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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**TURKEY'S ROLE IN NATO-EUROPEAN UNION
COOPERATION**

by

Saltuk Buğra Arkalı

June 2008

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Donald Abenheim
David S. Yost

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TURKEY'S ROLE IN NATO-EUROPEAN UNION COOPERATION

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First Lieutenant, Turkish Air Force
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the significant role of Turkey in cooperation between NATO and the European Union (EU). It first examines Turkish-EU relations in the period 1991-1999, when the EU relied on the Western European Union (WEU) as its instrument for security and defense matters. The years 1995-1999 were especially fruitful, because Turkey was an associate member of the WEU and participated fully in the relevant EU decision-making. After the emergence of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1998-1999, most WEU institutions were transferred to the EU, and Turkey's status in the WEU became irrelevant. The EU sought ready access to NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led ESDP operations. However, Turkey as a NATO member opposed granting this access in order to protect its national security interests until agreement could be reached on the "Berlin Plus" arrangements. Turkey has also upheld the NATO-EU agreement on information security. That is, classified NATO information cannot be shared with states that are not members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and that have not concluded security agreements with NATO in that framework, such as Cyprus and Malta. Turkey's principled policies have thus significantly affected cooperation between the EU and NATO.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to advance understanding of Turkey's role in NATO-European Union cooperation and to evaluate the prospects of Turkey and the European Union resolving current disagreements. The key research questions are the following: How have Turkey's policies affected cooperation between NATO and the European Union? How have the EU's ESDP decisions affected Turkey's security interests and NATO-EU cooperation?

In the post-Cold War era, events such as conflicts in the Balkans and terrorist attacks changed threat perceptions in NATO and the European Union. In order to shape the security environment and defend their interests, they sought new arrangements and began to transform their organizational structures. The NATO Allies chose to transform the alliance into one dedicated to protecting "shared values and common strategic interests."¹ Since 1999, the European Union has developed its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which includes as one of its options action supported by the assets and capabilities of NATO. The endeavors of the European Union to create decision-making and operational structures separate from those of the Alliance have caused some problems in NATO-EU relations. According to a Congressional Research Service report, "ESDP is intended to allow the European Union to make decisions and conduct military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged; ESDP is not aimed at usurping NATO's collective defense role."² These structural changes have affected most NATO and EU countries but especially the non-EU European NATO allies such as Iceland, Norway and Turkey and the non-European NATO allies such as Canada and the United States.

¹ Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 33.

² Kristin Archick, *The European Union: Questions and Answers*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RS21372, 27 December 2005.

Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has supported the goal of a common security and defense organization and has devoted resources to this project. The Western European Union (WEU) became the defense arm of the European Union, and Turkey had an associate membership status in the WEU, like Norway. However, in 1999-2000 the EU incorporated most of the WEU's institutions. This structural change downgraded the significance of Turkey's WEU associate member status. Under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) Turkey would not be able to participate in European Union military exercises or in the EU institutions that had previously been part of the WEU. As Tofte has noted, "Turkey was for a long time seen as the greatest test and largest challenge for the ESDP project."³

Turkey is determined to participate in ESDP decision making and operations as much as possible. Turkey as a NATO member has on some occasions threatened to block the European Union's use of NATO assets and capabilities for an EU-led operation, notably when Turkey has not been part of the decision-making. This policy is based on Turkey's right not to be a part of the force implementing a plan (and not to subsidize the EU's use of commonly funded NATO assets) when Turkey has not been part of the EU decision-making process. The participation problem is another unsolved issue. Turkey opposes the distribution of NATO information to the EU members that are not members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and that have not concluded information security agreements with NATO in that framework, namely Malta and the Republic of Cyprus.⁴ This situation is creating a serious problem in cooperation between NATO and the EU.

Turkey is prepared to participate in ESDP operations, and with its well-trained armed forces Turkey has played an active role in Bosnia and Kosovo. Although Turkey has served as a buffer zone for the security of Europe, Turkey has some concerns about its homeland security and other issues, such as arrangements concerning the Aegean Sea

³ Sunniva Tofte, *NATO, ESDP and the role of the non-EU European Allies in the emerging European Security Order*, A chapter of PhD thesis, 16.

⁴ It should be noted that the Turkish Republic does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus. References in this work to the "Republic of Cyprus" are made to conform to the academic literature but do not constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by the author.

and Cyprus. Turkey's quest for membership in the European Union is another serious issue. All these issues are, moreover, closely related.

Some of the deadlocks in the cooperation between NATO and the European Union are caused by political and security problems involving Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The unresolved problems include the Aegean Sea, international recognition of the political rights of Turkish Cypriots, and local arms competitions. Turkey has been a dependable ally in NATO since 1952 and wishes to have good relations with its Western partners. However, Turkey is not a member of the EU and therefore not a part of the ESDP project. Some members of the European Union, such as Austria and France, seem to be ready to reject Turkey's prospective membership despite the strategic importance of Turkey for the EU's security environment.

B. IMPORTANCE

Cooperation between NATO and the European Union depends on the agreement of their members to the changed structure of their relationship. While Turkey has been a valued NATO ally since 1952, the relationship between Turkey and the European Union has a long and less harmonious history.⁵

As Sunniva Tofte has observed, "Turkey's relationship with the EC [European Community] was first formalized through the 1963 Ankara Agreement, which gave Turkey associate membership of the EC."⁶ In this long and poor relationship, Europeans have been testing Turkey's patience. In order to promote peace and security in the Middle East region, ensure access to energy supplies and pursue commercial relations with local businesses, the European Union and NATO have to solve the problems affecting Turkey.⁷

Turkey has been a NATO ally and crucial to the efficacy of the alliance since 1952. However, Turkey's security concerns have changed since the end of the Cold War. Turkey has felt insecure and less protected by NATO's security umbrella, because

⁵ Tofte, *NATO, ESDP and the role of the non-EU European Allies*, 16.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷ Richard Weitz, *Towards a New Turkey-NATO Partnership in Central Asia* (Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 2006).

Turkey has faced several new challenges to its internal and external security, which have taken the place of the previous Soviet threat. The EU's attempts to create its own security and defense policy have left Turkey feeling isolated in its unstable and unbalanced region. In cooperation with the United States and other allies, Turkey has to establish its own security in its challenging environment at the crossroads of the Middle East, Europe and Asia.

Stability and peace in the Middle East and the Mediterranean are related to security in Europe and America. To achieve this goal, the Middle East needs a powerful Turkey in order to construct a bridge of dialogue and cooperation among cultures and states. Turkey has historically-based good relations with most of the Middle East and has a considerable association with Europe and America. This geostrategic, religious and historical advantage makes Turkey indispensable for establishing peace in the Middle East. Turkey still has great strategic importance for NATO and Europe, as in the past.

The subject examined in this thesis, Turkey's role in NATO-European Union cooperation, is important because the future of ESDP and the EU's relations with the Middle East and Asia will be significantly shaped by Turkey's role.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The pursuit of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent developments in this regard has to be evaluated from both NATO and European Union perspectives. In both cases Turkey is a most important common factor that influences decision-making about the future of these organizations.

The post-Cold War strategy of NATO has focused on new challenges since the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and the Alliance has continued to exist as a functional organization. According to the new strategy of NATO, the Middle East is a most important region in which the Allies pursue collective security aims. NATO is significantly influenced by the United States. Therefore, relations between NATO and Turkey are sometimes shaped by U.S.-Turkey relations. The United States is more aware of Turkey's importance in the Middle East than are some European nations. According to

Henri Barkey of Lehigh University, “Ankara's actual contribution to Washington's challenges went well beyond the Middle East. Turks collaborated with the allies in both Bosnia and Kosovo. It steadfastly improved relations with Bulgaria and Romania, took the lead in organizing Black Sea region institutions, and thus proved to be a source of stability in the Balkans.”⁸ Turkey’s contribution to global security is not negligible when “its unswerving support for the trans-Atlantic alliance through the Cold War, and recently... its substantial troop deployment to Afghanistan”⁹ and other military contributions are considered.

In 1999 the European Union decided to frame a common security and defense policy to enhance its ability to respond to international crises. This decision derived in part from the instability in the Balkans since the early 1990s. The Balkans experience demonstrated that the actual operational capability of the European Union was limited. However, the Middle East has emerged as clearly the most unstable and yet most valuable region of the world with its vital energy resources.

In the words of a British scholar, Jolyon Howorth, the ESDP is “a project to confer upon the EU the ability to take collective decisions relating to regional security and to deploy a range of instruments, including military instruments, in operations of crisis management, peace-keeping and, if necessary, peace-enforcement (preferably with a legal mandate), as a distinctive European contribution to the overall objectives of the Atlantic Alliance and in consultation with both European members of NATO and non-allied EU accession candidates.”¹⁰ One of the EU’s aims in establishing the ESDP is to acquire certain operational capabilities. The EU is utilizing NATO assets and capabilities in operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this situation concerns Turkey’s defense policy as a NATO member. As Yasar Yakış observed in 2005, “The EU does not yet possess suitable infrastructure for planning a military operation and for carrying out

⁸ Henri J. Barkey, *Turkey’s Strategic Future: A U.S. Perspectiv*, Prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, 12 May 2003.

⁹ The Hon. Alexander Downer, *NATO in the Age of Global Challenges*, Speech of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, 10 February 2007.

¹⁰ Jolyon Howorth, *Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance* (Columbia University).

command and control tasks. It is on its way to acquire such a capability.”¹¹ The ESDP will require a long time to acquire military forces able to deploy to the Middle East or Asia. The European Union will therefore need NATO’s help, including Turkey’s acceptance and assistance in its operations.

