFORMATION *ObjectCreateInfo;
*/
    /* +0x010 */ void *QuotaBlockCharged;

```

```

    /* +0x014 */ void                                *SecurityDescriptor;
};

struct VPB {
    /* +0x000 */ short                               Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short                               Size;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned short                     Flags;
    /* +0x006 */ unsigned short                     VolumeLabelLength;
    /* +0x008 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT               *DeviceObject;
    /* +0x00c */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT               *RealDevice;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long                       SerialNumber;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long                       ReferenceCount;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned short                     VolumeLabel[32];
/*Unicode name*/
};

struct DEVICE_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ short                               Type;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short                     Size;
    /* +0x004 */ long                               ReferenceCount;
    /* +0x008 */ struct DRIVER_OBJECT               *DriverObject;
    /* +0x00c */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT               *NextDevice;
    /* +0x010 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT               *AttachedDevice;
    /* +0x014 */ /* struct IRP */ void                *CurrentIrp;
    /* +0x018 */ /* struct IO_TIMER */ void           *Timer;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long                       Flags;
    /* +0x020 */ unsigned long                       Characteristics;
    /* +0x024 */ struct VPB                          *Vpb;
    /* +0x028 */ void                                *DeviceExtension;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long                       DeviceType;
    /* +0x030 */ char                                StackSize;
    /* +0x034 */ struct _unnamed                     Queue;
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long                       AlignmentRequirement;
    /* +0x060 */ struct KDEVICE_QUEUE                 DeviceQueue;
    /* +0x074 */ struct KDPC                          Dpc;
    /* +0x094 */ unsigned long                       ActiveThreadCount;
    /* +0x098 */ void                                *SecurityDescriptor;
    /* +0x09c */ struct KEVENT                       DeviceLock;
    /* +0x0ac */ unsigned short                      SectorSize;
    /* +0x0ae */ unsigned short                      Spare1;
    /* +0x0b0 */ /* struct DEVOBJ_EXTENSION */ void
*DeviceObjectExtension;
    /* +0x0b4 */ void                                *Reserved;
};

struct DRIVER_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ short                               Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short                               Size;
    /* +0x004 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT               *DeviceObject;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long                       Flags;
    /* +0x00c */ void                                *DriverStart;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long                       DriverSize;
    /* +0x014 */ void                                *DriverSection;
    /* +0x018 */ /* struct DRIVER_EXTENSION */ void *DriverExtension;
    /* +0x01c */ struct UNICODE_STRING               DriverName;
    /* +0x024 */ struct UNICODE_STRING               *HardwareDatabase;
    /* +0x028 */ /* struct FAST_IO_DISPATCH */ void *FastIoDispatch;
};

```

```

    /* +0x02c */ void                *DriverInit;
    /* +0x030 */ void                *DriverStartIo;
    /* +0x034 */ void                *DriverUnload;
    /* +0x038 */ void                *MajorFunction[28];
};

struct FILE_OBJECT {
    /* +0x000 */ short                Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short                Size;
    /* +0x004 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT *DeviceObject;
    /* +0x008 */ struct VPB           *Vpb;
    /* +0x00c */ void                *FsContext;
    /* +0x010 */ void                *FsContext2;
    /* +0x014 */ struct SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS *SectionObjectPointer;
    /* +0x018 */ void                *PrivateCacheMap;
    /* +0x01c */ long                FinalStatus;
    /* +0x020 */ struct FILE_OBJECT   *RelatedFileObject;
    /* +0x024 */ unsigned char        LockOperation;
    /* +0x025 */ unsigned char        DeletePending;
    /* +0x026 */ unsigned char        ReadAccess;
    /* +0x027 */ unsigned char        WriteAccess;
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned char        DeleteAccess;
    /* +0x029 */ unsigned char        SharedRead;
    /* +0x02a */ unsigned char        SharedWrite;
    /* +0x02b */ unsigned char        SharedDelete;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long        Flags;
    /* +0x030 */ struct UNICODE_STRING FileName;
    /* +0x038 */ long long            CurrentByteOffset;
    /* +0x040 */ unsigned long        Waiters;
    /* +0x044 */ unsigned long        Busy;
    /* +0x048 */ void                *LastLock;
    /* +0x04c */ struct KEVENT        Lock;
    /* +0x05c */ struct KEVENT        Event;
    /* +0x06c */ /* struct IO_COMPLETION_CONTEXT */ void
*CompletionContext;
};

struct EX_PUSH_LOCK {
    /* +0x000 */ int                Waiting : 1; //LSB
    /* +0x000 */ int                Exclusive : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int                Shared : 30;
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long Value;
    /* +0x000 */ void                *Ptr;
};

struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY_ENTRY {
    /* +0x000 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *ChainLink;
    /* +0x004 */ void                *Object;
};

struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY {
    /* +0x000 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *HashBuckets[37];
    /* +0x094 */ struct EX_PUSH_LOCK        Lock;
    /* +0x098 */ struct DEVICE_MAP         *DeviceMap;
    /* +0x09c */ unsigned long            SessionId;
    /* +0x0a0 */ unsigned short           Reserved;
    /* +0x0a2 */ unsigned short           SymbolicLinkUsageCount;
};

```

```

};

struct DEVICE_MAP {
    /* +0x000 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY      *DosDevicesDirectory;
    /* +0x004 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY
*GlobalDosDevicesDirectory;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long                ReferenceCount;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long                DriveMap;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned char                DriveType[32];
};

struct RTL_DRIVE_LETTER_CURDIR {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short Flags;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short Length;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long  TimeStamp;
    /* +0x008 */ struct STRING  DosPath;
};

struct RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long                MaximumLength;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long                Length;
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long                Flags;
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long                DebugFlags;
    /* +0x010 */ void                        *ConsoleHandle;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long                ConsoleFlags;
    /* +0x018 */ void                        *StandardInput;
    /* +0x01c */ void                        *StandardOutput;
    /* +0x020 */ void                        *StandardError;
    /* +0x024 */ struct CURDIR                CurrentDirectory;
    /* +0x030 */ struct UNICODE_STRING        DllPath;
    /* +0x038 */ struct UNICODE_STRING        ImagePathName;
    /* +0x040 */ struct UNICODE_STRING        CommandLine;
    /* +0x048 */ void                        *Environment;
    /* +0x04c */ unsigned long                StartingX;
    /* +0x050 */ unsigned long                StartingY;
    /* +0x054 */ unsigned long                CountX;
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned long                CountY;
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long                CountCharsX;
    /* +0x060 */ unsigned long                CountCharsY;
    /* +0x064 */ unsigned long                FillAttribute;
    /* +0x068 */ unsigned long                WindowFlags;
    /* +0x06c */ unsigned long                ShowWindowFlags;
    /* +0x070 */ struct UNICODE_STRING        WindowTitle;
    /* +0x078 */ struct UNICODE_STRING        DesktopInfo;
    /* +0x080 */ struct UNICODE_STRING        ShellInfo;
    /* +0x088 */ struct UNICODE_STRING        RuntimeData;
    /* +0x090 */ struct RTL_DRIVE_LETTER_CURDIR CurrentDirectores[32];
};

struct PEB {
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned char                InheritedAddressSpace;
    /* +0x001 */ unsigned char                ReadImageFileExecOptions;
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char                BeingDebugged;
    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char                SpareBool;
    /* +0x004 */ void                        *Mutant;
    /* +0x008 */ void                        *ImageBaseAddress;
    /* +0x00c */ struct PEB_LDR_DATA *Ldr;
};

```



```

/* +0x010 */ struct RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS *ProcessParameters;
/* +0x014 */ void *SubSystemData;
/* +0x018 */ void *ProcessHeap;
/* +0x01c */ struct RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION *FastPebLock;
/* +0x020 */ void *FastPebLockRoutine;
/* +0x024 */ void *FastPebUnlockRoutine;
/* +0x028 */ unsigned long EnvironmentUpdateCount;
/* +0x02c */ void *KernelCallbackTable;
/* +0x030 */ unsigned long SystemReserved[1];
/* +0x034 */ unsigned long AtlThunkSList;
/* +0x038 */ struct PEB_FREE_BLOCK *FreeList;
/* +0x03c */ unsigned long TlsExpansionCounter;
/* +0x040 */ void *TlsBitmap;
/* +0x044 */ unsigned long TlsBitmapBits[2];
/* +0x04c */ void *ReadOnlySharedMemoryBase;
/* +0x050 */ void *ReadOnlySharedMemoryHeap;
/* +0x054 */ void **ReadOnlyStaticServerData;
/* +0x058 */ void *AnsiCodePageData;
/* +0x05c */ void *OemCodePageData;
/* +0x060 */ void *UnicodeCaseTableData;
/* +0x064 */ unsigned long NumberOfProcessors;
/* +0x068 */ unsigned long NtGlobalFlag;
/* +0x070 */ long long CriticalSectionTimeout;
/* +0x078 */ unsigned long HeapSegmentReserve;
/* +0x07c */ unsigned long HeapSegmentCommit;
/* +0x080 */ unsigned long HeapDeCommitTotalFreeThreshold;
/* +0x084 */ unsigned long HeapDeCommitFreeBlockThreshold;
/* +0x088 */ unsigned long NumberOfHeaps;
/* +0x08c */ unsigned long MaximumNumberOfHeaps;
/* +0x090 */ void **ProcessHeaps;
/* +0x094 */ void *GdiSharedHandleTable;
/* +0x098 */ void *ProcessStarterHelper;
/* +0x09c */ unsigned long GdiDCAttributeList;
/* +0x0a0 */ void *LoaderLock;
/* +0x0a4 */ unsigned long OSMajorVersion;
/* +0x0a8 */ unsigned long OSMinorVersion;
/* +0x0ac */ unsigned short OSBuildNumber;
/* +0x0ae */ unsigned short OSCSDVersion;
/* +0x0b0 */ unsigned long OSPlatformId;
/* +0x0b4 */ unsigned long ImageSubsystem;
/* +0x0b8 */ unsigned long ImageSubsystemMajorVersion;
/* +0x0bc */ unsigned long ImageSubsystemMinorVersion;
/* +0x0c0 */ unsigned long ImageProcessAffinityMask;
/* +0x0c4 */ unsigned long GdiHandleBuffer[34];
/* +0x14c */ void *PostProcessInitRoutine;
/* +0x150 */ void *TlsExpansionBitmap;
/* +0x154 */ unsigned long TlsExpansionBitmapBits[32];
/* +0x1d4 */ unsigned long SessionId;
/* +0x1d8 */ unsigned long long AppCompatFlags;
/* +0x1e0 */ unsigned long long AppCompatFlagsUser;
/* +0x1e8 */ void *pShimData;
/* +0x1ec */ void *AppCompatInfo;
/* +0x1f0 */ struct UNICODE_STRING CSDVersion;
/* +0x1f8 */ void *ActivationContextData;
/* +0x1fc */ void *ProcessAssemblyStorageMap;
/* +0x200 */ void *SystemDefaultActivationContextData;
/* +0x204 */ void *SystemAssemblyStorageMap;

```

