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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**MILITIAS: EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE FORCE
STRUCTURES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE**

by

Daniel V. Gavra

June 2014

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Leo Blanken
John Arquilla

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**MILITIAS: EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURES
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

Large-scale conventional wars have become quite rare, yet most militaries are built with this model in mind. Conversely, less well-resourced entities employ force through part-time fighters and prevail at a higher rate than expected when facing standing militaries; in these cases, they employ pre-existing combat-related skills mastered either in civilian life or through military refresher courses. This research seeks to determine whether a militia-focused approach may be the most cost-effective security choice for a community; it may not be optimal for short, blitzkrieg-like engagements, but it may employ force effectively for defending the community it represents. Through analyzing three historical cases that stretch from small-scale to nationwide war, from desert to forested mountains, from unconventional to mechanized warfare, and from active combat to pure successful deterrence, this thesis examines the conditions under which a militia-based defense system is a viable and attractive option for national defense.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| Fosh | Hebrew acronym for <i>Plugot Sadeh</i> , field company; Haganah's mobile fighting force. |
| Gadna | Israeli pre-military program in IDF |
| GDP | Gross domestic product |
| Grande Armée | the French Army under Napoleon I, assembled in 1805 |
| Haganah | Jewish underground paramilitary group operating in Palestine before Israel's establishment |
| Him | Israeli self-sustainable defense forces at village level |
| Hish | Hebrew abbreviation for <i>Heil HaSadeh</i> , field corps; replacement units for Fosh. |
| IDF | Israeli Defense Force(s) |
| Loyalist | Tory exponent opposing the American Revolution |
| Lucerne hammer | Swiss polearm, designed to fight armored opponents |
| Militia | armed citizenry, non-professional citizen soldiers organized for defense-related duties |
| Morgenstern | Morning star, spiked club, weapon designed by Swiss infantry to overcome mailed armor |
| Nahal | Israeli program that combines military service, agriculture, and social volunteerism |
| NCO | non-commissioned officer |
| Notrim | Jewish police force under the British Mandate in Palestine |
| Overmountain Men | American frontiersmen from west of the Appalachian Mountains who took part in the American revolutionary War |
| Palmach | Hebrew acronym for <i>Plugot Mahatz</i> , literary strike force; Haganah's elite fighting force |
| Patriot | supporter of independence in the American Revolution |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| Rebel | Patriot of the American Revolution |
| Redcoat (Red coat) | soldier from the historic British Army, usually wearing red uniform |
| Reduit Nationale | national redoubt, backbone of the Swiss "porcupine" defense concept |
| SNS | Special Night Squadron |

| | |
|----------------|---|
| Tory (Tories) | partisan(s) of British traditionalism and conservatism |
| Ugdah | Israeli combat formation, equivalent with a division-level task force |
| UN | United Nations |
| Zahal (Tzahal) | the Hebrew acronym for <i>Tzva Hahagana LeYisra'el</i> , the Army of Defense for Israel; the Israeli Defense Force, IDF |

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Special thanks to Professor John Arquilla, whose colossal insight channeled my work and my whole understanding of irregular warfare.

Most importantly, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my former colleague, Ensign (PM) Claudiu Popa, and his fellow soldier, Second Lieutenant (PM) Adrian Postelnicu, fallen on the field of duty while this project was under development.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Large-scale conventional wars have become quite rare, yet most militaries are built with this model in mind. Land, air, and maritime forces are constantly upgraded and maintained; massively expensive conventional fighting equipment is developed, and decades later, it becomes aged and obsolete. Conversely, less well-resourced entities pursue their interests by employing force through part-time fighters, lightly equipped and poorly organized, from a conventional perspective. Yet, when facing each other, the irregulars¹ prevail at a higher rate than expected.²

The most recent examples are the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Despite the stunning initial victories over the conventionally-oriented defense structures of the invaded countries, the United States military (fighting on its own or leading a coalition) experienced long and difficult engagements during the stabilization phase in both theaters of operations; the high-quality professional forces became impotent mastodons and an opportunity target for the more versatile and cost-effective militias they faced. Moreover, the Syrian governmental forces regained the initiative against the rebels only *after* Hezbollah fighters joined the war on the Assad regime's side. With these examples in mind, corroborated by the prevalence of irregular warfare across the spectrum of armed conflict since the last world war, one can observe that professional militaries may not be the optimal investment for national security; perhaps it is the case that these militaries have become irrelevant for the conflicts of the third millennium,³ or at least an organizational structure that is ill-fitted to the current threat environment.

¹ Ivan Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1.

² Patricia L. Sullivan, *Who Wins?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), i.

³ Martin L. van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York and Toronto: Free Press, 1991), ii.

B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE

The scope of this thesis extends to analyzing the outputs that militia structures can offer for the systems of which they are a part, in order to determine the degree to which they may be a viable option for a nation-state's defense system. An analysis of a selection of performances of militia forces over the last three centuries in major conflicts and smaller interventions should allow us to identify the conditions under which part-time militaries can be successfully employed, and furthermore provide valuable advantages for developing defense strategies.

Correctly defined, these conditions should play an important role in shaping the organization and training cycle of the armed forces. This thesis will cover the strategic utility of militias, both in defensive wars against foreign threat/occupation and in expeditionary military actions abroad.

C. CORE ARGUMENT

The main research question of the thesis asks whether a militia-focused approach may be the most cost-effective defense/security choice for a community; is it a viable option for short, conventional, small-scale engagements? Can a militia-based approach defend the community it represents and promote its interests? This thesis will seek to find whether militia organizations identify with the community, and what is the relationship that eases the mutual support between the two; is there any ideology enforcing it?

This research will also try to reveal the most significant factors that directly affect the performance of the militia in combat; is it a matter of superior skills, superior technologies and equipment, or better tactics? Is it related to the nature of the potential conflict (that is offensive or defensive, violent or non-violent, kinetic or non-kinetic), and will militiamen eagerly engage in conflict-related activities, inside or outside the geographical borders of the community? Finally, the relevance of a centralized command, control, and support system related to the individual and collective performance of the militiamen and militia organizations will be investigated.

D. METHODOLOGY

The methodological contributions of this project are two-fold. The first is to develop the concept of “militia” more rigorously than has been done previously. This often neglected task is important for building the conceptual foundation of any social science study.⁴ The second is to test some exploratory propositions about militias using the qualitative method of structured-focused comparison.⁵

First, the hub-and-spoke nature of the militia concept is developed in Chapter II. The essentialist hub is the non-professional character of the forces, and the radial components are the national-level subordination (central command); state-sponsored training, manning, and equipping; the level of efficiency achieved through the usage of pre-existing skills; and the ideology driving the militiamen. All the spokes are allowed to vary or are set constant, case by case, and they cause variance on the dependent variable, as shown in the final chapter.⁶

Further, the cases span both conventional and unconventional warfare, so as to be relevant for current national security needs. Based on this profile, the performance of three militia-based military structures qualified as appropriate case studies: the American Rebels from the Revolutionary War, in particular the “over mountain men” of the King’s Mountain battle, which is a case of guerrillas directly engaging a conventional Redcoat militia; the Israeli Defense Force, which emerged from an underground movement into what is considered today the most competent military in the Middle East, particularly in regards to mechanized warfare; and the Swiss military, which evolved from the laboratory that created the world’s most feared mercenaries in the fifteenth century, into what is today known as the warrant of seven centuries of peace in the Federation of the Alps’ Cantons.

⁴ Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), ii.

⁵ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67.

⁶ Gary Goertz, *Increasing Concept-Indicator Validity: The Case of Democracy* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona, Department of Political Science, unpublished working paper), 10–12.

The correlation between the efficiency/inefficiency of the forces with respect to their purpose and the independent variables in place will be established through the method of structured-focused comparison.⁷ By analyzing the fitness of the militias in the environment, their formal organization, and the nature of the threats they faced, we expect to find specific characteristics that lead to success or failure. At the same time, the studies should also identify the features that did not influence the outcomes of the conflict.

E. THESIS OUTLINE

In the next chapter the concept of militia-based defense systems is introduced, and the case studies and the rationale for selecting them are presented.

Chapter III presents the battle of King's Mountain during the American Revolution and describes the traits of the opposing forces, providing the logical arguments that favored the Rebel militia when facing the traditional Redcoats.

Chapter IV is devoted to the Israeli Defense Force, from its inception until the political environment of the Middle East changed in favor of Israel during the 1970s. It presents a small nation fighting for survival in a completely hostile environment, and resorting to a militia-based defense system as the only way to overcome the external aggression and internal discontent during the phase of nation-building.

Chapter V introduces one of the most interesting militia-based defense systems: the Swiss military. It shows a neutral country that (almost completely) avoided being involved in a military conflict for the last five centuries without having a standing army, as opposed to its previous historical record when they lost all of their wars, despite having a trained standing military.

⁷ Stephen van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 56.

The final chapter brings together the conclusions drawn from the case studies and is entirely devoted to the induction of a theory addressing the potential benefits of a militia-based defense system for small nations under security uncertainty. Subsequently, it makes recommendations for the improvement of the defense structure's efficiency.

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II. EFFECTIVE MILITIAS: OVERLAPPING CIVILIAN SKILLS AND MILITARY MISSIONS

They all know how to shoot. They do not have to be trained how to fight in other environments than their own one.

–John McPhee

A. MILITIAS

It is universally accepted that states need security, and this is usually provided by a military organization embedded in a defense system. From this point forward, a strong debate concerning the ways in which the military should be set begins; the central themes consist of missions, capabilities, roles, reserve/active forces trade-offs, and budgeting.⁸ Most of the time, the resulting outcomes consist of normative statements that sometimes disregard the status quo of the society that should benefit from the desired security. The pre-existing skills and capabilities that are embedded within the population at large often play a marginal role or no role at all, and do not constitute one of the starting points of the defense planning process; thus, the common option is a traditional standing military. In the following chapters, close attention will be paid to the potential of militia organizations and citizens' pre-existing skills as alternatives to the commonly adopted professional military.

This chapter will introduce the concept of a defense-relevant militia system, in order to set the boundaries of the domain analyzed. Using hub-and-spoke construction, the next paragraph will set the primary and secondary attributes for an organization to be considered as militia-type. Next, the practicability of involving citizen soldiers across the spectrum of military operations will be addressed, followed by considerations regarding the need, if not the opportunity, of appealing to militia-based options as a better answer to national security needs. Last, the methodology used to support the claims of the thesis follows.

⁸ Paul K. Davis, "Introduction," in *Rethinking How Much is Enough* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 3.

In the official defense vernacular, there is no clear definition stating the characteristics, roles, and capabilities of militias; rather, there are plenty of general descriptions of what militia should or could be, with a single thread serving as the “essentialist hub of the concept:”⁹ that is, militias do not consist of professional soldiers. Using Goertz’s¹⁰ concept-indicator model, militias further present a number of components that are defining the radial structure of the hub-and-spoke: national-level subordination, state-sponsored training, manning, and equipping, background conditions incentivizing militia members to attend the organization, and the quality of militia units with respect to the resources dedicated to stand them up.

Given that the essential attribute of a militia is its non-professional nature, a common assumption concerning militias, centers on the trade-offs between quality and cost. This needs to be explored more fully in the modern context, given the remarkable outcomes of several conflicts where militia units have prevailed over standing militaries. One cannot assume anymore that a professional army should be preferred over a militia system, since the militia-like Israel Defense Forces defeated all the standing militaries invading their country in their early wars, but failed when confronted with irregulars like Fatah and Hezbollah. Moreover, both Soviet and NATO standing armies found themselves stuck while opposing “ragtag” irregulars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hence, sheer mass to the detriment of quality cannot be considered anymore as one of the main characteristics of the militia. Mass may still be a relevant characteristic; but researchers that put efforts into quantifying the outcomes of a militia-based system versus a standing-army system (presenting militia units as ten times cheaper than the standing units, in the case of ready reserve, and only three times cheaper in the case of National Guard units) may be overstating its impact.¹¹ This might be true for some militia units, where the cost of equipment is low when compared to the human resources’ cost. The military spending

⁹ Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 10.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Irvin Brighton Holley, Jr., *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 156. See also Paul K. Davis, “Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now,” in *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, ed. Paul K. Davis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 22.

per unit increases directly proportional with the readiness status of that unit, and is directly tied to the level of technology invested. For example, according to Holley¹² units being taken into account are pure infantry units, equipped at First World War standards, therefore they imply low costs related to the equipment, as well as to the training required for using it. As modernity comes into play, one can expect the cost associated with equipment and the required training to grow exponentially, and to reduce the regular-versus-militia cost ratio. As noted by the same author, using militia as fill-ins or cannon fodder is not the best mode of employment; taking into consideration the increasing costs necessary for a modern unit, militia is not cheap anymore either.

As identified by Hodgson and Thomas,¹³ the term militia often has a negative connotation, and is often confused with other armed irregular groups, especially in situations in which they are challenging the authority of a state. This prejudice, however, does not capture the essential nature of militia groups. Militias may indeed not be professional soldiers, but this does not disqualify them from fighting alongside the governmental forces for the national defense. For the purpose of this study, militias will be defined as citizen soldiers enrolled in defense-related activities at the national level. Such examples can be found throughout history and across the spectrum of conflict; we will consider only the time period starting with the American Revolutionary War (late eighteenth century), since that era was marked by the appearance of modern armies and nation-states¹⁴ as we know them today. Militias played an important role in major conflicts and smaller interventions; ranging from the American militiamen who supplemented the Continental Army to defeat the British troops and their loyalists, to the German militia tradition, ranging from the *Landsturm* of Clausewitz's time, to the *Volkssturm* of Nazi Germany. The Swiss military can serve as a standard example of a

¹² Holley, *General Palmer*, 498.

¹³ Terry L. Hodgson and G. R. Thomas, *Rethinking Militias: Recognizing the Potential Role of Militia Groups in Nation Building* (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 5–17. See also Mohammed Osman Tariq, "Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in South East Afghanistan," in *Occasional Papers no. 7* (London, GB: Crisis State's Research Centre, 2008), 3.

¹⁴ *Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, accessed March 24, 2013, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation-state>. A nation-state is "a form of political organization in which a group of people who share the same history, traditions, or language live in a particular area under one government." See also Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 121–125.

militia serving as the base of the conventional national defense (mirrored by the Israeli Defense Forces), while the National Federation of Peasants Rondas¹⁵ in Peru stands as an auxiliary defense system, keeping remote agricultural communities from succumbing to Marxist insurgent organizations. Hence, the first characteristic we will look for in a militia organization is the national sphere of influence.

