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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ORDER AND PROGRESS? THE EVOLUTION OF
BRAZILIAN DEFENSE STRATEGY**

by

Corey J. Robinson

March 2014

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Thomas C. Bruneau
Harold A. Trinkunas

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**ORDER AND PROGRESS? THE EVOLUTION OF BRAZILIAN DEFENSE
STRATEGY**

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MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (WESTERN HEMISPHERE)

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ABSTRACT

Most literature about civil-military relations focuses on civilian control of the military in order to thwart future coup attempts. The debate centers on what factors help or hinder this democratic civilian control of the military. This thesis departs from the standard civilian versus military debate and posits that cogent defense policy is the product of effective civil-military relations and actually facilitates its consolidation.

This thesis will focus on the consolidation of civil-military relations in Brazil from the standpoint of defense policy. The question of why the Ministry of Defense (MOD) published a national defense strategy (NDS) in 2008 lies in why Brazil established a MOD in 1999, 14 years after its return to democracy. After examining factors such as civilian knowledge, incentives, military prerogatives, and institution-building, one factor emerges as the catalyst for defense policy in contemporary Brazil: executive leadership. Just as the leadership and vision of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso prompted the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in 1999, President Lula da Silva ordered his MOD to publish its first NDS in 2008, legitimizing Brazil's desire to be not only a Latin American power, but also an international powerhouse.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Despite first establishing a democracy in 1946, the Brazilian people succumbed to military rule in 1964 and remained incapable of transitioning back to democracy until 1985.¹ Since then, Brazil's citizenry has shown its resolve to not repeat its dictatorial history by consolidating its democracy and establishing sustained civilian control over its armed forces.

One of the tenets of civil-military relations (CMR), democratic civilian control of the military, typically occurs within defense ministries. In Brazil, however, civilian control over its military is present in other organizations as well. For example, not only do civilians use the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as a mechanism to exert civilian control of the military, but also use regulations associated with the Public Ministry.²

The Ministry of Defense began operations in 1999, a full 14 years after Brazil's transition to democracy. After almost a decade of policy silence, the MOD published its *National Defense Strategy* in 2008 followed by a *White Book on National Defense* in 2012. What factors explain the timing and evolution of Brazil's defense policy?

B. IMPORTANCE

Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson observed, "The available literature in English on the topic of civil-military relations in Brazil is very limited in number of authors, perspectives, and additionally, much of it is dated."³ Additionally, they noted, "there is still no useful framework for analysis of civil-military relations and national

¹ An observation that sets Brazil apart from other Latin American countries in terms of democratic transition and civil-military relations is the manner in which the transition of power occurred. While extreme animosity between civilians and the armed forces existed in other countries, in Brazil the two sides were seen as "loyal partners" because "the military did not suffer a collapse, but simply stepped aside." Carlos Escudé and Andrés Fontana, "Argentina's Security Policies: Their Rationale and Regional Context," in *International Security and Democracy Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 66.

² Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality" (unpublished, 2013), 14.

³ *Ibid.*, 2.

defense in general.”⁴ This thesis will not only acknowledge the excellent work already accomplished in the civil-military relations field as applied to Latin America, but will seek to add to current academic thought concerning Brazil’s defense strategy. For instance, Bruneau and others demonstrated that there is more to effective civil-military relations than just democratic control of the armed forces.⁵ I will propose that effective civil-military relations theory includes not only knowledgeable civilian leadership and effective militaries, but also cogent and timely defense policy, which ties civil-military organizations together in achieving unity among the roles and missions within the MOD.

Since the consolidation of democracy in Brazil is largely uncontested among scholars, is that also true for Brazilian civil-military relations in general? By looking specifically at the Ministry of Defense as the presumed model of civil-military relations, this thesis will establish the status of CMR consolidation in contemporary Brazil.

Additionally, if the Brazilian Ministry of Defense can publish influential defense policy, it will reflect the importance of preparing the country against national security threats (real, perceived, or unknown). Focused attention from national leadership on defense strategy will help consolidate CMR within the Ministry of Defense even more, instead of allowing the spread of democratic civilian control of the military out over multiple organizations, as is the case in Brazil today.

Again, I intend to argue that effective and timely defense policy is the most important product the Brazilian MOD can produce and should be the third piece of effective CMR, after securing democratic civilian control of the military and employing an effective military. This idea is echoed in a statement from David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas that although “national defense policy has not been a high priority ... a well thought-out defense policy could certainly contribute to national security” after the proper institutions are in place.⁶

⁴ Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality,” 4.

⁵ Thomas C. Bruneau, “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited,” *Revista Fuerzas Armadas Y Sociedad* 19, no. 1 (2005): 116.

⁶ David Pion-Berlin and Harold A. Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America,” *Latin American Research Review* 42, no. 3 (2007): 76, 78.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Why did it take nine years for Brazil's Ministry of Defense to start publishing defense strategy? The answer may lie in the same factors that led to the establishment of the MOD itself. Among the many hypotheses that originate from an investigation into the timing of Brazilian defense policy, four are most noteworthy and deserve further exploration. Each hypothesis will look at a different element of civil-military relations: knowledge, incentives, prerogatives, and institutional development within the MOD. First, it is possible that civilian knowledge finally improved to the level where it was possible to write a national defense policy as noted by Thomas Bruneau, Harold Trinkunas, David Pion-Berlin, and others. Second, scholars such as Wendy Hunter provide insight into how politicians' incentives changed in the last 5–10 years so it was electorally important for the government to produce a national defense policy. Third, military prerogatives (or autonomy) identified by Alfred Stepan finally eroded enough that a national defense policy was possible, or in other words, it was in the military's interest to write national defense policy. Finally, Thomas Bruneau suggests that the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, as an institution, pushed for defense strategy as it matured. The following literature review will provide a more in-depth outline of the tentative arguments that will determine which one of these hypotheses best explains the timing of Brazilian defense policy.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis will be a qualitative analysis of civil-military relations consolidation in Brazil and its effects on defense policy timing. Since CMR, let alone democracy, did not occur in Brazil all at once, this analysis will look across decades of academic analysis to find relevant explanations for the four previously-outlined hypotheses to determine the most probable cause(s) of why and when the MOD wrote its defense policy.

The first hypothesis explores the possibility that civilian knowledge finally improved to the level where it was possible to write a national defense policy in 2008. The group of scholars that focuses on civilians as the key to effective civil-military relations includes Thomas Bruneau, Harold Trinkunas, David Pion-Berlin, and others.

These scholars offer an additional approach to the civil-military relations study by examining the factors that should help consolidate civil-military relations. They want to eliminate the deficit in civilian defense knowledge and claim the need for knowledgeable civilians to lead not only politically, but also in a context of national defense.

This civilian-focused camp argues for knowledgeable, but not expert, defense civilians. Many scholars accept that civilians do need some baseline level of defense acumen to be effective in creating defense policy. Thomas Bruneau advocates the imperative that civilian-led institutions, especially the Ministries of Defense, “establish stable institutions that embody and perpetuate the expertise needed to deal with possible roles and missions as they arise.”⁷ Trinkunas adds to Bruneau’s observation on this issue as well and says, “Civilian control by oversight exists when politicians and bureaucrats are able to determine policies and approve military activities through an institutionalized professional defense bureaucracy.”⁸

Bruneau further distinguishes himself within this group by suggesting that civilian leadership is only a part of the civil-military relations equation. In fact, he says that democratic civilian leadership of the military is only one of three important components for effective civil-military relations.⁹ He talks about civilian and military effectiveness, but as other scholars mentioned in this review, leaves room for an analysis of defense policy within the model of consolidated or democratic civil-military relations theory. Timely and effective defense strategy demonstrates civilian knowledge, gives the military a clear mission, addresses national security concerns, and deserves a commensurate budget.

The second hypothesis discusses how politicians’ incentives may have changed in the last 5-10 years so that it was now in their interest to have a national defense policy. The works of Wendy Hunter help focus on this question as to how politicians avoided

⁷ Bruneau, “The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited,” 121.

⁸ Harold A Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 5–6; overall argument framework for this section applied from David J Bennett, “The Trinity: A New Approach to Civil-Military Relations?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 3.

⁹ Bruneau, “The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited.”

defense issues in the past. Hunter does not mention anything about civilians needing incentives in knowing more about defense issues in general, but states that civilians had incentives to weaken the military prerogatives that Stepan laid out in his book.¹⁰ Tollefson offers an invaluable insight into Hunter's contributions as well. He says that Wendy Hunter adds more rational actor theory to the study of civil-military relations, while Stepan and Zaverucha focus on game theory.¹¹

Pion-Berlin argues that "what Latin America needs are civilians who can manage the military in political-, not defense-, oriented terms."¹² This approach is similar to J. Samuel Fitch's in that the onus is on the civilian leadership to manage the armed forces within a political framework and not worry so much about acquiring defense knowledge. Pion-Berlin argues that defense knowledge is not very necessary to civilian leaders because "there is a complete absence of civilian defense-related insight, influence, and expertise, yet military subordination to civilian rule has largely been achieved."¹³ Trinkunas adds to this argument by saying that although civil-military relations are moving forward and consolidating in Latin America without defense-minded civilians, he states that avoiding defense knowledge is not a calculated move on the part of politicians or defense civilians, as Wendy Hunter might suggest.¹⁴ It comes down to an absence of incentives to study defense issues, causing an "attention deficit" in matters of national security.¹⁵

The third hypothesis seeks to determine if military prerogatives (or autonomy) finally eroded enough that a national defense policy was possible or was in the military's interest to write one. The works of Alfred Stepan, and later Jorge Zaverucha, seek to explain the obstacles in moving toward democratic civilian control of the military

¹⁰ Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

¹¹ Scott D. Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: The Myth of Tutelary Democracy" (presented at the Latin America Studies Association, Washington DC, 1995), 3.

¹² David Pion-Berlin, "Political Management of the Military in Latin America," *Military Review* 85, no. 1 (2005): 19.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁴ Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective*, 2.

¹⁵ Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, "Attention Deficits."

following a military dictatorship. The obstacles range from high military prerogatives to a high degree of military autonomy, which delays the transfer of power from the military regime to the elected civilian democratic leaders.