```

    /* +0x208 */ unsigned long      MinimumStackCommit;
};

struct HARDWARE_PTE {
    /* +0x000 */ int Valid : 1; //LSB
    /* +0x000 */ int Write : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Owner : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int WriteThrough : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int CacheDisable : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Accessed : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Dirty : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int LargePage : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Global : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int CopyOnWrite : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Prototype : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int Reserved : 1;
    /* +0x000 */ int PageFrameNumber : 20;
};

struct KPROCESS {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ struct LIST_ENTRY      ProfileListHead;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long          DirectoryTableBase[2];
    /* +0x020 */ struct KGDTENTRY      LdtDescriptor;
    /* +0x028 */ struct KIDTENTRY      Int21Descriptor;
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned short        IopmOffset;
    /* +0x032 */ unsigned char          Iopl;
    /* +0x033 */ unsigned char          Unused;
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long          ActiveProcessors;
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long          KernelTime;
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long          UserTime;
    /* +0x040 */ struct LIST_ENTRY      ReadyListHead;
    /* +0x048 */ void                   *SwapListEntry;
    /* +0x04c */ void                   *VdmTrapHandler;
    /* +0x050 */ struct LIST_ENTRY      ThreadListHead;
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned long          ProcessLock;
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long          Affinity;
    /* +0x060 */ unsigned short         StackCount;
    /* +0x062 */ char                   BasePriority;
    /* +0x063 */ char                   ThreadQuantum;
    /* +0x064 */ unsigned char          AutoAlignment;
    /* +0x065 */ unsigned char          State;
    /* +0x066 */ unsigned char          ThreadSeed;
    /* +0x067 */ unsigned char          DisableBoost;
    /* +0x068 */ unsigned char          PowerState;
    /* +0x069 */ unsigned char          DisableQuantum;
    /* +0x06a */ unsigned char          IdealNode;
    /* +0x06b */ KEEXECUTE_OPTIONS      Flags; */
    /* +0x06b */ unsigned char          ExecuteOptions;
};

struct EPROCESS {
    /* +0x000 */ struct KPROCESS        Pcb;
    /* +0x06c */ unsigned long          ProcessLock;
    /* +0x070 */ unsigned long long     CreateTime;
    /* +0x078 */ unsigned long long     ExitTime;
    /* +0x080 */ unsigned long          RunDownProtect;
};

```

```

/* +0x084 */ void *UniqueProcessId;
/* +0x088 */ struct LIST_ENTRY ActiveProcessLinks;
/* +0x090 */ unsigned long QuotaUsage[3];
/* +0x09c */ unsigned long QuotaPeak[3];
/* +0x0a8 */ unsigned long CommitCharge;
/* +0x0ac */ unsigned long PeakVirtualSize;
/* +0x0b0 */ unsigned long VirtualSize;
/* +0x0b4 */ struct LIST_ENTRY SessionProcessLinks;
/* +0x0bc */ void *DebugPort;
/* +0x0c0 */ void *ExceptionPort;
/* +0x0c4 */ struct HANDLE_TABLE *ObjectTable;
/* +0x0c8 */ unsigned long Token;
/* +0x0cc */ struct FAST_MUTEX WorkingSetLock;
/* +0x0ec */ unsigned long WorkingSetPage;
/* +0x0f0 */ struct FAST_MUTEX AddressCreationLock;
/* +0x110 */ unsigned long HyperSpaceLock;
/* +0x114 */ struct ETHREAD *ForkInProgress;
/* +0x118 */ unsigned long HardwareTrigger;
/* +0x11c */ void *VadRoot;
/* +0x120 */ void *VadHint;
/* +0x124 */ void *CloneRoot;
/* +0x128 */ unsigned long NumberOfPrivatePages;
/* +0x12c */ unsigned long NumberOfLockedPages;
/* +0x130 */ void *Win32Process;
/* +0x134 */ void *Job; /*Points to EJOB*/
/* +0x138 */ void *SectionObject;
/* +0x13c */ void *SectionBaseAddress;
/* +0x140 */ void *QuotaBlock; /*points to EPROCESS_QUOTA_BLOCK*/
/* +0x144 */ void *WorkingSetWatch; /*points to PAGEFAULT_HISTORY*/
/* +0x148 */ void *Win32WindowStation;
/* +0x14c */ void *InheritedFromUniqueProcessId;
/* +0x150 */ void *LdtInformation;
/* +0x154 */ void *VadFreeHint;
/* +0x158 */ void *VdmObjects;
/* +0x15c */ struct DEVICE_MAP *DeviceMap;
/* +0x160 */ struct LIST_ENTRY PhysicalVadList;
/* +0x168 */ struct HARDWARE_PTE PageDirectoryPte;
/* +0x16c */ unsigned long Filler;
/* +0x170 */ void *Session;
/* +0x174 */ char ImageFileName[16];
/* +0x184 */ struct LIST_ENTRY JobLinks;
/* +0x18c */ void *LockedPagesList;
/* +0x190 */ struct LIST_ENTRY ThreadListHead;
/* +0x198 */ void *SecurityPort;
/* +0x19c */ void *PaeTop;
/* +0x1a0 */ unsigned long ActiveThreads;
/* +0x1a4 */ unsigned long GrantedAccess;
/* +0x1a8 */ unsigned long DefaultHardErrorProcessing;
/* +0x1ac */ long LastThreadExitStatus;
/* +0x1b0 */ struct PEB *Peb;
/* +0x1b4 */ unsigned long PrefetchTrace;
/* +0x1b8 */ unsigned long long ReadOperationCount;
/* +0x1c0 */ unsigned long long WriteOperationCount;
/* +0x1c8 */ unsigned long long OtherOperationCount;
/* +0x1d0 */ unsigned long long ReadTransferCount;
/* +0x1d8 */ unsigned long long WriteTransferCount;
/* +0x1e0 */ unsigned long long OtherTransferCount;

```

```

    /* +0x1e8 */ unsigned long      CommitChargeLimit;
    /* +0x1ec */ unsigned long      CommitChargePeak;
    /* +0x1f0 */ void                *AweInfo;
    /* +0x1f4 */ unsigned long      SeAuditProcessCreationInfo;
    /* +0x1f8 */ struct MMSUPPORT    Vm;
    /* +0x238 */ unsigned long      LastFaultCount;
    /* +0x23c */ unsigned long      ModifiedPageCount;
    /* +0x240 */ unsigned long      NumberOfVads;
    /* +0x244 */ unsigned long      JobStatus;
    /* +0x248 */ unsigned long      Flags;
    /* +0x24c */ long                ExitStatus;
    /* +0x250 */ unsigned short     NextPageColor;
    /* +0x252 */ unsigned char      SubSystemMinorVersion;
    /* +0x253 */ unsigned char      SubSystemMajorVersion;
    /* +0x254 */ unsigned short     SubSystemVersion;
    /* +0x256 */ unsigned char      PriorityClass;
    /* +0x257 */ unsigned char      WorkingSetAcquiredUnsafe;
    /* +0x258 */ unsigned long      Cookie;
};

struct CLIENT_ID {
    /* +0x000 */ void *UniqueProcess;
    /* +0x004 */ void *UniqueThread;
};

struct KAPC_STATE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct LIST_ENTRY  ApcListHead[2];
    /* +0x010 */ struct KPROCESS    *Process;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned char      KernelApcInProgress;
    /* +0x015 */ unsigned char      KernelApcPending;
    /* +0x016 */ unsigned char      UserApcPending;
    /* +0x017 */ unsigned char      Trailer;
};

struct KQUEUE {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ struct LIST_ENTRY      EntryListHead;
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long          CurrentCount;
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long          MaximumCount;
    /* +0x020 */ struct LIST_ENTRY      ThreadListHead;
};

struct KTIMER {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long long      DueTime;
    /* +0x018 */ struct LIST_ENTRY      TimerListEntry;
    /* +0x020 */ struct KDPC            *Dpc;
    /* +0x024 */ long                    Period;
};

struct KAPC {
    /* +0x000 */ short                  Type;
    /* +0x002 */ short                  Size;
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long          Spare0;
    /* +0x008 */ struct KTHREAD         *Thread;
    /* +0x00c */ struct LIST_ENTRY      ApcListEntry;
    /* +0x014 */ void                    *KernelRoutine;
};

```

