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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**RUSSIAN ANTI-AMERICANISM: ORIGINS AND
IMPLICATIONS**

by

Mark B. Leskoff

September 2008

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

James Clay Moltz
Mikhail Tsyarkin

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RUSSIAN ANTI-AMERICANISM: ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (EURASIA AND EUROPE)

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ABSTRACT

After enjoying close ties from 1991-2000, the United States and Russia have seen their partnership deteriorate with post-Soviet relations reaching an all-time low in mid-2008. In principle, the fault for this breakdown of these relations could be traced to Putin, Bush, U.S. policy, Russian nationalism, or Russia's struggle to strengthen its position in the international balance of power. The objective is to identify the main causes of Russian anti-Americanism through the employment of Kenneth Waltz's three levels of analysis.

The overall questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: 1) What has caused an increase in Russian anti-Americanism in recent years? 2) What historical, political, and strategic significance can be attributed to this increased Russian dissatisfaction with the United States? The analysis considers possible root causes found at each of the three levels of analysis identified in Kenneth Waltz's framework for studying international relations. These three levels concern the individual, the state (and society), and the international system. At each level, relevant factors are examined that may have contributed to Russian anti-Americanism, the thesis concludes that President Putin and his unique background, world outlook, and desire for power have played the most significant role.

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I. RUSSIAN ANTI-AMERICANISM: ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS

A. PURPOSE

This thesis analyzes twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism and the historical, political, and strategic relevance of these sentiments. The objective is to identify the root causes of this anti-Americanism and to assess its significance for Russian-American relations.

The overall questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: 1) What has caused an increase in Russian anti-Americanism in recent years? and 2) What historical, political, and strategic significance can be attributed to this increased Russian dissatisfaction with the United States? The analysis considers possible root causes found at each of the three levels of analysis identified in Kenneth Waltz's framework for studying international relations.¹ These three levels concern the individual, the state (and society), and the international system. At each level, relevant factors are examined that may have contributed to Russian anti-Americanism.

In accordance with Waltz's framework, three subsidiary issues are analyzed.

- First, how and why has President Vladimir Putin's personality, political mindset, and vision of Russia, contributed to the rise of Russian anti-Americanism?
- Second, how has Russian nationalism contributed to the rise of anti-American sentiment? The debate between the intellectual heirs to Slavophiles² and the

¹ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

² The Slavophiles were a nineteenth-century group of Russian intellectuals mainly comprised of petty nobility, well educated but not considered Europeanized like much of the upper Russian aristocracy. They supported the protection of Russian nationalism, strong Slavic heritage, and distinctive culture. They represented Russian Orthodoxy, old noble families, and traditional family beliefs. They discounted Western ideals, which included liberalism, socialism, and rationalism. Asgtrid S. Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism Since 1856, Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 63.

Westernizers,³ and the positions taken by the Russian Christian Orthodoxy are factors in the Russian state and society that deserve attention in this regard.

- Third, how has Russia's contemporary effort to reestablish its place in the international balance of power affected anti-Americanism, given Russia's degraded position during the 1990s and its attempt to close the Russian-American power gap and advance Russian political opportunity and ideology?

B. IMPORTANCE

The importance of analyzing twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism can be found in the deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Russia. Putin's and Washington's policies, Russian nationalism, and Russia's struggle to strengthen its position in the international balance of power have damaged relations between the United States and Russia. Although Russia had taken a number of steps forward in the development of positive relations with the United States after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it appears that President Putin since becoming president in 2000 has continued to take the Russian Federation in a direction that closely emulates old Soviet and Russian ideology.⁴

Because the events of 9/11 still hold significant relevance, it is crucial that the United States and Russia establish a closer political partnership. This partnership is necessary because of the continued threat that terrorism presents to the United States, Russia, and the international community. It is therefore imperative to take steps to reverse Russian anti-Americanism and assist in dissolving Russian hatred and dissatisfaction with the United States. Additionally, significant political matters that will continue to directly affect Russo-American relations are those regarding Russian nuclear capabilities and

³ The Westernizers constituted a movement that considered Russians during the nineteenth-century as illegitimate children that lacked a national identity. Unlike Slavophiles, Westernizers were never a group; it is a term denoting Russian intellectuals who believed that Russia should be more like the West. Unified of the greatest leaders of the Westernizer movement was Petr Chaadaev. His beliefs established a group that eventually was called Westernizers by the Slavophiles. Westernizers believed that Russia needed to look to the West for guidance and national identity, and that Russia must identify with the West if it was to be successful. *Ibid.*, 63.

⁴ Boris Yeltsin named Putin acting president on 31 December 1999, and Putin won election to the office in March 2000.

Russia's SS-X-27 TOPOL Missiles.⁵ Reducing Russian anti-Americanism is absolutely critical if the United States is to have any chance of successfully meeting Russian half way on a number of political issues. Most importantly, Washington's initiative to place missile defense systems along Russian borders has become a significant sore spot between George W. Bush and Putin and can be expected to remain so between Medvedev and Washington's next president. One may argue that Putin is overreacting. However, what must be considered is whether or not the United States would feel the same if Russia were to place a missile defense system along U.S.-Mexican borders and claim it was for Russian defensive protection.

In order to overcome current Russian anti-Americanism, it is important to identify the contemporary and historical factors that have contributed to this Russian perception. Waltz's three levels of analysis suggest that the rise in Russian anti-Americanism may be attributable to factors at one or all three levels. This research is intended to provide a better understanding of the complexity of twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism, its root causes, and what (if anything) can be done to reverse the sentiment. While anti-Americanism is running rampant throughout Russia and has evidently increased since President Putin took office in 2000, it can be argued that anti-Americanism is not a universal attitude in all geographic parts of Russia or Russian society.

C. HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY

The major question analyzed in this thesis is the origin and implications of twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism. The hypothesis is that relevant factors are present in each of Waltz's three levels of analysis, the individual, the state and society, and the international system. In other words, the root causes include the views of President Putin himself, historic and contemporary Russian nationalism, and Russia's vision of its place in the international system. Key factors at each of the aforementioned levels have contributed to the rise in contemporary Russian anti-Americanism. I argue that while the foundation of twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism can be

⁵"New Russian ICBM has Clinton Roots," Softwar, 7 July 2007, <http://www.softwar.net/ss27.html> (accessed 19 December 2007).

attributed to each of the three levels of analysis, the first level, the individual, in my opinion may be most responsible for this increased sentiment.

The thesis examines the theories of offensive and defensive realism and discusses whether either of them helps explain Waltz's third level of analysis and the apparent rise of Russian anti-Americanism. Is it possible that both offensive and defensive realism in different ways have contributed to a rise in twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism? If so, one could argue that both of these theoretical foundations offer some additional explanations as to why Russia perceives its international position as weak and failing.

D. BACKGROUND

Kenneth Waltz's first level of analysis suggests that it is possible that a root cause for an increase in Russian anti-Americanism may reside in the actions of a national leader who has significantly influenced national sentiment.⁶ Kenneth Waltz's second level of analysis discusses the state and society. Increased Russian anti-Americanism may derive from historical Russian culture, domestic forces and "ideological movements."⁷ Russian nationalism can be considered their independent variable, in that if it were not for Russian history and nationalist pride, Russian anti-Americanism might not be as substantial.⁸ Russian nationalism has clearly influenced recent Russian behavior.⁹ Kenneth Waltz's third level of analysis argues that state behavior is determined by the distribution of power among states. How Russia defines its role in this power struggle can be directly related to how it sees itself within the international security community.

The rising influence of anti-Americanism in Russian society has affected Russian-American relations and evoked much concern in the United States. Has Russian anti-Americanism always been present? Or has it only recently emerged in a more marked manner with the political maneuvering of President Vladimir Putin? While Putin goes so

⁶ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 17-38.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

far as to compare the proposed U.S. missile shield in Central Europe to the Cuban Missile Crisis, he does call President George W. Bush a friend and insists that Bush is working with Moscow to better understand Russia's defense concerns.¹⁰ The view that the American way was not necessarily bad and that the U.S. perspective of freedom and nationalism was acceptable was evident in a Russian poll conducted in 2000. Over 75% of Russians interviewed claimed that they would like a greater sense of human and individual rights that include freedoms of expression, religion, and media.¹¹

Peter Baker and Susan Glasser report that while Putin and Saddam Hussein were noted allies both economically and politically, when the 2003 war in Iraq was at the point of being initiated by the United States, Putin was trying to convince Saddam to give up, to retire, and to prevent an international situation that would not only divide trusted allies, but also cause a great deal of suffering and destruction.¹² Putin, however, realizing that Saddam would not bow to U.S. demands sided regretfully with the United States, but also informed President George W. Bush that he was making a significant political mistake by invading Iraq.

Over the course of 2004 to 2007, Dr. Sarah Mendelson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in collaboration with Dr. Ted Gerber of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, interviewed over 1,800 Russian youth between the ages of 16 and 29. The study was commissioned by the Levada Analytic Center¹³ and resulted in a joint publication by Mendelson and Gerber titled, "The Putin Generation." This report examined and presented the findings that over 60% of Russian youth now see the United States as either outright enemies or at a minimum rivals.¹⁴ Additionally, their report

10 "Putin Gives Stark Missile Warning," BBC , 26 October 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7064428.stm> (accessed 20 November 2007).

11 Dale Herspring and James J. Collins, *Putin's Russia, Past Imperfect: Future Uncertain* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 23.

12 Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, *Kremlin Rising* (New York: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 2005), 215-228.

13 Sarah E. Mendelson, "The Putin Generation: The political View of Russian Youth," CSIS, 25 July 2007, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_experts/task,view/id,89/ (accessed 11 January 2008).

14 Ibid.

presented that over 70% of Russian youth felt that the United States aggressively tries to impose its will on the rest of the world and that the United States is only willing to provide aid if it will influence that country's foreign policy in a very pro-American way.¹⁵

1. The Putin Phenomenon

Putin's neo-authoritarian leadership style may have contributed to this increased sentiment. Upon Putin's successful election in 2000, NATO, and President Bill Clinton warmly accepted this young, vibrant Russian as not only Russia's new leader but potentially the gateway to improving Russian-American relations.¹⁶ During a meeting in 2001, President George W. Bush stated that "I looked the man in the eye. I was able to get a sense of his soul."¹⁷ This led observers to believe that political relations between George W. Bush and Putin would be positive. However, Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok argue that Putin in many ways is just like Stalin. They are cold, emotionless, strong willed, methodical leaders and are considered political "strong men."¹⁸ Russia's strong sense of historical and contemporary nationalism, coupled with Putin's sense of Soviet pride and KGB grooming, seem to have spilled over politically into twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism.

Dale Herspring and James Collins agree that while Russia does seem to strive for successful relations with the United States, the Russians do not believe that they are taken seriously; and this forces a very pragmatic Putin to attempt "strong arming" the United States.¹⁹ Putin seems to seize any opportunity to advance what he sees as Russian political interests. Putin masterfully wielded the 9/11 attacks to provide a media

15 Sarah E. Mendelson, "The Putin Generation: The political View of Russian Youth," CSIS, 25 July 2007, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_experts/task,view/id,89/ (accessed 11 January 2008).

16 Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 139.

17 "Bush and Putin: Best of Friends," BBC, 6 June 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1392791.stm> (accessed 14 March 2008).

18 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 12.

19 Herspring and Collins, *Putin's Russia*, 233.

opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its interest in improved relations with the United States. Putin was the first to call President Bush, offering his condolences and the Russian government's help.²⁰

2. Russian Nationalism

Russian anti-Westernism is not new. It has strong roots in the Slavophilist movement during the early nineteenth-century.²¹ Astrid Tuminez notes that proponents of this movement held that Western society was soulless, self-centered, and shallow.²² Slavophiles argued that U.S. culture and society did not live in harmony and faith with each other.²³ In Other words, Americans did not respect each, share a common religion, and did not get along very well. Some Russians during this period were very anti-American and felt that Russia possessed a romantic nationalist culture that should be valued and remain distinctive and organic.²⁴

Upon President Putin's successful transition from Russian prime minister to RF president, he made it clear that "One should not forget that NATO and Europe is not the same thing. Russia belongs to European culture, but does not share the culture of NATO."²⁵ Putin extended his comments to the West and indicated that he did not trust the United States or its policy.

Dmitrii Likhachev holds that Russia has an exceptional degree of national pride and that Russia in its post-Soviet phase must protect its rich culture and history.²⁶ For these reasons, Russians have been programmed to dislike the U.S. based partially on strong Russian culture, pride, and a sense of romantic nationalism.²⁷ Richard Dobson interviewed many Russians and found that many displayed anxiety over American

20 Herspring and Collins, *Putin's Russia*, 233.

21 Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism Since 1856*, 265.

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*, 64.

24 Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism Since 1856*, 63..

25 *Ibid.*, 127.

26 *Ibid.*, 274.

27 *Ibid.*, 265.

policies and the U.S. way of life.²⁸ Many of the interviewees asserted that Americans lacked spirituality and that the United States was a growing pool of crime, inadequate social protection, and emptiness.²⁹ So what does this mean? While Russians do not necessarily want to become westernized, some do share a common view that things are not so bad in the United States. Russians are interested in exploring moderate levels of freedom, equality, and political opportunity, but do not wish to lose their sense of Russian pride in the process.

The literature at hand supports the argument that Russians have expressed and continue to manifest anti-American sentiments. Richard Dobson pointed out over 10 years ago that some Russians did wish to work with the United States in an effort to better social, economic, and political conditions.³⁰ Their only stipulation was they did not want to lose equality with the West, simply to adhere to a more positive relationship with Americans. Over 10 years ago, many Russians felt that America was trying to suppress Russia, weaken it, reduce Russia's role in the international system, and solidify America's own position as a dominant power.³¹ According to one Stavropol worker, "All troubles come from the West, we lack all independence."³²

3. International Balance of Power

Hedley Bull notes that a stable balance of power requires three basic foundations.³³ First, a balance of power is necessary throughout the entire international community so that there cannot be a quest for universal empires.³⁴ Russians contend that the United States is trying to dictate to them how they should run their government. Putin argues that Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both attempted to make Russia

28 Richard B. Dobson: *Russia's Future: Perspectives of Young Russians: 1994-1995*, R-1-95, September 1995, 9.

29 Dobson: *Russia's Future*, 9.

30 Dobson: *Russia's Future*, 9.

31 Dobson: *Russia's Future*, 20.

32 Ibid.

33 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 102.

34 Ibid.

subservient to the United States and decrease Russia's power internationally. Second, Bull states that the balance of power develops a form of checks and balances that prevents one state from being able to absorb another.³⁵ It can be argued that since Putin's election to the presidency in 2000, Russian sentiment has been that the United States has been trying to improve political relations with Russia. But, the literature also states that Russian anti-Americanism seems to be at its highest level in years.³⁶

The last foundation that Bull identifies is that in order for a balance of power to exist there must be international order in diplomacy, war, and power management among major international actors, notably the United States and Russia. While the United States is interested in missile defense and NATO expansion, Moscow seems to welcome U.S. offers with closed arms. Arguably Moscow's concerns about U.S. missile defense are not unfounded. Would Washington welcome a reverse initiative by Russia if they were to place missile defense systems in Cuba or Mexico? It is highly unlikely. It would seem that Putin is attempting to redress the unequal balance of power and to regain at least some of the influence of Soviet times.

E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The basic analytical approach to be used in this thesis will be a combination of the historical and analytical methods. There is an exceptional amount of literature on Russian anti-Americanism both online and on bookshelves. A variety of Russian and U.S. sources, both primary and secondary, are examined to test the aforementioned hypotheses. While President Putin has curtailed much of what the domestic media is allowed to write and how it is allowed to portray his government, there are suitable Russian sources available to study and analyze. Not all authors agree on the current state of Russian anti-Americanism. Some maintain that it is more historical in nature, while others argue that President Putin is the main factor promoting the reemergence of the "Iron Curtain."

35 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 102.

36 Dobson, *Russia's Future* 9.

F. ROADMAP

Chapter II analyzes President Vladimir Putin in relation to Waltz's first level of analysis, the individual, and how Putin's vision of Russia may have contributed to increased twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism. This chapter also analyzes Putin's youth, education, worldview, KGB career, position as prime minister, and eventual rise to the presidency of the Russian Federation. Putin's relationships with Presidents Bill Clinton, G.H.W. Bush, and G.W. Bush will also be analyzed, as well how his political approach slowly changed during each of their administrations. Additionally examined will be why Putin appears to hold the United States with such disdain, thereby promoting Russian anti-Americanism.

Chapter III addresses Russian nationalism and Waltz's second level of analysis: state and society. How this has contributed to the rise in Russian anti-Americanism can be associated with the positions taken traditionally by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Slavophiles. This level argues that because of the social psychology these groups foster, it is not surprising that Russians are pre-disposed to dislike recent American policies and attitudes. This provides a foundation to approach the perception of how a state observes its international counterparts. Additionally, how has social rallying contributed to the rise in anti-American sentiment? Could it be associated with Russian nationalism, social and state groupings? As Russians appear content with the efforts made by "Nashe," a social movement that intends to bring back old Soviet ways, it appears that Russians are lowering a new iron curtain. It also appears that President Putin is rallying nationalism and the state and social personality of twenty-first century Russia, which seems go hand-in-hand with increased anti-Americanism.

Chapter IV considers strategic balancing, Russian realism in combination with internal and external Russian political agendas, and leadership interpretations of Russia's international position. Waltz's third level analyzes the international system, and this relates to Russia's reaction to an unequal distribution of power in relation to the West. How Russia sees this inequality with the United States may have led to Russia's impression that it is strategically discriminated against and that the international balance of power favors the U.S. Russia's self-perceived weakness and unequal treatment could

be argued as a premise for the rise in twenty-first century anti-Americanism currently being examined. This has appeared to regard to Russia's struggle against U.S. missile defense, its deterrence concerns, and its strategic balancing against the United States and matters of defensive realism as Russia attempts to regain some of the power and influence that it exercised in Soviet times, could it be argued that Moscow is retreating to a more Darwinian state of affairs and championing the survival of the fittest as suggested by offensive realism. It may be concluded that as Russia continues to perceive its declining role in the balance of international power as unfair and threatened, it has begun to address problems of military readiness, strategic inferiority, and power projection capabilities. As it struggles with its own new strategic identity and position in the international balance of power, it has become more aggressive, at least in the short term.

Chapter V analyzes all three levels of analysis and determines which image is most responsible for the increased sense of Russian anti-Americanism. Discussed is the current state of declining twenty-first century Russo-American relations and how better policy initiatives may improve these relations in the areas of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the CFE Treaty, and NATO enlargement. Additionally reviewed is Russia's future with Medvedev as president, and Putin as prime minister, and what Washington will need to do to improve these relations and reduce Russian fears of U.S. dominance. Moreover, how will the next president affect Russo-American relations and how might Russia see each of the choices as the candidates prepare for the November elections? Lastly, is Medvedev being groomed as the next Putin or will he find the tenacity to pave his own way? Putin's influence over Medvedev will be addressed and how Putin may be setting himself up for a strong 2012 presidential run will also be analyzed.

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II. THE PUTIN PHENOMENON

A. FIRST LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Chapter II examines Kenneth Waltz's first level of analysis, the individual, and considers how President Vladimir Putin's personality, political mindset, and vision of Russia may have contributed to the rise of twenty-first Century Russian anti-Americanism. Have his relations with the United States and NATO been well received by elite and mass public audiences in Russia? Is Putin working a propaganda machine and seeking to mold Russian views of Americans? His purpose for this may be based on his own Communist education and distrust in the United States, as well as a desire to build his own personal popularity.

This chapter will provide evidence that Putin's behavior has become misdirected, aggressive, and politically defiant, which has contributed to Russia's less-than-favorable impression of the United States.³⁷ The recent Georgian conflict is a good example of this. Putin actually blamed the United States for the crisis, claiming that Washington was trying to make Russia look bad in the eyes of the international community.³⁸ Furthermore, Putin has changed his mind regarding NATO more times than not.³⁹ First, he expressed an interest, claiming Russia would consider joining. The he contradicts himself and states that NATO lacks qualities worthy of Russian consideration. This makes his political position frequently hard to read confusing U.S. officials.

Hans Morgenthau claims that "The test of political success is the degree to which one is able to maintain, to increase, or to demonstrate one's power over others."⁴⁰ Morgenthau's perspective may help explain Putin's apparent desire to control the image of the United States and Russia's interactions with Washington. He's uses the U.S. position on domestic and political positions and to rally Russian anti-Americanism.

³⁷ Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, 16.

³⁸ Dominic Evans, "Putin says suspects U.S. provoked Georgian crisis," Yahoo, 27 August 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080828/pl_nm/georgia_ossetia_putin_dc (accessed 27 August 2008).

³⁹ Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 127.

⁴⁰ Morgenthau cited, 35.

Putin's opinion of the United States does not seem to be based on factual information. Granted, it can be argued that the United States has given Putin grounds to be upset. Putin's opinions may instead be founded on Russia's and his own Communist background. Putin politically shoot from the hip. He is intelligent but his behavior leaves Washington wondering what his motives are.

