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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

THE SUPREME SOVIET AND
SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

by

Thomas A. Fries

June, 1991

Thesis Advisor:

Mikhail Tsyarkin

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The Supreme Soviet and Soviet Defense Policy

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the potential role of the Supreme Soviet and its Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security (KOGB) in the formation of Soviet defense policy. Important events leading to the creation of the new Supreme Soviet and opening-session debates on the appointment of the USSR Defense Minister and release of students from service in the Armed Forces are reviewed. The role of the KOGB in determining Soviet defense spending and military reform are also examined. The thesis concludes with an examination of the problems facing the KOGB, and points out that significant military reform will likely emerge from the Supreme Soviet should positive trends in Soviet political reform continue.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The formation of Soviet defense policy has traditionally been the purview of the highest levels of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leadership with inputs from and coordination with the military high command.¹ During the later Brezhnev era, the military's influence, by virtue of its "near monopoly of strategic planning and threat assessment," appeared to increase.² But as Stephen Foye points out, Mikhail Gorbachev's coming to power and his policy of perestroika (restructuring or reconstruction) "implied a diminution of the military establishment's long sacrosanct position" in Soviet society.³ One of the effects of Gorbachev's reform efforts has been to widen the playing field on which the debate of Soviet defense policy occurs. This has occurred on two levels. On one level, glasnost (openness) has permitted increased discussion of the subject both in the general public and academia. But on another more important level, fundamental change

¹ In this thesis the CPSU leadership includes primarily the Politburo and, to a lesser degree, Central Committee Secretariat. The military high command refers to the Ministry of Defense and General Staff.

² Jeffery Legro, *Soviet Decision-Making and the Gorbachev Reforms*, Rand/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies, August 19, 1989, p. 5. (While Legro's analysis pertains to the military's influence in crisis decision-making it is also true of the military's influence in determining defense policy.)

³ Stephen Foye, "The Soviet Armed Forces in 1989," Report on the USSR, January 26, 1989. p. 14.

in the formation of Soviet defense policy may result from the demokratizatsia (democratization) of Soviet society; specifically the formation of the new Supreme Soviet and its potential for playing an increased role in the governing of the Soviet state and determining defense policy.

This thesis examines the role (or possible role) of the Supreme Soviet and its Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security (Komitet po voprosam oborony gosudarstvennoy bezopanosti, KOGB) in the development of Soviet defense policy. The author, not a Russian linguist, draws primarily from English language translations of Soviet press items and radio broadcasts for primary sources. Secondary Western sources are used where they can help clarify or shed light on matters. At a time of rapid socio-political change in the Soviet Union, any studies of the subject that endeavor to be "current" are often dated before publication. For the same reason, projections about the future are at best risky and built upon an ever-shifting foundation. Therefore examination of the subject matter of this thesis is limited to the time period from mid-1988 to early 1990.

Despite the "widening of the playing field," there is still little concrete information on the Supreme Soviet's role in developing defense policy. The workings of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense and State Security, many of whose meetings are closed, remain nebulous if not secret. The degree of influence the committee will be able to exert remains to be seen as it is only in

the formative stages of development while at the same time, the entire Soviet political system is in a state of flux.

These difficulties notwithstanding, the subject warrants study because of its importance in the overall development of the Soviet system. Citizens of western Liberal democracies (specifically Americans) see little controversy in the notion of legislative oversight of executive functions. Indeed, the system of checks and balances is the very cornerstone of the U.S. Constitution.

But in the Soviet Union, Lenin's "vanguard party" has firmly controlled the levers of government for over 70 years. The Communist Party is at once executive, legislature, and judiciary, usurping all government functions. One need not pass judgement upon his ultimate goals to admit that Gorbachev, at the very least, has significantly altered the political environment of the country to the point where additional players have emerged. A skeletal structure upon which to build a freer, more open, and more balanced system has been erected. Whether or not the Soviet Union is able to successfully build upon this is one of the critical political developments of Soviet history, perhaps second in importance only to the October Revolution of 1917.

