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Reorganizing SOF for irregular warfare

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THESIS

REORGANIZING SOF FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

by

Daniel K. Hedman

December 2008

Thesis Advisor:	David Tucker
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REORGANIZING SOF FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

The U.S. military has developed doctrine to respond to Irregular Warfare (IW) threats. According to this doctrine, IW favors indirect approaches. Within USSOCOM, the Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units were created to conduct special operations of an indirect nature. These units, specifically Army Special Forces have been heavily engaged in major combat operations in OIF and OEF and unable to break away in order to return to their assigned Areas of Responsibility (AORs). This thesis explores how a reorganization of USSOCOM in order to create an IW organization would fill capability gaps created by having 80% of USSOCOMs forces dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan. This thesis identifies factors that need to be considered when creating an IW organization such as regional orientation and interagency capabilities. This thesis also outlines two possibilities for an IW organization as a framework to create a starting point and an ending point along the spectrum of organizational possibilities. This thesis concludes with a recommended IW organization.

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I.   INTRODUCTION

. . . This is another type of warfare; new in its intensity, ancient in its origin, warfare by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adaptive to what has been strangely called wars of liberation. [It attempts] to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries [trying] to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflict it requires in those situations, where we must counter it. These are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved: a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training. . . JFK (Small Wars Journal Editors, 2008)

A.   BACKGROUND

As the commander for Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) 574 and again as the Commander for Headquarters Support Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) (Airborne), I experienced and witnessed the frustration of Special Forces Soldiers as we attempted to understand what our role and purpose were in Operation Iraqi Freedom once the President declared the war was over. Special Forces (SF) are specifically trained for Unconventional Warfare (UW), to work by, with, and through indigenous forces (Rothstein, 2006, p. 175). In Iraq, Special Forces found itself not owning any terrain, nor were there any indigenous forces to work with once L. Paul Bremer stepped in and dissolved the Iraqi Army and followed through with his de-Baathification agenda (Ricks, 2006, pp. 159-161) Before the conventional forces got use to having ODAs across Iraq, 5th SFG sent two of its battalions home in hopes that Iraq would not require the same large number of ODAs required in Afghanistan in 2003. By the end of 2004, however, the requirement had surpassed that of Afghanistan putting three battalions of ODAs on the ground in Iraq. During this period, the majority of ODAs focused on unilateral, direct action missions and got involved in the man-hunting effort, since every Special Forces operator had a deck of cards with wanted Iraqis printed on them.

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The focus on direct action had started a couple years earlier though. In October, 2001, the 5th SFG was on the ground in Afghanistan. Although ODAs were certainly working by, with, and through the Northern Alliance in a textbook case of Unconventional Warfare (Moore, 2003, p. 4), Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was calling USSOCOM for a head count, which quickly became the measurement of success (Rothstein, History of Special Operations , 2008). Additionally, the speed with which a few hundred SOF, combined with Air Force combat controllers and the Northern Alliance toppled the Taliban Regime looked to reinforce the Pentagon's long-standing preoccupation for short duration missions with easily measurable effects (Rothstein, 2006, p. 175). This preoccupation with rapid results should come as no surprise since it directly relates to the military's promotion and incentive structure and the fact that a military officer is rarely in the same job over two years and in many cases only one year. For example, let's say Colonel Smith approved 36 direct action missions resulting in over 400 enemy combatants killed in action and the seizure of 50 portable surface-to-air missiles. These are all quantifiable results that occurred during Colonel Smith's two year assignment. On the other hand, let's say Colonel Smith was responsible for assigning advisors to El Salvador from 1982-1984. The success of that effort was not realized until a peace treaty was signed between El Salvador and the guerilla forces in 1992 (Andrade, 2008). The promotion and incentive structure, which is well understood in the military, rewards quantifiable accomplishments during the period in which a person is assigned to that position and therefore, career military officers want missions to be accomplished during their watch. The promotion and incentive structure will be addressed in more depth in Chapter II.

Besides direct action, USSOCOM has a myriad of core tasks to include Unconventional Warfare (UW), Civil Affairs (CA), and Information and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) that are crucial in the indirect approach to Irregular Warfare (IW). In order to better understand why this is, several key terms must first be defined. IW, as defined by the DoD, is "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities of

diplomacy, information, and economics (DIME), in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will" (Department of Defense, 2007, p. I.1). DIME is accomplished through interagency coordination, which is defined as the "coordination that occurs between elements of the DoD and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective" (Department of Defense, 2006, p. vii). "IW has emerged as a major and pervasive form of warfare, in which a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally armed military force, which often represents the nation's established regime" (Department of Defense, 2007, p. x). An indirect approach is "a means to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will; undermine the credibility and legitimacy of his political authority; and undermine adversary influence and control over, and support by, the indigenous population" (Department of Defense, 2007, p. I.19). The definition of UW has changed since the days of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II. The current definition of UW is "Operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations" (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 1.2). "IW is focused on people rather than weaponry and technology, meaning that a successful IW campaign is about building relationships and partnerships at the local level. IW requires patient, persistent, and culturally aware forces in order to be effective. An effective IW strategy will require the concerted efforts of all instruments of U.S. national power in order to address the spectrum of DIME" (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 1.5). Many of the constituent activities of IW, such as UW, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and PSYOPS are core tasks of USSOCOM. USSOCOM's Army Special Forces, CA, and PSYOPS are well suited to conduct indirect approach operations and according to the DoD definition, IW favors indirect approaches. So why hasn't USSOCOM taken the lead on IW? To give credit where credit is due, USSOCOM tried (Gustaitis, 2008), but the core task of IW was assigned to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) (United States Joint Forces Command, 2008). Regardless of which command has the lead on developing IW, the fact remains that USSOCOM has the preponderance of forces best suited for IW. But are these forces, specifically the Army Special Forces, CA, and PSYOPS, organized in an optimal manner

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to conduct an effective global IW campaign? This thesis argues they are not. "The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) makes the assertion that SOF should re-orient from a force that focuses primarily on short-duration, episodic missions, to one that is shaped, sized, and postured for long-duration, steady-state operations critical to the war on terror. The QDR argues that SOF must increase their capacity to perform long-duration and indirect operations in politically sensitive and denied areas" (Martinage, 2008, p. 3). To accomplish these QDR objectives, this thesis suggests that a reorganization of SOF for IW is necessary for three reasons: 80% of USSOCOM's current force structure has been committed to OIF and OEF at the detriment of other Areas of Responsibility creating a gap in capabilities associated with regional orientation, such as language and cultural training; the current force structure is not the best suited for an IW environment; the current promotion and incentive structure does not support the development of an effective IW force. That being said, there are several things about the current force structure that should not be changed and allowed to carry over to any new IW organization.

