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Civilian Control of the
Armed Forces in Asia

by Harold A. Trinkunas

EAST-WEST CENTER
OCCASIONAL PAPERS
Politics and Security Series
No. 1, October 1999

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This policy paper is a product of the project, "The Soldier and the State in Asia: Investigating Change and Continuity in Civil-Military Relations." The project attempts to answer the questions: What is the place of the military in the state? What are and what explains the cross-national similarities and differences in Asian states? What is the future of civil-military relations in Asia and what are the implications for domestic political change and for international politics in Asia?

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Even though there is a trend toward political liberalization and democratization across Asia, its emerging democracies will not become consolidated unless elected officials establish authority over their armed forces. While direct military rule has become rare in Asia, military forces continue to impose limits on the scope of democratization efforts in many countries. This paper argues that civilian control exists when government officials hold ultimate jurisdiction over military activities, and that control is maximized when soldiers are confined to tasks linked to their primary function: preparing for war. Civilian control is likely to emerge only when rulers gain sufficient leverage over the armed forces to compel military officers to accept oversight. Only when civilian control is institutionalized will democracy prevail and norms of civilian supremacy develop within the military.

This paper examines democratic civilian control and explores the challenges confronting Asia's democratizers. It also considers the nature of civil-military relations in Asia's authoritarian regimes and studies the barriers that civilian control may place in the path of political liberalization. After examining the issues facing emerging democracies, this paper analyzes civil-military relations in consolidated democracies in Asia, focusing on the question of how the military's activities can be supervised. Next it turns to the problems facing civilian authoritarian regimes in maintaining control over the armed forces, as well as the issues that may arise should these countries begin democratizing. Finally, the paper outlines policy recommendations to promote democratic civilian control.

Even though there is a trend toward political liberalization and democratization across Asia, its emerging democracies will not become consolidated unless elected officials establish authority over their armed forces. Even in Asia's remaining authoritarian regimes, the pace and scope of political liberalization are called into question by continuing military participation in political and economic decision-making. A few countries, such as Japan and India, have already achieved both democratization and government control of the armed forces. Moreover, some emerging democracies, such as South Korea and the Philippines, have made considerable progress toward subordinating the military to elected governments. But many countries in the region, ranging from Pakistan to Indonesia, are governed by unstable civilian regimes that coexist side by side with independent and autonomous armed forces. While direct military rule has become rare in Asia, military forces continue to impose limits on the scope of democratization efforts in many countries.

The central issue in civil-military relations in a democracy is this: who governs what area of the state?¹ After all, military officers in Asia often wear many hats—participating in revenue collection, road building, maintaining public order, managing state industries, and a multitude of other legal and illegal activities. Furthermore, while some military establishments have been effectively contained by civilian authority for years, in other countries they virtually dominate the state. Civilian control only exists when government officials hold ultimate jurisdiction over military activities. In other words, civilian control is maximized when rulers provide informed oversight and final approval for the policies and activities of their armed forces. While it is theoretically possible for civilians to supervise military participation in a wide spectrum of state activities, such as internal security, tax collection, and welfare promotion, civilian control is most likely to exist when soldiers are confined to tasks linked with their primary function: preparing for war. Furthermore, the armed forces are most likely to perform effectively in this primary mission when they withdraw from participation in other areas of state jurisdiction, such as internal security or economic policy.

Civilian control is an ongoing process, not an endpoint, in civil-military relations.² In consolidated democracies, rulers focus principally on supervising their armed forces by defining their roles, missions, and budgets. In principle

these tasks are straightforward since the armed forces accept civilian supremacy. But effective supervision of military forces demands a high level of civilian expertise, resources, and attention. Even in civilian authoritarian regimes, rulers are faced with the task of managing military forces—often through parallel political and military officer corps. While the integration of political and military elites in the ruling power protects the regime from overthrow by its own armed forces, it can also affect civilian efforts, as in Taiwan, to carry out political liberalization. In emerging democracies, democratizers face the more difficult task of compelling armed forces to accept government control where it does not already exist. These militaries comply with the directives of civilian leaders only when it is convenient for them to do so or when they fear the consequences of disobedience. Civilian control is more likely to emerge when rulers gain leverage over the armed forces that enables them to compel military officers to accept institutionalized civilian oversight of their activities. Only when civilian control is institutionalized will democracy prevail and norms of civilian supremacy develop within the military.

Here I wish to examine democratic civilian control and explore the challenges confronting Asia's democratizers. But I also want to consider the nature of civil-military relations in Asia's authoritarian regimes and study the barriers that civilian control may place in the path of political liberalization. After examining the issues facing emerging democracies as they attempt to establish authority over the armed forces, I analyze civil-military relations in consolidated democracies in Asia, focusing on the question of how the military's activities can be supervised. In the next section I turn to the problems facing civilian authoritarian regimes in maintaining control over the armed forces, as well as the issues that may arise should these countries begin democratizing. In the final section I outline policy recommendations to promote democratic civilian control.

DEFINING DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL

Today, democratic civilian control of the armed forces is understood to mean military compliance with government authority, rather than the absence of armed rebellion.³ Civilian control exists when government officials have authority over decisions concerning the missions, organization, and employment of a state's military means. Civilian control also requires that officials have broad decision-making authority over state policy free from military interference.⁴ This definition differs from Samuel Huntington's traditional prescription for civilian control in both its subjective and objective forms. In Huntington's version of subjective

control, political elites protect themselves from military intervention by ensuring that the armed forces share common values and objectives with them—often through a process of politicization of the officer corps. With respect to objective control, the military is independent from civilian interference. Instead, it is self-directed through strong norms of professionalism that include subordination toward duly constituted state authority and an apolitical attitude towards civilian government's policies and activities.⁵ Here I argue that the essential component of strong democratic civilian control has two dimensions: institutionalized oversight of military activities by civilian government agencies in combination with the professionalization of military forces. In other words, civilian control exists when politicians and bureaucrats are able to determine defense policies and approve military activities through an institutionalized defense bureaucracy.