Stepan is famous for his 11 military prerogatives found in his 1988 book, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. In it, Stepan shows that since military prerogatives were high, democratic civilian control of the military could not occur.¹⁶ Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson demonstrated that military prerogatives were high even in 1985 (the official start of Brazil's contemporary democracy), but that over time, the military lost the ability to maintain its autonomy and could no longer evade direction from civilians.¹⁷ Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson demonstrated that the military prerogatives did indeed go from high to low as civil-military relations consolidated in Brazil.¹⁸

If weakened military prerogatives contribute to the civil-military relations situation in Brazil today, then Zaverucha's claims of an autonomous military may be inadequate in explaining the current situation in Brazil, but it may help explain the delay in defense policy creation prior to 2008. However, Zaverucha argues that because of weak civilian leadership in the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, the military could choose its responsibilities and missions without much direction from civilian leadership.¹⁹

J. Samuel Fitch takes a more balanced approach between what Zaverucha argues and what the military and civilian leaderships accomplish together in strengthening civil-military relations. Fitch also disagrees with Stepan in that military prerogatives and civilian control are not mutually exclusive. Fitch writes, "It makes more sense to define

¹⁶ These 11 military prerogatives are: 1) constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in political system, 2) military relationship to the chief executive, 3) coordination of defense sector, 4) active duty military participation in the Cabinet, 5) role of Legislature, 6) role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees, 7) role in intelligence, 8) role in police, 9) role in military promotions, 10) role in state enterprises, and 11) role in legal system. Alfred C. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Political Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94–97.

¹⁷ Bruneau and Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality."

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Jorge Zaverucha, "Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil," *Latin American Perspectives* 27, no. 3 (2000): 8–31.

democratic civil-military relations affirmatively, by what they are rather than what they are not.”²⁰ Fitch states that either the civilian-led institutions determine the strategic direction of the military, or they do not. Democratic civil-military relations exist in the affirmative, but not in the negative. For Fitch, these new conditions are mutually exclusive.²¹

The final hypothesis posits that the MOD itself pushed for more published defense policies. While Hunter discusses other incentives that politicians used in the past to weaken military prerogatives, neither she nor most scholars look at the motivations for drafting defense policy. In addition to the democratic civilian control of the military, Thomas Bruneau suggests that the civil-military relations community should also examine the processes that drive defense strategy and the institutions that oversee that effort, principally the Ministry of Defense.²² Primary sources will provide insight into this question since there is not much published material on this issue of defense policy motivations since the defense documents themselves are new and interest in defense issues are just starting to flourish in Brazil.²³

In summary, the academic community appears split on the reasons for the timing of national defense organization in Brazil, which will also help explain the timing of defense policy in Brazil. One side argues that military prerogatives were high, which afforded the armed forces the ability to delay democratic civilian control of the military. The other side argues that the democratic institutions were in place for democratic civilian control of the military, but there was a deficit of knowledgeable defense civilian leadership with incentives to consolidate CMR in Brazil. Some scholars chose a position in the middle of these camps and often added research in one camp or another depending on the newest developments in Brazil and Latin America in general. The term “middle” is

²⁰ J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 62.

²¹ J. Samuel Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 37–38, 40.

²² Thomas Bruneau, personal communication, August 14, 2013.

²³ Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality,” 3.

used here to describe the scholars that take a more moderate approach to explaining CMR consolidation in Brazil and neither positing that the civilians nor the military was the main factor, but a combination of both actors yielded results. The commonality of all three of these groups is that Brazil still struggles in consolidating its national defense apparatus and do not mention much about national defense policy.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

Dr. Thomas Bruneau's civil-military relations "trinity" provides a model for examining the extent of CMR consolidation, the role of democratic civilian control over the armed forces, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the military,²⁴ even though "there is ... no useful framework for analysis of civil-military relations and national defense in general."²⁵ However, instead of applying effectiveness and efficiency to the military as in the original trinity framework, I will use the trinity framework as a lens in examining Brazil's MOD in order to understand its overall effectiveness by explaining the delays in publishing defense policy. Since efficiency is difficult to articulate, let alone measure, this thesis will focus on the importance of defense policy when measuring CMR consolidation.

Again, this thesis will provide a qualitative analysis of available research materials in determining the motivations and timing of Brazil's defense policy. Primary sources should help us discover motivations much better than the speculation often found in secondary sources; however, where there is a shortage of primary source material, academically vetted and other respected secondary sources will fill in any gaps in the research.

F. OVERVIEW

This thesis will provide a background on the origins of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense before delving into the potential reasons for the delay and evolution of Brazil's defense policy. The background will also include an analysis of the formation of the

²⁴ Bruneau, "The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited," 122.

²⁵ Bruneau and Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality," 4.

MOD using the same four dimensions that will help analyze our defense policy hypotheses: knowledge, incentives, prerogatives, and institutional development. The following chapter will explain why the MOD finally created defense strategy after 2008, using the four hypotheses, or dimensions, as a guide. The concluding remarks will summarize the results of this study and present the most plausible reason for Brazil's timing in designing its national defense strategy, namely the arrival of an energized executive to motivate defense civilians and the military to produce cogent defense strategy.

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II. BRAZIL'S MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

A. FORMATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

In order to understand the Brazilian Ministry of Defense's timing in publishing defense policy, we will need to first examine if those same factors affected the establishment of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)—where defense policy originates.²⁶ What factors contributed to Brazil's government establishing its own MOD?²⁷ According to a United States Army War College analysis of Brazilian defense strategy, Lieutenant Colonel Linwood Ham, Jr. observed that the first order of business for Brazil's civilian government was not to reconstitute the military, but to consolidate the fledgling democracy instead. Ham further argued that the consolidation continued for years as a Ministry of Defense was finally created in 1999.²⁸

On June 9, 1999, Complementary Law 97 authorized the creation of Brazil's Ministry of Defense. Prior to this event, the president, the various armed force

²⁶ Brazil's transition from a military dictatorship to a democracy is an example of effective civil-military relations and the Ministry of Defense is the capstone of that process. A Ministry of Defense is one of the "formal institutions that promote civilian authority" in a civil-military relations construct. Wendy Hunter, "Assessing Civil-Military Relations in Postauthoritarian Brazil," in *Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes*, ed. Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy Joseph Power (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 103.

²⁷ The quintessential quality of Brazilian life that permeates throughout culture and government institutions is the *deixa-la para amanhã* (leave it until tomorrow) attitude. This idea was typified in Brazil with the timeline started during the military regime and that continued toward democratization in the 1980s. In 1974, the military regime started an *abertura* (opening) toward democracy, meaning they would relinquish control in an orderly manner to try the experiment of democracy once more. Boris Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 317.

Why did the military regime start to open its closed government and move towards democratic thinking in 1974? One convincing answer comes from Drs. Bruneau and Trinkunas who stated that the Portuguese Revolution of 1974 initiated a Third Wave of democracy, an event that Brazil would be hard-pressed to avoid being influenced by in an era of the growing globalization of ideas. Additionally they concluded that "few scholars include external factors in their analyses of democratic consolidation"—a mistake this thesis will try to avoid. See Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, "International Democracy Promotion and Its Impacts on Civil-Military Relations," in *Global Politics of Defense Reform*, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 63.

²⁸ Linwood Ham Jr., *Brazil's National Defense Strategy—A Deepening of Civilian Control* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 1, 7–10.

components, and the Congress were all a part of this law-making process.²⁹ Although the military was against establishing a Ministry of Defense and giving up cabinet-level positions in the government as a consequence, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso managed to fulfill a campaign promise to establish a MOD toward the end of his first term in office, positioning himself for impending reelection.³⁰

B. FACTORS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

1. Civilian Defense Knowledge

A best practice that could balance the need for civilian legal authority and political power in Brazil was to develop a cadre of defense civilians.³¹ The capacity for civilian leaders to understand defense issues would strengthen legitimacy of the newly democratic government and ensure military support of the newly-created institutions and

²⁹ In Brazilian parlance, congressional approval of a law makes it *complementary*; without congressional approval, it would be a *decree*.

³⁰ Summarized from Samuel H. Prugh, “The Creation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense” (unpublished, n.d.). Obtained from Dr. Thomas Bruneau with permission from Colonel Prugh, January 14, 2014.

³¹ Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter, *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 73.

During this new period of Brazilian democracy, government civilians had limited knowledge of defense issues since the military bureaucracy used its military staff for decades prior to democratic transition. Additionally, there was a “brain drain” following democratization and many talented Brazilians left the country with any built-up knowledge as a response to Sarney’s leadership. Thomas E. Skidmore, *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 188.

Although there was a lack of defense knowledge, civilians possessed political shrewdness nonetheless. It was observed at this time that the “Brazilian government [was] misused by a clever elite.” Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 335.

It is my opinion also that the time had not come for defense issues to be at the forefront of the new political agenda and did not provide the incentives necessary to push for defense policy.

policies.³² Essentially, “civilian expertise is most effective if put into practice when at least some degree of confidence between the new authorities and the military has been cultivated.”³³

Arguably, the creation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense did not happen until there was a preponderance of both civilian and military knowledge to run this type of organization, or at least the desire to develop this defense knowledge organically in a centralized location.³⁴ Defense knowledge on the military side was present, but if Brazil wanted to have democratic civilian control of the military, a cadre of knowledgeable civilians was needed, but lacking in the initial stages of this process.³⁵ David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas focused on this lack of civilian knowledge as an “attention deficit” that made the idea of a defense institution managed by civilians a lower priority within the new government due to ignorance more than anything else.³⁶

Later in his research, Pion-Berlin recognized that as a democracy consolidates, so must the concepts of civil-military relations. As an advocate of robust civilian knowledge as a prerequisite for effective CMR, he recognized that consolidation could take place as

³² Knowledge is important to CMR because stable civil-military relations require “civilians ... know enough to be able to ensure that the armed forces are doing what they are required to do, not only in terms of submitting to civilian control, but also in successfully fulfilling the current very wide spectrum of roles and missions assigned to security forces in Latin America.” Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze Jr., “Civilian-Military Relations in Latin America,” *Military Review* 86, no. 5 (2006): 67.

Knowledge is also important because it is “one of the most critical power resources of any actor” and “can change what is considered relevant to national and international security.” Anne Clunan, “Globalization and the Impact of Norms on Defense Restructuring,” in *Global Politics of Defense Reform*, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 35.

³³ Felipe Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping Postauthoritarian Regimes,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 205.

³⁴ Even as late as 2001, Latin America (Brazil included) still had issues in terms of civilian knowledge and defense issues since “civilian governments [still needed] to empower themselves with defense knowledge so they [could] earn the confidence of their [military] officers.” David Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 12.

³⁵ Once civilians understand that “civil control may be defined as aiming and guiding the military toward socially acceptable goals,” or incentives, then “the more accurate and descriptive term is civilian *direction* of the military,” not necessarily civilian *control* of the military (emphasis added). Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 1 (1999): 19.