Turkey has a specific role in fulfilling both NATO’s and the European Union’s security and defense objectives. As noted by Meltem Müftüler Baç, in the European Security Strategy adopted by the EU Council in December 2003, “the EU identified its main security concerns as terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs and people and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”¹² Moreover, this document “focused on the dangers of instability in the perimeters of the EU, especially in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region. Instability in the Mediterranean Region carries significant security threats for the EU, as it would have the capacity to diffuse into European territory. In addition, stability in these regions is essential to prevent unwanted migration from the Mediterranean to Europe.”¹³ Terrorism is the most crucial current threat for the EU’s own security, and terrorist threats have often been supported from the region where Turkey is located. Turkey is also still important for the European Union’s security because of its stabilizer role in the Middle East. However, Turkey has been at the margins of the European Union’s security and defense planning since the early 1990s, even though Turkey has played an active role in NATO Europe’s defense for decades.

The relations between the United States and the European Union have become more complicated since the early 1990s. The members of the European Union ignited an extremely challenging movement by creating a security community apart from NATO in order to reduce their dependence on the United States for their security and defense. As noted by Baç, “Turkey’s accession to the EU will be a critical development in transatlantic relations”¹⁴. Turkey can repair the divergence that has emerged between the

¹¹ Yasar Yakış, *The Role of Turkey and EU in the Middle East*, Chairman of the European Union Commission in the Turkish Parliament, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the XV. Economic Forum-Krynica, 7-10 September.

¹² Meltem Müftüler Baç, *Turkey and European Security*, IAI-TESEV Report.

¹³ Ibid., 20.

¹⁴ Ibid.

United States and the European Union. “Since Turkey is an active NATO member, its role in the Mediterranean dialogue could also contribute to NATO-EU cooperation.”¹⁵

In establishing the ESDP, the European Union has faced serious problems. The European Union needs cooperation with NATO to continue its ESDP project. As Baç has pointed out, “The EU-NATO cooperation is highly important for the EU’s operationalization of its security and defense role.”¹⁶ Otherwise the European Union would have to increase its military expenditures to undertake operations on its own. At this point, as Baç has argued, “Turkey will contribute significantly to the EU’s military capabilities, since one of the major problems confronted by the EU is the capabilities/expectations gap; the Turkish membership might increase the EU’s military operability, both in terms of logistics and bases.”¹⁷

D. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

In order to help the defense and security policy decision makers of Turkey, this thesis evaluates the role of Turkey since 1991 in the relations between NATO and the European Union, notably with respect to the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy. Turkey’s defense strategies will be influenced to some extent by the boundaries of the ESDP. Moreover, the EU membership status of Turkey will be determined in the near future. This will be a milestone for Turkey and the European Union not only from a political viewpoint but also from a security and defense viewpoint. Turkey’s options will vary according to its defense strategies in the future. This thesis offers an analysis of the impact of Turkey’s policies on EU-NATO relations as a NATO member and as a candidate for full membership in the European Union.

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II examines Turkish-EU relations prior to the ESDP. This concerns the period from the framing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 to the EU’s formal acceptance in 1999 of the ESDP proposed by France and the United Kingdom. Chapter III considers the ESDP from 1999, the starting point, to 2004,

¹⁵Baç, *Turkey and European Security*, IAI-TESEV Report, 23.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 16-17.

when the EU enlarged by taking in ten new members, including Malta and the Republic of Cyprus. Chapter IV analyzes problems in NATO-EU relations in the most recent period, from 2004 to the present. Chapter V offers conclusions.

II. TURKISH-EU RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE ESDP (1991-1999)

A. INTRODUCTION

The early 1990s were the transition years of a new world order and changing security perceptions. This process started with the end of the Cold War, followed by the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the escalation of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In response to these structural shifts on the international stage, national governments redefined their security and defense policies to shape their future roles. In the light of these events, the member states of the European Community decided that the time for acting as a military power had come. In December 1991, the European Union (EU) was formed on the basis of shared values and interests with the Maastricht Treaty, “which consists of three pillars: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.”¹⁸ With the creation of the European Union, the relations between Turkey and the transforming EU and NATO began a new cooperation phase.

In fact, relations between European integration institutions and Turkey have a long history. These relations “started in July 1959 when the government of Turkey sought an association agreement with the European Economic Community. The agreement, also known as the Ankara agreement, was duly signed on 9 September 1963.”¹⁹ This agreement gave Turkey an associate membership that was expected to lead to full membership later. However, the development of improved relations between Turkey and the European Community was inhibited for several years because of Turkey’s Cyprus intervention in 1974.

Significant steps toward improved cooperation were not taken until the late 1980s. “Turkey applied for membership of the WEU in 1988, following its application for membership of the European Community in 1987.”²⁰ One of the objectives of the Maastricht Treaty was establishing a common foreign and security policy; this endowed

¹⁸ Activities of the European Union, Summaries of Legislation.

¹⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Turkey and the ESDP: A Fact-Sheet*.

²⁰ Esra Doğan, *Turkey in the New European Security and Defense Architecture*, Center for Strategic Research, 163.

the WEU with more responsibilities in order to enable it to play a significant role as an instrument of the EU. Moreover, at the 1992 Petersberg meeting the WEU members agreed to use military forces for specific types of operations in addition to collective defense. The WEU Council of Ministers agreed that the Petersberg tasks cover “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”²¹

Turkey was aware of the importance of the WEU. After the WEU invited the non-EU European members of NATO in 1992 to become associate members of the WEU in order to be able to participate fully in WEU-led operations, Turkey started to function as part of the security and defense branch of the European Union. The WEU extended Associate Membership invitations to Iceland, Norway and Turkey in 1992, but this status did not become effective until Greece was admitted to the WEU as a full member in March 1995. Moreover, Turkey took part in the decision making process of WEU-led operations.

The other milestone was the Berlin Agreement in 1996, whereby “NATO agreed to support WEU-led crisis-management operations as part of the development of a ‘European Security and Defense Identity’ *within* NATO.”²² Some problems nonetheless arose on using NATO capabilities and assets and sharing information. In order to give the EU more responsibility, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 “furthered CFSP by establishing the post of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Treaty also strengthened the ties between the EU and the WEU and increased the responsibilities for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks by incorporating the Petersberg tasks.”²³

The Saint Malo declaration in 1998 led to the formation of the European Security and Defense Policy, which called for the EU “to play its full role on the international

²¹ Europa Glossary, *Gateway to the European Union*.

²² Leo Michel, *NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations*, Research Paper No. 31 (NATO Defense College, February 2007), italics in the original.

²³ Corneliu Manole, *The Emergence of The Triangular Security Link: US-EU-TURKEY, Building a new European security framework?* (Eurojournal, February 2004).

stage” and gather “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces.”²⁴ The ESDP meant that the EU would no longer rely on the WEU as its CFSP instrument.

This chapter of the thesis reviews the historical background of Turkey-EU relations and the important treaties that have shaped the foundations of the European Security and Defense Policy. This review is intended to clarify the role of Turkey in trans-Atlantic security relations by analyzing its position from 1991 to 1999.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

European societies had regarded the Turks as a threat to their cultural, religious and territorial independence since the expansion of the Ottoman Empire through Istanbul, the Balkans and Central Europe after the 13th century. This counter pressure of the Ottomans against the several European crusades to the Muslim lands and peoples contributed to the establishment of a common European identity. As Meltem Müftüler Baç, a faculty member of the Sabanci University Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, noted, the European Identity “is based on a common cultural heritage, with foundations in ancient Greece, Christianity, and Europe of Enlightenment.”²⁵ Erkan Erdoğan, a graduate of the Department of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University in Turkey, pointed out that “Turks have been a part of Europe *geographically* since their arrival in the 11th century; *economically* since the expansion of trade routes in the 16th century; and *diplomatically* since the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the Concert of Europe in 1856.”²⁶ The inclusion of the Turks in the European Concert was significant because, “For the first time, Europeans formally recognized the Turks as a part of the European society of states, although this change was totally restricted to state-to-state relations and had nothing to do with cultural issues.”²⁷

²⁴Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke, England, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 33.

²⁵Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” *Turkish Studies* (Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000), 26.

²⁶Erkan Erdoğan, “Turkey and Europe: Undivided but not United,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2002), 40.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 41.

The Republic of Turkey, with its westernized secular and democratic regime, has been in close relations with European countries since its foundation in 1923 as the principal successor state to the theocratically-oriented Ottoman Empire. Turkey considered participation in European society as the right decision in order to reach the standards of civilized and modern nations and indeed to become part of modern Western civilization. Indeed, this approach had started in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, not only in the military and technology areas but also ideologically in the minds of people familiar with the modern standards of Europe in the late 19th century. According to the terms of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Republic of Turkey was established over the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, which had lost most of its assets and capabilities because of long wars. In the mid-1930s the international and political environment was changing. After constructing its internal structure, “Turkey endeavored to form a security belt on its western and eastern borders. It played a leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Entente (Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia) in 1934...In the wake of World War II, Turkey became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945 and the Council of Europe in 1949. As a result of growing threats to security in Europe, it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952.”²⁸ In September 1959, Turkey and Greece applied for association membership in the EEC (European Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union) Council of Ministers. The 1960 military intervention in Turkey delayed the negotiations, but Turkey became an Associate Member of the EEC via the Ankara Association Agreement. This agreement was signed on 12 September 1963 and became effective on 1 December 1964. “The EC-Turkey Association Agreement projected three stages for Turkey-EC relations: preparatory, transitional and final. The *preparatory* stage was intended to be a period in which the Community would provide unilateral concessions and financial aid to Turkey while Turkey would take appropriate measures to develop its economy and to prepare itself for the transitional stage. The *transitional* stage of between 12 and 22 years would aim at creating a customs union between EC and Turkey. The agreement also included the possibility of a third *final*

²⁸ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

stage, which would bring Turkey to full membership.”²⁹ An additional protocol, concluded in 1970, entered into force in 1973.