The thesis opens with a brief review of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the new Supreme Soviet and then traces its involvement in defense policy during its first session through two important debates. It then examines the workings of the course of developments over the second and third sessions of the Supreme

Soviet. The composition of the Committee for Defense and State Security is examined with the aim of trying to assess its impact on defense policy formation. The thesis ends with an assessment of the role the Supreme Soviet and its Commission on Defense and State Security have played so far and its prospects for the future.

II. POLITICAL REFORM AND SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

A. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF POLITICAL REFORM

According to the 1977 Soviet constitution,⁴ the Supreme Soviet is the "highest body of state authority" in the USSR.⁵ But the Supreme Soviet had never wielded real power, which was co-opted by the CPSU, the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society and its political system."⁶ This is particularly true of issues relating to national defense despite the fact that the constitution outlines several rights and duties of the Supreme Soviet in this area. According to the constitution, Supreme Soviet deputies had the right to "address inquiries to the Council of Ministers of the USSR," and were entitled to a response in three days.⁷ Powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the smaller "standing body"

⁴ There have been several revisions to the 1977 "Brezhnev" Constitution since the convening of the new Supreme Soviet. These primarily deal with the functions of the legislative body and the powers of the recently created Executive President. At the time of the 19th Party Conference (at which this thesis begins) the 1977 Constitution was in force.

⁵ Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Novosti Press Publishing House, 1987, p. 41. (For references on Soviet state structure see, John A. Armstrong, *Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union*, (Praeger Publishers: New York, Washington, 1974), Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, *Contemporary Soviet Politics*, (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978), *The Soviet Political System: A Book of Readings*, ed. Richard Cornell, (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), Richard G. Wesson, *The Soviet Russian State*, (John Wiley & Sons, Inc: New York, London, Sydney, Toronto, 1972).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10. (emphasis added)

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

acting as the "highest body of state authority" between Supreme Soviet sessions, included ratification of international treaties, instituting and conferring military ranks, formation of the Defense Council and appointment and dismissal of the high command of the Armed Forces.⁸ The Supreme Soviet, or the Presidium acting in its stead, did in fact accomplish all these tasks (though it is doubtful any inquiries were directed to the Ministry of Defense), but only after they had been predetermined at the highest levels of the Party leadership. Since the Supreme Soviet only met briefly twice a year, the Presidium carried out most of its duties. Also, with the senior members of the Presidium, the Chairman and First Vice-Chairman, being senior party members (and often members of the Politburo), Party control of this nominal legislature was assured. This system of an omnipotent Party superseding the legislature remained in effect through 1988.

By the middle of 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika was in trouble. After a period of modest economic growth in late 1985 and throughout 1986, Soviet economic performance reverted to the "years of stagnation" that had come to mark the Brezhnev era.⁹ In fact, as a result of increased shortages of basic goods and the confusion caused by lurching attempts at economic reform, the Soviet consumer was in many ways worse off in 1988 than before Gorbachev came to power. Economic reform efforts faltered because of half-hearted

⁸ Ibid., pp. 45-46.

⁹ "Party Approves Theses for 19th Conference," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. XL, June 22, 1988, p. 3.

measures repeatedly sabotaged by Party interference in economic planning (despite calls for the separation of Party and state functions), chronic transportation bottlenecks, and most importantly, Soviet unwillingness to enact price reform due to fears of "social unrest."¹⁰ Glasnost, originally intended by the regime as a means of bringing pressure to bear on a stagnated bureaucracy, misfired, fueling public resentment at leadership failures to address mounting problems. It also became the coalescing force around which restive nationalities agitated for increased autonomy and, in some cases, absolute independence from Moscow. The prestige, if not actual power of the CPSU, wilted as a result of public acknowledgement of corruption and criticism.

Party frustrations and concerns over the pace and direction of reform efforts were symbolized in the public dissensions of conservative Politburo members Yegor K. Ligachev and Viktor M. Chebrikov. In short, reform efforts were not keeping pace with the deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev realized that if any of his reform efforts were to work, he would have to ease the strangle hold of the Party while retaining its role as the USSR's "leading and guiding force". This was a calculated gamble that could (and indeed later would) start the Party down a "slippery slope" towards possibly losing that role. But for a recently converted Gorbachev, the facts of the matter were obvious;

¹⁰ "Talk with Nikolai Ryzhkov, Economic Czar," *Business Week*, June 5, 1989, p. 62.

political reform was the sine qua non for the success of perestroika.