³⁶ Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits,” 76, 78.

a result of this concept of defense knowledge. Pion-Berlin also spoke of the danger of attention deficits becoming wisdom deficits.³⁷

As countries such as Brazil realized that knowledge was important in establishing and running effective CMR organizations, such as its new Ministry of Defense, then civil-military consolidation would occur as knowledge consolidated in the form of wisdom.³⁸ Defense wisdom made civilians capable of finally “institutionalizing” a legitimate dialogue with the military.³⁹

A counterargument to the need of knowledgeable defense civilians is the abundance of trained and knowledgeable military officers, possessing the knowledge of when and where to advise his civilian counterpart. Some may suppose that a military officer’s career training is more robust to that of civilians and often relevant to issues other than defense, making them marketable in business circles as well. This focus on knowledge, however, is also dangerous to democracy and civil-military relations in general because this “perception invites the continuation of politicized professionalism in posttransition regimes” and “undermine[s] democratic regimes from within.”⁴⁰ Knowledge is a tool, but like any other would-be weapon, it must be used appropriately and proportionately to the challenge.

A ministry of defense is an evident choice to house defense knowledge that can be passed from one generation to another while developing its own culture and norms that will guide future policy as directed and influenced by the executive branch of government. Once CMR is embedded within institutions, it will be reinforced by experience and will become usable history for the organization.⁴¹ Then, one new criterion for a strong civil-military apparatus starts with powerful and charismatic leadership that

³⁷ David Pion-Berlin, “The Defense Wisdom Deficit in Latin America: A Reply to Thomas C. Bruneau,” *Revista Fuerzas Armadas Y Sociedad* 20, no. 1 (n.d.): 51–62.

³⁸ For this analysis, wisdom is defined as “applied knowledge” and manifests itself fully in well-written defense policy that not only focuses on the future of Brazil, but draws from the past as well. It attempts to avoid mistakes that other countries made and that Brazil could avoid through effective application of defense wisdom.

³⁹ Domínguez and Shifter, *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 72.

⁴⁰ Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 32.

⁴¹ Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” 16.

1) hires talented and knowledgeable civilian leadership within an established defense career track,⁴² 2) publishes meaningful policy, and 3) empowers the armed forces to carry out policy in order to increase national security and not for show (often called *para inglês ver* or “for the English to see”), or for any other political purpose. Institutional development and policy improvement will better confront the challenge that civilians have in “better design[ing] and manag[ing] the missions assigned to the armed forces.”⁴³ These missions encompass national defense and security, which “defines the corporate identity of the armed forces, and the management of security policy is the yardstick of civilian control ... regarding missions, duties, military prerogatives, and expenditures.”⁴⁴ In sum, a lack of civilian defense knowledge greatly attributed to the delayed establishment of the actual Ministry of Defense, which only came into existence in 1999, 14 years after Brazil’s transition to democracy.

2. Political Incentives

Civilian defense knowledge needed to develop into an understanding of the role of civilian leadership within the MOD, motivating defense civilians and incentivizing

⁴² This discussion of civilian knowledge does not mean that civilians need to know everything about defense issues. It would be unfair to expect defense civilians to come close to the knowledge military leaders gain over decades of applied experience. However, civilians must rely on their military counterparts to supply them with the expertise and advice needed to share the responsibility of parallel civil-military relations. Michael Desch wrote about this very subject when he said that “the bottom line is that while civilian leaders should have the final word on most issues of national [defense] policy, they should not speak the final word until they are sure that they have fully utilized military expertise.” Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 143.

Bland contributed the following: “Even in mature liberal democracies, there is an expectation that military leaders will share in decision-making regarding national defense and the employment of the armed forces with their civilian superiors.” Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” 11.

Civilians must realize that “national defense depends on military capacity, [which] justifies disproportionate expenditures on technological and industrial innovations.” David R. Mares, “Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and the Regional Neighborhood,” in *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe*, ed. David R. Mares (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 5.

Likewise, government civilian knowledge should include more than just defense knowledge since “defense budgets demand resources, and agreement over the armed forces budget can be ruined when civilians mishandle economic development.” *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴³ Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 12.

⁴⁴ Craig L. Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin, *Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of Change* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 157.

them toward further professional development. Incentivized civilians tend to understand their respective professions and lead accordingly.⁴⁵ Incentivized politicians, however, not defense civilians, own the national debate for creating new institutions and since politics is about power and survival, national defense needs to be popular and important enough to incentivize powerful political pragmatists to want maximum control over events and processes—one of which is the establishment of the MOD.⁴⁶

For more than a decade after democratization, “civilian politicians saw that confronting the military on [establishing an MOD] would not yield immediate electoral benefits” though.⁴⁷ In transitioning from a military-led government to a new democracy, there is often a need to not immediately approach defense issues in order to provide the military reassurance that the civilian government will not hastily change sensitive policies that the military is accustomed to controlling.⁴⁸ Brazilian politicians knew that sweeping changes could undermine civilian control of the military.

Still, the political incentives in Brazil to further consolidate civil-military relations and establish a MOD did not appear favorable at the time of democratization in 1985. Brazil appeared to have low political unity, damaged international prestige due to

⁴⁵ It was observed that “Pion-Berlin’s assertion that there is no incentive to become knowledgeable in military affairs may be spot on.” See Bennett, “The Trinity: A New Approach”; Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military in Latin America,” 19; Pion-Berlin, “The Defense Wisdom Deficit in Latin America: A Reply to Thomas C. Bruneau.”

Brazilian politicians did not challenge the military’s apparent control over defense issues during the late 1980s since they were more concerned with keeping their jobs. The newly-elected democratic politicians faced constraints from the type of military transfer of power and the debt crisis such that defense issues could not be further from their minds at this time. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 187.

Civilians did not target the military’s prerogatives or autonomy that hampered civil-military relations in Brazil at the time and were as much of the problem as the armed forces, especially if the civilians only “confront the armed forces over issues that carry greater resonance with the public ... and have a greater impact on their reelection potential.” Wendy Hunter, “Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: Present Trends, Future Prospects,” in *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America*, ed. Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 307.

⁴⁶ Wendy Hunter, “Reason, Culture, or Structure?: Assessing Civil-Military Dynamics in Brazil,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 43–44.

⁴⁷ Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers*, 47.

⁴⁸ Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining,” 205.

underdevelopment of its infrastructure and institutions, and acted like the “France of Latin America,” with all of the connotations that come with such a label.⁴⁹ In order to progress from this stereotype, Brazil needed a catalyst, which came from a charismatic national leader.

Toward the end of the Cardoso administration, President Cardoso revived the idea of establishing a Ministry of Defense. His incentives included the rationalization of the various missions among the different bureaucracies (including the future MOD) and the improvement of Brazil’s international image.⁵⁰ President Cardoso also presided over an improving economy that could fund a new civil-military institution and start the process of re-examining Brazil’s defense policy.⁵¹ Cardoso could politically afford to invest in civil-military relations because he was able to solve many of the domestic issues that appeared to be more important, such as improving the economic environment with his Real Plan, and brought “great legislative prestige and experience to the executive office.”⁵² Whatever “executive-legislative deadlock” that existed before, was loosened enough to facilitate the institutional development of civil-military relations in Brazil, embodied by a new Ministry of Defense.⁵³

3. Prerogatives

In a response to the aspirations of the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, the Brazilian senator Jose Sarney stated that “it is a [great] danger for Brazil and all of Latin America to have a military power in our continent.”⁵⁴ Although this statement came from a civilian leader, the military establishment had a different perspective of how to maintain regional security. The Brazilian military wanted to maintain whatever power it had left

⁴⁹ Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, *Transforming Latin America*, 62.

⁵⁰ Monica Hirst, “Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone,” in *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 108.

⁵¹ Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining,” 206.

⁵² Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 188.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 220.

⁵⁴ Leandro Prada, “Venezuela’s Planned Arms Purchases Leave Neighbors Unsettled,” *CNS News*, August 20, 2013, <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/venezuelas-planned-arms-purchases-leave-neighbors-unsettled>; taken from non-functioning source link found in Bennett, “The Trinity: A New Approach.”

from the democratic transition and codify the right to use military force well before the MOD started, while military officials concurrently locked in favorable salary structures and heavily influenced foreign policy decisions on matters of national defense.⁵⁵

Following the creation of the MOD, however, military leaders lost whatever influence at the executive level of government it retained following the democratic transition from authoritarian rule. Brazil's democratic government moved away from allowing military influence in activities that the armed forces traditionally had guidance or control over, such as picking key government leadership, setting public policy, and supervising internal security.⁵⁶ As defense policy transitioned into a matter of public policy, the military maintained even less autonomy, especially as defense policy would be developed predominately from the top government officials and not originating within the military itself. In light of this environment, however, military prerogatives remained due to concessions from the civilian side of Brazilian government: "In fact, the tacit arrangement that appears to have emerged is that civilians [were] willing to grant officers considerable autonomy in their own sphere of influence in exchange for noninterference in civilian decision making."⁵⁷ Observed as late as 2003, "Brazil's military [retained] prerogatives under democratic rule that [resembled] those under the military government" and retained a certain amount of power in politics and autonomy in its operations.⁵⁸ Thus, the perception of military prerogatives remained complicated, both within and outside of the armed forces.

The armed forces, however, did not feel they continued to have strong prerogatives and autonomy. The 1999 establishment of the Ministry of Defense severely weakened military prerogatives, especially from a Brazilian Air Force perspective. As a part of the presidential decrees establishing the MOD and defining its structure, the air forces relinquished control of the Department of Civilian Aviation, a huge controlling

⁵⁵ Hirst, "Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone," 108.

⁵⁶ Harold Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela," in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 165.

⁵⁷ Hunter, "Reason, Culture, or Structure?," 39.

⁵⁸ Domínguez and Shifter, *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 46.

stake in the aircraft manufacturer Embraer, and the nation's airport administration structure in order for the MOD to have these missions. These actions not only weakened military prerogatives, but were also a drain on corporate knowledge as intelligent leaders either resigned or lost their jobs during the transition.⁵⁹

One author noted that “the Brazilian military’s declining power over the first decade of civilian rule is all the more impressive, given the weakness of civilian institutions and the absence of any sustained civilian effort to consolidate a system of democratic control of the armed forces.”⁶⁰ Additionally, military prerogatives around the time of the early Ministry of Defense demonstrated that the military in Brazil was neither “in a conspiratorial mode” nor was it “complacent” since it did “show signs of displeasure with missions, budgets, government policy, and political ineptitude.”⁶¹ Wendy Hunter wrote that the core prerogative of the military at this time was to prevent the MOD from forming since each service wanted to preserve its own autonomy of decision-making within each service. The military succeeded in preventing the MOD from happening until 1999.⁶² Even though establishing the MOD was a success for civilian leadership against military prerogatives, the early Ministry of Defense had much work to do.