B.   WHAT NEEDS TO CONTINUE?

1.   Regional Orientation

One of the unique designs to the Army Special Forces Groups is that each Group is regionally oriented. In addition to an 18 series MOS, every Green Beret is taught a language specific to his assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR) and provided cultural training and sensitivities specific to that AOR. Additionally, Special Forces personnel routinely deploy to their assigned AORs to conduct a variety of core tasks, all of which are to maintain the personal relationships established with the Host Nation (HN) and often enhance the capabilities of the HN's military or law enforcement. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations are similarly arranged within their organizations at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) is assigned to Central Command's (CENTCOM) AOR which includes both Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the war in Iraq began in 2003, the 10th SFG has been dedicated to Iraq and the 3rd and 7th SFGs have been assigned to Afghanistan. This has seriously diminished the capability of the 3rd, 7th,

and 10th SFGs to remain engaged in their assigned AORs, as well as maintain the language proficiency and cultural awareness of their assigned AORs (Sonntag, 2008). This problem must be addressed in any creation of an IW organization within USSOCOM in order to ensure regional orientation is maintained.

2. Interagency Cooperation and Joint Interoperability

Since OIF and OEF began, the military as a whole has gotten better at incorporating the other agencies of the U.S. Government to address the spectrum of DIME. The SFGs are no different and now routinely have members of the CIA, FBI, and USAID assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTFs) Headquarters operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. This thesis acknowledges the fact that there are many problems with the current interagency capability across the U.S. Government that need to be addressed by the senior leadership of the U.S., but nonetheless, an effective IW organization must have an interagency capability internal to it which will be explained in Chapter II. The combined arms and multi-service joint capabilities currently within a CJSOTF are other crucial factors that must continue in an IW organization.

3. A Shift in Emphasis: The Importance of the Indirect Approach

The man-hunting effort of USSOCOM really came to light in the effort to kill or capture Abu Musab al-Zarqawi which was an effort that took several years and a vast amount of man power and resources (Knickmeyer & Finer, 2006). Realizing the necessity of influencing a relevant population in order to diminish safe havens for similar terrorists to operate in Admiral Olson, the Commander of USSOCOM since July 2007, removed the indirect approach from the backburner and began to emphasize the importance of the indirect approach within IW and USSOCOM (Olson E. A., 2008). On October 31st, 2007, Admiral Olson spoke at the US Marine Corps IW Conference to discuss how SOF is by nature geared towards IW. He made the point that although SOF is not the Executive Agent, a proponent, or the lead for IW, SOF's unique core activities tend to naturally flow into the conduct of IW and that SOF must contribute to the IW effort (Olson E. A., 2007). His envisioned contribution to the IW effort has not been an

easy road. During his visit to the Naval Postgraduate School in September, 2008, Admiral Olson discussed the difficulties associated with reassigning Special Forces in Iraq. Due to circumstances over which he has no control, he acknowledged the situation would not change soon (Olson E. A., 2008). That being said, the continued emphasis on the importance of the indirect approach within USSOCOM must continue if the US efforts in IW are to improve.

C.   SUMMARY

This thesis will not address the debate on the use or misuse of Special Forces in support of conventional forces in OIF and OEF, but rather the fact that OIF and OEF have consumed over 80% of USSOCOM's forces which has hindered the ability to remain engaged in parts of the world that are vulnerable to insurgencies and Islamic extremists' ideology. Many SF operators from the 3rd, 7th, and 10th SFGs have only deployed to OIF or OEF which has hurt the language capability associated with their regional orientation. Language skills take time to develop (Csrnko, 2008). With the creation of an IW organization, this thesis will propose that the IW organization be designed to specifically engage countries or regions meeting the following three criteria: first, the HN or the U.S. ambassador has asked for assistance in regards to activities associated with IW; second, the U.S. military is not conducting major combat operations within the borders of the HN where the IW effort is taking place in order to prevent the IW organization from being drawn into a war effort; and third, the HN is within the assigned AOR of the IW organization with the associated regional orientation.   In Chapter II, this thesis will examine organizational structure in relation to its operating environment, as well as problems associated with the current promotion and incentive structure that are not conducive to an IW organization. Chapter III will provide two examples of reorganizing USSOCOM for IW. This thesis will conclude by providing advantages and disadvantages to each example and provide a recommendation based on those results.

II.   CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN IW ORGANIZATION

> . . . The plan deploys a variety of elite troops around the world, including about 80 to 90 12-man teams of Army Special Forces soldiers who are skilled in foreign languages and at working with indigenous forces. Today, those forces are heavily concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, but as their numbers grow, they will increase their presence in other countries. Michael Vickers (Tyson, 2007)

A.   GETTING STARTED

An important lesson should be considered from Amy Zegart's book, *Flawed by Design*, which shows how important it is to get the organization's design right from the start. By examining the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the National Security Council (NSC), Zegart provides insight into how these organizations were handicapped from conception and how these handicaps continue to plague these organizations today. Her point is to be careful about what you create and how you create it, because once it is made and a culture is established, it is very difficult to change it. For example, the 1947 National Security Act meant to create a small central intelligence agency that would coordinate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence, not collect it (Zegart, 1999, p. 163). The final creation of the CIA was a product of executive branch decisions by President Truman. The OSS and the Central Intelligence Group had fought for a strongly centralized system while the Departments of State, Justice, War, and the Navy all fought to protect their own intelligence services from outside interference. To them the ideal CIA was a weak CIA (Zegart, 1999, p. 184). The Departments of State, Justice, War and the Navy got what they wanted. The CIA quickly found its own niche, one of clandestine and covert operations. However, that created a problem within the CIA. The CIA became two competing cultures within one organization: a coordinating/analysis unit and a clandestine service (Zegart, 1999, p. 185). Within a year of creating the CIA, a National Security Council Directive made the CIA's covert unit permanent. The covert culture of

the CIA took off and dominated an agency that was created only to analyze and coordinate intelligence (Zegart, 1999, p. 195).