In the Cold War era, the EC and Turkey established a relationship of a strategic and political cooperation through the significant impact of the United States and NATO, despite some disputes among states. These disputes and economic concerns slowed down the speed of the negotiations and the implementation of the stages before membership. The 1960 and 1980 coup-d`etats in Turkey had damaged EC-Turkey relations. Besides this, disagreements between Turkey and Greece, especially the Cyprus crisis and Turkey’s military intervention to prevent the ethnic mass killings of Turkish Cypriots in 1974, had stopped the negotiations for a while. After the mid-1980s Turkey’s economy had faced some structural changes, and Turkey became more confident in its political perspective. As noted by Erkan Erdoğan, “The growth of confidence in Turkey’s economic performance and democracy together with Prime Minister Turgut Ozal’s more outward-looking foreign policy culminated in the Turkish application for full EC membership on April 14, 1987, which came as a surprise both to the EC institutions and member governments.”³⁰

Another milestone for the relationship between Turkey and the EU was the end of the Cold War, when the power balance and threat perceptions totally changed. The fundamental changes in Europe included “the emergence of new independent states, the reunification of Germany, and the spread of pluralist democracy and free market economies,”³¹ as well as new threats to security and regional stability, such as ethnic nationalism and terrorism. In this respect, at first the EC discounted the importance and position of Turkey in this recently shaped security environment. However, the developments after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, especially the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the instability and ethnic conflicts in the Balkan region, underlined the necessity of Turkey’s support to establish stability in the region.

²⁹ Erdoğan, “Turkey and Europe: Undivided but not United, 41-42.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Turkey's 1987 application to become a member of the EC was an unexpectedly early movement by Turkey in light of the transforming structure of the EC. Consequently, "instead of accession negotiations, Turkey was offered a number of initiatives such as a customs union in order to prepare the country for entry. In 1995, a customs union was formed."³² However, without Turkey participating in the decision making mechanism of the European Union, the Customs Union would only serve the interests of the EU members, which used it as a bargaining instrument for the applicants to the EU. As noted by Erdoğan, "In short, for the critics, the Customs Union is just an artificial and one-sided system designed to incorporate Turkey within the EU without granting membership. Under the Customs Union framework, Turkey is in a position of implementer but not decision maker."³³ Turkey was nonetheless the only country that accepted the EU's Customs Union offer without being assured and guaranteed full membership in the EU.

The relations between the EU and Turkey had become more important after the economic and technological developments associated with the emergence of computers and the internet in the last quarter of the 20th century. Meanwhile, Turkey became a major trade partner of the EU. As stated in an International Crisis Group Europe Report, "Whereas in 1980 just one third of Turkey's trade was with EU states, it was half on the eve of the 1995 Customs Union and has stayed that way, while overall trade has quadrupled. Over the ensuing decade Turkey has been the EU's sixth or seventh biggest partner. Germany, whose exports to the country have risen 54 per cent since 2003, is usually Turkey's biggest customer and supplier."³⁴

C. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND RELATED AGREEMENTS

The period of transition to a new security and economic environment after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disagreements among European states regarding the rising ethnic conflict issues in the Balkan region led the Europeans to think

³² Yasin Kalın, *The Implications of EU Admittance of Turkey on Turkish-EU Relations and Turkish-U.S. Relations*, USAWC Strategy Research Project, 18 March 2005.

³³ Erdoğan, *Turkey and Europe: Undivided but not United*.

³⁴ *Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead*, International Crisis Group Europe Report N.184 – 17 August.

of their common voice and policy while sharing certain interests. Moreover, the United Nations was also concerned about protecting human rights by intervening in the internal affairs of the new sovereign states in the Balkans.³⁵ Europeans started to think about supplying their own security through their own decisions and capacity. As Jolyon Howorth noted, “during the mid-1990s, the EU had attempted to organize its security arrangements entirely *within* the NATO framework by developing a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) based on European-only forces, a European-only command chain, and complex arrangements for borrowing essential assets from the Alliance.”³⁶

In the early 1990s, the EU sought to establish a common union in all policy fields and to carry forward its enlargement policy by several treaties and agreements. The European Council meeting in Rome in December 1990 launched intergovernmental conferences intended to deepen European integration. These conferences led to the Maastricht Summit in December 1991. The Maastricht Treaty, also called the Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into force on 1 November 1993. The objectives of the Maastricht Treaty were not limited to economic progress in the common market. In this context, the Treaty of Maastricht responds to five key goals:

- strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the institutions;
- improve the effectiveness of the institutions;
- establish economic and monetary union;
- develop the Community social dimension;
- establish a common foreign and security policy.³⁷

This treaty was a turning point in the integration and enlargement process of the European Union, which consists of three pillars: the European Communities, the common

³⁵ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European*, 54.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 8; italics in the original.

³⁷ Activities of the European Union, Summaries of Legislation.

foreign and security policy, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. These pillars are officially explained as follows:

The first pillar consists of the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom and concerns the domains in which the Member States share their sovereignty via the Community institutions. The process known as the Community method applies in this connection, i.e., a proposal by the European Commission, its adoption by the Council and the European Parliament and the monitoring of compliance with Community law by the Court of Justice.

The second pillar establishes common foreign and security policy (CFSP), enshrined in Title V of the Treaty on European Union. This replaces the provisions of the Single European Act and allows Member States to take joint action in the field of foreign policy. This pillar involves an intergovernmental decision-making process, which largely relies on unanimity. The Commission and Parliament play a modest role and the Court of Justice has no say in this area.

The third pillar concerns cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (JHA), provided for in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. The Union is expected to undertake joint action so as to offer European citizens a high level of protection in the area of freedom, security and justice. The decision-making process is also intergovernmental.³⁸

The Treaty of Maastricht established the foundation of the common foreign and security policy of the European Union states.

A few months after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the foreign and defense ministers of the WEU organization came together in Petersberg in June 1992 and approved the famous Petersberg Tasks. These tasks were important to promote international security and peace by providing the basis for the legitimacy of the European Union's use of the WEU to conduct crisis-management operations.

³⁸ Activities of the European Union, Summaries of Legislation.

As stated in the Europa Glossary, “The ‘Petersberg tasks’ are an integral part of the European security and defence policy (ESDP). They were explicitly included in the [Amsterdam and Nice versions of the] Treaty on European Union (Article 17) and cover:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”³⁹

The June 1996 Berlin Agreement “created the possibility that the WEU, for the first time, might become a militarily effective organization, able to respond to at least some of the limited range of agreed Petersberg Tasks.”⁴⁰ This agreement gave the opportunity to the European Union to make use of NATO’s assets and capabilities, called “separable but not separate” forces, in WEU-led missions. The importance of this agreement can be easily observed.

The grand bargain sealed at Berlin and Brussels in June 1996 had several key elements, of which the following were most important:

- There could be “WEU-led” operations, including “planning and exercising of command elements and forces.”
- NATO would identify “types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets . . . HQs [Headquarters], HQ elements and command structures . . . which could be made available, subject to decision by the [North Atlantic Council]” and subsequent “monitoring of the use” of these forces by NATO. This continuing role of NATO in the use of its “assets” was later broadened to provide for their “return or recall,” if they proved to be needed by the alliance—e.g., in the event of a competing crisis or conflict...
- All European members of NATO would be able to take part in WEU-led operations, including European command arrangements if they chose to do so (this was in particular a reference to Turkey).⁴¹

³⁹ Europa Glossary.

⁴⁰ Robert E. Hunter, *European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor?* RAND Reports, 2002, 15-16.

⁴¹ Hunter, *European Security and Defense Policy*, 15-16.

All Alliance members, including the largest contributor to NATO, the United States, agreed to the WEU's access to NATO's collective assets under WEU command, even in autonomous operations in which the Alliance was not fully engaged.

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in October 1997, and supported the Common Foreign and Security Policy by strengthening "the ties between the EU and the WEU and increased the EU's responsibilities for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks by incorporating the Petersberg tasks."⁴²

As noted in an official EU publication, the aim of negotiations in the Amsterdam Treaty "was clear: to create the political and institutional conditions to enable the European Union to meet the challenges of the future such as the rapid evolution of the international situation, the globalization of the economy and its impact on jobs, the fight against terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, ecological problems and threats to public health."⁴³ In order to achieve these goals the European Union had to be able to defend its interests more effectively and coherently on the international scene.

The Amsterdam Treaty supported the idea of the CFSP and took this policy into action. As stated in an official publication, the section on the CFSP looks at the following reforms:

- the creation of a new instrument: the common strategy;
- improved decision-making thanks to greater use of qualified majority voting in the Council;
- the creation of the post of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy to give the CFSP greater prominence and coherence;
- the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit to encourage joint analysis of international developments and their consequences;
- the incorporation of the "Petersberg tasks" into Title V (CFSP) of the Treaty on European Union, to demonstrate the Member States' common desire to safeguard security in Europe through operations to provide humanitarian aid and restore peace;

⁴² Manole, *The Emergence of The Triangular Security Link*.

⁴³ The Amsterdam Treaty: Introduction, Activities of the European Union, Summaries of Legislation.

- the simplification of the procedures for funding the CFSP.⁴⁴

These agreements and treaties shaped the basic structure and the main aims of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy prior to the emergence of the European Security and Defense Policy in 1998-1999.

D. CONCLUSION

Turkey's relations with the European Community and shifting security requirements have shaped the cooperation between NATO and the EU in the past and will do so in the future. The period from 1991 (the emergence of the EU and its CFSP) to 1999 (the launch of the ESDP) was full of military operations, structural changes in security organizations, and negotiations among states and security organizations. During these years, the negotiations between Turkey and the EU made remarkable progress. However, there were some unresolved issues among the parties, such as the EU's access to NATO assets and capabilities, Turkey's role in European security decision-making, Turkey's full membership in the EU, and disagreements arising from the enlargement policies of NATO and the EU.

Turkey's relationship to the WEU, the military branch of the EU from 1991 to 1999, became a long-term question affecting NATO and the EU. Turkey's objective is full integration in the developing security, defense and foreign policy structure of the EU. However, Turkey has already been an essential contributor to European security through NATO. After Turkey's application for full membership in the WEU, Turkey was offered an associate membership, a position parallel to its EU membership level. Afterwards, Turkey along with Norway and Iceland became an associate member of the WEU on 20 November 1992 (a status which became effective in 1995).⁴⁵ Although Turkey wanted to be a full member of the WEU, the associate member position provided a valuable strategic role in the development of the ESDI by the WEU within NATO. As Ramazan Gozen stated, "The WEU associate membership provided Turkey with a place and some institutional rights in the WEU's decision-making processes as well as in the WEU's

⁴⁴Activities of the European Union, Summaries of Legislation.