The armed forces, however, were not the only ones to have prerogatives that influenced the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in Brazil. Civilian prerogatives also existed, which included the ideas of organizational direction, guidance, national objectives, budget, and the use of military force to make the MOD effective. Contrarily, military prerogatives focused on roles and missions aligned with their stated goals and objectives, which were not published at the national level yet as a strategy. Optimistically, having separate prerogatives allowed expertise to develop, but did not close the gap between civilians and the military in terms of a unified strategy in the

⁵⁹ Domínguez and Shifter, *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 47.

⁶⁰ Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 53.

⁶¹ Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 1.

⁶² Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers*, 44.

mission and roles of each group. Both sides needed to find a way to align their prerogatives in such a way to move toward a shared, consolidated form of civil-military relations.⁶³

One argument towards consolidated CMR states that civilian control is the key in controlling military prerogatives and maintaining democracies; I disagree.⁶⁴ My personal view is that a consolidation of CMR in general needs to happen in a manner where no one entity feels stronger than the other. An extreme consolidation of civilian control will only create resentment among military forces and could result in the military shirking orders from civilians or becoming less effective and efficient due to the lack of care and feeding received from civilian leadership. All that civilian control needs to accomplish is enough strengthening to be an equal partner with the defense arm of the state. Civilians should direct the strategic vision of defense since that encompasses the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic principles that only the state should implement. The military tactically and operationally executes the nation's vision autonomously due to its expertise in defense matters. Thus, militaries will relinquish power to those they respect, strengthening civilian prerogatives, which will increase institutional capacity and democratic legitimacy.

4. Institutional Development

In order for civil-military relations to have a lasting influence, they must be centralized and contained within institutions that endure the coming and going of various leaders. In a reference to Brazil, it was said that “the most basic tenet of civilian control over the military, the allocation of the leadership and management of the nation's defense policies to a civilian Ministry, involved a complex and tense process between the government and the military.”⁶⁵ This process affected the way Brazil democratized and may help to explain the evolution of defense policy explored in the next chapter. Since the transition was military-led, the residual military prerogatives delayed what Trinkunas,

⁶³ Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” 19.

⁶⁴ Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela,” 189.

⁶⁵ Domínguez and Shifter, *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 47.

Hunter, and others argue as ideal CMR—where there is abundant civilian control of the military and the defense responsibilities are shared.⁶⁶

In addition, “institutions matter only when powerful protagonists agree to work within them.”⁶⁷ This is a common theme among the research dimensions presented in this thesis: in a system of people, a person must be a catalyst of progress. Sometimes, as is the case with Brazil, it takes a powerful protagonist to create an institution in the first place. President Fernando Enrique Cardoso was Brazil’s president from 1994-2002 and in 1998, decided to create a ministry of defense. At the time, Brazil and Nicaragua were the only countries left in Latin America without a Ministry of Defense. His decision to establish a MOD also eliminated military leaders as cabinet members, thus reducing their prerogatives as stated earlier.⁶⁸ There was “little resistance ... from the military so long as the [MOD] objectives [coincided] with military interests,”⁶⁹ but sadly, the institution that epitomizes civil-military control did not receive the attention it needed until 1998, 13 years after democratization.

Recently, Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson examined the state of Brazil’s democratic progress in terms of the strength of civil-military relations and the remaining challenges that lay ahead. They wrote that the Ministry of Defense formed in 1999, well after the 1985 democratic transition, and that the Ministry of Justice continues to have oversight into civil-military relations when it should be concentrated in the MOD. Bruneau and Tollefson raised another good point in that if Brazil were serious about fulfilling its ‘destiny’ from a national defense perspective, the fundamental challenge would be to prepare a cadre of educated civilians on defense matters, and to provide opportunities for careers and advancement in that sector. Brazil will likely have to invest in the same improvements among other institutions as well in order to develop into an equal partner among various international powers.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ See previous literature review in Chapter 1.

⁶⁷ Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 31.

⁶⁸ Hunter, “Reason, Culture, or Structure?,” 37.

⁶⁹ Domínguez and Shifter, *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 64.

⁷⁰ Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality.”

In summarizing additional challenges that ministries of defense face, especially in Brazil, David Pion-Berlin succinctly stated:

The Ministry of Defense is generally ill-prepared to assume the important tasks mandated to it. Its civilian ministers do not arrive on the job well versed in defense issues, nor do they stay on the job long enough to acquire the skills. And its staff has not reaped the benefits of professional training because there has been no institutionalization of expertise within the ministry ... The Defense Ministry's lack of ministerial competence and continuity translates into a deficiency of will. Being less confident in the area, its ministers are more reticent to demonstrate leadership, deferring instead to military judgment.⁷¹

Institutional development poses many problems that Pion-Berlin provides here as a summary of the challenges for institutionalizing defense including: knowledge deficits, incentives, and military prerogatives as mentioned previously. Furthermore, in the absence of geopolitical threats, strategy tends to be focused inwardly. The following chapter addresses the strategy that the MOD created in the absence of external threats and the possible reasons for the timing of those policies.

⁷¹ David Pion-Berlin, "Civil-Military Circumvention," in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 147.

III. BRAZILIAN DEFENSE STRATEGY: 1996–2013

A. DEFENSE POLICY DOCUMENTS

Although written defense policy may have existed in Brazil for some time prior to democratization,⁷² this thesis will highlight post-democratization policy-making.⁷³ Before Brazil's transition to democracy in 1985, a military regime governed for 21 years. During its rule, the regime further institutionalized what was called 'national security doctrine.' This doctrine actually began 30 years prior, at the beginning of the Vargas administration.⁷⁴ Brazil was ahead of its Latin American counterparts in having its security/defense doctrine codified and tied to military projects, but was not published as a national defense policy tied to roles and missions outside the use of military force.⁷⁵

During the beginning of Vargas' rule, the Law of National Security was passed and a Council of National Security was established to monitor the security of the nation and consolidate that national responsibility within the armed forces.⁷⁶ Additionally,

⁷² In addition to explaining the reasons for delaying published defense policy, this thesis posits that the three components of an effective Ministry of Defense are: knowledgeable civilian leadership, a professional military, and a measurable mission (articulated through published defense strategy). The Bruneau CMR trinity touches on all three of these components, but since efficiency is almost impossible to measure, this section will focus on the trinity's foundation of an effective and efficient military: effective policy. Bennett, "The Trinity: A New Approach."

This section will not go into the details of the CMR trinity, but will highlight policy as a possibility for binding civilian and military relations together. If civilians have buy-in with the policy (which they should because they should write it), they will fund it, and if the military thinks the strategy is legitimate, it will be implemented. Policy is what binds civilian control and military action. Policy provides (or should provide) the proper incentives to get civilians and the armed forces working together effectively.

⁷³ Domestic politics reveal the flipside of civil-military relations: the relationship of the public and the military, not just the interaction between civilian leadership and military leaders. Andrew J. Bacevich, "Whose Army?," in *The Modern American Military*, ed. David M. Kennedy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 194.

Defense policy not only binds civil and military leaders together, but published policy acts as way of advertising the military's mission to the citizenry in order to gain a stronger voice in domestic affairs and political agendas. Defense strategy and policy also ensures enough subordination to repress coup attempts, but leaves enough autonomy and purpose for the military to secure the nation. There is a fine line between subordination and oppression; the military will shirk responsibility if it feels belittled and rise to meet any threat if it feels valued.

⁷⁴ Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 208.

⁷⁵ Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 58.

⁷⁶ Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 212, 218.

Brazil internally published defense doctrine addressing internal security and revolutionary war predating the Cuban revolution.⁷⁷ As shown with other policy and institutional development in contemporary Brazil and throughout the world, national defense doctrine would take time to consolidate and publish. Before examining the possible reason for this timing, we will look at the different defense documents Brazil has today.

1. National Defense Policies: 1996–2007

In November 1996, Brazil publicized its new defense policy authored entirely under a democratic government. This defense policy was similar to what other Latin American countries, known as white books or white papers, but was “the first time in Brazilian history that a civilian government ... established guidelines of action for the armed forces.”⁷⁸ “The Committee for Foreign Relations and Defense of the Presidency of the Republic drafted the new policy,” eliminating security tensions with Argentina and proposed moving the concentration of military forces from the southern part of Brazil to the Amazon region.⁷⁹ It is ironic that one academic argument suggests that the military regime stepped aside in 1985 because the internal threats were gone, but only a decade later, internal security became the focus again.⁸⁰ Any policy solution to an external security issue, however, would not be readily accepted if it came from the U.S. instead of developed within, but would be handled in this new era with partner countries in a “cooperative security” environment as demonstrated with the operations in Nicaragua, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Haiti.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 108.

⁷⁸ Hunter, “Assessing Civil-Military Relations in Postauthoritarian Brazil,” 114–115.

⁷⁹ Escudé and Fontana, “Argentina’s Security Policies: Their Rationale and Regional Context,” 61.

⁸⁰ Michael C. Desch, “Why Latin America May Miss the Cold War—The United States and the Future of Inter-American Security Relations,” in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 259.

⁸¹ Paul G. Buchanan, “Chameleon, Tortoise, or Toad: The Changing US Security Role in Contemporary Latin America,” in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 278, 287.

Cardoso's *National Defense Policy* (NDP) made plain the civil-military paradigm that civilians were in charge of the military.⁸² The NDP also provided the military an external focus and broke away from blindly following the United States in matters of national security, while at the same time making amends with Argentina. The NDP also made defending and occupying the Amazon the number-one priority, which will be discussed further in this chapter.⁸³ Although a NDP existed in 1996, it was a weak template that was not as robust as the 2008 *National Defense Strategy* would eventually become.

The *National Defense Plan* concentrated on external threats such as hypothetical invasions from a regional neighbor or other adversarial actions (that never materialized). The NDP would also be negated by a “no enemies” policy since Brazil believed it had no external enemies and could look inward instead by focusing on endogenous security threats as part of its new era of national security strategy.⁸⁴

2. National Defense Strategy: 2008

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Brazil's intent to create a new Ministry of Defense was announced in 1998, 13 years after Brazil transitioned to democracy from a military dictatorship that ruled for more than two decades. Ten years later, in 2008, the MOD published the first Brazilian *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) or what Brazil calls its *Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*.