```

    /* +0x018 */ void                *RundownRoutine;
    /* +0x01c */ void                *NormalRoutine;
    /* +0x020 */ void                *NormalContext;
    /* +0x024 */ void                *SystemArgument1;
    /* +0x028 */ void                *SystemArgument2;
    /* +0x02c */ char                ApcStateIndex;
    /* +0x02d */ char                ApcMode;
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned char       Inserted;
    /* +0x02f */ char                Trailer;
};

struct KWAIT_BLOCK {
    /* +0x000 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    WaitListEntry;
    /* +0x008 */ struct KTHREAD      *Thread;
    /* +0x00c */ void                *Object;
    /* +0x010 */ struct KWAIT_BLOCK *NextWaitBlock;
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned short       WaitKey;
    /* +0x016 */ unsigned short       WaitType;
};

struct KTHREAD {
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header;
    /* +0x010 */ struct LIST_ENTRY      MutantListHead;
    /* +0x018 */ void                  *InitialStack;
    /* +0x01c */ void                  *StackLimit;
    /* +0x020 */ void                  *Teb;
    /* +0x024 */ void                  *TlsArray;
    /* +0x028 */ void                  *KernelStack;
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned char          DebugActive;
    /* +0x02d */ unsigned char          State;
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned char          Alerted[2];
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned char          Iopl;
    /* +0x031 */ unsigned char          NpxState;
    /* +0x032 */ char                  Saturation;
    /* +0x033 */ char                  Priority;
    /* +0x034 */ struct KAPC_STATE      ApcState;
    /* +0x04c */ unsigned long          ContextSwitches;
    /* +0x050 */ unsigned char          IdleSwapBlock;
    /* +0x051 */ unsigned char          Spare0[3];
    /* +0x054 */ long                  WaitStatus;
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned char          WaitIrql;
    /* +0x059 */ char                  WaitMode;
    /* +0x05a */ unsigned char          WaitNext;
    /* +0x05b */ unsigned char          WaitReason;
    /* +0x05c */ struct KWAIT_BLOCK     *WaitBlockList;
    /* +0x060 */ struct LIST_ENTRY      WaitListEntry;
    /* +0x068 */ unsigned long          WaitTime;
    /* +0x06c */ char                  BasePriority;
    /* +0x06d */ unsigned char          DecrementCount;
    /* +0x06e */ char                  PriorityDecrement;
    /* +0x06f */ char                  Quantum;
    /* +0x070 */ struct KWAIT_BLOCK     WaitBlock[4];
    /* +0x0d0 */ void                  *LegoData;
    /* +0x0d4 */ unsigned long          KernelApcDisable;
    /* +0x0d8 */ unsigned long          UserAffinity;
    /* +0x0dc */ unsigned char          SystemAffinityActive;
    /* +0x0dd */ unsigned char          PowerState;
};

```

```

/* +0x0de */ unsigned char      NpxIrql;
/* +0x0df */ unsigned char      InitialNode;
/* +0x0e0 */ void                *ServiceTable;
/* +0x0e4 */ struct KQUEUE       *Queue;
/* +0x0e8 */ unsigned long      ApcQueueLock;
/* +0x0f0 */ struct KTIMER       Timer;
/* +0x118 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   QueueListEntry;
/* +0x120 */ unsigned long      SoftAffinity;
/* +0x124 */ unsigned long      Affinity;
/* +0x128 */ unsigned char      Preempted;
/* +0x129 */ unsigned char      ProcessReadyQueue;
/* +0x12a */ unsigned char      KernelStackResident;
/* +0x12b */ unsigned char      NextProcessor;
/* +0x12c */ void                *CallbackStack;
/* +0x130 */ void                *Win32Thread;
/* +0x134 */ void                *TrapFrame; /*points to KTRAP_FRAME*/
/* +0x138 */ struct KAPC_STATE   *ApcStatePointer[2];
/* +0x140 */ char                PreviousMode;
/* +0x141 */ unsigned char      EnableStackSwap;
/* +0x142 */ unsigned char      LargeStack;
/* +0x143 */ unsigned char      ResourceIndex;
/* +0x144 */ unsigned long      KernelTime;
/* +0x148 */ unsigned long      UserTime;
/* +0x14c */ struct KAPC_STATE   SavedApcState;
/* +0x164 */ unsigned char      Alertable;
/* +0x165 */ unsigned char      ApcStateIndex;
/* +0x166 */ unsigned char      ApcQueueable;
/* +0x167 */ unsigned char      AutoAlignment;
/* +0x168 */ void                *StackBase;
/* +0x16c */ struct KAPC         SuspendApc;
/* +0x19c */ struct KSEMAPHORE   SuspendSemaphore;
/* +0x1b0 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   ThreadListEntry;
/* +0x1b8 */ char                FreezeCount;
/* +0x1b9 */ char                SuspendCount;
/* +0x1ba */ unsigned char      IdealProcessor;
/* +0x1bb */ unsigned char      DisableBoost;
/* +0x1bc */ long long          Trailer;
};

struct ETHREAD {
/* +0x000 */ struct KTHREAD      Tcb;
/* +0x1c0 */ long long          CreateTime;
/* +0x1c8 */ long long          ExitTime;
/* +0x1d0 */ long              ExitStatus;
/* +0x1d4 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   PostBlockList;
/* +0x1dc */ void                *TerminationPort;
/* +0x1e0 */ unsigned long      ActiveTimerListLock;
/* +0x1e4 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   ActiveTimerListHead;
/* +0x1ec */ struct CLIENT_ID    Cid;
/* +0x1f4 */ struct KSEMAPHORE   LpcReplySemaphore;
/* +0x208 */ void                *LpcReplyMessage;
/* +0x20c */ void                *ImpersonationInfo;
/* +0x210 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   IrpList;
/* +0x218 */ unsigned long      TopLevelIrp;
/* +0x21c */ void                *DeviceToVerify;
/* +0x220 */ struct EPROCESS     *ThreadsProcess;
/* +0x224 */ void                *StartAddress;
};

```

```

/* +0x228 */ void *Win32StartAddress;
/* +0x22c */ struct LIST_ENTRY ThreadListEntry;
/* +0x234 */ unsigned long RundownProtect;
/* +0x238 */ unsigned long ThreadLock;
/* +0x23c */ unsigned long LpcReplyMessageId;
/* +0x240 */ unsigned long ReadClusterSize;
/* +0x244 */ unsigned long GrantedAccess;
/* +0x248 */ unsigned long CrossThreadFlags;
/* +0x24c */ unsigned long SameThreadPassiveFlags;
/* +0x250 */ unsigned long SameThreadApcFlags;
/* +0x254 */ unsigned char ForwardClusterOnly;
/* +0x255 */ unsigned char DisablePageFaultClustering;
};

__END_DECLS

#endif

```

APPENDIX B. SOURCE CODE

A. EPROC.C

```

/*****
File eprocess.c
Version 1.0
Author Jared Stimson

Description: This is a tool used to search for processes using various
methods. It can be used to gather information from the image about
running processes.
*****/

#include<stdlib.h>
#include<stdio.h>
#include<string.h>
#include<time.h>
#include<io.h>
#include<windows.h>
#include<ctype.h>
#include<unistd.h>
#include"win32structs.h"

#define KERNEL_OFFSET          0x80000000
#define sizeof_proc           0x260
#define sizeof_thrd           0x258
#define PAGE_SIZE              0x1000
#define TOTAL_TYPES           32

int PAGEFILE = 0;

/*****
Prints the usage statement.
Input: None
Output: Usage Statement
*****/
void print_usage(){
    fprintf (stderr, "Usage: ./eprocess2DEC07.exe option <imageFile>
<args>\n"
            " -l Walk active process list\n"
            " -s Scan image for process structures\n"
            " -t Translates Virtual to Physical Address\n"
            " -d Dump process information\n"
            " -i Identify Operating System\n"
            " -p Gets the number of pages in memory\n"
            " -m Dump Process Memory\n");
}

/*****
Convert the hex string to int.
Input: Hex String
Output: int
*****/
```



```

unsigned int hstr_i(char *cptr){
    unsigned int i, j = 0;
    while (cptr && *cptr && isxdigit(*cptr)){
        i = *cptr++ - '0';
        if (9 < i)
            i -= 7;
        j <= 4;
        j |= (i & 0x0f);
    }
    return(j);
}

/*****
Convert the Windows time format to Unix format and convert the Unix
time
to GMT with the existing Linux Time library functions.