Francis Bacon states "the human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order and equality in things that it really finds."⁴¹ This is attributable to Putin in that he appears to strive for the development of a greater sense of equality with the United States. One could argue that Putin realizes this cannot be accomplished since the United States is realistically the only true superpower but still Putin aggressively attacks the U.S. and its policy agenda.

Robert Jervis argues that leaders can become uncomfortable trying to address a situation that cannot be rationally, intellectually, or pragmatically, in Putin's case, explained.⁴² The result can be psychological discomfort, insecurity, and intellectual dissatisfaction.⁴³ Putin's Communist upbringing may not allow him to readily understand the complexity of the United States without a predisposed set of twentieth-century biases. Everything the United States does is perceived by Putin as an attempt to make Russia a little brother to the United States. Moscow is no longer experiencing Cold War aggressions, but it seems to be suffering from a Cold War mentality that continues to foster a negative perception.

1. Perceptions and Misperceptions

Putin emulates Soviet era distrust and sees things only as he wishes. His Soviet background predisposes him to distrust the United States and he views U.S. policy as manipulative and dishonest. This has clouded Putin's ability to reasonably assess policies and motives. He is not interested in Russia serving as a lapdog to the United States and

41 Quoted in Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 319.

42 Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 319..

43 Ibid.

clearly will not stand for it.⁴⁴ To a degree, the United States is a perfect model of Morgenthau's definition of political success, and Russia is not. Putin aggressively and publicly expresses his admiration for a fallen Soviet Union. He longs to recapture its political power and displays a sense of embracing its glorious past.⁴⁵

When Putin inherited the political reins of Russia, he accepted the huge task of bringing Russia into the twenty-first century politically and socially. His personality is calculating, his decisions stern and forthright, and his emotions, at times, skillfully hidden. His political influence has the potential to yield a new and stronger Russian infrastructure of political stability and domestic hope for a better Russia. However, his decisions regarding how he addresses and contends with Washington appear to be sending Russia steamrolling back to old Soviet ways. Because Putin is Communist in nature, he seeks to strengthen Russia's perception of external power. Waltz and Morgenthau offer that men are "born seekers of power."⁴⁶ Power can offer a leader "means to an end" and, in other instances, power is just the instrument towards men gaining the control they desire.⁴⁷ Putin was born into an era of USSR vs. U.S. dominance, and therefore is physiologically programmed to recreate a nostalgic image of the Soviet Union. Therefore, he seems to be copying much of its instinctive opposition to U.S. policies and initiatives.

2. Personal Experiences

Jervis states that one's behavior is attributable to one's past and personal experiences.⁴⁸ How Putin makes decisions can be attributed to his own personal experiences during his childhood, his time at Leningrad State University (LGU), and

44 Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Rise of Russian Anti-Americanism after September 2001: Envy as a Leading Factor, Michigan State University," <http://www.msu.edu/~shlapent/antiusenvy.htm> (accessed 11 November 2007).

45 Ibid..

46 Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 35.

47 Ibid.

48 Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 217.

more importantly, his career in the KGB. Jervis theorizes that a number of variables are attributable to how to one makes decisions and behaves politically.

There are four variables that influence the degree to which an event affects later perceptual predispositions are whether or not the person experienced the event firsthand, whether it occurred early in his adult life or career, whether it had important consequences for him or his nation, and whether he is familiar with a range of international events that facilitate alternative perceptions. We can make only two observations about the relative importance of these variables and the way they interact. First, when several of the variables are positive, the event will have especially great salience. But it would be attempting too much precision to say whether the impact of the variables is additive or multiplicative. Second, events that are terribly important for a nation can have so great an impact that the perceptual predispositions of those who did not participate in the making of the policy will be affected almost as much as those who did.⁴⁹

It is important to reflect on the last part of Jervis's statement in that past events of great importance to a nation can subconsciously affect the individual making that nation's decisions. Clearly, Putin is an example of this. His strong Soviet background may lead him to postulate Washington's desire to control Russia, thereby driving Putin to subconsciously attack the United States and its Russian policy. Jervis also offers for consideration that "a person who has been bitten by a snake will be predisposed to seeing ambiguous figures as snakes."⁵⁰ In the instance, the United States can be perceived as the snake and Putin the victim. He continues this sentiment with the person who has been bitten with take excessive measures to prevent future bites.⁵¹ This strongly resembles Putin's behavior towards the United States. The Soviets may have felt the U.S. bit them during the Cold War. Since Putin is a product of this time, his threats that Russia will not become subservient to the United States seem reasonably logical.

As Jervis claims, personal experiences are a significant platform for one's behavior and how leaders conduct themselves in the presence of another nation's policies and principal actors. One could contend that Putin sees the United States as an essential

49 Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 239.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., 240.

factor in the recent submission of Russia politically. Jervis theorizes that “a person’s most fundamental orientations, his feelings, and his ability to influence his environment and possibly his nation, whether hostile or benign originate during his childhood.”⁵² Putin spent his youth saturated by g Soviet propaganda. Now as an adult, Putin perspectives can be seen as a reflection of these Stalinist values.

Benedict Spinoza stated that to “understand or explain human behavior, you need to reference psychological factors.”⁵³ This, one can argue, reflects on Putin’s past. To understand Putin and why he seems transparently anti-American, we need to examine his psychological makeup. He was born and raised during a very difficult time in the USSR when the United States was not perceived as friend but more as a foe.

B. VLADIMIR THE PERSON

Putin’s transformation and quick rise to political stardom fell unexpectedly into the hands of a man once defined as socially insecure, skinny, and hardnosed.⁵⁴ So what could be expected of Putin? He certainly never imagined he would become president of Russia. At best he aspired to become a KGB officer. He had no idea what the future would hold for him, but became the perfect example of Russia’s American dream, rising up from a poverty-stricken youth surrounded by crime and corruption. Subconsciously driven by a strong Soviet upbringing, Putin has arguably transformed himself into a Russian post-Soviet tsar. He is intelligent, speaks with a golden tongue, albeit with a penchant for crude humor, and seems to use his political influence as a sounding board in the promotion of Russian anti-American.

1. Early Years

Putin was not born to a family of riches, education, influence or power. Small, and scrawny in stature, Putin was full of youthful aggression but presumed limited

⁵² Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 250.

⁵³ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 29.

⁵⁴ Mikhail Tsypkin, NPS lecture, 12 February 2008.

potential. His childhood was rooted in the problems of a very poor USSR, a shoddy boyhood home, and a hallway shared with rats.⁵⁵ Nurtured on common Communist principles,

Putin was born in Leningrad on October 7, 1952. He would eventually reach only 5 feet 6 inches, his features chiseled, emotions void of sympathy or charisma, and mannerisms punctuated only by limited episodes of laughter or softness. His penetrating steely blue eyes are very characteristic of a true Russian.

His grandfather, Spiridon Putin, was the personal cook for both Lenin and Stalin, and a survivor of a brutal Soviet era.⁵⁶ His parents were of common Soviet virtue, simple and ordinary. Putin's father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, was stern, void of emotion, and was considered a very mean-looking man.⁵⁷ Putin's fourth-grade teacher, Vera Dmitrievna Gurevich, commented that Putin's father raised him with a heavy hand.⁵⁸ There were no hugs, kisses, or affection in the Putin household. Putin's father appeared to be kindhearted but emotionally, everything was kept inside.⁵⁹ Putin would take after his father. Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin served in the Soviet Navy as a submariner and eventually as a soldier in the demolitions battalion of the NKVD during World War II.⁶⁰ After being injured, his father left the service and became a Communist party member and factory worker.⁶¹ Putin's mother, Maria Ivanovna Putina, was a factory worker, a romantic and devout Orthodox. She could be considered the catalyst behind instilling gentleness in Putin as a father and husband.

55 "Much Ado About \$100 Oil," US News, 31 January, 2008, <http://www.usnews.com/blogs/beyond-the-barrel/2008/1/4/much-ado-about-100-oil.html> (accessed 10 April 2008).

56 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 40.

57 Gevorkyan, *First Person*, 17.

58 Ibid.

59 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 41.

60 Gevorkyan, *First Person*, 17.

61 Ibid., 8-12.

As a child, Putin was a rough, ill-mannered, troublemaker submersed in a concrete jungle that forced him to become aggressive and self-reliant.⁶² But his teacher Gurevich felt that although Putin was rough around the edges, he was generally a good person. Putin recalls not starting school until he was 8 years old, and to this day, remembers himself as a very average student, aggressive and defiant towards his teachers.⁶³ Gurevich notes that Putin would not forgive those who betrayed him.⁶⁴ This may offer insight into Putin's behavior and his later decision to defy U.S. policies after feeling ignored and double-crossed by the United States over a series of issues.

2. Leningrad State University (LGU)

It is important to consider that while at LGU, Putin's interest went beyond the realm of his studies. He became highly interested in the Communist Party of the USSR, and eventually became a member, until the party was dissolved in 1991.⁶⁵ It is necessary to reflect on Putin's affiliation with the Communist Party. Putin not only supported the Communist Party, he also only elected to dissolve his membership when he was forced to do so. Notably one could argue that Putin only entertains twenty-first century relations with the U.S. because he feels obligated to do so through U.S. pressure. What also should be considered is that LGU was a theoretical stronghold of anti-Americanism in the 1970s and 1980s.⁶⁶ Most of Putin's professors were strong advocates of the Communist system, views that could have logically been translated to Putin.⁶⁷

3. KGB Officer and Duties Abroad

Propelled by aspirations of becoming a high-ranking KGB officer and protector of the Soviet Union, Putin became infatuated with the KGB at a very young age. He fell in

62 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 42.

63 Gevorkyan, *First Person*, 13-16.

64 Gevorkyan, *First Person*, 21.

65 Irina Skakova, "Political Portrait of Vladimir Putin," OMDA, http://www.omda.bg/studentski_forum/political_portrait_of_vladimir_p.htm (accessed 15 July 2008).

66 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 140.

67 Ibid.

love with the movie *Sword and Shield*, and the seemingly romantic idea of becoming a KGB intelligence officer.⁶⁸ Putin eventually changed his impression of the romanticisms of the service. According to one account, “the KBG was not as he expected and certainly was not glamorous or as fancy as he once thought.”⁶⁹

During Putin’s ninth-grade year, he began to give serious consideration to joining the KGB.⁷⁰ He went to the KGB Directorate and approached an officer asking if he could join.⁷¹ To his dismay, the agent told him that the KGB did not accept volunteers and that he had to be selected for membership.⁷² More importantly, the agent told Putin he needed to attend university first and, if the KGB was interested, it would find him. This did not discourage Putin. His desire to become a KGB member would only propel him to work harder and become more focused. In 1975, Putin successfully graduated from LGU with a degree in law.⁷³ The culmination of Putin’s dream and hard work was realized when upon graduation from LGU, he successfully entered the KGB.⁷⁴ Putin later recalled that the KGB targeted him for recruitment even before he graduated from LGU.⁷⁵ “You know, I even wanted it,” he said of joining the KGB.⁷⁶ “I was driven by high motives. I thought I would be able to use my skills to the best for society.”⁷⁷

In 1978, he completed his training as a KGB Intelligence Specialist⁷⁸ and after spying on foreigners for the First Department of Leningrad, Putin was called back to

68 Gevorkyan, *First Person*, 67.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Gevorkyan, *First Person*, 23.

72 Ibid.

73 Skakova, “Political Portrait of Vladimir Putin.”

74 Ibid.

75 David Hoffman, “Putin’s career rooted in Russia’s KGB,” *Washington Post*, January 30, 2000, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/russiagov/putin.htm> (accessed 2 February 2008).

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Skakova, “Political Portrait of Vladimir Putin,”(accessed 15 July 2008).

attend elite foreign intelligence training institute until 1983.⁷⁹ At the age of 32 and upon completion of his training, Putin served abroad in Dresden, Germany, for five years. He found himself in Dresden during a time when East Germany was of considerable interest to Moscow.⁸⁰ The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was the location of approximately 380,000 Soviet troops, as well as a deployment of SS-20 mobile nuclear-tipped missiles.⁸¹ During his time in East Germany he would become quite well versed in German, and gain an appreciation for German culture.⁸² This could be considered the start of Putin's political career, even if he was unaware of it.

To this day, Putin would consider his time in Dresden as highly beneficial, but that the position he held to be very minor.⁸³ Interestingly, Communist paranoia and the extreme confidentiality of KGB duties limited available information regarding how agents were tasked. For this reason, Putin's duties while in Dresden cannot be accurately discussed, and Putin seems unwilling to do so. Following the collapse of the East German regime, Putin was ordered back to the USSR, and eventually returned to Leningrad.⁸⁴ In June of 1990, he accepted a position with the International Affairs section of LGU, reporting to Vice-Rector Yuri Molchanov.⁸⁵ In his new position, Putin became reacquainted with a long-time friend and colleague Anatoly Sobchak, then mayor of Leningrad.⁸⁶ Sobchak had served as an assistant professor during Putin's university years and became a very good friend to Putin.⁸⁷ On August 20, 1991, Putin officially resigned from the State Security Services during the KGB-supported abortive ousting of President

79 Skakova, "Political Portrait of Vladimir Putin,"(accessed 15 July 2008).

80 Hoffman, "Putin's career rooted in Russia's KGB,"(accessed 2 February 2008).

81 Ibid.

82 Skakova, "Political Portrait of Vladimir Putin," (accessed 15 July 2008).

83 Adi Ignatius, "A Tsar is Born," Time, January 7, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/1,28804,1690753_1690757_1690766,00.html (accessed 10 January 2008).

84 Ibid.

85 Skakova, "Political Portrait of Vladimir Putin."

86 Gevorkyan , *First Person*, 67.

87 Ibid.

Mikhail Gorbachev.⁸⁸ Putin had spent 16 years as an agent, and in the end, was considered an average agent, nothing spectacular, and certainly not someone expected to become Russia's next president. After a number of attempts, Putin successfully resigned.⁸⁹ Putin's resume in the KGB may provide insight into his behavior toward the U.S. in that in one instance he may approve of Washington and the United States but on the other hand, may actually find significant suspicion in U.S. policy.⁹⁰

4. St. Petersburg

From 1994 to 1996, Putin would serve as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg under Sobchak. In this capacity, Putin became very influential, becoming involved in every aspect of running St. Petersburg. Putin became a principal actor in the alleged corruption that would define its municipal government. During his tenure as deputy mayor, Putin's office fell under criticism for unethical and illegal contract activity.⁹¹ It was alleged that he provided preferential treatment to a group of companies that had agreed to import food to Russia in return for contracts that would exceed \$92 million.⁹² Although avidly denying the charges, Putin would get caught personally signing an oil contract in excess of \$32 million.⁹³ Marina Salye, a local St. Petersburg's lawyer, recommended Putin's dismissal. She would claim that Putin's behavior was characterized by "incompetence bordering on lack of conscientiousness, and that he presented unprecedented negligence and irresponsibility in his duties as deputy mayor."⁹⁴ Even after the commission led by Marina Salye recommended Putin's dismissal, and presented convincing proof, Sobchak refused to dismiss Putin.⁹⁵

88 Gevorkyan , *First Person*, 67.

89 Gevorkyan , *First Person*, 67.

90 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 140.

91 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 47.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Paul J. Saunders, "The Real Vladimir Putin," The Nixon Center, January 6, 2000, http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/articles/1_6_00Putin.htm (accessed 12 May 2008).

5. The Yeltsin Transition

Boris Yeltsin always had a soft spot for placing those into office that he considered Siloviki.⁹⁶ Siloviki were officials with experience in the “power ministries,” such as the army, police, and secret services, and Putin fell perfectly into this category.⁹⁷ Yeltsin wanted to surround himself with those who had been part of a strong Soviet Union and were part of youth movements, or were young lawyers and economists. He liked Putin but recalled that during his first encounter he noticed that Putin seemed emotionally withdrawn and lacked a certain sense of personal contact. Yeltsin furthered his sentiment of Putin by claiming that Putin’s “calmness scared him and made him very cautious.”⁹⁸ Yeltsin would later state he came to realize it was just Putin’s “ingrained nature” to behave in such a way.⁹⁹

Throughout Putin’s career under Yeltsin, he would continually gain the interest and support of Yeltsin. After serving just one year in Moscow, he had impressed Yeltsin so much that he was promoted to director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).¹⁰⁰ This position went beyond Putin’s expectations. His performance had been average at best during his career with the KGB, and he never could have imagined that he would lead the organization that started his career almost 20 years earlier.

On 26 December 1999 Yeltsin meet with Putin at his home. He informed Putin that on the 31st, he would be stepping down and identified Putin as his replacement. Whereas most people would find great excitement in the realization they were about to enter into such a grand office, Putin thought differently. He would express to Yeltsin that he was not ready and quite frankly did not want the job.¹⁰¹ Putin claimed the presidency

⁹⁶ Eugene Huskey, *Overcoming the Yeltsin Legacy*, ed. Archie Brown (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 84

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 49.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

offered a rather “difficult destiny,” and one he was not sure he could pull off.¹⁰² In an effort to pacify Putin’s concerns, Yeltsin would claim that Russia was ready for a new leader, a man who could take it to another level. He claimed Russia was ready for the “Putin era.”¹⁰³ This man who had just been named prime minister in August of 1999 was now on the cusp of running the world’s largest country. Until this point, Putin was more concerned with just keeping his job. As it had been publically reported, Yeltsin had already gone through five prime ministers in 17, months leaving Putin to wonder how secure his job was.¹⁰⁴ Putin would state that Yeltsin’s move was, “totally unexpected and still to this day amazes him.”¹⁰⁵

Yeltsin relinquished the presidency on New Year’s Eve, 1999, naming Putin as his successor.¹⁰⁶ In the face of public tears and discontent in the announcement of his resignation, Yeltsin begged for Russians to forgive him. He wanted them to warmly welcome Putin as their interim president. As Yeltsin left office, he told Putin “take care of Russia.”¹⁰⁷ The United States had come to know Yeltsin as a drunkard and politically inept leader. What they were about to face in Putin would be completely different. To thank Yeltsin, Putin’s first act as president would be to exonerate Yeltsin and his family from future criminal prosecution over his various misdeeds in office.¹⁰⁸

6. Russia’s Twenty-First Century President

Vladimir Putin’s rise to the presidency on 31 December 1999 can be depicted as the beginning of a new Russia. Political expectations of Putin were substantial. He found himself tasked not only with transforming the Soviet Union, but more dauntingly, resurrecting a fractured Russia and a dismal Russian self image. He ultimately addressed

102 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 49.

103 Ibid.

104 Adi Ignatius, “A Tsar is Born.”

105 Ibid.

106 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 127.

107 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 60.

108 Ibid.

Russia's place internationally, and created an administration that developed and repaired Russia's failing social and economic status. Seemingly, Putin became driven to either solidify better relations with the United States, or knock them off their self-appointed pedestal of international superiority. Putin initially cooperated with the United States on a number of treaty issues where Yeltsin had failed (START II and the CTBT) but it is debatable whether Putin's true agenda was so flexible.

His actions, words, and relations with the United States became the catalyst of what could be considered the foundation of Russo-American relations. So if Putin was so driven to establish better Russo-American relations, what happened? Why would Putin later strive to create hostile relations between Russia and the United States? Putin could be compared with Stalin in very general terms. Both Stalin and Putin desired a strong Russian hierarchy, capable of influencing and dominating border states and controlling their own internal sovereignty. This point holds great importance in the development of Putin as a strong Russian leader and his influence on future relations with Washington. He may have seen the United States as progressively making Russia subservient to Washington and thereby found it necessary to strike back with verbal aggression and transparent threats.

As Putin entered office, he was committed to following Russia's constitutional laws and political foundations. Unfortunately, it would appear that as president, he has incorporated his own interpolations of the constitution, which many would consider flawed and brutally unethical. Putin implies that following the rules is an absolute, and that all great leaders must abide and appreciate basic political foundations that should never be compromised.¹⁰⁹ The problem with this form of Putin's politics is that he does not follow his own words and readily jails or exiles members of the media, businessmen, or politicians who do not follow his agenda. An example of this would be the

¹⁰⁹ Vladimir Putin, "Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference," President of Russia, Official Portal, 17 February 2008, http://kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/02/14/1011_type82915_160266.shtml, (accessed 12 March 2008).

Khodorkovskiy¹¹⁰ incarceration or the highly publicized assassination of Alexander Litvinenko under dubious circumstances involving radioactive materials.¹¹¹

Putin considers himself a statesman among statesmen and believes that his two terms as President have yielded nothing but absolute success both in Russia and within the international community.¹¹² When Putin was asked whom he respects as strong political leaders, Putin discusses his admiration for Charles De Gaulle and Ludwig Erhard.¹¹³ Both were pragmatic and authoritarian leaders and both were considered to have accomplished great political initiatives for France and Germany. Just as they recreated and revitalized their countries, Putin wants to believe that he is Russia's moral compass and a good example of what it means to be Russian.¹¹⁴ One could easily argue that in considering Putin's background, psychological make-up, and policy directives, he may believe that he can return Russia to times of a Soviet greatness. This is a daunting task considering over half of the Soviet Union's population now lives in independent countries and Russia has lost one-fourth of its former territory.