B.   A DOMINATING CULTURE

The Army Special Forces have perceived USSOCOM's emphasis on man-hunting and direct approach operations under General Brown as the dominating culture (Sonntag, 2008). Admiral Olson has made steps to balance the direct and indirect cultures within USSOCOM, but the current promotion and incentive structure for the military is counterintuitive to the indirect approach associated with IW. Often organizations have multiple cultures, but when one culture dominates over the other, this may cause limitations for promotion and incentives within the dominated cultures.

How has the difference in cultures affected promotions? Since conventional board members can relate to positions and missions executed by the SMUs, the Ranger Regiment, and the 160th SOAR, members of these organizations have typically risen to the top positions of the Special Operations community. Of the five Army officers to command USSOCOM, none of them have been career SF officers and only two out of six commanders of USASOC have been career SF officers. Additionally, no active duty PSYOP or CA officer has ever been promoted to the rank of general officer (Rothstein, 2006, p. 92).   An SF officer had not commanded U.S. ASOC since before the GWOT started until LTG Mulholland took command in November, 2008 and he too has served multiple tours in units associated with the direct approach culture.

It is important to mention organizational culture here because it comprises the assumptions, values, and norms of organization members and their behaviors (McNamara, 2008). It is why an organization conducts business the way it does. The concept of culture is particularly important when attempting to manage organizational change.   Practitioners are coming to realize that even with the best-laid plans, organizational change must include changing corporate culture as well as changing structures and processes (McNamara, 2008). As an IW organization is created, it is critical to establish what the organization will do, what the organization will not do, and

how it will operate. This will also help to define the attributes, skills, and personality traits that will be desired for an IW organization.

Another point to consider during any reorganization is what it will take to make the reorganization take place. The number of stake holders and the reluctance or eagerness of each stake holder for the reorganization will also have a major impact on the success or failure of the new organization. In the past, the President has been granted the Presidential Reorganization Authority by Congress in order to respond to a perceived crisis. Such reorganizations included the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, and the most recent reorganization creation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 (Light, 2003). Determining the number of stakeholders and the requirements necessary for the desired level of reorganization, may shed light on the feasibility of the reorganization.

Why should USSOCOM consider reorganizing at all? The military as a whole has determined that IW must be addressed in some capacity and this thesis has already established that USSOCOM has the majority of forces geared for IW.   The current organization has employed 80% of its force structure that is geared for IW to two countries and since USSOCOM is a force provider, once the forces are employed by a Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC) to support major combat operations, it is difficult for USSOCOM to reassign those units to other efforts. A dedicated IW organization within or from USSOCOM is necessary to remain globally engaged in troubled regions around the world specifically during times when the country is at war. That is not to say an IW organization could not assist with IW threats in a declared war zone, but it should not be the primary focus, nor should it come at the expense of leaving a troubled area requiring an indirect approach unattended. There will still be plenty of other SOF units to assist with the war effort when needed. How would a reorganization of USSOCOM help? Dr. Paul Light from the Wagner School of Public Service, New York University, testified before the United States House Government Reform Committee on why reorganization is important. He gave the following six reasons explaining why he felt reorganization holds the promise of better government

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performance; all of these reasons, except perhaps five, are reasons that would apply to any reorganization effort to create an IW organization:

1. Reorganization can give greater attention to a priority such as homeland security.

2. Reorganization can reduce overlap and duplication among widespread programs, thereby increasing accountability and efficiency.

3. Reorganization can create a platform for a new and/or rapidly expanding governmental activity.

4. Reorganization can force greater cooperation among large, quasi-independent agencies such as the Coast Guard and Federal Aviation Administration.

5. Reorganization can create greater transparency in the delivery of public goods and services to and on behalf of the public.

6. Reorganization can improve employee satisfaction and performance (Light, 2003).

Changing an organization can be difficult; military organizations are no exception. To further complicate the situation, several subcultures have developed over time, such as the rift between conventional forces and SOF and even between different units within USSOCOM. As history has shown, it sometimes takes outside influence to force the military to change when the change is significant. After the failed hostage rescue attempt during Operation Eagle Claw and continued problems during Operation Urgent Fury, Congress decided to force change on the military. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 brought massive change to the military and was followed up with the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the FY87 National Defense Authorization Act to address problems in the special operations community. The Cohen-Nunn Amendment established the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict ASD/SOLIC and USSOCOM (Shelton, 1996).

C.   DEFINING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR IW

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld determined that the military needed to focus on IW and instructed each service to draw up a plan to address future IW threats. As the U.S. military begins to rebalance its forces for the IW environment, it is critical to create an organizational structure that is the best suited for IW. According to the analysis of organizational theorist Henry Mintzberg, the U.S. Army is unarguably a professional bureaucracy. Figure 1 presents Mintzberg's analysis. The two axes represent different aspects of the environment. The vertical axis represents the measure of instability in the environment, while the horizontal axis represents the measure of complexity in the environment. Instability in the environment refers to the tendency or frequency in which changes occur in the environment. The greater the frequency of change, the greater amount of instability exists in the environment. Complexity in the environment refers to the consistency in which elements in the environment are interconnected. In other words, how would one action to one element of the environment affect the other elements in the same environment. The more elements affected by a single action, the greater amount of complexity exists in the environment.   The four quadrants represent different environments in which organizations operate. The lower left quadrant is a stable and simple environment; the lower right, stable, but complex; the upper left quadrant, simple, but unstable; and the upper right, complex and unstable (Jansen, 2008).   Irregular Warfare is by definition a complex and unstable environment, which is also depicted in Figure 1.