⁸² Prior to the aforementioned democratic enlightenment of Cardoso, however, President Collor made institutional changes without creating new institutions per se by reducing the number of active duty military officers in his 26-member cabinet from six to three. Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, xvi.

President Woodrow Wilson arguably brought the United States out of its isolationist policies, but Brazil was at this time (and continues to be today) very isolationist in terms of its involvement in issues that would propagate its aspirations internationally. For Wilson it was the League of Nations and World War I that brought the U.S. the prestige it wanted, but for Brazil, it would come by more subtle means and institutions (discussed in the following chapters) that would help propel Brazil into the international spotlight. For Brazil, only world peace “could justify a return of the old national security paradigm of isolation and passive defense, an unlikely prospect in the future.” An idea taken from David F. Trask, “Presidency, National Security, and Intervention,” in *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989*, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1991), 313.

⁸³ Hunter, “Assessing Civil-Military Relations in Postauthoritarian Brazil,” 115.

⁸⁴ Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality,” 9.

In 2006, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took action and directed the civilian-led MOD to draft the first Brazilian NDS. Nelson Jobim (Minister of Defense) and Roberto Unger (Minister Head of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency) drafted an overarching defense strategy that would become the third official iteration of any codified defense policy in Brazil. The two ministers submitted the first National Defense Strategy to President da Silva in 2008—to commemorate the upcoming tenth anniversary of the MOD.⁸⁵

The Brazilian NDS is limited on details, but expansive in vision. One of the goals of this document was to brand national defense as a “theme of interest of all sectors of the Brazilian society” by “inserting defense issues into the national agenda.”⁸⁶ Were defense issues not a part of the national discussion prior to the 2008 NDS? Security issues were likely discussed frequently in political and military circles, but the intent of the NDS was to make national defense a bigger portion of the social dialogue while avoiding the taboo mention of “national security,” a term harboring the residual fear stemming from the military dictatorship era.

For Brazil and Latin America in general, history is not just something that happened long ago, but includes those experiences that actually shape policy in the present.⁸⁷ Something as simple as how a policy would be named had to be acknowledged in order to avoid the appearance of following an unintended path toward the 1970s National Security Law, still fresh in the minds of the people (even though the NDS is a national security strategy by another name).⁸⁸ The term “national security” does appear one time on the penultimate page of the 2008 NDS; however, the term is essentially buried in the document as an appendix.⁸⁹ Changing policy takes time and the more time

⁸⁵ Ham Jr., *Brazil's National Defense Strategy--A Deepening of Civilian Control*, 9, 13.

⁸⁶ Nelson Jobim and Roberto Mangabeira Unger, “National Strategy of Defense: Peace and Security for Brazil” (Brazilian Ministry of Defense, 2008), 5–6, http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf.

⁸⁷ Brian Loveman, “Historical Foundations of Civil-Military Relations in Spanish America,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 246.

⁸⁸ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Political Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 53.

⁸⁹ Jobim and Unger, “National Strategy of Defense: Peace and Security for Brazil,” 65.

goes by, the easier it becomes to move forward from a troubled past. The problem here is that allowing time to pass further delayed the drafting of the NDS.⁹⁰

Brazil's "no enemies" theory within the NDS understates many facets of Brazilian international strategy and is a domestic issue that plays a part in its national defense strategy.⁹¹ There is some truth to this doctrine in that as countries integrate economically, external conflict becomes much more complicated.⁹² Still, if "the more challenging international security environment ... is likely to have [a] paradoxical effect of making civil-military relations better" in Brazil, what does this perception in the lack of perceived security threats say about the current state of civil-military relations in Brazil?⁹³ An increase in internal versus external threats fosters the need for a more centralized security apparatus, which led to the 1964 military regime in the first place.⁹⁴ Fundamentally, Brazil argues against having strong civil-military relations when it says it has no enemies and, perhaps unknowingly, rationalizes the feasibility of military rule.

⁹⁰ A more comprehensive analysis would afford the opportunity to delve into the many topics within the NDS that form the basis of Brazil's national defense policies, but would not help explain the delay in publishing this important document. Some of the following hypotheses definitely delayed the NDS, while others hastened the MOD's timeline in completing the 2008 National Defense Strategy.

⁹¹ Contemporary Brazilian armed forces owe their role and mission to its history during the Paraguayan War. The "greatest consequence of the war was the army's emergence as an institution with a definite form and a set of objectives all its own." Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil*, 126.

More importantly, Brazil arguably considers this to be the final battle against an 'enemy.' Brazil spent the following century and a half in relative peace and declares today that it has no enemies because of it. This line of thinking originated during the military regime when the "emphasis [was] placed on internal security and the fight against subversion, at the expense of the usual defense policy directed against external enemies" and "transformed the military institutions in the region into conservative forces." Arie M. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective* (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1998), 108–109.

This line of thinking may prove dangerous in the long-term, but reveals Brazil's contemporary priorities of national defense issues not being popular in Brazilian politics today.

⁹² David R. Mares, "Latin American Economic Integration and Democratic Control of the Military: Is There a Symbiotic Relationship?," in *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 224.

⁹³ Michael C. Desch, "The Changing International Environment and Civil-Military Relations in Post-Cold War Southern Latin America," in *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America*, ed. Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 334.

⁹⁴ Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 20.

Not having any enemies does not mean that Brazil does not have any threats. One report shows that Brazil's threats come from Colombia and other neighbors as they become further involved in the drug trade,⁹⁵ yet, in actuality, the "locus of conflict has shifted from between to within states."⁹⁶

Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson further explained the ramifications of Brazil's "no enemies" policy. They stated that Brazil has no perceived threats that require military capabilities and that Brazil is also geopolitically satisfied and has no major boundary disputes, which is impressive since they have 10 neighboring countries to deal with. Argentina is no longer an issue after a decades-long rivalry and this relative peace places Brazil in a unique position within international affairs. Bruneau and Tollefson also mention that Brazilians believe they are immune to terrorism and believe they would be at the bottom of any list of potential targets. Declaring itself enemy-free, however, creates some challenges for Brazil. Defense issues receive a lack of political attention as they are a minor part of domestic affairs. Defense will then receive less

⁹⁵ *Brazil Defence & Security Report: Q2 2013* (London, UK: Business Monitor International, 2013), 10.

⁹⁶ David Pion-Berlin, "The Challenge to Reform Defense," in *Global Politics of Defense Reform*, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 275.

This is especially true now that Brazil views itself, and is perceived, as the regional hegemon. Although Brazil focused on different internal threats in the 1950s such as "economic underdevelopment, elite corruption, and leftist subversion," (Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace*, 108) Brazil has a tremendous domestic drug problem as well as its geographic position functions as a node in the global drug supply chain. Desch, "Post-Cold War Southern Latin America," 327.

Drugs are a huge national security issue in that "drug trafficking issues tend to weaken the inchoate formation of normative channels to design defense policies, increase the range of military autonomy, and produce de facto military participation without civilian government oversight." Domínguez and Shifter, *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 70.

Brazil also is seeking nuclear options such as acquiring a nuclear submarine. A Congressional Research Service report states that Brazil aspires to be a net exporter of uranium and is unlikely to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol and references the Tri-Border Area (the area that Brazil shares with Paraguay and Argentina) as a potential cause for concern. Peter J. Meyer, *Brazil-U.S. Relations* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 17.

Again, fixing problems domestically will allow Brazil to fix problems internationally. Brazilians hurt themselves by saying they do not have any enemies, but they were shortsighted since they do have many threats. A "no enemies" policy makes defense issues seem unimportant.

funding and Brazil will not have the resources it needs to take care of internal security, which is a major domestic issue and hinders itself from achieving its international aspirations.⁹⁷

A lack of civilian knowledge and motivation in the defense sector of government, coupled with the fear of emulating the military dictatorship's national security law, prolonged the period in which Brazil's Ministry of Defense took to write its first national defense strategy. Between 1999 and 2008, civilian defense knowledge could not contribute to publishing effective strategy even though defense knowledge was increasing due to civilians attending Brazil's *Escola Superior da Guerra* (Higher War College) "in which senior military officers mix with civilians."⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the first NDS was written sooner than anticipated in order to prepare Brazil to compete in hosting the World Cup, the Summer Olympic Games, and to show the international community that it was serious about security abroad as well as within its own borders—which would also justify a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Lastly, it appears the 2008 *National Defense Strategy* is primarily a political document—a mission statement for the nation's future. Brazil is demonstrating to the world that it can craft a national security strategy that deals with its external threats while simultaneously addressing its internal security issues so it can negotiate more legitimately with other established democracies in matters of international affairs and foreign policy. A formulized national defense strategy is important for Brazil since its constitution still allows the military to step in when law enforcement cannot provide effective internal security.⁹⁹ As long as Brazil can effectively diversify security responsibilities among its law enforcement agencies and help them be effective through implementing this national defense strategy, funding their respective missions, and making needed adjustments along the way, Brazil can avoid future coup attempts and further consolidate and strengthen its democracy. Whether or not the next iteration of the NDS will take another decade for the MOD to produce remains to be seen.

⁹⁷ Bruneau and Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality."

⁹⁸ Bruneau and Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality," 18.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

Five years have passed since the creation of Brazil's NDS and a more in-depth analysis might yield insights as to the overall effectiveness of this delayed defense document. Essentially, the NDS is a top-down document, with limited funding attached to accomplish many of its stated objectives. The NDS focuses resources on handling all national security threats, both internal and external ones, using Brazil's diversified law enforcement agencies and military. Brazil is further strengthening its democratic institutions by avoiding situations that could result in similar conditions seen in 1964 when the military regime began—stemming from an ideological disconnect between civilian leaders and the military as to the best way to handle a given national security crisis. While a national defense strategy is a start, actually implementing the overall vision of the NDS and measuring the results will determine Brazilian national security policy success.

3. White Book on National Defense: 2012

In 2012, Brazil's Ministry of Defense published a *White Book on National Defense* at the direction of President Dilma Rousseff. Again, a major defense initiative instigated by a powerful civilian catalyst, just as the Ministry of Defense and the *National Defense Strategy* came into existence.

Brazil's *White Book* essentially contains the same topics that the 2008 NDS addressed, but presented in an expanded form and explaining how the defense side of Brazil's government will fulfill the strategy contained in the 2008 NDS. Still, unlike the NDS, which was a product of a decree (without legislative backing) until 2013, the *Livro Branco (White Book)* is based on complementary law, with legislative clout, and must be written every four years.¹⁰⁰ The *White Book* is also four times as long as the NDS and yet states the same principles.