B. CREATING THE NEW SUPREME SOVIET

At the 19th All Union Party Conference in late June 1988 Gorbachev outlined his plan for political reform. Central to this effort was the creation of a "new" Supreme Soviet. This new Supreme Soviet would be smaller (400-500 members) than its predecessor and be elected by a new legislative body-the Congress of People's Deputies. The new Supreme Soviet would be "a permanent supreme body of power," would "discuss and resolve all legislative, administrative and monitoring questions," and "direct the work of the agencies accountable to it".¹¹ Like the old Supreme Soviet, the new body would be composed of two chambers-the Soviet of Nationalities and Soviet of the Union. Among other issues, the Soviet of the Union would concentrate on "strengthening the country's defense capability".¹² Gorbachev proposed the creation of the post of "Chairman of the Supreme Soviet" with "broad state authority" who, in addition to other duties, would "exercise overall guidance" and "resolve key questions of foreign policy, defense capability, and the country's security."¹³ The Presidium

¹¹ "Gorbachev Report Sizes Up Restructuring," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. XL, July 27, 1988, p. 16.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ When Gorbachev took on the powers of the new Executive President in March 1990, these powers of "broad state authority" moved from the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet to the President.

of the Supreme Soviet would be carried over from the old, though its functions would be somewhat different. The Presidium would consist of the Chairman (of the Supreme Soviet), two First Vice-Chairmen, 15 Vice-Chairmen (one per Union republic), the chairmen of the two chambers, and the chairmen of standing and other committees of the Supreme Soviet.¹⁴

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet would "convene sessions, coordinate the work of the committees...and have certain representative and other powers."¹⁵

Gorbachev also envisioned "reinforcing the status" and substantially expanding the powers of the committees in light of their "new tasks." Committee members would be drawn from the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies.¹⁶

Gorbachev intended that the government be responsive to the Supreme Soviet and that the "government would reply to deputies' questions and expand the practice of deputies inquiries."¹⁷

Gorbachev's proposals caught many by surprise and appear to have either been formulated at the last moment or kept secret until the conference. The Central Committee theses, published a month prior to the conference and supposedly the "starting point" for discussions at the conference, dealt almost exclusively with

¹⁴ "Gorbachev Report Sizes Up Restructuring," p. 16

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

rejuvenating the local soviets.¹⁸ The theses did state that the rejuvenation of the local soviets presupposed "a cardinal increase in the role of the country's supreme body of power," but merely that various "options and proposals are possible here."¹⁹ However, there was no mention of creating a new position of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, nor creating the new Congress of People's Deputies. And, as Dawn Mann points out, the post-conference resolution on democratization and political reform was a "very ambiguous, incomplete document" that "glossed over" or failed to mention many of Gorbachev's proposals.²⁰ One of those not mentioned was the post of Chairman indicating that some of the Party leadership did not share the General Secretary's enthusiasm for the idea. Thus Gorbachev's political reform proposals were greeted with skepticism, if not apprehension, by his own party.²¹

¹⁸ "Conference Theses: The Way Ahead?" *Soviet Analyst*, v. 17, June 15, 1988, p. 1.

¹⁹ "Party Approves Theses for 19th Conference," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. XL, June 22, 1988, p. 7.

²⁰ Dawn Mann, "The Party Conference Resolution on Democratization and Political Reform," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, July 6, 1988, p. 1.

²¹ For a discussion of the effects of Gorbachev's reforms upon Soviet national security, see Bruce Parrott, "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism*, Nov-Dec 1988, pp. 1-36.