Similar to Stalin, Putin is not a trusting leader. Whether this originates from his time as a KGB officer or his political tenure in St. Petersburg or not, this quality clearly influences Putin's every political decision.¹¹⁵ Putin claims that in order to be taken seriously, one must exude a sense of confidence and control.¹¹⁶ This could be the premise behind why Putin tends to be very crude and aggressive in the language he uses. While some of his inherent distrust could be simply founded in Communist history, it is clear he does possess personal animosity and distrust towards the United States. During Russia's December 2007 elections, Russia fell under international controversy and disapproval

110 "The Tycoon and the President," *Economist*, 19 March 2005, http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3983898 (accessed 11 April 2008).

111 "Reaction: Russian Ex-Spy's Death," BBC, 24 November 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6179212.stm (accessed 11 April 2008).

112 Gevorkyan, *First Person*, 195.

113 *Ibid.*, 3.

114 Gevorkyan, *First Person*, 195.

115 Shlapentokh, "Trust in Public Institutions in Russia: The Lowest in the World."

116 Gevorkyan, *First Person*, 168.

from the U.S. for its electoral process. Reportedly, the United States did not approve of the Russian refusal to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) request for full access to its elections or the opportunity to be present for purposes of monitoring. Putin struck back by stating that the OCSE's decision to boycott the elections "was done on the recommendation of the U.S. State Department, and we will take this into account in our intergovernmental relations with that country."¹¹⁷ Putin furthered his comments by stating that "Actions like this will not foil elections in Russia, they will fail to attain this goal."¹¹⁸ By this, one could argue, that Putin saw himself as preventing the United States and the OSCE from controlling or influencing Russia's state sovereignty.

Putin validates Russian anti-Americanism insinuating that the United States is out to get Russia. With this in mind, Russians would be more likely to believe that the United States is trying to subvert Russia." Sarah Mendelson reports that Putin has become vocal in his accusations against the United States and compares Washington to Germany's Third Reich in its pursuit of world dominance.¹¹⁹ As president, Putin felt perhaps betrayed by disagreements over U.S. missile defense, space initiatives, the ABM Treaty, and the CFE Treaty. Arguably, these disputes could serve as the premise for Putin internally convincing himself that the United States was the enemy, and that Russians must be aware of this. Moreover, one might hypothesize that Putin entered office with an open mind and that these events and disagreements, contributed to his regression to Soviet-style anti-American thinking. But it did not seem to take much pushing, given Putin's predilections.

C. PUTIN AND BUSH

Relations between the United States and Russia haven't always been frosty. There were times during the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries when diplomatic relations were

¹¹⁷ Peter Finn, "Putin accuses U.S. of Interference," Washington Post, 27 November 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/26/AR2007112600573.html> (accessed 2 December 2007).

¹¹⁸ Finn, "Putin accuses U.S. of Interference."

¹¹⁹ "Young Russia's Enemy No.1," Washington Post, 3 August 2007, http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/ar2007080202148.html?nav=rss_opinions (accessed 11 December 2007).

quite good. Spearheaded by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his ambassadorial pact with the Russians in 1933, the United States and Russia also managed to get along and allied together to fight Nazi Germany.¹²⁰ If history repeats itself, we could see a shifting in the political winds between Washington and Moscow, which may have originated with Putin and his aggressive verbal rhetoric and could gravitate to Medvedev and more positive relations over the coming years. U.S. presidents have always found it necessary to entertain the Russian psyche in an effort to reassure Moscow that we are not out to suppress their political, social, and economic agendas. But personalities matter, whether through Roosevelt's diplomatic initiative, Kennedy's temperance in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nixon's offer to curtail the nuclear arms race, or Reagan's desire to end the Cold War, the United States appears to be continually working towards keeping the peace with Moscow.¹²¹ George Kisker noted:

That to realize peace, one must seek to understand the minds of men; only when we deal with their "motives" do we approach the "fundamental levels of the problem."¹²²

Prior to George W. Bush entering office, Putin began looking forward to his arrival and began to politically court the prospective Bush cabinet.¹²³ This was based on comments by George Bush Sr. to Russian officials during a trip to Russia that his son, George Bush Jr., would become the next U.S. president.¹²⁴ One could argue that Moscow and Washington with an earlier Bush as president had enjoyed positive Russo-American relations. It had been rumored that towards the end of the Clinton-Putin era, Putin was growing tired of Clinton and looked forward to another Bush in office.¹²⁵

120 "Highlights in the History of U.S. Relations With Russia: 1780-June 2006, State, 11 May 2007, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/c22305.htm#cuban_missile (accessed 13 June 2008).

121 "Ronald Reagan and his Legacy in Space," Russian space web, 5 June 2004, <http://www.russianspaceweb.com/reagan.html> (accessed 9 October 2007).

122 Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 60.

123 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 126.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.

With the successful election of George W. Bush, and Putin's respect for the Bush family, Moscow expected prosperous relations to develop in Washington. Putin perceived Bush as pragmatic, just as he saw himself, and expected Washington and Russia to see eye-to-eye on many issues. As Bush entered office, he tried to cement positive relations with Putin by claiming he respected Putin, and that he "saw the soul of a good man."¹²⁶ He would also comment that:

We're dealing with a lot history and a lot of suspicion...the President and I will try to work through these for our common good. And I'm hopeful we can have some breakthroughs.¹²⁷

It seemed that at times, Bush and Putin were on the same political page. However, Putin would ultimately, disagree with many of Bush's initiatives. Putin may have felt the United States betrayed Russia with its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Jackson-Vanik misunderstanding, and the failure of the United States to back Russia on the CFE Treaty.

Whether Russia is right or wrong is irrelevant. Washington must realize a better understanding of Russia's internal struggles before they can properly address twenty-first century Russo-American relations.

1. September 11, 2001

Following the September 11 attacks, Putin and George W. Bush Russia began to reshape their political relations in an effort to combat terrorism together. Putin was quick to call Bush and relay his condolences and support to the United States. This politically savvy move by Putin would forge a new and apparent friendship between the United States and Russia in the fight against terrorism. With a new Russo-American partnership in place, the United States would further assist Russia economically. Putin hoped this newly forged relationship with Washington would assist in developing Russia

¹²⁶ Jill Dougherty, "Another looks into Putin's soul," CNN, 24 February 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/02/24/summit.russia.dougherty/> (accessed 10 April 2008).

¹²⁷ "President Bush Participates in Joint Press Availability with President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine," White House, 1 April 2008, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080401-1.html> (accessed 15 May 2008).

economically and further integration politically with the United States.¹²⁸ He also hoped this new relationship would stop the United States from its continual criticism of Russia and its actions in Chechnya.

In May of 2002, while both G.W. Bush and Putin were celebrating the Treaty of Moscow, both presidents came to verbal blows. Putin became very upset in that he had hoped the Treaty of Moscow would help develop of a new strategic relationship with Bush. He felt double crossed at the concept of a Bush-imposed steel tariff. Putin would rebut Bush's tariff with aggressively stating how poor the poultry was that the U.S. sent to Russia. He claimed the "U.S. was sending poor chicken legs to Russia on purpose and that the United States had separate plants for good and bad chickens." President George W. Bush addressed Putin's concerns and told him "he was wrong about this." Putin however seems content in that the "Bush legs" fiasco was finely orchestrated initiative by Washington to intentionally poison future Russo-American relationship. Interestingly, Bush felt that Putin's information was not only inaccurate but that it was stemming from the ex-KGB advisors, Putin has employed.

One of the most significant confrontations the United States has faced with Russia was the military initiative against Saddam Hussein in 2003. Putin considered Saddam a business associate, and more importantly a friend.¹²⁹ Putin would send Primakov to Saddam with a secret message, "resign, retire, and make things easier on yourself."¹³⁰ Putin trusted Primakov; after all, during the Cold War Primakov was staunchly anti-American. He influenced just about every policy matter regarding the U.S. and Putin knew Primakov was the best option for taking sense into Saddam. However, Primakov's efforts would fail. Saddam would refuse Putin's and Primakov's effort to save his life. In the end, as Bush's effort to invade Iraq progressed, Putin would verbalize his impression that Bush was conducting himself not only unethically, but also in clear violation of the United Nation (UN) charter. This suggests that the rise in twenty-first century anti-Americanism could be founded on both U.S. leaders and how Putin sees U.S. policy.

128 Putin, "Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference."

129 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 215

130 Ibid.

However, one could argue that Putin's inability to move beyond a strong Communist past may be the sole premise for his opinions of the United States and that U.S. policy is only the catalyst for aggravating Putin.

In March 2003, Fred Weir provided commentary that relations between the United States and Russia were getting frostier by the minute.¹³¹ Russia accused George W. Bush of resorting to Cold War tactics by deploying U-2 spy planes over Russia. Putin also became upset with reports that surfaced claiming that Russia had sold arms and high tech surveillance equipment to Iraq in defiance of the UN Iraq sanctions.¹³² These statements alarmed Putin, who in turn sent strong anti-American messages throughout Russia with chastising rebuttals towards the United States for its allegedly inaccurate accusations. Putin scolded the United States publicly for making these presumptions.

In response to Washington's Iraq invasion, Putin would join forces with France. This would send a clear and unmistakable message that Putin disapproved of the U.S. attack. This caught Bush off guard. Throughout Russia, the United States was seen as egotistical, arrogant, and guilty of placing itself on a pedestal of superiority capable of ruling anyone at anytime. Under the control of Putin, Russian news and Putin himself were reporting the United States as monstrous, controlling, and behaving irresponsibly. President George W. Bush was portrayed as a political cowboy who was shooting from the hip because Saddam had tried to assassinate his father, Bush Senior years before.¹³³ Putin would initially refuse to support U.S. efforts in Iraq, and would stand firm on Russia's position. Putin would conclude his disapproval by expressing to Bush via phone that his decision to invade Iraq was wrong, and that it would result in tremendous human suffering.¹³⁴ He proceeded to tell Bush, "I feel bad for you."¹³⁵

131 "Relations between U.S.-Russia frosty," CDI Russian Weekly, 26 March 2003, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/250-2.cfm> (accessed 11 June 2008).

132 Ibid.

133 Jim Lobe, "So, did Saddam really try to kill Bush's dad?" Asia Times, 21 October 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FJ21Ak02.html (accessed 12 December 2007).

134 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 228.

135 Ibid.

Putin's distrusting nature and Communist background his character has been defined as reactionary and pessimist towards George W. Bush and Washington. When Putin identifies something as anti-Russian, he frequently strikes back publicly with crude disparaging language. This forces Washington to engage in damage control and psychoanalyzing of Putin's inferences in an effort to figure out his true motives.

Putin claims that the United States refuses to see Russia as an equal partner and that it is this is the main cause of friction in Russo-U.S. relations.¹³⁶ He claims that the United States portrays Russia as uncivilized, savage little dirty tree dwellers that need a good shave and bath.¹³⁷ Putin asks the United States, "What makes you believe you have the right to interfere in our affairs? That is the main problem in our relationship."¹³⁸ Putin feels that he is not respected or perceived as having an opinion or intelligent position on Russia's future within NATO or future U.S. policy.

2. Failed Promises

It could be argued that the United States has contributed to a rise in twenty-first Century Russian anti-Americanism. It certainly did not help that Vice President Dick Cheney publicly commented that when he did not share George W. Bush's vision, and that when he looked into Putin's eyes, he saw "KGB, KGB, KGB," just as Senator McCain would.¹³⁹ Furthermore, Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had promised to address the Jackson-Vanik amendment but failed to do so, which led Putin to believe that Washington was full of empty promises. This amendment, contained in Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act, denied unconditional trade relations with Russia as it possessed a non-market economy restriction based on emigration opportunities.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶"U.S.refusesToSeeRussiaAsEqualPartner-Putin," Johnson's Russian List, 19 December 2007, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-261-6.cfm> (accessed 21 December 2007).

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 125.

¹⁴⁰ "Jackson-Vanik and Russian Fact Sheet," The White House, 13 November 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-16.html> (accessed 15 March 2008).

Putin's administration would become frustrated with Washington and, more directly, George W. Bush. After agreeing to such measures as closing Russia's Cuba bases, and ratifying the CTBT and the START II Treaties, Putin expressed that Moscow was doing everything the U.S. asked, and was receiving nothing in return.¹⁴¹ Even U.S. Ambassador John Bolton was quoted as saying "There was definitely a lot of heartburn that the relationship is all give and no get."¹⁴² He believed that Russia's complaints had merit, and that the Russians had the right to be dissatisfied with the United States.

3. NATO Summit

During NATO's 2008 summit, President Bush proclaimed that "NATO expansion was absolutely necessary and that it would establish a strong unified Europe."¹⁴³ Furthering his statements, as reported by Nile Gardiner of the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, "NATO is a strong reflection of President Bush's firm conviction that the frontiers of freedom must be advanced across Europe right to the borders of Russia, and that is his legacy."¹⁴⁴ Through George W. Bush expressing such opinions, Russo-American relations have suffered significantly. Granted, Clinton initiated NATO expansion but Bush too is a strong advocate of NATO's growth and supports its progress.¹⁴⁵ This is what Putin had hoped to avoid with another Bush in office.

4. Political Puppeteer

As Putin stepped down as president, it was debated whether he would fully relinquish presidential power. He skillfully positioned Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev as his successor to the presidency, but many ponder whether or not Medvedev is not Putin's political puppet. Putin stated during his February 2008 presidential speech:

141 Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising*, 220.

142 Ibid.

143 "At NATO summit, Bush likely to get some of what he wants." Yahoo, 2 April 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20080402/ts_csm/apondcrossing (accessed 6 April 2008).

144 Ibid.

145 "At NATO summit, Bush likely to get some of what he wants." Yahoo, 2 April 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20080402/ts_csm/apondcrossing (accessed 6 April 2008).

The President is the head of state, guarantor of the Constitution, and sets the main domestic and foreign policy guidelines, but the highest executive power in the country is in the hands of the Government. There are enough powers to go around, and Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev and I will divide them between ourselves and build up our personal relations, if the voters give us such a chance. I can assure you that there will be no problems in this respect.¹⁴⁶

This would lead one to believe that Putin is not ready to step down and has chosen someone he can control. Putin is a master propagandist, and very good at articulating his message in a very transparent way that appears passive and obvious, but in actuality is very calculating. Putin knows the Russian people adore him, and want him to run for a third term. This works to his advantage, as it appears he can do no wrong. Economically, many feel Putin has saved Russia from economic disaster and international inequality, whether he deserves it or not. Interestingly, if Putin continues to enjoy widespread Russian support even as prime minister, it is likely that he is positioning himself to run for the presidency again, thereby solidifying his status as Russia's great twenty-first century tsar.

While Putin does not fully agree or wish to fully democratize Russia, he understands that democratic programs are not necessarily unrealistic.¹⁴⁷ But he wants a managed democratic system in Russia.¹⁴⁸ This would allow Putin to better control its political system and agenda, even as prime minister.

D. PUTIN'S PUBLIC INFLUENCE

Putin's success is not one dimensional. He has managed to rally a nation that approves of his ideology and political presence. He maintained an overwhelming 70% approval rating over his past eight years in office.¹⁴⁹ In comparison, most U.S. presidents generally lose a significant degree of approval towards the end of their terms. This shows

146 Putin, "Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference."

147 Leon Aron, "What does Putin want?" AEI, 29 November 2006, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all.pubID.25204/pub_detail.asp (accessed 5 January 2008).

148 Aron, "What does Putin want?"

149 "Putin Has 70-80% Approval," FMNN, 16 October 2007, <http://www.freemarketnews.com/WorldNews.asp?nid=50288> (accessed 14 January 2008).

that Russians are not only very happy with Putin they are arguably not looking forward to a Russia without Putin. This influence on the Russian public is remarkable and quite frankly doubtful to be seen again, as Medvedev furthers his tenure as Russia's newest head of state. Putin has increased the general sense of anti-Americanism that was not present in the 1990s during a time when Russo-American relations were quite favorable. After the end of the Cold War, Russia was welcoming the U.S. with open arms. Yeltsin was trying to defeat the remnants of lingering Soviet Communism and, at the same time, attract U.S. aid and interest. Granted, it can be argued he failed at both; Putin was handed a country eagerly trying to rebuild itself and suffering from a lost identity.

On one hand, it seems that Putin wanted to work on improving Russo-American relations. On the other hand, he clearly supported the Russian people, the Soviet past, and seems very tongue-in cheek about truly welcoming Washington to Russia's political table. Because the Soviets by nature distrusted the United States, it is possible that this involuntary emotion towards the U.S. had been hereditarily passed to Putin through a form of psychogenesis. Waltz theorized "individual behavior can be the result of misdirected aggression and stupidity."¹⁵⁰ Putin's expectation of becoming equal with the U.S. could be founded on his expectation to recapture a glorious Soviet past that was present during the twentieth-century. This premise could be founded on political aggression towards the U.S. and Russia's inability to contend, which made Putin's job of drumming up Russian anti-Americanism quite easy.

1. Statistical Approval

Interestingly, the generation born between 1976 and 1991 is considered the "Putin generation."¹⁵¹ As reported by Mendelson and Gerber, it appeared that Putin's first directive in an effort to restore Russia's lost sense of dominance was to reinvent its lost pride. It is expected that pride in Putin will last for years to come since it is the younger generation that has benefited from his administration. In 2005, Mendelson and Gerber

¹⁵⁰ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 16.

¹⁵¹ Sarah E. Mendelson, "The Putin Generation: The political View of Russian Youth," CSIS, 25 July 2007, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_experts/task,view/id,89/ (accessed 14 December 2007).

conducted a survey that detailed how Russian's felt about Stalin's reign. It was noted that most did not feel Stalin did a bad job and that really he did "more good than bad."¹⁵² One could argue that Putin is successfully convincing Russians that he is protecting them from aggressive external influences from the United States. His rhetoric could be convincing Russians that the U.S. is trying to push Russia around, and that Putin is standing in the way.¹⁵³

Putin's behavior can be attributed to Rousseau's theory that "man was as society created him."¹⁵⁴ In this instance, one could argue that while Soviet society may have created Putin, Putin has successfully influenced Russian society and its return to Soviet contempt for the U.S. Moreover, it would appear that this offers a logical explanation for Putin's behavior. But in order to position himself as a potentially great Russian leader, he also realizes he must help Russians realize higher salaries and a better quality of life, and exterminate the chaotic Yeltsin era, when economic and political disorder reared its ugly head as recently as the Yeltsin era, causing significant domestic problems and domestic friction. To do so, Putin consolidated key economic enterprises under state control. As Putin's political success grows and oil is peaking at over \$145 per barrel, Russia continues to find stability as a major oil producer, which yields increased governmental cash flow, resulting in Russian citizens enjoying an improved quality of life, a strengthened national identity, and major improvements in paid pensions.

152 Sarah E. Mendelson, "The Putin Generation: The political View of Russian Youth," CSIS, 25 July 2007, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_experts/task,view/id,89/ (accessed 14 December 2007).

153 Ibid.

154 Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 16.



Figure 1. Russian Economy from 1991 thru 2005

Figure 1 demonstrates that Putin’s administration has been successful in substantially enhancing Russia’s economic status and therefore yielding a better quality of life for Russian citizens in comparison with the Yeltsin administration. Putin has done a good job for Russia in general. He has developed a strong sense of Russian worth in that Russia is debt free, is revitalizing its military, and seemingly standing up to the United States. Putin continues to use anti-American rhetoric, and after stepping down from the presidency, was overwhelmingly welcomed as Russia’s prime minister. Putin is a neo-authoritarian whose leadership style and background enabled him to realize that logically, it is nearly impossible to compete with the United States. This has helped Putin rationalize what he sees as Russia’s place, but, at the same time, has hurt his political relations with the United States. His behavior has given the U.S. the impression he may still hold communist-type hostility towards Washington.

E. CONCLUSION

Max Weber notes: that, Interests, not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the images of the world created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.

Putin could be considered a dangerous man, but the threat is not material, it is presented in his politically aggressive rhetoric and questionable behavior towards the United States. He sees the world in a reflection that he has created. His interests could be

considered convoluted, and it is possible his Soviet psyche dominates his ethics. He is a product of a time past, and it would appear he is unable to let go of his nostalgia for a strong Soviet empire. One could logically argue that Putin does not take into consideration Russia's current geo-political reality but only considers his desired image of Russia.

Offering hints of anti-Americanism through his speeches and political actions, he is transparently influencing Russian society to believe that the United States is out to keep Russia from regaining international equality. As a neo-authoritarian leader, Putin has been compared to Benito Mussolini, Italy's fascist dictator and a publicity conscious showman.¹⁵⁵

Putin's media, political, and social regulations of Russia and insinuation that the United States is forcing his actions, lends credence to the presumption that Putin is confident that he can control public perceptions, Putin has eliminated all independence in the media and those who disobey are either exiled or fired.¹⁵⁶ This was seen most recently when a local Russian newspaper, *Moskovsky Korrespondent*, reported that Putin had left his wife for a woman thirty years younger than him.¹⁵⁷ Quickly imposing his will, he disbanded the paper. Putin has masterfully instituted the full-scale destruction of the autonomy of regional governments, and has weakened the Duma. He has controlled electoral processes, falsely imprisoned his competition, and in some instances been linked to the murders of those who defy him. Hand picking Medvedev, it would seem, Putin will continue his reign as Russia's puppeteer. At least Putin keeps in character. He is skillfully placing those into power that he feels closest to, and those he considers allies.