The next relevant attribute of militias is their relationship to the national leadership. Following the U.S. example that ended up putting the National Guard under dual command in order to include the federal government in the chain of command, this research will look for the nature of subordination to the centralized government authority. This is why, for instance, the Afghan *Arbakai* system will not be considered in this study, since they traditionally reject Kabul's authority over their actions, and their activities do not usually extend to the national level. *Arbakai* may, in a general sense be militia, but here we are concerned with those organizations formed and controlled by the national government, regardless of the legitimacy of the latter.¹⁶ Hence, a second characteristic assigned to the militias in the scope of this thesis is direct subordination to the national-level authority; not necessarily under government control, militias should still be at least under national-level command.

The third aspect concerning militia organizations studied is the national responsibility to train, equip, and maintain them. Although initially the militiamen were asked to provide their own weapons, later development in the art of warfare and

¹⁵ Mario A. Fumerton, "Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant Self-defense Organizations in Ayacucho," in *Session 182 DEM, Armed Actors: Security Forces, Militias, and Guerillas in Latin America During the 1990s*, March 16–18, 2000, <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/lasa2000/fumarton.pdf>.

¹⁶ Afghan Militia and the French Milice are two examples of security forces working for a collaborationist government, which were seen as corrupt by their co-nationals, and were fought against; in the first case the Kabul government, working in close cooperation with Soviet advisers stood up citizen soldiers under the Militia denomination (Olga Oliker, *Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime the Soviet Experience*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011); thus, the *Arbakais*, which are a tribal security system, will claim they are not militia (Mohammed Tarik, *Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in South East Afghanistan*, London, GB: Crisis State Research Centre, Occasional Paper no. 7), in order to clarify their non-collaborationist feature, although they are indeed a militia-type organization; the same holds true for the French Militia (Milice) during the German occupation in WW II (Stephen Cullen, *Legion of the Damned: Milice Francaise, 1943–1945*, 2008), which was seen as an opponent by the French partisans. Hence, in order to set a distinction between the collaborators and themselves, the underground organizations are assigning a bad connotation to the name "militia," although they are militia as well.

increasing demands from the state to employ the citizen soldiers in engagements not directly related with their community, led to the assumption of these responsibilities by the state/government. Hence, militia performance is based on the readiness and proficiency level attained through centrally planned training programs, or particular standard training requirements issued by the central authority.

The last relevant attribute of the national-level militia organization is represented by the political dimension affecting their morale and will to fight. As stated by Carl Schmitt in his “Theory of the Partisan,” irregular forces need a political dimension to keep them in fight.¹⁷ This is not necessarily adding a specific political ideology driving the soldiers in a revolutionary war (as it is the case of Schmitt’s partisans or Mao’s revolutionaries). On the contrary, the political dimensions this paper seeks to quantify stand for the national representativeness of militia, as opposed to their being regional, tribal, or partisan organizations. In this respect, different values of the dependent variables are expected when different political dimensions are intervening in the organization’s body.

In conclusion, the militia organizations studied in this thesis can be defined by the provisions of the U.S. Code (Title 10, Section 311, Paragraph (a)): “The militia [...] consists of all able-bodied males at [certain age] who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens [...] and of female citizens of the [state] who are members of the [militia organization].” To this generic definition, one should add the characteristics presented previously (subordination of the organization to the national chain of command, the states’ competency in equipping, training, and maintaining the militia, and the political dimension legitimizing the militia actions) to generate an accurate description of the organizations studied this thesis.

¹⁷ Carl Schmitt, *The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 10. The political dimension of the militia is considered in different, but not opposing, ways by the two authors. First, Schmitt attaches a political dimension to the partisans, making this the particular distinction between them and other armed groups; extended to the national level, this holds true in identifying militia representing the national authority among other possible armed citizens. On the other hand, Holley (*General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldier and the Army of a Democracy*) and Davis (*Rethinking How Much is Enough*) portray the militia-based defense system as the *sine qua non* condition for a democratic government to legitimately employ force as the will of the nation.

B. HOW TO EVALUATE THE WORTH OF MODERN MILITIAS

The central argument of this project focuses on the degree to which militia organizations may be able to exploit pre-existing skills and attributes of civilian population through the mobilization of non-professional citizen-soldiers. This has occurred at some points in history,¹⁸ but may represent an underappreciated source of national security, given the changing missions of the post-Cold War world. In this respect, besides the Norwegian Rifle Club members that thwarted the German attempt to capture Norway's leadership in World War II, there were other situations where pre-existing non-military skills were successfully employed while opposing hostile elements threatening a community. From the most relevant cases, worth mentioning are the American patriot militia of the eighteenth century, initially defending their homes from Native American raiding parties, and culminating with instances as the King's Mountain battle, which began to turn the tide in the favor of the revolutionaries in October 7, 1780.¹⁹

Surprisingly, another militia, engaged this time on the counter-insurgent side, had a similar tide-turning effect in the 2013 Syrian civil war. Syria's Assad regime, in conjunction with the Hezbollah militia, rebalanced the outcomes of the civil war by winning control of Qusayr village, seen as a strategic point in the development of the

¹⁸ In 1940, Nazi Germany invaded Norway, in order to secure access to the country's natural resources and its geo-strategic position. In order to do it quickly, the Germans deployed light infantry units (Fallschirmjäger) with the task of capturing the Norwegian king and the government, along with the Norwegian treasury. Taken by surprise, the Norwegian Army did not have time to mount an effective defense of the capital, therefore resorted to a hasty blocking position in vicinity of Midtskogen. Formed from a fraction of a Norwegian reserve company and local Rifle Club members, the defending forces were able to stop and force the German raiding party to withdraw, and gave the Norwegian leadership the opportunity to leave the country and take refuge in exile. (Francois Kersaudy, *Norway 1940*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 80; Det Frivillige Skyttervesen, <http://www.dfs.no/en/>, English version).

¹⁹ On that date, overmountain men (American patriot militia) ambushed and destroyed the bulk of loyalist forces in North Carolina. As the Independence War moved south, British authorities had high hopes for being helped by the loyalist population in the area to fight against the revolutionaries. However, the overmountain men employed their shooting skills, mostly trained through hunting for food and fighting raiding Indian bands, and their tactics were witnessed to be effective while opposing British regular units, and prevailed over an organized, British-led loyalist (Tory) unit. (<http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nchist-revolution/4272>).

conflict.²⁰ Only in this case, the pre-developed skills were not related to shooting, but to better understanding and adjusting to the battlefield. Militia did not serve simply as cannon fodder, although they were reserved for this role by the nineteenth-century American military leader Emory Upton and his enthusiasts; Hezbollah excelled when employing pre-developed skills, under their terms, and compensated for their lack of formal military training with multiple means, more or less conventional, aimed against a less flexible opponent.

With the industrialization of the global economy, the battlefield was seized by standing armies for various reasons; one of them is the irrelevance of citizens' ability to apply force against an organized military element, along with the development of military knowledge that allowed the conventional units to avoid being caught in unwinnable engagements. Accordingly, militia sought engagements that could compensate for their lack of combat capabilities, and resorted to waging the war in three distinct ways: 1) either attend the required training to make them effective, as is the case of the Swiss military or the active reserve of the U.S. Army, for instance; 2) take part in fighting as auxiliaries or combat service support, where they could best employ their skills without directly engaging the opponent; or 3) engage in conflict only when cover or concealment provides them a decisive advantage over the opponent. By the end of the twentieth century, there was a dramatic change in warfare statistics: asymmetric wars became the dominant form of engagement.

As indicated by Octavian Manea in a discussion with Dr. David H. Ucko and Dr. Robert Egnell, about their book *Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare*,

War is about politics, and politics is about people; it follows that war is intimately tied to the people over or among whom it is fought. This relationship is only reinforced by the global trend of urbanization, which suggests that most operations will be conducted in built-up or at least

²⁰ Nicholas Blanford, "The Battle for Qusayr: How the Syrian Regime and Hizb Allah Tipped the Balance," *CTC Sentinel*, no.8, August 2013, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss8.pdf>, 18–23.

inhabited environments, where the local population cannot be ignored, but more often must be co-opted or even protected against attack.²¹

To be successful in battle today, one should develop completely different capabilities from those required until the end of the Cold War, in addition to the existing ones.²²

As defined in the U.S. Joint Publication 3.0, chapter I, para. (3), military operations are grouped in three major areas across the spectrum of military operations as follows: military engagements, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; and major operations and campaigns. The probability of combat engagements grows gradually, from low probability to certainty across this spectrum. Table 1 is an attempt to use deductive logic for assessing the utility of individual or organizational civilian skills, across the range of modern military missions. Note that the applicability qualifier (none, low, medium, or high) given in the second column, refers to the degree to which pre-existing civilian skills can apply to the mission with respect to the additional basic training required; therefore, “high” means “no training,” and “none” equals full basic training is required for a civilian to be part of the operation. The third column refers to the applicability of militia/citizen-soldier units as a whole on the battlefield, not as fill-ins. The “goodness” rubrics provide a tentative assessment for the outcomes of involving militia units into operations, without taking in consideration the availability of standing units for support. This last rubric is split into two, one for each of the two core capabilities generally assigned for a military: homeland defense and power projection.

²¹ Octavian Manea, “Learning from Today’s Crisis of Counterinsurgency,” *Small Wars Journal*, October 8, 2013, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/learning-from-today%E2%80%99s-crisis-of-counterinsurgency>.

²² This thesis was also advanced in 2001 by Ivan Arrequin-Toft, “How Weak Win Wars- A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” *International Security* 26:1, 122.

Table 1. Potential use of pre-existing civilian skills across the spectrum of military operations

| Nature of mission | Degree of which pre-existing civilian skills can apply to mission | Investment of militias in a mix with regular troops | Goodness | |
|--|---|---|------------------|------------------|
| | | | Homeland defense | Power projection |
| Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence | | | | |
| Arms control and disarmament | high | medium | high | medium |
| Nation assistance | medium | low-high | none | medium |
| Civil support | high | low-high | high | high |
| Enforcement of sanctions | medium | none-medium | none | medium |
| Protection of shipping | low | none-low | high | none |
| Freedom of navigation | none | none | high | none |
| Crisis response and limited contingency operations | | | | |
| Noncombatant evacuation operations | high | high | N/A | high |
| Consequence management | high | high | high | high |
| Foreign humanitarian assistance | high | high | N/A | high |
| Peace operations | medium | low-high | high | low |
| Support to insurgency | low | low | N/A | low |
| COIN | medium | medium | medium | medium |
| Combating terrorism | none | none | high | none |
| Recovery operations | medium | low | medium | none |
| Major operations and campaigns | | | | |
| Routine, recurring military activities | none | medium | none | none |
| Strikes | none | none | none | none |
| Raids | none | none | low | low |
| Show of force | low | low | none | none |
| Major operations | low | medium | low | low |

As can be observed, except for major operations and campaigns, pre-existing civilian skills can play a beneficial role during most military engagements. Current doctrine is trying to prepare the standing military units to better fit the tasks more often requested of the military to fulfill. This comes with a cost, though; professional soldiers have to assign training time for the new missions to the detriment of their initial training. If this is the case, one may wonder why the pre-existing resources are not efficiently

employed to the detriment of the ones becoming irrelevant. Steps were already taken at the organizational level, with the establishment of the Africa Combatant Command in 2007 at the Department of Defense level, by assigning increasing roles to civilians in the leadership structure as an answer to the different nature of the newly identified theater of operations; however, the force-generating organizations still maintain their Cold-War-style structure, and therefore, redundancy between the military and the civil sector still exists. If Arreguín-Toft's identified need for more capability-oriented structures holds true, and the civil sector possesses the required resources to fill in those newly identified force requirements, then a larger, militia-based defense structure could provide an answer to the security needs of the twenty-first century.

C. THE UTILITY OF MILITIA FORCES

One of the basic needs of the society is safety. For ages, this was assured by employing the able bodied of its members in violent confrontations. Outcomes varying over time and the management of violence were assigned to a specific part of the society, which evolved from a warrior caste to modern standing armies. Instability and the dynamic evolution of the security environment have cast doubt on the notion of peace and war; thus, modern nation-states opted for sustaining a standing military to answer their security needs. However, the gap in the relationship between the military sector and the population at large allowed for situations where armed forces were not addressing the reason for their existence. This happened by being employed domestically or abroad, without this action matching the popular will;²³ or by failing to address security needs the population demanded.²⁴ This thesis states that militia-based defense systems better answer the security needs of the population, and maintain a close relationship with civil society; provide a hands-on control of the population to the defense elements; and

²³ The former Eastern Bloc countries excelled in employing their militaries against populations trying to challenge the communist regimes in their countries, as was the case in Hungary in 1956 or China in 1989; the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982 is just one example of a government using force abroad, without necessarily responding to a popular demand.

²⁴ The best example here can be considered the lack of actions by the British forces deployed in the area to prevent American Indians' raids against the English colonists in North America.

enforce a reliable feedback mechanism that allows for better domestic and international situational awareness.

D. CASE SELECTION AND RELEVANCE

In order to identify the relationship between the militia-based security systems, the outcome of developing such a system for the states holding it, and the potential intervening variables and antecedent conditions that could influence these outcomes, a number of case studies will be presented.

First, the battle of King's Mountain will be addressed, from the mirroring perspectives of the Patriots, which were a pure insurgency-oriented militia, and the Tories, employed as conventionally-oriented fighters. Next, an analysis of the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) experience from their Independence War up to the Yom Kippur war of 1973 will follow. The IDF is a blend of conventional-and irregular-warfare-dedicated organization, which consists of a regular army largely supplemented with militia type reserves. Its effectiveness has ranged from outstanding victories to lamentable defeats, and for the purpose of employing the controlled comparison method of difference, the two cases mentioned earlier will be analyzed. The last case studied will be the Swiss Military as a whole. Switzerland bases its defense on a national-level militia that is designed to deter any potential external military aggression.

It is important to establish a research model to help identify the required features for a militia-based defense system to work. This thesis seeks to identify the potential of militias as valuable resources that present ready-made capabilities without decreasing the resoluteness of the assigned mission. The model assumes that militias require just enough training to fit in the defense environment, in addition to the particular skills that they might already have, and the potential terrain features that might play to their advantage. In their quest to establish a militia-based system in the U.S., Pentagon planners during the post-World War II era were acknowledging the difference in combat capabilities that would feature the American traditional fighting virtues, augmenting them with compulsory military training. In order to enhance the relevance of the study to the current conflict environment, close attention will be paid to the niche capabilities that militias

would address, as opposed to mirroring standard conventional professional militaries, but at a lower cost or on a larger scale. Finally, the model would imply that the lowest echelons of fighting will better accomplish their tasks if these are few and stable; therefore, one militia unit would act nimbly while employed steadily, rather than being constantly re-tasked and retrained.