⁴⁵ Ramazan Gozen, *Turkey's Delicate position Between NATO and the ESDP* (March 2003), 26.

non-Article 5 operations. Turkey's status in the WEU system granted Turkey the right to become closely involved in the European security architecture. Most importantly, Turkey had the right to participate in the meetings of the WEU Council and its working groups and subsidiary bodies under certain conditions."⁴⁶

Though the EU had shown only a little encouragement to Turkey, Ankara had responded to this movement by joining the Customs Union without any guarantee of full membership. Moreover, Turkey played an active role in international peacekeeping operations in most of the crises concerning security and stability in the region, even more than several EU member states, within the framework of the U.N., NATO and WEU-led missions.

The WEU was for several years the organization for implementation of the EU's security and defense policies. Therefore, as Osman Şengül stated, "Turkey got rather disturbed once the EU began to develop ESDP terminating the WEU and not taking a good care of the status of non-EU European NATO allies under the new arrangement."⁴⁷ Turkey had contributed to the security of Europe for more than half a century and had contributed remarkably to the emergence of what became the European Security and Defense Policy.

In this period, after concluding the Maastricht Treaty, the foundation of the EU, the EU furthered its CFSP by including the WEU's Petersberg Tasks in the Amsterdam version of the Treaty on European Union and established agreements with NATO about using the Alliance's assets and capabilities in its autonomous peace operations. The EU was ready to develop its own autonomous operational power instead of relying on the WEU, which was closely linked to NATO.

⁴⁶ Gozen, *Turkey's Delicate position Between NATO and the ESDP* (March 2003), 26.

⁴⁷ Osman Şengül, "Turkey: An Asset for European Security in Terms of the ESDP?" *Journal of Security Issues* 1, 63.

III. ESDP (1999-2004)

A. INTRODUCTION

The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was launched in place of the Western European Union (WEU) as the defense and security institution of the European Union in 1999. Before ESDP, “the WEU was the only existing security structure which acted as an interface between the EU and NATO.”⁴⁸ However, the WEU was not employed to deal with certain security challenges. Moreover, it was dependent upon NATO and was regarded as having a relatively weak political structure. The ESDP reflects the desire of the EU to play a greater role on the international stage. In order to achieve this aim, the ESDP has to be backed by credible military power. The ESDP is intended to resolve the cooperation problems between NATO and the EU after the transfer of most WEU institutions to the EU.

In 1999, a political and strategic project, called the European Security and Defense Policy, started “with a common body of instruments which all member states — except Denmark — agree to implement collectively and which has acquired its own distinct profile and footprint.”⁴⁹ The emergence of the ESDP was a milestone in relations between the EU and Turkey that affected cooperation between NATO and the EU. The ESDP has provoked debates about its purpose and functionality because this institution has brought a significant change in trans-Atlantic relations. Michael Rühle, an expert at NATO Headquarters, remarked that the majority of NATO Allies “now organize themselves in a framework that also covers security — and conducts its own dialogue with Washington.”⁵⁰ Moreover, Rühle observed, “A European Union with a distinct military dimension constitutes the most profound institutional change within the transatlantic security community since its creation almost six decades ago.”⁵¹

⁴⁸ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 8.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵⁰ Michael Rühle, “A More Political NATO.” *NATO Review* (Winter 2005).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Turkey as a WEU associate member had some concerns about the EU's ESDP displacing the WEU. "One of the most controversial and sensitive issues for Turkey during this process was the redefinition of the future role of the non-EU members of NATO within the new ESDP framework."⁵² As noted by Sühnaz Yılmaz, an assistant professor at Koc University, "Turkey had a high stake in maintaining the institutional status quo, especially since the ESDP excludes Turkey from its decision-making mechanisms."⁵³ Therefore, Turkey was right to be concerned about the implications of the ESDP for Turkish interests.

The exclusion of Turkey from the EU's decision-making structure caused some disagreements in NATO-EU cooperation. The main debate after the ESDP's emergence has concerned NATO-EU relations. As David Yost has noted, "In the April 1999 Washington Summit Communiqué the Allies simultaneously approved fundamental guidelines for the development of effective NATO-EU cooperation. These guidelines, including 'assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations' and 'the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations,' have been incorporated into the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreements."⁵⁴ However, this assured access commitment led to a significant problem because its fulfillment depends on the non-EU NATO members of the alliance.

In Madeleine Albright's statement, in December 1998, directly after the Saint-Malo Declaration, the US concerns about ESDP were clearly articulated: "First, we want to avoid decoupling: NATO is the expression of the indispensable transatlantic link. It should remain an organization of sovereign allies, where European decision-making is not unhooked from broader alliance decision-making. Second, we want to avoid duplication: defense resources are too scarce for allies to conduct force planning, operate command structures, and make procurement decisions twice — once at NATO and once

⁵² Sühnaz Yılmaz, *Turkey and European Security*, IAI-TESEV Report, 58.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ David S. Yost, "NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept," in Jean Dufourcq + Lionel Ponsard, eds., *Security Strategies: NATO, the United States, and the European Union* (NATO Defense College, Rome, March 2005), 29.

more at the EU. And third, we want to avoid any discrimination against NATO members who are not EU members.”⁵⁵ The ESDP project of the EU and the use of NATO assets in EU-led operations have been supported by the United States and the other NATO Allies. However, the establishment of the ESDP affected Turkey directly. Turkey was excluded from participating in the EU’s ESDP, although Turkey had been an associate member of the WEU, and it had been willing to approve lending NATO assets to the EU.⁵⁶

This chapter considers the initial period of the ESDP, its fundamental drivers, and the multifaceted problems that arose after the major shifts in the institutional structure of the European Union between 1999 and 2004, when the enlargement of the European Union with ten new members took place.

B. THE EMERGENCE OF ESDP OVER WEU

The WEU’s approval of the Petersberg tasks in 1992, the NATO Berlin Agreement in 1996, and the provisions of the Amsterdam version of the Treaty on European Union dealing with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy all contributed to the emergence of ESDP.

NATO had agreed that the WEU could use NATO assets and capabilities on WEU-led missions at the 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting. However, the 1996 Berlin arrangements were not enough for the European Union, which had plans to become an international actor conducting its own security and defense policies. Therefore, the Saint Malo Declaration was released by the leading officials of the British and French governments, namely Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair, in December 1998; and this was the beginning of what became the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). According to the Saint Malo Declaration,

1. The European Union needs to be in position to play its full role on the international stage...

⁵⁵ Madeleine K. Albright, “The right balance will secure NATO’s future,” *Financial Times*, 7, December 1998.

⁵⁶ Kristin Archick, Paul Gallis, *NATO and the European Union*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL32342, 3 January 2006, 15.

2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.
3. The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected.
4. ...the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).

Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and technology.⁵⁷

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the EU faced international conflicts and problems in and between sovereign states, and was therefore forced to accept greater responsibility for international security and stability. Moreover, the United States focus on the Middle East showed the need for EU nations to acquire reliable military capabilities to conduct interventions and humanitarian and peace operations in the problematic areas of their region as a respected political actor.⁵⁸

In December 1999, at the European Council in Helsinki, the ESDP was formally launched and the EU members expressed a willingness to accept the consequences of this decision. At the Helsinki summit, in order to accomplish the full range of Petersberg tasks, the EU “proposed a Headline Goal of 60,000 troops plus appropriate aerial and naval support, to be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for a year, to be in place by 2003.”⁵⁹

Soon after the Saint-Malo Declaration, at the Washington Summit of NATO in April 1999, the plans for cooperation between NATO and the EU had to be revised because of the shift in attention from the WEU to the EU and the consequent irrelevance of previous agreements with the WEU. NATO-EU cooperation started a new page and new principles of cooperation were needed. The NATO Allies at the Washington Summit committed to formulating the Berlin Plus agreements, which would be the next step in

⁵⁷ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union* 34-35.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 37-60.

⁵⁹ Alistair J K Shepherd, *ESDP: Recent Events, Unresolved Issues, An Executive Summary*.

cooperation between the EU and NATO in relation to the 1996 Berlin agreement, in order to “address EU access to NATO operational planning, capabilities and common assets, command options, and adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system.”⁶⁰

The Alliance was ready to consider the cooperation issues related to ESDP, which had replaced the WEU as the main vehicle of the European Union’s security and defense cooperation. As noted by David Yost, “The Allies declared that they were ‘ready to define and adopt the necessary agreements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance,’ and added that these arrangements would address: Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; The further adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.”⁶¹ These agreements allowed the EU to develop its own security and defense structure independent of NATO, but in cooperation with NATO, and thus without decreasing its security assurances from NATO regarding the use of NATO’s assets and capabilities.

The Nice Treaty, in December 2000, also contained some amendments about EU enlargement and the formation of an autonomous military capacity deployable by an independent EU policy, in the name of ESDP. At Nice, the EU had proposed some plans for cooperation with NATO in order to benefit from NATO’s planning capabilities. These plans included assured access to NATO’s assets and capabilities without difficulty to avoid duplication. The Nice Summit also called for arrangements on the participation of the non-EU NATO European Allies in the ESDP project, such as Turkey and Norway.

⁶⁰ Leo Michel, *NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations*, Research Paper (NATO Defense College, No. 31, February 2007).

⁶¹ David S. Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, Forum Paper no. 3 (Rome: NATO Defense College, September 2007), 74-75. Yost’s reference is to the Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999, par. 10.

