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Civil-Military Relations, Occasional Paper

Bruneau, Thomas C.

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
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**THE CENTER FOR  
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**Occasional Paper**

**Ministries of Defense and  
Democratic Civil-Military Relations**

**Thomas C. Bruneau  
August 2001**

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense of the United States Government.

## **The Center for Civil-Military Relations**

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## **Thomas C. Bruneau**

Thomas Bruneau is a Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He joined the School in 1987 after having taught in the Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada since 1969. He became Chairman of the Department in 1989, and continued in that position until late-1995. He has researched and written extensively on Latin America, especially Brazil, and Portugal. He has published more than a dozen books in English and Portuguese as well as articles in journals including *Latin American Research Review*, *Comparative Politics*, *Third World Quarterly*, *Journal of Interamerican Studies* and *World Affairs*, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, and *Encyclopedia of Democracy*.

A native of California, Professor Bruneau received his B.A. from California State University at San Jose and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley. He was a Fulbright scholar to India (1962-63) and to Brazil (1985-86), and has been awarded fellowships from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (several awards), the International Development Research Centre, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Gulbenkian Foundation, and the Luso-American Development Foundation. He has traveled extensively in Latin America and Europe, with shorter trips to Africa and Asia.

In addition to his position as Professor in the National Security Affairs Department, Professor Bruneau is the Director for the Center for Civil-Military Relations.

# MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND DEMOCRATIC CIVIL– MILITARY RELATIONS

Thomas C. Bruneau

## Introduction

The very existence of a ministry of defense (MOD) is an important basic indicator of the overall situation of civil-military relations in a country. Although some of these ministries are but hollow shells with no power whatsoever, others have assumed increasingly important roles as catalysts and platforms in consolidating democratic civil – military relations. This paper situates the founding and development of ministries of defense in historical context, namely the current era of democratization at the end of the Cold War; explains why they are created; and identifies conditions and actions required for the ministries to fulfill major roles and responsibilities in achieving effective and efficient defense while also ensuring democratic civilian control.

A MOD is currently a core element in democratic civil-military relations. This structure today is widely viewed as the solution to the classic, paradoxical problem “who guards the guardians?” If the correct response is that the democratically elected civilians guard the guardians, then a MOD is the fundamental vehicle used for this control. A MOD is the preferred mechanism to match the democratic legitimacy of the elected civilians with the professional expertise in armed conflict of the military. Some of the most important issues in civil-military relations in the contemporary era of democratic consolidation are addressed in the form and functions of a MOD.

Despite the arguable importance of this topic, there is very little written about ministries of defense and democratic consolidation. There is good material on the history and current dynamics of the U.S. Department of Defense, and while some of the lessons learned since its creation in 1947 are relevant elsewhere, civilian control over the armed forces was never the challenge in the United States that it has been for most of the so-called new democracies.<sup>1</sup> Although most of the central issues in civil-military relations are generic, and as such must be confronted in any democracy, the differences in history,

security environment, and institutional structures are so vast that the lessons learned in the older, more “mature” democracies are not fully relevant to the new democracies. There is nothing written analyzing what is required for a MOD to successfully combine the democratic legitimacy of politicians with the expertise of professional military officers.<sup>2</sup>

In this paper I will draw data from observations in countries creating, or recreating, a MOD and interviews conducted with those involved. I will illustrate main points with examples from several countries, as determined by the availability of information. This effort is, then, more deductive than inductive, being based on awareness of how institutions work, some basic research, and extensive experience in countries currently establishing their ministries of defense.<sup>3</sup> This paper defines the themes and issues involved without extensive elaboration. It is intended for policy makers in new and not so new democracies that want to learn how civilians can exercise control of the armed forces while also maintaining forces that can provide for the security and defense of the nation. For researchers, if this framework seems appropriate, books could be written on important cases, such as Spain or South Africa, or a set of comparative studies.

## **Conceptual Approach**

In order to avoid the all too common error in studies of civil – military relations of misleading formalism, of confusing form with content, we must at least briefly define the conceptual approach to this topic. An analysis of a bureaucracy such as a MOD must begin with Max Weber. In his classic “Bureaucracy” Weber explains, “The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production.”<sup>4</sup> While this statement is formally correct, and Weber elaborates on the conditions under which bureaucracies emerged, much hinges on the term “fully developed bureaucratic mechanism.” The more recent literature in the theory of organizations, and particularly the sub-field of social science known as the “new

institutionalism,” takes us further and highlights a number of necessary considerations for the topic under study. The more important of these considerations center on the often forgotten fact that bureaucracies, that are here referred to as institutions, are crafted by humans at particular times and with particular agendas or purposes in mind. The scholars using this approach also look to the conditions under which these institutions develop or wither. And, they analyze the “stickiness” of institutions. Created at one time, they do not easily change.<sup>5</sup> All of this is by way of caution: that one MOD does not equal another MOD. It depends; we must be skeptical and analyze in some detail to grasp whether a MOD does or does not have power, and the real extent of its roles and reach. In sum, the approach to analysis here looks at MODs as institutions that are either formal and without power and content, or are alive and dynamic with potential to continue to develop. To allow us to situate a MOD in an historical and political space in order to analyze the conditions for creation and development, we must first briefly review the current political and military context.

## **Current Context**

There are three main features or elements of the current global context that are most important. The first is the spread of democracy. The world continues to be riding on the so-called Third Wave of democratization that has seen dictatorships collapse, replaced by democracies of varying degrees of stability and popular participation. Since 1974 the world has experienced a continuing wave in which authoritarian regimes, where the armed forces were either the rulers or a key actor for the rulers, are replaced by democratically elected civilians. While the debate continues on the definition of “democracy,” if we use the term “procedural democracy” (which means elections are free and fair and in fact determine who governs) then they have expanded from 27% of independent states in 1974 to 63% of the 192 independent countries in 2000.<sup>6</sup> The continuing spread of democracies, then, is the first element in the current context. Of particular importance in the consolidation of democracy is the issue of accountability; that is, the rulers are to some degree accountable to the citizens, those whom they rule. Once the concept of accountability is introduced, then immediately the issues of structures and processes also emerge. By what means are the rulers held accountable?



My argument in this paper is that the accountability of the armed forces to democratically elected civilians is via a MOD, and thereby finally to the citizens. If there is no MOD, or if it is but a façade there is simply not enough accountability to justify use of the term.<sup>7</sup>

The second, equally important and to a degree interdependent, element is the end of the Cold War. The Cold War not only defined the strategic relationship between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and their respective allies and enemies, with all the importance and danger that the nuclear and conventional relationship involved, defined virtually all security relationships, including domestic security, throughout the world. The Cold War was fought in East and Central Europe, but also in Guatemala in 1954, Cuba after 1959, Chile in 1973, Angola in 1976, Afghanistan after 1979, and so forth, where East and West vied for ascendancy regionally and within countries. While quite possibly stabilizing and avoiding global war involving the United States and the Soviet Union, on the periphery in most cases the Cold War accentuated regional tensions increasing the importance of the armed forces. As a consequence, the armed forces assumed a greater role than would have otherwise been the case in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East for most of the period since 1945. Indeed, they were the government in most of these regions for most of this period.