In conclusion, each situation will be presented through a brief description of the case, followed by an evaluation of the components discussed in the hub-and-spoke concept: the national character; the relationship with the national leadership structures; the national responsibilities in managing, training, equipping, and maintaining the units; and the intrinsic or extrinsic motivations backing the combat effectiveness of the soldiers. Next, the existence and the level of development of a militia's particular skills, or the need for those skills to be further developed, will be sought. Finally, additional conditions that could influence the outcomes of military engagements presented will be considered.

Following this research model, the case studies will be analyzed using a controlled comparison method, seeking to identify the degree to which a militia-based defense system may be a viable and attractive option, and tentatively identify the conditions under which this may be the case.

III. HUNTING THE BRITISH ARMY: THE OVERMOUNTAIN MEN AND THE KING'S MOUNTAIN BATTLE

The Battle of King's Mountain presents a case where politically motivated colonists of North America employed their shooting skills and defeated a well-trained formation of the British Army. Based on the military knowledge of the era, the odds favored the defending forces; but in this particular case, a series of other factors decisively influenced the outcomes of the encounter, providing the rebel militiamen the necessary advantage for winning.

Following a brief presentation of the historical context, this chapter will dissect the two opposing forces, trying to establish whether the necessary characteristics of a militia-based defense system were in place, and what was their relevance in that particular military engagement. Next, it will focus on the importance of using hunting means and skills by the rebels, as opposed to the standard military skills employed by the Tory militia. Finally, the chapter will provide the conclusions that emerge from this tide-turning event of the American Revolution.

A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

After the hard fighting of the early years of the American Revolution, a stalemate ensued, with neither Rebel nor British forces able to achieve decisive victories against their foes. The general situation was rather unclear for the revolutionaries, or Rebels, as they were considered by the British government; the British troops retreated from most of the colonies, and the American National Congress replaced their royal governments, but they were vulnerable to retaliation by the British armies. With the French joining the war in 1778, the odds were somewhat leveled. Although the Rebels controlled many of the American colonies, the *de facto* situation resembled actually a widely dispersed civil war between the Rebels and Tories.²⁵ Especially in the South, the Tory loyalist influence was significant and the Revolutionaries were busy quelling pro-monarchy supporters, while in

²⁵ Thomas B. Allen, *Tories: Fighting for the King in the America's First Civil War* (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 2010), xiv, 285.

the north the Continental army was in a very poor shape. One of General Washington's letters describes the difficulty of the situation in January 1780 as follows: "Our army by the first of January [1780] diminished to little more than sufficient garrison for West [P]oint, the enemy [is] at full liberty to ravage the country wherever they please.... The army is...dwindling into nothing."²⁶ In 1780, British forces under the command of Lord Cornwallis landed in South Carolina and recaptured the town of Charleston.²⁷ The Rebels' morale dropped after this event,²⁸ and due to the pro-British and anti-rebellion sentiments of the population,²⁹ the British forces were able to repel the Rebel Continental Army under the command of General Gates, and to re-establish British rule in the South.³⁰

Lord Cornwallis' intent was to stabilize the South, then begin a drive to the Northern colonies, which were considered Rebel strongholds. With this in mind, he augmented his infantry and dragoons with loyalist provincial regiments,³¹ and started his drive north, and reached Charlotte. Under the command of the General Inspector for the Militia, Major Patrick Ferguson—perhaps the British officer with the greatest aptitude for warfare in the wilderness—Cornwallis' left wing, comprised entirely of loyalist militia units,³² invaded North Carolina and expelled the Rebel militia from the region.³³ Moreover, he issued an ultimatum to the rebel forces west of the Appalachians to surrender to the King's rule, or be pursued and destroyed.³⁴ Perceiving the British Left Wing in their proximity as a threat to their existence, remnants of militiamen from the

²⁶ Allen, *Tories*, 284.

²⁷ Hank Messick, *King's Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge "Mountain Men" in The American Revolution* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1976), xx.

²⁸ Messick, *King's Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 41.

²⁹ Allen, *Tories*, 250.

³⁰ David J. Dameron, *King's Mountain: The Defeat of the Loyalists, October 7, 1780* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2003), 20. See also Messick, *King's Mountain*, 44.

³¹ According to Allen (*Tories*, xiv), throughout the war provincial regulars and loyalist militia fought in 576 of the 772 battles and skirmishes, and formed 29 loyalist military units, mostly of regimental size.

³² Dameron, *King's Mountain*, 11, 22.

³³ Messick, *King's Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 63.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 80.

Rebel army requested the “overmountain men” help remove Patrick Ferguson’s force from the scene. The backwater or backwoods men, as they were called by their “more civilized” opponents, answered the call and mounted a raid aiming at the total annihilation of the loyalist threat. Combined with other militia elements from North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia,³⁵ the rebel force totaling around 1,000 mounted fighters moved into loyalist territory, gathered intelligence about their adversary, and as soon as they found it, planned an attack.³⁶ Realizing the danger in which they found themselves, the loyalist echelon prepared a defensive stand at King’s Mountain and requested assistance from the main British force, stationed a few miles away in Charlotte. Ferguson reasoned that the terrain, the size of his forces, and the traditional fighting skills of his Tory militia would give him an edge over the *bandits* in pursuit.³⁷ He and his troops were confident that the outcome of a potential combat engagement would be favorable to them; however, the reality proved different.

The rebels they were about to encounter were led by veterans of the French and Indian war of 1756–1763,³⁸ and the frontier war against the Native Americans in 1774.³⁹ As Messick puts it,⁴⁰ the militia learned the utility of Indian-style fighting against British regulars, as opposed to the traditional military thinkers—who included George Washington. Thus, they employed tactics meant to benefit from the cover of the woods and their weapons’ superior accuracy, and to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy bayonet charges. After an encounter that lasted little more than one hour, the entire loyalist force was killed or captured on King’s Mountain,⁴¹ with the Rebels suffering just one-fourth the losses of the Tories.⁴²

³⁵ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 35–36. Messick, *King’s Mountain*, 63.

³⁶ Messick, *King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 90.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 124.

³⁸ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 25.

³⁹ Messick, *King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 13,14.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, xvii.

⁴¹ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 75.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 76.

The effects of this encounter were devastating for the British attempt to raise loyalist forces to aid them for the rest of the war,⁴³ and gave the Revolutionary army enough time to reconsolidate and regain the initiative that it kept.⁴⁴

B. THE “MILITIA” CHARACTER OF THE FORCES

On the rebel side, the main actors were the ‘overmountain men,’ backwoods, or backwater men living west of the frontier designated by Royal proclamation in 1763.⁴⁵ These settlers chose to avoid British rule and live a better life outside the borders of the Empire. Due to the scarcity of education and governance in the area, they were regarded by other colonists as uncivilized, but they were determined to continue with their way of life and resist the British and Native American threat in the wilderness. As soon as the Revolutionary War broke out in 1776, they organized as a standing district and formally requested George Washington to consider them as a part of the Rebel side.⁴⁶ Thus, they were full-time citizen farmers organized to defend their communities against external threats, who adopted the rebel side as a last resort, since the royal government outlawed their existence west of the Appalachians.⁴⁷ Their subordination to the National Congress was effected through their leaders and fully accepted by the whole community. In respect to the other spokes of the militia concept, there were none. Mostly due to the remoteness of their location and the slow speed at which events occurred in the period, there were no formal contacts between the ‘overmountain men’ and the rest of the rebels. Although they were adept at fighting in the mountainous woodland, it was due to their need for survival there, and it happened without any involvement with the rebel defense system. They used in fighting the same weapons they used for hunting; their Deckard Long Rifles provided better accuracy and three times greater effective range than the standard muskets in use by the regular armies of the time.⁴⁸

⁴³ Allen, *Tories*, 290.

⁴⁴ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 9.

⁴⁵ Messick, *King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 7. Allen, *Tories*, 287.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁸ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 80.

They provided their own rifles, horses, powder, and food. The Continental Army barely had enough resources for its needs. Thus, it can be concluded that the ‘overmountain men’ were trained, manned and equipped locally, and subordinated to the central authority through their freely elected militia leaders.⁴⁹

Opposed to this system, the loyalist militia raised under Major Ferguson was of a different sort. Part-time soldiers and full-time Tories, they were fully commanded and controlled by the British commander on the scene, and manned, trained, and equipped by central authorities.⁵⁰ However, records attest that their equipment was incomplete, no uniforms were issued, and the militia had to improvise bayonets from butcher knives in order to meet the requirements of the traditional fighting standards.⁵¹

C. THE USE OF PRE-EXISTING SKILLS

It is obvious that the marksmanship skills of the frontier men were employed skillfully during the King’s Mountain battle. Using their own hunting rifles, the rebels did not need additional training for the fight. Having their leaders born and raised on the frontier,⁵² the ‘overmountain men’ had the opportunity to employ these hunting skills in a favorable manner, which ultimately enabled their victory. Messick⁵³ even presents instances where the militia used the same tactics learnt in the war against the Shawnees, but this time against Tories, and won. It can be asserted that the ‘overmountain men’ militia tested their fighting style with great success. During the planning phase for the engagement on the King’s Mountain, the militia leaders held daily meetings and were closely concerned with the possible outcomes of the battle. Confident in their skills and fighting style, they undertook all the necessary actions to avoid traditional-thinking traps. For this, they removed the South Carolina militia commander (McDowell, who consented to this) from the chain of command, and passed it to Campbell, who was known to them from the wars on the frontier. These on-the-spot adjustments are unthinkable in a

⁴⁹ Messick, *King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 40.

⁵⁰ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 53.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 24. Messick, *King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 133.

⁵² Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 25.

⁵³ Messick, *King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 74, 75.

conventional regular army, but the militia sometimes can afford the liberty of choosing the leadership they consider most appropriate.⁵⁴

This was not the case for the Tory militia. Under the command of Major Ferguson, the general inspector for the militia, the loyalists trained in massed volley-fire with the standard-issued “Brown Bess” musket, and in charging the enemy with bayonets.⁵⁵ One could think that this was the only option for raising them to the status of a fighting force, but this would be an error. Both the militia men and their leader, Patrick Ferguson, were aware of the superiority of the rifle compared to the musket. On one hand, the loyalist militia and the rebel militia were, in fact, the same people, neighbors from the same communities or even members of the same families.⁵⁶ Thus, to think that the loyalists were not able to fight in the same way their foes did would be against the historical evidence. As regarding Major Ferguson, he was ironically the inventor of a breech-loaded rifle that he proposed to be adopted by the whole British army.⁵⁷ At the battle of Brandywine (1777), he commanded a rifle company that “performed brilliantly”⁵⁸ while fighting non-traditionally, and Messick considers that it was the large-scale implications⁵⁹ of adopting the new weapon and tactics that led to the dismissal of Ferguson’s revolutionary ideas. Thus, one explanation for so obviously denying the evidence could be the traditional way of thinking that the British officer and his loyalist followers could not abandon.

⁵⁴ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 26.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁵⁶ Messick, *King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 141–143.

⁵⁷ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 14–16. Messick, *King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 133.

⁵⁸ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 16.

⁵⁹ Messick, *King’s Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 32–33.

D. OTHER INFLUENCING FACTORS

Citing Nathanael Greene, Allen⁶⁰ considers that the political conflict between the Rebels and Tories escalated into civil war during the American Revolution, and both sides fought each other with great savagery and relentless fury. When the British brought back the war into the southern colonies, Tories proved to be loyal to the British forces and supported the Redcoat army during the military engagements. However, they were less motivated than the Patriots, and this proves to be another contrast between the two opposing American factions. On the Rebel side, neutrality was not considered a crime; except for abuses against the most prominent Tories, the Patriots did not muster neutral parties under arms. On the contrary, the British did. Soon after the fall of Charleston, the British governor of South Carolina forced neutral people to take sides by ordering them to fight for the King.⁶¹ Thus, part of them sought refuge by joining rebel bands. Ferguson's ultimatum, asking the 'overmountain men' to drop their cause and swear allegiance to the King, caused even an increased reaction among them, which eventually led to their raid to remove the loyalist regiment.⁶² The British and Ferguson's militia did nothing wrong, in accordance with the traditional military thinking of the time. They were just out-thought by their opponents. Ferguson's ideas were perhaps restrained by his aspirations as a career officer, while the Patriot militia commanders had no such concerns to hamper their judgment. As Holley⁶³ notes in respect to the effectiveness of military officers, a reservist with broadly cultivated ideas may prove more effective when war comes than an officer with views confined by the traditional wisdom. Ferguson resembled the attributes of the latter.

⁶⁰ Allen, *Tories*, xiv, 285.

⁶¹ Allen, *Tories*, 284.

⁶² Messick, *King's Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 90.

⁶³ Holley, *General Parker*, 333.

E. CONCLUSION

Surprisingly, the literature on the Rebel militia and the battle of King's Mountain is sparse, despite their importance to the course of the Revolutionary War. The King's Mountain battle caused the British forces to renounce their march from South Carolina to the north and prevented them from delivering a decisive blow to the weakened Continental Army. The aid provided by the unconventionally fighting rebel militia was not only decisive, but it was also free of charge. Following a couple of skirmishes that were no match for the loss of the entire Continental Army in the South, the rebel militia, lacking traditional training, equipment, and leadership, was able to destroy the Tory Loyalist movement in America and to deprive the menacing British forces of their American allies.

In the Battle of King's Mountain, opposing forces approximately equal in numbers clashed with an unexpected result. Approximately 900 Patriots completely defeated the left wing of Lord Cornwallis' army, consisting of about 1,200 loyalist militia.⁶⁴ The non-traditional force was able to outmatch its foe's military skills with innovative employment on the battlefield of pre-existing hunting assets and skills tested in their previous wars with the Native Americans.

The opposing forces were pure Americans, with the exception of the British commander. One might assert that the loyalists' will to fight did not match the determination of the 'overmountain men,' who would have a more difficult time if they were to fight British regulars. This is denied by De Peyster's report to his superior officer, Lord Cornwallis,⁶⁵ as well as by the records of rebel militia fighting before⁶⁶ and after King's Mountain against regular troops.⁶⁷ A revolution in military doctrine was

⁶⁴ Dameron, *King's Mountain*, 53. Messick, *King's Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 120–124.