Maximizing civilian control in a democracy involves limiting the areas of state policy in which the armed forces hold ultimate jurisdiction. The ability of the armed forces to make decisions on state policy without civilian input or supervision is clearly incompatible with civilian control. The existence of enclaves of military autonomy within the state and institutional vetoes over civilian policy-making threatens regime stability. Armed forces that have exclusive control over state revenues or industries outside the supervision of civilian authorities are more difficult to monitor and control. States in which the armed forces control internal security agencies have found it hard to prevent military intervention in politics.⁶ Broadly based and autonomous military participation in state activities not only prevents civilian control over the armed forces but also calls into question the very nature of a democratic regime. Furthermore, the military's participation in areas outside its primary mission has historically led to the politicization of the armed forces, friction between civilian and military, and a significant reduction in military effectiveness.⁷ To maximize regime stability, democratic governments are well advised to confine the armed forces to tasks closely associated with defending the state against external threats.⁸

One way of assessing the degree of civilian control in a country is by examining a wide range of state activities and determining who governs military participation in each area. States in Asia have used their militaries to control riots, collect taxes, enforce unpopular domestic policies, and, most threatening to civil authority, protect or displace governments. But when the armed forces determine for themselves when and where they will engage in these activities, they evade civilian control. In other words, when the military has autonomous jurisdiction over important aspects of state activity—such as internal security, economic policy, or revenue collection—it prevents this full democratization. To depict these

jurisdictional boundaries, I have divided state activities into four concentric rings in Figure 1.




Figure 1. State Jurisdictional Boundaries: Where Is Military Participation Most Threatening to Civilian Rule? From Trinkunas (1999).

The concentric circles in Figure 1 suggest the possible range of civil-military jurisdictional boundaries within a state. Above all, the diagram indicates those areas where military participation is most dangerous to civilian control. These areas are ordered in relation to their increasing functional distance from the primary combat mission of the armed forces as well as the increasing threat to civilian control posed by military involvement in them. External Defense tasks involve preparing for war and conducting war and related military missions, managing the military bureaucracy, training, and strategic planning. Internal Security includes the maintenance of public order in emergency situations, preparation for counterinsurgency warfare, domestic intelligence gathering, and daily policing.* Public Policy covers state budgets, the functioning of government

*Internal security and domestic intelligence are the most problematic roles for the armed forces in civilian-ruled states. See Pion-Berlin (1992: 89); Stepan (1973: 172–174); and Stepan (1988: 106–114).

agencies, and the crafting of public policy to achieve social welfare, development, and political objectives. Leadership Selection involves decisions concerning the criteria and process by which government officials are recruited, legitimated, and empowered.*

But analyzing military participation in different areas of state activity is not sufficient to determine the presence or absence of civilian control in a country because it does not answer the question *who governs* that activity. The armed forces can participate in leadership selection at many different levels, for example, ranging from vetoing presidential candidates, to running their own nominees, to simply assisting civilian election authorities by distributing materials and guarding polling stations. In the first two instances, the armed forces are acting independent of civilian guidance—suggesting an absence of government control over the military. In the latter example, the military is presumably under the orders of civilian election officials in a democratic regime. In other words, who is in charge of making policy in a state activity determines whether civilian control exists. Alagappa provides a useful definition of different power relationships in civil-military relations by emphasizing the difference between complete civilian jurisdiction over a state activity—such as the civilian courts—as opposed to ultimate civilian jurisdiction over such issues as military deployments and operations.⁹ In India today, civilians have long held control over the activities of the armed forces, for example, yet they allow professional military officers to make most day-to-day decisions concerning the training of soldiers, sailors, and aviators. Even though civilians have ultimate authority over military training, they delegate this authority to professionals.

Within the broad categories of external defense, internal security, and public policy, there exists a hierarchy of institutions that can provide democratizers with lasting control over the armed forces. These categories simply provide broad measures of the areas in which civilian regimes should hold predominant authority. The configuration of this authority depends on civilian rulers institutionalizing their control over a defined range of activities.¹⁰

There are two aspects of public policy where civilian authority is crucial:

*Resource allocation, domestic policy, and leadership selection are areas of state policy that are least connected to the role of the armed forces in external coercion, particularly in times of peace. While the armed forces in many countries attempt to lobby or exercise influence in support of military industrialization projects and budget allocations, there exists a clear distinction between influence, the threat of force, and direct military control of these processes. See Colton (1979: 231–245).

control of state enterprises and control of government budgets. Excluding the armed forces from direct control over state-owned enterprises is a key step toward civilian control. Military ownership of state assets—whether directly associated with military activities or with purely commercial enterprises, such as cross-border trade by officers in Thailand—creates sources of funding for the armed forces that lie outside the direct supervision of civilian officials. Not only do these activities increase the autonomy of the armed forces, but they also create a range of new interests within the officer corps that are concerned directly with the government's management of the economy, labor relations, and social welfare. These interests sharpen politicization within the armed forces. This is a problem shared by civilian authoritarian regimes in Asia, such as the PRC and Vietnam. Indeed, the threat posed by autonomous sources of military funding may have influenced Premier Jiang Zemin's decision to restrict the role of the People's Liberation Army in the private economy.¹¹

But even in regimes where the armed forces do not manage state assets, an important step toward civilian control occurs when elected officials are able to define the overall budget of the armed forces. Control over the sources and dimensions of military funding is one of the key tools that regimes can use to define the size, mission, and role of the armed forces. This is particularly true once civilians move beyond setting caps on military spending and begin to define funding levels for procurement, recruitment, infrastructure, and operations. Yet this tool is effective only if the overall government mechanisms for setting and administering state budgets are effective. In countries where governments collect few revenues and official budgets have little relationship to actual state activities, civilian control of the military budget has a negligible impact on the activities of the armed forces.

Within the internal security function, as well, there is a clear hierarchy of tasks that should be accomplished before strong democratic control can be achieved. In aspiring democracies, the first step is to exclude military participation from daily police functions. Intelligence gathering on domestic political activities should also be removed from the purview of the armed forces. Both policing and intelligence gathering provide the armed forces with an unwarranted level of control over the activities of private citizens, especially in an emerging democracy, and they create constituencies within the officer corps that support military interference in domestic politics, regardless of regime type. With few exceptions, however, states still rely on the military as the final bulwark against the threat of internal armed opposition. This is especially true if we consider the significant role of the armed forces in some Asian countries, such as the

Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, in conducting counterinsurgency operations. While there is a role for the armed forces in counterinsurgency activities, or in restoring public order during a crisis, elected officials in a democracy must be able to regulate the military's participation in these activities.