    Unix    epoch is 1970-01-01 00:00:00 resolution is seconds
    Windows epoch is 1601-01-01 00:00:00 resolution is 100ns
*****/
void win_time(long long winTime, char date[]){
    long unixTime = 0;
    unixTime = (long long) (winTime/10000000) - (long long)
11644473600ULL;
    strftime(date,32,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z",gmtime(&unixTime));
}

/*****
Translates virtual address to a valid physical address, if the virtual
address is mapped to a physical address.
Input: Long, Page Directory Base, File descriptor, Size of file.
Output: Pyisical offset of virtual address (long)
*****/
long virtual_to_physical(long ptr32, long pageDirBase, FILE * in,long
size) {
    if(size > 256000000){
        if((ptr32 & 0xf0000000) <= 0x80000000 )
            return ptr32 - KERNEL_OFFSET;
    }
    unsigned long pageDirectoryIndex = ptr32 & 0xffc00000;
    pageDirectoryIndex = pageDirectoryIndex >> 22;
    unsigned long pageTableIndex = ptr32 & 0x003ff000;
    pageTableIndex = pageTableIndex >> 12;
    unsigned long byteIndex = ptr32 & 0x00000fff;
    ptr32 = pageDirBase + pageDirectoryIndex * 4;
    fseek(in,ptr32,SEEK_SET);
    fread(&ptr32,4,1,in);
    if( (ptr32 & 0x01) || ((ptr32 & 0xc00) == 0) || ((ptr32 & 0xc00)
== 0x8)) {
        ptr32 = (ptr32 & 0xfffff000) + pageTableIndex * 4;
        if(ptr32 == 0) return -1;
        fseek(in,ptr32,SEEK_SET);
        fread(&ptr32,4,1,in);
        if((ptr32 & 0x01) || ((ptr32 & 0xc00) == 0) || ((ptr32 &
0xc00) == 0x8)) {
            ptr32 = (ptr32 & 0xfffff000) + byteIndex;
            return ptr32;
        }
    }
}

```

```

        } else return -1;
    } else return -1;
}

/*****
Returns the page Table Base.
Input: Pointer to Page Table Base
Output: Contents of PTB
*****/
long get_PTB(long ptr32) {
    long pageTableBase = 0;
    if((ptr32 & 1)){
        pageTableBase = ptr32 & 0xfffff000;
        return pageTableBase;
    }
    else {
        if(!(ptr32 & 0xc00)){
            if((ptr32 & 0x1e) == 0){
                pageTableBase = (ptr32 & 0xfffff000);
                if(!pageTableBase)
                    return 0;
                pageTableBase = pageTableBase + 1;
                return pageTableBase;
            } else
                return 3;
        }
        if(ptr32 & 0x400)
            pageTableBase = pageTableBase + 2;
    }
    return 4;
}

/*****
Returns the page Base Address.
Input: Pointer to Page Base Address
Output: Contents of Page Base Address
*****/
long get_PBA(long ptr32) {
    long pageBaseAddr = 0;
    if(ptr32 & 0x100){
        return 5;
    }
    if((ptr32 & 1) || ((ptr32 & 0xc00) == 0x800)){
        pageBaseAddr = ptr32 & 0xfffff000;
        return pageBaseAddr;
    } else {
        if((ptr32 & 0xc00) == 0){
            if((ptr32 & 0x1e) == 0){
                pageBaseAddr = ptr32 & 0xfffff000;
                if(!pageBaseAddr)
                    return 0;
                pageBaseAddr = pageBaseAddr + 1;
                return pageBaseAddr;
            } else
                return 3;
        }
        if(ptr32 & 0x400)

```

```

        return 2;
    }
    return 4;
}

/*****
Convert unicode string to ascii string and put it in tempString.
Input: unicode string
Output: ascii string
*****/
void unicode_to_ascii(char *string, unsigned short length) {
    if( length <= 0 )
        return;
    int m;
    char *tempString = malloc(length/2);
    for(m=0;m<length;m+=2) {
        memcpy(tempString+m/2,string+m,1);
    }
    memset(string,0,length);
    memcpy(string,tempString,length/2);
    free(tempString);
    return;
}

/*****
Compares 2 4-byte numbers for greater than, less than, or equal to
condition.
Input: 2 numbers
Output: -1,0,1
*****/
int longcmp( const void *n1, const void *n2 ) {
    unsigned long a = *(unsigned long *)n1;
    unsigned long b = *(unsigned long *)n2;

    return (a < b) ? -1 : ((a == b) ? 0 : 1);
}

/*****
Used to lookup the machine type for an image.
Input: machine number, empty string
Output: machine name
*****/
void lookup_machine(int machineNumber, char machineName[]){
    switch (machineNumber) {
        case 0x014c:
            strcpy(machineName,"IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386");
            break;
        case 0x014d:
            strcpy(machineName,"IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I860");
            break;
        case 0x0200:
            strcpy(machineName,"IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64");
            break;
        case 0x8664:
            strcpy(machineName,"IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64");
            break;
        default:

```

```

        strcpy(machineName, "Machine Unknown");
        break;
    }
}

/*****
Returns String with file header characteristic information.
Input: Empty string
Output: Characteristics of file image
*****/
void get_file_header_characteristics(int charsIn, char
characteristics[]){
    if(charsIn & 0x0001)
        strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0002)
        strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0004)
        strcat(characteristics,
"\tIMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0008)
        strcat(characteristics,
"\tIMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0010)
        strcat(characteristics,
"\tIMAGE_FILE_AGGRESIVE_WS_TRIM\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0020)
        strcat(characteristics,
"\tIMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0080)
        strcat(characteristics,
"\tIMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_LO\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0100)
        strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0200)
        strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_DEBUG_STRIPPED\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0400)
        strcat(characteristics,
"\tIMAGE_FILE_REMOVABLE_RUN_FROM_SWAP\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x0800)
        strcat(characteristics,
"\tIMAGE_FILE_NET_RUN_FROM_SWAP\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x1000)
        strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x2000)
        strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_DLL\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x4000)
        strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_UP_SYSTEM_ONLY\n");
    if(charsIn & 0x8000)
        strcat(characteristics,
"\tIMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_HI\n");
    strcat(characteristics, "");
}

/*****
Returns String with Optional Header Subsystem Information.
Input: Empty string
Output: File subsystem information

```

```

*****/
void get_optional_header_subsystem(int subIn, char subSystem[]){
    switch (subIn) {
        case 0:
            strcpy(subSystem, "IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_UNKNOWN");
            break;
        case 1:
            strcpy(subSystem, "IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE");
            break;
        case 2:
            strcpy(subSystem, "IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI");
            break;
        case 3:
            strcpy(subSystem, "IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI");
            break;
        case 5:
            strcpy(subSystem, "IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_OS2_CUI");
            break;
        case 7:
            strcpy(subSystem, "IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_POSIX_CUI");
            break;
        case 8:
            strcpy(subSystem, "IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE_WINDOWS");
            break;
        case 9:
            strcpy(subSystem, "IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CE_GUI");
            break;
        case 14:
            strcpy(subSystem, "IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_XBOX");
            break;
        default:
            strcpy(subSystem, "Machine Unknown");
            break;
    }
}

/*****
Prints Data Directory Information
Input: Image Optional Header
Output: Data Directory Information

Directory Entries
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT          0
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT         1
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE       2
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION     3
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY      4
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC     5
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG         6
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT     7
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR     8
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS           9
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG  10

*****/
/

```

```

void print_data_directories(struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER *optHeader){
    printf("\n\t\tData Directory Information\n");
    printf("\n%-27s      %-10s      %-10s\n", "Data Directory",
"RVA", "Size");
    printf("%-27s      %-10s      %-10s\n", "-----", "--
-", "----");
    char directory[11][32] = {"Export Directory", "Import
Directory", "Resource Directory",
"Exception Directory", "Security
Directory", "Base Relocation Table",
"Debug Directory", "Description
String", "Machine Value (MIPS GP)",
"TLS Directory", "Load
Configuration Directory"};
    int i = 0;
    for(i;i < 11; i++){
        if((optHeader->DataDirectory[i].VirtualAddress > 0)
&& (optHeader->DataDirectory[i].Size > 0))
            printf("%-32s0x%.8x      0x%.8x\n",
                directory[i],
                optHeader-
>DataDirectory[i].VirtualAddress,
                optHeader->DataDirectory[i].Size);
    }
}

```

```

/*****
Prints section header information.
Input: File, offset, Image section header
Output: Section information
*****/

```

```

void print_section_data(FILE *in, int offset, struct
_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sectHeader){
    fseek(in,offset,SEEK_SET);
    fread(sectHeader,sizeof(struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER),1,in);
    memcpy(sectHeader->Name + 8,"",1);
    printf("%-9s0x%.8x 0x%.8x 0x%.8x 0x%.8x 0x%.8x\n",
        sectHeader->Name,
        sectHeader->Misc.VirtualSize,
        sectHeader->VirtualAddress,
        sectHeader->SizeOfRawData,
        sectHeader->PointerToRawData,
        sectHeader->Characteristics);
}

```

```

/*****
Calculates statistics about memory usage.
Input: Eprocess block, File, page file, size
Output: Memory Stats
*****/

```

```

void get_memory_stats(struct EPROCESS *eprocess, FILE *mem, FILE
*pageFile, int size){
    long PDE[1024];
    long PTE[1024];
    long pageTableBase = 0;
    int i = 0;
    int valid = 0;

```