⁶⁵ Messick, *King's Mountain: The Epic of the Blue Ridge*, 146. Cpt. De Peyster was Maj. Ferguson's deputy in the loyalist regiment.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 74, 75. Overmountain men militia waged partisan warfare in South Carolina with great success at Fair Forest Creek and Musgrove Mill.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 181. The same tactics were employed in the dismissal of Banister Tarleton, Ferguson's competitor for military career and glory.

emerging, and both militia commanders and professional soldiers acknowledged the superiority of the rifled weapon over the musket. However, the militia took advantage of it, not the professionals.

The performance of the militia during the American Revolutionary War was brilliant. Started as self-defense body of citizens,⁶⁸ Minutemen companies started the Independence War at Lexington and Concord⁶⁹ and were the only option for both Patriots and British forces if they were to control the spread-out territory of the colonies.⁷⁰ Less than fifty years later, the militia units, with their three months enlistment period, lost their reputation as reliable forces during the war with Mexico,⁷¹ although the battlefield performance was fully equal to the professional competence of the Regulars.⁷²

As of today, the United States military still features a large body of militia in their defense forces, known as the National Guard; however, they employ traditional fighting and mirror their active-duty counterparts. Subject to be deployed both in the proximity of their community or in remote areas, the National Guard is not reluctant to answer the requests of the political leadership, acting somehow in a Rebel, rather than a Tory manner. With the standardization of the battlefield, it seems that militia-style innovative thinking has its place in the new, joint operational areas. If one looks closely at the lessons learned during the Los Angeles riots of 1992,⁷³ one will find more evidence supporting the better outcome reached using rather the National Guard militia than the standing army for quelling domestic unrest.

⁶⁸ Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), 23.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁷⁰ Millis, *Arms and Men*, 34.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁷² Jim Dan Hill, *The Minutemen in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard* (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Co., 1964), 391.

⁷³ Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Lessons Learned in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots," *Parameters, Summer 1997* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 1997), <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/97summer/schnau.htm>.

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IV. ZAHAL—THE CITIZEN SOLDIERS’ ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE

No relevant study of militia-based defense systems should be conducted without closely surveying one of the most active military forces during the period following World War II: the militia-centered Israeli Defense Forces. Although the IDF has marked its existence with outstanding achievements, both doctrinal and operational, this chapter will address the 25-year period that covers from the Israeli independence war in 1948 to the Yom Kippur (or fourth Arab-Israeli) war in 1973, which is considered a “survival era” when Israel was a David opposing the Goliath of its larger and richer enemies. After 1973, the Middle East “moved away from a total rejection of Israel,”⁷⁴ and peace treaties were signed with Egypt and Jordan several years later. Evolving from a political situation where Israel could only fight for its survival, its policy encompassed plenty of interventions in the domestic politics of neighboring Lebanon, as well as suppression of insurgencies in the occupied territories after the Yom Kippur War; thus, this later period is less relevant for the purpose of this thesis: the study of militia models in more purely self-defensive roles.

This chapter begins with a brief summary of the rise and development of the Israeli military (with an emphasis on the ground forces); the key points taken from The Six-Day War; and the IDF’s mixed performance during the Yom Kippur War. The following paragraphs will take a closer look at the organization of the military along the lines of the militia characteristics presented in Chapter II of the thesis, followed by an analysis of the use of pre-existing civilian skills in support of the defense establishment. Later sections will consist of other considerations relevant to the topic, and the conclusions that can be drawn from the Israeli military model.

⁷⁴ Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence through Lebanon* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 379.

A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In their book, *The Israeli Army 1948–1973*, Edward Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz defined Israel as a nation of soldiers, formed that way by geographical and political factors.⁷⁵ The next paragraphs will briefly present the evolution of the Israeli military as it evolved from the underground organizations of the 1920s, to a national-level defense structure; its military engagements with the standing militaries of the surrounding Arab countries in 1967, as the IDF became the most competent military organization in the region; and the controversial performance of this force in 1973, under auspices considered more favorable.

1. From an Underground Movement to a Citizen Army

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the small Jewish population in Palestine had to face rising Arab militancy in the area.⁷⁶ Jewish settlements survived the attacks of the larger Arab population and Bedouin raids by self-organizing in defense groups; the unification of these defense groups in 1937 produced a country-wide militia called Haganah.⁷⁷ Although it tried to answer the security needs country-wide, Haganah was merely an underground organization, with its activities focused at a local level.⁷⁸ It had a strictly defense-oriented policy, although some attacks were carried out against Arab bands as early as 1936.⁷⁹ Following the First World War, the rule of Palestine switched from the hands of the Ottoman Empire to the British Empire under a “mandate,” and the latter recruited Jewish citizens to help them contain Arab unrest. The British-supervised constabulary Palestinian Police, along with the newly formed Jewish Settlement Police and the civil guards (*notrim*) actually served as a cover for Haganah to continue performing their security duties, this time with the official support of an

⁷⁵ Edward N. Luttwak, and D. Horowitz. *The Israeli Army 1948–1973* (Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1983), viii.

⁷⁶ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 8.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 8, 11.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 12, 13.

unaware British consulate.⁸⁰ The underground activities of Haganah expanded to include establishment of a central command over the Jewish security forces, some of them being already full-time police units officially under British control. It was during that time the future leaders of Israel exercised their command and control abilities in deploying the *Fosh* (field companies consisting of full time members of the Palestinian Police) country-wide.⁸¹

Further development of British policy in Palestine led to the employment of the Jewish police as Special Night Squads as counter-guerrilla forces, whose legacy will be found later on in the active defense policy based on night raids.⁸² Aside from the British official policy regarding immigration, the Jewish Haganah massively supported Jewish immigration to Palestine, and when opposed by the official rulers in the region, they turned against the latter.⁸³ To resist both Arab aggression and British constraints, Jewish political leadership established an army-like defense structure under Haganah, consisting of maneuver elements (*Hish*, inspired by the effectiveness of *Fosh* and SNS) and static, village-level, self-sustainable defense forces (*Him*, consisting of old individuals, poorly armed).⁸⁴ Following these so-called reforms, the Haganah had, by 1940, a central leadership paid by different political agencies⁸⁵ and part-time field units (*Hish* and *Him*) able to answer the nation's defense calls, but lacking adequate logistics and training.⁸⁶ As the Second World War erupted, oppression of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe sparked massive immigration to Palestine, and incentivized the Jewish population to volunteer to fight alongside Allied forces against Germany. Besides the "volunteers" conscripted by Haganah, a new mobile force was raised by the Jewish leadership in Palestine: the Palmach,⁸⁷ designated to oppose Rommel's armies that were advancing on Egypt. Later,

⁸⁰ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 13.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 15.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

two extremist Jewish organizations joined forces with Haganah and Palmach: the dissident-inspired Irgun and Lehi.⁸⁸

When the United Nations voted the Palestine Partition Plan (November 29, 1947) and the British withdrew from the region, the Jewish nation was organized for fighting and defeated Arab opposition in the Palestinian area allotted to it by the UN. Under the unified command of Haganah, some 43,000 men and women were organized into part-time *Hish* and full-time Palmach fighting units, ready to provide quick assistance to the whole able body of the villages' population enrolled under *Him*;⁸⁹ although they lacked weapons and ammunition, it is arguably the central command exercised by Haganah that allowed the Jewish victory over their Arab foes, since the latter were constantly provided fighting equipment by the neighboring countries, but lacked unified control.⁹⁰ On May 15, 1948, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF, also known as *Zahal*) was founded as the only legitimate military force of the newly emergent Jewish state.⁹¹ With 6,000 Palmach, 18,000 *Hish*, an embryonic air force, and artillery, and with the leadership and combat capabilities developed in the fights waged during the previous 30 years, Israel began its independence war against the standing armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, which attacked the next day. Surprisingly, the IDF was able to coordinate its efforts and successfully defended its territorial integrity, adjusted its command and control structure by establishing a General Headquarters and four regional commands, increased its manpower to 12 brigades, and transformed *Him* into garrison brigades responsible for static defense duties of their hometowns.⁹² By October 1948, IDF was not only successful in withstanding Arab aggression, but its command and control structure, along with proper manning and training sections were functioning at high levels.⁹³ The last of a

⁸⁸ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 22.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 23–25.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 43.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 45.

series of armistices and truces marked, in July 1949, the end of the first Arab-Israeli war, and witnessed a clear victory of the newly-born state and its army against its enemies.⁹⁴

The Army that assured Israel's independence disintegrated after 1949,⁹⁵ and a new structure was set in order to provide the required defense capability to the state. Due to the small size of the country, its inability to sustain an adequate-size standing army, and the lack of natural defenses,⁹⁶ the IDF combined elements from the previous Haganah's *Hish* and the Swiss dual system of home-guards and reservists into a militia-type army able to act on short notice, with great emphasis on the reserve component.⁹⁷ Thus, IDF became a military structure consisting of all able-bodied in its society (except the Muslim-Arab minority) on 11 months' leave,⁹⁸ subordinated only to the Chief of Staff, which is in turn directed by the government.⁹⁹ Its static forces resemble the Haganah's *Him* taken over almost unchanged, with women and old men organized as local defense groups, under their own leaders, training plans, and able to cooperate with the Army's maneuver units operating in the area.¹⁰⁰ The main component of the IDF is the reserve element.¹⁰¹ It consists of established independent brigades manned by reservists¹⁰² that acquired the necessary training through a previous period of long conscription and maintained their skills by attending frequent refresher training. The third component of the army is the "standing," or regular one. It is composed of the permanent cadre of career officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and specialists whose skills cannot be preserved through refresher training, and the annual conscript contingent, which follows the mandatory military service over a period of two to three years or

⁹⁴ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 52.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 98.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 77.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁰² Gunther Erich Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army: The Israel Defense Force, 1948–1978* (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1979), 72.

longer, according to the country's security needs.¹⁰³ According to Rothenberg, a high reliance is placed on civilian facilities and equipment, providing support during peacetime or requisitioned for war, which allows the IDF to deploy forward 50 percent of its force, as opposed to the one-to-four, teeth-to-tail ratio common in many other modern military organizations.¹⁰⁴ The new army developed also its own doctrine and tactics, based mostly on the lessons learned during its 1948–1949 war. Decentralization of command, the role of the independent brigade in battle, the right combination of fire and movement/assault, the concept of active mobile defense, the role of the tank versus infantry, along with a preference for indirect approaches and night raids, were all developed and rehearsed during the years following the establishment of the new army.¹⁰⁵ The next seven years were marked by anti-infiltration duties in conjunction with the home-guards along the borders¹⁰⁶ and the establishment of the IDF's elite units.¹⁰⁷ Thus, until the Sinai Campaign of 1956, the IDF's reserve system was not tested in battle.¹⁰⁸ During this campaign, the uneven performance of the reserve brigades alarmed military decision makers. They assessed the leadership of these units as irresolute, and reconsidered future officers' training.¹⁰⁹ Conscription and refresher training duration also increased to raise the combat effectiveness of the reserves to the required level.¹¹⁰ Finally, the role of the tank and the composition of armored and mechanized brigades were reconsidered, with a greater emphasis on the tank formations, which required that a large portion of resources be directed to their necessary professional training and maintenance.¹¹¹ Only the "positive indiscipline," which was considered a consequence of

¹⁰³ Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 72.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹⁰⁵ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 89–93.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 105–106.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 110–113.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 155.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 157.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 181.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 189–192.

high morale and fighting spirit, remained evenly accepted in the IDF after the Sinai Campaign.¹¹²

2. The Six-Day War

The shortcomings of the IDF, as identified during the Sinai Campaign, were corrected by adjusting the officers and the reserve training during the next decade. More importantly, the armored corps, the air force, and the airborne units increased in size and developed their own doctrine,¹¹³ trying to meet a new standard and war-waging criterion: the fighting should be focused on achieving as much, in the shortest time possible, in order to secure the best outcomes until an externally imposed ceasefire will come into effect.¹¹⁴ Artillery and intelligence were given great importance, after they proved extremely useful during the previous war.¹¹⁵ In the face of Arab hostility, which had a galvanizing effect on Israeli society, the compulsory service for men was extended; this, in turn, corroded the public morale.¹¹⁶

On the other side of the front, Egypt and Syria were openly manifesting their intent to destroy Israel in a war of annihilation, and in mid-May 1967, Egyptian forces began crossing the Suez Canal.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the Syrian military appeared to be readying for war and threatening the northern part of Israel (the Galilee), and the continuous build-up of Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula posed a threat to which Israel could not symmetrically answer, due to the militia nature of its military.¹¹⁸

Following Egypt's removal of UN troops from the border area, Israel started to feel threatened and to see its deterrent capability at stake if it remained inactive. Although Israeli intelligence recommended the activation of the whole IDF (140,000 strength by 1967), only half of it would be mobilized by the end of the month. In addition, active

¹¹² Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 160.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 202.

¹¹⁴ Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 153.

¹¹⁵ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 220.

¹¹⁶ Oren, *Six Days of War*, 18, 30.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹¹⁸ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 222–223; Oren, *Six Days of War*, 76.

armored units were redeployed to the south, where the Egyptian threat was seen as increasing.¹¹⁹ In order to avoid a likely inevitable defeat, on June 5, Israel preemptively attacked its neighbors in order to “liberate [...] itself] from encirclement.”¹²⁰ In the first hours of battle, Israel destroyed much of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces, relieving IDF ground forces of the need for air cover.¹²¹ The Israeli Air Force served as airborne artillery in support of the ground forces for the remainder of the war. This provided an enhanced freedom of movement for the ground forces, enabling the high mobility required for employing the indirect approach to battle preferred by IDF.

During the first day of battle, Israeli ground forces used innovative combinations of armored units, paratroops, and artillery maneuvers, and encircled almost completely the Egyptian forces stationed in Sinai.¹²² During the next 24 hours, the Egyptian threat was neutralized, and after the fourth day, it was completely removed.¹²³ Only political considerations stopped the Israeli brigades from crossing the Suez Canal and advancing to Cairo.¹²⁴ Although the control of the Gaza strip took an extended period of time to complete, it should not diminish the overall success of the anti-Egyptian operation, from the Israeli perspective.¹²⁵ Their strategic objective was to seize an easily defensible line in the proximity of Suez Canal, and the militia army performed extremely well against the Egyptian conventional foe. The extended struggle with the Palestinian irregulars in Gaza was considered a police action rather than a military operation.

The other two opponents of the IDF were Syria and Jordan, who counterattacked following the Israeli air strikes. Postponing the requests for assistance of the northern settlements under the artillery fire of the Syrian military, the IDF's leadership shifted the war effort against the Jordanian military in the east which, supported by the Arab

¹¹⁹ Oren, *Six Days of War*, 76–79.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 158.