External defense is the one area where the armed forces' interest in greater autonomy converges with civilian interest in national defense. After all, external defense is an area where military professionals have an advantage in expertise and experience over elected officials—especially in wartime. Here a certain degree of military autonomy from civilian interference is advantageous to maintaining an effective defense. This does not preclude elected officials from developing institutional mechanisms to determine military roles and missions, and monitor military spending and procurement in detail, as well as establishing guidelines for military promotions and assignments. But to provide this degree of informed oversight, democratic regimes must develop cadres of civilians, both politicians and bureaucrats, who have acquired expertise in defense affairs and can collaborate with military officers in carrying out external defense duties.

ACHIEVING CIVILIAN CONTROL IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

In democratizing states where civilian control is absent, militaries comply with the directives of civilian leaders only when it is convenient for them to do so, when they fear the consequences of disobedience, or when they are so internally divided that they are unable to resist civilian authority. Elected officials can gain leverage over the armed forces by taking advantage of opportunities—such as a transition to democracy—that foster these conditions within the officer corps.¹² While other external shocks, such as wars or economic crises, may also provide opportunities, the transition to democracy offers the earliest and most favorable moment for civilians to gain authority over the military.¹³

The nature of the crisis leading up to a transition to democracy determines the scope of this opportunity. Political and economic failures attributable to the policies of a dictatorship—particularly if they are compounded by defeat in war—are likely to hasten the collapse of the regime while increasing recrimination and distrust among outgoing ruling elites.* This is particularly true in certain Asian

*See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Haggard and Kaufmann (1992: 321–324). Wars that incur heavy costs or end in defeat are significantly likely to lead to violent regime change. See Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992).

cases, such as Indonesia, where authoritarian rule was legitimized by the promise and reality of economic development. Paradoxically, rapid economic development can also accelerate the collapse of dictatorship by creating new social and political forces to challenge the existing regime.¹⁴

The failures of dictatorial rule can also establish the basis for a broad civilian consensus opposing a return to authoritarianism and reduce the likelihood of significant elites “knocking on the barracks door.”¹⁵ The combination of mass mobilization and elite consensus can provide a powerful counterweight to military threats to the democratic process. But mass mobilization can also threaten emerging democratic regimes in countries where there is no broad consensus on democratization. While in the Philippines “people power” contributed strongly to the defense of democracy,¹⁶ authoritarian elements have engaged in mass mobilization in Indonesia and Cambodia in recent years.

Not all transitions offer strong opportunities to democratizers, however. In some cases, the positive performance of an outgoing dictatorship empowers authoritarian elites and the armed forces vis-à-vis democratizers. Furthermore, a legacy of positive government performance under authoritarian rule is likely to deepen divisions among civilians. In these conditions, democratizers are compelled to adopt an evolutionary approach to reducing military jurisdictional boundaries—taking advantage of new shocks, such as the recent Asian financial crisis, to create leverage over the armed forces and induce them to acquiesce to civilian authority.¹⁷

Civilian leaders can maximize their leverage over the armed forces through a host of strategies ranging from appeasement to divide-and-rule to sanctioning. The weakest strategy—appeasement—relies on a government adopting policies and budgets that satisfy the interests of the officer corps in the hopes of discouraging military intervention in politics. High levels of economic growth in Thailand during the 1990s, for example, permitted civilian governments to maintain substantial levels of defense spending in an effort to minimize military opposition to the democratic regime.¹⁸ Divide-and-rule strategies generate civilian leverage by exploiting internal military cleavages and encouraging competition within and among state security forces—thereby raising the cost of military intervention. In this case, civilian leaders either create new counterbalancing security forces, such as gendarmeries or national police forces, or they induce existing military units to balance against each other, creating deterrence within the armed forces. Sanctioning strategies use the fear of punishment to induce military cooperation with a democratic regime. Sometimes democratizers may be able to use civilian and military courts, loyalists in the military command struc-

ture, or internal security forces to suppress military uprisings and punish rebellious officers. A sanctioning strategy, it should be noted, does not require repeated confrontations with the armed forces—if successful, it has the effect of modifying the interests of the officer corps. Officers who cooperate with a new democratic regime will tend to have successful careers and rapid advancement. Those who oppose it will find themselves imprisoned or retired if they participate in failed rebellions. These new incentives and the fear of punishment will lead the armed forces to accept the jurisdictional boundaries set by civilians and cooperate with the government.

This range of strategies relies on co-opting, recruiting, or intimidating a sufficiently large number of military officers into supporting the government's agenda in order to prevent the armed forces from acting cohesively to oppose civilian control. These strategies are not designed to benefit the armed forces. Rather, they are intended to defend a democratic regime from military threats in cases where civilian control does not exist. Civilian leaders who blend strategies of appeasement, monitoring, and divide-and-rule can achieve particularly powerful combinations that grant governments both early warning of military threats and the leverage necessary to avert them. Military forces in democratizing regimes almost always pursue counterstrategies to oppose civilian control. But when civilians benefit from strong opportunities—as during transitions to democracy—the officer corps is likely to be internally divided and unable to implement such counterstrategies.

Institutionalizing Civilian Control of the Armed Forces

Civilian authority is likely to persist only if democratizers use the regime's leverage to create institutions that reduce the military's jurisdictional boundaries. All states face crises—wars, economic recessions, social unrest—that can weaken the legitimacy of a democratic regime and increase the military's power. Even in the absence of crises, armed forces usually recover internal cohesion and unity once they have withdrawn from direct rule over the state. Institutions allow civilian rulers to transform their temporary leverage over the armed forces into permanent democratic control.

Civilian rulers are likely to select institutions that reflect the strategies which allowed them to achieve leverage over the military. Those who use sanctioning strategies create legislative oversight committees with permanent staffs, civilian defense secretariats, and independent intelligence agencies. Governments that rely on divide-and-rule strengthen police forces and create multiple intelligence and security agencies. Generous pensions, benefits, and housing

subsidies are more likely to appease military officers than ad hoc pay raises designed to ward off an imminent coup. When temporary strategies become institutionalized as rules governing civil-military relations, they are transformed into permanently operating factors that sustain civilian leverage over the military bureaucracy.

For these institutions to become consolidated, the rules that govern them must first be written and then they must acquire authority. These rules may emerge from a new constitution, executive decrees, legislative action, or court decisions that define new military jurisdictional boundaries. Some of these rules will acquire the weight of authority through custom—either because they are in the interest of significant factions in the officer corps or because the armed forces find themselves in too weak a position to challenge them following the transition. In many cases, however, enforcement of new rules is an inherently conflictive process as both sides attempt to manipulate the new institutions to suit their needs and protect their prerogatives. The outcomes of these conflicts become the norms for future dealings between civilian officials and the officer corps. By continually prevailing in civil-military conflicts, democratizers persuade military officers to accept civilian orders—thereby facilitating the process of writing and enforcing the rules of civilian control.