```

        valid, prototype, global, paged, unknown);
}
/*****
Dumps the processes memory pages from the image and optionally the
paging
file if available using the Page Directories.
*****/
void get_memory(struct EPROCESS *eprocess, FILE *mem, FILE *pageFile,
int size){
    char pname[24];
    char processID[8];
    char fname[56];
    char iname[56];
    char directory[24] = "mkdir ";
    char deldir[24] = "rm -rf ";
    byte buffer[4096];
    long pid = 0;
    long PDE[1024];
    long PTE[1024];
    long pageTableBase = 0;
    char vAddr[20];
    int i = 0;
    int valid = 0;
    int paged = 0;
    int zero = 0;
    int global = 0;
    int prototype = 0;
    int unknown = 0;
    FILE *fd1 = NULL;
    FILE *fd2 = NULL;
    fseek(mem,eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],SEEK_SET);
    fread(PDE,4096,1,mem);
    pid = (long)eprocess->UniqueProcessId;
    snprintf(processID,sizeof(processID),"\x5f%lu",pid);
    strncpy(pname,eprocess->ImageFileName,sizeof(pname));
    strncat(pname,processID,sizeof(pname));
    strncat(directory,pname,sizeof(directory)-strlen(directory));
    if(fopen(pname,"r") != NULL ) {
        fprintf(stderr,"Error: Directory %s already
exists!\n",pname);
        exit(0);
    }
    system(directory);
    strncpy(fname,pname,sizeof(fname));
        strncat(fname,"/",1);
    strncat(fname,pname,sizeof(fname)-strlen(fname));
    strncpy(iname,fname,sizeof(fname));
    strncat(fname,".dmp",4);
    strncat(iname,".txt",4);
    fd1 = fopen(fname,"wb");
    fd2 = fopen(iname,"wb");
    if( fd1 == NULL ){
        fprintf(stderr,"Error: Could not open %s!\n",fname);
        exit(0);
    }
    if( fd2 == NULL ){
        fprintf(stderr,"Error: Could not open %s!\n",iname);

```



```

        exit(0);
    }
    fprintf(stderr, "Creating Working Set Files, Please Wait\n");
    for(i; i < 1024; i++){
        pageTableBase = get_PTB(PDE[i]);
        if(pageTableBase != 0) {
            switch (pageTableBase & 0xf) {
                case 0:
                    fseek(mem, pageTableBase, SEEK_SET);
                    fread(PTE, 4096, 1, mem);
                    break;
                case 1:
                    if(pageFile != NULL) {
                        fseek(pageFile, pageTableBase, SEEK_SET);
                        fread(PTE, 4096, 1, pageFile);
                    } else
                        pageTableBase = 0;
                    break;
                default:
                    pageTableBase = 0;
                    break;
            }
            if(pageTableBase != 0) {
                int j = 0;
                long pageBaseAddr = 0;
                for(j; j < 1024; j++){
                    pageBaseAddr = get_PBA(PTE[j]);
                    if(pageBaseAddr != 0) {
                        sprintf(vAddr, "%8x", ((i << 22) + (j
<< 12)));
                        switch (pageBaseAddr & 0xf) {
                            case 0:

                                fseek(mem, pageBaseAddr, SEEK_SET);

                                fread(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), mem);

                                fwrite(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), fd1);

                                fprintf(fd2, "%s\n", vAddr);

                                    valid++;
                                    break;
                                case 1:
                                    if(pageFile != NULL){

                                        fseek(pageFile, pageBaseAddr, SEEK_SET);

                                        fread(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), pageFile);

                                        fwrite(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), fd1);

                                        fprintf(fd2, "%s\n", vAddr);

                                            }
                                            paged++;
                                            break;
                                case 2:

```



```

void print_dos_header(FILE * in,struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
*dosHeader,long imgBaseOffset){
    printf("\n\t\tDOS Header\n");
    printf("e_magic:                                0x%x\n",dosHeader->e_magic);
    printf("e_lfanew:                                0x%x\n",dosHeader->e_lfanew);
    int ntHeader = 0;
    fseek(in,(long) imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew, SEEK_SET);
    fread(&ntHeader,2,1,in);
    printf("SIGNATURE:                                0x%x\n",ntHeader);
}

/*****
Prints File Header information.
Input: Image File Header
Output: Prints file header information
*****/
void print_file_header(struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER *fileHeader){
    char machineName[] = "Machine Unknown";
    char timeStamp[32];
    char characteristics[256];
    strcpy(characteristics,"\n");
    lookup_machine(fileHeader->Machine,machineName);
    printf("\n\t\tFile Header\n");
    printf("Machine Type:                                %s\n", machineName);
    printf("Number of Sections:                          %d\n", fileHeader->NumberOfSections);
    win_time(fileHeader->TimeDateStamp, timeStamp);
    printf("Time Stamp:                                %s\n", timeStamp);
    printf("Size of Optional Header:                      0x%x (%d bytes)\n",
fileHeader->SizeOfOptionalHeader, fileHeader->SizeOfOptionalHeader);
    get_file_header_characteristics(fileHeader->Characteristics,characteristics);
    printf("Characteristics: \n%s\n", characteristics);
}

/*****
Prints the process image information.
Input: Eprocess block, file, size, binary verbose
Output: kernel image information
*****/
void print_image_info(struct EPROCESS *eprocess, FILE * in, long size,
int b){
    struct PEB *peb;
    int peb_offset = 0;
    int imgBaseOffset = 0;
    int address = 0;
    byte buf[1000];
    peb = malloc(sizeof(struct PEB));
    peb_offset = virtual_to_physical((long) eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],in, size);
    fseek(in,(long) peb_offset,SEEK_SET);
    fread(peb,sizeof(struct PEB),1,in);
    imgBaseOffset = virtual_to_physical((long) peb->ImageBaseAddress,eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],in, size);
    if(imgBaseOffset != -1){

```

```

        printf("\nImage Base Offset:
0x%x\n",imgBaseOffset);
        struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dosHeader;
        dosHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER));
        fseek(in,(long) imgBaseOffset, SEEK_SET);
        fread(dosHeader,64,1,in);
        print_dos_header(in,dosHeader,imgBaseOffset);
        struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER *fileHeader;
        fileHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER));
        fseek(in,(long) imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew + 4,
SEEK_SET);
        fread(fileHeader,sizeof(struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER),1,in);
        print_file_header(fileHeader);
        struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER *optHeader;
        optHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER));
        fseek(in,imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew +
24,SEEK_SET);
        fread(optHeader,sizeof(struct
_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER),1,in);
        print_optional_header(optHeader);
        print_data_directories(optHeader);
        printf("\n\t\tSection Information\n");
        struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sectHeader[fileHeader-
>NumberOfSections];
        printf("\nName      Virt Size   Virt Addr   rData Ofs
rData Size  Char\n");
        printf("-----      -----      -----      -----
-----
----  ----\n");
        int i = 0;
        for(i;i < fileHeader->NumberOfSections;i++){
            sectHeader[i] = malloc(sizeof(struct
_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
            print_section_data(in, imgBaseOffset + dosHeader-
>e_lfanew + 24 + 96 + 8*optHeader->NumberOfRvaAndSizes + 40*i,
sectHeader[i]);
            if(b == 1) {
                int numPages = sectHeader[i]-
>SizeOfRawData/0x1000;
                printf("\nThere are %d pages in this
section\n\n", numPages);
                int j;
                for(j = 0;j < numPages;j++){
                    int vAddr = (long) peb->ImageBaseAddress
+ (long) sectHeader[i]->VirtualAddress + 0x1000*j;
                    int pageAddr = virtual_to_physical((long)
vAddr,eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0], in, size);
                    if(pageAddr != -1){
                        printf("0x%.8x (0x%.8x)\n", vAddr,
pageAddr);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

/*****

```

```

Prints a report of information found in the Eprocess block.
Input: Eprocess block, count, offset
Output: Process information
*****/
void print_process_report(struct EPROCESS *eprocess, int count, int
offset) {
    char created[32];
    win_time(eprocess->CreateTime, created);
    printf("%3d |%-20s|%8d|%8d|%25s| %10.8p | %10.8p |\n",
        count,
        eprocess->ImageFileName,
        eprocess->UniqueProcessId,
        eprocess->InheritedFromUniqueProcessId,
        created,
        offset,
        eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0]);
    fflush(NULL);
}

/*****
Calculates the size of the Image file. Used to determin the VAT
method.
Input: Image file
Output: Size of file
*****/
long file_size(FILE *f){
    long cur_pos, length;
    cur_pos = ftell(f);
    fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); // set pointer to end of file
    length=ftell(f); // offset in bytes from file's beginning
    fseek(f, cur_pos, SEEK_SET); // restore original position
    return length;
}

/*****
Checks if memory block contains a valid process.
Input: Eprocess block
Output: 1 if not process, 0 if it is
*****/
int check_process(struct EPROCESS *procTest){
    int check = 1;
    if((procTest->Pcb.Header.Type != 0x03) || (procTest-
>Pcb.Header.Size != 0x1b)){
        check = 0;
    } else if (procTest->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0] == 0){
        check = 0;
    } else if ((procTest->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0] %
0x1000) != 0){
        check = 0;
    } else if(((long) procTest-
>Pcb.ThreadListHead.Flink < KERNEL_OFFSET) || ((long) procTest-
>Pcb.ThreadListHead.Blink < KERNEL_OFFSET)){
        check = 0;
    } else if((procTest-
>WorkingSetLock.Event.Type != 0x01) || (procTest-
>WorkingSetLock.Event.Size != 0x04)){
        check = 0;
    }
}

```

```

        }
    return check;
}

/*****
Scans memory image for the active process head.  Used when enumerating
process list.
Input: File and offset to start search
Output: Offset to active process head
*****/
int get_active_process_head(FILE * in, int offset){
    int check = 1;
    struct EPROCESS *procTest;
    procTest = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));
    while(!feof(in)){
        check = 1;
        fseek(in,offset,SEEK_SET);
        fread(procTest,SIZEOF_PROC,1,in);
        if((check_process(procTest) == 1) && (strcmp(procTest->ImageFileName,"System") == 0)){
            free(procTest);
            return offset;
        }
        offset +=8;
    }
    free(procTest);
    return 0;
}