III. THE BIRTH OF THE NEW SUPREME SOVIET

A. FROM THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES TO THE SUPREME SOVIET

The new Congress of People's Deputies' primary responsibility was the election of the new Supreme Soviet.²² This was done at the first Congress session from 25 May - 9 June 1989. The Congress elected 542 Deputies to the Supreme Soviet, elected Gorbachev Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and Anatoliy Lukyanov, a close Gorbachev protege and candidate Politburo member, Deputy Chairman.²³ The Congress also elected the Committees of the Supreme Soviet, drawing from deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet and from Congress deputies that were not elected to the new standing legislature. The Congress created 14 committees including the Committee for Defense and State Security, the first such body dealing with security issues in a Soviet state structure. The composition of each of the committees was subject to the approval of the entire Supreme Soviet. Approval of the Committees and the government were the first issues on the agenda of the opening session of the Supreme Soviet.

²² While the Congress of People's Deputies obviously played a crucial role in the democratization of Soviet society, neither the elections for the Congress nor the Congress sessions are discussed.

²³ In March 1990, after a change of heart and considerable debate, Gorbachev succeeded in having the Congress of People's Deputies elect him Executive President of the USSR. Lukyanov was then elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, which Gorbachev vacated and the post of Deputy Chairman was eliminated. A discussion of Gorbachev's position as President and the relationship of the new post vis-a-vis the Supreme Soviet is beyond the scope of this thesis.

B. THE COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS OF DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY

The week before the Supreme Soviet was to convene, the committees met, discussed, and approved the candidates for government posts recommended by Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov.²⁴ The Chairman of the Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security, Vladimir L. Lapygin, was interviewed by Krasnaya Zvezda. Lapygin is a design engineer specializing in missile guidance, a designer for the on-board guidance system for the Soviet space shuttle Buran, and a life-long employee of the Soviet aerospace industry.²⁵

In the Krasnaya Zvezda interview, Lapygin acknowledged his "surprise" at being elected committee chairman and outlined what he thought the KOGB's duties were.²⁶ Early in the interview he addressed what had become one of the sore points for the military high command--the issue of stationing troops from the Baltic republics on their own territories, an issue raised by the Baltic nationalist movements. While not acknowledging the issue directly, Lapygin stated that he "could not agree, ... with the viewpoint of

²⁴ "Joint Session Scheduled for 27 June," Daily Report: Soviet Union, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS-SOV)-89-121, June 26, 1989, p. 36.

²⁵ Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," Report on the USSR, May 11, 1990, p. 9.

²⁶ According to Lapygin, he and other committee chairmen were nominated for their positions by Gorbachev and Lukyanov and approved by the Supreme Soviet. ("The New Soviet Legislature: Committee on Defense and State Security," Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, No. 8, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April 11, 1990, p. 5.)

a number of deputies from the Baltic republics-representatives of indigenous nationalities". Lapygin stated ambiguously that the "chief aim" of his committee was "to strengthen the country's defense and to control the executive organs operating in this area." Careful to address both the concerns of the military and the political leadership, Lapygin stated that among the important tasks the committee would be performing would be to "elaborate legislative policy...to ensure our state's security interests" while on the other hand insuring that "these interests do not transcend the limits of reasonable sufficiency." The work of the KOGB would be based on the principles of "new thinking." But he left no doubts about the future of the military budget by saying that "such approaches to Soviet defense building make it possible to reduce military spending on the basis of imparting a new quality" to the Armed Forces without "harming" the nations defense capability.²⁷

Lapygin pointed out that the committee would "examine very important programs for the development of the Army and Navy" with "due regard" for Soviet military doctrine and reasonable sufficiency in order to "ensure strategic stability" and the defense of the USSR and its allies. The KOGB would also "analyze" how efforts to enhance the quality of the Armed Forces were being carried out. Then in a comment that could be indicative of from where the committee intended to draw its information, Lapygin

²⁷ "Lapygin Interviewed on Security Chairmanship," FBIS-SOV-89-120, June 23, 1989, p. 43.

stated that the committee would "listen to the defense minister, other ministers working for defense and top military leaders." He added that "if necessary" the KOGB would "go out to the troops and to defense industry enterprises." Curiously left out are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which under Eduard Shevardnadze has moved to play a larger role in determining military policy, and defense intellectuals attached to the Academy of Sciences²⁸ who have often been highly critical of the Soviet military.²⁹