A democratic regime's ability to institutionalize civilian control is constrained by its capacity to supervise the armed forces and enforce new rules.* This capacity is the combination of budgetary resources, expert civilian personnel, and government attention committed exclusively to matters of civilian control and national defense. Institutionalizing a sanctioning strategy demands a high level of this capacity—especially civilian defense experts to manage military bureaucracies, develop and allocate budgets, and institutionalize government oversight mechanisms. This approach is most effective when civil society contains groups and associations, such as think tanks or human rights organizations, committed to sustaining the regime's control over the armed forces and providing the government with external sources of defense expertise.†

The appeasement or divide-and-rule strategies, by contrast, are attractive to democratizers precisely because they require little of the regime's capacity.

*Recent discussions of civil/military relations in emerging democracies have noted the lack of government attention and administrative capacity dedicated to this issue. See Fitch (1998: 167–169) and Rial (1996: 58–59).

†Governments rely on internal and external oversight mechanisms to regulate bureaucracies. See McCubbins and Schwartz (1984).

Divide-and-rule strategies rely on mutual vigilance and counterbalancing by military (as opposed to civilian) forces to deter intervention in politics. Rather than allocating civilian experts and resources to the task of controlling the military, rulers modify the structure of the security forces in order to increase internal competition for power and resources.* Appeasement strategies require little more than the acquiescence of elected officials to military demands. And while they may lead to higher defense budgets, they consume little in the way of government management capacity.

Implications for Democracy in Asia

The central task facing civilian rulers in emerging democracies that lack civilian control is building up the regime leverage necessary to induce the armed forces to accept narrowed jurisdictional boundaries. In many Asian countries, the armed forces still have bloated jurisdictional boundaries and engage relatively independently in politics, economic development, and internal security. In Pakistan, the armed forces continue to assume exclusive jurisdiction over security functions: even after ten years of democratization, the military still steps in to resolve state leadership crises such as the confrontation between Prime Minister Sharif, the president, and the Supreme Court during the constitutional crisis of 1997.¹⁹ In Indonesia, the armed forces are allotted a certain portion of legislative seats, they play an important role in the domestic economy, and under the doctrine of “*d w i f u n g s i*” (dual function) they maintain control over both internal and external security functions.²⁰ Similarly, the armed forces in Thailand have long played a dominant role in internal security and many officers have participated in cross-border trade with Burma and Cambodia.²¹ In these countries and in others with similar jurisdictional boundaries, maximizing civilian control requires compelling the armed forces to abandon their role in leadership selection, public policy, and internal security and then refocusing the military mission on their primary professional role: preparing for external conflict. Unlike some regions of the world, such as Latin America, many Asian countries face a threatening international environment—making the external defense mission both a necessary and a professionally rewarding focus for military activity.

*Divide-and-rule strategies may consume a great deal of military capacity in inefficient duplication of capabilities and unnecessary competitiveness, but they require little in the way of civilian expertise and attention.

Transitions to democracy remain the primary opportunity to create leverage over the armed forces. Some Asian states, such as Indonesia, are in the midst of regime transitions, and democratizers may still have a chance to improve their leverage over the armed forces. Indonesian democratizers face a mixed opportunity structure: social mobilization may act as a counterbalance to the traditional power of the armed forces, yet divisions within civilian elites and a lack of consensus on the goals of democratization are likely to prevent the regime from gaining much leverage over the armed forces.²² Other cases, such as Cambodia, face much dimmer prospects and democratizers are unlikely to attain a position of authority from which they can begin the task of crafting democracy and civilian control. The key underpinning for civilian control is a broad civilian consensus on democratization. Asian countries in transition that fail to attain this consensus are unlikely to achieve democratization, let alone civilian control.

In some Asian countries, however, such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, democratization processes have already moved past the initial transition phase. In these cases the armed forces have largely reconstituted their internal cohesion and capacity to intervene in politics. Increasing the regime's leverage over the armed forces in these cases is more difficult, but this does not rule out further progress on civilian control. New opportunities may arise from external shocks to the civil-military system. The current Asian financial crisis provides an example of this, since the requirements of fiscal austerity may compel civilians to seek greater authority over military spending and operations in the interest of reducing costs. Moreover, military officers are likely to acquiesce to these emergency measures, as has occurred in Thailand, seeing them as justified by the depths of the financial crisis.²³ Although the robustness of democratic institutions in South Korea contributes to the regime's leverage over the armed forces, the financial crisis has also provided the new government with opportunities to reduce the defense budget.²⁴

Similarly, the broad commitment to democratization in the international community and increasing globalization may give civilian rulers an additional means to maximize their leverage over the armed forces and deter a military coup. Increasingly, international institutions are conditioning their relations with Asian states on human rights and democratization. The European Union's relations with ASEAN have been affected by disputes over the participation of Burma in this regional organization, for example, and Cambodia has faced increasing international criticism over the actions of the Hun Sen government.²⁵ It also appears that the sheer complexity of the political and economic problems facing Pakistan—as well as the possibility that military intervention in politics

may worsen the crisis—has deterred the Pakistani armed forces from removing Prime Minister Sharif despite serious challenges to traditional military prerogatives.²⁶ At least since the end of the Cold War, it has become increasingly apparent that military intervention in politics has negative effects on foreign assistance and international investment—an additional deterrent to coups d'état.

But even if Asian democratizers are able to gain leverage over the armed forces, they still face the crucial task of institutionalizing this control in a democratic fashion. In particular, emerging democracies may lack the human resources necessary to staff the civilian defense ministries, legislative oversight committees, and defense policy institutes that constitute the network of institutions that undergird government oversight of the armed forces. In countries such as Thailand and Indonesia, defense policy studies by civilians have been discouraged by the armed forces in the name of national security—but also with the intent of limiting defense expertise to military officers, thus enhancing their autonomy. In countries with a history of military repression, civilians may deliberately avoid studying defense issues for fear of reprisal by local security forces. Until recently, the strong economic performance of Asian countries was likely to lure civilian experts away from the study of defense issues and into a more rewarding focus on economic policy. These factors discouraged the formation of the human capital necessary to institutionalize strong civilian control.²⁷

Democratizing states in Asia are at many different stages of transition. Some countries, such as Indonesia, are only beginning their transitions and it remains to be seen whether they will become fully democratic. In others, such as Thailand, civilian rulers have little leverage over their armed forces and the process of narrowing military jurisdictional boundaries proceeds incrementally. In South Korea, civilian authority is relatively well established, but government control is not fully institutionalized. Here the principal task is building up the regime's capacity in order to strengthen defense oversight institutions.²⁸ None of these countries has experienced the broad opportunity structures that would enable them to rapidly institutionalize civilian control. Instead, democratizers will need to take advantage of new opportunities, created by external shocks such as the regional economic crisis, to advance their authority over the armed forces. Until this evolutionary process is complete, these democracies will not be fully consolidated.