In NATO's Prague Summit Declaration in November 2002, the importance of stability in the Mediterranean for the security of Europe, and the significance of the cooperation between NATO and the EU are stated clearly.⁶²

After a long dispute between Turkey and the European Union on the issue of the EU's access to NATO's assets and capabilities, "In March 2003 NATO and the EU announced that they had worked out a 'Berlin Plus' package of arrangements to allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged."⁶³ The delay of this announcement of the Berlin Plus agreement revealed the problems raised by the transfer of most of the WEU's institutions to the EU, including Turkey's exclusion from the decision-making structure of the European Union. This agreement made possible the first experience of a NATO operation's transition to EU leadership, as noted by Leo Michel: "In March 2003, a relatively small NATO crisis management operation in Macedonia, begun in August 2001, transitioned to EU leadership. In this first implementation experience for Berlin Plus, a small NATO headquarters remained in Skopje, including a Senior Civilian Representative and a Senior Military Representative, to assist Macedonian authorities in the development of security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards."⁶⁴ Moreover, as noted in a NATO fact sheet, "between 19 and 25 November 2003, the first joint NATO-EU crisis management exercise (CME/CMX 03) based on the standing 'Berlin-Plus' arrangements was held."⁶⁵ However, the problems were not solved properly and might block the EU's use of NATO assets and capabilities unless the EU accepts the involvement of non-EU European members of NATO in its ESDP decision-making process.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks have affected the EU's security and defense policy. These events had a positive impact on

⁶² "NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests. We remain strongly committed to the decisions made at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, in order to enhance NATO-EU cooperation." *Prague Summit Declaration*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002.

⁶³ Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, 77.

⁶⁴ Leo Michel, *NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations*, Research Paper (NATO Defense College, No. 31, February 2007).

⁶⁵ *NATO-EU : A strategic partnership*, Working in the field.

NATO-EU cooperation on common policies against terrorism. As a result of these common perspectives, as noted by Jolyon Howorth, “after the start of the Iraq War in 2003, the EU devised its first ever ‘Security Strategy’ document, which spelled out the broad outlines of its military objectives.”⁶⁶ In the European Security Strategy, as Meltem Müftüler Baç, an associate professor at Sabanci University, noted, “the EU identified its main security concerns as terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs and people and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...Instability in the Mediterranean Region carries significant security threats for the EU, as it would have the capacity to diffuse into European territory.”⁶⁷

The EU launched the ESDP in 1999 and established its fundamental structure with a sequence of treaties and agreements. However, when the EU shifted its focus of activity away from the WEU, it also broke off ties with allies — including Turkey — that had contributed much to European security.

C. CHANGES IN NATO-EU RELATIONS AFTER ESDP

1999 and the following years brought significant changes not only to the long-term structure of the EU but also to trans-Atlantic relations. These changes were hopeful for both the EU and the United States with regard to establishing a new security and defense framework. As Sally McNamara, a senior policy analyst in European affairs, stated, “The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005 profoundly demonstrate the new security threats facing the West.”⁶⁸ These threats formed common interests and concerns in security and defense policies by NATO and the EU. According to McNamara, “The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has emerged as one of the biggest attempts to expand EU power to date, centralizing the most important tools of nation-statehood. The militarization of the

⁶⁶ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 106.

⁶⁷ Baç, *Turkey and European Security*, 20.

⁶⁸ Sally McNamara, *The European Security and Defense Policy: A Challenge to the Transatlantic Security Alliance*, Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation, no. 2053, July 18, 2007).

European Union marks one of the greatest geopolitical shifts in the transatlantic alliance since the end of the Second World War.”⁶⁹

The members of NATO and the EU are mostly common. More precisely, 84% of EU members are also NATO members.⁷⁰ Thus, progress on NATO-EU relations depends on progress in operational cooperation by these two organizations. To develop this cooperation, NATO and the EU have implemented a series of transition and joint operations. However, there are some problems about participation and access to the assets and capabilities of NATO by the EU. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 showed the limited operational capability of the EU without the assistance of the United States. In spite of this fact, the EU’s ESDP project has been supported by the United States, subject to the concerns expressed by Madeleine Albright in December 1998. However, non-EU European members of NATO, such as Turkey and Norway, have been excluded from the EU’s decision-making structure, although they were associate members of the WEU.

Jolyon Howorth has explained the changed conditions briefly: “As major security actors within NATO, Turkey and Norway had played important roles in WEU. That role abruptly ended with the inauguration of ESDP in 2000.”⁷¹ Turkey and Norway tried to participate in the European Union’s security and defense decision-making structure and were willing to contribute to ESDP operations. “Although the EU, in spring 2000, instituted regular security and defense discussions between the COPS [Political and Security Committee] and the six non-EU NATO members, as well as with all 15 non-EU European states, Turkey — strongly backed by USA — found this inadequate in three ways. First, it was widely recognized that most of the scenarios for regional destabilization had their locus in South-Eastern Europe — in Turkey’s ‘near abroad’.”⁷² According to Bruce Kuniholm, director of Duke University's Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs and chairman of Duke's Department of Public Policy Studies, “What

⁶⁹McNamara, *The European Security and Defense Policy*.

⁷⁰ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 9.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁷² *Ibid.*

worries Turkey about the creation of an EU defense force is that areas near Turkey's borders are those most likely to be the location of EU missions (13 of 16 possible crisis regions throughout the world cited in one NATO survey were in regions near Turkey). Because Turkey is a non-member of the EU, its representatives would be outside decision-making circles if the defense force were not closely tied to NATO."⁷³ Moreover, in some of the possible operations in this region Turkey would be required to participate directly in conflict near its borders. According to Mustafa Kibaroglu, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University in Turkey, "In such a case, EU intervention in conflicts in the immediate neighborhood of Turkey without Ankara's active participation — both in the planning and in the operational phases — may not only severely damage Turkey's interests, but also threaten its security."⁷⁴

Howorth's analysis continues as follows: "Second, this was particularly significant, viewed from Ankara, in the context of the unresolved disputes between Turkey and Greece over Aegean airspace and territorial waters, and over the divided island of Cyprus. Third, the matter was exacerbated by the EU's longstanding reluctance to engage in discussions over Turkish membership of the Union."⁷⁵ For these reasons Turkey did not fully accept the principle of guaranteed access of the EU to NATO assets and capabilities and used its NATO membership to delay approval of the "Berlin Plus" agreement.

Turkey's situation created a genuine dilemma for both the EU and NATO. This dilemma stayed unresolved for more than two years and was resolved partly in order to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for a specific operation. This arrangement would not only avoid duplication of Allied forces in the same region, but would also provide the basis for improved operational capacity by supplying the EU with virtually automatic access to the assets even in its autonomous ESDP operations. As Kibaroglu pointed out, "Turkey, as a non-member of the Union, has made it clear that it

⁷³Bruce Kuniholm, *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and U.S. Attitudes, and Challenges for Turkey*, 168.

⁷⁴ Mustafa Kibaroglu, *Turkey's Triple Trouble: ESDP, Cyprus and N. Iraq*, *Insight Turkey* (January-March 2002, Vol. 4, No. 1) 2.

⁷⁵ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 167.

would not give its unconditional approval to such a request, which would mean losing its control over the use of NATO assets in the future military operations of the EU. This is because Turkey fears that EU-led operations may well contradict its supreme national interests.”⁷⁶ According to Osman Şengül, “Greece could veto Turkey’s participation in autonomous EU operations on regions of outmost strategic salience for Turkey and even it could press the EU to conduct a ‘Petersberg-type operation’ on Cyprus or Aegean Sea.”⁷⁷

It is entirely reasonable for the EU to establish an autonomous military force in accordance with the decision of the European Security and Defense Policy. As Kibaroglu has observed, “A sovereign political entity (the EU in this case) that has a parliament, a ministerial council, a full-fledged bureaucracy, as well as a flag and a banknote in circulation (the new euro) has the right, in theory, to make a claim to establish a military unit of its own. Otherwise, its sovereignty will be called into question. However, if that political entity has to depend on others’ military assets and capabilities, it must acknowledge the need to share the decision-making authority, as well as the command and control, with those who somehow contribute to its capabilities.”⁷⁸ Turkey does not want to participate in an operation in which it has no role in the decision-making process. In contrast with Turkey’s exclusion from the decision-making autonomy of the ESDP, the EU depends on the united approval of the NATO Allies for use of NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations. As Kibaroglu has noted, “Turkey insisted on being admitted to the decision-making mechanism whenever NATO assets would be called into action, and especially when the Union conducted military operations in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood.”⁷⁹

In the presence of these concerns, Turkey decided to use its NATO rights to delay agreement on the EU’s access to NATO assets and capabilities, which was envisaged in

⁷⁶ Kibaroglu, *Turkey’s Triple Trouble*, 2.

⁷⁷ Osman Şengül, “Turkey: An Asset for European Security in Terms of the ESDP?” *Journal of Security Issues* 1, 64.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Kibaroglu, *Turkey’s Triple Trouble*, 2.

the “Berlin Plus” arrangements. Turkey’s policy prevented the EU from utilizing NATO’s operational opportunities directly and complicated the ESDP’s operationalization. This long-standing problem was not solved until December 2002. The solution was reached through lengthy dialogues involving Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU. “Ankara settled for ‘the fullest possible involvement’ in the EU’s security and defense decision-shaping process and automatic involvement in the event of an EU mission using NATO assets. Turkey was also given a formal guarantee that ESDP missions would not be deployed in the Aegean and that an EU force would not attack a NATO member state.”⁸⁰ This agreement is known as the “Ankara document.” Greece had refused to accept the document for one year. Turkey, with this agreement, was confident about its security, and participated in most of the EU-led operations. However, Turkey demanded and deserved a position of responsibility equivalent to that in the WEU period in the decision-making and planning process of the ESDP.

In the presence of these problems, the cooperation of NATO and the EU had faltered seriously. However, the relations of these two organizations developed after facing the new common asymmetric threats. The United States and the United Kingdom played the main role in NATO’s diplomacy regarding Turkey and the development of the European Security and Defense Policy and NATO-EU relations.