155 Martin Wolf, "Why Putin's Rule Threatens both Russia and the West," *Financial Times*, 13 February 2008, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fec0c678-d98f-11dc-bd4d-0000779fd2ac.html> (accessed 16 May 2008).

156 Martin Wolf, "Why Putin's Rule Threatens both Russia and the West," *Financial Times*, 13 February 2008, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fec0c678-d98f-11dc-bd4d-0000779fd2ac.html> (accessed 16 May 2008).

157 "Paper shut down after publishing Vladimir Putin Story," *Dvorak.org*, 20 April 2008, <http://www.dvorak.org/blog/?p=17360> (accessed 9 June 2008).

The youth of Russia now see the United States through Putin-filled anti-American lenses.¹⁵⁸ Putin has promoted this shift and built his support among those who do not know any better. His neo-authoritarian leadership in selecting Medvedev as his predecessor screams corruption and is very reflective of past Soviet times. Throughout Putin's tenure as president, he has yearned for political success, Russian independence, and international recognition, which appear present through his moments of defiance towards the United States. Taking this behavior into consideration, Putin himself can be seen as a primary factor in the rise of twenty-first Century Russian anti-Americanism. It would appear that Waltz's first level of analysis is validated.

Putin now visualizes the United States as an aggressor from which Russia must protect itself at all costs. Jervis observes, "If powers retreat, they will not only lose the specific value at stake but, more important in the long run, will encourage the aggressor to press harder."¹⁵⁹ Putin may very well anticipate that if he follows the U.S. agenda and NATO expansion that he and Russia will find themselves locked into years of serving the U.S., leading Moscow to give more and receive less, which could ultimately lead to weaker Russian influence. As the United States and NATO push forward with NATO expansion, Putin claims he is not afraid to use his resources if encroachment on Russian borders is not stopped.¹⁶⁰

As Putin has left office, the transformation of a fallen Soviet Union and the resurrection of Russia as a great power has been placed in the hands of Medvedev. Putin attempted to change the perception of Russia in the eyes of Washington by seeming to be accepting of U.S. policy early in his term. Prime Minister Putin will continue to influence and guide Medvedev politically and personally in his continues this effort to make Russia look as a serious contender to be dealt with. To date, it seems that Medvedev is already starting to mend Russo-American fences but it has yet to be determined if his political character resembles Putin's. At the beginning of Putin's term, he behaved very similar to

158 Mendelson, "The Putin Generation: The political View of Russian Youth."

159 Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 58.

160 "Putin goes Ballistic," Iran Daily, 10 June 2007, <http://www.iran-daily.com/1386/2863/pdf/i7.pdf> (accessed 10 June 2007).

Medvedev in that on the outside it appeared he was trying to build a stronger Russo-American alliance. This leads one to believe that Russian anti-Americanism will continue to grow as Russia's political ideology finds itself still on Putin's watch. Putin's actions and words regarding the United States will significantly influence future Russo-American relations and Moscow's new president.¹⁶¹

When George W. Bush met Medvedev, he did not make any presumptions about Medvedev's soul. His only comment was that Medvedev was a "straightforward fellow" and that he looked forward to working with him.¹⁶² It appeared Bush had realized that words would not change the basic foundation or opinions of a Russian politician. Putin embraced Bush's compliment, but it did not change Putin's rhetoric toward the U.S. This time, Bush would not try to define the soul of Russia's next president.

¹⁶¹ Andrew Osborn, "Medvedev Enters but Putin is Omnipresent," *WSJ*, 8 May 2008, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121014947453873543.html> (accessed 1 June 2008).

¹⁶² "U.S., Russia disagree on missile defense," *Yahoo News*, 5 April 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080406/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush_202 (accessed 1 May 2008).

III. RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

A. SECOND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Chapter III examines Kenneth Waltz's second level of analysis.¹⁶³ This image theorizes that the nature of the state and society influences how a nation will act and respond to perceived adversity or aggressors. Waltz notes that wars are fought for the country and therefore that nationalism creates a sense of conformity and camaraderie. Focusing on Slavophiles, and the Orthodox Church, a relation may be drawn that a strong sense of Russian nationalism may have influenced the sentiment. Russia's attitudes may have contributed to a increased sense of anti-Americanism and Russian nationalism putting into question the assumption that Russians would rather pursue strong relations with the United States rather than reconstructing a strong Russian identity.¹⁶⁴ Neo-conservatism in Russia during the 1990s emerged to these roots, the Russian past.¹⁶⁵

Arguably, one of the most storied debates in Russian history has been that between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. Throughout the nineteenth-century, the debate would rage on and seemed to be most prominent from 1840-1861. It also occurred in the twentieth-century. The Slavophiles felt that Russia needed to work on its own history, develop its own culture, and protect its religion. Westernizers felt that Russia was backwards and needed to open to the West, its technology, and its more representative forms of government.

Nationalism, in accordance with Waltz's second level, offers an opportunity for society to rise. For example, Russian nationalism provided the platform that the Slavophiles and Christian Orthodox Church used to promote their agenda. This provides a distraction for the United States and thereby allows Russia an opportunity to maintain a peaceful situations at home. Waltz quotes Bodin in that "the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing against sedition, rebellion and civil war is to keep the subjects in

163 Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*.

164 Dobson, *Is Russia Turning the Corner?* 9.

165 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 77.

amity one with another, and to this end, find an enemy against who they can make common cause.”¹⁶⁶ This is a perfect example of current Russo-American relations. Anti-Americanism had gradually increased and now is at its highest level in years. It can be debated that Russian nationalism has brought its citizens together in a way to overlook other internal problems.

Waltz continues to theorize that states act on the expectations of their citizens. He uses that analogy that if we say a “pot is boiling, we actually mean the water inside is boiling.”¹⁶⁷ This can be attributed to Russia in that its sense of anti-Americanism is founded on the ideology of its people. Russia may realize a sense of increased anti-Americanism because historically, it has not totally desired an infusion of democratic structures and Western culture. Arguably, Russian nationalism may be the catalyst behind increased twenty-first century anti-Americanism.

Richard Dobson pointed out over 10 years ago that some Russians did wish to work with the United States in an effort to better their social, economic, and political conditions.¹⁶⁸ Their only stipulation was they did not want to lose equality with the West simply to adhere to a more positive relationship with Americans. During the past 10 years, many Russians felt that America was trying to suppress Russia, weaken it, reduce its role in the international system, and solidify America’s own position as a dominant power.¹⁶⁹ According to one Stavropol worker, “All troubles come from the West, we lack all independence.”¹⁷⁰ By this it would appear the Russians may feel that they are unable to secure their own identity free of American influence.

In this chapter, I first outline the basis premise and history of the Westernizers vs. Slavophiles debate, focusing more attention on Slavophile leadership and ideology. Throughout the debate, Westernizers were pushed aside by Slavophiles as Russia sought

¹⁶⁶ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 81.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Dobson, *Is Russia Turning the Corner?* 19.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

a new identity. Moreover, Westernizers, were a pro-Western group that did not contribute to Russian anti-Americanism. Regardless, a brief historic perspective of their primary leaders and ideology is necessary. Second, Putin's relationship with the Orthodox Church will be examined to include a brief examination of Putin's influence and the Church's political support of him. Additionally, this chapter will review a number of polls conducted by Sarah Mendelson that offer evidence that Russia identifies the United States in negative terms. The chapter intends on identifying that twenty-first century anti-Americanism can be founded on the premise that Russia's strong sense of nationalism prohibits them from accepting America's Western ideology and that the Slavophiles movement attempted to protect Russia's spirituality and organic history.

B. WESTERNIZERS

The Westernizers constituted a movement that considered Russians during the nineteenth century as illegitimate children who lacked a national identity. Unlike Slavophiles, Westernizers were never a group; it is a term denoting Russian intellectuals who believed that Russia should be more like the West. One of the greatest leaders of the Westernizers movement was Petr Chaadaev. His beliefs established a group that eventually was called Westernizers by the Slavophiles. Westernizers believed that Russia needed to look to the West for guidance and national identity, and that Russia must identify with the West if it was to be successful.

The basic premise of the Westernizers was that accepting some hints of Westernism could lead to a better Russia and that it could possibly help bring Russia out of the dark and regain some sort of history. It was perceived by the Westernizers that if Russia wanted a strong future, they would need to welcome Western technology and social opportunities. Russian's who supported the integration of Western ideals thought that Russia was fooling itself in believing they were better off ignoring Western contacts. A prominent analyst of Russia in the 1970s commented:

Russians have flattered themselves for centuries that we possess a moral nature of our own that is different from Western culture but just as valuable. On the contrary, it signifies formlessness, spiritual sloth, a dead-end existence, not mysticism, but an all-destroying mediocrity of the soul.¹⁷¹

The objectives of the Westernizers were to entice Russians to accept western social and political influence in an attempt to help Russia become unique and modern. They saw Slavophiles as ignorant and full of misguided utopianism.¹⁷² Westernizers would go so far in their attempt to discredit the Slavophiles that they would frequently refer to Slavophilism as a form of anti-religious and cultural anarchy.¹⁷³

1. Petr Chaadaev

Petr Chaadaev was born in 1794, and is considered one of Russia's best minds for planting controversy into the Slavophiles vs. Westernizers debate.¹⁷⁴ Most notable for his "Philosophical Letters," Chaadaev's philosophical effort would be published in the Moscow journal *Teleskop* in 1836, meeting with sharp criticism by Nicholas I. The premise of the "Letters" was to question Russia's relationship with the West and how it might be related to the structural demise of Russia's culture and human capital. Chaadaev noted how backward Russia was and that it was culturally inferior and disconnected from the rest of the world.¹⁷⁵ Chaadaev would become very critical of Russia and note:

We, Russians, like illegitimate children, come to this world without patrimony, without any links with people who lived on the earth before us this is a natural result of a culture based wholly on borrowing and imitation. There is among us no inward development, no natural progress....We grow, but we do not mature, we advance, but obliquely, that is in a direction which does not lead to the goal, Isolated in the world, we have given nothing to the world, we have taken nothing from the

171 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 12.

172 Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*, 268.

173 Ibid.

174 James M. Edie and others, *Russian Philosophy, vol. 1, The beginning of Russian Philosophy* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), 10.

175 Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism Since 1856*, 62.

world; we have not added a single idea to the mass of human ideas; we have contributed nothing to the progress of the human spirit. And we have disfigured everything we have touched of that progress.¹⁷⁶

His sentiments were clear, Russia had nothing to offer as it stood. Void of a worthy past, present, or future, Russia was debatably a damaged country socially.¹⁷⁷ Chaadaev theorized that Russia had been exiled from world history because of Russian Orthodoxy. This perception can be logically traced since Russia's Orthodox religion did encourage retreating from the rest of the world that did not share its religious beliefs. But Chaadaev would also be very critical of Peter the Great and his attempt to Westernize Russia. He would theorize that Peter had failed civilize Russia and that he tried to make Russia appear better superficially though transparent import initiatives with the West. Chaadaev thought Peter was so excessive in his efforts to make Russia appear Westernized that he forgot about what it meant to be Russian and possess its own identity. Chaadaev's aggressive anti-Russian banter would set the premise for future debates between the Slavophiles and Westernizers. Chaadaev's work would cause such outrage and political concern that in 1837 he would be placed under house arrest, be ruled insane and placed under a doctor's care.¹⁷⁸ However, in 1838, was given his freedom under one condition: he was never to write again.¹⁷⁹

2. Vissarion Grigoryevich Belinsky

Born in 1811, Belinsky's father was a poor doctor and the family was of common Russian stock.¹⁸⁰ Growing up, Belinsky's home was full of violence that seemed to mirror the streets of his neighborhood. Disliking his father's foul language and bitterness, Belinsky would leave home at the age of 14 finding refuge in a nearby gymnasium in

176 Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism Since 1856*, 63.

177 Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism Since 1856*, 63.

178 Edie, *Russian Philosophy*, 102.

179 Ibid.

180 Ibid., 280.

Penza.¹⁸¹ In 1829, he would gain acceptance to Moscow University only to be expelled three years later for his aggressive criticism of serfdom in a play he wrote called *Dmitry Kalinin*.¹⁸²

Belinsky's theorized his concept of images through his work, *The Idea of Art*. This effort would identify in Belinsky's mind that all things were derived of one's own thoughts and capabilities.¹⁸³ He argued that spirituality, nature, life, humanity, history, and the universe were only existed because people wanted them to.¹⁸⁴ Belinsky would further his theory in observing that all things were a creation of man and that western idealism would only bring greater strength to Russia. He offered that

Every great man performs the deeds of his time, solves contemporary problems, expresses in his activity the spirit of the times in which he was born and developed.¹⁸⁵

Belinsky would argue that every great nation was a derivative of its own internal leadership. He would interject that Russia was free and capable because of the tsars that came before.¹⁸⁶ When Russia was faced with the Tatars, it was Ivan the Terrible who came to their rescue.¹⁸⁷ When Russia needed to open its "window to the West," it was Peter the Great that unlocked it.¹⁸⁸ So just as these great Russian leaders tried to protect and engage Russia, Belinsky felt that only those with the internal will could change Russia. This would include opening Russia's arms to Western ideas and technology.

181 Edie, *Russian Philosophy*, 102.

182 Ibid.

183 Edie, *Russian Philosophy*, 285

184 Ibid.

185 Ibid., 290.

186 Ibid., 297.

187 Ibid.

188 Ibid.

3. The Decembrists

In 1825, approximately 2500 members of the Russian army and nobility attempted to overthrow Nicolas I due to his authoritarian leadership and government.¹⁸⁹ Many of its members were of very wealthy families and welcomed the attempted fusion of European Restoration and improvements to Russian society that was expected from embracing western ideas.¹⁹⁰ The members also considered themselves Westernizers and believed that including Russia with western opportunity would only better Russia in the long run.¹⁹¹

One of the most famous Decembrists, P.G. Kakhovskii would write Nicholas while in prison, “It is a bitter thing for a Russian not to have a nation, and to terminate everything in the Sovereign alone.”¹⁹² The Decembrists movement had hoped for enlightenment of Russia, which would need Western influence to prosper and grow. Without this, it would seem that what Kakhovskii was trying to say was that Russia was doomed to continue without identity and with only a failing image that would never flourish.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Westernizers pushed for an elective assembly of nobles and for emancipation of the serfs. Later, more radical movements occurred calling for the adoption of Western socialist concepts and the overthrow of the tsar. Radicals, including Lenin’s brother, carried out attempted assassinations of Tsar Alexander II in the 1870s, finally succeeding in 1881. While tsarism was restored, World War I created conditions for tsarism’s overthrow by radical, communist-led Westernizers. For 70 years they attacked Russian religion and its nobility with radical Western ideas, although with a totalitarian streak that alienated Western democracies.

189 Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism Since 1856*, 36-38.

190 Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*, 259.

191 Ibid., 67.

192 Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism Since 1856*, 38-39.

C. THE SLAVOPHILES

The Slavophiles were a nineteenth century group of Russian intellectuals mainly comprised of petty nobility, well educated but not considered Europeanized like much of the upper Russian aristocracy. They supported the protection of Russian nationalism, strong Slavic heritage, and distinctive culture. They represented Russian Orthodoxy, old noble families, and traditional family beliefs. They discounted Western ideology, which they saw as including liberalism, socialism, and rationalism. Moreover, Slavophiles viewed their movement as the premise of the Orthodox Church.¹⁹³ They believed they were employed with the responsibility of protecting Russia's rich historic and moral value and organic thought.¹⁹⁴ Slavophiles did not think that the Western ideas were necessarily bad, they just felt that those who progressed with Western ways had taken a "wrong turn" in life and only the Orthodox Church could reroute them to salvation.¹⁹⁵

The Slavophiles were drawn to Fyodor Dostoyevsky's impression that Russian should not try to solve problems through intellect but instead through the foundations of God.¹⁹⁶ Slavophilism is based on the theory of finding ones way with the help of God and not the technological advancements or opportunity that Western society may provide. The heart can lead one to salvation, not the excessive condoning of rationalism. They believed that the West lacked moral values and more importantly, a soul. Slavophiles felt that those who would welcome the West were traitors to Russian nationalism. They also felt that those embracing Western ideology were betraying the Russian soul and favoring an arrogant West.

Slavophiles believed that the history of Russian culture was worth protecting and embracing.¹⁹⁷ They also felt that the most important difference between themselves and the Westernizers could be traced to

193 Wayne Allensworth, *The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernization, and Post-Communist Russia* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 32-34.

194 Allensworth, *The Russian Question*, 32-34..

195 Ibid.

196 Ian Buruma and others, *Occidentalism* (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 81.

197 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 23.

religion and morality.¹⁹⁸ Closeness to Orthodoxy and its Christian beliefs were absolute in considering oneself a true Russian. It was readily understood that Russia's past was full of suffering and disappointment. But Slavophiles found it illogical to give up their cultural heritage and succumb to the Western, which they perceived as offensive to Russian values.

Clearly, to be Russian, was not easy. It required a sense of determination and drive as well as acceptance of a difficult past. However, it was not worth throwing away for ease of life, loss of spirituality, and encouragement of immorality and Western norms.

1. Ivan Kireevsky

Arguably, the most influential leader of the Slavophile movement and one of its founders was Ivan Kireevsky. Born to the nobility, Kireevsky would grow up reading Russian literature, fluently speaking German, and nearly memorizing French literature.¹⁹⁹ Throughout Kireevsky's life, the word "national" became part of his identity. He would repeatedly see Russia as possessing a strong national uniqueness that was worth holding onto. Upon graduating from Moscow University, he joined the Society of Lovers of Wisdom. His education focused around Christian Orthodoxy and notably, Pushkin's poetry and literary works. He believed that the premise of all Russian humanity was the existence of a strong national culture.²⁰⁰

Kireevsky would note that while much of Russia's history may have been imported from other Western entities, Russia was unique and needed to continue with the creation of a coherent national philosophy that would amplify Russian society and culture.²⁰¹ Kireevsky may have accepted and even appreciated Western influences, he felt that the West would soon wear out its welcome.

Kireevsky would argue that religion and the internal strength of Russia would secure its place in history. He was known best for his philosophical views and support of

198 Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*, 266.

199 Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy* 121.

200 Ibid., 122-123.

201 Ibid., 125.

the Russian Orthodox Church. Just as Orthodoxy had defeated Catholic efforts to transform Russia spiritually, he believed that Russia's faith would rescue and protect it from Western principles and influences. He would rally Russians to be heard and to voice their personality and to embrace his doctrine of "integral cognition," which also referred to "their faith."²⁰²

2. Aleksei Khomyakov

Many Russian scholars argue whether it was Khomyakov or Kireevsky that actually founded Slavophilism.²⁰³ But most argue that Khomyakov was the more academically rounded, intellectual, and possessed a greater sense of Slavophilism, its philology, journalism, and poetry.²⁰⁴

Khomyakov was born in 1804 and would die in 1860. His background is very similar to Kireevsky and his parents would raise him with strong religious beliefs and respect for the peasants they owned and were responsible for.²⁰⁵ His personality was powerful and charismatic, and he employed the ability to gain great admiration and respect from those who would encounter him. Moreover, his beliefs were strongly connected to Russian nationalism, its traditions, and the concept of protecting Orthodoxy and Russian uniqueness.²⁰⁶

He disapproved of Europe's attempt to force Russia into western Europeanism and would argue that Europe was founded on the premise of feudalism.²⁰⁷ He would argue the importance of national purity and the ability to deny European materialism and what he perceived as Catholic authoritarianism.²⁰⁸ Khomyakov felt that the necessity of maintaining an inner holiness had to be protected and that that only way to realize this

202 Edie, *Russian Philosophy*, 168-169.

203 Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy*, 179.

204 Ibid.

205 Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy*, 182.

206 Ibid., 185.

207 Ibid., 191.

208 Ibid. 191.

was to protect the Russian Orthodox Church. Moreover, it would seem that Khomyakov felt that the Westernizers were corrupt not only intellectually, but also spiritually. He believed that accepting Western idealism would only lead to Russia further losing grasp of their national and religious identity. He would further note while addressing the Bible and its scriptures that,

Christianity is nothing other than freedom in Christ....I consider the church to have greater freedom than the Protestants. For Protestantism holds the Scriptures to be an infallible and at the same time external authority, while to the church the Scriptures are evidence of herself; she regards them as an inner fact of her own existence. It is therefore quite erroneous to suppose that the church demands enforced unity or enforced obedience; on the contrary, the church abhors both the former and the latter, for in matters of faith enforced unity is falsehood and enforced obedience is death²⁰⁹

Alexander Panarin would theorize that to be anti-Western was to be anti-American.²¹⁰ It would be logical to presume that during the nineteenth century and thus spilling over into the twentieth century, the Orthodox Church perceived Western and eventually U.S. influence as unwelcome and crude. The Orthodox Church would see America as a self-serving, destructive entity that was attempting to take over the world with mass globalization and political aggressiveness.²¹¹ The church would reject Western idealism and its obsession with the market economy and the social and physical sciences.²¹² It would become reliant on spiritual necessity and opportunity and focus on matters of God and nature.²¹³

But the church faced virtual destruction under Communist rule. Only in the late 1980s did it begin to re-emerge as an independent force in Russia life. Today, it has been restored almost as a quasi-official church in its relations with the Russian state.