WHO WILL GUARD THE GUARDIANS?

Although civilian supremacy is unchallenged in democracies such as India and

Japan, civilian supervision of the armed forces remains problematic. Neither country is threatened by military intervention in politics. In both countries, military jurisdictional boundaries are narrow. Instead, civil-military relations revolve around the bureaucratic politics that characterize relationships between elected officials and bureaucrats in every democracy. In other words, civil-military relations are characterized by the interplay between the military officers' efforts to secure their professional goals, such as greater autonomy or more resources, and the need for elected officials to supervise the military to ensure compliance with their own policy preferences.

Supervising the armed forces is a difficult task for elected officials because of the asymmetry in expertise and the differences in policy preferences between politicians and soldiers. In a democracy, civilian officials determine defense policy in order to ensure that the state is adequately protected and that military activities comply with the desires of the electorate.* The officers they supervise, however, have access to specialized expertise on defense affairs that is often greater than that of the civilians who oversee them. By participating in combat, soldiers differentiate themselves from civilians and can claim a special authority on defense issues due to their willingness to risk their lives. Furthermore, military activities are often surrounded by secrecy in the interest of furthering national defense. The armed forces tend to prefer considerable autonomy from civilian oversight, as well, arguing that excessive civilian interference in military affairs leads to inefficiency and hinders the performance of the armed forces in combat. This combination of factors makes the military an unusually opaque institution: elected officials often have little information on which to base their decisions and few measures that reveal whether they are indeed carried out.²⁹

And even though the armed forces in consolidated democracies accept civilian supremacy, they are still able to act strategically to deflect civilian policies that run counter to their preferences. Military leaders in democracies can defend themselves against civilian policies by appealing to traditions and norms, by playing off the civilian legislature against the executive branch, or by mobilizing supporters in civil society. Appealing to their expertise in national security affairs, they may also be able to argue against civilian policies on the basis of their special knowledge. Unless they have access to alternative sources of expertise,

*Clausewitz set forth an early division of responsibilities between civilian and military officials by allocating decisions over strategic matters to the civilians and delegating operational and tactical decisions to the armed forces. See Feaver (1996).

elected officials may be unable to judge the accuracy of the military's counter-arguments and may find it less costly politically to defer to the military's wishes.

Elected officials can use a wide variety of institutional mechanisms to secure accurate information on military intentions, activities, and compliance with civilian directives. They can take proactive measures—so-called police patrols—by strengthening the civilian secretariat charged with overseeing defense policy. This secretariat can then conduct inspections, audits, and research that allows informed civilian decisions on defense policy issues. As Feaver argues, the larger the civilian defense secretariat is relative to the armed forces it supervises, the more likely elected officials are to develop an accurate picture of military activities. Legislatures can take an active role through their defense committees, as well, by conducting hearings and investigations of military activities. Democracies can also rely on “fire alarms”—institutions designed to alert elected officials to problems inside the armed forces. This type of monitoring can be provided through external agencies, such as an independent press or defense policy think tanks, or it can emerge from within the armed forces as a result of interservice rivalry and competition for resources.³⁰ In both cases, elected officials are alerted to problems developing within the armed forces.

In Asia, two countries have achieved both democratic consolidation and civilian control of the armed forces: Japan and India. Yet civil-military relations in each country are characterized by certain perverse features that inhibit the professionalization of the military and prevent an efficient articulation of civilian control over the armed forces. In Japan, a history of militarism prior to 1945 has cast a shadow over civil-military relations, and fears raised by both domestic and international audiences over the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have led to a particularly narrow bureaucratic base for civilian control. India has maintained civilian control of the armed forces since independence, yet the increasing deployment of the armed forces in internal security duties and the exclusion of the military from nuclear security issues create potential problems for civil-military relations in the long term. In both countries, the issues facing civil-military relations have little to do with the regime's stability but, rather, with proper roles for politicians, bureaucrats, and officers in formulating defense policy.

Japan maintains a high degree of civilian control—as is evidenced by the military's narrow jurisdictional boundaries. The Japanese armed forces play no role in internal security functions, let alone public policy or state leadership selection. Foreign policy is principally in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trade and

Industry occasionally participate in key decisions. The civilian secretariat in the Joint Defense Agency (JDA) has a substantial role in formulating defense policy and national strategy, and the director general of the JDA approves defense programs and strategic estimates. Civilians head all senior leadership posts within the JDA, as well as the six bureaus that control armed forces operations, such as finance, defense policy, and personnel. The Joint Staff Council represents the most senior level of the Self-Defense Forces military hierarchy. Their role in national security policy is limited to preparing short-term and long-term defense programs and mobilization plans for civilian approval.³¹

Despite the sophistication of the institutions of civilian control in Japan, they are narrowly based in the civilian bureaucracy. There is little participation from the cabinet, the legislature, or civil society. In great part, this is a legacy of the history of militarism prior to 1945 as well as continuing concerns both at home and abroad to restrain the resurgence of Japanese military power in the future. Japanese public opinion continues to reflect opposition to any serious defense buildup or any revision of Japan's "peace" constitution.³² Public debate over national security issues has concentrated on the legal standing of the Self-Defense Forces. Legislation governing the use of the armed forces in national emergencies is almost nonexistent, which makes their mobilization and deployment problematic. Moreover, legislative interest in defense policy is limited largely to budgetary issues rather than to defense policy as a whole.³³