/*****
Prints process image information to the screen.
Input: File, size, offset to process block as ascii hex, binary
pagefile present
Output: Prints process reports
*****/
void dump_process_image(FILE * in,long size, char *process_address, int
b) {
    struct EPROCESS *procCounter;
    int count = 0;
    long procAddr = hstr_i(process_address); //0x21fe020 notepad.exe
laptopMem.dump
    procCounter = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));
    fseek(in,procAddr,SEEK_SET);
    fread(procCounter,sizeof(struct EPROCESS),1,in);
    if(check_process(procCounter) == 1){
        printf("      |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s
|\n","Name","Pid","PPid","      Time","  Offset","  PDB");
        printf("      -----
----- \n");
        print_process_report(procCounter, count, procAddr);
        print_image_info(procCounter, in, size, b);
        free(procCounter);
        printf("\n\n");
    }
    else {
        printf("Process not Found!");
        printf("\n\n");
    }
}

```

```

    }
}

/*****
Uses the location of the Kernel Executable Image to identify which OS
is running.
Input: Image Base Address
Output: Operating System
*****/
void identify_kernel(long imgBaseOffset) {
    switch (imgBaseOffset) {
        case 0x400000:
            printf("Windows 2000\n");
            break;
        case 0x4d4000:
            printf("Windows XP\n");
            break;
        case 0x4d0000:
            printf("Windows XP\n");
            break;
        case 0x4d5000:
            printf("Windows XP\n");
            break;
        case 0xa02000:
            printf("Windows XP\n");
            break;
        case 0x4d7000:
            printf("Windows XP Service Pack 2\n");
            break;
        case 0x4de000:
            printf("Windows 2003\n");
            break;
        case 0x800000:
            printf("Windows 2003 Service Pack 1\n");
            break;
        case 0x2000000:
            printf("Windows Vista Beta 2\n");
            break;
        case 0x1800000:
            printf("Windows Vista RC1\n");
            break;
    }
}

/*****
Looks for Kernel Address Space to identify the Operating System.
Input: File, Size, Image Base Address, binary verbose
Output: Operating System and Kernel Data
*****/
void check_kernel(FILE * in, long size, long imgBaseOffset, int b) {
    struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dosHeader;
    dosHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER));
    fseek(in, (long) imgBaseOffset, SEEK_SET);
    fread(dosHeader, 64, 1, in);
    if(dosHeader->e_magic == 0x5a4d){
        identify_kernel(imgBaseOffset);
        if(b == 1) {

```

```

        printf("\nImage Base Offset:
0x%x\n",imgBaseOffset);
        print_dos_header(in,dosHeader,imgBaseOffset);
        struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER *fileHeader;
        fileHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct
_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER));
        fseek(in,(long) imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew +
4, SEEK_SET);
        fread(fileHeader,sizeof(struct
_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER),1,in);
        print_file_header(fileHeader);
        struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER *optHeader;
        optHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct
_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER));
        fseek(in,imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew +
24,SEEK_SET);
        fread(optHeader,sizeof(struct
_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER),1,in);
        print_optional_header(optHeader);
        print_data_directories(optHeader);
        printf("\n\t\t\tSection Information\n");
        struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sectHeader[fileHeader-
>NumberOfSections];
        printf("\nName      Virt Size   Virt Addr   rData ofs
rData Size  Char\n");
        printf("-----      -
-----      -
-----      -
-----\n");
        int i = 0;
        for(i;i < fileHeader->NumberOfSections;i++){
            sectHeader[i] = malloc(sizeof(struct
_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
            print_section_data(in, imgBaseOffset +
dosHeader->e_lfanew + 24 + 96 + 8*optHeader->NumberOfRvaAndSizes +
40*i, sectHeader[i]);
        }
    }
    free(dosHeader);
}

/*****
Performs OS detection of a RAM dump by locating the kernel base address
and parsing the ResourceTable from the PE file located at that address.
Input: File, Size, binary verbose
Output: Operating System
*****/
void osid(FILE * in,long size,int b){
    int os_type[10] =
{0x80400000,0x804d4000,0x804d0000,0x804d5000,0x80a02000,0x804d7000,0x80
4de000,0x80800000,0x82000000,0x81800000};
    int i = 0;
    int k_address = 0;
    for(i;i < 10;i++){
        k_address = os_type[i] - KERNEL_OFFSET;
        check_kernel(in, size, k_address, b);
    }
}

```



```

/*****
Gets the process located at the process address from the raw memory
image.
Input: File, Size, Process Offset, empty Eprocess Block
Output: Eprocess block
*****/
void get_process(FILE *in,long size, int procAddr, struct EPROCESS
*proc) {
    fseek(in,procAddr,SEEK_SET);
    fread(proc,sizeof(struct EPROCESS),1,in);
}

/*****
Dumps the process memory from the Page Directory.
Input: File, Page File, Size, Process offset as char
Output: Process report and memory contents to file
*****/
void dump_process_memory(FILE *in, FILE *pageFile, long size, char
*process_address) {
    long procAddr = hstr_i(process_address); //0x21fe020 notepad.exe
laptopMem.dump
    struct EPROCESS *proc;
    proc = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));
    get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc);
    if(check_process(proc) == 1){
        printf("      |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s
|\n","Name","Pid","PPid","      Time","  Offset","    PDB");
        printf("      -----
----- \n");
        print_process_report(proc, 0, procAddr);
        printf("\n");
        get_memory(proc, in, pageFile, size);
        free(proc);
        printf("\n\n");
    }
    else {
        printf("Process not Found!");
        printf("\n\n");
    }
}

/*****
Gets the number of pages in memory.
Input: File, Page File, Size, Process offset as char
Output: Memory Stats
*****/
void get_process_memory_stats(FILE *in,FILE *pageFile, long size, char
*process_address) {
    long procAddr = hstr_i(process_address);
    struct EPROCESS *proc;
    proc = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));
    get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc);
    if(check_process(proc) == 1){
        printf("      |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s
|\n","Name","Pid","PPid","      Time","  Offset","    PDB");

```

```

        printf("
-----
\n");
    print_process_report(proc, 0, procAddr);
    get_memory_stats(proc, in, pageFile, size);
    free(proc);
    printf("\n\n");
}
else {
    printf("Process not Found!");
    printf("\n\n");
}
}

/*****
Translates Virtual addresses to Physical Addresses.
Input: File, Size, Process offset as char
Output: Physical offset
*****/
void translate_address(FILE *in, long size, char *pAddr, char *vAddr) {
    long procAddr = hstr_i(pAddr);
    long virtAddr = hstr_i(vAddr);
    struct EPROCESS *proc;
    if(virtAddr == 0){
        printf("Not a Valid Address\n");
        exit(0);
    }
    proc = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));
    get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc);
    if(check_process(proc) == 1){
        printf("
|-20s|8s|8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s
\n", "Name", "Pid", "PPid", "
Time", "
Offset", "
PDB");
        printf("
-----
\n");
        print_process_report(proc, 0, procAddr);
        printf("\n");
        printf("Virtual Address:\t\t0x%.8x\n", virtAddr);
        printf("Physical
Address:\t\t0x%.8x\n", virtual_to_physical(virtAddr, proc->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0], in, size));
        free(proc);
        printf("\n\n");
    }
    else {
        printf("Process not Found!");
        printf("\n\n");
    }
}

/*****
Given the pointer to the first process in the active process list, this
function follows the list of active processes. Default value for the
pointer is 0. If a valid process is not found it will continue to
search
the image from the address of the pointer.
Input: File, Size, Process offset
Output: List of processes
*****/

```

```

void process_list(FILE * in,long size,long pAddr) {
    struct EPROCESS *proc;
    int count = 0;
    long procAddr = 0;
    procAddr = get_active_process_head(in, pAddr);
    proc = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));
    get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc);
    if((check_process(proc) == 1) && (strcmp(proc->ImageFileName,"System") == 0)) {
        printf("      |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s\n",
"Name", "Pid", "PPid", "      Time", "  Offset", "    PDB");
        printf("      -----\n");
        print_process_report(proc, count, procAddr);
        while(1) {
            count++;
            procAddr = virtual_to_physical((long) proc->ActiveProcessLinks.Flink,proc->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],in, size)-0x88;
            get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc);
            if(check_process(proc) != 1)
                break;
            print_process_report(proc, count, procAddr);
        }
    } else {
        printf("System process not found");
        exit(0);
    }
    free(proc);
    printf("\n\n");
}

```

```

/*****
Identifies the name and size of the memory image.
Input: File, path to image, size
Output: Name and Size
*****/
void identify_image(FILE * in, char *name,long size){
    char * format =
        "\nImage name: %21s\n"
        "Image Size: %12d Bytes\n\n";
    printf(format, name, size);
}

```

```

/*****
Scans the image for process objects.
Input: file and size
Output: process scan
*****/
void process_scan(FILE * in,long size) {
    int count = 0;
    int offset = 0;
    struct EPROCESS *procTest;
    procTest = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS));
    printf("      |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s\n",
"Name", "Pid", "PPid", "      Time", "  Offset", "    PDB");

```

```

printf("-----
----- \n");
while(!feof(in)){
    get_process(in, size, offset, procTest);
    if(check_process(procTest) == 1){
        print_process_report(procTest, count, offset);
        count++;
    }
    offset +=8;
}
free(procTest);
printf("\n\n");
}