With the end of the Cold War the prior rationale for security, and specifically for the size and centrality of the armed forces, disappeared. Today most armed forces are scrambling for justifications. In the meantime, defense budgets have plummeted as have the sizes of the armed forces. Universal male conscription is increasingly being abolished. New alliances and coalitions, often with historical enemy states are publicly discussed. In the midst of these changes, militaries are finding it difficult to define their current and future roles and missions.

The third and last element of the contemporary context is the international scramble for new relationships and new forms of influence in this democratizing, post - Cold War, and increasingly global world. If during the Cold War, nations, with the US and USSR at the lead, sought influence and ascendancy everywhere, nations and alliances

continue to do so today, but with different instruments and even different goals. Today democracy and free market capitalism are on the defining characteristics. The pressure is to spread them and consolidate them, although as dynamic multi-faceted processes it is difficult to define unambiguously that they are consolidated. Today nations, international organizations, foundations, non-governmental organizations, and even individuals (George Soros, Bill Gates, and Ted Turner for example) are profoundly involved in providing models, resources, technical assistance, and the like to other, politically evolving, countries. And, these links and mechanisms for influence are not the monopoly of the bigger and wealthy, but also extend to regional players, and organizations within them such as Spain, Switzerland, South Africa, and Argentina.

In sum, the global, regional, and in many countries domestic political context characterized by democratization, the end of the Cold War, and globalization is radically different today from what it was but a decade ago.

### **The Previous Situation in Civil-Military Relations**

To better understand the trajectories and challenges involved in establishing viable ministries of defense today, it is necessary to review briefly the situation in civil-military relations prior to the democratic transitions. By definition these governments were not democratic. Elections were either not held at all or were formal and without effect. Those in power did not rely on popular legitimacy for their positions. Rather, they tended overwhelmingly to rule by force, possibly with reference to some kind of nationalism or other ideology, which required the capability and threat of repression.<sup>8</sup> While some authoritarian regimes were run by civilians (Portugal, Spain, and the Soviet Union) and others by the military (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, and Nigeria) in virtually all cases the armed forces were a central element in the actual or potential use of repression. In most, but definitely not all countries, the primary function of the armed forces was domestic control. It could even be argued, with a certain amount of theoretical and empirical support, that the external conflicts these authoritarian regimes engaged in were largely due to their non-democratic characteristics.<sup>9</sup> In sum, the armed forces had exaggerated or at least much expanded roles and positions in these regimes.

The Cold War influenced virtually all military roles and missions and civil-military relations in many parts of the World, and through surrogates in most other parts. By definition the “War,” while Cold, was still a war. As such, it justified, or provided a rationale, for much expanded importance of the armed forces. In a context of “War,” the armed forces could justify more resources, a high degree of autonomy, and influence or even veto power in a huge variety of areas of state, economy, and society.

In their inflated and exalted positions, the armed forces were not required to coordinate their activities, cooperate, or rationalize their use of resources. After all, preparation for “War” can justify any level of funding and autonomy. And, as authoritarian regimes, there was no public pressure to coordinate and economize in order to achieve effectiveness and efficiency. These were largely alien concepts that did not figure into the very restricted, if any, debate in society.

### **Ministries of Defense Are Common Today**

In the contemporary era most countries have created, or recreated under at least formal civilian control, ministries of defense. For example, a MOD was created in Spain in 1977, in Portugal an old organization was redefined and brought under formal civilian control in 1982, and in Argentina it was brought under civilian leadership in 1988. In much of Latin America this is a recent development with Nicaragua (1997), Honduras (1998), and Brazil (1999) having created MODs. It must be stressed again that the mere presence of a MOD does not mean anything at all about civilian control. Nor, for that matter, does having a civilian minister of defense mean much either. In Portugal, up until the late 1980s, there was a MOD but it did not have any power. In Nicaragua, today four years after its creation, it has no real power. And, in East and Central Europe, where there were MODs, there was no guarantee of civilian control. What I am mainly, but not exclusively, focusing on in this paper is the creation of MODs that have some potential of holding and exercising power. That is, of providing a central vehicle for democratic accountability of the military to elected civilians and ultimately to the citizens.

Why have new democracies created, or recreated under formal civilian control, ministries of defense now and not previously? There are two main reasons for these developments. First, they are following the example of other, more established, democracies where civilians exercise control over the armed forces and at the same time maximize military effectiveness and efficiency in the use of resources. This could be termed the “demonstration effect” where there is awareness that the MOD is currently a near universal solution for civilian control of the armed forces combined with effectiveness and efficiency. It is widely recognized that the armed forces, which hold the ultimate burden for national defense, rarely if ever acknowledge that they have enough money for equipment, troops, maintenance, and training. If the armed forces were left to their own devices, which is most often the situation in authoritarian regimes, they work out deals or understandings among themselves whereby they inflate their demands. This results in increased costs and lack of efficiency. All of these problems are widely recognized, and as new democracies seek to bring their armed forces under control, and cut costs, a MOD appears as the most appropriate institution for these purposes.

Admiral D. Angel Liberal Lucini, first sub-secretary of the Spanish Ministry of Defense between its founding in July 1977 and 1983, and then the first Chief of Defense Staff (JEMAD) the principal collaborator of the minister of defense, between 1984 and 1986, made this point in an unpublished article and in an interview.<sup>10</sup> He noted that prior to 1977 Spain was the only country in NATO’s region (which Spain would join in 1983 and reaffirm its membership in the 1986 referendum) without a ministry of defense, and he emphasized the negative effects of the previous complete independence of the three services. The creation of the MOD, and the definition of its relations with the JEMAD, was an answer to both civilian control as well as effectiveness and efficiency. And, in the case of South Africa, a participant and observer of the process of establishing the MOD writes as follows about the rationale for establishing the ministry: “When I asked the Chief of the South African Navy, Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson, of his feelings about the establishment of civilian control over the military, he said he welcomed the idea. This

was because in Western democracies there were established patterns of civilian control over the military, so South Africa had no choice but to follow suite.”<sup>11</sup>