Political sensitivity over national security issues is reflected in the institutions of civilian supervision. The Joint Defense Agency is not accorded ministerial rank but is instead a bureau under the direction of the Prime Minister's Office. The prime minister must officially communicate through the director general of the JDA to give orders to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, however, which limits the prime minister's access to defense information and grants the civilian bureaucracy in the JDA an unusual degree of power over policy. Some scholars have characterized the role of the prime minister and the cabinet as a rubber stamp for the decisions of the civilian bureaucracy. Yet the low status of the JDA limits its influence within the overall Japanese bureaucracy and in government policymaking. The armed forces in Japan are doubly isolated: first by their limited defense role and narrow jurisdictional boundaries and again by the low status of the civilian secretariat that supervises their activities. Although civilian control is strong in Japan, the isolation of the armed forces and the discomfort of political leaders with defense issues have created a highly inefficient policy apparatus.³⁴ One notes that there is already some movement away from the containment of the Self-Defense Forces by civilian politicians to a policy

of engagement with the uniformed SDF officers on issues of national security, particularly under Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1997.³⁵

India too faces problems with its institutions of civilian control, although for reasons entirely different from those of Japan. Civilian control has been well established in India since independence. Theoretically this control has operated through two tiers of civilian supervision over the armed forces: the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs and the civilian Ministry of Defense. Civilians have always played an important role in defense policy—at times even exerting excessive control over operational matters in several of India's conflicts with its neighbors.³⁶ Moreover, there is little evidence of a substantial role for either the legislature or civil society in controlling the military, and the competence of the Ministry of Defense bureaucracy to participate in oversight activities has been questioned. Although the Indian armed forces have generally acquired some degree of professional autonomy in external defense matters, military jurisdictional boundaries have been under strain due to civilian efforts to pull the armed forces into internal security duties and prevent them from participating in nuclear weapons policymaking. Participation in internal security duties has risen dramatically in the past decade: it is estimated that 65 percent of Indian Army troops are assigned to such tasks.³⁷ This tendency is particularly worrisome, since internal security roles tend to degrade the professional capabilities of the armed forces and politicize the officer corps. In other words, the skills used in internal security are not those used in external defense, and troops that are trained to carry out one function cannot readily prepare for the other. These concerns are shared by the Indian military high command. But for civilian politicians, the immediate need to maintain public order in a diverse society trumps considerations of efficiency.³⁸

Similarly, the civilian bureaucracy's efforts to control all aspects of nuclear planning have prevented significant military participation in this policy arena—even though the armed forces are increasingly concerned with adapting their operational planning to take into account nuclear scenarios.³⁹ In the wake of recent Indian nuclear tests, there have been efforts to increase the participation of military officers in the Ministry of Defense and in the newly created National Security Council, although it is still too early to determine whether these institutional changes will be effective.⁴⁰ Even though civilians dominate nuclear policymaking, this level of civilian control may have perverse consequences for national security, by preventing the effective planning and integration of nuclear and conventional forces in the event of full-scale conflict.

In countries with consolidated democracies, civil-military relations focus

on balancing effective civilian supervision of the military with the military's need for professional autonomy in order to maintain an efficient armed forces. Just as too little civilian control is dangerous in emerging democracies, too much civilian control can lead to perverse consequences. In Japan, the present isolation of the armed forces and public distaste for military affairs means that it is difficult for civilian politicians to make effective defense policy or prepare adequate defense legislation—even though external threats, such as the North Korean missile program, seem to be growing. The current system of national security decision-making may also be insufficiently flexible to function in crisis situations, and it has rarely been tested since the end of World War II. Japan would be well advised to accelerate the reforms begun under Prime Minister Hashimoto and create a broader system of civilian control that includes effective engagement between the uniformed Self-Defense Forces, the cabinet, the diet, and civil society.⁴¹

In India, civil-military relations would function more effectively if military jurisdictional boundaries were reshaped. Even in countries with well-established civilian control, the involvement of military troops in internal security generates perverse consequences for military readiness and regime stability—as well as increasing the politicization of the officer corps. India would benefit from delegating internal security to the police and paramilitary forces, allowing the regular military to withdraw from this function and focus on its international role. This renewed focus on external defense should include a reasonable role for the armed forces in preparing for nuclear contingencies—a role that reconciles military needs for defense efficiency with civilian jurisdiction over nuclear policy.

CIVILIAN CONTROL IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: OBSTACLE TO LIBERALIZATION?

Even civilian authoritarian regimes, such as China and Vietnam, face problems similar to those of democratic regimes when it comes to controlling their armed forces. They, however, have largely solved the problem of civilian control by an entirely different institutional mechanism: the political commissar system (PCS). This institution has afforded these regimes a high degree of security against military intervention in politics. Nevertheless, even though civil-military relations at the state level may be unproblematic, this has not ruled out political-military conflicts within the dominant single party—as occurred in the PRC during the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, as civilian authoritarian regimes begin to democratize, as in Taiwan, these states will have to replace the institutions associated with the political commissariat with those appropriate

to a democratic regime to ensure the depoliticization of the armed forces and continued civilian oversight.

In these states, the political commissar system assures the authority of the hegemonic party over the armed forces through strategies of monitoring and indoctrination. In both China and Vietnam, the hierarchy of military officers is paralleled by a hierarchy of political officers representing the Communist Party.* This pattern of parallel authority is reinforced by the high level of military officer membership in the Communist Party—reaching 70 percent of the officer corps in Vietnam, which includes nearly all mid-level and high-ranking officers. The Communist Party has also developed parallel organizations with all state defense oversight institutions, providing it with another channel through which to monitor and command the armed forces.† For example, the chairman of the Communist Party in China heads both the State Central Military Committee and the CP Central Military Committee, which makes him the supreme commander of the armed forces.⁴² Beyond monitoring, the political commissariat still carries out an important role in indoctrination. In China, the Tiananmen crisis led to a substantial intensification of this indoctrination, reinforcing the norm that the Communist Party had absolute control over the armed forces. As Paltiel points out, however, this shift toward greater indoctrination was only possible because the principle of Communist Party supremacy was not challenged by the military in the first place.⁴³

While this system gives civilians in these regimes a well-developed system for monitoring the armed forces, the high level of membership of military officers in the Communist Party also gives the armed forces an important voice in party (and therefore state) decisions. Shambaugh, for example, notes that the percentage of PLA officer membership in the Communist Party Central Committee rose as high as 45 percent in 1969, although by 1987 it had dropped to 19 percent.⁴⁴ Moreover, even though the regime is not threatened with military intervention, there have been episodes of highly conflictual political-military relations within the party.⁴⁵ Particularly since the PLA's role in preserving the Communist Party's

* In China there are actually three parallel organizations comprising the political work system: the General Political Department, the Discipline Inspection Committee system, and the Party Committee system. These organizations have representatives at almost all levels of the military hierarchy down to the company level. See Shambaugh (1991: 547).