Lapygin acknowledged that *dedovshchina* (hazing or bullying of junior enlisted personnel by their seniors) remained a problem in the military, referring to it as "nonregulation relations". He also addressed "social problems" in the military, especially those arising from troop reductions. Lapygin was unclear as to just how the KOGB would exercise "control" over the Army, saying that "it was not a question of control in the usual sense of the word" and that the committee must "control the Armed Forces' state of combat readiness."³⁰

Overall, Lapygin took a basically pro-military stance in his interview with *Krasnaya Zvezda* which is understandable given his audience. He did, however, also hit upon the major themes of Soviet military policy formulated after the Party's 27th Party Congress (reasonable sufficiency and maintaining strategic parity as the end goal of Soviet military policy). Lapygin's indication that the

²⁸ Primarily Georgi and Alexi Arbatov and Andrei Kokoshin.

²⁹ "Lapygin Interviewed on Security Chairmanship," p. 43.

³⁰ Ibid.

committee will rely (solely, it would seem) on the professional military for advice was doubtless pleasing to a military leadership which had grown sensitive to the criticisms of "outsiders." According to the interview, the KOGB's primary duty would be to see that the military's request for resources remained within the boundaries of reasonable sufficiency. His comment that the committee's responsibilities did not include "control in the usual sense of the word" begs the question of just how much oversight powers the KOGB will have.

IV. THE SUPREME SOVIET CONVENES

A. CONTROVERSY OVER COMPOSITION OF THE KOGB

Controversy over the KOGB arose on the first day of the convening of the new Supreme Soviet. As mentioned earlier, the first item on the agenda was the approval of the 14 committees. A dispute immediately arose over the membership of the KOGB, indicating a high level of interest in the composition of the committee.³¹ The "greatest discussion flared up" in the Soviet of Nationalities over the composition of the KOGB. Several deputies were skeptical that the committee would be able to carry out its "function of control" since the majority of KOGB members came from the defense sector of the economy. The Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, R. N. Nishanov, responded that like other committees, the KOGB "includes people's deputies who are professionally involved in these matters." Deputies from Lithuania and Kazakhstan were also dissatisfied that no representatives from their republics were on the KOGB. A Lithuanian delegate attributed the exclusion of a Lithuanian representative to the fact that the

³¹ In seeming contrast to the amount of interest in the KOGB indicated by the high level of debate over the composition of the committee, the House Armed Services Committee report on the KOGB mentions one member stating that few Supreme Soviet members "initially showed interest" in the committee. (Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 5.) The deputy's statement also runs counter to a statement by G. Sturua that "the greatest number of applications was submitted" for membership on the KOGB. ("Defense, State Security Committee Viewed," *World Economy and International Relations*, No. 1, January 1990)

majority of the Lithuanian delegates belonged to the separatist Sajudis movement. An additional proposal was put forward to include representatives of all union republics on the KOGB. Evidently losing patience at both the tenacity of those making the argument and the repeated raising of the issue, Chairman Nishanov "called on everyone to engage in a constructive, calm discussion" saying that no one would be excluded from the "discussion of important questions" relating to either the republics or the Union. The resolution of the objection of the Lithuanian and Kazakh deputies would have to be resolved in conjunction with the Soviet of the Union. The composition of the committee was approved "taking into account the proposals" submitted by the deputies. The Soviet of the Union took up the issue that evening and once again "lively debates developed" during the discussion of the composition of the KOGB. The Soviet of the Union, after changing the membership of the KOGB for the "umpteenth time," approved the inclusion of Lithuanian and Kazakh representatives and added younger junior officers to the committee.³²

As approved by both chambers of the Supreme Soviet, the Committee on Defense and State Security contains 43 members including 12 apparently working in the defense industry, six military officers (three of them high-ranking flag officers, two