/*****
Main Function.
*****/
int main( int argc, char **argv ) {

    int c = 0;
    FILE * imgFile = NULL;
    FILE * pageFile = NULL;
    long procAddr = 0;
    if(argc < 3){
        print_usage();
        exit(0);
    }
    imgFile = fopen(argv[2],"rb");
    if( imgFile == NULL ){
        fprintf(stderr,"Error: Could not open
%s!\n",argv[2]);
        exit(0);
    }
    int fileSize = file_size(imgFile);
    identify_image(imgFile,argv[2],fileSize);
    while ((c = getopt (argc, argv, "lstdipm")) != -1)
        switch (c) {
            case 'l':
                if(argc > 3){
                    procAddr = hstr_i(argv[3]);
                }
                process_list(imgFile, fileSize, procAddr);
                break;
            case 's':
                process_scan(imgFile, fileSize);
                break;
            case 't':
                if(argc > 4){
                    translate_address(imgFile, fileSize,
argv[3],argv[4]);
                } else print_usage();
                break;
            case 'd':
                if((argc > 4) && (strcmp(argv[4],"-pages") ==
0)) {
                    dump_process_image(imgFile, fileSize,
argv[3], 1);

```

```

                                } else dump_process_image(imgFile, fileSize,
argv[3], 0);
                                break;
case 'i':
    if((argc > 3) && (strcmp(argv[3],"-verbose") ==
0)) {
        osid(imgFile, fileSize, 1);
    } else osid(imgFile, fileSize, 0);
    break;
case 'p':
    get_process_memory_stats(imgFile, pageFile,
fileSize, argv[3]);
    break;
case 'm':
    if(argc > 4){
        pageFile = fopen(argv[4],"rb");
    }
    dump_process_memory(imgFile, pageFile,
fileSize, argv[3]);
    break;
default:
    print_usage();
    break;
    }
fclose(imgFile);
return 0;
}

```

APPENDIX C. TEST RESULTS

A. TEST RESULTS

Eproc.exe has been tested against WPMOA [7] and Volatility [4]. The table below shows the results of the tests.

Test		Eproc	WPMOA [7]	Volatility [4]
List		38 procs	38 procs	38 procs
Scan		78 procs	N/A	75 procs
Mem dump	Notepad.exe	87 MB	20 MB	N/A

These tests show that processes that have been exited or removed from the active process list by some other means can be found by scanning the image for process block structures and that it gives a better picture of what was running on the system at the time the image was taken. This is a more forensically sound method of finding the processes in a memory image. The next test is the memory retrieved using Eproc over WPMOA [7]. The later used the working set list to find memory pages used by a process and only found 20 MB of memory for notepad.exe. Eproc on the other hand dumps all non-global pages from the page directory and when combined with the more robust method of address translation mentioned above was able to locate 87 MB of data. Improvements over WPMOA are an algorithm built in that will locate the Active Process List head, a scanning function used to locate processes not it the list, processing of PE header information, the ability to locate data in the swap file if available.

B. SAMPLE OUTPUT

1. Process List

Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump
Image Size: 536776704 Bytes

	Name	Pid	PPid	Time	Offset	PDB
0	System	4	0	2009-04-22 19:24:48	0x023ca830	0x00039000
1	smss.exe	1628	4	2007-08-24 22:10:52	0x021bb8f8	0x18a12000
2	csrss.exe	1700	1628	2007-08-24 22:10:54	0x020adc08	0x1ac4b000
3	winlogon.exe	1724	1628	2007-08-24 22:11:01	0x0228b2c8	0x1efb0000
4	services.exe	1768	1724	2007-08-24 22:11:02	0x022851f8	0x1f0fc000
5	lsass.exe	1780	1724	2007-08-24 22:11:02	0x0213dda0	0x1f0b6000
6	svchost.exe	1948	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:05	0x02260c40	0x1f7a8000
7	svchost.exe	1996	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:06	0x02124da0	0x1f8b2000
8	svchost.exe	492	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:06	0x021a1020	0x1fb38000
9	svchost.exe	612	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:06	0x021355f8	0x1fce0000
10	svchost.exe	840	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:07	0x021bfd00	0x0073a000

11	ccSetMgr.exe	1120	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x02123358	0x0394f000
12	explorer.exe	1228	1168	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x02280460	0x08dc3000
13	ccEvtMgr.exe	1248	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x01fae638	0x03f80000
14	spoolsv.exe	1448	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:09	0x020ecbe0	0x0b648000
15	DefWatch.exe	1680	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x01ee4518	0x0c27f000
16	GoogleUpdaterSe	1848	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x01fb9478	0x0c224000
17	mdm.exe	1912	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x0226ac78	0x0c209000
18	svchost.exe	284	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x02105be0	0x0d6f1000
19	Rtvscan.exe	692	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:24	0x01f08be0	0x0d8f5000
20	vmware-authd.ex	728	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x01eecda0	0x0da7b000
21	vmount2.exe	796	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x01f1d258	0x0dc76000
22	vmnat.exe	772	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x01ec9c10	0x0deae000
23	vmnetdhcp.exe	1824	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x01e20a28	0x0df63000
24	vmserverdWin32.	356	1768	2007-08-24 22:12:25	0x01e076a0	0x0f366000
25	alg.exe	3088	1768	2007-08-24 22:12:33	0x01df35e8	0x1186c000
26	ccApp.exe	3580	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:35	0x01e34020	0x12025000
27	VPTray.exe	3812	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:36	0x021e1738	0x1447d000
28	acrotray.exe	3820	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:36	0x01f11da0	0x14e91000
29	jusched.exe	3924	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:40	0x01ef3438	0x131e6000
30	ctfmon.exe	1136	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:42	0x020dd558	0x1411e000
31	GoogleUpdater.e	2300	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:44	0x01de9a68	0x14e8b000
32	FNPLicensingSer	2728	1768	2007-08-24 22:12:50	0x01eef530	0x1c4c8000
33	cmd.exe	984	1228	2007-08-24 22:13:16	0x01fad820	0x03d23000
34	bash.exe	1092	984	2007-08-24 22:13:17	0x01e53020	0x1577a000
35	firefox.exe	2440	1228	2007-08-24 23:24:30	0x01dd3a60	0x0a62d000
36	notepad.exe	720	1228	2007-08-24 23:24:46	0x021fe020	0x0cb45000
37	cmd.exe	2892	1228	2007-08-24 23:25:11	0x01da9248	0x1e3e0000
38	dd.exe	2232	2892	2007-08-24 23:26:55	0x01d7d020	0x0c4aa000

2. Process Scan

Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump

Image Size: 536776704 Bytes

	Name	Pid	PPid	Time	Offset	PDB
0	Idle	0	0	2009-04-22 19:24:48	0x00559080	0x00039000
1	dd.exe	2232	2892	2007-08-24 23:26:55	0x01d7d020	0x0c4aa000
2	cmd.exe	2492	1228	2007-08-24 22:24:48	0x01d846b0	0x07a74000
3	cmd.exe	2892	1228	2007-08-24 23:25:11	0x01da9248	0x1e3e0000
4	bash.exe	2404	1092	2007-08-24 23:18:09	0x01dc8218	0x06c32000
5	firefox.exe	2440	1228	2007-08-24 23:24:30	0x01dd3a60	0x0a62d000
6	GoogleUpdater.e	2300	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:44	0x01de9a68	0x14e8b000
7	alg.exe	3088	1768	2007-08-24 22:12:33	0x01df35e8	0x1186c000
8	vmserverdWin32.	356	1768	2007-08-24 22:12:25	0x01e076a0	0x0f366000
9	vmnetdhcp.exe	1824	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x01e20a28	0x0df63000
10	ccApp.exe	3580	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:35	0x01e34020	0x12025000
11	bash.exe	1092	984	2007-08-24 22:13:17	0x01e53020	0x1577a000
12	vmnat.exe	772	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x01ec9c10	0x0deae000
13	DefWatch.exe	1680	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x01ee4518	0x0c27f000
14	vmware-authd.ex	728	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x01eecda0	0x0da7b000
15	FNPLicensingSer	2728	1768	2007-08-24 22:12:50	0x01eef530	0x1c4c8000
16	jusched.exe	3924	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:40	0x01ef3438	0x131e6000
17	Rtvscan.exe	692	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:24	0x01f08be0	0x0d8f5000
18	acrotray.exe	3820	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:36	0x01f11da0	0x14e91000
19	vmount2.exe	796	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x01f1d258	0x0dc76000
20	cmd.exe	984	1228	2007-08-24 22:13:16	0x01fad820	0x03d23000
21	ccEvtMgr.exe	1248	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x01fae638	0x03f80000
22	GoogleUpdaterSe	1848	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x01fb9478	0x0c224000
23	csrss.exe	1700	1628	2007-08-24 22:10:54	0x020adc08	0x1ac4b000
24	ctfmon.exe	1136	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:42	0x020dd558	0x1411e000
25	spoolsv.exe	1448	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:09	0x020ecbe0	0x0b648000
26	svchost.exe	284	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x02105be0	0x0d6f1000
27	ccSetMgr.exe	1120	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x02123358	0x0394f000
28	svchost.exe	1996	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:06	0x02124da0	0x1f8b2000
29	svchost.exe	612	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:06	0x021355f8	0x1f0e0000
30	lsass.exe	1780	1724	2007-08-24 22:11:02	0x0213dda0	0x1f0b6000
31	svchost.exe	492	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:06	0x021a1020	0x1fb38000
32	smss.exe	1628	4	2007-08-24 22:10:52	0x021bb8f8	0x18a12000

33	svchost.exe	840	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:07	0x021bfda0	0x0073a000
34	VPTray.exe	3812	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:36	0x021e1738	0x1447d000
35	dd.exe	3284	2404	2007-08-24 23:18:09	0x021f30e8	0x1f71f000
36	notepad.exe	720	1228	2007-08-24 23:24:46	0x021fe020	0x0cb45000
37	svchost.exe	1948	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:05	0x0226c40	0x1f7a8000
38	mdm.exe	1912	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x0226ac78	0x0c209000
39	explorer.exe	1228	1168	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x02280460	0x08dc3000
40	services.exe	1768	1724	2007-08-24 22:11:02	0x022851f8	0x1f0fc000
41	winlogon.exe	1724	1628	2007-08-24 22:11:01	0x0228b2c8	0x1efb0000
42	Acrobat.exe	1332	1228	2007-08-24 22:22:37	0x022f27b8	0x0924c000
43	System	4	0	2009-04-22 19:24:48	0x023ca830	0x00039000
44	svchost.exe	1948	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:05	0x0257ec40	0x1f7a8000
45	jusched.exe	3924	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:40	0x03416438	0x131e6000
46	ccSetMgr.exe	1120	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x040b3358	0x0394f000
47	bash.exe	2404	1092	2007-08-24 23:18:09	0x04229218	0x06c32000
48	GoogleUpdaterSe	1848	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x045ad478	0x0c224000
49	notepad.exe	720	1228	2007-08-24 23:24:46	0x046db020	0x0cb45000
50	vmserverdWin32.	356	1768	2007-08-24 22:12:25	0x059886a0	0x0f366000
51	bash.exe	2404	1092	2007-08-24 23:18:09	0x06043218	0x06c32000
52	mdm.exe	1912	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x07488c78	0x0c209000
53	ccEvtMgr.exe	1248	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x08052638	0x03f80000
54	Acrobat.exe	1332	1228	2007-08-24 22:22:37	0x083017b8	0x0924c000
55		4	0	2009-04-22 19:24:48	0x09341998	0x00039000
56	Acrobat.exe	1332	1228	2007-08-24 22:22:37	0x0a7ed7b8	0x0924c000
57	ccSetMgr.exe	1120	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x0a8a3358	0x0394f000
58	ccEvtMgr.exe	1248	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x0a908638	0x03f80000
59		4	0	2009-04-22 19:24:48	0x0ae10998	0x00039000
60	explorer.exe	1228	1168	2007-08-24 22:11:08	0x0ae8e460	0x08dc3000
61	FNPLicensingSer	2728	1768	2007-08-24 22:12:50	0x0b3b2530	0x1c4c8000
62	VPTray.exe	3812	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:36	0x0b47e738	0x1447d000
63	ccApp.exe	3580	1228	2007-08-24 22:12:35	0x0c096020	0x12025000
64	bash.exe	1092	984	2007-08-24 22:13:17	0x0ccc5020	0x1577a000
65		4	0	2009-04-22 19:24:48	0x0cd1f998	0x00039000
66	spoolsv.exe	1448	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:09	0x0d055be0	0x0b648000
67	svchost.exe	492	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:06	0x0e8bc020	0x1fb38000
68	vmware-authd.ex	728	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x0ea4fda0	0x0da7b000
69	csrss.exe	1700	1628	2007-08-24 22:10:54	0x0ed23c08	0x1ac4b000
70	vmnat.exe	772	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x0ee9cc10	0x0deae000
71	svchost.exe	284	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x0f08fbc0	0x0d6f1000
72	bash.exe	2404	1092	2007-08-24 23:18:09	0x0f6a5218	0x06c32000
73	vmount2.exe	796	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:25	0x0fa90258	0x0dc76000
74	winlogon.exe	1724	1628	2007-08-24 22:11:01	0x0fcc692c8	0x1efb0000
75	svchost.exe	612	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:06	0x0fccf5f8	0x1fce0000
76	GoogleUpdaterSe	1848	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x0feee478	0x0c224000
77	DefWatch.exe	1680	1768	2007-08-24 22:11:18	0x0ff97518	0x0c27f000
78	notepad.exe	720	1228	2007-08-24 23:24:46	0x10c9e020	0x0cb45000

3. Process Information

Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump
Image Size: 536776704 Bytes

Name	Pid	PPid	Time	Offset	PDB
0 bash.exe	1092	984	2007-08-24 22:13:17	0x01e53020	0x1577a000

Image Base Offset: 0x1b393000

DOS Header

e_magic: 0x5a4d
e_lfanew: 0x80
SIGNATURE: 0x4550

File Header

Machine Type: IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
Number of Sections: 5
Time Stamp: 2009-04-22 19:26:45
Size of Optional Header: 0xe0 (224 bytes)
Characteristics:


```

IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED
IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED
IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED
IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE
IMAGE_FILE_DEBUG_STRIPPED

```

Optional Header

```

Magic Number:      0x10b
Subsystem:         IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI
Image Base Address: 0x400000
Address of Entry Point: 0x1000 (RVA)
Code Base Address: 0x1000 (RVA)
Data Base Address: 0x5b000 (RVA)
Major OS Version:  4
Minor OS Version:  0
Size of Stack Reserved: 0x200000 (2097152 bytes)
Number of RVA and Sizes: 0x10

```

Data Directory Information

Data Directory	RVA	Size
-----	---	----
Import Directory	0x00076000	0x00003e3c

Section Information

Name	Virt Size	Virt Addr	rData Ofs	rData Size	Char
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	----
.text	0x00059200	0x00001000	0x00059400	0x00000400	0xe0000020
.data	0x00002400	0x0005b000	0x00002400	0x00059800	0xc0000040
.rdata	0x00013000	0x0005e000	0x00013200	0x0005bc00	0x40000040
.bss	0x00003200	0x00072000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0xc0000080
.idata	0x00003e00	0x00076000	0x00004000	0x0006ee00	0xc0000040

4. Operating System Identification -Verbose

```

Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump
Image Size: 536776704 Bytes

```

Windows XP Service Pack 2

```
Image Base Offset: 0x4d7000
```

DOS Header

```

e_magic:      0x5a4d
e_lfanew:     0xe8
SIGNATURE:    0x4550

```

File Header

```

Machine Type:  IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
Number of Sections: 21
Time Stamp:    2009-04-22 19:26:45
Size of Optional Header: 0xe0 (224 bytes)
Characteristics:

```

```

IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED
IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED
IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE

```

Optional Header

```

Magic Number:      0x10b
Subsystem:         IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE
Image Base Address: 0x400000
Address of Entry Point: 0x1d55ce (RVA)
Code Base Address: 0x580 (RVA)
Data Base Address: 0x6a400 (RVA)

```

```

Major OS Version:      5
Minor OS Version:      1
Size of Stack Reserved: 0x40000 (262144 bytes)
Number of RVA and Sizes: 0x10

```

Data Directory Information

Data Directory	RVA	Size
Export Directory	0x001aa380	0x0000b55d
Import Directory	0x001f3a24	0x00000050
Resource Directory	0x001f4380	0x00010708
Base Relocation Table	0x00204b00	0x0000f984
Debug Directory	0x00071f00	0x00000038
Load Configuration Directory	0x000535a0	0x00000040

Section Information

Name	Virt Size	Virt Addr	rData Ofs	rData Size	Char
.text	0x00071900	0x00000580	0x00071a00	0x00000580	0x68000020
POOLMI	0x00001200	0x00071f80	0x00001300	0x00071f80	0x68000020
MISYSPT	0x00000700	0x00073280	0x00000700	0x00073280	0x68000020
POOLCODE	0x00001500	0x00073980	0x00001600	0x00073980	0x68000020
.data	0x00016c00	0x00074f80	0x00016d00	0x00074f80	0xc8000040
PAGE	0x000f8e00	0x0008bc80	0x000f8e80	0x0008bc80	0x60000020
PAGEVRFY	0x0000f100	0x00192e80	0x0000f200	0x00192e80	0x60000020
PAGEWMI	0x00001700	0x001a2080	0x00001800	0x001a2080	0x60000020
PAGEKD	0x00004000	0x001a3880	0x00004080	0x001a3880	0x60000020
.edata	0x0000b500	0x001aa380	0x0000b580	0x001aa380	0x40000040
PAGEDATA	0x00001500	0x001b5900	0x00001580	0x001b5900	0xc0000040
PAGEKD	0x0000c000	0x001b6e80	0x0000c080	0x001b6e80	0xc0000040
PAGECONS	0x00000100	0x001c2f00	0x00000200	0x001c2f00	0xc0000040
PAGEVRFC	0x00003400	0x001c3100	0x00003480	0x001c3100	0x40000040
PAGEVRFD	0x00000600	0x001c6580	0x00000680	0x001c6580	0xc0000040
INIT	0x0002d700	0x001c6c00	0x0002d780	0x001c6c00	0xe2000020
.rsrc	0x00010700	0x001f4380	0x00010780	0x001f4380	0x40000040
.reloc	0x0000f900	0x00204b00	0x0000fa00	0x00204b00	0x42000040

5. Memory Statistics

```

Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump
Image Size: 536776704 Bytes

```

Name	Pid	PPid	Time	Offset	PDB
0 dd.exe	2232	2892	2007-08-24 23:26:55	0x01d7d020	0x0c4aa000

Valid 2020
Prototype 50966
Global 32156
Paged 8400
Unknown 324

6. Address Translation

```

Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump
Image Size: 536776704 Bytes

```

Name	Pid	PPid	Time	Offset	PDB
0 dd.exe	2232	2892	2007-08-24 23:26:55	0x01d7d020	0x0c4aa000

Virtual Address: 0x00407000
Physical Address: 0x04a1a000

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