To establish that IW is an unstable environment as Mintzberg defines that term, we can turn to the definition of IW. It states that a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally armed military force. How is this accomplished? An adversary may attempt to do this by maintaining an information advantage, meaning the adversary maintains his anonymity by living among a population that is not supportive to the local government (McCormick, 2007). Government representation, such as police or military forces, is often in uniform making it easy for an adversary to identify a potential target. As long as this information advantage is maintained by the adversary, he or she will have

the freedom of maneuver to conduct an attack at the time and place of choice. This creates an unstable environment for the affected government.

The complexity of the environment is derived from addressing the IW threat, which according to the definition may employ the full range of military and other capacities of diplomacy, information, and economics in order to win the struggle of legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. Since the factors that DIME addresses are already operating in an IW environment, the government must make a complex response.

According to Mintzberg, certain types of organizations are better suited for different types of environments. Figure 1 shows that as uncertainty increases, or the inability to predict what an adversary may do, the environment moves to the upper right quadrant of complex and unstable. Mintzberg places organizations into four categories: a machine bureaucracy, a simple structure, a professional bureaucracy, and an adhocracy. A machine bureaucracy, like a car manufacturer, is best suited in a simple and stable environment where it can standardize work processes. In an environment that is simple but unstable, a small organization like a "mom and pop" store is the best structure because it operates primarily under the direct supervision of one or a just a few individuals who can quickly alter practices across the organization in response to an unstable environment. A professional bureaucracy, like the U.S. Army, is best suited for a stable but complex environment. The Army trains its personnel to have a standardization of skills for a complex environment, but because of its size, it is slow to respond to instability in the environment. The last category is an adhocracy, which, according to Mintzberg, is the best type of organization for a complex and unstable environment like IW, as depicted in Figure 1 (Jansen, 2008).

Figure 1.   Organizational Structures for Various Operating Environments (Jansen, 2008)

An adhocracy is made up of people that have a high degree of specialization and training in different fields, similar to the Army; but unlike the Army, an adhocracy has little formalization in order for it to quickly adapt to a changing environment. Due to the size of the U.S. Army, it needs formalized processes. It is this requirement for formalized processes that make the Army poorly suited for an IW environment. That is not to say that the Army could not dedicate an organization to IW. A new IW organization should consist of regionally oriented sub-organizations that are designed to create operating adhocracies, which are temporary organizations brought together to address a specific issue or problem (Jansen, 2008). When that specific problem is resolved, the temporary organization dissolves into the parent organization, until the next problem arises. Certain functions of an IW organization, such as the everyday administrative tasks would be standardized, but the components responsible for IW engagements would do so as operating adhocracies with the intent of developing specific solutions for a specific location. The key to success with these temporary operating adhocracies is to have as many tools as possible to apply to the problem and then apply

the right tools, meaning that not all of the tools have to be used every time there is a problem. As stated in the previous chapter, these tools refer to the joint and interagency capacities that need to continue and improve in any future IW organization. The expertise provided from personnel of these other agencies can be used to establish the operating adhocracies that Mintzberg recommends for an organization operating in a complex and unstable environment. The advantages to an adhocracy are that it is innovative, flexible, and adaptive.

D.   LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION

In order to influence the policy makers in Washington, USSOCOM should consider establishing an IW headquarters in Washington. The physical location of an organization may help or hinder the ability to acquire resources. The Cohen-Nunn Amendment recommended that USSOCOM be placed in Washington D.C., but General Lindsay, commander of Readiness Command and the first USSOCOM commander, argued along with others that the Command should stay in Tampa, Florida, where Readiness Command was located (Marquis, 1997, p. 151). This physical separation of USSOCOM from Washington allowed the bureaucracy of the Pentagon to heavily influence the role of SOF before mission requests ever got to the national level decision makers (Gustaitis, 2008). Technology has minimized the effects of physical separation, but it still cannot compete with the benefits of developing personal relationships and networks that take place with repeated face to face interaction over time.

USSOCOM's unique counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and man-hunting capabilities have led to a significant funding increase without having to compete for resources since those tasks are specific core tasks of USSOCOM. IW, however, is currently a military-wide function, which means all of the services and many organizations within the services will be competing for relevancy, funds, and other resources applicable to IW.

E.   CREATING AN IW PROMOTION AND INCENTIVE STRUCTURE

Since IW is about influencing people, building relationships, and maintaining a persistent presence all of which take time, it would benefit an IW organization to have a

promotion and incentive structure that would support these characteristics. As previously stated, the recommended organizational structure is an adhocracy made up of interagency and military personnel from all of the services, and therefore the promotion and incentive structure should be created to reward personnel who excel in this type of organization.

The military promotion system for an IW organization will need to change as well. Within the SOF community, there are two ways of conducting a mission: a direct approach or an indirect approach. By design, Army Special Forces often conduct missions through an indirect approach. USSOCOM, however, does not support all of its unique capabilities equally. It favors direct missions over indirect missions (Tucker & Lamb, 2007, p.236). One reason for this may be that Special Mission Units (SMUs), the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) specialize in USSOCOM's core tasks that tend to be short duration, episodic direct missions that relate well to the conventional military. These missions may be referred to as hyper-conventional missions, meaning that they are similar to operations conducted by a conventional force, but executed with a precision not normally associated with a conventional force (Rothstein, 2008, p.102). Direct action and counter terrorism are two of the core tasks. Additionally, the personnel assigned to these units do not have military occupational skills (MOSs) that are specific to special operations, unless it is an 18 series MOS assigned outside of Special Forces. For example, an infantry officer assigned to the Ranger Regiment or an SMU could be assigned to a conventional unit such as the 82d Airborne Division for his next assignment. The Ranger Regiment or the SMUs are structured with a hierarchy similar to other conventional units. This is important when it comes time for promotions since the vast majority of promotion board members come from the conventional force. In other words, a board member who is a field artillery officer can easily associate the similarities between a battalion operations officer in the Ranger Regiment to the same position in an artillery battalion.