¹²¹ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 225–231.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 249.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 250, 259.

¹²⁴ Oren, *Six Days of War*, 240. Schiff Ze'ev, *A History of the Israeli Army* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985), 131.

¹²⁵ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 258.

population in Eastern Jerusalem, threatened the Israeli side of that city. Despite the competent opposition of the Jordanian Army, the Israeli Air force, with the night fighting in which the Israelis surpassed their opponents and the employment of surprise, provided the IDF the opportunity to extend its control over the whole territory west of the Jordan River in only 48 hours, and by the end of the third day, to defeat the fierce Jordanian resistance in Jerusalem.¹²⁶ The seizure of the sacred places in Jerusalem (especially the Temple Mount) by the IDF's Central Command is presented by Oren as a catalyst for the Israeli Southern and Northern Commands to pursue similarly important achievements, and it led to disobeying the orders limiting their advance across the Suez Canal or beyond the Golan Heights.¹²⁷

During the engagements with Egypt and Jordan, the Syrian offensive consisted of a few timid actions that were easily repelled by the Israeli settlers and small detachments from the maneuver unit still present in the area.¹²⁸ During the fifth and the sixth days of war, a reserve armored brigade in conjunction with the regular infantry brigade present in the area mounted a bold attack against the Syrian defense system on the Golan Heights and were able to seize yet another easily defendable alignment at the northern border. After vanquishing the Syrian troops defending on the Golan, the Israeli advance was stopped by the Soviet Union's threatening posture.¹²⁹

The stunning victory of the IDF against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, did not go unnoticed. By the end of hostilities, Israel had expanded its territory by 300 percent, adding the whole West bank of the Jordan River, as well as the Sinai Peninsula; this determined a shift of international opinion against the country, especially with Arab propaganda introducing the idea of a Palestinian nation on the stage, and transforming Israel from a David fighting the Arab Goliath, into a Goliath oppressing the helpless Palestinian population.¹³⁰ Indeed, if one takes into consideration the casualties at the end

¹²⁶ Oren, *Six Days of War*, 238, 240.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 259, 261.

¹²⁸ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 275.

¹²⁹ Oren, *Six Days of War*, 294.

¹³⁰ Ze'ev Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 175.

of the war, for each Israeli soldier dead, wounded, or missing, there were at least eight of his foes corresponding.¹³¹

It also determined the IDF leadership to reconsider the role that the air force and armored corps should play in future battles, highly increasing their budget shares and adjusting tactics to emphasize the tank/plane combination, to the detriment of mechanized infantry which Israel so successfully used in previous wars.¹³² According to Luttwak, “[s]eldom has a victorious army undergone such a radical transformation so soon after its men and methods had proved so successful in battle.”¹³³ In addition to the expanding role of the air force and armored units,¹³⁴ Israel shifted its defense orientation to counter-terrorist operations against the rising Palestinian insurgency, positional warfare aimed at defending the new borders, increasing defense industry production capability, and a new foreign policy based on a single strategic ally—the United States.¹³⁵ In order to achieve the combat capabilities imposed by the new doctrine, as well as to counter the growing Russo-Egyptian threat, Israel had to extend its conscription period for the active-duty component of the IDF to three years, the annual reserve duty to two months annually, and to allocate more than 25 percent of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) to the defense budget.¹³⁶

3. The Yom Kippur War

Positional warfare was against the IDF’s traditional fighting style. Although the country’s borders were now suited to this type of defense, Israel preferred to maintain its reliance on mobility of the armored units¹³⁷ and the versatility of the air force, which

¹³¹ Oren, *Six Days of War*, 235, 306.

¹³² Martin van Creveld, “Military Lessons from the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives,” *The Washington Papers*, no. 24 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, CSIS, 1975), 1–3.

¹³³ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 336.

¹³⁴ According to Rothenberg, the defense budget increased ten times, reaching \$ 4 billion/year, of which 50 percent was directed towards air force, 30 percent to tanker units (armored units), and the rest of 20 percent for infantry, artillery, navy, and others (Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 126).

¹³⁵ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 304–305, 329, 334.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 327.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 318.

achieved the status of an “all purpose” force able to attain any, if not all, goals possibly imagined on the battlefield.¹³⁸ For example, the border with Egypt was guarded by the Bar-Lev line, an alignment of circular fortifications watching over the Suez Canal that served as an early warning system, and a mobile tank force kept deep in the defense zone, in order to protect it from the Egyptian artillery preparations of the offensive. Despite the reports of massive Egyptian build-ups west of the border, Israeli military intelligence considered that the active duty component of IDF, which by now was as large as 100,000, and its air force, were strong enough to contain an Egyptian invasion until the reserve troops would be mobilized.¹³⁹ These intelligence estimates were not accepted by the commanding General of the Northern Command, who personally intervened at the defense minister level to augment the Golan garrison, in the face of an obvious Syrian concentration of forces,¹⁴⁰ and obtained the redeployment of a whole brigade to the North.

From a statistical perspective, Israel was at the peak of its military strength, and the force ratio between the IDF, fully mobilized, and its adversaries, was better than ever.¹⁴¹ However, when Egyptian forces attacked on October 6, 1973, they found an Israeli Army on leave, or observing the Day of Atonement, thus unable to properly defend against the full-scale, Soviet doctrine-like offensive that took place. With their tactics adjusted after the humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War, the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies crossed the Suez Canal under an umbrella of anti-aircraft missile and gun batteries, encircled the Bar-Lev line fortifications, and established themselves in a defensive perimeter ten miles deep into Israeli territory, waiting for the expected counterattack. When this occurred, it was met with effective missile fire that forced the Israeli armored brigades and ground support planes to break off their attacks; the territorial commander’s decision to abandon the Bar-Lev line until reserve forces arrived was based on the inefficiency of the air force due to limited visibility, and the redirection

¹³⁸ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 298.

¹³⁹ Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 179.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 180.

of all available planes North, where they had to repel the Syrian offensive.¹⁴² Two days later, having another two armored divisions mobilized in Sinai, Israel launched a more powerful counter-attack, which achieved nothing but failure; its armored forces attacking Egyptian anti-tank zones suffered heavy losses, with one of the brigades being “almost totally wiped out.”¹⁴³ This time, having lost about 400 of its tanks, the Southern command officers reconsidered the situation and decided to renounce the “infallible” direct armored attacks and re-employ surprise and the indirect tactics that proved so successful in earlier wars.

This was the turning point of the anti-Egyptian campaign. The Egyptian Army, unable to think beyond the Soviet doctrine that allowed them to set foot east of the Israeli border, tried to advance further in order to relieve their Syrian allies fighting in the North from some of the pressure put by the Israeli Air Force, and the continuous flow of reserves driving to Galilee. Without their anti-aircraft umbrella, Egyptian armored units and mechanized infantry were routed, and by October 14, Israelis started to plan a new offensive operation.¹⁴⁴

Aware of their lack of effectiveness against prepared defenses, the Israelis breached the Canal defense line between the two Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez during the night of October 15 with elements from a paratroop brigade, and by improvised ferries managed to move a small number of tanks across the waterway. The ad-hoc constituted force, lately reinforced by another brigade, cut off the communications of an entire Egyptian army, which put Israel at an advantage when the UN Security Council ceasefire halted the operations about one week later.¹⁴⁵

On the Northern front, events occurred in a more rapid way, due to the different approaches used by both parties. On the attackers’ side, the Syrian offensive was based on a first echelon of three mechanized divisions, trying to create gaps in the Israeli defenses, through which two armored divisions were to penetrate into Galilee and

¹⁴² Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 186.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 195.

beyond. Not much was accomplished during the first day of fighting, since the Israelis were expecting the Syrian attack, their defenses were reinforced by an extra armored brigade, and reserve elements started to arrive and reinforce the defense during the night.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, the Israeli soldiers were alert, as opposed to the ones serving at the Egyptian border. Massively outnumbered, the two brigades guarding the Golan plateau resisted the Syrian attack, but suffered heavy losses; the Southern one ceased to exist as a unit by the morning of the next day, and only desperate air force runs prevented the Syrians from reaching the Jordan bridges in the South.¹⁴⁷ The offensive stopped short of reaching its initial objectives, and by the next day, the attackers were forced to withdraw.

On the other hand, the Israelis resumed a mobile defense and their higher gunnery skills and air support assured their success. With elements of two armored divisions mustered and incorporated into the fight early in the afternoon of October 7, and with a third one arriving during the night, the IDF Northern Command was ready to begin its counterattack.¹⁴⁸ Contrary to the development of the war until now, the IDF managed to push the Syrians back to their initial positions by the end of the next day; next, the Israelis enveloped the Northern Syrian flank, threatening their capital,¹⁴⁹ broke through Syrian overall defense line, and resisted the combined efforts of Jordanian and Iraqi units.¹⁵⁰ Offensive operations stopped here, with Israel holding a serious edge over the combined Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian units, and from this point IDF focused on the development of the Southern front, in an effort to deprive as much as possible the Egyptians from their initial gains before an expected ceasefire came into effect.

Thus, although controlling the battlefield when hostilities ceased, Israel did not accomplish much during this war. They lost the Sinai Peninsula at the post-conflict negotiation table, saw the tank/plane concept destroyed by the determined missile fires of

¹⁴⁶ Schiff Ze'ev, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 214.

¹⁴⁷ Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 188.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁴⁹ The Northern flank was enveloped and elements from an armored division set hold of the Damascus highway. The purpose was to keep the Syrians off-balanced, since the seizure of the capital was out of questions, fearing a Soviet intervention (in Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 190, 192).

¹⁵⁰ Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 192.

their opponents, and had to admit that their leadership reflected an “ossified” military mind in some cases. They also had to admit that the unfriendly foreign attitude towards Israel’s policy prevented them from attacking first, fearing international intervention.¹⁵¹ Although the intelligence failure determined a very late mobilization start, the causes for the initial poor performance of the IDF should be sought in the differences between the outcomes of the Southern and Northern command. In the North, where the commanders (mostly with paratroop background) and troops maintained a high readiness stance, the attack was repelled and initiative regained in less than two days. On the other hand, the Southern command persisted in the faulty doctrine until the losses became too high to go unnoticed. Although not specifically mentioned by the historians, the outcomes of the reserve units coming into battle were obvious. As soon as the reserves arrived on both fronts, the situation stabilized and the operational abilities of the central leadership decided the fate of the battles.

The Yom Kippur War saw the first large-scale use of missiles on the battlefield, heralding the high attrition rate of modern mechanized warfare. Van Creveld points to the 3,000 tanks lost by both sides in less than three weeks of fighting,¹⁵² while Rothenberg compares the flow of missile supplies with the distribution of shotgun cartridges.¹⁵³ Yet, the only positive element for Israel in this war comes from the Golan campaign, and it is the confirmation of the high quality of its soldiers, being those reserves or active-duty.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Oren, *Six Days of War*, 315.

¹⁵² Van Creveld, *Military Lessons*, 47. According to the author, 75 percent of the losses were Arab. Taking into consideration that one year later Israel could deploy 600 T-54/55s and 140 T-62s captured in the previous wars (in Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 218), one can assert that the 3,000 number may be exaggerated.

¹⁵³ Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 191.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 193.

B. THE “NATIONAL MILITIA” CHARACTER OF THE IDF

The Israeli Defense Forces present, from their inception until today, an example of how a small nation, surrounded by hostile neighbors, and deprived of the most elementary natural defenses, is able to survive by engaging the whole able body of its citizenry in the defense system. Luttwak,¹⁵⁵ Rothenberg,¹⁵⁶ and many others present accurately the way in which Israel keeps all able-bodied citizens enrolled in military reserve units, and maintains their combat capabilities through annual refresher courses.¹⁵⁷ The length of the refresher period ranges from one to two or three months, depending on the training objectives identified by the central command. Except for the refresher periods, Israeli reservists are civilians for 11 months, and are called to arms only for mobilization. What this reserve-based system successfully implements is the placement of the reservists on the top of the defense forces, therefore discouraging any sense of superiority of the active-duty component of the IDF.¹⁵⁸ The small nucleus of the active military has a primary role to enable the mobilization flow, so that the reserve units will be operational in less than 24 hours. This way, the small nation of Israel can engage in a full-scale war on short notice;¹⁵⁹ later development of the military doctrine after the Six-Day War bolstered the active component’s role to that of containing an initial attack, but the character of the reserves, and thus of the part-time soldiers, as the consolidated body of the IDF remained.¹⁶⁰

Besides stressing the need for a large military, perhaps the next essential feature of the IDF, which granted it the capability to deal with multiple enemies simultaneously, is the centralized subordination of all forces to the national level. Tailored initially on the rudimentary command and control structure of the underground Haganah, the modern IDF has a general staff, which integrates all combat elements, and is commanded by the

¹⁵⁵ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 76.

¹⁵⁶ Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 68–70.

¹⁵⁷ Ze’ev, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 122.

¹⁵⁸ Luttwak, *Israeli Army*, 77.

¹⁵⁹ Ze’ev, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 51.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 122.

chief of staff.¹⁶¹ Despite decentralizing decision making as much as possible, the national-level command may easily move the subordinated forces from one theatre to another, according to the battlefield needs. The small size of the country allows rapid redeployment of units, and the flexibility of their tactics and high frequency of training sessions fosters smooth cooperation between intermingled units. Although the ground forces are organized in three separate commands (North, designed to contain a Syrian and Lebanese aggression, Central, tailored to control unrest in West Bank and to respond to potential Jordanian threats, and Southern command, specifically designated to withstand aggression from South and South-West)¹⁶² the actual ground units can form different combinations, from armored-only to pure mechanized infantry or elite paratroopers units. Since the introduction in the Sinai Campaign of the *ugda*—literally a Hebrew term for the nowadays task-force¹⁶³—the problem of cohesion, adaptability, and improvisation at division level and above was doctrinally established.

The need for national-level responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping the reserves was identified as early as the underground activity of Haganah during the British rule in Palestine, and they were formally established as individual entities under the General Staff immediately after the independence was proclaimed.¹⁶⁴ According to Schiff,¹⁶⁵ the General Staff tries to issue the reserve units weapon-systems that are easier to use, store, and sustain, and this could sometimes affect their more precarious and less technology-oriented features.

Together with the national-level command and control, the centralized training and equipping authority succeeds in embracing as much as possible from the national existing resources, and in generating enough fighting power to overcome the country's scarcity of resources.¹⁶⁶ Rothenberg¹⁶⁷ synthesizes the IDF as the means and ends

¹⁶¹ Ze'ev, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 123.