Second, in recognition of the general validity of the point above, there is pressure from the more established democracies for the newer democracies to follow these models. This might be termed the “influence effect”. Through regional security organizations and arrangements such as NATO and the Partnership for Peace, U.S. regional commander in chiefs, and the external defense and defense cooperation programs of the U.S. and European democracies, there is strong encouragement for all countries to establish effective ministries of defense.<sup>12</sup> While, as noted above, little literature exists on the topic, there is however a widely-held but vague assumption that what has worked elsewhere, in the more established democracies, will also work in the new democracies. Consequently, the creation of ministries of defense is on the agenda of international assistance and influence in democratic civil–military relations. For example, Rudolf Joo, a former Hungarian Deputy Minister of Defense, lists seven societal, institutional, and procedural requirements constituting the *democratic model* of civilian control of the armed forces. One of the seven requirements is as follows: “the hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government through a civilian organ of public administration – a ministry or department of defence – that is charged, as a general rule, with the direction/supervision of its activity.”<sup>13</sup>

## **Ministries of Defense Have Been Created to Achieve Four Main Purposes**

Based on a review of the literature, but fundamentally on what I have observed in the new democracies attempting to deal with issues in civil – military relations, it appears that MODs have been created for four main purposes. This is not to say that these purposes, singly or jointly were the beginning point or justification for their creation, but rather that they figured in at some point, often being discovered, after – the –fact, as purposes for the new or recreated institutions. These four purposes are conceptually distinct, but like any social or political phenomena they are intertwined in reality.

The first, and most obvious purpose for democratic civil – military relations, is for a MOD to structure the power relationships between the democratically elected civilians and the armed forces. A MOD is the fundamental vehicle whereby relationships are institutionalized between those who hold the democratic right to rule, through the electoral process, and those who hold a monopoly on the means of violence. How civilians in different countries attain this right, and whether they are in fact able to exercise it, varies tremendously, and the scholarly literature is as ambiguous on this point as it is broad. But once the civilians have this right a if not the key issue in democratic consolidation is how to bring the armed forces under control.<sup>14</sup> A MOD is the favored institutional mechanism in the contemporary era for this control. Based on my research and especially on my direct observations in different parts of the world, I would go so far as to say that today without a MOD there can be no civilian control. It is necessary but not sufficient for democratic civilian control.<sup>15</sup>

The second purpose is to sort out, or define and allocate, responsibilities between and among civilians and military officers. It is less about civilian control and more about division of tasks and responsibilities. This purpose may seem straightforward or simple, but it most definitely is not. As proof of this one need only review the ongoing efforts by the two North American highly institutionalized democracies in sorting out these relationships. The U.S. efforts in creating the Department of Defense, and defining its responsibilities with regard to the armed services, including the newly – created Air Force in 1947 were extremely complicated and highly political, and the national security system was modified or reformed at least twice in the following four decades. The most recent reform, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, or Goldwater–Nichols as it is generally known, was equally complicated and political. Indeed, it was virtually imposed by Congress over the resistance of the Department of Defense and some of the armed services.<sup>16</sup> One might anticipate the difficulty and drama in U.S. civil–military relations due to its superpower status and global involvement. In contrast, one might Canada anticipate that relations between civilians and military officers will be more tranquil and simple in Canada. Yet, the most respected Canadian student of defense issues concludes the following: “In Canada, civil–military relations are floundering and uncertain. Recent

events have exposed the problem, but they are only the current manifestation of weaknesses long resident in the structure of the defense establishment....The relationship between the government and the defence establishment is troubled because political leaders have failed in their basic responsibility to supervise the armed forces of Canada.<sup>17</sup>

A key ingredient of this definition and allocation of responsibilities is the role of a MOD as buffer between politics and the armed forces. The role of the MOD as buffer may be less obvious, especially for countries that are not familiar with elected political figures leading important state institutions. The basic idea is that a political figure, selected through negotiations within the governing party if it has a majority or among the governing parties if there is a coalition in most parliamentary systems or appointed by the chief executive in presidential systems, can represent the needs of the armed forces to other political figures, particularly the finance or economics minister, and to the electorate in general. If the armed forces seek to represent their own needs, which they did not need to do publicly in authoritarian regimes, they are seen *prima facie* as subjective and self-serving. Thus having a civilian as the minister of defense can in fact be positive for the armed forces' interests. It is clearly positive for the democracy since it removes a complicating element in democratic legitimacy; that of having a non-elected organization using its bureaucracy, and quite possibly its control of violence, to influence or even blackmail politics.<sup>18</sup> The negative implications of the politicization of the armed forces are obvious, and range from corrosion of democracy to civil war. Mr. Alexei Arbatov, Vice Chairman of the Defense Committee in the State Duma, emphasized to me the negative aspects of not having such a buffer for both democracy and the armed forces in Russia. He noted that the lack of a buffer kept the armed forces "in politics" and frustrated the ongoing efforts at military reform.<sup>19</sup>

There are two core causes for the propensity for confusion and politicization in the relationship between democratically elected civilians and military officers that are exacerbated by the absence of a buffer. The first is that the bases, or logics, behind their professions are totally different as so brilliantly recognized by Max Weber in his writings

on politics as a vocation and bureaucracy.<sup>20</sup> Politicians in a democracy come into office on the basis of elections in which they make popular, and unrealistic, promises; and there is a tendency towards, as one would expect, politicization in order to both be elected and be reelected. There is also a necessary vagueness in their fulfillment of promises since the specificity of any promise is quickly warped in the clash with economic and social reality. Military officers in a democracy, on the other hand, have a totally different basis for their positions in office which is through a largely merit-based promotion system. Further, they are held responsible for often extremely serious issues of national defense, and as peoples' lives, and expensive equipment are involved, precision and accuracy are emphasized. Second, the armed forces are normally both a prominent national patriotic symbol and they hold a monopoly of the means of violence in a society. This monopoly of violence is really what most distinguishes them as a profession from other professions and as a bureaucracy from other state bureaucracies.<sup>21</sup> As such, they can offer obvious resources for politicians seeking ways to enhance their political positions. To do so, for example by promoting or retiring officers for largely political reasons, is to disrupt the career progression of the merit - based promotion system, thereby politicizing the officer corps, and most likely decreasing the military capability of the armed forces. MODs have thus been created in part to serve as a buffer - an institutional mechanism to define and structure the very different responsibilities of the democratically elected civilians and the military officers. This purpose is really a further specification of the marrying of democratic legitimacy of the politician and professional expertise in armed conflict of the military.