The units within USSOCOM that predominantly conduct indirect missions are another story, especially Army Officers. The Army Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are MOSs that are specific to special operations. Army Special Forces, the largest component of USSOCOM, is typically

associated with USSOCOM's core task of Unconventional Warfare (UW). The very definition of UW has changed several times as recently as the 1980s and again in the 2008 Field Manual for Unconventional Warfare. These changes have been made by the SF community, so how can SF expect conventional leaders to understand what they do, if SF has a difficult time defining what it does? As previously stated, the current definition of UW is "operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations" (Department of the Army, 2008). The fact that UW specifically requires the use of irregular forces lends itself to a long duration operation. Before an irregular force can begin operations, SF must first establish rapport with the irregular force and then organize, train, and equip that force to a level of performance that is equal to or has preferably surpassed that of the adversary. The bottom line is this process takes time, which does not translate to the conventional board members as easily as a direct action mission that took a total of 48 hours and resulted in 25 dead terrorists.

Since SF, CA, and PSYOP officers are on the same promotion boards as the rest of the Army, the same "ticket punching" mentality that drives the conventional force is alive and well among these branches as well. For example, a major returning to a Special Forces Group will have two years at that group until he is reassigned in order to make room for other officers that must also complete the same jobs in order to get promoted. During the first year in group, the major may be a company commander for an SF company consisting of six ODAs. Although these ODAs could be deployed to several different countries simultaneously making the job very complex and therefore requiring the experience of a major, the conventional army has captains as company commanders of larger companies. Those companies are not designed to operate with the same complexity as an SF company, but the board members see an SF major as a company commander. This position does not align well with conventional counterparts, so the second year is spent being a battalion operations officer or executive officer which does relate to the conventional force. This ticket punching mentality, however, is counterproductive to an IW environment which again requires a persistent and patient engagement and the development of relationships. This thesis recommends members of

an IW organization have a completely separate promotion and incentive structure that is conducive to developing an effective IW force which would allow members to stay in the same job for extended period of time and provide incentives based upon performance.

Even with a separate promotion and incentive structure, it is still important to have the right people. As IW is about people and building relationships, personalities will matter. This was a key lesson learned from operations in El Salvador from 1980-1992. When an effective advisor worked well with the USAID representative and the HN commander, the result was much greater than the sum of its parts (Rothstein, Special Forces in El Salvador, 2008).

F. SUMMARY

So far, this thesis has made several recommendations that should be considered before any IW organization is created within or from USSOCOM:

1. Define what the organization will do, not do, and how it will do it. This will assist in determining what organizations and capabilities the organization will need, how large the organization will need to be, and how it will employ it assets in relation to established practices. This will also determine the skill sets and personality traits that will benefit an IW organization.

2. Use an IW organization in countries where the conventional military is not conducting major combat operations and the HN or U.S. ambassador has asked for assistance. The purpose of a separate IW organization is to stay globally engaged even during times of war. Other SOF units will be available to support major combat operations if needed.

3. Based upon the level of reorganization, determine what it will take for the reorganization to take place and who the stake holders are in order to determine the feasibility of any proposed reorganization.

4. Design the planning and operational components of an IW organization as adhocracies. This will require an IW organization to be an interagency and joint organization.

5.   Maintain regional orientation.

6.   Consider an IW headquarters in Washington.

7.   Establish a promotion and incentive structure that develops an effective IW organization.

III.   REORGANIZATION POSSIBILITIES

A.   DEFINING THE SPECTUM

This chapter will present two reorganization possibilities. The first concept is titled the Special Operations Agency (SOA) and suggests a significant reorganization spanning across many U.S. agencies (Synder, et al., 2008). The SOA is at the high end of difficulty. The second concept is titled the Joint Irregular Warfare Command (JIWC). This concept is a reorganization of several units within USSOCOM. This concept, although not easy, is considered the starting point for reorganization possibilities.

B.   THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY

1.   Establishing the Military Framework

The SOA would be created by making USSOCOM a separate service.   The Director of the Special Operations Agency would be appointed by the President and have similar duties and responsibilities as the other five service secretaries. The current relationship with the other services would continue as far as logistical support to deployed forces, airlift, sea transport, etc., in order to eliminate the need for duplicate capabilities, as well as hosting SOA personnel on current installations. The SOA would consist of a large robust joint, interagency IW organization titled the Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) and the current command responsible for the Special Mission Units (SMUs). A decision by senior officials would have to be made as to whether or not the SMUs and supporting organizations should remain in the SOA or if the chain of command for that headquarters should be streamlined directly to the national command authorities as it was prior to the creation of USSOCOM (Marquis, 1997, p. 155). For the sake of argument, this thesis will leave the SMUs and associated organizations within the SOA. That being said, the CIW and the SMUs within the SOA will have their own distinct chains of command.

The SOA would establish its own promotion and incentive structure for personnel in the CIW and be allowed to recruit from the other services. Additionally, the SOA would maintain the joint billeting that currently mans USSOCOM with personnel from

all of the services in order to manage the everyday administrative functions as a headquarters. Personnel selected for the CIW would enter a career field designated for IW and managed until they retire or resign from the CIW.

The CIW would be arranged into regionally oriented Irregular Warfare Task Forces (IWTF). Depending on the number of priority countries determined by the DoD that happen to be in a particular region, IWTFs could vary in size. The military elements of the IWTF would be organized with the functional elements of ground, maritime, and air which personnel would be assigned to based upon their skills, training, and education, not necessarily their previous service (Synder, et al., 2008). Arranging the CIW subordinate units by functionality would eliminate the need for multiple training facilities teaching the same skill set within the different services and increase the interoperability of personnel with different service backgrounds.