³² "Chambers Hold Separate Sittings," FBIS-SOV-89-122, June 27, 1989, pp. 30-31. (originally in Sovetskaya Rossiya, June 27, 1989, pp. 1-2); "Debate on Defense Committee Analyzed," FBIS-SOV-89-124, June 29, 1989, pp. 41-43. (originally in Krasnaya Zvezda, June 29, 1989, p. 3); "Defense Committee Makeup Debated," FBIS-SOV-89-121, June 26, 1989, pp. 39-40. (originally by TASS International Service 1057 GMT June 26, 1989.)

younger reformist officers, and the last the deputy chairman of the committee), three high-ranking KGB officers, eight party and government officials (including two high-ranking Party officials in charge of defense industry), and two scientists. The rest are educators, industry officials, and three reformist intellectuals.³³ The committee is divided into three subcommittees: Armed Forces, Defense Industry, and State Security.³⁴

The controversy over the composition of the KOGB is one of the more interesting developments in the opening session of the Supreme Soviet. That some deputies are distrustful of what they perceive as the over-representation of the defense sector on the committee, and thus its impartiality, could be indicative of general distrust of the defense community in the Supreme Soviet. This would seem particularly true in light of the deputies' willingness to allow their compatriots to sit on other committees where their expertise lies. The committee's sensitivity to this criticism became evident when Lapygin later got up before the Supreme Soviet and broke down by percentages the areas of expertise of the members of his committee pointing out that the "majority of comrades" on the KOGB were "in no way linked to military production." Apparently sensing the deputies' skepticism towards the committee's ability to examine defense issues with a critical eye, Lapygin tried to convince the deputies that "from the point of view of criticism of the military

³³ Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," p. 8. (The members of the Committee for Defense and State Security are listed in appendix A.)

³⁴ Report of the Committee on Armed Services, pp. 5-6.

and industrial complex, this is not bad." He also acknowledged, however, that this "creates a certain difficulty in our committee's work" and that since the issues dealt with the "strategy of arming and providing for defense to state security," "specialists" were needed.³⁵

The issue of republican representation on the committee also illustrated both the nascent assertiveness of the republics to protect (or establish) their autonomy and their sensitivity to Ministry of Defense decisions affecting their republics. Both of these controversies could be indicators of the amount of influence the KOGB may be able to exert vis-a-vis the Supreme Soviet.

At the opening of the Supreme Soviet, Lapygin gave an interview to Izvestia where he once again talked about the duties of the KOGB and where, for the first time, he addressed the issues of secrecy and the relationship between his committee and the KGB. He also expressed some thoughts that appeared to conflict with those expressed earlier in Krasnaya Zvezda.³⁶

Lapygin described the KOGB's "objective" in "general terms" as "reliably ensuring the country's reasonable defense capability and security at optimum expenditure." He pointed out, as he had earlier in Krasnaya Zvezda, that defense decisions must be based upon the principles of "new thinking" but added that "equally

³⁵ "Lapygin on Defense Committee," FBIS-SOV-89-124, June 29, 1989, pp. 37-38.

³⁶ "Lapygin Explains Security Committee's Role," FBIS-SOV-89-124, June 29, 1989, pp. 43-45. (originally in Izvestia, June 27, 1989, p. 2)

important...the real economic difficulties experienced by the people." Lapygin also indicated that the debate on defense decision making would be considerably more open than previously indicated by hoping that "the consideration of alternative opinions to specific decisions and the involvement of experts and specialists who view problems from unorthodox angles will become the rule in the work of the committee." He once again had to defend the inclusion of officials associated with the defense industry, saying that as far as the Committee on Agrarian Questions was concerned, "no one had any misgivings about the fact that most of its members were agriculture specialists."³⁷

Regarding state secrets, which the interviewer gave as the reason for past "rejection" for "outside intervention in the affairs of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB," Lapygin stated that there were "fewer secrets now" and that remaining state secrets related to the "creation of new types of arms and technological priorities in their development and production." Lapygin acknowledged that state secrets were still necessary because "we are forced to compete with other countries." As an example, Lapygin pointed out that the U.S. was aware of the Soviets' "developing systems which are capable in principle of countering their SDI," but that this did not mean that the Soviets had to furnish the U.S. with the results of the work.