209 Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy*, 194.

210 Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy*, 182..

211 "The Rebirth of Eurasianism," NCSJ, 18 July 2002, <https://ncsj.org/Auxpages/071802Rjournal.shtml> (accessed 1 March 2008).

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.

Mendelson and Gerber note in their 2002 study that Russians firmly cemented in Orthodoxy tend to see Americans more negatively. This can be attributed to the relationship between the Orthodox Church and Slavophiles. Both have historically disapproved of Westernism and its aggressive attempt to infuse Russia with its technology and spiritually inferior society.

3. Putin and the Orthodox Church

Throughout Putin's tenure as president and now prime minister he has always enjoyed the support of the Russian Orthodox Church. In November 2007, just before elections were to be held, Putin called upon Orthodox followers and Alexei II the Church's patriarch to support his transition to prime minister and Medvedev's election as president.²¹⁴ In response, the church would support Putin and Medvedev causing some to express that the relationship was an "unholy alliance,"²¹⁵

Putin also commented that the Orthodox Church needed to honor their obligation to him and Medvedev by not only supporting him but expressing to the Russian people that he was a moral and spiritual leader.²¹⁶ Putin would further state that, "Orthodoxy has always had a special role in shaping our statehood, our culture, our morals"²¹⁷

Putin seems to imply that his behavior and the policies of the Russian Federation were a direction reflection of the Church. He would further note that the Orthodox Church should support him and Russia just as all other Russian citizens would. It would appear that through Putin's statement, he was calling for the continuation of his own power within the walls of the Kremlin through the support of Orthodoxy, and the church was willing to comply. Throughout Putin's presidential tenure, he supported the

214 Adrian Blomfield, "Orthodox Church unholy alliance with Putin," 26 February 2008, Telegraph, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1579638/Orthodox-Church-unholy-alliance-with-Putin.html> (accessed 26 August 2008).

215 Ibid.

216 "Putin vows Orthodox Church support," 20 November 2007, Press TV, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=31804§ionid=351020602> (accessed 26 August 2008).

217 Ibid.

Orthodox Church and protected it from liberalism and Western influence.²¹⁸ For example, he has placed strict limits on the activities of foreign missionaries in Russia, even going so far as to ban certain denominations. It would seem that as he positioned himself to take over as prime minister, he was calling upon the church as a form of payback for his loyalty.

D. SLAVOPHILES VS. WESTERNIZERS

It seems the United States is revisiting this debate but in different terms. Spilling over from the late 1990s, the twenty-first century continues to witness an increased sentiment of Russian anti-Americanism and declining relations between the U.S. and Moscow. While many Russians applaud U.S. democratic intervention with the expectation that it will bring a better life for Russia, many Russians distrust the United States. Russians collectively view the United States, their motives, and political behavior as controlling. Russians do not necessarily wish for U.S. intervention in the development of their social, cultural, or national aspirations. Notably, this parallels the Slavophiles vs. Westernizers debate that occurred during the nineteenth-century. Slavophiles refused Western influence deeming it wrong for Russia and without substance. It would seem this sentiment had been revisited during a very young twenty-first century.

Figure 2 examines Russian public opinion polls conducted from 1995 thru 1999. These polls offer that Russian citizens were becoming disenchanted with the United States and felt that the U.S. was not only challenging Russian nationalism but also its solidarity. One could argue that most expected better post-Soviet relations with the United States. Russians during the mid to late 1990s began to realize a greater involvement by the United States in its efforts to transform Russia into another politically structured democracy. In 1994, just two years later, the honeymoon was over. Russians began to feel threatened by the U.S.: its economic dominance, military superiority, and morally loose ideology.

²¹⁸ "Putin vows Orthodox Church support," 20 November 2007, Press TV, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=31804§ionid=351020602> (accessed 26 August 2008).

	1995	1996	1997	1999
Agree	50%	52%	56%	55%
Disagree	28%	27%	14%	30%
Do not know	22%	21%	20%	15%

Source: VTsIOM²¹⁹ National sample

Figure 2. Western Democracy is Incompatible with Russia's Traditions²²⁰

Interestingly, the twenty-first century seems to repeat itself in line with the Slavophile's vs. Westernizer's debate. Similar to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, during the twenty-first century, many Russians did wish to adopt Western ideology, morals, and in some instances technology. A chief concern was not to absorb too many U.S. morals, since that may have been perceived as less than suitable for religiously driven Russians.

Figure 3 offers statistical data that, as mentioned, Russian's feel Putin and his plan has been successful. Russian approval of him and the agencies he controls, mainly the army and presidential office, grew from 78 percent in 2005 to 82 percent in 2007.²²¹ Mendelson and Gerber's survey displayed that young Russians were very happy with Putin and felt he was on the right path.²²²

219 VTsIOM is public opinion survey data derived from the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research surveys.

220 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 70-71.

221 VTsIOM is public opinion survey data derived from the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research surveys.

222 Ibid.




Figure 3. How Much Do Russians Trust?

In 2008, Mendelson and Gerber conducted a number of surveys that concluded Russian anti-Americanism had become more prevalent in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, it appeared their survey connected this sentiment with Russia’s strong sense of nationalism. Commonly referred to as “jackals,” Russians felt that the United States always seemed to interfere with everyone else’s social and political issues and continually attempted to impose its foreign policy.²²³ Of the respondents interviewed, approximately 70% viewed the United States in very negative terms.²²⁴ Approximately 63% of Russian polled felt that Americans were either an enemy or a rival.²²⁵ When asked how many of those polled felt the United States tortured suspects only 13% disagreed. A resounding 77% did believe that the United States tortured and abused

²²³ VTsIOM is public opinion survey data derived from the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research surveys.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

terrorist suspects. Most of these interviewed were young Russians, most educated, and had good jobs. One may argue that Russians are anti-American because they are not able to understand the American way. But if Mendelson and Gerber's public opinion polls tell us anything, it is that Russians making these decisions are educated and reside in urban areas.

It is hard to believe that during the late twentieth century relations between the United States and Russia seemed to be on a positive path. However, as the United States closes 2008 it may be on a verge of another Cold War-type relationship with a very nationalist and aggressive Russia. When polled regarding who Russians felt was a danger to them other than the United States, they mentioned Georgia.²²⁶ Based on the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict should the United States be preparing itself for a potential Russian intervention elsewhere?

E. CONCLUSION

When the Cold War ended and Russia transitioned from a strong Communist state to a lost, politically damaged nation. It appears that the Slavophile vs. Westernizers debate and the Orthodox Church were strong factors in setting the foundation for twenty-first century anti-Americanism. However, it would seem that when Russia lost its Communist face in the early 1990s, it also lost its national identity. Struggling to find themselves, Russians they would become angry with the U.S. and its sudden surge in power once the Soviet Union fell. While the United States got stronger, Russia became disintegrated and politically ignored. National flags were not flown, and the Russian national anthem was not heard. Russians would logically begin to attack the United States for damaging Russia and placing it in such dire circumstances. President Reagan and his famous request to "tear down that wall"²²⁷ would seemingly give Russians the impression that United States was completely behind the fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of a weak Russia.

²²⁶ Mendelson and Gerber, "US and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin Generation."

²²⁷ "Former U.S. President Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl receive new German unity prize," Pravda, 17 June 2005, <http://english.pravda.ru/world/2005/06/17/60391.html> (accessed 23 July 2008).

Russia became angry during the 1990s and the way in which the United States seemed to discount what Russia had gone through historically. They also complained that the United States was stingy with aid when Russians faced economic difficulties and even food shortages after throwing off Communism. Yeltsin would publish a number of articles regarding Russia and its attempts to regain a national identity. Russian's had suffered and given a great deal. They felt that the United States and the geopolitical agenda were trying to keep Russia from regaining a strong national identity and from further integration of Russia in to the international community.²²⁸ Sergei Kortunov, a former Soviet arms control expert for the federation, claimed that the United States viewed Russia as trying to become an imperial power. It was in his opinion that Washington, was attempting to persuade international leaders to avoid Moscow politically.²²⁹

As Dmitry Ryurikov writes, between 1992 and 1998, Russian lacked a national identity more so than ever.²³⁰ Since the Cold War was over and Communism was gone, one could argue that Russian's had no idea who they were, The problem was, they had no idea how to embrace their history and transition into a new dawn for a post-Soviet Russia. They would become engulfed with U.S. consumerism and fail to identify their own path of political and economic fairness for Russian citizens.²³¹ One could argue that Russians lashed out at the United States because they felt the U.S. was bringing Western ideals to Russia and further weakening Russia's ability to create its own image outside of Communism.

228 "Former U.S. President Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl receive new German unity prize," Pravda, 17 June 2005, <http://english.pravda.ru/world/2005/06/17/60391.html> (accessed 23 July 2008).

229 Ibid.

230 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 79.

231 Ibid.

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IV. BALANCE OF POWER

A. THIRD LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

For what can be done against force without force?²³²

Marcus Cicero²³³

Kenneth Waltz's third level of analysis offers that state behavior is determined by the distribution of power among nations. How Russia defines its role in this power struggle can be directly related to how it sees itself in the international community, system, and political arena. Russia feels that the international balance of power is off kilter and that while the United States appears to have the upper hand on political power, Russia is realizing a decline in political opportunities and influence.

Robert Jervis theorizes that "wishful thinking, defense mechanisms, and motivated distortions of reality force the unemotional person to draw inferences and evidence based on a confusing situation or world."²³⁴ One of the points this chapter will argue is that, Moscow's perception of how the United States is treating Russia appears distorted and based on ambiguous evidence. Putin does not support the U.S. missile defense initiatives and it would appear that Putin's intentions are to transform Russo-American relations to a point that a re-establishment of Cold War equality could be realized with the United States.

Finding an acceptable middle and political sharing of what Russia perceives as satisfactory international balance of power could limit a continual increase in twenty-first century anti-Americanism. Russia appears to find it necessary to project its limited power in an effort to feel it is being given an equal opportunity to Influence to the international community. But, as Russia continues to see that the world has become unipolar and the

²³² Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 159.

²³³ Marcus Cicero is perceived the most versatile mind of ancient Rome in that he solely introduced Romans to Greek philosophy and Latin philosophical terms. Cicero established himself as a great orator, lawyer, translator, and philosopher.

²³⁴ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 3.

U.S. is on top, it feels a greater sense of insecurity. Russian concerns may be well-founded regarding their internal and external security. Arguably with the United States possessing so much power, Moscow may feel it will eventually find itself unable to defend itself.

Hedley Bull theorizes that a stable balance of power requires several basic foundations for the accomplishment of state preservation.²³⁵ One might consider that first, a balance of power is necessary throughout the entire international system so that there cannot be a quest for universal empires.²³⁶ Arguably, when nations are part of a bipolar or multi-polar world, options for balancing are typically better than a unipolar system. For this reason, Russia may be substituting aggression for its internal fear of the United States. Bull also theorizes that in order for a stable balance of power to exist there must be international order in diplomacy, war, and power management among international actors, notably the United States and Russia.

Russia argues that Washington's political agenda and international influence unfairly places it in a dominate position superior to Moscow. Putin would argue that Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush attempted to make Russia subservient via empty pleasantries and unfulfilled promises. Bull states that the balance of power forms a system of checks and balances that prevents one state from being able to absorb another.²³⁷ Russia's place in the balance of power has been sorely weakened. This may force Russia to think the United States could politically control it and influence its internal state sovereignty. Since Putin's election to the presidency in 2000, Russian sentiment has been that the United States has not been trying to improve political relations with Russia.

As Russia continues to address its internal security and modernize its conventional, nuclear, and space systems, it continues to come up short. Consequently, with Russia's continual bullying of nearby countries in an effort to regain its place, it has

235 Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 102.

236 Ibid.

237 Ibid.

become nothing more than a political annoyance. During the mid twentieth-century, the USSR was a country taken seriously, possessing weapons systems, leadership, and the strength necessary to make an impression upon the international community. With this lost, one of Russia's greatest fears in a unipolar world is that if it does not strengthen its internal and external security, the United States will eventually dictate Moscow's policy and further threaten its survival as a nation.

It appears that the United States is attempting to further develop Russo-American relations and it is arguable whether or not it perceives Russia as a threat. Because of Russia's weak position in the balance of power, the United States may see Russia as a controllable entity. This may translate to Moscow as a blatant disrespect for a once strong USSR thereby increasing twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism. It may also paint a picture that the United States is arrogant and politically pretentious. With Washington's missile defense agenda, its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and its widely publicized disapproval of Russia's CFE violations failures, Moscow may be rattled and concerned that the United States is becoming unstoppable.

As Russia's continue to realize it no longer fits into the international system as a superpower, it continues to readdress the issue by recruiting and bullying neighboring countries into joining its effort against the United States. Bull theorizes that Russia does not see a stable or favorable position in its current state of affairs in comparison to the United States. Since Russia doesn't perceive a balance between itself and the U.S. it appears to feel that the United States dictates policy where it benefits Washington.

With this in mind, Moscow is attempting to improve its nuclear capability in an effort to keep up with the United States. Moscow seems adamant on continuing to modernize its MIRV capability and claims that defending itself with nuclear weapons is a possibility if pushed. Russia is also revitalizing its space program in an effort to eliminate U.S. hegemony over world affairs and its internal security.²³⁸ In 2010, after the U.S. space shuttle is scheduled to be retired, Russia will control access to the International

238 "Europe, Russia announce next-generation spacecraft," RussianSpaceWeb 14 May 2008, <http://www.russianspaceweb.com/ard.html#agreement> (accessed 14 May 2008).

Space Station (ISS), a step towards Russia grasping for strength lost during the fall of the USSR.²³⁹ Moreover, Russia's space program presents some expectation that technologically, Russia is progressing. However, it is clear they are still many years behind the U.S. in regards to system efficiency and modernization in the military sector.

Chapter IV analyzes theories of defensive and offensive realism and how Waltz and Mearsheimer explain Russia's security dilemma's in relation to their degraded position in the balance of power. Could Russia's impression of how it fits into the international system be driving it to attack U.S. policy? Furthermore, is the perception that the country must modernize and expand its military and nuclear capability in order to protect itself well-founded? The chapter analyzes whether or not Russian views regarding its reduced power and its new struggle to balance against the U.S. can be considered logical and are connected to failed CFE, ABM, and START II treaties. This chapter will attempt to connect twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism with evaluations of how Russia fits into the international system and how U.S. hegemonic superiority could be driving this sentiment.

1. Defensive Realism

Defensive realism, also referred to as "structural realism," was created in the late 1970s by Kenneth Waltz. He suggests that states "desire to merely survive and realize an equal degree of security."²⁴⁰ He also contended that states tend to disregard cooperation with other states in an effort to survive.²⁴¹ This is because concerns about relative losses in capability become of greater interest, thus forcing states to balance against each other out of fear.²⁴² This appears to offer explanation as to why Russia refuses to work with Washington on foreign policy matters. They are afraid of losing further competitive advantages when compared to the United States. Arguably, the concept behind Russia's

239 "Russia Says ISS Ready For Permanency," 8 October 2008, Space Daily, <http://www.cndyorks.gn.apc.org/yspace/articles/iss2.htm> (accessed 26 August 2008).

240 Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*.

241 Jeffery W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01): 138.

242 Ibid.

fear can be addressed as Russia's concern that the U.S. will eventually take over their internal and external security if Russia engages in cooperation. The problem is that Russia has very little to offer the United States other than natural resources, and even those are of little interest to Washington.

Jeffery Taliaferro offers that four auxiliary assumptions underline defensive realism.²⁴³ These assumptions about the roots of state concerns are: "security dilemmas, offensive-defensive balance, material power, and domestic politics."²⁴⁴ Each of these areas contributes significantly to how Russia fits into the balance of power and how it sees itself. Some defensive realists argue that the international system is more agreeable, offering opportunities and, in some cases, incentives for expansion, but only when such moves can be accomplished at low risk.²⁴⁵ Russia perceives international expansion around its borders as an opportunity to regain power and territory it lost when the USSR fell. When states attempt to strengthen their own security, it is typical for other states to realize a subsequent decline in power.²⁴⁶ This can be related to the Russian-Georgian crisis. Russia tried to gain additional power through the absorption of Georgia; as a result, Georgia lost significant military manpower, money, and hopes of regaining its former territories and citizens.

Russia is considering how to best use its resources in an effort to regain its lost Soviet power. Defensive realists theorize that "material power" can be used as a foundation for driving states' foreign policy perceptions.²⁴⁷ Taliaferro notes that this "material power" is commonly referred to as "structural modifiers."²⁴⁸ These modifiers can guide a state in the direction of technological modernization, offensive-defensive balance of its military, and, in some instances, access to raw material.²⁴⁹ Defensive

243 Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," 159.

244 Ibid.

245 Ibid.

246 Ibid., 129.

247 Ibid, 136-137.

248 Ibid.

249 Ibid.

realists also theorize that these modifiers are significant in international conflict and generally do influence conflict more so than the mere balance of power between states.²⁵⁰ The self-perpetuating concern that Russia believes that the United States is attempting to take over Russia politically may have led Putin to generate other related concerns that in turn force Moscow to seek alternate solutions to defy the U.S. ²⁵¹ Defensive realists also contend that states will respond to the anarchy of the international system with the use of force only out of fear instead of hegemonic desires.²⁵²

2. Offensive Realism

Offensive realism is founded on the idea that there is no “status quo” in international politics and that “states look for opportunities to gain power by taking advantage of rival states.”²⁵³ Offensive realists also state that an anarchical international system strongly favors expansion.²⁵⁴ Russia perceives the United States as attempting to weaken and dominate its policies. John Mearsheimer argues that great powers must possess the ability to utilize a sufficiently large military capable of effectively fighting, winning, and gaining international power and dominance or risk another country doing this to them.²⁵⁵ Russia sees this as a lose-lose situation because of the U.S. position on the ABM, CFE, and BMD. As the United States continues to support NATO expansion which has led to the positioning of NATO troops closer to Russian borders, Moscow appears to be getting nervous about what the true intentions of the United States are. Washington’s policy of developing a strong BMD program and positioning ABM sites in Poland and the Czech Republic may make Russia sense that the United States is attempting to threaten and control it.

250 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy,” 136-137.

251 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy,” 159..

252 Mark V. Kauppi and Paul R. Viotti, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond* (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 55-56.

253 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: University of Chicago, 2001), 21.

254 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy,” 128-161.

255 Ibid.

Mearsheimer²⁵⁶ furthers his development of offensive realism in his book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, arguing that some international actors will identify ways to solidify their position as great international powers. He further notes that, “states will constantly worry about their survival because potential competitors may try to eliminate them at any time.”²⁵⁷ Russia may anticipate that in order to restore its position in the international system it must portray itself as an aggressive international bully that the United States must contend with. What Russia has on its side is a very antagonistic Soviet past that infuses fear into some countries. On the one hand, this may allow Russia to get its way, but on the other hand it presents Russia as a very distrustful nation to deal with. Mearsheimer notes:

Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to become hegemonic in the international system because if thought it already had sufficient power to survive.

Russia seems to be striving for international or at least Eurasian dominance through a sequence of political maneuvers that not only seem quite anti-American but anti-Western.

Hans J. Morgenthau theorizes that nations seek to strengthen their internal and external stability through the improvement of their military, economy, or security capabilities, regardless of moral ideology.²⁵⁸ This international relations theory is also referred to as simple power politics. In an effort to gain back a relative degree of its international power, Russia appears to discount politically ethical behavior, as seen in Moscow’s threats and attempts to bully weaker states in its neighborhood. During a roundtable press conference during the 2007 G8 meetings, Putin was asked, “If the United States continues building a strategic shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, will

256 Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 21.

257 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy,” 140.

258 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).

we not return to the situation and times in which the former Soviet Union's nuclear forces were focused on European cities, on European targets?"²⁵⁹ Putin replied, "Certainly. Of course we will return to those times....Of course we must have new targets in Europe."²⁶⁰

These statements are politically directed towards these former Soviet states in that they might become new European targets for Russia if the U.S. continues to move forward with its BMD initiative.

B. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

In 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev concluded the ABM Treaty, which remained in effect for 30 years. After the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the treaty on June 13, 2002, an association was created between the ABM Treaty and a rise in twenty-first century anti-Americanism. The U.S. departure came six months after giving the obligatory notice of its intentions to Russia, a move that infuriated Moscow. One day after the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia retaliated by withdrawing from the START II Treaty.