Along with the reorganization to create the SOA, the role of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) would be enhanced. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) has recommended that the next administration consider increasing the rank of selected TSOC Commander's and their staffs for the 2009 QDR (Martinage, 2008, p. xiii). Increasing the TSOCs capacities would allow the TSOCs to command and control (C2) other organizations within the SOA that are involved in major combat operations such as OEF and OIF in CENTCOM's AOR (Csrnko, 2008).

2. The Interagency Effort

IW is inherently an interagency problem since it spans the spectrum of DIME and a pure military organization cannot solve many IW issues alone. Therefore, the CIW would benefit from having an interagency component internal to it. This allows the CIW to rapidly create an internal team of military and civilians with a myriad of backgrounds and expertise to develop multiple approaches to whatever IW environment they may find themselves in. As previously stated, the SOA is at the high end of difficulty and the CIW would have a large robust interagency capability. In this concept, the interagency capability is acquired from the transfer of personnel and in some cases entire subordinate organizations of other U.S. agencies that have core tasks which are deemed critical to

addressing DIME. The Division of Reconstruction and Stabilization from the Department of State is an example of an organization that would enhance the CIW's capacity to execute operations across the spectrum of DIME. Reconstruction and stabilization could be accomplished with less effort, if the necessary military forces and civilians were on the same team, reducing the amount of inefficiencies commonly associated with large U.S. Government bureaucracies. Experts from other departments such as the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, Transportation and USAID could provide personnel to the CIW on a detail program. With an interagency and joint capability internal to the CIW, Mintzberg's recommended adhocracy is complete.

U.S. operations in El Salvador throughout the 1980's provide an excellent case as to how operations could benefit from a synchronized interagency effort. In the case of El Salvador, which was a long term commitment to combat a communist movement, the U.S. Congress restricted the Army to 55 advisors who were not allowed to actually participate in combat operations (Andrade, 2008). Simultaneously, USAID provided millions of dollars of financial and economic aid each year and the CIA assisted with intelligence on the insurgency. Unfortunately, there was limited coordination between the military advisors, USAID, and the CIA, which often hurt ongoing efforts in other aspects of DIME (Rothstein, Special Forces in El Salvador, 2008). Having the expertise under one roof would in theory eliminate any piecemeal efforts like El Salvador. Additionally, the lack of a cohesive vision for El Salvador magnifies the necessity of putting one person in charge of the U.S. effort in that country (Andrade, 2008). The U.S. ambassadors around the globe need to be the overall visionaries for their assigned countries, synchronizing the U.S. effort. An IWTF would work for the U.S. ambassador, if there is no ambassador for whatever reason, the IWTF would report to the Geographical Combatant Commander to ensure IW efforts were synchronized with other operations in the region.

As an IWTF, interagency and military personnel would plan and execute operations together when appropriate. As previously stated in Chapter I, an IW organization would deploy at the request of the Host Nation (HN) and the U.S.

ambassador and not to countries where the U.S. military is conducting major combat operations. The CIW would follow these guidelines as well, with the purpose of staying globally engaged even during times of war.

These interagency additions are merely suggestions that could assist the CIW by providing planning and operational expertise in other fields that are relevant to IW. Exactly what organizations would be transferred to the CIW and how interagency augmentees are assigned to the CIW would have to be carefully determined, but the Director of the SOA, a civilian selected by the President, must have the ability to fire interagency personnel that are not performing to standard. Additionally, the CIW must be funded appropriately to allow the interagency personnel to effectively address problems in their perspective areas related to DIME. Significant reorganizations have been done before with the President executing his Reorganization Authority.

3. Implementation

Since 1930, the President of the United States has had selected opportunities to utilize the presidential reorganization authority. Congress has always had its hand in the reorganization authority and when it has been granted, Congress restricted the authority to the term of the President in office (Light, 2003). Unfortunately, the event that serves as a catalyst for reorganization has historically been an unfavorable event for the U.S. In 1957, for example the Soviet Union conducted the successful launch of Sputnik. President Eisenhower responded with the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, President Bush responded with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In each case, the President was granted the presidential reorganization authority. The keystone to this process is the fact that it is a reorganization of assets that already exist, not a brand new organization. This is important when an issue, such as the internal security of the U.S., is time sensitive. To illustrate how the President executed his authority to reorganize, this thesis will examine the creation of NASA and DHS. This thesis is not defending the effectiveness of either of these organizations, but merely pointing out the fact that reorganization has been done before.

a.   *A Closer Look at NASA*

On October 4, 1957, the Soviet news agency Tass announced to the world that the Soviet Union had successfully placed Elementary Satellite 1, known as Sputnik into an elliptical orbit some 550 miles above a Cold War-wracked planet. For the moment, at least, communism had trumped capitalism on a major front, and the conceit that America stood unequaled in the technological sphere was shaken. When, less than a month later, the Russians put the larger and much-heavier Sputnik 2 into orbit, with the dog Laika aboard, genuine alarm set in. Now there was talk of a growing technology gap. There were also fears in U.S. military circles that these satellites might be capable of pinpointing targets for a Soviet nuclear-missile attack (Long, 2008).

Sputnik 1 and 2 created the necessary environment for a reorganization to take place. The U.S. had a space program already, but it had predominantly been in the hands of the military. The Navy's Vanguard program failed to launch a satellite in 1957, however, the German scientist Wernher von Braun working for the Army, successfully launched Explorer 1 on January 31, 1958. The Eisenhower administration was getting nowhere with Congress, so President Eisenhower directed his science adviser, James Killian, to convene a committee and come up with a game plan. Killian started by handing the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) all nonmilitary responsibilities connected to space exploration. As NACA's charter grew, the decision was made to expand it into a full-fledged government agency taking direct responsibility for the nation's space program. President Eisenhower signed the legislation creating NASA on July 29, 1958 and it officially became a functioning entity October 1, with T. Keith Glennan as its first administrator. NASA inherited 8,000 employees from NACA, the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, and an annual budget of $100 million (Long, 2008).

b.   *Defending the Homeland*

A more recent use of the reorganization authority is the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by President George W. Bush in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. Once again, an event initiated the

reorganization. This would have been an appropriate time to create the SOA as well, but the focus after the attacks was to improve security on the home front and prevent any further attacks from occurring.