Lapygin also equated military secrets with "commercial secrets" that could affect "the might of a country as a whole."

³⁷ Ibid., p. 43.

Admitting that the Soviet penchant for secrecy sometimes got out of hand, Lapygin said that "unjustified secrecy" remained. Specifically he spoke of the locations of obvious "major military enterprises" of which the "whole world knows about." Pointing out the necessity "to rid ourselves of primitive spy mania," Lapygin was even more critical of using the "mantle of secrecy" to "hide all kinds of problems and shortcomings." Lapygin ended his discussion about secrecy by noting that "psuedosecrecy" hampered the "introduction of useful ideas into the civilian economy" saying this represented "a whole treasure trove of untapped potential." Still, for the KOGB Chairman, the problem of state secrecy remained a "complex one."³⁸

Lapygin was asked how the KOGB was going to "monitor" the work of the Armed Forces and (for the first time) the KGB. Lapygin indicated that the committee would draw information both from within these organizations and from without. Claiming that the committee would "listen to heads of departments and their deputies," he also said it would be necessary to establish a "system of extradepartmental experts" and use "information provided by the public, the press, and the population." Despite this, "an efficient monitoring mechanism" has not been established yet, but it must have a "legal basis." Speaking directly of the KGB, Lapygin said there was a "need for oversight of the KGB on the part of the organs of soviet power and on the part of the public." To Lapygin this meant "the optimization of budget appropriations and

³⁸ Ibid., p. 44.

qualitative improvement of the structure of the KGB at the center and at the local level."³⁹

On military issues, Lapygin was asked about his attitude towards a "professional army." He believed that "such an army would be stronger than the current one" and felt that the increasing sophistication of military equipment and "conscripts ("yesterday's schoolchildren") inability to handle it skillfully" made a professional army necessary. Lapygin also pointed out that the trend towards increased manning by "specialist officers, warrant officers, and ensigns" would only increase in the future. The KOGB Chairman was not sure what the cost of such a force would be, but that "in-depth analysis and discussions" would be necessary. Lapygin did disagree with those who discarded the idea "point blank" because it was "not to the taste of certain military leaders."⁴⁰

On other matters, Lapygin came out strongly against the use of the Army in "conflicts inside the country" calling it "extremely undesirable" and the responsibility of MVD troops. He gave strong backing to military R & D projects saying that the conversion of defense industries to civilian production should not lead to the "dismantling or placing on starvation rations" the "scientific research institutes, design bureaus, and their experimental plants" that create "new types of arms." Lapygin stated unequivocally that "research and development work must not be discontinued" or the

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

USSR would run the risk of "falling seriously behind our competitors." He called the mass production of new arms "another matter," saying it "swallows up" a "large part of the resources devoted to the defense industry." In Lapygin's opinion, this is where reductions must take place and be "reoriented towards civilian needs." The chairman was extremely critical of the "duplication in the work of the defense complexes."⁴¹

Lapygin's Izvestia interview was different from his Krasnaya Zvezda interview of a few days earlier in that he took a more pronounced pro-reform stand and said some things that probably would not sit well with the high command. His talk of considering "alternative options" and eliciting the involvement of experts and specialists with "unorthodox" views as a "rule" in committee work is different from his statements in Krasnaya Zvezda where he indicated emphasis upon seeking advice from the professional military. The high command has grown increasingly resentful of the intrusion of such "amateurs" in the military arts.

In saying that he was opposed to the misuse of secrecy to cover mistakes and shortcomings, Lapygin gave a vote of support to military glasnost, a subject that the high command has increasingly railed against. Another opinion that could not have been pleasing to the generals was his tentative endorsement of a "professional army." While hinting that the adoption of such an idea would be dependent upon the cost, Lapygin did feel a professional army would be "stronger" and that the sophistication of modern weapons

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 44-45.

necessitated it. His comment that the idea should not be abandoned because "certain military leaders" might be opposed to it (the most outspoken of whom were Minister of Defense Yazov and Chief of the General Staff Moiseev!), was a direct rebuff to the military leadership and seemingly put him on a collision course with the high command.