It is important to realize that the purpose of the ABM Treaty between the United States and the USSR was to place stringent limitations and regulatory guidance on anti-ballistic missile systems. The accord was simple; it would keep both the United States and Russia honest in the advancement of ICBM and SLBM technology and capability by reducing their incentive to build more missiles to overcome defenses. However, Russia perceived the U.S. withdraw of as sudden and politically motivated. It would end Putin's expectations that Russia and the United States would continue relatively congenial strategic relations.²⁶¹

259 "Bucharest Summit: US Missile Defense Bases Continue to Divide NATO," Acronym, Spring 2008, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd87/87nbmb.htm> (accessed 5 June 2008).

260 "Bucharest Summit: US Missile Defense Bases Continue to Divide NATO."

261 Alex Pravda, *Putin's Foreign Policy after September: Radical or Revolutionary?* ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky (Portland OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 53.

During President Putin's 2001 trip to the Bush ranch Presidents George W. Bush and Putin addressed the student body at Crawford High School. A question was directed to both Bush and Putin regarding U.S. missile defense systems and the probability that they would end up in Europe. President Bush explained that he felt the 1972 ABM treaty was outdated and that it needed to be revised at best. He explained that the treaty was effective "during a time when the U.S. and Soviet Union hated each other but now times were different and both governments needed to move on."²⁶² President Bush stated that even though they did not share the same views on missile defense; their relationship was strong enough to endure these differences. This notion obviously was not shared by Putin.

This dispute created a resounding sense in Russia that the United States again was using its military and political might to enforce its will. Moscow later proposed to the United States that instead of placing their BMD sites in both Poland and the Czech Republic that it could instead co-utilize Russian radars located in Gabala, Azerbaijan, and in Southern Russia.²⁶³ What Putin was counting on was that by offering this to the United States, it would dislodge current U.S. policy interest in positioning BMD systems in countries that Russia may perceive potential security threats.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Mull, the U.S. acting assistant secretary for political-military affairs, noted that the United States would not accept nor change its BMD initiative, or consider Putin's offering of Gabala as a substitute over using the Czech Republic or Poland for its missile sites.²⁶⁴ Dr. Rice would provide vague commentary that the United States was interested in continued Russo-American talks in an effort to develop "constructive dialogue." regarding BMD.²⁶⁵ However, it is doubtful whether the proposal was ever seriously discussed.

262 "President Bush and President Putin Talk to Crawford Students," White House website, 15 November 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011115-4.html> (accessed 20 February 2008).

263 Pyotr Goncharov, "US versus Russia on ABM," *Novosti*, 17 July 2007, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_Versus_Russia_On_ABM_999.html (accessed, 12 June 2008).

264 Goncharov, "US versus Russia on ABM."

265 *Ibid.*

C. CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

The original CFE treaty was signed in November 1990 in Paris, France, and was a reflection of over 16 years of negotiations with 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.²⁶⁶ While considered the result of the political wizardry of George H.W. Bush, its success cannot be attributed to any single person, and its demise also cannot be attributed to Russia, Putin, or any specific U.S. administration. Overwhelmingly approved during the 1989 NATO Brussels Summit and officially concluded in 1990, the CFE has continued to be a major source of political drama and increased anti-Americanism in Russia. For Russia, the purpose of the treaty was simple. It would place limits on the number of conventional military assets Russia could place throughout the territory of the former USSR in return for similar limits to NATO forces. This would prevent both sides from orchestrating conventional arms build-ups, engaging in potential mass offensives in Europe, and, more importantly, prevent small-scale surprise attacks.

With Russian military personnel and equipment still in Moldova and Georgia and against Russia's 1999 Istanbul commitments, NATO refuses to ratify the modified CFE treaty. Putin responded by stating that the military forces left in Moldova are nothing more than retirees, and the harmless equipment is operationally degraded.²⁶⁷ Regardless of why Russian military assets are still in Moldova and Georgia, Russia's April 2007 withdrawal from the CFE treaty sent chilling reminders of Russia's continuing Cold War mentality.²⁶⁸

1. Warsaw Pact and CFE Ratification

With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the integration of new NATO members and NATO's progressive expansion during the 1990s, Moscow began to call into question the CFE and demand it be modified to account for new NATO members in

²⁶⁶ Nicoll, "The CFE Treaty: End of the Road?"

²⁶⁷ Mikhail Tsypkin, NPS lecture, 12 February 2008.

²⁶⁸ "The CFE Treaty: End of the road?" IISS, March, 2008, <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-14-2008/volume-14-issue-2/> (accessed 12 May 2008).

an effort to prevent a NATO troop buildup on Russian borders.²⁶⁹ In an effort to push for a modified CFE, Russia unilaterally agreed to pull its troops out of Georgia and Moldova. Russia hoped would entice the United States and NATO to agree to its demands and modify the CFE. However, after the United States and NATO agreed to the modifications based on the notion that Russia would remove its troops from Georgia and Moldova, Russia declared that the issue of troop removal was separate from the proposed CFE ratification.²⁷⁰ Russia would not agree to remove its troops from Georgia and Moldova and therefore the United States and NATO declared that the CFE would not be ratified until this has been accomplished.²⁷¹ This became a significant political sore spot for Russia. It did not see it necessary to pull all troops out of Georgia and Moldova and felt that a U.S.-controlled NATO was trying to bully it into submission.

2. Political Considerations

The problem with the CFE treaty is that it was initiated by the United States. Russia perceives the CFE as nothing more than another attempt by the United States to use its overwhelming military and political power to influence the international community. Russia describes the CFE as no longer serving meaningful purposes for Russia, and not conforming to its current or future military position or political obligations.²⁷² Russia is also discouraged by the developmental progress of the United States in placing conventional arms in post-Warsaw Pact, states such as Bulgaria and Romania. To Moscow it defies CFE Treaty modifications proposals to stay away from Russian borders, which the United States has done by planning to place BMD systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. None of this came as a surprise to Russia. Moscow

269 Nicoll, "The CFE Treaty: End of the Road?"

270 Ibid.

271 Nicoll, "The CFE Treaty: End of the Road?"

272 "Russian pundit sees CFE treaty ending up on the 'scrap heap of history,'" Johnson's Russia List, 15 July 2007, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-155-25.cfm> (accessed 12 March 2008).

expected the United States to respond just as it has. Sergey Karaganov stated that “The United States is predictable,” leading one to believe that Russia’s anti-American culture sees the United States as nothing more than hypocritical.²⁷³

3. Russia’s Continued Presence in Georgia

In July 2007, with the CFE still not ratified and troops still present in Georgia, Russia went a step further; it suspended its participation and further compliance with the treaty. It perceived the CFE as a Cold War initiative, developed to combat Russia growth and capability, which it was, and to Russians meant a renewed sense of militaristic thinking in Europe, led by the United States.²⁷⁴ Putin would go a step further to declare that neither the United States nor NATO was interested in Russia security concerns and that both continued to position NATO troops on Russian borders, ignoring Moscow’s demands that this not happen.²⁷⁵ Putin stated, “It is already clear that a new arms race is being unleashed in the world; we must not allow ourselves to be drawn into this.”²⁷⁶

Arguably, Russia sees the United States as anti-Russian and therefore is not interested in forging a new partnership. This perception that the U.S. does not care about Russian security issues seems influential throughout Moscow and is negatively impacting any chance of improving relations with Moscow. During the twentieth-century, Russia found itself favorably positioned in a very bipolar world. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union and with its weakened military capabilities, Russia now finds it is on the outside looking in.

273 “Russian pundit sees CFE treaty ending up on the ‘scrap heap of history,” Johnson’s Russia List, 15 July 2007, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-155-25.cfm> (accessed 12 March 2008).

274 “Russian pundit sees CFE treaty ending up on the ‘scrap heap of history,”

275 Chris Wilson, “Vladimir Putin attacks West for ignoring arms race concerns.” *Mirror*, 8 February 2008, <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/2008/02/08/vladimir-putin-attacks-west-for-ignoring-arms-race-concerns-89520-20312890/> (accessed 9 February 2008).

276 Wilson, “Vladimir Putin attacks West for ignoring arms race concerns.”..

D. NATO

The birth of formal relations between NATO and the USSR began in 1991.²⁷⁷ With establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a new Russian-NATO partnership was created with the intention of fostering a new friendship that would be far removed from Cold War tensions.

In 1997, relations between Moscow and NATO seemed to be moving forward with great expectations. Both signed the Founding Act,²⁷⁸ which would offer a platform to discuss security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. With the development of the Permanent Joint Council (JPC), Russia presumably expected greater influence in security decision making and cooperation with NATO. This agreement was expected to bring Russia and NATO closer together with the understanding that both would become strong strategic allies. However, since Russia was unable to let go of strong Cold War feelings towards NATO, the JPC never became a reality.²⁷⁹

277 "NATO-Russia: forging deeper relations," NATO website, March, 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-russia/nato-russia-e.pdf> (accessed 15 May 2008).

278 The Founding Act established an opportunity for Russia to partner with NATO in consultation, cooperation, and engagement of joint discussions regarding Euro-Atlantic security issues. Included in the act was the development of the Permanent Joint Council (JPC) which offered Russia the opportunity to participate in making joint decisions with NATO. The act also delineated that Russia would not deploy nuclear weapons or station its soldiers in NATO countries. It also outlined "scopes and parameters" for the CFE that Russia agreed to follow.

279 "NATO-Russia: forging deeper relations."

1991	Russian joins North Atlantic Cooperation Council
1994	Russia joins Partnership for Peace
1996	Russian peacekeepers deploy to Bosnia and Herzegovina
1997	Founding Act signed
1998	Russian mission to NATO established
1999	Russia suspends PJC over Kosovo air campaign
2000	Putin elected, PJC relations start up again
2001	NATO Information Office opens in Moscow
2002	NATO opens Military Liaison Office in Moscow
2003	NATO-Russian Council (NRC) is established
2003	Russian troops withdraw from NATO-Balkans campaign
2005	Russia hosts NATO multinational disaster-response exercise in Kaliningrad
2006	First Russian frigate deploys in support of NATO-supported, Operation Active Endeavour

Figure 4. Key dates in NATO-Russian relations.²⁸⁰

During the 1990s, it seemed that NATO and Russia would realize a strong partnership. But with the progression of NATO expansion, relations began to decline as Russia saw NATO efforts as threatening Russian security and sovereignty.²⁸¹ Putin noted that, “if NATO expects Russia to cooperate, then it better stay away from Russian borders.”²⁸² Failure to do so would lead to Russia fighting back to what it would perceive as a “direct threat” from NATO and its western partner, the United States.²⁸³ Putin also noted:

280 “NATO-Russia: forging deeper relations.”

281 “NATO Expansion: Costs and Implications,” Comw, 23 July 1998, <http://www.comw.org/pda/nato699.html> (accessed 1 July 2008).

282 Adrian Blomfield, “Stay Away: Vladimir Putin tells NATO,” Telegraph, 6 April 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1584027/Stay-away,-Vladimir-Putin-tells-Nato.html> (accessed 7 April 2008).

283 Blomfield, “Stay Away: Vladimir Putin tells NATO.”

The effectiveness of our cooperation will depend on the extent to which NATO respects the interests of the Russian Federation and the Alliance's willingness to compromise on issues shaping the strategic environment in Europe and the world.²⁸⁴

Over the past decade, the United States, NATO, and the OSCE have struggled with Russia in trying to find common political ground. Putin identifies these organizations as one and the same, ultimately led by the United States. As was the position in the late 1990s, Russia still is not permitted to veto internal NATO decisions, delay enlargement, or affect what post-Soviet countries should or should not be allowed admittance to NATO.²⁸⁵ Putin contends that he continues to abide by U.S.-led agendas, but receives little political benefit from the United States, NATO, or the OSCE for Russia's conforming political behavior. One could argue that without cooperative relations with the United States, Putin is presuming that gaining international political support will remain a difficult goal to attain.

Although Putin continually states that it is not beyond reason that Russia one day would join NATO, it is questionable whether he really believes this. But NATO is not solely to blame for Russian dissatisfaction. Russia's refusal to abide by the CFE Treaty continues to stir discussion throughout NATO.

Arguably NATO and the OSCE simply tolerate Russia, rather than taking it seriously. This could be founded on the premise that both organizations share the support of the United States and feel comfortable in challenging Putin with big brother in their corner. In response to Russia's publicly announced distrust of NATO and the OSCE, the United States has stated that Russia needs to move beyond its zero-sum-game mentality and realize that Russia does not have to lose if Europe, NATO, or the OSCE gains and

²⁸⁴ Vladimir Putin, "Press Statement and Answers to Journalists' Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council." President of Russia, 4 April 2008, <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/> (accessed 23 April 2008).

²⁸⁵ David Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Role in International Security* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 141.

vice versa.²⁸⁶ The United States also made it quite clear that Russia's unwillingness to support NATO expansion will not be considered a reason to stop the enlargement from occurring.²⁸⁷

E. START II

On January 3, 1993, the START II treaty was signed by President George H.W. Bush and President Boris Yeltsin. The premise behind the START II Treaty was to develop a method for controlling and monitoring, ICBMS and eliminating MIRVed (multiple-warhead) ICBMS. The United States and Russia would reduce their respective nuclear arsenals by two-thirds. In addition to this, phase one of the accord expected that the United States and Russia would reduce their total nuclear warhead count to no more than 4,250 warheads each.

The accord was founded on the premise that by December 31, 2007, both the United States and Russia would successfully reduce their total deployed nuclear warheads to a number not to exceed 3,500. Again it was agreed upon that all MIRVed ICBMS would to be eliminated from both U.S. and Russian arsenals. The hope was that only single-warhead ICBMS would exist thus reducing either side's first-strike potential or strategic advantage. In combination with this, all nuclear delivery devices such as the maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV) were to be eliminated and dismantled. This was to occur no later than December 31, 2003.

START II also created a foundation that no more than 1,700-1,750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMS. There was, however, no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMS. Under START II, the Russians agreed that they would eliminate their SS-18 missiles. This would include both deployed and non-deployed assets. The idea behind this was that the United States wanted to eliminate the existence of all heavy MIRVed ICBMS.

However, upon the United States and President George W. Bush withdrawing from the ABM Treaty on June 12, 2002 Moscow immediately withdrew from the START

²⁸⁶ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 131.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

II Treaty on June 13, 2002 just had it had long warned it would do. Russia was protesting U.S. withdrawal and was notably dissatisfied. Even with questionable trust on either side, Russia hoped that a new nuclear partnership between the United States and Russia could be forged. Each would be able to dedicate its own nuclear policy and program in an effort to protect its own sovereign ability to exist and not be attacked by other nation-states.²⁸⁸ Upon the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Moscow unnecessarily became suspicious and questioned U.S. motives. A strong sense of anti-Americanism fell over Russia. Moscow was not presuming that the U.S. was attempting to tip the nuclear scale in its direction and thereby weakening and subordinating Russia to Washington.²⁸⁹ Russia was under the impression that the United States knew of Russia's security concerns and that by withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, it expressed to Moscow that Washington simply did not care. The United States was placing its own security concerns above the collective security framework that Russia had been striving to achieve.

Russia perceives the U.S. as a playground bully attempting to force its nuclear will upon the international community. Russia may realize it cannot equally defend or compete with the U.S. in terms of nuclear capability. Morgenthau points out that the possibility of a nation becoming a nuclear superpower instills a sense of power, equality, and political credibility.²⁹⁰ As the United States limits Russia's opportunity to equally balance its nuclear existence with the U.S., Moscow may perceive the U.S. as solidifying only itself as a nuclear juggernaut.

F. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

While Moscow appears willing to discuss BMD with the United States, Moscow rejects the placement of ten interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar station in the Czech

²⁸⁸ Alexei Arbatov and others, *Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation*, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 93.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 114.

Republic.²⁹¹ Russian officials warned Poland that if they accepted a U.S. missile defense system, they would run the risk of both a conventional and nuclear attack by Russian.²⁹² While a nuclear attack by Moscow is not expected, its aggressive rhetoric suggests they are demanding international respect. Moscow noted that Poland is only six minutes from Moscow and that the missile flight pattern would force Russia to automatically respond to a launch by the U.S. as an attack upon Moscow.²⁹³ Washington's plan to move forward with its BMD agenda is stirring difficult relations with Russia and forcing Russia to see the U.S. as a bully and international aggressor.

One should consider how the United States might react if Moscow were to place similar missile defense system in Mexico with an explanation that it was to protect Moscow from South American adversaries. Interestingly, this question may be posed sooner than expected. July 2008 marked the rekindling of a potentially new Russo-Cuba nuclear relationship, which was abruptly ended in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems, noted that since the United States is expanding its regional influence to Russia's neighbors, it seems only logical that Russia expand its military presence abroad to include such Cold War allies as Cuba.²⁹⁴ This clearly amplifies Russia's attempt to balance overwhelmingly unbalanced U.S. superiority.

Regardless of what the United States does, Russia will presume that it will need to protect its borders against any potential threat, whether it is the United States or not. As the U.S. continues to move forward with NMD, Moscow could potentially identify U.S. actions as anti-Russian thereby contributing to the increased sense of Russian anti-

291 "Putin Offers to Join Missile Shield Efforts; G-8 Leaders Back Bush Plan on Emissions," The Washington Post, 8 June, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/07/AR2007060700258.html> (accessed 18 May 2008).

292 Jim Heintz, "Russia Warns Poland Over U.S. Missiles," Philadelphia Inquirer, 16 August 2008, <http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20080816622775.html> (accessed 18 August 2008).

293 Nicola Butler, "Bucharest Summit: U.S. Missile Defense Bases Continue to Divide NATO," Acronym, Spring 2008, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd87/87nbmb.htm> (accessed 3 July 2008).

294 "Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin calls for restoring position in Cuba," NYDaily, 5 August 2008, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/us_world/2008/08/05/2008-08-05_russian_prime_minister_vladimir_putin_ca.html, (accessed 7 August 2008).

Americanism. The potential result of the United States ignoring Russia's NMD concerns could translate to a crippling inability to control a nuclear build-up of Russian assets.²⁹⁵ Putin expressed that while the United States and Russia are clearly at odds with the system, he believes that the United States and Russia could enter into an understanding that hopefully would lead to common language on the issue.²⁹⁶ National Security Advisor Steven Hadley expressed, however, that the United States and Russia are a long way from coming to terms with each other position regarding NMD.²⁹⁷

G. NUCLEAR CONCERNS

Russia's nuclear concerns are founded on the premise that the United States reigns as the world's only true nuclear superpower. During the Cold War, the political agenda toward the USSR was to make sure it understood that if it cherished its continued existence, it would never consider attacking the U.S. with nuclear assets. As Cold War nuclear assets grew, the U.S. and Russia realized a deadlock in nuclear capability. Both would collectively build more than 70,000 nuclear weapons and the term "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) became a staple of the era.²⁹⁸

What has happened since the major reductions of nuclear capability by both the U.S. and Russia is that the U.S. is perceived as a superior nuclear state. But Washington's nuclear capability and technological advancements do nothing to prevent Russia from expanding and improving its own nuclear capability, nor do the terms of the 2002 Moscow Treaty on strategic arms. Thus, Russians may perceive nuclear weapons as providing an opportunity to balance out international opportunity and power. Alarming Russia may a recent request by President George W. Bush that Congress increase spending on U.S. nuclear weapon's modernization and the reliable replacement

²⁹⁵ Dmitri Trenin, *After the Empire: Russia's Emerging International Identity*, ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky (Portland OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 37.

²⁹⁶ "US, Russia disagree on missile defense," Yahoo, 5 April 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080406/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush_202, (accessed, 2 May 2008).

²⁹⁷ "US, Russia disagree on missile defense,"

²⁹⁸ Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, "Nuclear Insecurity," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 86, no.5 (2007): 110.

warhead.²⁹⁹ Russia is already instinctively paranoid about current U.S. relations and how it is perceived by the United States after years of economic weakness, corruption, and political failure. It may feel that it needs to aggressively expand its own nuclear capability in order to keep up with the United States. Morgenthau notes that a stable balance of power refers to nation-states enjoying the ability to maintain the status quo in relative power distribution.³⁰⁰ It would appear that as the United States continues to make nuclear advancements and allocate additional funding towards the revitalization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; Russia is ready to test its ability in nuclear improvements.

The planned SS-27 is manufactured by the Moscow Institute for Thermal Technology. This new mobile system is reportedly to possess a MARV capability that is potentially designed for the purpose of defeating expected U.S. deployments of ABM systems. The “second strike” system appears to have U.S. officials worried as it is designed to counter an ABM strike.³⁰¹ Washington noted that SS-27 flights were observed by “Cobra Ball” (an Air Force airborne intelligence RC-135 platform that carries infrared telescopes for tracking ballistic-missile tests at long range³⁰²) and that it could not comment on the new reported MARV capability.

Russia has moved forward with resounding success in the development and launch of an improved Topol-M missile in May 2007. Reportedly the ICBM struck its target 3,400 miles down range on the Kamchatka Peninsula.³⁰³ Following the ICBM test, Russian news agencies reported First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov saying that “the ICBM, as well as a tactical cruise missile that also was tested that day, can penetrate

299 “Bush asks Congress to Fund Nuclear Arsenal revamp,” Spacewar, 25 July 2007, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Bush_Asked_Congress_Fund_Nuclear_Arsenal_Revamp_999.html (accessed 12 December 2008).