D. CONCLUSION

The period from 1999 to 2004 started with the formal launch of the ESDP and ended with the enlargement of the EU. Between these significant milestones, were unexpected threats that required a collective response from NATO and the EU. The unfavorable situation of the non-EU European NATO members, especially Turkey, led to some disputes about the sharing of NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations. This situation would also create some disputes in conjunction with the participation problem in the years after the 2004 EU enlargement.

⁸⁰ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 169, 170.

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IV. ESDP (2004-PRESENT)

A. INTRODUCTION

The European Union established the ESDP in order to act as a more effective international security and stability actor in today's international structure. In the changing strategic environment the non-EU European members of NATO have maintained their distinct status in relation to these two important organizations. Especially after the extensive enlargement of the EU in 2004, their status has appeared to be more anomalous and exceptional.

In May 2004, the EU accepted ten states as new members (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Moreover, in January 2007 two more states (Bulgaria and Romania) concluded their accession to the EU. With its enlargement policy, the EU aimed at “widening the zone of stability, democracy and prosperity that the EU stands for.”⁸¹ The EU's enlargement, notably in Eastern Europe, led in some cases to new disputes with neighbors of the new EU members. Some of these new EU members were not members of NATO. Consequently, the participation problem that arose after the 2004 enlargement of the EU led to disagreements about sharing classified NATO information with certain non-NATO members of the EU. Moreover, the dispute over the EU's use of NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations has remained an unsolved problem between the organizations and non-EU NATO members. There are also some EU member states that reject the development of closer relations between the EU and NATO. The “scope problem” consists of the reluctance of some EU members to pursue certain topics in cooperation with NATO, because they would prefer to reserve these topics solely for the EU. As David Yost noted, this problem “stems in part from an inter-institutional competition rooted in overlapping missions and contrasting national ambitions for the two organizations.”⁸² Indeed, as Yost observes, the “scope problem ... derives in large

⁸¹ Çiğdem Nas, *EU and Turkey: Challenges and Opportunities in Enlargement and Foreign Policy*, (TUNACES & European Community Institute, Marmara University, FORNET Plenary 21-22 April 2005).

⁸² Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, 16-17.

part from the reluctance of a number of EU member states that are NATO Allies to expand the scope of NATO-EU cooperation beyond capabilities development discussions and operations under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements.”⁸³ These problems contribute to the feebleness of cooperation between these organizations.

Despite the concern provoked by these significant problems in cooperation between the EU and NATO, NATO has transferred responsibility for some operations to the EU – notably in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the EU has since 2003 also conducted its own EU-led ESDP missions outside of Europe for the first time. These operations have generally been civilian or police missions and have included training local stabilization units.

The EU has searched for ways to strengthen its military capabilities and become a decisive military actor since the announcement of the European Security Strategy in December 2003. Therefore, at the European Council meeting on 17 June 2004, the EU determined some force development goals for 2010 beyond the 2003 Headline Goals in order to acquire more responsive military capabilities, at the same time as the launch of the European Defense Agency (EDA).⁸⁴ The EU’s attempts include the creation of rapid reaction EU Battlegroups for the autonomous missions of the EU. A related goal is to increase cooperation among EU members to improve the European Union’s military capabilities. Consequently, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007 by representatives of the 27 Member States. This Treaty offers more coherence and a framework for the EU to behave as a global actor with greater effectiveness.

The most important problems of the EU include developing greater cohesion and conducting positive relations with the candidate states of the European Union in the enlargement process. The Cyprus dispute between Turkey and the EU, including the problem of the EU’s use of NATO assets and capabilities and the barriers to the

⁸³ Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, 12.

⁸⁴ “The ESDP has developed significantly after 11 September [2001] in recognition of the fact that threats such as terrorism are becoming more and more important outside of EU borders. Europe’s strategy is outlined in the European Security Strategy (ESS)...the European Defence Agency (EDA)...is open to all Member States (through joint action) who express their interest in participating. The Agency’s primary functions are to develop ‘defence capabilities, research, acquisition and armaments’ and to ‘act in support of the CFSP and the ESDP’.” *The EU’s Response to the Threat of Terrorism*.

distribution of NATO classified information to EU states which are not members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and which have not completed a security agreement with NATO in that framework, hinders cooperation between the EU and NATO. Besides, Turkey's long accession process to EU membership makes the problems more complicated. These problems are affecting cooperation between the EU and NATO in a significant way, and hamper the development of the EU as an efficient supplier of security and stability.

This chapter of the thesis considers recent ESDP developments and the impact of the disputes between Turkey and the EU on Cyprus and related problems in cooperation between the EU and NATO since the enlargement of the European Union in 2004.

B. THE EU'S POLICY AFTER EU ENLARGEMENT AND ESDP DEVELOPMENT

In order to avoid new threats to stability after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and to extend the economic and political benefits of the European Union to the eastern part of Europe, the EU accelerated its usual enlargement process. The 2004 enlargement of the EU was the largest expansion of its history, from 15 members to 25 members. The new states, namely Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia were generally less prosperous than the 15 established members of the EU, and most of them had been influenced by the Soviet regime for decades and surrounded by problematic areas. Therefore, this round of enlargement was the most challenging ever undertaken by the EU. In January 2007, as noted previously, two more states became members of the European Union, namely Bulgaria and Romania.

The effects of this enlargement are important for cooperation between the EU and NATO. At present, the EU contains 21 NATO members out of its 27 members. In other words, there are six non-NATO EU members, namely Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. On the other hand, three European members of NATO from Europe are not members of the EU, namely Iceland, Norway and Turkey.⁸⁵ Two of these states

⁸⁵ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 8.

have no diplomatic relations with each other— that is, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. This situation has caused several problems, not only between Turkey and the EU but also between the EU and NATO.

The declaration of the European Security Strategy and the problems in cooperation about using NATO's assets and capabilities in EU-led operations brought out the need for a sustainable and well-trained force to employ in the urgent situations. One of the serious attempts to achieve this goal was the creation of the European Defense Agency. As stated by Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, experts with the Congressional Research Service, "in June 2004, EU leaders agreed to establish a European Defense Agency (EDA) devoted to improving European military capabilities and interoperability. A key focus of the EDA will be to help the EU's 25 member states to stretch their scarce defense funds farther by increasing cooperation among members in the areas of weapons research, development, and procurement."⁸⁶ EDA was an important step for the EU, because it called for developing defense capabilities and maintaining cooperation inside the European Union.

Headline Goal 2010 was a significant step beyond the 2003 Headline Goal of the ESDP. As noted by Konstantinos Vrettos, "the Headline Goal 2010 calls for a high level of responsiveness on the part of both headquarters and forces: five days for decision-making, ten days for deployment."⁸⁷ This requirement of the European Union supported the battlegroup concept. The battlegroup was assumed to be "the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations."⁸⁸ To have this operational flexibility the EU needed highly-trained small units at a specific readiness level. As noted by Jolyon Howorth, battlegroups are "units of 1,500 troops prepared for combat in jungle,

⁸⁶ Archick and Gallis, *NATO and the European Union*, 17.

⁸⁷ Konstantinos Vrettos, *ESDP developments and the Headline Goal 2010- Reply to the annual report of the Council*, Document A/1898, 15 June 2005, Assembly of WEU, 10, par. 41.

⁸⁸ Vrettos, *ESDP developments and the Headline Goal 2010*.

desert or mountain conditions, deployable within 15 days and sustainable in the field for up to 30 days with potential extension to 120 days.”⁸⁹

In the most recent period of relations between NATO and the EU, the EU has played a more enterprising role and conducted more operations outside of Europe. Significant events such as the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 have profoundly shaped the new security perceptions of the EU. As noted by Sally McNamara, “Transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and unstable or failed states present daunting challenges to the entire Euro-Atlantic community and require a long-term sustained response.”⁹⁰ The EU has increased its participation in international peace-keeping operations.

The EU took over NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation in Bosnia and renamed it operation Althea in December 2004. Operation Althea remains the biggest mission that the European Union has undertaken. A police mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo to assist the police forces in coordination with the U.N. was launched in April 2005, after being delayed by logistical problems. Moreover, “In June 2005, the EU and NATO agreed to coordinate efforts to airlift African Union peacekeepers to Sudan to help quell the ongoing violence in the Darfur region.”⁹¹ However, the Darfur case illustrated the importance of improved cooperation between these organizations to avoid delays in meeting needs.⁹²

The EU has also conducted some civilian ESDP operations in the Middle East and Asia. As stated by Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, “in July 2005, the EU began a civilian rule of law mission to help train about 800 Iraqi police, judges, and administrators. Training is taking place primarily outside of Iraq because of ongoing security concerns.”⁹³ In addition to this, “in November 2005, the EU began deploying about 70 monitors to the Rafah border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt as part of

⁸⁹ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 107.

⁹⁰ McNamara, *The European Security and Defense Policy*.

⁹¹ Archick and Gallis, *NATO and the European Union*, 17.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on security controls for Gaza following Israel's withdrawal."⁹⁴ Furthermore, the EU led some civilian missions in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, in September 2005 in order to monitor the stability of the region; these missions lasted for approximately one year. "In June 2007, the EU launched a 200-strong police training mission in Afghanistan, partly in response to calls from NATO and the United States for assistance."⁹⁵

The EU has also undertaken steps to advance security and stability by assisting and providing education to officials of non-EU countries in "countering weapons trafficking, organized crime, and corruption,"⁹⁶ as with the border missions in Moldova and Ukraine in December 2005. As a recent example, "in January 2008, the EU approved deploying a 3,700-strong peacekeeping force to Chad aimed at protecting the thousands of Sudanese refugees there; this mission is expected to begin in March 2008."⁹⁷

Debates over developing the military capacity and organization for the planning and conduct of these operations preoccupied members of the EU, especially after Operation EUFOR DR Congo, led by the EU in 2006. As Ion Dumitrascu has observed, "The [EU] Council has the overall responsibility for the conduct of EU-led crisis management operations...including the decision to take actions as well as to invite third countries."⁹⁸ These responsibilities include, as noted by Dumitrascu, "the decision to launch and terminate the operation, [and] the review and adaptation of the mission."⁹⁹ Therefore, the EU recognized the need for an operational headquarters, and in 2007 established the EU Operations Centre in Brussels. The need for an EU centre to handle command and control in operations and coordination with other organizations became

⁹⁴ Archick and Gallis, *NATO and the European Union*, 17.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ion Dumitrascu, "EU operations Centre, A New instrument to Lead Crisis Management Operations," *Romanian Military Thinking*, no. 2, 2007, 30, EU Operations Centre.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

apparent after some experiences with operations, as an alternative to using facilities provided by powerful members of the European Union or borrowing NATO's capabilities.¹⁰⁰

The Treaty of Lisbon, also known as the Reform Treaty, was signed in December 2007. As noted by Christian Molling, "The key objectives of this treaty are to render the enlarged EU more effective and to increase its transparency and democratic legitimacy."¹⁰¹ The Treaty of Lisbon was concluded in order to take account of the EU's enlargement and to amend the current EU and EC treaties.