A third purpose in creating a MOD is to maximize the effectiveness in employment of the armed forces. By effectiveness I mean the capacity to actually implement policies; in the case of the armed forces, to provide for the security and defense of the nation. It is not only armed forces that, as bureaucracies, are slow to change, but they must surely be among the slowest due to their mission in national defense, career promotion structures, and huge investment in and lead time in developing new equipment. This issue of effectiveness may have been of marginal importance in the past in many countries where there was either no real threat on the borders and where the



main function was to control and intimidate their own defenseless populations. Currently, with the end of the Cold War and its superpower alliance relations, and with the Third Wave of democratization and a general lessening of interstate wars, the utility of the armed forces with regard to other government functions is an open question. Consequently, in many countries there is wide-ranging debate on not only the future roles and missions of the armed forces but also on whether a country needs the armed forces at all. With the built - in inertia of any established bureaucracy the effectiveness of redefining and implementing new roles and missions, or a new mix of them, cannot take place without another, higher level institution, playing the central role.<sup>22</sup> This issue of effectiveness is particularly acute today, in the current environment of low interstate but considerable intrastate conflict as many countries are increasingly discovering peacekeeping or peacemaking roles as central to the justification of their armed forces. These missions, combining prominent roles for civilians, particularly in foreign ministries, are hard to imagine without a central role being played by a MOD. This is obvious if we survey those countries that are most active in peacekeeping; they not only have had to resolve their inter-service rivalries but also clarify the central roles for civilian leadership. In sum, the effectiveness of the armed forces in the current environment of international peacekeeping puts a premium on a MOD. The MOD is the vehicle or basis for this wide-ranging and extremely dynamic coordination that is required for effectiveness.

The fourth and last major purpose in creating a MOD is to maximize the efficiency in the use of resources – funds, personnel, and equipment – in these different and changing roles and missions. By efficiency I mean the ability to achieve a goal at the lowest possible cost. In the previous, pre-democratic phase, in many countries the different branches of the armed forces enjoyed tremendous independence. Their missions often overlapped and they maintained separate supply and training programs. If they cooperated at all it was to insure the greatest amount of resources for the separate services. Most often their budgets were secret and even if they weren't the population would have no influence over the allocations in any case. Today, with democratization and globalization, both demanding transparency, the previously acquired privileges or

prerogatives are long gone. With popularly elected governments that have to respond to the demands of sectors of the population, the armed forces can no longer enjoy the luxury of abundant resources. With globalization, organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, NATO, and EU, individual states, and even individual investors demand convincing justification for any investment at all in national defense. In the case of the European Union, this pressure is codified in the strict fiscal requirements of belonging to the European Monetary Union. Consequently, with defense budgets dropping just about everywhere, the armed forces are pressured to be as efficient as possible.<sup>23</sup> The vehicle whereby this is done, or at least where it is centered, is a MOD. In the MOD the civilian politicians can implement programs to ensure budget transparency, act as arbiter, minimize duplication among the services, sell off unnecessary facilities, and negotiate with those seeking to sell equipment and services. The MOD is the institution that employs lawyers, accountants, and planners to initiate and implement all of these programs. That is, the MOD is the place to concentrate a wide variety of expertise in order to manage effectively and efficiently the defense and security of a nation.

These four purposes are the most important that I have been able to identify as justifying, implicitly or explicitly, sooner or later, the creation of MODs. I have never seen anything written that elaborates them together in this manner, but when the researcher stands back and reviews what is being said and done, normally over a period of at least a decade, these four purposes emerge as the most critical reasons or purposes to create a MOD. Taken together they can be summarized as follows: armed forces that are capable of providing for the nation's security and defense and under civilian control.

There are other possible purposes. One, for example, is to balance out relative weights of the services. In all authoritarian regimes the army was the dominant service, if only because it provided the force for internal control. In the transitions the other services are particularly eager to have a MOD that can right this balance. And, with the redefinition of roles and missions, the other services are indeed much more important than in the past. Thus a MOD is created in order to better promote what is termed "jointness" in the U.S.

However, it is one thing to create a MOD, and quite another to provide it with sufficient legal authority, financial and personnel resources, and power to fulfill these purposes. In fact so far very few of the MODs in the new democracies possess these essential requirements. Greece, Portugal and Spain clearly do. I think this has much to do with both the relatively early transitions, or in the case of Greece, return, to democracy in these three countries combined with membership in NATO (after 1983 for Spain) and in the European Union. In these three Southern European democracies the advanced development of the MODs is due to the length of time combined with pressure and support from NATO and the EU, and their ancillary organizations. Available literature and my interviews show that the MODs in Russia, Taiwan, and Thailand clearly do not meet the minimal requirements to function as real MODs.<sup>24</sup> From my experience nor do the MODs in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Others, such as Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Romania are somewhere in between.

## **The Primary Competencies of a MOD and Its Relations with Other Institutions**

If a MOD is to fulfill one or more of these four main purposes it must be endowed, or empowered, with a number of primary tasks, functions, or competencies. Further, its relations with other agencies must place it in a position of relative power. This section is divided into two main subdivisions. They review first the key competencies and then the most important relations to be specified. The following is based on the experiences in established democracies and the lessons being learned in the newer democracies, both positive and negative.

### **1. Key Competencies**

There are at a minimum four key competencies for a MOD. These four are necessary if a MOD is to be able to fulfill the above purposes. The competencies are in the areas of budgets, personnel, acquisitions, and definition of roles and missions. If a MOD does not have power or authority in these areas, it is but a shell, and without much significance.

a. Budgets. It is trite, but true, that the “power of the purse” is the basis of civilian control of the armed forces. In authoritarian regimes the defense budgets (and probably other budgets as well) were secret, and the funds went directly to the armed forces with virtually total autonomy to allocate within the services and other departments.<sup>25</sup> In many countries the system was especially pernicious as funds for the troops would be allocated to a local commander with no oversight on how the money was in fact used. One hears of many cases where the commander would minimize the funds for the troops’ food, clothing, equipment, and training, and simply pocket it.

The challenge is, how to move from this situation to one where a civilian – controlled MOD assumes responsibility for allocation and oversight? Based on my observations, it is a very gradual process in which a MOD and Ministry of Finance, or equivalent, absorb the budget functions from a general staff and divide them between these two ministries. The Ministry of Finance provides the general allocations among the ministries, and the MOD provides the allocations within the defense sectors. This immediately brings up the issue of how to do it, and while there are no panaceas, and the programming, planning, budgeting system (PPBS) is clearly not the solution it is often made out to be (due to the huge requirements for data and objective systems to make it work), some kind of system is necessary. At a minimum the adopted system must guarantee transparency, provide justification for funding categories and funding at a certain level, and accountability. It has struck me that in many of the countries I visit there is apparently no perceived link between the population’s paying taxes and providing resources to the government in general, and what the government, including the armed forces, do with these resources. Until the population comes to demand accountability, and there must obviously be some prior opening by the government for this to begin, there will not be accountability throughout the system. All of this requires an active civil society and a free and energetic media. In Portugal, Spain, and Argentina their MODs have in fact assumed control of the budgets within the defense sector, thereby allowing the civilians to in fact control the armed forces.<sup>26</sup> I have it on secondary evidence that this is also the case in South Africa.