300 Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 167.

301 Norman Polmar, “Improved Russian Missile Tested.” Military.com, 4 June 2007, <http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,138051,00.html?wh=wh> (accessed 12 March 2008)..

302 “Cobra Ball.” Fas, 10 October 2006, http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/cobra_ball.htm (accessed 11 December 2007).

303 Polmar, “Improved Russian Missile Tested.”

any missile defense system.”³⁰⁴ It appears obvious that Russia is not willing to accept Washington’s explanation that BMD plans are a preventative tool against possible Iranian attacks against the United States.

First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov was quoted as stating, “As of today, Russia has new [missiles] that are capable of overcoming any existing or future missile defense systems. So, in terms of defense and security, Russian can look calmly to the country’s future.”³⁰⁵ This should concern U.S. policy makers. Moscow is confident that it has developed a missile defense system and that nothing the U.S. currently possesses is superior.³⁰⁶ Russia is clearly dissatisfied with the United States and its BMD system. Moscow may perceive U.S. actions as disrupting the balance of power and making it nearly impossible for Russia to compete with the U.S. both politically and militarily. Russia’s balancing hinges towards the improved development of its Topol-M capability, which could translate into the United States finding difficulty in defending its home borders just as Russia is claiming it will protect its.

H. RUSSIA’S NAVAL CAPABILITY

As Russia seeks to restore its international sphere of influence, and continues to realize greater economic stability, it appears that it is moving forward with the development of a stronger navy. Twenty-first century Russian forces are better trained, and present a greater sense of operational capability.

Russia’s naval infrastructure has also improved, which was noticeable on 15 April 2007, when Russia celebrated the completion of its Borei 955 strategic nuclear submarine complex located at Sevmash in Severodvinsk.³⁰⁷ What makes this historic is that the Borei class uses state-of-the-art submarine design, holds 16 ballistic missiles, travels at

304 Polmar, “Improved Russian Missile Tested.”

305 “New ICBM has Clinton Roots,” Softwar, <http://www.softwar.net/ss27.html> (accessed 1 August 2008)

306 Polmar, “Improved Russian Missile Tested.”

307 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Launches New Strategic Submarine,” Jamestown, 18 April 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372106 (accessed 28 August 2008).

25 knots submerged, and is relatively undetectable by sonar.³⁰⁸ This first-generation, post-USSR nuclear submarine will replace the Delta III, Delta IV, and Typhoon class submarines.³⁰⁹ Moscow expects each Borei-class submarine will cost approximately 890 million dollars.³¹⁰ In May 2007, the first Project 955 submarine *Yuri Dolgorukiy* was successfully launched gaining international attention.³¹¹ With the successful launch of the *Dolgorukiy*, Moscow expects four³¹² more Borei class to be launched by 2010, and a total of 20 launched by 2020.³¹³ This would be an exceptional accomplishment that would solidify Russia's capability to develop and deploy strategic nuclear submarines, which arguably could challenge U.S. submarine forces.³¹⁴

As it appeared Russia's SSBN program was on track, Admiral Vladimir Masorin stated that Russia would also be reforming its surface naval capabilities and working towards building a naval force that would be second only to the United States.³¹⁵ He went on to add that Russia would be moving away from large, carrier-type ships and building a great fleet of multiple use vessels capable of varying missions.³¹⁶ Felgenhauer notes that as Russia steadily builds its forces, it will possess a surface capability that is "only five times smaller than the U.S. and only two times smaller than Great Britain."³¹⁷

308 "935 Borei," FAS.org, 13 July 2000, www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/slbm/935.htm (accessed 27 August 2008).

309 Ibid.

310 "Russia launches new generation nuclear submarine," ABC, 15 April 2007, www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200704/s1897694.htm (accessed 27 August 2008).

311 "Yuri Dolgoruky launched," Russian Forces, 13 February 2008. www.russianforces.org/blog/2008/02/yuri_dolgoruky_lanuched.shtml (accessed 27 August 2008).

312 "Russia: Achieved SSBN and SLBM Development," 5 August 2003, NTI, www.nit.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/ssbns/ssbndevs.htm (accessed 27 August 2008).

313 "Project 955," Deagel.com, 24 August 2008, www.deagel.com/ballistic-submarines/project-955_a000341001.aspx (accessed 27 August 2008).

314 Felgenhauer, "Russia Launches New Strategic Submarine."

315 Andrei Kislyakov "Will Russia create the world's second largest navy," Novosti, 13 November 2007 <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20071113/87843710.html> (accessed 1 August 2008).

316 Ibid.

317 Ibid.

While Russia's aspirations to match U.S. naval supremacy are many years from becoming a reality, it is necessary to focus on Russia's potential capability. As of July 17, 2008, Russia deployed two surface ships to patrol the arctic waters, which included the Northern Fleet *Seveomorsk* submarine destroyer and the *Marshal Ustinov* missile cruiser.³¹⁸ While Moscow claims neither of these platforms should concern the United States, as they are not on aggressive missions, both vessels do offer a significant array of armaments and forward presence. While Russia has completed a number of two month deployments in recent years to China, India, and Vietnam their arctic operations are not fully understood by Washington.

It is possible that Russia's attempted reemergence as a naval force could be related to an attempt to recreate a multipolar world in hopes of rebalancing itself with the United States. Morgenthau claims that as more nations come to terms with their own balance of power, a sense of uncertainty arises.³¹⁹ Russia continues to aggressively compete for a greater sense of equality with the United States.³²⁰ Historically, Russia's submarine and surface force has been inferior to U.S. assets. However, as Russia continues to enjoy strong economic gains, it is reasonable to hypothesize that Russia will close the Russo-American naval gap.

Currently, Russia's defense budget is approximately 35 billion dollars a year.³²¹ It takes approximately four billion dollars to build an aircraft carrier which costs 10 million dollar per month to maintain.³²² With these allocations in mind, Russia would need to spend approximately one billion dollars a year in construction alone in order to meet the

318 David Nowak "Russian Ships to Patrol Arctic Again," TIME.com, 14 July 2008
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1822514,00.html> (accessed 15 July 2008).

319 Nowak, "Russian Ships to Patrol Arctic Again."

320 Ibid.

321 "Will Russia create the world's largest second surface Navy?" Novosti, 19 November 2007,
http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/navy/Will_Russia_Create_The_World_s_Second_Largest_Surface_Navy120014226.php (accessed 4 September 2008).

322 Ibid.

goal of becoming the second largest navy in the world.³²³This would pose a serious threat that would force the United States to reconsider where it deployed its forces and how it would potentially engage Russia abroad.

The potential of Russia becoming a strong naval threat parallels U.S. paranoia during the 1980s when Soviet maritime strategy was a chief concern for Washington. President Reagan noted during a White House speech in 1983 that a strong Navy was necessary for “long-needed modernization.”³²⁴ It seemed that Reagan realized that the United States needed to protect itself from outside aggressors which included Russia. He would become obsessed with building a 600-ship Navy and thereby setting a new standard in U.S. naval capabilities.³²⁵

I. RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

What has yet to be determined is how much influence Putin had in the decision to invade Georgia. Moreover, what influence did Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili have in Russia’s decision to attack? By invading Georgia, Medvedev contradicted Putin’s claim that troops in Georgia were inactive and that the equipment was dilapidated. While some may debate that the equipment was antiquated, Russia successfully moved large military assets into Georgia very quickly. This leaves one to believe that either the equipment was not inoperable, or that Russia had planned this invasion for some time. Furthermore, it is not clear whether Russia’s claim that the Georgians started the conflict is true. It would seem illogical that such a small sovereign nation would attack such a superior military. But, then again, it has been argued, that each August Georgian forces

323 “Will Russia create the world’s largest second surface Navy?” Novosti, 19 November 2007, http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/navy/Will_Russia_Create_The_World_s_Second_Largest_Surface_Navy120014226.php (accessed 4 September 2008).

324 Ronald Reagan, “Announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative,” 23 March 1983, President Reagan.info, www.presidentreagan.info/speeches/sdi.cfm (accessed 31 August 2008).

325 Ronald Reagan, “Announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative,” 23 March 1983, President Reagan.info, www.presidentreagan.info/speeches/sdi.cfm (accessed 31 August 2008).

pressure Russian forces.³²⁶ Regardless, what is apparent is that South Ossetia, the northern part of Georgia, and Abkhazia have become Russia's most recent crusades and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

Figure 5 shows how Russia's deep penetration of Georgian borders has been and how positioning of surface and land forces clearly states its intentions. Stationing warships off the coast of Abkhazia does not imply a peacekeeping mission nor does the destruction of Georgian ground forces in Georgia itself.



Figure 5. Map of Russia and South Ossetia.

There are a number of theories behind Moscow's invasion of Georgia. Some speculate Russia is motivated by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.³²⁷ Figure 6 shows how this 1,000 mile pipeline makes its way from the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan, across Georgia, and ends in the Black Sea.³²⁸ The relevance of this pipeline is that it is

326 John Arquilla, NPS lecture, 14 August 2008.

327 Michael T. Klare, "War in Ossetia: It is the Oil Stupid," Huffington Post, 16 August 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-t-klare/south-ossetia-its-the-oil_b_118717.html (accessed 16 August 2008).

328 "Giant Caspian oil pipeline opens," 25 May 2005, BBC, www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4577497.stm (accessed 1 September 2008).

U.S. supported, and is owned by a number of energy companies, which include Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Unocal, and Chevron.³²⁹ Furthermore, the pipeline supplies oil to Europe and much of the world making it a major geostrategic interest.³³⁰



Figure 6. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline

Another theory is that since NATO and the U.S. are considering Georgia's acceptance to NATO, Russia felt it necessary to show Georgia that it still could inflict its presence on them and that Tbilisi should avoid accepting membership.³³¹ Russia remains unhappy with NATO, and may see recruitment of neighboring Russian countries as a continuation of its anti-Russia agenda.

What could become an even greater problem is accomplishing Russia's withdrawal from Georgia? Russia claims it will maintain peacekeeping troops in the

329 Vladimir Socor, "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline inaugurated," 31 May 2005, Jamestown, www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2369812 (accessed 31 August 2008).

330 "Caspian pipeline dream becomes reality."

331 "NATO relations with Georgia," NATO website, 17 August 2008, <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-georgia/index.html> (accessed 17 August 2008).

vicinity of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone.³³² However, withdrawal may never be possible. Anatoly Nogovitsyn³³³ noted that it seems Georgia is not interested in peacefully resolving the conflict.³³⁴ Nogovitsyn expects that there will be a third conflict and that Russia needs to maintain a strong presence as peacekeepers in North Ossetia in the event another Russo-Georgian situation erupts.³³⁵ During a recent CNN interview televised in Russia, Putin blamed the United States for the Georgian crisis stating that,

It is not just that the American side could not restrain the Georgian leadership from the criminal act. The American side in effect armed and trained the Georgian army.³³⁶

Putin furthered his anti-American rhetoric by noting that,

Why seek a difficult compromise solution in the peacekeeping process? It is easier to arm one of the sides and provoke it into killing the other side and the job is done. The suspicion arises that someone in the United States especially created this conflict with the aim of making the situation more tense and creating a competitive advantage for one of the candidates fighting for the post of U.S. president. ³³⁷

Putin is clearly responsible for a significant amount of Russia's twenty-first century anti-Americanism, but the U.S. should be careful how it scolds Moscow publicly. Recently, the U.S. commended China for not supporting Russia in the Georgian

332 "Russian troops complete Georgia withdrawal," Russia Today, 23 August 2008, www.russiatoday.com/news/news/29347 (accessed 27 August 2008).

333 Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsyn is one of Russia's deputy chiefs of its General Staff. His primary duties are as the general staff's spokesman for the Russian Air Force. He is considered one of Russia's strongest voices against the United States and its current missile defense systems. He is also a proponent of using nuclear weapons even against its allies if it serves Russia's purpose. Adrian Bloomfield, "Who is Anatoly Nogovitsyn?" Telegraph, 15 August 2008, www.Telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/Europe/Georgia/2566161/who-is-anatoly-nogovitsyn.html (accessed 27 August 2008).

334 "Russian troops complete Georgia withdrawal."

335 Ibid.

336 Dominic Evans, "Putin says suspects U.S. provoked Georgian crisis," Yahoo, 27 August 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080828/pl_nm/georgia_ossetia_putin_dc (accessed 27 August 2008).

337 Ibid.

crisis.³³⁸ This could only fuel Russia's anti-American fire and present the premise that Putin and Moscow are right in calling Washington anti-Russian.

J. CONCLUSION

It is irrational for one to expect that the U.S. will successfully resolve all of Russia's grievances and concerns over CFE, START II, and BMD or the treaties involving the U.S. and Russia will yield the same landmark repercussions that we experienced when the Cold War ended. According to Aleksei Arbatov, head the International Security Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences' World Economy and International Relations Institute (IMEMO), the United States and Russia simply have different priorities.³³⁹ To be exact, the United States is more concerned with issues such as proliferation of nuclear weapons, and dual-use technology, and Russia is more concerned with preventing NATO expansion and limiting what the United States can do in regard to CFE and BMD.³⁴⁰ Moreover, Russians are concerned with the United States and its ability to overwhelm them militarily which includes extending superiority over CFE.

At the micro level, Russia disagrees with NATO expansion and the CFE treaty over Moldova and Georgia. At the macro level, Russia is aggressively competing with the United States over military capabilities, missile defense, and struggling over international control of issues.

It seems obvious that as George W. Bush leaves office, BMD and a number of security issues will fall to the next U.S. administration's lap. Meetings in September 2007 between Presidents Bush and Putin yielded little to be excited about and left Bush replying only that he was "interested" by what Putin had to say but did not expect anything to change in the way of the United States not placing missile defense sites in

338 "US welcomes China's refusal to back Russia action," Yahoo, 27 August 2998, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080828/pl_afp/georgiarussiaconflictuschinatajikistanasia_080828164021;_ylt=At0X9z05kA9_tJzfqkCzPCcb.3QA (accessed 27 August 2008).

339 Light, *Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy*, 425.

340 Ibid.

Poland or the Czech Republic.³⁴¹ During the meeting, Putin was noticeably disturbed, and it would appear that he is now trying to simply get along with the United States long enough to achieve what he and Moscow desire.³⁴² While Putin expressed “a cautious optimism, concerning a final U.S.-Russian accord” in relation to BMD, it is obvious that Putin’s sentiments hold a transparent disdain for Washington’s missile defense policy.³⁴³

As Moscow strives for greater strategic cooperation with the United States, it continues to express concern with U.S. intentions to deploy BMD sites so close to Russia. The United States continues to try to pacify Moscow with its argument that the missile sites are to protect the United States from Iran and not Russia.³⁴⁴ The problem is that Iranian missile systems cannot reach the United States, and Washington has rejected Russia’s offers of sites closer to Iran. This lends to a degree of validation to Russian concerns about the true purpose of U.S. missile defense systems. Russia perceives the U.S. initiative as upsetting the international balance of power and thereby threatening Russia’s internal and external stability and security.³⁴⁵

341 “Bush-Putin Meeting in Sydney call unproductive,” Boston University, 20 September 2007, <http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news/?dept=732&id=46779> (accessed 13 April 2008).

342 Stephen Boykewich, “No missile deal for Putin, Bush,” News.com, 7 September 2007, <http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22380892-29277,00.html> (accessed 15 December 2007).

343 “Bush, Putin bury hatchet over anti-missile defense,” Yahoo News, 6 April 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080406/wl_afp/russiaussummit_080406094755 (accessed 6 April 2008).

344 Boykewich, “No missile deal for Putin, Bush.”

345 Ibid.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The twenty-first century poses a plethora of political hurdles that will continue to plague U.S.-Russian relations well after President George W. Bush leaves office. Unlike the 1990s, when Russo-American relations seemed to be moving forward, current relations have become awkwardly unpleasant. Arguably, U.S. policy is partly to blame, but logically it would appear that Russia's misinterpretation of BMD, NATO expansion, and even the CFE fine print would appear to be causing most of the aggression coming from Russia.

It seems obvious that years will pass before Moscow is successfully able to break free from its self-suppressing Cold War personality. It will not matter which political party takes up residency in the White House, Russia will continue to be a sore spot for both Democrats and Republicans. Washington should hope for a Medvedev who will engage in his presidential duties with greater liberalism and acceptance of the United States. More importantly, Washington should hope for a Medvedev who will not be politically controlled by Prime Minister Putin.

The outcome of the 2008 U.S presidential elections will yield more than just a new leader in Washington and a fresh political start for the United States. These elections will determine future Russo-American relations and how successful they will be. If Senator Obama is elected, relations could become quite a bit better. This is based on the premise that Obama and Medvedev are of the same generation and potentially would not be infected with Cold War distrust.³⁴⁶ However, generational similarities alone do promise better relations with Moscow. That being said, since Medvedev and Obama are close in age, they may not view Russia or the Cold War as McCain might. If McCain is elected, expect to see relations with Moscow grow colder and a bit more hostile. Considered a significant strike to Putin is the admiration and support that Senator

³⁴⁶ "Should Moscow Root For Obama?" Johnson's Russia List, 21 March 2008, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-61-41.cfm> (accessed 21 March 2008).

McCain holds for Garry Kasparov,³⁴⁷ one of Putin's strongest critics.³⁴⁸ Keep in mind, McCain is already calling for Russia's removal from the G8 which also will work against better ties with Moscow. McCain has called for a Russo-American arms control treaty but continues to express subtle dislike for Putin and his Moscow cronies. This does not favor Medvedev or his potential attempt to smooth over Russia's unstable twenty-first century partnership with the United States. Not only must this situation be addressed, it needs swift attention and resolution if we're to see any chance of correcting what seems to be a very bad start for the twenty-first century in terms of a strong Russo-American partnership and a very disgruntled Moscow.

Regardless of who our next U.S. president and vice-president are, both the Democrats and Republicans will inherit the task of convincing Moscow that the U.S. is not out to destroy them. As Russia's joint space discovery and its ISS presence take on a significant role throughout the twenty-first century, Russo-American relations will potentially experience a greater sense of political urgency that could surpass conflicts over missile defense, GWOT, and NATO expansion.³⁴⁹ Medvedev is not Putin, and will most likely not share all of Putin's political defiance towards Washington, but it is yet to be seen whether or not Medvedev will truly be able to lead Russia without Putin interjecting and molding Russian foreign policy as prime minister.

1. Pacifying the Russian Bear

The United States must address Russia's insecurity that it is being subordinated to Washington and its policy agenda. Washington's next president will inherit the daunting task of developing policies that educate Moscow with a better understanding of U.S. policies, its views, and Russia's international responsibilities. Arguably, Washington does thoughtfully consider Russia's foreign policy interests and security priorities, but

³⁴⁷ Gary Kasparov was born on April 13, 1963 in Baku Azerbaijan. He is considered one of the greatest chess masters of all time and holds the title; chess grandmaster. A strong support of democratic values, civil liberties, and free market he was arrested and jailed on November 24, 2007 after leading a demonstration against Vladimir Putin and what Kasparov referred to as a authoritarian Russian government littered with corruption. www.volokh.com/posts/1176577283.shtml (accessed 27 August 2008).

³⁴⁸ "Should Moscow Root For Obama."

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

what Moscow must realize is that their internal perceptions of the world do not warrant a constant knee jerk reaction. With this in mind, not understanding Russia's internal composition does hold grave implications to future U.S.-Russia relations. Just as President George W. Bush has worked with Putin, Washington must set forth a pragmatic policy agenda that will consider seriously Russia's concerns and demands in an effort to achieve its desired goal, a stronger twenty-first century Russo-American strategic partnership.

U.S. policy and its international agenda must remain its first priority for Washington. The next president must delicately manage Russia's aggressive behavior without making them seem politically weak. Celeste A. Wallander a visiting Associate Professor of Foreign Affairs at Georgetown University noted that "Russia's political system is essentially a modern day authoritarian regime."³⁵⁰ Putin clearly strengthened his power and influence through the solidification of two questionable neo-Stalinist processes. First, he eliminated all those who opposed him politically. Second, he placed into power only those whom he could trust would support him unconditionally.³⁵¹ One could argue that just as the KGB was a forceful entity under the USSR, Putin extended this Soviet mentality to the Russian Kremlin. Even though Putin is no longer president, it is questionable whether or not Medvedev will find himself ruling Russia alone or under the direction of an ex-KGB officer now residing as prime minister. It is doubtful that Putin's aggressive persona will dissolve even though he is now technically subordinate to Medvedev.

2. Jackson-Vanik Amendment

It is necessary that the United States take the lead in bettering Russo-American relations in the form of rectifying and dissolving certain policy situations that should no longer prevent the improvement of trans-Atlantic relations with Russia.

³⁵⁰ "Russian Power and Interests at the Next Stage in U.S.-Russian Relations," CDI, 8 May 2008, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-96-44.cfm> (accessed 9 May 2008).