The creation of the DHS was a significant reorganization to the government in order to put all of the organizations responsible for securing the U.S. in one sense or another under one enormous department. The following organizations were transferred to the DHS: the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office of the Department of Commerce, the National Communications System of the FBI, the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, the Energy Assurance Office of the Department of Energy, the Federal Computer Incident Response Center of the General Services

Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Transportation Security Administration, functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Protective Service, the Office of Domestic Preparedness, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the functions of the Secretary of Agriculture relating to agricultural import and entry inspection activities, the United States Secret Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Integrated Hazard Information System of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Domestic Preparedness Office of the FBI, the Domestic Emergency Support Team of the Department of Justice, the Metropolitan Medical Response System of the Department of

Health and Human Services, the National Disaster Medical System of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Strategic National Stockpile of the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center of USDA (DHS, 2002). This thesis does not attempt to argue the effectiveness of this massive reorganization, but simply to reinforce the idea that a massive reorganization can be done and has been done before.

C.   JOINT IRREGULAR WARFARE COMMAND

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has published the following recommendation for the 2009 QDR: "Establish a Joint Irregular Warfare Command to ensure an appropriate balance, in both strategy and resources, between direct and indirect approaches to special operations" (Martinage, 2008, p. xiii).

1.   Background

Several organizations to include the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low intensity Conflict, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) have all stated the need for a Joint Irregular Warfare Command of some fashion. The following paragraphs provide the history of USASFC's design.

Under the direction of Major General Lambert, USASFC began to develop a plan for an Unconventional Warfare Task Force (UWTF) in 2002, which meant turning USASFC into a deployable headquarters focused specifically on UW and counter insurgency (COIN) (Joyner, Unconventional Warfare Task Force, 2008). The concept gained significant momentum after being approved by the Commanding General of USASOC on March 29, 2003 (Joyner, HQ, USASFC(A) Transformation Strategy Commanding General In-Progress Review, 2003). Major General Lambert believed there were capability gaps within USSOCOM in the conduct of the GWOT that the UWTF could fill as shown in Figure 2. The concept continued as USASOC began to pursue the necessary funds and approval from USSOCOM to transform USASFC into the UWTF (Joyner, HQ, USASFC(A) Transformation Strategy Commanding General In-Progress Review, 2003).   In September 2004, USSOCOM altered the concept and tasked USASOC to develop a deployable UW focused headquarters to form the core of a SOF Joint Task Force (JTF) named JTF SWORD (Joyner, Joint Irregular Warfare Command, 2008). In February 2006, under the command of Brigadier General John Mulholland, the concept was modified again to create the Joint Irregular Warfare Command (JIWC) in order to meet tasked requirements and shortfalls identified by the IW Roadmap and Inter-agency Working Group (Joyner, Joint Irregular Warfare Command, 2008). The JIWC

was briefed to the Senior Leaders Group at USSOCOM during SOF week in May 2006, but was not approved. USASFC was directed to retain all files for further development (Joyner, Joint Irregular Warfare Command, 2008).


Figure 2.   The USSOCOM's GWOT Contribution with the UWTF (Joyner, HQ, USASFC(A) Transformation Strategy Commanding General In-Progress Review, 2003)

2.   Why is the JIWC Needed?

. . . The objective is to drain the swamp, not kill all the alligators in the swamp. In some cases, we end up killing the alligators and they're replaced almost as fast as we can kill them or capture them. . . We've got to get after the future base area. We've got to get after developing friends and allies and proxies, because when you fight an insurgency the best people to do this are the host country and not American forces. General Wayne Downing (Downing, 2006)

After the release of the IW Roadmap, BG Mulholland noted the shortcomings of the UWTF and adjusted the concept to the JIWC. A dedicated operational IW command would meet the tasks given to USSOCOM in the IW Roadmap (Joyner, Joint Irregular Warfar Command, 2008). Warfare Command, 2008). Paragraph **1**.2.2 of the IW

Roadmap states that "the DoD cannot meet today's complex security challenges alone. Current efforts on five continents demonstrate the importance of being able to train and work with partners, employ surrogates, operate clandestinely, and set security conditions for the development of civil society and the establishment of effective governance in ungoverned and under-governed areas. The Department must also be able to sustain a persistent but low-visibility presence in countries where U.S. forces have not traditionally operated" (Department of Defense, 2006, p. 4) The JIWC, as envisioned, would meet the requirements outlined in Paragraph 1.2.2, but some changes would have to be made within USASOC.

3.   What is the JIWC?

In order to state what the JIWC is, the USASFC G3 had to determine what the JIWC was going to do. A mission statement was developed along with key tasks that would define the JIWC's purpose: "The JIWC supports and, on order, conducts Irregular Warfare to deter, defeat, and disrupt terrorist networks in order to prevail in the Global War on Terror." The key tasks for the JIWC are to provide IW expertise to national and theater level organizations; conduct interagency IW operational planning; synchronize IW efforts in order to achieve coordinated effects; form, train, deploy, and command and control rotational Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) and Irregular Warfare Task Forces (IWTFs) (Mannell, 2006).

BG Mulholland envisioned the JIWC to be unlike any existing military organization. The JIWC would be responsible for jointly training, synchronizing and employing USSOCOM's IW forces as well as integrating the interagency, academic and other stakeholders in support of USSOCOM's grand strategy. The JIWC would operate in support of the GCCs and operationally complement USSOCOM's direct action requirements. USASFC designed the JIWC to be part laboratory, part brain trust, and part operational practitioner with additional lines to various stakeholders as shown in Figure 3 (Mannell, 2006). Similar to the CIW concept, the JIWC looks to incorporate expertise in a variety of fields, but unlike the CIW, other existing governmental organizations will not be transferred to the JIWC.