† Nan Li (1993: 403–405) points out that since the political commissariat in the People's Liberation Army often shares administrative functions (and therefore interests) with the organization it monitors, its performance as a monitor is weakened.

dominance during the Tiananmen crisis, the military has achieved a substantial voice in senior party councils, although cross-cutting cleavages within the military elite prevent them from acting in a unified manner.⁴⁶ Even though the Communist Party is still the dominant player in state policymaking, the configuration of civil-military relations in China and Vietnam has placed significant constraints on civilian rulers.

These constraints are exacerbated by the broad jurisdictional boundaries of the armed forces in China and Vietnam. In China, the armed forces play an important role in internal security—as evidenced by the PLA's role in the Tiananmen Square events in 1989. Thayer points to the PAVN's dual role in Vietnam—providing external defense and building socialism—as evidence of its broad mission. This expansive definition of the military's role has been compounded by the decision of the party leadership in both Vietnam and China to partially “marketize” the budgets of the armed forces. In Vietnam, for example, 20 percent of the armed forces budget for 1989 was internally generated and 12 percent of military personnel participated directly in economic activities in 1993.⁴⁷ Although the military's participation in the economy may reduce the burden of defense spending on the state budget, having independent sources of funding tends to increase military independence from civilian oversight and to create a new array of factions within the officer corps that have vested interests in the government's economic and labor policy. In other regions of the world, particularly Latin America, this type of policy has heightened military politicization and increased civil-military friction. A similar set of concerns explain the decision of Premier Jiang Zemin in 1998 to order the PLA to diminish its independent participation in the emerging Chinese market economy.⁴⁸

While this degree of military input into public policy may be functional within the overall context of Communist Party domination of the state, it is unacceptable in a democracy. Replacing the party commissar system with democratic institutions of control is a difficult but necessary part of any successful transition to democracy, as the current experience of Taiwan suggests. As in the PRC and Vietnam, in Taiwan the Kuomintang (KMT) utilized a system of political commissars (Military-Party Department, or MPD) to maintain control over the armed forces, although this institution was kept secret from the public between 1950 and 1988.⁴⁹ Not only did the MPD act as a command channel to the Ministry of Defense, but it also participated in domestic security by carrying out surveillance against military personnel and civilians.⁵⁰ The armed forces in general participated extensively in domestic security functions through a number of organizations. One of the most prominent of these was the Taiwan Garrison

Command, charged with administering martial law. The end of the KMT's official role in the armed forces in 1988 and the abolition of the Taiwan Garrison Command in 1991 ended much of the military's official responsibility for internal security. Yet it is precisely those hard-line officers most closely aligned with the KMT's political commissariat and security forces who led the resistance to democratization during the 1980s and 1990s.* Although this activity has not threatened the regime itself, it has played a role in delaying democratization. Moreover, the ruling party has not shown itself particularly eager to empower alternative institutions of civilian control, such as the Ministry of Defense. Instead, it has fallen to the opposition Democratic People's Party (DPP) to push for greater executive and legislative oversight of military activities (with only partial success).⁵¹ Although civilian supremacy appears to be increasingly assured in Taiwan, the inability of the KMT and the DPP to arrive at a consensus on democratic institutions of civilian control suggests that government oversight of the armed forces will remain weak.

The political commissar system provides civilian authoritarian regimes with reliable protection from a military threat to regime stability at the cost of some degree of control over the armed forces. The interlocking networks of military and civilian elites within the hegemonic party in these countries create diffuse military jurisdictional boundaries that call into question whether these countries have achieved purely civilian (as opposed to party) control of the armed forces. As the Taiwanese case suggests, movement toward more democratic forms is a complex process. But unlike many emerging democracies in Asia, it is one in which democratizers benefit from well-established norms of civilian supremacy.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has focused on democratic or democratizing states in Asia or on authoritarian states that are engaging in political liberalization. Clearly a number of Asian states do not fit these categories. In Burma, a well-entrenched military regime has ruled for over a decade, although it has had problems controlling its regional commanders.⁵² Malaysia is difficult to classify either as a purely authoritarian or a democratic state, although it has maintained civilian control over the

*Sullivan (1996: 37–45) highlights the role of General Hau Pei-tsun in resisting democratization both as chief of the general staff and as premier until 1993.

military since its independence. Singapore provides a similar example, although the state's small size and the high proportion of reservists in its armed forces may strengthen the civil-military consensus and minimize the armed forces' autonomy. But for most democratizing states in Asia, there are a number of well-defined policies and institutions that can ensure civilian control of the armed forces. Not only are these policies appropriate for emerging democracies, but they also serve as reminders for policymakers in consolidated democracies.

Strengthen Civilian Consensus on Democracy

A strong civilian consensus on democratization is one of the most important elements for preventing military intervention in politics. Armed forces rarely act alone in politics, and military intervention is difficult without the open support of powerful civilian interests. Countries that strengthen their democratic institutions and the confidence of their citizens in the regime are more likely to establish government authority over the armed forces, as the cases of the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand suggest. In all three countries, the armed forces have a history of political power and influence. Yet civilian consensus and mobilization in favor of democracy have allowed the emerging regimes in these cases to survive threats from their armed forces and make substantial progress toward civilian control. Furthermore, the emergence of an independent press and a diverse civil society provide the democratic regime with additional resources with which to monitor the armed forces and alert elected officials of problems in civil-military relations. Although it is too early to tell, Indonesia may benefit from strong civilian support for democratization. This does not rule out serious, even violent, civil-military confrontations during the first years of democratization, however.

Create Civilian Agencies to Oversee Military Activities

The most successful cases of democratic civilian control in Asia—Japan and India—are both characterized by strong civilian bureaucracies that monitor the daily activities of their armed forces. In other democracies in Europe and the Americas, civilian oversight is shared by civilian defense ministries, legislative committees, a free press, and civil society. Many emerging democracies in Asia would benefit from greater civilian participation in government institutions, such as defense committees in parliament. They may also have to create entirely new institutions—such as realistic defense budgets that can be tracked and enforced by government officials. In the aggregate, these bodies have three essential tasks: controlling promotions and assignments within the officer corps; deter-

mining military spending and procurement; and approving appropriate missions and roles for the armed forces. This will require most democratizing states in Asia—ranging from Indonesia and Pakistan to Thailand and South Korea—to invest additional resources in training civilian bureaucrats to participate in defense decision-making. Not only should these states train civilian defense analysts, but they must also find a way to compensate them adequately for their services and empower them *vis-à-vis* entrenched military interests. Given the international community's support for democratization, other countries that have achieved civilian control in Asia, Europe, and the Americas are likely to back efforts to upgrade civilian defense institutions in these countries.