So why did Brazil release *White Book* in the first place? Some “observers say the White [Book] initiative, together with the 2008 National Defense Strategy, has improved civilian-military relations within the country and inspired Brazil's neighbors to consider

¹⁰⁰ “Câmara Aprova Política Nacional de Defesa, Estratégia Nacional de Defesa E Livro Branco,” *DefesaNet*, September 12, 2013, <http://www.defesanet.com.br/defesa/noticia/12227/DEFESA---Camara-aprova-Politica-Nacional-de-Defesa--Estrategia-Nacional-de-Defesa-e-Livro-Branco/>.

the strategic ramifications of a militarily powerful Brazil.”¹⁰¹ President Rousseff’s goal is to take the dialogue of defense policy and make it a matter of domestic policy since “civil society should understand that defense issues are not exclusive to the military.”¹⁰² Time will tell if the *White Book* will be an effective guide for future defense strategy and attainment, or just another *para mundo ver* (for the world to see) propaganda document without the resources and incentives behind it to actually implement. In other words, the 2012 *White Book*’s main purpose is to “make defense objectives, capabilities, and strategies ... visible to others in the region and beyond.”¹⁰³

B. EXPLAINING THE TIMING OF DEFENSE POLICY IN BRAZIL

Many possible factors contributed to Brazil formulating its defense policy though some factors more than others help explain the actual timing of the different policy documents. Before continuing with the original four research dimensions or hypotheses as applied to defense policy, it is of note that the overarching driver in Brazil, and elsewhere in Latin America, is that “no policy realm is more tied to state sovereignty than defense [since] a nation cannot claim to be sovereign if it loses control of its territory; fails to safeguard its borders, or deter foreign aggressors—all central elements of defense preparedness.”¹⁰⁴ Brazilian leadership realized that defense strategy was important and a wave of defense policy followed, but what were the actual drivers of that realization?

1. Civilian Defense Knowledge

As David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas declared, “Politician’s emphasis on civil-military power relations and coup prevention has masked the stark deficiencies in civilian attention to defense policy across the region.”¹⁰⁵ Since the Ministry of Defense is an institution run by civilians, defense strategy and policy needed attention from

¹⁰¹ Janie Hulse, “Brazilian Military’s White Paper to Guide Future Defense Priorities,” *Diálogo*, accessed July 30, 2013, http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2011/06/17/aa-brazil-white-paper.

¹⁰² Hulse, “Brazilian Military’s White Paper.”

¹⁰³ Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military in Latin America,” 30.

¹⁰⁴ Pion-Berlin, “The Challenge to Reform Defense,” 283–284.

¹⁰⁵ Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits,” 77.

competent civilian leadership in order to be published without relying solely on military input. The problem in Brazil and other Latin American countries is that it is common to not have career tracks in which a civilian can remain in one organization long enough to develop a knowledge base that will allow the organization to be effective.

Brazilian national leadership knew that real change needed to occur outside of the established defense institutions in the absence of any real advance in policy. Dr. Thomas Bruneau mentions that early on in its existence the “MOD was under weak and erratic leadership, and did not develop as an institution.”¹⁰⁶ An institution such as the MOD will flounder in the absence of leadership, especially without engaged and knowledgeable personnel to carry out the mission. This lack of incentive for civilians to learn enough about their mission to be effective in making lasting change is what David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas observed as “attention deficits.” These scholars stated that although “national defense policy has not been a high priority ... a well thought-out defense policy could certainly contribute to national security.”¹⁰⁷ Brazilian politicians took more than two decades to draft the NDS because they could “ignore defense without incurring great risks to national security” to some extent.¹⁰⁸

The lack of effective civilian oversight and fleeting defense knowledge not only delayed the drafting cogent defense strategy, but also impaired Brazil’s struggle to control one of Brazil’s most insecure regions: the Tri-border Area. The national, state, and local governments in Brazil remained ineffective in their handling of the TBA. The politicians insisted that the level of terrorist activity was minimal and did not deserve as much attention and resources as other security concerns wanted or needed. Despite a handful of successful operations to identify illegal operations, routes, and vehicles, the few confiscations made were a small portion of the overall problem and still require resolution. The government has generally shown apathy toward the TBA as shown in the government’s lack of effective debate, legislation, and inclusion in a national security policy up until the NDS of 2008. Grappling with complex security issues, such as the

¹⁰⁶ Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality,” 17.

¹⁰⁷ Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits,” 76, 78.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

TBA, can delay effective policy like the NDS due to paralysis by analysis. Shuffling civilian leaders around different organizations or spending too much time drafting policy and not spending enough time implementing some sort of ad-hoc solution and reassessing if it is effective, is not the way to handle national security.¹⁰⁹

Maria Celina D’Araujo, a proponent of more involved civilian leadership in defense matters, strengthens Stepan’s argument that democratic civilian leadership could not achieve full civilian control of the armed forces during Brazil’s democratization. She argued that the situation in Brazil would remain stagnant unless change happened within the armed forces themselves and civilian attitudes changed toward an increased role in controlling the military, which is another form of the knowledge needed to manage defense issues.¹¹⁰ In addition, as some experienced military personnel retire and transition to civilian roles their expertise and knowledge will add to the building cadre of effective civilian leaders in the CMR construct.¹¹¹ Conversely, the incentive for retired officers to pass on their knowledge and serve as government civilians will not happen if the prevailing pension system continues giving retired military too generous of a pension, which contributes to Brazil spending 73.6 percent of its total defense budget on personnel.¹¹²

This hypothesis of a civilian knowledge deficiency is convincing because it not only contributed to the delay in the establishment of the MOD, but further compounded Brazil’s national security issues by not producing the knowledge and motivation necessary to draft the *National Defense Strategy*, which is arguably the crux of many defense and political policies that followed. The lack of civilian knowledge underfunds critical military missions as well since “civilian disinterest in defense policy has also contributed to the lack of basic operating resources.”¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America” (Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003), 64.

¹¹⁰ Maria Celina D’Araujo, “Perspectiva Brasileira Para Os Novos Aspectos Da Segurança Regional,” *Cadernos Adenauer* XI, no. 4 (2010): 34–42.

¹¹¹ Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 172.

¹¹² Bruneau and Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: Rhetoric and Reality,” 21.

¹¹³ Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 103.

2. Political Incentives

J. Samuel Fitch stated, “The Brazilian experience vividly demonstrates the importance of the political context—particularly the political strength or weakness of the president—as a force shaping military policy.”¹¹⁴ Political incentives drive the need for civilian control of the military and “is a low-cost means of achieving a relative calm in civil-military affairs without investing in extensive institution building, expertise, legislative oversight, and large budgets.”¹¹⁵ The problem with this type of arrangement is the lack of synergy between politicians and military leaders in creating effective lasting institutions because “civilian leaders do not meddle in core military interests if the military observes similar rules about the government’s core interests.”¹¹⁶ That very few nations outside of the United States had politicians with incentives to reform the defense establishment was another issue that Brazil needed to deal with.¹¹⁷ Additionally, “most countries do not develop public national security strategies because they would rather not call attention to the issue, for fear that they would have to make good on their declared goals.”¹¹⁸

Again, Brazil eventually became serious about national defense as it sought to obtain a permanent seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and wanted to assimilate policies implemented by established UN members.¹¹⁹ Brazilian politicians eventually realized that it could not delay the national security/defense process any longer. Civilian leadership also realized that although national defense may not have been a sociopolitical priority in the early stages of its democratic transition, a national defense strategy was essential in developing foreign and domestic policy. By demonstrating its

¹¹⁴ Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 153.

¹¹⁵ Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military in Latin America,” 28; this line of thinking borrowed from Bennett, “The Trinity: A New Approach.”

¹¹⁶ Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military in Latin America,” 29.

¹¹⁷ Pion-Berlin, “The Challenge to Reform Defense,” 272.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 273.

¹¹⁹ Edmundo Sussumo Fujita, “O Brasil E O Conselho de Segurança: Notas Sobre Uma Década de Transição (1985-1995),” *Parcerias Estratégicas* 1, no. 2 (2009): 67–78.

credibility (internationally and regionally) as a developed nation, Brazil could become a peer with established nations in the realm of international affairs.

A counterargument to this need to be defense-minded is the perception that the United States' role in military affairs increased during the Cardoso administration and Brazil sought to counter that perception by seeking a seat on the UN Security Council to balance the perceived (or real) influence that the U.S. had on Brazilian defense policy.¹²⁰ In the absence of primary sources explaining the motivations of Brazil's civilian and military leaders, at least on the surface, more forces appear to be at work.

If Brazil wanted to compete for UN Security Council permanent membership, it needed to look and act like the other permanent-member countries on the council in terms of economic, military, social, and nuclear prowess. The 2008 Brazilian NDS addressed all four of these areas. The NDS tackles economic issues with a desire to invest in its defense industry and have indigenous defense capabilities that will compete effectively in the world market. The strategy organizes the military in such a way as to capitalize on a robust defense industry and have the most state-of-the-art equipment. Brazil integrates the NDS socially as a major part of the national agenda and develops its nuclear prowess beyond electricity production by proposing the militarization of nuclear technology through its nuclear-powered submarine program.¹²¹

In addition to assimilating to other UN Security Council members on paper, Brazil has engaged in peacekeeping and other "international security endeavors [to justify] ... a permanent UN Security Council seat."¹²² Brazil is not the only country vying for a permanent UN Security Council seat, however. Brazil's biggest competition in gaining a permanent seat in the Security Council is arguably India, which is further ahead than Brazil in some of these research dimensions, especially in the nuclear arena.

¹²⁰ Jorge I. Domínguez, "Security, Peace, and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean," in *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 16.

¹²¹ Jobim and Unger, "National Strategy of Defense: Peace and Security for Brazil," 5–71.

¹²² Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, "Attention Deficits," 97.

Gaining a UN Security Council seat is a major priority for Brazil and created the impetus for the MOD to draft a NDS sooner rather than later.

Brazilian politicians also needed time to formulate policy that distanced itself from its military dictatorship history and avoided using the term ‘national security’ while at the same time addressing security issues. National security had a negative connotation and reminded citizens of the bygone military regime’s repressive policies.¹²³ In contemporary language, national security strategy goes beyond just defense and military organizations and includes internal and external threats, but Brazil could not name its national policy accurately because of the “national security program” references used during the decades-long authoritarian regime.¹²⁴ In addition, Brazil started to implement what I call ‘security force diversification’ and created multiple law enforcement agencies to balance against the military in order to have additional forces to call upon in times of crisis instead of only having the option to use military forces. Brazil was consolidating its democracy by making it more difficult for a coup to occur in the future by establishing a civilian-led Ministry of Defense, diversifying the law enforcement capacity of the country, and removing or changing references in the national defense doctrine that were associated with the former military dictatorship.