¹⁶² Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 50.

¹⁶³ Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 106–120; Luttwak, *The Israeli Army*, 176.

¹⁶⁴ Luttwak, *The Israeli Army*, 45.

¹⁶⁵ Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 122.

¹⁶⁶ Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 102, 126.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 71.

through which Israel educates its citizens,¹⁶⁸ while engaging all state-supported activities—transportation, health preservation, communications, constructions—into a complex military-civilian oriented system.

With respect to the third spoke of the national militia concept, the political dimension of the Israeli militia can be summarized in the speech that one officer delivered to his troops: “[I]f we lose, we will have nowhere to return.”¹⁶⁹ Despite the political affiliations of the soldiers, the active solidarity between the troops gives IDF an advantage over the poorly linked soldiers from the opposing Arab militaries.¹⁷⁰

C. THE USE OF PRE-EXISTING SKILLS

There is an obvious difference between the lack of traditional Jewish military organizations¹⁷¹ and the Israelis’ developed skills for handling weapons and tactics.¹⁷² Notwithstanding the long conscription period and the refresher training, which do not have the same quality outputs for other militaries, the explanation can be found in the emphasis Israel puts on the pre-military training of its youth. In order to develop the physical and mental skills of the young, IDF general staff incorporates two separate commands dedicated exclusively to making full use of the resources of the next generation before reaching the military age. Gadna and Nahal are two separate commands holding the same hierarchical importance as the territorial commands, air force, navy, training, and resources inspectorates.¹⁷³ From the two, Gadna trains and educates young Israelis, despite their sex, religion, or ethnicity, starting from the age of 14 until they reach the last stage of high school; in the process, they become familiar with all military-related activities, except for shooting.¹⁷⁴ Next, only the Jewish youth and some of the Druse community continue their paramilitary education, with an emphasis on

¹⁶⁸ Luttwak, *The Israeli Army*, 205.

¹⁶⁹ Oren, *Six Days of War*, 179.

¹⁷⁰ Luttwak, *The Israeli Army*, 284.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁷² Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 102.

¹⁷³ Luttwak, *The Israeli Army*, 100.

¹⁷⁴ Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 103.

training in arms.¹⁷⁵ If needed, these under-aged citizens will perform military duties under the Nahal's supervision.

The other way Israel benefits in war from the pre-existing skills of its citizens is the high reliance that the army puts on the civilian infrastructure, as presented previously; this way, the General Staff is able swiftly to employ up to 50 percent of its forces to the front line.¹⁷⁶

D. OTHER INFLUENCING FACTORS

There are a couple of other factors that influence the success of IDF. Some of them, such as the exemption of illiterate people from military duty, are the merit of Israeli maturity in shaping its defense policy. To the same category belongs the officer training and selection, namely the lack of a standing military academy, which means all officers are drawn from the rank and file.¹⁷⁷ A great emphasis is put on the officers' natural leadership skills,¹⁷⁸ and leading by example is considered a matter of morality.¹⁷⁹ There is also the participation of all soldiers in the officers' selection process that assures the recognition of their leaders' qualities.¹⁸⁰

The geographic disadvantages of Israel's defenses are concerns, but in some cases can help. Negev Desert climatic conditions in the South, for instance, forced the encircled, leaderless Egyptians to give up fighting when out of water and food during the Six-Day War. Six years later, the encircled Third Egyptian Army ran out of water, and interventions from United States were necessary to force the Israelis to allow their foes to survive. It was the innovative Israeli leadership that put the Egyptians in these unexpected situations; thus, the merit should be given to the former.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 105.

¹⁷⁶ Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army*, 126.

¹⁷⁷ Luttwak, *The Israeli Army*, 85.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 87.

¹⁷⁹ Avraham Shapira, *The Seventh Day* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 59.

¹⁸⁰ Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 102.

E. CONCLUSION

The Israeli Defense Force provides an outstanding example of how a small country, lacking essential resources, can withstand bigger and richer adversaries. Having the militia as the only practical defense option, Israel developed the concept of mechanized warfare for its citizen army. Starting with a complete part-time military during the British protectorate, Israel officially established its military right after proclaiming its independence and since then maintained a continuous state of war with most of its neighbors. Yet, despite the high degree of specialization required to operate modern fighting assets, Israel managed to maintain a ratio of one-to-four active/reserve components by 1983, which is subject to constant change depending on the length of the conscription period and the size of specialist components required to man advanced fighting assets.¹⁸¹

After van Creveld noted in 1975 that modern warfare requires the war-making capability of a country to be linked to the other constituents of the society in order to determine the outcome of war,¹⁸² Schiff puts IDF in a central position in the Israeli society, without labeling the latter as a militarist one.¹⁸³ Hence, there is a special bond between the Israeli military and the society from which it emerges that allows its ascendance over the other militaries in the region.

¹⁸¹ Luttwak, *The Israeli Army*, 102.

¹⁸² Van Creveld, *Military Lessons*, 49.

¹⁸³ Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army*, 101.

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V. A NATION IN ARMS—THE SWISS MILITARY

Switzerland is considered one of the oldest democracies in the world, and the Swiss military is its guarantor. This chapter proposes a closer look at the defense system that allowed Switzerland to maintain its armed neutrality over the last seven centuries, and will try to identify the conditions that made it possible for this small country to remain at peace in the heart of Europe, while the whole continent was continually engulfed in the flames of war, including the two world conflagrations of the twentieth century. To the casual observer, the country could appear too insignificant to become the target of a military aggression, or one might assume that its policy makers possess some special diplomatic abilities that enabled its neutrality for such an extended period of time. In fact, nothing could be more erroneous; in the next section, a brief historical overview will present the evolution of Switzerland from the Confederation of Cantons to today's Switzerland, backed by the armed character of its citizenry.

Next, the characteristics of the militia army will be approached, based on the hub-and-spoke concept, followed by the use of pre-existing civilian skills. Since this case presents a particular interest due to the particularities that make the country unique in its performance in keeping conflicts far from its territory, other factors potentially influencing its neutrality will be analyzed in order to single out those variables that could not be generally applied to other nations.

The chapter will end with the conclusions underscoring the features that make Switzerland the most renowned country in the world for its neutrality, and the lessons that other nations can learn from the "Swiss model."

A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A good sense of Switzerland today can be found in the special chapter dedicated to the Swiss soldiers by Sir Charles William Chadwick Oman in his book *The Art of War in the Middle Ages—A.D. 378–1515*,¹⁸⁴ as well as in other authors' works.¹⁸⁵ Under constant pressure from their eastern Austrian neighbor, at the end of the thirteenth century¹⁸⁶ three Alpine communities established a trilateral agreement for assistance “in the interest of mutual security and peace.”¹⁸⁷ Lacking large population and resources, this Confederation of free herdsmen from the Alps began their fight for freedom in 1315, destroying at Morgarten an Austrian army probably six times larger and better equipped for war than the 1,500 peasants they mustered;¹⁸⁸ this militia army proved wise in choosing a battlefield where the terrain gave them protection against the traditional cavalry charges that the Austrian medieval knights were seeking to use, and also greatly restrained the maneuver of the infantry following from the rear. What resulted was almost a complete destruction of the cavalry operating in front of the army and their panicked retreat, which instilled fear in the ranks of the infantry which tried to leave the battlefield rather than fight, and the chaos that infected the Austrian army enabled a slaughter that the ruthless Confederates took advantage of immediately.¹⁸⁹ Some 20 years later,¹⁹⁰ the Confederation army defeated—this time on an open field—another superior Austrian army.¹⁹¹ Just as in the previous fight, the Austrians fought in the traditional manner they

¹⁸⁴ Charles William Chadwick Oman, Sir. *The Art of War in the Middle Ages—A.D. 378–1515* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1953).

¹⁸⁵ John McPhee. *La Place de la Concorde Suisse* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1984); William E. Rappard, *Collective Security in Swiss Experience, 1291–1948* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1948); Stephen P. Halbrook, *Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II* (New York: Sarpedon, 1998). These latter authors, while supporting Oman's notes, focus on the later development of the country and its military; thus, the first reference pays much closer attention to the birth of what will become The Country of the Cantons in the nineteenth century.

¹⁸⁶ William E. Rappard, *Collective Security in Swiss Experience, 1291–1948* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1948), xi. The three communities were Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden.

¹⁸⁷ Rappard, *Collective Security*, xi.

¹⁸⁸ Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 89.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 87–89.

¹⁹⁰ Laupen, *1339 AD*.

¹⁹¹ Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 89.

were accustomed to, but for which the Confederation militiamen had developed a countermeasure: the pike. However, the Laupen defeat did not deter the ambitious Austrian prince from trying to bring the Swiss to his will, and mounted another expedition in the Alps and met the Confederation army at Sempach, 1386.¹⁹² Although this time the cavalry dismounted to deny the advantage of the pikes over the cavalry, the heavy weapons that the militiamen developed to overcome the mail armor of their adversaries¹⁹³ drove the battle towards a complete carnage, similar to the one at Morgarten 70 years earlier.¹⁹⁴

The Swiss weapons and tactics (pikes and column) proved to be a redoubtable match for the feudal mailed knights that owned the battlefields of that era; fierceness, mercilessness, brutality, ferocity, and determination, and with an attitude of “no quarter given or expected” qualified the Swiss as the best fighting infantry of the period. To outline the Swiss boldness while encountering invaders is the example from 1444, in which a single column of about 1,000 Confederation infantry attacked an invading army 15 times larger and fought to the last man, killing double their numbers; as a result, the commander of the invaders decided to retreat before facing the main Swiss force.¹⁹⁵

Such achievements, the difficult terrain, and the Confederation forces’ ability to quickly mobilize and to move rapidly to meet the enemy, undermined the morale of any invader of the Swiss nation to the point that made them expect defeat.¹⁹⁶ The battles of Grandson, Morat, Nancy, Frastenz, and Dornach between 1476 and 1499 were the last battles on Swiss soil until the French Revolution at the end of eighteenth century.¹⁹⁷ However, the Confederation failed to see their enemies’ responses to their tactics, and

¹⁹² Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 93.

¹⁹³ Besides the halberd and the two-handed sword, the Swiss developed the Morgenstern and the Lucerne hammer, weapons particularly effective against armored opponents. McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde Suisse*.

¹⁹⁴ Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 93.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 96. The same resolve was shown by the Swiss Guards during the sack of Rome in 1527, and Napoleon’s take-over of the Vatican; in Carol Glatz, *Swiss Guard: Keeping the Peace and Protecting the Pope for 500 Years*, in Vatican Letter, May 7, 2004, <http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/swiss.htm>.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 97–104.

their victories became costlier each battle, until they were finally defeated by the Spanish infantry and the German *Landsknechte*.¹⁹⁸ Still the Confederation remained a major mercenary infantry provider for their wary neighbors; but after a costly defeat at Marignano in 1515, the Confederation renounced any conquest campaigns¹⁹⁹ and focused on the country's development and defense.

The long period of peace over the Confederation of initially three, then 13, then 19, and later 22²⁰⁰ Cantons, known as the Helvetic Body, ended in 1798 when the country fell under the French occupation of Napoleon's armies. The cohesion of the nation was first weakened by French propaganda that disunited the Swiss; the French cantons based in the Jura Mountains abandoned the Swiss cause, and the *Grande Armée* penetrated the Helvetic fortress. The remaining Swiss cantons mounted a resistance on the Alps Plateau, but they were defeated by the superior numbers, equipment, and fighting capabilities of Napoleon's army,²⁰¹ despite their heroic stand.

However, the Swiss enjoyed a period of peace, order, and prosperity, while being administratively organized by Napoleon Bonaparte as a Federal Republic.²⁰² Following the fall of Napoleon, the Helvetic Confederation decided to keep in their fundamental law the Napoleonic influence that proved beneficial to the country; the same era witnessed the solemn recognition from the Concert of Europe the neutrality of Switzerland as being in the "true interests of the policy in Europe as a whole,"²⁰³ and independence, as well as neutrality, remained stipulated in all constitutional revisions until today.²⁰⁴

Being defeated by Napoleon forced the Swiss to reassess their defense capabilities, and the following 125 years²⁰⁵ were dedicated to the establishment of a

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 107.

¹⁹⁹ Rappard, *Collective Security*, 16.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., xii.

²⁰¹ Stephen P. Halbrook, *Target Switzerland-Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II* (New York: Sarpedon, 1998), 14.

²⁰² Rappard, *Collective Security*, 27.

²⁰³ Ibid. (1815).

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 30.

²⁰⁵ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 15.

militia system able to anticipate new types of threats. They acknowledged their weakness, especially their lack of unity and “spiritual” national defense, and the need to resist modern armies and foreign propaganda.²⁰⁶ As a German observer would note in 1857, the new citizen army, by that time preparing to repel 150,000 Prussian soldiers, could count as “half a dozen standing armies.”²⁰⁷ In 1874 the militia forces from all cantons were subordinated to a federal command structure;²⁰⁸ besides these organizational improvements, they abandoned direct confrontation tactics, and resorted to rifle-centered doctrine. The Swiss began to produce their own rifles,²⁰⁹ coupled with nationwide shooting training. As George W. Wingate remarks,²¹⁰ in the early twentieth century in Switzerland there were 3,656 rifle clubs, under which 218,815 members from a population of around 3 million people were shooting 21 million cartridges with the standard army rifle. In these conditions, during the First World War the country protected its neutrality resorting to an “occupation of the frontier” strategy²¹¹ that required the mobilization of 450,000 citizens,²¹² all good marksmen armed with a Swiss-made rifle designed in 1911.²¹³

Contemplating World War II, Switzerland readied its militia again; Nazi propaganda that tried to include the German-speaking Swiss population into the Third Reich²¹⁴ signaled that the government’s integrity was threatened again. As early as 1933, \$39 million was appropriated for new rifles, machine-guns, and artillery.²¹⁵ Two years later, the basic military education period was extended to match the new battlefield

²⁰⁶ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 14.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 20.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 18.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 33.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

development.²¹⁶ New “K 31” rifles were designed to overcome the new Mauser 98 K issued to the German military.²¹⁷ Swiss Parliament appointed a general as the commander in chief (this is the only general officer position in the Swiss military) in 1939,²¹⁸ and the General took decisive steps to strengthen the national resistance to fifth column strategies employed by the German propaganda against Switzerland.²¹⁹

Besides the “danger from the interior,” Switzerland was susceptible to having its territory used by either of the warring parties to outflank its opponent, a common threat that was also present in the Franco-Prussian war and World War I.²²⁰ Although initially focusing its defense against a potential German threat from the northern border, the fall of France to the Germans transformed Switzerland into an oasis of freedom surrounded by the Axis’ Forces. Although Finland’s initial success in defending against the superior forces of the Soviet aggression²²¹ by using the terrain and the high-level marksmanship skills proved that Switzerland could be defended in a similar manner, the swift fall of Greece and Yugoslavia convinced the military leadership of the futility of any attempt to defend the whole frontier against the Blitzkrieg strategy.²²² Therefore, concomitant with the increase of shooting training for the civilians, to include women,²²³ the Swiss Army focused its strategy on using the mountainous area as the defense hub,²²⁴ oriented the training to more efficiency in using the terrain,²²⁵ and decided that abandoning significant parts of the country’s population to a potential adversary in full offensive would be the only feasible defense option.²²⁶ This sound, although bold strategy,

216 Ibid., 35.

217 Ibid., 37.

218 Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 76.