b. Definition of Roles and Missions. Roles and missions, theoretically embedded in a strategy, are the bases for what the armed forces are all about. Roles and missions define why the military exists at all. This is particularly obvious today at the end of the Cold War, in the midst of the Third Wave, and with the multi-faceted phenomenon of globalization. What are the forces to be used for and under what conditions? It is clearly not what they were supposed to be used for during the Cold War or during the authoritarian regimes. These are issues that are debated everywhere there is an openness and sufficient knowledge for a debate. In the end, in a democracy, it should be the democratically elected civilians who determine the strategy and the purposes of the forces.<sup>27</sup> This responsibility becomes particularly crucial today with the ambiguous, heavily civilian oriented, missions in peacekeeping. These missions are of particular interest to civilians not only as an issue of civilian control of the armed forces, but also because involvement in peacekeeping missions is an unwritten but widely understood requirement for membership in the ranks of responsible nations. Thus it is all the more crucial for civilians to be aware, be in charge, and actually determine strategy and roles and missions.

Generally the same point can be made regarding what are loosely termed ‘military missions in support of civilian authorities’. These missions range from disaster relief – volcanoes, floods, earthquakes, etc., riot control, counter-drugs, and internal insurrection. For obvious reasons, the latter examples on this list are extremely sensitive and may be perceived as a return to the “bad old days.” These missions thus require very clear guidance, based on law and exercised through robust structures and processes, to ensure that the military execute the tasks without usurping power. Again, the MOD should have responsibilities in determining when and how to use the armed forces for these domestic missions.

c. Personnel. The issue of armed forces personnel is more complicated than it might appear initially. Here the reference is to both officers and enlisted personnel in the forces. If the armed forces were sized in the context of the Cold War and

authoritarianism, then the sizing and training in the current context will of necessity be very different. The problem is, it is impossible to know a priori how they will be different unless roles and missions are first defined. Also, there are political and career structure considerations that impinge on these decisions. The main point is, however, that there are decisions to be made, that the past is not the future, that inertia should not be allowed to rule, and the decisions on personnel and training should be made in the MOD. It is difficult to know about the sizing and training for the forces unless it is known what they will be used for. The political concerns include, on the one hand, pressure in a democratizing society to abolish conscription and allocate fewer funds to defense and more funds to social areas; and on the other hand, concern to not alienate the armed forces by cutting them too far and too quickly. There was awareness of the latter in Spain, but apparently not in Russia. The career structure considerations relate to both political concerns and morale. The number of senior officers, generally colonel and above, optimally depends on the number of troops, thus to cut down the size of the force should, logically, result in fewer senior officers. However, for political and morale reasons, the upper ranks may not be reduced, at least not quickly and proportionally, thereby causing problems of morale in the lower ranks, having “hollow forces”, using up more resources than necessary for salaries for the higher ranks.

The issue of conscription versus an all-volunteer force (AVF) is also not as simple as it may appear initially. In the contemporary era, there may seem to be little reason for conscription. Indeed, as practiced in the US during the war in Southeast Asia, and Colombia today, there is much to argue for AVF on the basis of equity as well as effectiveness. However, in some countries issues of costs, ethnic diversity, and nation building may overwhelm the arguments against conscription. For example, in Mozambique the argument for conscription is cogently based on the need for national integration. The general point to be made here is that there are many considerations involved in personnel, including in force structure, and the past is not necessarily a good guide for the future. Given the inherent conservatism of bureaucracies, and especially military bureaucracies, these decisions should be made at a more general, and higher, level, which is at the level of the MOD.

d. Acquisitions and Facilities. There are at least two generalizations that can be made regarding acquisitions in defense: they are very expensive and the lead time between when they are purchased or borrowed and finally put into use is great. It is thus all the more important that a system be put in place to most efficiently determine and acquire the most appropriate equipment. Again, the appropriateness must be determined by the missions for which the equipment, and the forces, will be committed, and this requires attention to making decisions. Acquisitions often lead to graft and corruption, so the system must be especially rigorous. Again, it is difficult to see how the armed forces alone can achieve these levels of systems and robustness. Management of facilities is an emerging issue both because of the different requirements that vary by different uses for the forces and the fact that armed forces often accumulate installations over the years. The issue becomes how to most effectively sell off, or give away, no longer useful, or utilizable, facilities and acquire new ones or convert old ones to meet new needs. This issue obviously requires attention at a level above the services in order to make the best use of the existing facilities, convert them, or sell them and use the resources for other purposes. It is obviously easy to imagine the opportunities for graft and corruption in selling off real estate in areas that have appreciated tremendously. And, there are also huge implications for local politics if facilities are closed and employees lose their jobs. Apparently good progress has been made in Argentina and Portugal in this area.

The overall point is, therefore, that much of what is being discussed here – in personnel, acquisitions, and installations – that things are new and different, requiring new ideas and systems, and a new organization, a MOD, would appear to be the most appropriate organization to deal with them.

These four key competencies are obviously not monopolies of a MOD. Indeed, they are initially not even competencies of the MOD as either there is no MOD or it has not yet acquired them. Initially there is a lack of an institutional basis and expertise to exercise the hypothetical competencies. But, they must be acquired if the MOD is to fulfill the purposes defined the section above. But, while acquiring them and continuing

to build them, another series of issues must be dealt with which are to define relationships with key elements of the domestic political system, the armed forces, and international actors.

## **2. Relations to be Defined and Clarified**

It is obvious that a MOD does not emerge fully formed out of a new democratic political system. Rather, there is a tremendous amount of institutional engineering required to build the MOD and endow it with the four competencies listed above. This same point clearly pertains to other democratic institutions such as the legislature, courts, political parties, regional and local governments, and organizational components of civil society. The institutional engineering is not limited to structures and processes within the MOD, but also to its relations with other key components or actors, which are also developing. At a minimum, these must include the executive, of which it is a part, the legislature, the armed forces, and relevant international actors.