Additionally, Brazil’s civilian leadership developed a defense strategy as it desired to compete for high-visibility events such as the Olympic Games and the Soccer World Cup. The Brazilians saw these sporting events as not only an opportunity to compete athletically, but also as an “instrument for promoting national integration ... [and] even became a matter of national security.”¹²⁵ Essentially, if the nation came together around a common purpose, then internal stability increases and Brazil gains more legitimacy on international issues.

Brazil had participated in the Olympic Games since 1920, but had never hosted them before. The Brazilian government tried to host the 2004 Olympic Games but lost

¹²³ Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, 112.

¹²⁴ Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Fear in Military Regimes: An Overview* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 17.

¹²⁵ Joseph A. Page, *The Brazilians* (Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 1995), 400.

and decided to forgo bidding for the 2008 games so it could host the 2007 Pan American Games, the largest sporting event in America and the second largest in the world.¹²⁶ According to the Comitê Olímpico Brasileiro (Brazilian Olympic Committee), the goal of having the Olympic and Paralympic games in Rio de Janeiro was to “[bring] sustainable development [to] Brazil ... [which] development would be associated with the transformation of the city, with the emergence of a new urban infrastructure, new environmental initiatives, ... continued growth of the economy and tourism in the country, bringing to Brazil a new level of international recognition and reinforcing the country’s reputation of being an exciting place where it is good to live, do business and [visit].”¹²⁷

In addition to the Olympic Games, Brazil had not hosted the World Cup since 1950 and won the bid in late October 2007 to host the prestigious 2014 soccer tournament.¹²⁸ Hosting these two events created an opportunity, and when “opportunities arise ... it depends on leaders to seize them.”¹²⁹ Coincidentally, on September 6, 2007 (one month before the World Cup bid announcement), Brazilian President da Silva called for a “Ministerial Committee” to “design” the NDS.¹³⁰ Even though da Silva called for the drafting of a NDS in 2006, the announcement for a new NDS committee showed that little progress was being made and that the NDS was an important political document for Brazil in more ways than one: the NDS would focus the government’s attention on national security issues and act as a public service announcement to the world that Brazil was a safe place to invest and play. Hosting the Pan American Games in 2007 might have brought more credibility to Brazil than crafting a security document, but this thesis contends that these setbacks of not winning high-visibility events earlier motivated the government to examine what was lacking and asked the Ministry of Defense to draft the

¹²⁶ “Perguntas Frequentes,” Rio 2016, accessed June 2, 2013, <http://www.rio2016.org/comite-organizador/perguntas-frequentes>.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Vicki Hodges, “Brazil to Stage 2014 World Cup,” *Telegraph*, October 30, 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/2324530/Brazil-to-stage-2014-World-Cup.html>.

¹²⁹ Pion-Berlin, “The Challenge to Reform Defense,” 282.

¹³⁰ Jobim and Unger, “National Strategy of Defense: Peace and Security for Brazil,” 4.

NDS toward securing the country for the people and for events such as these. In other words, the MOD and national leadership would have taken longer to craft an NDS had it not had high-visibility events to compete for.

3. Prerogatives

The military prerogatives that once existed and prevented change in the civil-military relationship construct in Brazil do not appear to be an obvious issue today. As applied contemporarily, Dr. Stepan's foresight explains the current condition of CMR in Brazil such that "in an uncontested model of civilian control of the military, both military prerogatives and articulated conflict are low."¹³¹ Brazilian executive leadership claims not to have any enemies (military included) and the military is freely able to counter any internal security threats as they arise—through a few different programs. Also, as Brazil's military priorities become more grandiose, its neighbors may see that as a security dilemma as discussed earlier concerning Brazil's views of Venezuela increasing its defense capacity during the Chavez administration. However, even though "Argentina, Brazil, and Chile well exemplify dimensions of the classic security dilemma ... their interstate relations perhaps have never been better."¹³² The cooperation among these countries is better than ever and deploying armed forces along the borders as a show of force is no longer an issue.¹³³

Security issues are still at the forefront of Brazilian grand strategy and create a great internal dilemma for Brazil so the new military prerogative is not to appear weak on defense. Brazil also wants to demonstrate to the international community that it has plans to confront existing security and defense issues. Well-armed gangs and illicit economic growth are fueling crime. Crime has the dual effect of hindering economic performance and prestige abroad. By effectively handling security issues, especially in proximity to

¹³¹ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Political Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 98.

¹³² Domínguez, "Security, Peace, and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean," 7.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 13.

major population centers, Brazil is able to compete as a safe place to host the world's premier events, bring more business to the country, and handle a mix of exogenous and endogenous security threats.

Jorge Zaverucha argued that “with the end of the Cold War and in the absence of any border conflict, the Brazilian government turned even more to their domestic affairs,” which delayed defense strategy, but also ignored important internal security issues that will be discussed in this section.¹³⁴ Additionally, Brazil needed to form institutions and policy to counter historical experience that in times of internal crisis, the military could have *carte blanche* to restore order.¹³⁵ Defense strategy, along with constitutional amendments, guarantees the appropriate amount of civil-military oversight for any given security concern.

It has been said that “civilian control ... is irrelevant unless the armed forces can effectively fulfill their roles and missions.”¹³⁶ One way for civilian leaders to weaken military prerogatives, while at the same time providing salient roles and missions to the military, is to separate the armed forces from domestic issues and focus them on external issues. In the late 1990s, this idea seemed difficult since the majority of the armed forces concentrated around urban centers of the country. By finding external missions, civilian control of the military would allow the military to handle security and the civilians to handle the politics.¹³⁷ Moreover, civilian leaders over time learned how far they could test the military's resolve on multiple issues using “a process of mutual testing” that

¹³⁴ Zaverucha, “Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil,” 9.

¹³⁵ Loveman, “Historical Foundations of Civil-Military Relations in Spanish America,” 269.

¹³⁶ Thomas C. Bruneau and Harold A. Trinkunas, “Global Trends and Their Impact on Civil-Military Relations” (unpublished 2007), 15.

¹³⁷ Hunter, “Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,” 308.

“established precedents and expectations.”¹³⁸ In summary, military prerogatives eroded as civilian leadership learned how to lead and the military consented to civilian leadership with fewer caveats.¹³⁹

In the absence of concrete external threats, Brazil is currently implementing several projects to address perceived external security challenges, of which the *fronteras vivas* (living borders) initiative is one of the most prominent (see Figure 1). For Brazil, “drug trafficking, immigration, ethnic (indigenous) conflicts, and environmental protection are becoming more significant national security issues in a region where traditional border conflicts have either been resolved or have diminished in importance.”¹⁴⁰

By appropriating military resources, Brazil desires to address some of these contemporary security issues and modernize its interior region along the expansive Brazilian border. These projects serve two important purposes: first, a large country can only maintain its national security through reinforcing the outermost parts of its landmass to discourage illegal immigration, boundary extension by its neighbors, or illicit activity in the periphery; second, these projects create institutional infrastructure to combat security issues at the fringes before they come into the population centers of the country while at the same time sustaining the new local communities. Without these infrastructure projects, there would be no incentive for people to live in such remote areas and more difficult for law enforcement to secure the border against perceived and very

¹³⁸ Hunter, “Assessing Civil-Military Relations in Postauthoritarian Brazil,” 109.

¹³⁹ These military prerogatives posed a threat to Brazil if it did not learn from its militaristic past during this tenuous period of democratic transition. Wendy Hunter stated that “while not posing an immediate threat to the stability of democracy, remaining pockets of military autonomy, specific missions that the armed forces persist in advocating or adopting, and attitudes that officers continue to harbor inhibit civilian supremacy and impair the quality of democracy.” Hunter, “Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,” 300.

Although characterizing the Southern Cone of South America in one broad academic brushstroke, Hunter’s points apply to Brazil quite well. One mission in particular, the nuclear submarine program, is such an example of a specific program or mission that the military used to preserve its autonomy, albeit in a difficult fiscal environment.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 309.

real national security threats.¹⁴¹ Unfortunately, Brazil is addressing the boundary issues in the Amazon region, but neglecting the security relations with Argentina that are not handled with the attention those economic issues in the region receive.¹⁴²



Figure 1. Brazil's *fronteras vivas* projects¹⁴³

Another challenging national defense issue for Brazil is the tri-border area (TBA) formed with Argentina and Paraguay in the Foz do Iguacu area (see Figure 2). The security challenge in this region is a byproduct of geography. The TBA encompasses interior spaces within Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, further complicating the issue of cooperative security. Because of the TBA's distance from urbanized areas among the three nations, a lawless culture has developed in the area. This region is characterized as a hub for organized crime and alleged terrorist activity for many infamous terrorist

¹⁴¹ David S. Salisbury et al., "Fronteras Vivas or Dead Ends? The Impact of Military Settlement Projects in the Amazon Borderlands," *Journal of Latin American Geography* 9, no. 2 (2010): 51–52.

¹⁴² David R. Mares, "Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and Regional Security in Comparative Perspective," in *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe*, ed. David R. Mares (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 251.

¹⁴³ Salisbury et al., "Fronteras Vivas or Dead Ends? The Impact of Military Settlement Projects in the Amazon Borderlands," 52.

groups such as “Egypt’s Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Al-Jihad, al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, and al-Muqawamah.”¹⁴⁴ The challenge for Brazil is how to deal with the TBA, whether or not the United States should be involved, and whether to address the security issues in the region through diplomatic, economic, or military means.¹⁴⁵



Figure 2. The South American Tri-border Region¹⁴⁶

Brazilian civilians and military leaders have focused on a few portions of the problem in the triple frontier: “drug trafficking, money laundering, arms dealing, automobile smuggling, illegal immigration, counterfeiting, piracy, fundraising, recruiting,

¹⁴⁴ Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America,” 1.

¹⁴⁵ Patricia Taft, David A. Poplack, and Rita Grossman-Vermaas, *The Crime-Terrorism Nexus: Risks in the Tri-Border Area* (Washington DC: Fund for Peace, 2009), 4, <http://fundforpeace.org/global/library/ttcvr1208-threatconvergence-triborder-04e.pdf>.