The EU's relations with the rest of the world are conducted by multiple actors inside the European Union. Coordinated and timely actions have been obstructed by these actors and inappropriate institutional structures. The Lisbon Treaty is important because of its attempts to solve the coherence and effectiveness problems. As noted by Sophia Dagand, "in an attempt to offer greater coherence, the Lisbon Treaty introduces some innovations aimed at rationalizing the EU's institutional architecture."¹⁰²

As stated by Christian Molling, "The Lisbon Treaty affects the area of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in two ways. First, general harmonization of the overall institutional framework should facilitate relations between the Council and the Commission with respect to crisis management issues. Second, several articles in the treaty are intended to strengthen Europe's role in the world directly through the improvement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its subordinated area of ESDP."¹⁰³

The national policies of EU member states led to divisions inside the intergovernmental structure of the European Union in managing the common policy of the EU. As stated by Sophia Dagand, "The new treaty offers various opportunities for

¹⁰⁰ Dumitrascu, "EU operations Centre, A New instrument to Lead Crisis Management Operations."

¹⁰¹ Christian Molling, "ESDP after Lisbon: More Coherent and Capable?" *CSS Analyses in Security Policy* (Vol. 3, No. 28, February 2008), 1.

¹⁰² Sophia Dagand, "The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP," *European Security Review* (No. 37, March 2008).

¹⁰³ Molling, "ESDP after Lisbon: More Coherent and Capable?"

greater policy coherence, effectiveness and visibility.”¹⁰⁴ The treaty was designed to strengthen the European Union and make it more active and effective in international relations according to common European Union interests and ambitions.

C. PROBLEMS AND RECENT SITUATION OF NATO-EU RELATIONS

The problems and disputes between the EU and NATO have increased, especially since the EU has pursued greater ambitions as an international actor. The emergence of the ESDP in 1998-1999, to the detriment of the WEU, changed the terms of reference for cooperation between the EU and NATO. According to the mutual needs of these two organizations in establishing security in the Euro-Atlantic region, their cooperation improved after the establishment of the ESDP and the Berlin Plus agreement on sharing NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations. However, the differentiated structure of these organizations, in conjunction with the enlargement process and new threat perceptions, created some problems after the launch of the ESDP in 1998-1999 and the major enlargement round of the EU in 2004.

As noted by David Yost,

Turkey has since 1963 refused to recognize the government of the Republic of Cyprus, which joined the EU in May 2004. Turkey has since 1983 recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and has maintained that the Nicosia government has lacked the legal authority to represent Cyprus as a whole and to join the European Union.¹⁰⁵

Therefore, Turkey has blocked formal contacts between the EU and NATO because of the recognition problem associated with Cyprus and the obstacles to sharing classified NATO information with states that are not members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and that have not concluded security agreements with NATO in that framework. As noted by Yost, “The “participation problem” is shorthand for the conflict of principles that has since the 2004 enlargement of the EU limited effective cooperation between the members of NATO and the EU.”¹⁰⁶ This conflict of principles has prevented formal common

¹⁰⁴ Dagand, “The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP.”

¹⁰⁵ Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, 93.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

planning and decision-making by these two organizations regarding important questions such as a potential crisis in Kosovo. Turkey's concerns are understandable because the EU might decide to conduct an operation in an area of strategic interest to Turkey – such as Cyprus, the Aegean or the Balkans.

In fact the EU disregarded its own accession rules for Cyprus, given that Cyprus is an island divided between two republics, namely the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus, that has many political, economic, and territorial problems to solve. By accepting the Republic of Cyprus as a member of the European Union, the EU brought about these problems in cooperation with NATO. Moreover, as noted by Sinan Ülgen, the chairman of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in Turkey, “on the basis of the Community solidarity principle, the EU claims that Cyprus can no longer be left outside of the scope of this arrangement and refuses to engage in dialogue with NATO without all [EU] members sitting around the table.”¹⁰⁷

It appears to be politically impossible in current circumstances for Turkey to drop its opposition to formal relations between the EU and NATO. The situation differs from that which prevailed before the 2004 enlargement of the EU. Some EU observers may interpret Turkey's opposition to formal NATO-EU relations as a punishment to the EU for accepting the Republic of Cyprus, which is not recognized by Turkey, as a member while protracting the process for Turkey's membership application for more than forty years. As noted by F. Stephen Larrabee, “frustration with and anger toward the EU is rising in Turkey. Support for Turkish membership in the EU has declined visibly over the last year. In 2004, 73 percent of the Turkish population supported Turkish membership; in 2006, that portion dropped to 54 percent.”¹⁰⁸ Turkey and the EU nonetheless have many things to offer each other. Larrabee added that “Turkey wants to be a part of Europe's defence policy. Its army is very capable, and is Europe's largest. At the same time, Europe does not have sufficient troops to fulfill all its peacekeeping commitments,

¹⁰⁷ Sinan Ülgen, *The Evolving EU, NATO and Turkey Relationship: Implications for Transatlantic Security*, The Atlantic Council of the United States.

¹⁰⁸ F. Staffen Larrabee, *Turkey As a U.S. Security Partner*.

and it is already relying on Turkish help for some of its operations.”¹⁰⁹ The EU agreed at the Brussels summit in December 2004 to open negotiations for Turkey’s accession as a full member.

The EU has opposed the involvement of non-EU states such as Turkey in the decision-making and management of its ESDP operations, even when they contribute forces to the operations. Turkey has no right to veto the EU’s autonomous operations because it is not a member of the EU. The admittance of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU without appropriate measures concerning the northern part of the island damaged relations between Turkey and the EU. Moreover, this relationship has become complicated. As noted by Larrabee, “under the Customs Union agreement signed with the EU in 1996, Turkey is obligated to open its ports and airports to Cypriot vessels and aircraft now that Cyprus is a full member of the EU. However, Turkey has refused to do so until the EU fulfills its promise to lift its trade embargo against Northern Cyprus.”¹¹⁰

Ankara’s decision not to allow formal relations between NATO and the EU is a response to the uncooperative behavior of the EU and the Greek Cypriots. Consequently, Turkey’s behavior in upholding its principled policy regarding the participation problem presented by Cyprus and Malta has created an obstacle to cooperation between the EU and NATO on developing the relationship.

Although the members of NATO and the EU are nearly the same (21 of the 27 EU members are also members of NATO), these two organizations have experienced several failures in cooperation and coordination. For instance, as mentioned by Tomas Valasek, “in 2005 they could not agree on who should support the African Union’s mission in Sudan, so each organization now runs its own operation there.”¹¹¹ Both of these organizations are trying to increase their military capacity in order to act more efficiently in stabilization operations and in establishing Euro-Atlantic security. The EU has attempted to boost its military strength by forming the European Defence Agency and

¹⁰⁹ Larrabee, *Turkey As a U.S. Security Partner*.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Tomas Valasek, *The Roadmap to Better EU-NATO Relations*.

articulating the 2010 Headline Goal. Valasek added, “the relative decline in Europe’s military capabilities is accelerating. EU member-states are not sending as many forces to Afghanistan as the operation commanders have requested, and they have failed to provide enough soldiers for the NATO response force.”¹¹²

As noted by Yost, “The NATO-EU “participation problem” is thus rooted in part in the absence of a negotiated settlement in Cyprus.”¹¹³ In this situation, the EU and NATO cannot officially meet and discuss joint future strategies. According to Sinan Ülgen,

Turkey is therefore under increased pressure from its European allies to accept the new state of affairs and lift its veto on Cyprus. So far, Turkey has conditionally decided to lift its objection to the NATO-EU strategic dialogue with the EU-27, *i.e.*, including Cyprus. The conditions require that the meetings be held non-officially (*i.e.*, ‘informal’ dialogues) and in relation to urgent matters involving humanitarian concerns. As a result of this change of attitude, ‘informal’ NAC-PSC meetings were held on Darfur and on Kosovo.¹¹⁴

Turkey intends to avoid weakening NATO because the strength of NATO is the strength of Turkey.

Turkey and the EU had supported the Annan plan for uniting Cyprus. However, it was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in April 2004. Both parties, namely the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, are unwilling to compromise. As noted by Sinan Ülgen, “Cyprus (and Greece) are blocking Turkey’s security agreement and its participation in the European Defense Agency (even though Norway, another non-EU NATO member, is allowed to participate fully in EDA). The Cypriot government is intent on using Turkey’s negotiations process to steal concessions from Turkey regarding the political settlement on the island.”¹¹⁵

¹¹² Valasek, *The Roadmap to Better EU-NATO Relations*.

¹¹³ Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, 93.

¹¹⁴ Sinan Ülgen, *The Evolving EU, NATO and Turkey Relationship*.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

D. CONCLUSION

These ongoing disputes among members of both the EU and NATO are damaging the NATO-EU partnership. In order to establish more effective cooperation, both organizations have to find solutions to persuade and satisfy the parties that have created the disagreements. Otherwise, this situation will weaken not only the emerging ESDP but also the key long-standing security organization, NATO.

V. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the European Union's ambitions to play a greater role in the international arena in the 1990s after the disappearance of the Soviet Union led to the launch of the European Security and Defense Policy in 1998-1999. The establishment of the ESDP and the enlargement policy of the EU brought some problems in cooperation between the EU and NATO. The EU sought operational capability at first to conduct EU-led missions in Europe, especially in the Balkan region, after the long conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. But then, in accordance with its revised security strategies, the EU sent troops outside of Europe for peacekeeping operations on an autonomous basis and in cooperation with NATO. Both NATO and the EU have pursued enlargement policies and adapted their security strategies to meet new challenges in the wake of terrorist attacks and increased ethnic violence in critical regions.

The European Union remained primarily an economic actor before the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. In 1998-1999, the European Union launched the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), established agreements inside and outside of the European Union — especially with NATO — and conducted many ESDP operations. As noted by Olli Rehn, the EU commissioner for enlargement, “20 missions have been launched, covering three continents, ranging from fully fledged military missions in the Balkans and Africa, to police missions [in] Iraq and Afghanistan, and rule of law missions in the Caucasus.”¹¹⁶ These developments happened with the strong support of the major European powers and the United States. Washington has long favored a more active contribution from the European Union in establishing security and stability in Europe and neighboring regions.

The EU developed its ESDP with many treaties and agreements in order to establish an effective decision-making structure and to promote coherence in the policy

¹¹⁶ Olli Rehn, “Europe’s Soft Power in a Changing World,” *Seminar on Global Security and Strategy 2030* (Helsinki, 29 November 2007), 2.

of the European Union. However, the reluctance of several EU members to increase defense budgets is constraining the EU's progress as an international actor helping to shape the security environment in a constructive fashion. The EU's use of NATO assets and capabilities has nonetheless remained a partly unsolved problem between NATO and the EU. The EU has experienced an enormous change in its membership owing to the admittance of twelve states (ten in 2004, and two more in 2007) since it established the ESDP and associated institutions in 1998-1999. The two main difficulties in NATO-EU relations are the "participation problem" and the "scope problem," and the former can be seen as an indirect consequence of the EU's enlargement, as explained in Chapter IV.

The EU's ESDP decisions have directly affected Turkey's security interests. This impact started with the exclusion of Turkey from the EU's decision-making structure for the newly launched ESDP. This situation contrasted with the EU's previous reliance on the institutions of the WEU, of which Turkey was an associate member. However, Turkey has participated in EU-led ESDP operations more than some EU member states. The EU demanded ready access to NATO assets and capabilities without accepting non-EU European NATO members in the EU decision-making process. After long disputes Turkey accepted this agreement with "a formal guarantee that ESDP missions would not be deployed in the Aegean and that an EU force would not attack a NATO member state."¹¹⁷

A new problem came up on the agenda, however, after the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in the 2004 EU enlargement. Cyprus is a divided island, including both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. As Sühnaz Yılmaz has observed, "To the dismay of Brussels, the fortified Green Line dividing the two parts of Cyprus has now become an external EU border."¹¹⁸ This situation stems from the fact that the EU violated its own rules in the accession of the Republic of Cyprus, because it is a state with border and recognition problems. Today's situation threatens Turkey's security interests in the Mediterranean and the Aegean. In the 2004 enlargement of the EU, Cyprus and

¹¹⁷ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, 170.

¹¹⁸ Sühnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey and the European Union: A Security Perspective," *Turkey and European Union Security*, IAI-TESEV Report.

Malta gained full member status. The EU has pressed for the participation of these states in the formal meetings between NATO and the EU. However, Turkey opposes the distribution of NATO classified information to EU states which are not members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and which have not completed a security agreement with NATO in that framework, such as Cyprus and Malta. In taking this position, Turkey is upholding the 14 March 2003 NATO-EU agreement on information security.¹¹⁹

The EU's decisions about Turkey and its evolving ESDP project have not only affected Turkey's interests but also the EU's policies and EU cooperation with NATO in the years since the launch of the ESDP. First, the EU has lacked Turkey's full support and contribution to EU-led operations. This shortcoming is significant because Turkey has the largest army in Europe. Second, the development of the ESDP and associated agreements on using NATO assets and capabilities (the "Berlin Plus" agreements) took more than 2 years. Third, since the Republic of Cyprus became an EU member, the EU has had to rely on informal meetings with NATO.

Turkey's candidate status for full membership in the EU has become a roundabout, and the seemingly endless process has consumed the enthusiasm and support of the Turkish people.

B. TURKEY'S IMPORTANCE

The significant role of Turkey in NATO-EU cooperation is becoming more obvious with the new security improvements and defense cooperation efforts of these organizations. Turkey's strategic position between three continents is important for Europe because the EU's future security plans unavoidably involve the region in which Turkey is located. Turkey has valuable regional influence with a wide range of states from Israel to Iran, because Turkey has a common history and culture with most of these states. As Baç noted, "Turkey is not the sole actor that could impact a settlement but its friendly ties and regional power status would greatly enhance the EU's position in the Middle East and the Mediterranean."¹²⁰ In addition, Turkey is becoming aware of its

¹¹⁹ Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, 76.

¹²⁰ Baç, *Turkey and European Security*, 25.

actual capability with its young and educated population. As Sinan Ülgen has observed, “With its growing political and economic influence and self confidence, Turkey has become more active in regional politics. Its relationship with the countries of the Middle East has improved considerably.”¹²¹

Turkey remains a staunch member of NATO and has close relations with many European states. Proof of Turkey’s significance resides **in** the substantial contributions of Turkey to NATO and EU-led peace operations. Turkey makes these contributions despite the fact that it faces more threats than many NATO and EU member states. As stated by Larrabee, “Turkey is the only NATO member that currently faces a threat from ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.”¹²²

Turkey is also important because of its military capabilities and its NATO-compatible military assets. The need to increase the EU’s military capability is a serious issue on the EU’s ESDP agenda. Turkey sees itself as a European state that upholds European norms. Turkey has therefore participated in NATO and EU-led peace operations as a significant contributor. As Baç stated, “Turkey’s military capabilities will increasingly adapt to the EU’s new strategic objectives and enhance the EU’s military operability.”¹²³ Turkey is an appropriate and capable partner for the EU to project power in neighboring regions.

Turkey plays a stabilization and mediation role in its region, where some of the current threats to European security arise, such as “terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs and people and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”¹²⁴

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should increase its military spending in order to acquire stronger operational capabilities as an international actor. The differences in defense spending of the EU members have been summarized by Yves Boyer as follows: “Of the 27 EU

¹²¹ Ülgen, *The Evolving EU, NATO, and Turkey Relationship*, 3.

¹²² Larrabee, *Turkey As a U.S. Security Partner*.

¹²³ Baç, *Turkey and European Security*, 23.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

countries, only six — France, Germany, [the] UK, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands — accommodated [that is, accounted] for 82 % of all EU defence spending.”¹²⁵ The level of will and commitment of the EU members will help to determine the effectiveness of the ESDP. As the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has stated, “The ESDP has meanwhile become an inseparable part of European integration.”¹²⁶ Therefore, the EU has to pursue a coherent policy on every aspect of the ESDP.

Both NATO and the EU have a differentiated future perspective. These organizations are becoming more interdependent, and stronger cooperation by NATO and the EU has become vitally necessary to meet the challenges of the future security environment.

Some of the most important unresolved problems are related to the differing memberships of NATO and the EU. As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has observed, “This leads to formal wrangles over security agreements, the exchange of information or the format of meetings. We have been able to circumvent many of these hurdles through informal procedures. But if those who put up these hurdles do not display more responsibility and flexibility, it will continue to place a heavy burden on NATO-EU relations.”¹²⁷ However, these hurdles involve interactions between the state parties and according to their national (not their organizational) interests. The EU’s attitude towards Turkey, as it has been expressed since the launch of the ESDP in 1998-1999, should change from regarding it as a “step ally” to recognizing that it is a real ally. Moreover, the principle of protecting the rights of EU members, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, should be reconciled with the imperative of bringing about more productive security cooperation with Turkey.

The European Union should take action to get the support of Turkey to develop stronger cooperation between NATO and the EU. First, the parties should work together to define a solution for the Cyprus dispute, on the island and in the international arena.

¹²⁵ Yves Boyer, “ESDP is badly damaged but it’s far from dead,” *Revisiting NATO-ESDP Relations*, Security Defence Agency Discussion Paper, 16.

¹²⁶ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter*, NATO (Berlin, Germany, 29 January 2007).

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

Turkey is prepared to support the unification of the island with the conditions specified in the 2004 Annan Plan, including equal rights for Turkish Cypriots. Second, as noted by Tomas Valasek, “The EU should offer Turkey an associate partnership in ESDP.”¹²⁸ The EU would then receive more cooperation from Turkey. Third, the EU should accelerate Turkey’s accession to the EU as a full member. Turkey’s accession to the EU would put an end to many of the disputes and disagreements affecting cooperation between NATO and the EU. In a security perspective, Turkish membership in the EU would radically change the distance of the EU to the current threats. As noted by Çiğdem Nas, “EU policy towards Turkey is also extremely vital regarding the determination of the borders of the EU and the future identity of the EU.”¹²⁹ The EU’s new neighbors would be Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

Turkey’s accession to the European Union would be a critical step for the EU in becoming an effective international actor. It would enhance trans-Atlantic cooperation enormously and promote constructive NATO-EU cooperation. However, this step would be a challenging one for the EU because Turkey’s accession is a multifaceted issue involving many questions in addition to the ESDP and NATO.

** It should be noted that the Turkish Republic does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus. References in this work to the “Republic of Cyprus” are made to conform to the academic literature but do not constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by the author.*

¹²⁸ Valasek, *The Roadmap to Better EU-NATO Relations*, 6.

¹²⁹ Çiğdem Nas, *EU and Turkey: Challenges and Opportunities in Enlargement and Foreign Policy*, (TUNACEŞ & European Community Institute, Marmara University, FORNET Plenary 21-22 April 2005).

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