a. The Executive. The MOD is part of the executive. Obviously there are critical differences in the structures of relations in presidential versus parliamentary systems. The generalizations here are meant to apply to both types of democratic political systems, and are thus even more generic. The fundamental issue is one of power, as it is indeed in all aspects of civil – military relations. The question that must be asked is: does the MOD, as an institution and the MOD as individual, have a central position in the power structure of a country, or is the MOD only a façade and the minister a political nobody? If the MOD is not integrated into the cabinet with clear lines of authority radiating from the president or prime minister, and if the minister of defense is not politically powerful, then the MOD by definition is not a player in the political system. This is particularly important because building a MOD is clearly a case of institution building, when there was nothing previously. If the MOD as institution, and MOD as individual, are not closely linked to power, then either the armed forces continue to enjoy a great deal of autonomy or there is some other institution in the executive branch that holds the power. Based on my observations and readings, this other institution is the ministry of finance, treasury, or its equivalent. While this “power of the purse” may indeed control the



military, most likely by starving it for resources, it does nothing for the two other goals or purposes of effectiveness and efficiency. The ideal situation, at least in a new democracy, is one in which the MOD as institution and minister as individual is integrated into the structure of power in the government and holds the personal confidence of the executive. In this way the armed forces know they are taken seriously on the one hand, and know on the other hand that they must deal with the MOD and not attempt to avoid its control. This was the situation in both Portugal and Spain in the critical period of the early 1980s. In Greece Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou also held the position of minister of defense. In Nicaragua in contrast, ever since President Violeta Chamorro gave up the minister of defense position in November 1996, it has been occupied by weak political figures. In fact, over the past five years it has been occupied by five different weak political figures, including her son Pedro twice.

b. The Legislature. There are extremely important differences between a presidential and parliamentary system in regard to the role of the legislature. <sup>28</sup> And, again, the general points here apply despite the different forms of political systems. The most important point, or consideration, is to broaden the interest in or concern with the armed forces, and national security and defense, beyond a relatively small group in the executive. We must recall the background was one in which few civilians had any interest in or opportunity to deal with the armed forces. There was no advantage to such an interest, and it could be very dangerous. By broadening the possibility of control to the legislature not only are there more structural means for involving another body but personal ones as well to interest a broader group of politicians. The former point speaks to the issue of effectiveness; to have another institution interested and involved, and the latter speaks to preparing a cadre of politicians who can specialize in the armed forces, security, and defense. How this may be done is illustrated by Portugal, Spain, and Argentina where defense committees were created with some powers of policy and oversight, which encouraged the members to become interested and involved. This is currently happening as well in Brazil. Later, at least in Portugal, a member of the defense committees became the minister of defense. This of course is common in the U.S. where the two most recent administrations, those of President George Bush, 1989 -- 92 and

William Clinton, 1992 – 2001, nominated former members of the Congress as their Secretaries of Defense.

c. The Armed Forces. Obviously the relations between the MOD and the armed forces will have to be defined, with democratically elected civilians clearly in charge. Specifically what is meant here is the relationship between the MOD and the top ranks of the armed forces, generally constituted as a joint or general staff, or even as a joint general staff. There are a variety of relations to be clarified at this level since, in most cases, the MOD is taking over roles from the joint staff, and the central issue is what the MOD takes on and what is left with the joint staff. From my observations, the two main relations that must be clarified concern nominations for the highest military positions (assuming the executive nominates and the legislature approves) and operational roles. How are nominations for senior officers handled? Does the MOD play a central role in handling the candidates and making the nominations, or are nominations done strictly by the joint staff? If the MOD plays a central role then it will influence not only the character of the higher officer ranks but also influence the behavior of those who aspire to higher ranks. I became aware of this role in Spain, and it was pointed out to me in the context of asserting civilian control over the armed forces. Spanish officers are very much aware that their career possibilities are related to their (non) political behavior. These are the new rules of the game that must be asserted, likely tested, and subsequently reaffirmed and institutionalized. The issue here is not the power of the executive, the president or prime minister, to promote or retire, which is a first sign of civilian control, but rather the proper management of personnel, including promotion of the best qualified officers to the highest positions.

The second issue, that of operational roles, concerns the division between the MOD and the joint staff for command responsibility in peace, but also in war. Has the MOD assumed the “support” roles of budgets, equipping, personnel management, training, and the like, and the joint staff taken on operational roles? I have found that this issue is clarified in the more advanced new democracies, such as Portugal and Spain,

but is much less clear in the newer new democracies such as Russia, Brazil, and Nicaragua.

d. International Actors. There are an incredible number and variety of international actors involved in international defense and security, including civil – military relations. The issue here is – who deals with them? Do the armed forces, as services or the joint staff at the peak of the services, deal directly with them? Does the executive, or maybe even the legislature, deal with them? Or, does the MOD have at least initial responsibility to interact with these international actors? I would argue that if the MOD can monopolize the role as initial contact then it can increase its roles by mobilizing all types of resources: financial, personnel, training, and grants of equipment. These international actors include other countries' MODs, visiting flag rank officers and officials, United States regional commander in chiefs, organizations such as NATO and Partnership for Peace, the Foreign Military Finance & International Military Education and Training and other programs from the US, and so forth. The myriad of international donors, the coordination of which is minimal even for one country let alone among several countries, offer real resources, providing the MOD can create structures and processes for dealing with them. From my experience, very few MODs are in this position. Indeed, in most cases the services are still in the lead and there is little coordination. Or, in contrast, during President Fujimori's tenure as president of Peru, he personally approved every international activity. While he personally used this, and other means, to assert personal control, it did not make for effectiveness or efficiency of the armed forces.

Unless and until at least these four sets of relationships are clarified, the MOD will be unable to fulfill one or more of the purposes for which they are created. Clearly, defining and finally managing these four relationships takes knowledge and qualified personnel, two resources that a new MOD is unlikely to possess. If, however, an initial commitment is made, then the MOD can develop as it reworks these relationships to its institutional advantage. This has been done in Portugal and Spain, has gone fairly far in

Argentina, is just beginning, but on the right track in South Africa and Brazil, has not gone anywhere at all in Nicaragua, and is regressing in Venezuela.

A MOD will not be born, or reborn, with all of the key competencies and relationships defined, let alone developed. These eight elements are all by way of structures and processes that must be encouraged and finally institutionalized. In the more “mature” democracies such as France and the United States the adjustments, while important, are at the margins. In the older “new democracies” of Greece, Portugal, and Spain they have achieved a reasonable level of development in these eight areas.<sup>29</sup> Argentina, South Africa, and the new NATO members of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are well along. Brazil is just beginning, but the situation is promising, as is the case in El Salvador. Russia remains mired in disorganization and Honduras and Nicaragua are barely even defining the issues.<sup>30</sup>

### **Initial Requirements to Begin to Achieve the Institutional Development**

A MOD, like any institution, will grow or decline, depending on its founding conditions and ongoing support or opposition. Based on my observations in the United States, Portugal and Spain, and in several of the even newer democracies, there are three basic and necessary initial requirements to allow a MOD to begin to take on the kind of institutional life hypothesized throughout this paper. These are as follows: First, workable structures and processes, supported by legal status and resources; second, informed and responsible civilians with an expectation of some degree of permanence in their positions; and third, a mechanism to include in the MOD military officers with their professional backgrounds and expertise. These are all fairly obvious requirements and I will only briefly describe them here.