219 Willi Gautschi, *General Henri Guisan* (New York: Front Street Press, 2003), 135, 157, 548.

220 Ibid., 51.

221 Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 75, 88.

222 Ibid., 147.

223 Ibid., 88.

224 Gautschi, *General Henri Guisan*, 245.

225 Ibid., 559.

226 Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 120–121.

convinced the German military planners that any attempt to subdue Switzerland would lead to no strategic gains, since the territory would remain unusable for military purposes.²²⁷ It is considered that this *Reduit Nationale* strategy and General Guisan's speech promoting a "no surrender" and "fight to the last bullet" direct orders²²⁸ addressed to all military leaders in the Swiss Army soon after the fall of France had the necessary compelling weight that deterred a German aggression and raised the morale of the Swiss military and society,²²⁹ which had deteriorated after the partial demobilization decided by the political body soon after the German-French armistice.²³⁰

Although Switzerland faced serious security, economic, and political problems during the Second World War, the country's independence and territorial integrity remained intact.²³¹ The military preparedness of the Swiss nation and General Guisan's strategies oriented to strengthening the discipline and will of the troops, and to creating close ties between the people and the army worked.²³² As Halbrook²³³ states, Switzerland escaped Nazi occupation due to two reasons: the doctrine of armed neutrality, defended by almost a million people under arms;²³⁴ and the decentralized character of the federal state, with no elite body having the authority to surrender.²³⁵

After the war, Switzerland maintained its armed neutrality policy, and tried to watch closely the evolution of warfare, in order to keep its militia army ready to

227 Ibid., 125.

228 Gautschi, *General Henri Guisan*, 144, 238–239.

229 Ibid., 238–239.

230 Ibid., 165–170.

231 Ibid., 180.

232 Ibid., vii, 692.

233 Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, viii.

234 Gautschi, *General Henri Guisan*, 593. Encompassing 20 percent of the entire population, the 900,000 people in the Swiss defense system were soldiers (500,000), auxiliaries (300,000), and members of local civil defense units (100,000).

235 Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 93. Denmark is presented as an example of the king "serving" the country to Hitler without a fight.

effectively repel a potential aggression.²³⁶ As it will be presented in the next section, the Swiss army is still one of the largest and best trained militaries in Europe.

B. THE MODERN SWISS ARMY

The record of not being involved in a war from 1515²³⁷ is not easy to match, and the Swiss nation and its military are dedicated to keep raising the bar. Through proper display of their timely preparations and the decisive will to defend, the deterrent effect is achieved.²³⁸ The current section tries to be a brief analysis of the Swiss Army, as it can be seen from outside. John McPhee's book, *La Place de la Concorde Suisse*, is the main source for the following paragraphs, and it is corroborated with Halbhook's notes from the last chapters of his *Target Switzerland*.

What both authors point out upfront is the militia character of the military, its high level of readiness,²³⁹ and the impressive numbers that the Swiss defense establishment advertises. Numbering 650,000, according to McPhee, and targeting a downsizing to 400,000 in 2005, based on Halbhook's evidence,²⁴⁰ the Swiss Army clearly seems to be a redoubtable force. All males are part of the military for 30 years,²⁴¹ the first 20 as members of "active" units, and then subject to being called until the age of 50.²⁴² On a voluntary basis, women can serve in the military for a period of 15 years²⁴³ in the auxiliary or specialized units. The Swiss believe that if a country is defended by such an "impressive" army, a war will never start.²⁴⁴ These are indeed impressive numbers, totaling about 10 percent of the country's population, with 99.5 percent armed

²³⁶ Ibid., 240.

²³⁷ This is a common theme found in both McPhee's and Rappard's books; however, as presented in the previous section, Napoleon Bonaparte succeeded in fighting and defeating the Swiss militia, with the cooperation of the population from the French-speaking cantons.

²³⁸ Halbhook, *Target Switzerland*, 245.

²³⁹ John McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde Suisse* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1984), 3; and Halbhook, *Target Switzerland*, 244.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 3; Halbhook, *Target Switzerland*, 245.

²⁴¹ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 3.

²⁴² Halbhook, *Target Switzerland*, 244.

²⁴³ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 68.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 27.

civilians, leaving the rest of 0.5 percent for professionals.²⁴⁵ Even in the General Staff, consisting roughly of 2,000 officers, only half of the personnel are professional soldiers.²⁴⁶

This vast army has a mobilization time considerably shorter than 48 hours, according to McPhee.²⁴⁷ Such an astonishing system provides a time-frame that will be met under the most difficult conditions. The quickest Swiss reaction time is given by Halbrook, who states that the militia can mobilize in as little as four hours, and reach any part of the country in another two.²⁴⁸ The army-issued weapon is so usual in a Swiss house that it is considered part of the furnishing;²⁴⁹ additionally, the Swiss soldier keeps the ammunition at home that might be necessary before reaching the mustering point and his/her gas mask.²⁵⁰ Thus, almost half a million soldiers, owning at home a similar number of small arsenals, are trained to man state-of-the-art military equipment after reaching their units. Switzerland provides the best weapons for the military,²⁵¹ some of which are Swiss-made.²⁵² One of the requirements of any piece of equipment issued to the militia soldier is to be “user friendly” and easy to maintain operationally for the long period of service they intend to keep them in use.

Usually, the total number of days spent during the periodical refresher courses and integrated training is around 365 in 30 years of service for a private. The amount of training increases with the rank, and the Swiss considered this as a “pay” for the rank. To the meticulously calculated 365 service-days of a private, the corporal will add another 140, the lieutenant 236, the captain 165 or more, up to the level where a colonel will serve not less than 1,200 extra days. On top of this, the General Staff officers will add

²⁴⁵Ibid., 12.

²⁴² McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 62.

²⁴⁷ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 3.

²⁴⁸ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 245.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 72.

²⁵⁰ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 40.

²⁵¹ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 243.

²⁵² McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 126.

eight weeks of duty every year.²⁵³ For all these days spent in the service, the Swiss industry pays its armed workers as usual, and the people consider the events as part of their lives. There is a positive correlation between military training and efficiency at one's workplace, thus military duties and responsibilities are part of every Swiss résumé. There are even some jobs inaccessible for people who are not part of the army;²⁵⁴ Swiss society and the military complete each other, since military training is considered useful for the civilian occupation, and conversely one's civilian occupation is matched with leadership qualifications.²⁵⁵ The army takes advantage of any civilian experience and skills that the militia possesses and that results in appropriate assignments.²⁵⁶

Nested within the society, the Swiss military relies on another determinant factor that bolsters its defense capability: the terrain. The mainly mountainous territory of the country is carefully prepared by the military for a "porcupine" style defense concept.²⁵⁷ Around three permanently manned defense centers,²⁵⁸ each resembling a true fortress, a discrete military infrastructure is concealed in the terrain and is able to support, in case of necessity, the service support and combat service support needs of the military. Any potential way of advance by an aggressor is spotted by the 3,000 demolition points already in place and countless strong defensive positions.²⁵⁹

The last features characterizing the military-prone Switzerland are the hobbies of its citizens, which are mandated to practice shooting while not on duty.²⁶⁰ For the Swiss people, shooting is like golf or fishing for other nations.²⁶¹ It can be said that Switzerland, with its rough terrain, determined citizen-soldiers, and an economic

²⁵³ Ibid., 60–62.

²⁵⁴ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 59–65.

²⁵⁵ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 244.

²⁵⁶ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 57, 63, 121; Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 244.

²⁵⁷ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 21.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 25.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 22, 23.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 93.

²⁶¹ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 27.

infrastructure pre-tailored to meet military demands in case of conflict, is always preparing for war; perhaps this is why they have enjoyed such long period of peace.

C. THE NATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE MILITIA

There are only a few Swiss military that are professional soldiers, and their main assignment is to keep the militia cohesive and accustomed to the way of war.²⁶² What started in 1291 as an amalgam of independently raised militias from each canton is nowadays a federally organized army, supervised by a general staff and, in case of war, having appointed a unique Commander in Chief: the General.²⁶³ Historically, the Swiss militia functioned well organized along canton lines, and the regionally raised units performed well even without forming a nationwide cohesive body. The current centralized organization is due to the defeat they suffered at the hands of the French Army at the end of the seventeenth century;²⁶⁴ that fateful event uncovered other shortcomings of the Swiss militia, such as the outdated character of their tactics and equipment, as well their weakness in the face of hostile propaganda. Thus, beginning in 1874, Article 18 of the Swiss constitution regulates the functioning of the militia in a centralized federal system and appoints the country as responsible for issuing “the first equipment, clothing, and arms without payment”²⁶⁵ for every serviceman. Realizing that their previous battlefield innovations dated from the Middle Ages,²⁶⁶ the Swiss started designing high-quality weapons, so their militia would never be outfought by another army on Swiss soil.²⁶⁷ From the standard-issue rifle to the high-end fighter jets of the air force, Switzerland equips its armed forces with considerably advanced weapon systems.

²⁶² McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 12.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 12, 62.

²⁶⁴ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 15, 17.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁶⁶ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 49; the Helvetic militia introduced the pike and pike column tactics, as well as the Morgenstern and the Lucerne hammer, weapons able to penetrate through the mail armor of the feudal knights.

²⁶⁷ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 18, 42, 242–245; the Model 1911 rifle of World War I, the K 31 of WW II, and the newer design weapons manufactured in Switzerland by SIG-Sauer, Brugger-Thomet, Hamerli, and others are just few examples of the Swiss continuous preoccupation with firearms development; Switzerland is one of the top 15 weapons manufacturer selling small arms (<http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php>).

D. THE USE OF PRE-EXISTING SKILLS

There are two ways in which the Swiss Army employs the skills acquired by its citizens outside the defense establishment: appropriate assignments of the personnel, according to the aptitudes he/she developed in daily civilian life;²⁶⁸ and the enforcement of rifle-shooting as a compulsory national sport and contest.²⁶⁹

The Swiss military is considered to mirror the society, meaning that pre-existing leadership and specialized aptitudes of a soldier are considered when he or she is appointed to his/her military position. The Swiss banking system is said to compensate for the lack of formal superior military education structures. “Swiss banks are the counterpart of West Point,”²⁷⁰ as McPhee states, and it is a common fact that most of the high-ranking banking officials retain military leadership positions, and superior officers from the militia hold leadership positions in civilian companies.²⁷¹ Other civilian occupations also match the military ones, as is the case for medics, veterinarians, horse conductors, drivers, mechanics, pilots, and so on.²⁷²

As for the shooting training, it is not just a sport. It is a mandatory national sport, and the Swiss Shooting Federation serves as the backbone of the armed citizenry, every Swiss must be involved in marksmanship activities until the age of 40.²⁷³ There is one annual shooting festival held in various locations simultaneously, and countless cantonal or local shooting matches, capped by the federal shooting festival every five years, which is by far the greatest shooting festival in the world.²⁷⁴ Due to the large number of shooting ranges, the familiarity between the shooter and his rifle, and the efforts made by the military to issue user-friendly shooting training handbooks that are religiously used by the Swiss citizens, marksmanship has become a common skill of the average

²⁶⁸ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 225.

²⁶⁹ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 93.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 63.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 56, 57.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 121.

²⁷³ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 26.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 242; See also <http://smith-wessonforum.com/lounge/145345-worlds-biggest-shooting-competition-pic-heavy-not-56k-modems.html>.

civilian.²⁷⁵ Continuous practice with the army-issued rifle makes the Swiss soldier very efficient in shooting at distances ranging between 50 to 300 or 400 meters, and even more in favorable conditions.²⁷⁶

E. OTHER INFLUENCING FACTORS

There are particular conditions that influence the deterrent capabilities of Switzerland, so obviously underscored by the seven centuries of little fighting.²⁷⁷ First, its geography is highly advantageous for the defender; next, the accommodation of the Swiss citizen to hardship, and the reckless determination to resist by all means, death being preferred to losing their freedom, make Switzerland a special case in the world of nations. Their mobilization system has remained effective through time, and the Swiss know how to organize themselves in such a manner that gives their army a high readiness status. The military service is tailored to the nation's needs, and the nation evolved along a defense-centered approach. Worth mentioning is the Swiss ability to develop the proper tools they might need in their fights, and the special affection they show for them. From the medieval weapons that defeated the mounted feudal knights from the position of dominance they held over the battlefield, to the current small arms industry that makes every Swiss soldier a marksman, Switzerland has maintained a weapons industry of the best kind.

Finally, the Swiss constitution and international treaties establish Switzerland in a permanent neutrality status necessary to enable diplomatic relations between belligerents in case of hostilities and diplomatic breakdowns.

²⁷⁵ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 26.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁷⁷ McPhee, *La Place de la Concorde*, 13. Since this period of no conquest of Switzerland was briefly interrupted during the Napoleonic wars, the Swiss still continue to claim that it was at least a period of freedom.

F. CONCLUSION

The militia army of Switzerland, far from being protected from external aggressions, forged its status as a formidable opponent that, since 1515, deterred any invasion of the country by a foreign power, except for Napoleon's Revolutionary France. Charles Oman regarded Switzerland as the example of a small nation achieving military dominance through a "good military organization, and a sound system of national tactics,"²⁷⁸ but it took the lesson of Marignano to understand that even the soundest tactics need refinement. Later, during the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars, Switzerland was occupied by the *Grande Armée*, which resorted to psychological warfare and succeeded in disuniting the Swiss people, thus easing the access of the invading force inside the national mountain fortress. This taught the Swiss a lesson that encouraged them to unify the national militia, and to develop propaganda countermeasures. As it was seen during the First and Second World Wars, Switzerland succeeded in deterring any invasion attempts by the totalitarian powers surrounding it.