JIWC Structure

Figure 3.   JIWC Structure (Mannell, 2006)

4. Implementation

Included with the recommendation of a JIWC for the 2009 QDR, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) identifies the following units that should be assigned to the JIWC: USASFC as the headquarters, all seven active duty and reserve Special Forces Groups, the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, and the 4th Psychological Operations Battalion. The CSBA also recommends some AFCOC and MARSOC components be included in the JIWC (Martinage, 2008, p. 44).

This thesis recommends using USASOC as the recommended three-star command for the JIWC. There are many reasons for this recommendation. The most obvious reason is the fact that USASOC is already a three star billet, eliminating the need for Congressional approval for additional general officer billets. Under the JIWC, the USASFC, CA and PSYOPS commanders would become deputy commanders for their

organizations. Additionally, USASFC is not a major army command (MACOM) and therefore relies on USASOC for several staffing functions to include USASOC's Contracting Office. The USASFC staff consists of fewer than 200 personnel, while USASOC's staff is a robust staff of over 700 personnel. Removing Special Forces, which makes up over 60% of USASOC's assigned forces, CA, and PSYOPS, would leave only two brigade size elements for USASOC to command (Martinage, 2008, p. 12). This thesis recommends moving the 75th Ranger Regiment and the components of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment that support SMUs to another command within USSOCOM and using USASOC as the base foundation for a JIWC.

Of the organizations that call for a JIWC, none of them have addressed the inherent problems associated with the current promotion and incentive structure. This thesis recommends that at a minimum, Special Forces, CA, and PSYOPS establish a separate promotion board that will begin to instill the indirect culture within the new command. This is only a start, however, until a new promotion and incentive structure can be implemented.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. A SUMMARY OF CONSIDERATIONS

The purpose of this thesis was to provide an explanation as to why an IW organization is needed, considerations for creating an IW organization, and examples of what an IW organization might look like. The overall purpose of any IW organization must be to remain regionally oriented and globally engaged in troubled nations or regions that are prone to insurgency or a rise of Islamic Extremism. The IW organization should not be drawn into DoD war campaigns such as OIF and OEF, which has consumed 80% of USSOCOM's forces. Other SOF organizations will remain intact to conduct direct approach missions.

In Chapter II, this thesis presented several considerations that should be addressed before determining what an IW organization will look like. Of course it is important to determine what an organization will do, but it is also important to determine what the organization will not do. This will determine the organization's niche and prevent mission creep. This thesis discussed the importance of having the right people in the organization. IW is about people and relationships, and therefore personalities will make or break an IW organization. This thesis discussed the importance of an IW organization having interagency and joint capabilities and how these capabilities could be structured as adaptive and flexible adhocracies able to quickly adjust to a complex and unstable IW environment. Finally, this thesis presented reasons as to why an IW organization should be headquartered in Washington and why a new promotion and incentive structure should be established to reward personnel who have the attributes required for an effective IW organization.

B. SOA VS JIWC: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

In the Special Operations Agency/Center for Irregular Warfare concept, several other factors came to light besides just the difficulties involved in the reorganization. Every organization that is required to transfer a subcomponent or an individual person is a stake holder in the creation of the SOA, and therefore can affect how the SOA is

created. Amy Zegart discovered in her study of the creation of the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council that the stake holders involved in the creation can purposely create limitations if the new organization is perceived as treading on another organization's turf (Zegart, 1999, pp. 2-9). Once created, the SOA/CIW does provide a robust capability to address the issues of DIME in troubled regions. Creating the SOA/CIW would be costly and due to its size it would be prone to bureaucratic trends, but its size would allow it to be dispersed throughout an AOR. Finally, a SOA with a presidential appointed director would provide the emphasis that IW requires.

The Joint Irregular Warfare Command has several advantages over the SOA concept. First of all, there are several organizations already calling for a JIWC and it will be recommended in the 2009 QDR (Martinage, 2008, p. xiii). The JIWC would be relatively cheap since it does not involve the transfer of interagency assets. The JIWC would also deploy operational Irregular Warfare Task Forces (IWTF) maintaining a presence where required, but the IWTFs would not have the same robust capabilities as the IWTFs under the SOA since the JIWC is not incorporating other agency subcomponents. This could also be an advantage since the IWTF under the JIWC would have more of an advisor role, leading the HN to execute missions. This helps to provide legitimacy for the HN government. In comparison to the SOA, the JIWC would be much smaller and yet still incorporate joint interoperability and interagency cooperation as well as incorporating other civilian expertise related to IW. This would allow the desired adhocracies to form for planning purposes and possibly deploy in small advisory teams capable of assisting the HN with all aspects of DIME. In theory, the JIWC would bring balance to USSOCOM's direct and indirect capabilities, but many experts recommend a complete separation.

C.   RECOMMENDATION

The DoD has determined that IW will be addressed and this thesis has established why USSOCOM should be a part of that transformation. After conducting this research, this thesis supports the creation of a JIWC using USASOC as a foundation. The creation of a JIWC is internal to USSOCOM and could be formed with little to no external

support. Moving the 75th Ranger Regiment and portions of the 160th SOAR to another headquarters could be accomplished on paper without having to physically move any of those organizations and the transformation of USASOC to JIWC could be accomplished in a relatively short period of time to include the hiring of the required civilian expertise. There are other factors that suggest the time to act on a JIWC is now. A new presidential administration is coming in that is primed for change. The 2009 QDR will recommend the creation of a JIWC and BG Mulholland, the visionary of USASFC's JIWC, is now LTG Mulholland, commander of USASOC. If the future of warfare is IW, then there is no better opportunity than now for USSOCOM to prepare for this future.

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