The creation of structures and processes is a minimum requirement for any institution. This demands a foundation in law for the institution and at least a basic initial definition of what its competencies and relations will be. This should be embodied in something akin to an organic law, often following from the constitution, which must also define relationships to other institutions. The new MOD will also require something as

simple, but also as fundamental, as facilities. In the more successful instances of institutional development that I have observed these facilities, and there is an important element of symbolism here, are located in the facilities originally inhabited by the services or joint staff. It has been interesting to observe over the years how the MODs in Portugal, Spain, and Argentina first moved into these building and then expanded from one floor to another. This is currently happening in Brazil as well. In other countries, however, such as Nicaragua, the small size and marginal location of the facilities make it clear that the MOD is inconsequential. Honduras is interesting as the new minister of defense in 1999 had to forcefully take over the office of the commander of the armed forces, whose position had been abolished, which was occupied by the vice commander. Finally, and obviously, the MOD must have resources; that is, funds. I am not referring only to the funds to support the MOD itself, which need not be great, but also to its purview over resources for the armed forces in general. In short, it must have some initial control otherwise the joint staff will maintain its monopoly over the allocation of resources for the armed forces.

The MOD will require a professional civilian staff with some expectation of stability. As frequently reiterated above, in the past the realms of national defense and the armed forces were the monopoly of the armed forces. Yet, if democratic legitimacy is to be implemented in an overall system of civil–military relations, civilians will have to be included in key positions in the MOD. The dilemma, not surprisingly is that initially there are few if any civilians who know anything about defense. Therefore, at least initially, civilians from other ministries, academics, lawyers, accountants, and the like will have to be recruited into the MOD and provided with the means to learn on the job and through courses in country, and abroad, about these issues. These training programs are available, indeed I am the director of a center that exists to provide them, and it is a matter of taking the best advantage of these courses.

There is a further, almost insurmountable problem, however, in that in most new democracies there is the noxious combination of the absence of a civil service system providing career stability and politicization of most government positions. There is,

therefore, most frequently no prospect for stability in government employment because it is likely that the positions are filled for political reasons by the executive. Unless these problems are confronted and to some degree resolved there is little hope that the necessary prepared civilians can be attracted and retained even if they are trained through some combination of international courses and on the job training.<sup>31</sup>

The third requirement, which is the issue of including both retired and active duty officers in the MOD, is more complicated than might appear initially. If, as is frequently the case in most new democracies, the MOD is staffed with active duty or retired officers, then there are fewer opportunities and incentives to include civilians. This is frequently justified as a stopgap measure, but can easily become a permanent “solution” to the problem of informed personnel in the MOD. In Guatemala, for example, the only civilians in the MOD are the janitorial staff. This is the negative side of the involvement of officers, active duty or retired, in the MOD, and it concerns not only occupying positions that civilians might occupy but also general orientations. After spending their careers in the armed forces in most of these countries, many of which lack vibrant civil societies and diverse economic options, they are still essentially military officers with other officers, active duty or retired as friends and the culture of military officers. My point here is not to preclude using active duty and retired officers, but to balance them with civilians.

The positive side of involving retired officers in the MOD is highlighted paradoxically by the oft - noted negative example of Nicaragua where there were, when I last visited in 1999, only civilians in the MOD. The problem was, these civilians knew virtually nothing about defense or the armed forces. The joint staff basically handled all of these issues and the civilians didn't seem to know the difference. There is, then, a convincing argument that can be made to include officers, both active duty and retired, in the MOD in order to draw on their professional expertise. But, it must be done consciously with the goal to achieve a balance between military and civilians, and with a plan to encourage them to train the civilians. This is basically the system in the U.S.

Department of Defense, and was explicitly followed in both Portugal and Spain. It would appear to be the plan currently being implemented in South Africa and Brazil.

### **Responsibilities for Future Initiatives**

Whether there is a MOD or not, whether it possesses scant or abundant resources initially, and the nature of its competencies and relationships, will depend on the initiative of the executive and possibly the legislature. Yet nothing is static and MODs in the Southern European democracies, new members of NATO, Argentina, and South Africa have accumulated new competencies and (re) defined their relations with other political institutions and foreign actors. They have accumulated them due to their founding statutes, the efforts of strong early leaders in the MODs, or some kind of bureaucratic dynamic. The issue at hand is the degree to which the MOD itself has a role in initiating and formalizing these new and changing roles, especially in the legal realm. Here the issue is whether or not the MOD has the capacity to formulate or change the following levels of legislation which are listed from the most general to most specific: changes in the constitution relating to the MOD and the armed forces; an organic law or laws for the MOD itself and possibly the general staff; regular legislation passed by the legislature; and ongoing policy initiatives of the executive. Some MODs, such as Brazil's, are acquiring these legal initiatives, whereas others, such as Guatemala, have no power of initiative at all. From my observations, in most countries there is little awareness of the importance of having this power of initiative. Again, if an institution has the initiative in defining its future legal status, then it can better accumulate roles and establish itself as a viable institution in the constellation of powers including the executive, legislature, and armed forces.

In sum, there are at least these three initial requirements that must be dealt with to increase the chances that the MOD will become a dynamic institution capable of fulfilling the purposes for which they are typically created. All of these require resources – political, personnel, and financial – and there are only so many resources to go around in any democracy, particularly new ones. However, if the political leaders are not committed to developing the institution of a MOD, and providing it with these resources,

then it is difficult to imagine how democratic civil – military relations can be established and maintained.

## **Conclusion**

This paper is mainly about the politics of the management of defense. In the contemporary process of democratic consolidation, the issues of civil–military relations become less about the likelihood of military coups (although in many cases including Ecuador, Indonesia, Paraguay and Philippines, this possibility remains relevant) and more about institutionalizing effective and durable relations between democratically elected civilians and the armed forces. It is about how to manage, to cope with, the difficult relationship between democratic legitimacy and professional military expertise. Based on the observed experience of a number of new democracies, there are similar reasons for creating an effective MOD, and a common series of responsibilities that must be defined and implemented. In order to achieve this, there is another set of requirements that must be initially undertaken which demand a substantial commitment of a variety of resources. If policy makers are interested in achieving civilian control of the armed forces and maintaining credible forces, this paper can serve as an inventory of what is required. It must be recognized that policy makers may not be interested in either of these goals. If so, this paper allows for assessments on what has not been done. But, if policy makers want to achieve these two goals, the domestic resources of political capital, energy, funds, and personnel can be supplemented by international resources in training and education. There is really no mystery to institutional development; it just requires will, knowledge, and resources.

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<sup>1</sup> For an excellent political analysis of how the United States created its national security institutions at the end of the Second World War see Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.)