The Swiss military is a militia army that equals or betters the readiness and reaction time of any standing military. By employing a defense system tailored around the defense-friendly geography of the country, and maintaining a strong determination of the Swiss people to train, in order to be always ready to defend themselves, Switzerland makes the best use of the resources it has. It is considered that the militia character of the military played a major role in the preparedness of Switzerland to repel an invasion during the two world wars of the twentieth century; for the Swiss, the whole amount of money could have been directed to training and equipping the militia, as opposed to the case of Holland or Belgium, which despite spending double the amount, were unable to mount a credible defense.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸ Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, 76.

²⁷⁹ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 35–37.

Although there are a series of specific conditions that make the Swiss case particular, those were achieved in time through adhering to the principle of armed neutrality, defiance of chivalry during fighting, and stubborn determination in defending their core values: freedom and democracy.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter of the research provides the conclusions resulting from the analysis of the features of the militia forces presented in the three case studies. It will begin with a re-evaluation of the findings related to the national militia hub-and-spoke concept, encompassing the components unfolded after the investigation of the cases, as depicted in Table 2.

Table 2. National militia radial structure

| | | Components | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| | | Non-professional | National command | De-centralized execution | Centralized training | National level support | National driven ideology | Pre-existing civilian skills |
| Primary category | Conceptual militia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Study cases | Overmountain men | ✓ | | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ |
| | Tory militia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | 1968 IDF | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | 1973 IDF | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | Pre-1800 Swiss militia | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| | Post-Napoleon Swiss Army | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

In the second part, the relevance of the pre-existing civilian skills as a resource for national defense will be addressed. Finally, the relevance of a militia-based defense option will be considered, in the face of the recent political and military developments occurring in Eastern Europe and leading to this date to the attempts of several eastern Ukrainian regions to claim autonomy from Kiev and seek annexation to Russia.

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In the following paragraphs, we review the findings of our examination of the presented cases, including the performance of militias and their relationship with their communities, their relationship to a central authority, and the manner in which they are trained and equipped.

1. Militia Identifies with the Community, and its Performance Level Increases with the Threat Perceived

In all of the presented cases, the problem of representing the community was encountered at least once. The conflict between Rebels and the Tory militia in the first case, between the Haganah (later IDF) and other militant organizations (Irgun and Lehi on the Jewish side, and the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas on the Arab side) in Israel, and the dissent sowed by revolutionary propaganda in the French-speaking cantons of Switzerland, all tested the strength of the militia system.

In the first case, the Rebels identified themselves with the *American* settlers' community, while the Tory militia harbored a *British* image which, although representing only a fraction of the population, was powerful enough to instill obedience in the population, fear in their opponents, and confidence in themselves. While the Tories perceived their foes as mere "mongrels" provoking minor troubles, and the Continental Army as the real threat they should face, the Rebels saw in Ferguson's militia a deadly threat to their lives; therefore, it was enough for them to acknowledge the presence of hostile Redcoats in their area, and they decided to act. This was the only threat perceived by the 'overmountain men' community, yet it motivated them strongly enough to equal, at least, the indoctrination and training of the Tory militia.

The Israeli case brings additional data to this variable, since the isolation of the Jewish community among different hostile ethnic populations had the effect of keeping them together. Starting with the defense of the *kibutzim* in the emerging Israel, the Israelis constantly identified the IDF with their country, nation, and society, and the military reacted in the same way. This was not the case for Irgun and Lehi which,

although very active in the public media, could not gain enough popular support to replace the IDF in people's minds.

In the Swiss case, ideas of freedom, democracy, and mutual dependence provided enough rationale to keep the nation together and the militia effect efficient, until they encountered the French revolutionary propaganda. The French-speaking cantons gave up the whole national edifice for nationalist and proletarian ideals, in the face of which the Swiss porcupine-defense was helpless. This was not the case in the first and second world conflagrations, where effective Swiss counter-propaganda deemed useless the German attempts to gain any benefits of having a major co-national group in neighboring Switzerland.

Thus, one can conclude that militia *usually* identifies itself with the community, which adds to the militia's fighting efficiency, but in the absence of an ideological or other form of political education, the militia is susceptible to psychological warfare.

2. National-Level Authority, Manning, Training, and Equipping

The authority of central government over the militia has several aspects. For our purpose here, in the following paragraphs we will consider the whole authority spectrum divided in two: the "chain of command" and the "administrative" sections of it.

a. Command, Control, and Decision-Making Authority

Far from being always considered as a formal command authority relationship, all the cases feature an overarching national framework providing guidance for the militia groups to act. This variable varies within and across cases, and will be discussed further.

Beginning with the Rebel militia, the formal national-level command relationship was almost nonexistent. The unconventionally fighting rebels acknowledged the existence of a national body representing their interest, and therefore joined the cause animated by their revolutionary sentiments. However, they sought to correlate their actions with the national-level efforts, regardless of their totally unofficial involvement in the hostilities. By formally recognizing Nathanael Greene as their official superior, the Rebels embedded themselves in the Revolutionary body, even if only for seeking

legitimacy, if not for political considerations alone. Nevertheless, they would undoubtedly perform at the same level or better under national command, as was proved by Greene's campaign in the South, which eventually helped bring total defeat to Cornwallis' army. Worth mentioning is the independence of each rebel during the fight, which was unheard of in the British Army. Officers were near useless once fighting broke out on the rebel side, but badly needed by the Redcoats. Unfortunately for Ferguson's militia, this permanent need of supervision from officers impeded the efficiency of the Tories, as soon as officers were targeted by rebel sharpshooters; furthermore, their inaccurate image of the battlefield led them to miss tactical opportunities several times.

Moving to the Swiss cantons, it is well-known that they fought and trained in a decentralized manner, until their patterned pike-column tactics were overcome on the battlefield. Centuries later, when they built their "porcupine" strategy as a deterrent to external aggression, the Swiss recognized the benefits of a unified command. Between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War, the Swiss Federation adopted a unique command for their federal militia and established a clear command and control system that would answer the coordination needs of the fighting force. Through training, the Swiss militia acts today as a disciplined professional army, but eventually the decision can be taken at the lowest level, which is the soldier. Even in contingencies, the Swiss are prepared to fight "to the last bullet, and then with the bayonet," knowing that this way they are buying valuable time for the militia mustering inside the National Redoubt.

A similar trait can be observed in the Israeli command and control system, with an emphasis on the battalion and brigade level, which are designed and trained to fight in conjunction with other elements as combined arms. The centralized command of the IDF provided the infrastructure that allowed the recruiting and training, when necessary, of the militia; moreover, after gaining the independence of Israel, the centralized command provided the operational insight for envisioning rapid deployment of the forces using interior lines of communications between simultaneously active fronts. Although having visible effects during the Arab-Israeli wars, the centralized command brought its most important contribution to the Israeli people during the underground, unconventional-

fighting era and the independence war, periods in which it made the difference between winning and losing, since their opponents lacked unity.

Hence, the three cases provide evidence of a positive relation between the national-level command of the militia, and the outcomes of the violent engagement. All things being equal, or even when fighting in inferiority, the militia prevailed under national-level command, but with decentralized decision-making authority. Another aspect emerging from the analysis of the three cases shows that militia units performed better when they were employed *not* in conjunction with a traditional standing military. This is outlined by the Israeli decision to designate the militia (the reserve component of the IDF) as the main element of the national defense, but it also can be observed in other instances, like in the early Swiss military history, or later in the U.S.²⁸⁰

b. Manning, Training, and Equipping the Militia

In the same manner as in the previous paragraph, there is an obvious trend of improved militia performance once the burden of training and equipping the militia was assumed at the national level, as shown in the examples of the Swiss military and the IDF. However, the use of the rifle and the pike were introduced by elements that were neither trained, nor equipped by a superior authority. These might rather suggest that scarcity of conventional equipment, augmented by deep knowledge of the opponent's traditional way of fighting, enabled both the American rebels and the Swiss herdsman to seek and find solutions that proved viable and cheap, and that fundamentally changed, or prepared to change the battlefield. Further developing this argument, it seems that there is a culminating point where the centralization of training and equipping responsibilities at

²⁸⁰ At Morgarten, the invading Austrian forces numbered a substantial body of infantry, including Swiss contingents from the neighboring cantons, but their mounted mailed feudal knights were placed in front, according to traditional warfare rules of the epoch; the same military thinking assigned the knights the "honor" of attacking first in later battles, until the decision to dismount them was made, but the militia infantry was still considered as a second option, not worthy enough to bear the responsibility of the fight. (Oman, in *The Art of War*, 89, 91, 93; Rappard, *Collective Security*, 5). A similar tendency of overlooking the militia potential and their ability to fight unconventionally on their own soil can be observed during the American Civil War (1861–1865); despite the advantageous position given by the defending posture of the South, and the steady positive outcomes of the unconventional engagements conducted by the generals in the Western theatre of operations, Robert E. Lee insisted on applying a traditional Napoleonic strategy in the North, and eventually lost the war (Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 92–127).

the national level becomes counter-productive, as was the case for the Tory militia mustered by Patrick Ferguson.²⁸¹ Therefore, it can be considered that centralized administration of the militia has a beneficial effect, but it can also have an adverse effect, if responsibilities are taken by traditionalist “crypto-militarists,” as General Palmer would describe with one word the inability of military planners to understand how a citizen army functions.²⁸² As it will be described in the following section, there are adequate solutions for training and equipping the militia, and they can lead to superior efficiency on the battlefield, despite the character of the war the militia prepares for.

B. THE USE OF PRE-EXISTING SKILLS

The first case presented in this thesis introduced the use of personal hunting rifles by the American rebels to defeat a traditionally trained and equipped formation, superior in numbers, and perceived as more properly equipped for fight. However, the outcome of the battle proved the contrary, as the rebel militia had the liberty of using their hunting weapons, which they were proficient with. Thus, their mastery in using hunting rifles found a proper role in the non-traditional tactic chosen by the rebel leaders, and they prevailed at King’s Mountain and beyond.

With the exception of the Swiss pike-column tactics, the later cases do not resemble similar situations, as the battlefield homogenously evolved into mechanized warfare; in these later cases, Switzerland and Israel focused on maintaining large, highly trained militias as the defense solution. Although the background of the two countries differs drastically—since the Swiss are renowned marksmen, while Israel had no military tradition, and its citizens do not usually carry weapons—in both cases they introduced pre-military training programs, with Israel’s being more comprehensive than the Swiss one. Hence, this particular variable, although initially considered as part under the overarching “training” spoke of the militia concept, became two-fold: under normal circumstances, militia performance improves with the increase in the use of pre-existing skills, which are usually “imported” directly from the civilian occupation of the

²⁸¹ Dameron, *King’s Mountain*, 53.

²⁸² Holley, *General Palmer*, 98.

militiamen, or developed through training outside the military service. Under specific circumstances, such as the case of introducing the pike versus the mailed knights, or the rifle against the musket, pre-existing civilian skills can become game-changers in the military domain. In the first instance, the rationale advocating for the militia to the detriment of the standing traditional military is cost related. As asserted by Halbrook,²⁸³ military expenditures are less relevant when analyzing a militia versus a standing army, since for the militia all the expenses are directed to training and equipment. In the other case, they will have to cover additional costs, such as the full-time pay, barracks, and others. Both Switzerland and Israel take full advantage of advertising their high regard for military training, as well as the symbiotic relationship between the military capabilities and the civil society's ability to support a large defense body. Although neither one of the two is offering accurate details regarding their defense expenditures, their claims are supported by past experiences, such as the manner in which Israel performed during the last wars, and the unusual amount of military-applicable recreational activities present everywhere in Switzerland. These performances could be replicated by similar standing armies, but the cost could prove unbearable for the economy.

The second instance, which addresses the introduction of rather revolutionary, innovative elements on the battlefield, is even more intriguing. Despite the normal expectations, history shows that revolutionary changes in the military domain do not come exclusively from the defense research laboratories, but sometimes from common, daily practice. A second look at Table 1 reveals the potential use of pre-existing skills across the range of missions currently defined for the U.S. military, which will reiterate the broad applicability of civilian skills in defense-related activities, or missions; in this case, common sense may suggest that a civilian performing a specific duty in a competitive environment for extended periods of time will be more efficient in that specific field than a soldier accustomed to it as a second, contingency-related skill.

²⁸³ Halbrook, *Target Switzerland*, 36. For the selected year 1934–1935, the military expenditures of Belgium and Holland were significantly higher than those of Switzerland; the author considers their spending as modeled on a World War I approach, but this impediment may be shadowed by the fact that all countries used the same model at that time.

Moreover, the last section of the table, “major operations and campaigns,” seemed initially reserved for the standing militaries, since civilians might prefer to continue with their routines. The case studies showed this idea to be wrong, and the citizen soldiers proved to be a redoubtable defense resource, if properly trained and employed.

C. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

We began this research trying to learn whether a militia-based approach may be a viable option for the national defense of a nation-state, and through the case studies, we found plenty of evidence supporting the effectiveness of this option for a neutral country, as well as for an openly threatened one, such as Israel. So it happened that the time period dedicated for this research coincided with the confusing events that occurred in Ukraine at the beginning of 2014, reaffirming the irrelevance of a standing military when required to handle an unconventional aggression. However, events in Ukraine are neither over, nor are they outlining anything else than the impotence of a “standing” military. Undoubtedly, a high-readiness militia could provide better coverage of the national territory, but it could also become an armed opposition for the central authority, if the other elements identified here as enhancing the militia ability to withstand external, as well as internal threats, are not present.

Militia systems such as the Israeli, the Swiss, or the U.S. National Guard, are the result of long years of trial-and-error policy, and cannot be devised overnight. Properly maintained and updated, they fulfill national defense goals; they provide returns in terms of increasing cohesiveness of the population, and reduce the vulnerability of the latter to destabilizing agents. As long as it is regarded as the main defense asset of the nation, the militia will not be under resourced, for the benefit of a potentially present standing component of the military. This way, the nation can benefit by having a viable defense structure, while maintaining an active component for additional duties.

Taking one step beyond the conventional thinking, one might hypothesize the time for a revolution in military affairs along militia lines has come, and defense concepts as we understand them today are on the verge of becoming irrelevant. In this case, it should not come as a surprise that the use of unexpected skills will bring obsolescence to

the symbols of today's sheer military might, such as the aircraft carrier, the jet fighter, or the tank, and warfare may continue to retain a "low intensity" or "unconventional" character, due to the low probability of conventional survival in a conventional, force-on-force, military engagement. In such a world, militias may come to matter a great deal.

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