³⁵¹ Ibid.

The Jackson-Vanik amendment, at this point, should not hold any significance in Russo-American relations. Unfortunately it still does. Every year since 2001, Putin has lobbied the United States and the Bush administration to remove the amendment.³⁵² But his efforts have fallen dramatically short of accomplishing this goal. It is for this reason that the United States must positively address and absolve Russian anger towards the amendment. In doing so, the United States would free³⁵³ Russia from the amendment and potentially rally better Russo-American relations.

3. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

The CFE treaty has plagued U.S.-Russian relations and has extended this political turmoil to NATO for years. What Washington should do is establish a forum-based set of meetings that would allow Russia to accurately and unequivocally express its concerns with the CFE Treaty. This may not fix the problem, but it would allow Russia the opportunity to intellectually address its concerns in a bilateral way.

A major consideration that Washington now faces regarding the CFE is the Russian-Georgian conflict. Everything Putin has told the U.S. regarding troops and equipment in Georgia can be challenged and therefore should cause alarm for the United States and its decision to side with Russia on CFE ratification. If Russia has any expectation of resolving the CFE, they must make clear attempts to remove itself from Georgia and Moldova soon.

4. World Trade Organization

Putin has recently noted that he does believe that Russia should join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The reason behind not joining is that, the WTO would not serve Russia well or provide any substantial gain either economically or politically.³⁵⁴ He

352 Alex Nicholson, "Russian Foreign Minister Criticizes Curbs," NCSJ, 20 January 2006, http://www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/012006AP_JV.shtml (accessed 3 December 2008).

353 "Russian Power and Interests at the Next Stage in U.S.-Russian Relations."

354 Simon Shuster, "Putin sees no advantages for Russia from WTO," Times of Malta.com, 26 August 2008, www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20080826/world-news/putin-sees-no-advantages-for-russia-from-wto (accessed 27 August 2008).

further noted that “We do not see or feel any advantages from membership (WTO), if they exist at all. But we are carrying the burden.”³⁵⁵

Putin has vocally attributed the WTO culture as archaic, undemocratic, and awkward.³⁵⁶ He expressed concerns that the “WTO only protects a select number of developed countries and is guilty of not modernizing the way it makes decisions and addresses economic problems.”³⁵⁷ To date, Russia is the only major economic country that is not part of the WTO.³⁵⁸ As the WTO continues to persuade Russia that intentions are good, Putin refuses to accept that allowing the WTO access to Russia’s vast energy sector is beneficial to Moscow.³⁵⁹

Obviously, Moscow still feels it is giving everything and receiving nothing in return. It is questionable whether or not Moscow would turn down membership to the WTO if offered. But Russia cannot be relied upon to maintain a stable position on whether it wants in or not. For this reason, it would not be advisable for the WTO to accept Russia as a member. If Putin continues to play the “poor Russia” card every time something politically upsets him, Russian membership to either organization could become a headache for the international community. This alone offers enough evidence to leave Russia on the outside looking in.

5. Extending Space Cooperation

The decision to formalize a U.S. partnership with Moscow regarding the *ISS* is and was a good idea, and should be further expanded in the twenty-first century. The points made by former U.S. official Dr. Michael Nacht in supporting Russia’s role in the early 1990s still hold true. As he noted:

355 Shuster, “Putin sees no advantages for Russia from WTO.”

356 Alex Nicholson, “Russia’s Putin Calls for WTO Alternative,” *Washington Post*, 10 June 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061000378.html (accessed 1 September 2008).

357 *Ibid.*

358 *Ibid.*

359 *Ibid.*

Russian participation could advance U.S. goals in the former Soviet Union. First, it would provide hard currency for the government. Second, Russia is struggling to cling to the vestiges of its superpower status, and hardliners, in their fight against reforms, have played on the people's fears of diminished international standing. Remaining active in the space exploration could help Russia maintain technological prestige while it reduces its nuclear arsenal.³⁶⁰

As Russia begins to play a more significant role in the *ISS* in 2010, it arguably could become beneficial if Washington extended Moscow more opportunity to engage with the U.S. in space. This could create a pro-cooperation atmosphere between Moscow and Washington. Furthermore, it would allow the United States to better observe Moscow's technological advancements without seeming as if they are being spied on. One problem accomplishing with will be convincing Russia that the U.S. is not attempting to gain access for reasons of suppressing them technologically. Indeed, Russia may have a great deal to offer, particularly in areas of long-duration human spaceflight critical to the U.S. return to the Moon. But the U.S. will need to establish a policies that Russia sees as mutually beneficial, including giving Moscow a significant role in the U.S. space agenda.

6. NATO Enlargement

It has been well documented that Putin does not feel NATO has any intelligent role in Europe or Russia for that matter. The movement and extension of NATO troops to neighboring countries that border Russia will continue to be a significant problem that the United States will be forced to address. Russia perceives NATO as under the control of the United States. Any NATO initiative that is perceived by Russia as aggressive will be linked to U.S. policy. Russia views NATO as a Cold War organization that has limited relevance in twenty-first century politics. While it may be very true that NATO expansion achieves very little, it is necessary that if NATO continues its expansion east, Russia will need greater convincing that the expansion is not an effort to eventually invade Russia.

³⁶⁰ Roald Sagdeev and Michael Nacht, "Space Policy is Foreign Policy," *The New York Times*, 26 June 1993, 19.

What must be considered is whether or not we want Russian as a part of NATO? Does Washington really want to give Putin the trust and benefits of NATO membership given Putin's current erratic behavior? Anatoly Nogovitsyn noted that "Russia doctrine permits the right to use nuclear weapons "against the allies of countries having nuclear weapons if they help out in some way."³⁶¹ This clearly presents a problem. Can Washington trust Moscow to properly manage its first strike capabilities and not overreact to security issues presented by neighboring countries or the United States? Putin furthered Nogovitsyn's claim and added that the use of Russian nuclear weapons was not out of the question if Moscow feels they were on the brink of invasion. While it is doubtful that Russia would ever actually use nuclear weapons, giving them the opportunity cannot be risked. Tony Blair mentioned prior to his exit from office that Russia should be allowed to sit at NATO's table. What cannot be validated is whether or not Mr. Blair expressed this sentiment while he was in office. Regardless, it seems like a very liberal stance that offers more harm than good.

Historically, Russia has presented itself as a hostile international contender and one to be dealt with. Now that Russia finds itself in a weaker international role, it is arguably paranoid and insecure about external invasion and internal political persuasion from the United States. One of Putin's latest statements regarding NATO and its enlargement clearly presents that NATO and the United States has a lofty mission ahead of itself and pacifying Russia that both entities are more friendly towards Russia than not. He proclaimed:

The effectiveness of our cooperation will depend on the extent to which NATO respects the interests of the Russian Federation and the Alliances willingness to compromise on issues shaping the strategic environment in Europe and the world.³⁶²

361 Bloomfield, "Who is Anatoly Nogovitsyn."

362 Vladimir Putin, "Press Statement and Answers to Journalists' Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council," Kremlin, 4 April 2008, <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/appearances/2008/04/163148.shtml> (accessed 9 April 2008).

7. START I

A chief concern for the U.S. will be the expiration START I in December 2009. The purpose of START I was to reduce the number of strategic offensive arms the United States and USSR had. Article II prohibits the U.S. and Russia from deploying more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 ICBMs, SLBMs, and associated launchers.³⁶³ In July 2006, now Prime Minister Putin recommended a new treaty that is being referred to as “START+.”³⁶⁴ It appears that START+ will have the same fundamental structure as START I did, but where the problem might be found is that it is expected Russia will ask to remove all limitations on MIRV warheads.³⁶⁵ Specifically, Russia will likely look to increase the number of warheads on its ICBMs without interference from the United States. Another issue that START+ is expected to address is the verification process.³⁶⁶ As it stands, the process is convoluted and very expensive. Logically, both the U.S. and Russia should be able to come to an agreement on this. It is clear that better allocation of funds making the process cheaper is of mutual interest. Moreover, better facilitation of inspections should not hold the process up either. But what will pose a problem is comprehensively reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles, which will include reserve assets.³⁶⁷ Furthermore, Washington must consider that no matter what the outcome, it is feasible that—according to Nikolai Sokov—this will be the last “bilateral strategic treaty the U.S. signs with Russia.”³⁶⁸

As Washington prepares for the 2008 elections, both presidential candidates need to keep in mind is that START I negotiations will not be easy. As 2008 comes to an end, Russia is expressing grave dissatisfaction with Washington. With the treaty expiring in just over a year, Washington needs to reconsider relations with Moscow and employ an

363 “START I Treaty,” State Department website, 31 July 1991, www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starhtml/start/startI.html (accessed 1 September 2008).

364 Nikolai Sokov, “START I Replacement: End of Cold War Disarmament,” CSIS, December 2006, www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0418.pdf (accessed 1 September 2008).

365 Ibid.

366 Ibid.

367 Ibid.

368 Ibid.

active policy of fixing how Russia feels about the U.S. If policy makers cannot convince Russia that the U.S. is not out to get them, START I Treaty follow-on negotiations could turn out badly. If START I is successful renegotiated, Sokov notes that it could revitalize failing twenty-first century relations with Moscow. Successful negotiations might provide a better sense of political stability between the United States and Russia. Sokov furthers that it could also offer a, “a stable long-term framework” that could yield a “strategic nuclear partnership”

8. The Putin-Medvedev Dilemma

As the United States enters the Medvedev era, it will become crucial that Washington address a number of Moscow’s concerns in an effort to present a renewed sense of Russo-American cooperation. While it seems logical that most of the problems Russia has with Washington are self-imposed, it would benefit Washington to mend some of the broken fences that have fallen apart already during the twenty-first century. If anything, Washington’s effort would represent good intentions and hopefully persuade Moscow that the U.S. is not anti-Russian.

While it appeared that Putin was satisfied with current relations with Washington, things have slowly fallen apart with BMD and the recent Georgian crisis. During visits to Maine with Bush in 2007, Putin commented that he looked forward to solidifying better relations with Washington. However, it would appear that regardless of what Putin says, he has actually become disenchanted with the United States. Sarah Mendelson and Ted Gerber note that, Russian’s seem to see the United States as nothing more than “political jackals.”³⁶⁹ This Russian perspective of the United States may offer that Washington has more work ahead of itself than it realizes.

369 Mendelson and Gerber, “Us and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin Generation.”

B. PRIME MINISTER PUTIN

Putin as president did a good job solidifying a strong Russia figurehead within Moscow. He changed Russia's economic face and revitalized its social cohesion. For the United States, Putin has been nothing short of a difficult and politically annoying. He has challenged U.S. policy, and claimed that the U.S. strongly resembles the Third Reich.³⁷⁰

As Putin entered office, he is already set a very ambitious agenda for himself. Besides proposing tax deductions for the oil industry, and making several undeclared tax code changes, he believes Russia imports too much from other countries.³⁷¹ He reported that, Russia imports 70% of its food products and that this must be reduced.³⁷² He appears to feel that Russia needs become more self-sufficient and less reliant on outside sources. He has made it clear that he will become just as influential as prime minister, as he was as president.

1. Policy Influence, Medvedev or Putin

As Putin transitions to the prime minister position, it is still unclear how much control he will have over Medvedev. Putin's strong will and aggressive political behavior would lead one to believe that he will continue to have some sort of influence on Medvedev and his role as president. It was noted that many in Russia feel that the transition between Putin and Medvedev was nothing more than cosmetic.³⁷³ Many Russians feel that it is more than possible that Putin will become a "super prime minister" easily controlling Russia's security affairs, military, and foreign policy initiatives.³⁷⁴

370 "Meek White House Reaction to Putin's 'Nazi' Remarks," The Other Russia, 20 July 2008, <http://www.theotherussia.org/2007/05/11/meek-white-house-reaction-to-putins-nazi-remarks/> (accessed July 20, 2008).

371 C.J. Chivers, "Putin, now prime minister, set policy agenda," International Herald Tribune, Europe, 8 May 2008, www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/europe/09russia.php (accessed 1 September 2008).

372 Chivers, "Putin, now prime minister, set policy agenda."

373 "Russia: Putin Hands Reigns to Medvedev, But remains in control," Radio Free Europe, 6 May 2008, <http://www.rferl.org> (accessed 7 June 2008).

374 "Russian Succession: Putin Prime Minister, Medvedev President," Heritage Foundation, 11 December 2007, <http://www.heritage.org/research/russianandEurasia/wm1731.cfm> (accessed 11 May 2008).


Clearly Russia is pleased with Putin and the job he is doing as prime minister. It seems as president, his efforts were welcomed and applauded. He successfully improved Russian foreign affairs, standard of living, safety, and security.³⁷⁵ With his many successes, and overwhelming Russian support, Medvedev may be forced to pay more attention to his prime minister, than he would like.

Figure 7 represents a poll conducted by the Yury Levada Analytical Center that encompassed approximately 1600 participants.³⁷⁶ The poll was conducted in June and July of 2008 and concluded that Russians believe their future is in the collective hands of both Putin and Medvedev. It appears Putin still holds an edge over Medvedev even as prime minister.³⁷⁷ Either way, Russian's do not seem to have a problem with Russia's current state of affairs. They're happy with Putin, and Medvedev, leading the country, regardless of who holds the power.

375 "Putin Leaves Russian Presidency with High Marks," Angus-Reid Global Monitor, 31 March 2008, http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/putin_leaves_russian_presidency_with_high_marks/, (accessed 10 June 2008).

376 "Most Russian's say Medvedev has no Power."

377 Ibid.



Source: Angus Reid Global Monitor, Yuri Levada Analytical Center.

Figure 7. In Whose Hands is the Real Authority in the Russian Federation Placed Right Now?

As Medvedev moves into office, it is necessary, as Dr. Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation observes that Russia is given a chance to succeed without immediate influence from the United States. One would argue that this time is not only crucial, it is beneficial to both Medvedev and Putin. This will allow both Medvedev and Putin the opportunity to establish their respective positions and authority. Learning to work together in the eyes of the international community is crucial if Medvedev is expected to be taken seriously and as more than Putin's puppet.

The problem with allowing Russia an opportunity to settle into a new presidency, is the inability to know what will happen next. Just as the Georgian conflict caught everyone off guard, we may not want to give Russia too much rope, as they may end up

hanging the international community vice themselves. Regardless of what Washington hopes to see, Russian policy does waiver. Even under Medvedev, the United States needs to keep a watchful eye.

2. 2012 Presidential Campaign

It is quite possible that Putin will run for President again in 2012. He is already noted to reporters of the daily *Kommersant* that he would not rule out running and has plenty of time to make such a decision.³⁷⁸ Indeed, Putin is a strong contender to win the 2012 elections. He was the force behind Medvedev being elected and still to this day, Putin is beloved in Russia. Russians perceive Putin as saving them from a failing social and economic system and the catalyst behind reinstating their retirement checks. This was a warm welcome for Russians who previously only knew poverty, sadness, and a drunkard in President Yeltsin. Putin gave Russians hope, his persona is strong, comparable to Stalin, and he is easily identified as a protector of Russian interests and hopes.

As reported by the Russian News and Information Agency (NOVOSTI), the Kremlin's left-wing political party has publicly made it clear that it will nominate Putin as its candidate for president in 2012.³⁷⁹ Putin is aware that Russians, for the most part, feel that if they are to continue enjoying improvements in their economic and social status, he must be their president. Arguably, Putin only stood down in an effort to remove the idea that he was turning Russia into a dictatorship. The only way Putin could remain in office was to change Russia's constitution and he clearly stated he would not do this. Regardless, Putin is a strong candidate for the 2012 elections and would easily defeat Medvedev regardless of how well Medvedev does during his four years in office.

³⁷⁸ "Putin open to 2012 presidential race," NDTV, 9 June 2007, <http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN200714973> (accessed 14 July 2008).

³⁷⁹ "Just Russian party to nominate Putin 2012 presidential candidate," NOVOSTI, 17 August 2007, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070817/72061565.html> (accessed 7 May 2008).

C. RUSSIA'S FUTURE WITH MEDVEDEV

As Medvedev enters office, he will be presented with the daunting task of being compared to Putin, and filling his shoes. The 42-year-old, ex-Putin chief of staff has a background worthy of corporate America, but maybe not so for Russia's president. He is successful lawyer, a democrat, and is the youngest Soviet or Russian leader to hold the position of president.³⁸⁰ What is yet to be seen is whether or not Medvedev will find success in the implementation of his own presidential power and policy without Putin interfering. It is expected that Medvedev will transfer significant power to Putin over the course of the next few months. When this occurs, it will present arguably a very challenging moment for Washington.

It is heavily noted throughout Moscow that Medvedev is a strong liberal and understands that Russia is flooded with corruption and an economy overly dependent on natural resources.³⁸¹ He is not anti-Western, he believes in a strong democratic system and that the state should not have significant control over private industry.³⁸² He agrees that from time to time, the state does need to influence the economy, but actively disapproves of a government-regulated system.³⁸³ What seems most interesting about Medvedev's views are that they do not completely shadow Putin's. This would question why Putin supported Medvedev as his successor unless Putin knew he could control Medvedev and his policy agenda.

Figure 8 shows that Medvedev's future as Russian president continues to prosper and gain public support. His popularity remains steady and without much grounds for concern. One could argue, he is doing just what is expected of him. He is filling the position, listening to Putin, and addressing public opinion with a similar charismatic charm that Putin did. Russians like him; he is not stepping on too many toes; and his liberal democratic nature seems fairly welcomed by Moscow and Washington alike. With


380 "Russian Succession: Putin Prime Minister, Medvedev President."

381 Ibid.

382 Ibid.

383 Ibid.

Russia's newest attempt to take over Georgia in August 2008, Medvedev has shown his constituency that he can be just as tough as Putin. But what has yet to be seen is whether or not Putin or Medvedev pulled the military strings. The war in Georgia may please Moscow and the Russian citizenry, it is not winning any popularity contests in Washington. Recently President George W. Bush noted that "Russia must respect the freedom of its neighbors" and accused Russia of being bullies and trying to intimidate weaker, less capable nations.³⁸⁴ He furthered his statement in that "Russian needed to get out of Georgia," and that Georgia would remain a part of the international community and, "there is no room for debate on this matter."³⁸⁵



Source: Angus Reid Global Monitor, Yury Gerasimov Analytical Center

Figure 8. Do You Approve or Disapprove of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's Performance?

384 "Bush Condemns 'Bullying' Russia." BBC, 15 August 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7563452.stm> (accessed 15 August 2008).

385 "No Room for Debate: Bush orders Russia out of Georgia," ABC, 16 August 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=5595988&page=1> (accessed 16 August 2008).

Given the state of Russia when Putin took command, it is logical that he realizes without his leadership over the past eight years, Russia might still be entrenched in poverty, unbridled crime, and control by economic oligarch. Whether one likes Putin or not, he has been a noteworthy participant in the renaissance of Russia, even if it is only a weakened replica of Soviet-era strength.

It is doubtful Medvedev will resemble Putin in many ways. Medvedev is not Soviet in the same way Putin is. He does not have the personal liking nor professional connection with either Stalin or Lenin as Putin did, and he never served in the KGB. What can be anticipated is that Medvedev will work diligently with the United States in an effort to intelligently address and improve failed Russo-American relations. The larger question will be whether or not Putin will give up his power.

D. FINAL ANALYSIS

Each of Kenneth Waltz's three levels of analysis theorizes why Russia is experiencing increased twenty-first century anti-Americanism. It would appear that the most prominent level is the first. While Russian nationalism and its perceived balance of power inequality do spark controversy, neither seem to present significant evidence that they alone exceed the influence of level one, the individual. Putin has done an exceptional job of creating a delusional sense of fear in Russia that the United States is potentially trying to take the country over and humiliate it. This could be considered nothing more than a "show of sorts," and a skillful mastering of propaganda that pins Russia against the United States.

As Putin takes over as prime minister one could debate that his political strategy is well thought out, and his expectation is to just fade away into Russian history. Throughout history, Russia has always been influenced by who is in charge. Putin is not different in that he has created an image of himself that cannot be touched by weakening other political forces. He successfully spun a propaganda web that defined the United States as anti-Russian thereby damaging Washington's strategic partnership with Moscow and bolstering twenty-first century anti-Americanism.

One might argue that Russia is looking for a sense of security, a desire for someone who will protect them from what they may not understand. Putin presents himself as being strong, determined, and wise. He poses for photo opportunities shirtless, flies military jets, and belligerently attacks the United States. He is what Russians were looking for, a confident leader who would lead them back to times of greatness, strength and international respect. Many contend that Russians do not think the USSR was better than current-day Russia, but it could be argued that they were not pleased with how Russia was being treated by the United States. Putin, individually, attacks Washington when he feels Russia is being disrespected. Regardless of what the actual truth may be, Russians like his demeanor. It is doubtful you'll find a Russian who thinks Putin allows himself to be subordinated by Bush or his administration. As the saying goes, "it is better to say something, than nothing at all." Even if what Putin is saying is wrong, he is given Russians hope. This will arguably become one of Washington's biggest tasks, convincing Moscow that the United States not only respects them, but wishes to work with them.

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