<sup>2</sup> There is some useful background material, however, that includes the following: Martin Edmonds, Central Organizations of Defense (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) and Catherine Kelleher, “Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told Tale,” In Robert Art, et. al, eds, Reorganizing America’s Defense: Leadership in War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon.Brasssey’s, 1985), pp. 82-107.

<sup>3</sup> My background on this specific topic dates to 1992-93 when I was on sabbatical leave. I was based in Lisbon, but made a half dozen full week trips to Madrid, researching on the



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topic of “Iberian Defense Policies.” In order to deal with that topic I had to define and analyze civil-military relations to determine who was in fact making these policies. I consequently interviewed approximately fifty of the key actors to include politicians, government officials, and military officers. The timing was important in that Spain had just worked out its civil-military relations, and institutionalized the MOD, while Portugal was still in the process. Later, when the Center for Civil-Military Relations was founded in 1994, I led seminars on a variety of topics, including MODs, and collected extensive information on different countries’ experiences in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This latter work continues today. It should be obvious that I am not an unbiased observer on this topic. The underlying theme in this paper is to assist democratically elected civilians in establishing MODs that will allow them to control the armed forces and for the latter to be effective in their tasks of defending the nation.

<sup>4</sup> H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 214.

<sup>5</sup> For an introduction to this literature see Sven Steinmo, et. al, eds. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.) See in particular Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical institutionalism in comparative politics,” pp. 1 – 32.

<sup>6</sup> Data is from Freedom House. See [www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html](http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html)

<sup>7</sup> For a succinct discussion of the key issues in democratic consolidation see Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, “What Democracy is...and is Not,” in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds. The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 39 – 52.

<sup>8</sup> The classic statement on these non-democratic regimes is Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000.) The content was first published in another venue in 1975.

<sup>9</sup> This is of course the obverse of the “democratic peace” approach. For the classic statement see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.)

<sup>10</sup> The unpublished article is “Evolucion de la Estructura de la Defensa en Espana Desde 1939” and the interview was in Madrid on 17 February 1993. A good analysis of the role of civil-military relations in Spain, including the creation of the MOD, is Felipe Aguero’s Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.)

<sup>11</sup> Lekoa Solomon Mollo, “Negotiating for Civilian Control: Strategy and Tactics of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) in the Democratic Transition of South Africa” M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2000, p. 63.

<sup>12</sup> Jeff Simon cites four conditions as being necessary to determine whether a state is exerting “effective” democratic oversight and management of the military. One includes the MOD and another is explicit. “3. Peacetime government oversight of General Staffs and military commanders through civilian defense ministries.” Jeff Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996.), p. 27.

<sup>13</sup> Rudolf Joo, The democratic control of armed forces: The experience of Hungary (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, WEU, 1996), p. 6. The other requirements are legal, institutional, and societal. All are included, directly or indirectly, in this paper.

<sup>14</sup> One of the most highly respected scholars writing on democratic transitions & consolidations states the following: “Obviously, the institutional framework of civilian control over the military constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation.” Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 29. Unfortunately, Przeworski does not develop the argument in this book, or to the best of my knowledge, in his many other books and articles.

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<sup>15</sup> At the Center for Civil-Military Relations we have developed assessment frameworks to evaluate the status of civil-military relations in different countries. One version can be found at [www.ccmr.org](http://www.ccmr.org)

<sup>16</sup> On Goldwater-Nichols Dr. Archie Barrett, who as a congressional staffer had a hand in drafting the legislation, has assembled the key elements of the process in his “Goldwater-Nichols Act Readings: Legislative activities and documents leading to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986” Naval Postgraduate School, May 2001.

<sup>17</sup> Douglas L. Bland, National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision a study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997.), pp. 47-8.

<sup>18</sup> For a short statement of the current, classic, statement of democracy see Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.) pp. 5-7.

<sup>19</sup> Interview at Naval Postgraduate School, 29 August 2000. For an excellent survey of these issues see Mikhail Tsygkin, “The Russian Military, Politics and Security Policy in the 1990s,” in Michael H. Crutcher, ed., The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Army War College, 2000), pp 23 –44. This edited volume includes several extremely useful chapters on civil-military relations in Russia.

<sup>20</sup> Gerth and Mills, pp. 77-128, and 196-239.

<sup>21</sup> This uniqueness was captured in S. E. Finer’s classic The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962.) After reviewing their organizational characteristics and monopoly of the means of violence, Finer queried why they ever left political control of a nation.

<sup>22</sup> In my interviews in Portugal and Spain in the early 1990s the military and civilian officials in the MOD, other ministries, and the parliaments were clear on the need for a strong MOD in redefining the roles and missions of the armed forces.

<sup>23</sup> For example, between 1990 and 2000 defense spending as a percentage of GDP dropped from 5.5% in the U.S. to 3.0% and for the other NATO allies it declined from 3.0% to 2.0%. Source is National Responses to 2000 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire.

<sup>24</sup> See Michael D. Swaine, Taiwan’s National Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons Procurement Processes (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999), pp.17-8. On Thailand see Ravinder Pal Singh, ed., Arms Procurement Decision Making Volume I: China, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea and Thailand (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 219.

<sup>25</sup> For example, in Angola the greatest part of defense expenditures are secret, but it is calculated that they are 20% of GDP. These calculations are based on IMF sources as reported in USAID/Angola, “Avaliacao Estrategica do Programa de Democracia e Governacao” April, 2000, pp. 60-1.

<sup>26</sup> Everywhere, including in Argentina, there is an ongoing struggle between different agencies and individuals for control of resources. This topic has been dealt with by David Pion-Berlin, Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), Chapter 5 “Trimming the Fat: Military Budget-Cutting Successes Under Democratic Rule”, pp. 107-40. In my most recent trip, May 2001, however, it is obvious that the MOD is very much involved in seeking and managing its own resources.

<sup>27</sup> It was pointed out to me by Professor Arch Barrett in several conversations in May 2001 that it was Goldwater-Nichols that directed the U.S. Executive Branch to produce an annual statement on the nation’s security strategy. For the last of the Clinton Administration see A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December, 2000), pp. i – 67.

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<sup>28</sup> For an excellent overview on these differences with regional cases see Kurt Von Mettenheim, ed., Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.)

<sup>29</sup> The evolution of these democracies, including in the military area, are analyzed in Thomas Bruneau, et al., "Democracy, Southern Style," in P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunther, eds. Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 16-82.

<sup>30</sup> An option that must be considered is that the civilians don't really want to control the military except in the most general terms. This was the case in Venezuela after 1958 until the mid or late 1990s. For an excellent analysis of the Venezuelan situation see Harold Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and Venezuela," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42, #3, pp. 77-109.

<sup>31</sup> The issue of staffing receives substantial attention in Mollo, 2000, pp. 68-70.