Limit Military Participation in the Economy

For some Asian countries, such as China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia, official and unofficial military participation in the economy has become a means of reducing government defense expenditures. In some cases, it has also become a means of accelerating economic development by improving the infrastructure. From the perspective of achieving democratic civilian control, however, this approach creates fundamental problems. Simply put: military forces that generate a portion of their funding from their own activities find it easier to evade civilian supervision. In other words, military officers can fund projects that run counter to government policy, thus escaping civilian control. Furthermore, military participation in the civilian economy generates new interests in the officer corps that may be affected by the decisions of elected officials. For example, military involvement in cross-border smuggling in Thailand undermines the rule of law, damages civilian confidence in democratic institutions, and strengthens military interests in a lax government frontier policy. If elected officials ensure that the armed forces' budget is entirely funded and controlled through their decisions, they will find that controlling other military activities, such as operations and missions, becomes considerably easier.

Strengthen Civilian Police and Internal Security Forces

Even in states with strong civilian control, such as India, the armed forces dedicate a substantial degree of their time to internal security duties. Furthermore, military forces in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have often played a key role in counterinsurgency operations, many of which have been conducted with little input from civilian rulers. As this study has argued, military participation in internal security tends to reduce the efficacy of the armed forces in their external defense role and increases the risk of politi-

cization within the officer corps. All too often, however, the armed forces in these countries have participated in internal security duties at the behest of civilian rulers who find that alternative institutions, such as national or local police forces, have failed to maintain public order. In many cases, these civilian-led internal security forces have proved inefficient, venal, and corrupt. Democratizers can promote civilian control by reforming these internal security forces so that they can carry out their duties effectively. This effort may involve seeking international assistance in reforming and modernizing civilian security forces. Elected officials should also regulate the participation of armed forces in internal security emergencies. When the police have been overwhelmed, it is the elected officials who must determine where and when the armed forces should participate in internal security.

Offer the Military a Positive External Defense Mission

Although the official rationale for most armed forces in Asia is external defense, in many cases the military prefers to participate in more substantive, prestigious, or lucrative internal missions—as has been the case in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Many emerging democracies in Asia still lack the civilian oversight capacity to supervise military participation in internal missions, however. As I have argued, shifting the military's focus to external defense is likely to reduce the threat to the new democracy and increase military professionalism, even when civilian oversight capacities are still weak. This shift toward an external orientation does not necessarily increase the risk of international conflict. As recent efforts in South America suggest, regional security planning, joint exercises, and participation in international peacekeeping missions can provide alternative sources of employment for armed forces. Other important missions for Asian militaries include the eradication of piracy in Southeast Asian sea lanes, naval patrols of territorial waters, and military patrols of porous frontiers to prevent foreign and local depredation of natural resources. While these tasks promote military professionalism, they do so without increasing the risk of regional war that might otherwise be created if Asian militaries were to shift collectively

ENDNOTES

1 Stepan (1988).

2 Welch (1992: 323–342).

3 Agüero (1995); Pion-Berlin (1992: 83–102).

4 Agüero (1995: 19–21).

5 Huntington (1957).

6 Stepan (1988: 93–127); Linz and Stepan (1996: 209–211).

7 Pion-Berlin (1992); Stepan (1988).

- 8 Huntington (1957: 32). Military forces that concentrate on their primary mission are more effective in combat and less likely to intervene in political affairs.
- 9 Alagappa (1998).
- 10 See Fitch (1998: 182–187) for an insightful discussion of the institutions necessary for democratic civilian control.
- 11 Mulvenon (1998); Ockey (1998: 9–10).
- 12 Agüero (1995); Stepan (1986); Linz and Stepan (1996: 55–65); Karl (1990).
- 13 See Trinkunas (1999: chap. 1) for an extended discussion of building civilian control in emerging democracies.
- 14 Huntington (1968: 49–58); Alagappa (1998).
- 15 Stepan (1988).
- 16 Hedman (1999: 29).
- 17 Linz (1978).
- 18 Ockey, “Auld Lang Syne,” 9–10.
- 19 Sattar (1999: 8).
- 20 McBeth (1996: 24).
- 21 Buszynski (1994: 721–738).
- 22 Robinson (1998).
- 23 Vatikiotis, Tasker, and Thayer (1998: 23).
- 24 Hoon (1998: 24).
- 25 Tasker (1996: 24); Thayer (1998: 21).
- 26 Radhid (1998: 25); Sattar (1999: 16–20).
- 27 Alagappa (1998: 10–11).
- 28 Hoon (1993: 36).
- 29 Feaver (1996: 11–13).
- 30 McCubbins and Schwartz (1984); Feaver (1996: 14–17).
- 31 Katzenstein (1996: 104–107); Katahara (1998: 9–10).
- 32 Jiang (1992: 9); do Rosario (1991: 26–27).
- 33 Katahara (1998: 2–5).
- 34 Katzenstein (1996: 108–111); Katahara (1998: 6–7).
- 35 Katahara (1999: 18–19 and 26–29).
- 36 Singh Sidhu (1998: 3–6).
- 37 Dasgupta (1999: 19).
- 38 Ganguly (1991); Singh Sidhu (1998: 9).
- 39 Singh Sidhu (1998: 13); Dasgupta (1999: 16–17).
- 40 Dasgupta (1999: 13–15).
- 41 Katahara (1999: 18–19).
- 42 Paltiel (1995: 786).
- 43 Shambaugh (1991: 551–553); Paltiel (1995: 786).
- 44 Shambaugh (1991: 534). Thayer too reports a substantial though steadily diminishing percentage of military participation in the Vietnamese CP Central Committee; see Thayer (1994: 1–3).
- 45 Shambaugh (1991: 535) notes several instances of the PLA’s political role; see also Paltiel (1995: 785–788).
- 46 Paltiel (1995: 798–800).
- 47 Thayer (1994: 50).
- 48 Mulvenon (1998: 12–14).
- 49 See Cheng (1990).
- 50 Sullivan (1996: 18–20).
- 51 Sullivan (1996: 42–48).
- 52 Callahan (1999).

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