¹⁴⁶ Pablo Gato, “Hezbollah Builds a Western Base,” *NBC News*, accessed January 28, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17874369/ns/world_news-americas/t/hezbollah-builds-western-base/.

and alleged nuclear material smuggling.”¹⁴⁷ Since the range of issues is so vast, no single government entity can effectively counter the local strongmen in the region. Brazil, Argentina, and to a lesser extent Paraguay, attempt military and police actions but lack the prosecutory power that should come from the Brazilian capitol, which would make catching criminals more incentivized for law enforcement agencies.¹⁴⁸

Brazilian criminal policy legislation and implementation are largely left in the hands of individual states. As a result, the local forces are often small and only perform investigative services. Law enforcement credibility is damaged because of the many reports of corruption and human rights violations among its police forces as well. In spite of these issues, the amount of attention in the region has grown since 2001, but has shown very little progress thus far. As Brazil continued its emphasis on stabilizing the TBA, it delayed creating effective institutions and policy that had a lasting effect. Once a MOD and a NDS were in place, Brazil could appear to be more like its developed peers and appear safer for international involvement.¹⁴⁹

What started as a foreign policy issue, the geographic frontier in Brazil plays a role in the prerogatives and motivations of the armed forces in Brazil as well. Similar to the *fronteiras vivas* project, *Calha Norte* tried unsuccessfully to move the preponderance of the armed forces from the southern portion on the country to the north. Additionally, Brazil started a \$1.2 billion Amazonian watch system (SIVAM) to prevent the “internationalization” of the Amazon region as well as combat similar types of issues discussed with the TBA and *fonteiras vivas* including: countering drug trafficking, preventing border smuggling, protecting indigenous people, preserving environmental resources, and establishing a presence in the region.¹⁵⁰ Essentially, Brazil confronts many

¹⁴⁷ Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America,” 1, 50–59.

¹⁴⁸ Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America,” 64.

¹⁴⁹ Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America,” 64.

¹⁵⁰ Hirst, “Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone,” 112.

issues due to its “geographic proximity” to many countries and requires the strategy and resources to successfully complete these missions.¹⁵¹

4. Institutional Development

According to Thomas Bruneau et al., effective civil-military relations “[are] grounded in and exercised through institutions ranging from organic laws that empower the Ministry of Defense, oversight committees and executive bodies that direct police, to budget processes and civilian control of promotions within intelligence agencies.”¹⁵² The institutions are finally in place and the issue now becomes a matter of what the MOD will continue to do to further consolidate the role of civil-military relations into its organization and not share responsibilities with the Public Ministry or any other institution. However, as repeated many times in this thesis, institutions are useless if civilians do not know what they should accomplish, especially when the MOD has “institutional interests of its own and prerogatives its members seek to advance.”¹⁵³

Civilians must know something about defense and they must be “aware of what they do not know if they are to be successful in utilizing the armed forces and the more widely construed ‘security forces’ to the best advantage of their government and nation.”¹⁵⁴ The military has long been called “remarkably open and transparent about defense issues” and the MOD should bring that transparency and expertise to anything defense related.¹⁵⁵ Consolidation and centralization of defense knowledge and direction is the next step and could only come after clear defense policy established an end-state to work towards. This end-state often appears as strengthened legitimacy, efficacy, and capacity in further developing the Ministry of Defense as an institution of effective CMR.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, *Transforming Latin America*, 200–201.

¹⁵² Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” *Democratization* 15, no. 5 (2008): 154–55.

¹⁵³ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Political Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 10.

¹⁵⁴ Bruneau, “The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited,” 113; overall argument inspired from Bennett, “The Trinity: A New Approach.”

¹⁵⁵ Escudé and Fontana, “Argentina’s Security Policies: Their Rationale and Regional Context,” 73.

¹⁵⁶ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 226–30.

IV. CONCLUSION

Effective CMR is both a byproduct and a function of a strong democracy—as democracy consolidates and deepens so will civil-military relations.¹⁵⁷ Once democracy consolidates, other aspects of government will fall into place including CMR. Synergy is possible within CMR as 1) civilians and military give and take knowledge from each other, 2) policy is developed by both parties, and 3) civilians expect compliance and the military expects resources to carry it out. However, I agree with David Mares in that “civil-military relationships are fluid” and require time to achieve the type of relations the political environment supports, which appears to lean toward civilian-dominant CMR.¹⁵⁸

As Bruneau and Matei observed, most civil-military relations research focuses on civilian control of the military (or lack thereof during military regimes), but ignores the efforts of the military in attempting to create a CMR symbiosis between civilians and their military counterparts. These two authors discuss the efficiency and effectiveness of the military component, but more research need to happen concerning the synergy that materializes when the national defense properly includes the roles and mission of the military as demonstrated in well-written defense strategy.¹⁵⁹ However, CMR often is tainted by politics and as applied to the MOD or national defense strategy, synergy may be more difficult to attain as civilians and military have different political angles to pursue.

¹⁵⁷ Although this analysis started out as a thesis about democratization and consolidating civil-military relations, it quickly transitioned into questions of defense reform and the effects on CMR as well. This paper also analyzed the rational, structural, and cultural reasons for the delay in publishing Brazilian defense policy. Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 17.

From a realist perspective, politicians, defense civilians, and military leaders strategically used the new democratic landscape to shape their own spheres of influence in a consolidating democracy. From a structuralist point of view, Brazil changed the institutional make-up of civil-military relations by establishing a Ministry of Defense and continues to use that institution as the focal point of civil-military relations consolidation. From a cultural standpoint, the *deixa para manha* and *para ingles ver* doctrine continues to permeate Brazilian society and does not reflect laziness or apathy, but a cultural legacy that will either continue or change throughout the genesis of CMR in Brazil

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” 923.

A further argument of this thesis is that outside of the reasons for the delay in defense policy, cogent defense policy will ensure that the right missions get codified and funded. Politicians will see that the military is focusing on only the right type and amount of missions based on the defense strategy and limited resources are neither squandered by the politicians apportioning them nor by the military utilizing them.¹⁶⁰

Brazil's democracy is consolidating, which requires additional time to establish itself internationally. It needs to integrate and strengthen the necessary institutions that will allow it to become an established democracy among the developed nations of the world. If countries such as Brazil want to hasten the process, they must turn knowledge into wisdom by putting knowledge into action, creating the institutions, mechanisms, and incentives necessary to become an established democracy. Finally, Brazil has not had the tumultuous past of most countries, which may explain the lack of development in Brazil that the U.S. had after fighting in the world wars since it was James Tilly's notion that the "war made the state and the state made war."¹⁶¹ Maybe Brazil's "no enemies" doctrine is preventing what it needs to 'arrive' on the international scene?

Now that Brazil has the institutions to further develop civil-military relations (namely the MOD) and publish defense strategy, the next step is to formulate what exactly Brazil's national security strategy should contain. For the military regime of 1964 - 1985, national security doctrine was concrete and was carried out in unison by the military regime. In contemporary Brazil, threats can come from anywhere: the economy, the citizenry, the military, etc. and must be addressed.

This thesis also discussed the role that civilian knowledge, military prerogatives, incentives, political objectives, and institutions have on the development of civil-military relations in Brazil, but is there a correct order to accomplish these items in? Ideally, incentives and prerogatives drive synergistic defense knowledge between civilians and the military and then policy gets created before institutions grow to fulfill the roles and missions outlined in the national defense strategy. In Brazil, it appears that political

¹⁶⁰ Pion-Berlin, "The Challenge to Reform Defense," 276.

¹⁶¹ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1992).

incentives drove the creation of the MOD by President Cardoso with the civilian and military leadership backfilling their stated mission with policy and potentially some future execution of the policy.

Additionally, it appears that democracy follows a series of natural laws in its path to consolidation and strength. There are also certain milestones that appear to be required to strengthen CMR and Brazil is passing through those much faster than established democracies did. Moreover, it appears that civil-military relations are extremely important to a nation as it aspires to sovereignty and prosperity; diplomacy and national defense are arguably two of the few things the government is able to handle efficiently and CMR play a crucial role in both, which Brazil is finally internalizing. Since “civil-military conflicts ... have often constrained sovereignty and weakened legitimacy” of the government, it is important that governments support the CMR apparatuses to ensure democratic consolidation and national security.¹⁶²

One final counterargument to this whole analysis of defense strategy evolution is Brazil always had a defense strategy because the military probably had one. While this is potentially true, this thesis identifies policy as an indicator of effective civil-military relations theory and once the transition to democracy started, institutions and policy came slowly, therefore a published strategy was lacking. In essence, national security strategy has to originate in the executive branch of the government since they represent the people in a democratic society. In a constitutional democracy, the president decides on the direction that policy should go as seen with Presidents Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff. Coincidentally, the national defense organizational changes discussed in this thesis occurred following periods of national economic growth.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 220.

¹⁶³ “The economy, having [stabilized] under Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the mid-1990s, accelerated under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the early 2000s. ... To add to the magic, Brazil was awarded both next year’s football World Cup and the summer 2016 Olympics. On the strength of all that, Lula persuaded voters in the same year to choose as president his technocratic protégée, Dilma Rousseff.” “Has Brazil Blown It?,” *The Economist*, September 28, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21586833-stagnant-economy-bloated-state-and-mass-protests-mean-dilma-rousseff-must-change-course-has>.

Finally, each one of the research dimensions analyzed here appears to be valid; however, some are more valid than others in explaining the evolution of defense policy in Brazil. Essentially, since civil-military relations involve people, people are the most important variable in the strengthening and consolidation of CMR in any given country. In Brazil, it was the leadership of President Cardoso in establishing the MOD and President Lula da Silva directing the new era of published defense policy that showcased how not only is democracy consolidating in Brazil, but so are civil-military relations. It is not a question of *what* will be the next defense milestone in Brazil's CMR evolution, but *who* will be the catalyst of it?

David Pion-Berlin offers one perspective on the impact of this research in the field of Brazilian civil-military relations when he said:

None of us has the last word on the study of civil-military relations. Undoubtedly, [this thesis] will raise as many questions as they answer, given the fast-paced changes in and around the civil-military world, the complexities of the subject, and the limitations of [my] approaches. That is all good, since it is those questions that will inevitably lead to new research.¹⁶⁴

Additionally, David Mares offers me additional consolation in that this thesis “provides a speculative answer in the hopes of encouraging more research” in the realm of Brazilian civil-military relations.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Pion-Berlin, “Introduction,” 29.

¹⁶⁵ Mares, “Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and Regional Security in Comparative Perspective,” 247.

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