But there were some issues on which Lapygin's line of thinking appeared more "conventional." His discussion of state secrets did not establish a definitive criteria by which information could be evaluated and, more importantly for the committee and those interested in following its development, provide an idea of the "openness" of the committee's deliberations. His most interesting statement was the acknowledgement that the secrecy surrounding the defense industry "hampered" the crossover of technology into the civilian economy. However, by stressing that the problem was a "complex" one, Lapygin did not open any new doors nor did he promise to in the future. Lapygin also sided with the military by coming out against the use of the army to quell internal unrest in the Soviet Union and his insistence that R & D into new types of weapons must not be victim of planned reduced defense spending.

Lapygin shed no light on how the committee planned to monitor the KGB other than acknowledging the necessity for "oversight." His comment about the lack of an "efficient monitoring mechanism" is an accurate assessment of the problem and hardly cause for confidence on the part of those calling for reform of the security apparatus.

B. DEFENSE POLICY AND THE SUPREME SOVIET

On the second day of the opening session of the Supreme Soviet, Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov outlined the government's proposals that would be presented to the legislature and debated among the deputies. In discussing defense matters, Ryzhkov singled out "two problems that were dealt with by the relevant committee" of the Supreme Soviet "during the examination of the program submitted by the Ministry of Defense." According to Ryzhkov, the first problem was defense spending. He stated that on the basis of "the new military doctrine," the government would "consistently implement measures to reduce" defense spending. Efforts to ensure the Soviet Union's defense capability "must be based solely on the requirements of reasonable sufficiency." Ryzhkov indicated that this had already caused some conflict within the KOGB where "the exchange of views about this became a serious conversation about changes that must take place in the activity of the Defense Ministry."

Stating that the second problem was the need to ensure the military's supply of modern weaponry at a time of diminishing resources, the Prime Minister said that reasonable sufficiency "must be backed up by the further technical reequipping of the Armed Forces on a qualitatively new basis." Ryzhkov also sought to soothe the Armed Forces' wounds over public criticism by acknowledging the "obligation" to support the Armed Forces and "to do everything for its prestige and authority to be strengthened and held in high regard." Ryzhkov then suggested that a portion of some

of the savings from reduced defense spending should be directed towards "tackling the social problems of the Armed Forces."⁴²

Ryzhkov's comments are interesting in that by noting the "serious conversation" arising from the "exchange of views" in the KOGB, they provide a brief glimpse of the conflict that apparently existed in the committee over (at least the degree of) reductions in defense spending. By noting that these discussions took place over "changes that must take place" in the way the Ministry of Defense does business, Ryzhkov put his weight behind the growing calls for reform in the Defense Ministry.

1. The Defense Minister Before the Supreme Soviet

After approving the membership of the various committees, the next item on the Supreme Soviet's agenda was the confirmation of the government as proposed by Prime Minister Ryzhkov. One of the members up for confirmation was Army General⁴³ Dimitri Yazov as Minister of Defense. Yazov's confirmation hearing would be the first instance of the new Supreme Soviet finding its voice on defense policy issues and intruding into an area that previously had been the exclusive realm of the high command.

⁴² "Ryzhkov's 27 June Report to Supreme Soviet," *FBIS-SOV-89-123*, June 28, 1989, pp. 34-41. (originally in *Pravda*, June 27, 1989, p. 2.)

⁴³ Yazov was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union on April 28, 1990, making him the first Marshal on active duty since early 1989. Stephen Foye points out that Yazov's promotion, coming on the eve of celebrations marking the 45th anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II, represents another effort by Gorbachev to placate an increasingly restive military high command. (*Radio Liberty Daily Report*, April 30, 1990.)

General Yazov, whom the KOGB approved for remaining on as Defense Minister, appeared before the Supreme Soviet on 3 July 1989. Yazov would first speak and then answer questions from deputies. Yazov began his speech by noting that the defense policy of the USSR was the responsibility of the "supreme political leadership of the country." He then added that "reduction of the Armed Forces, drafts, and other measures associated with organizational development" were also determined by the political leadership.⁴⁴

Then, wasting no time in addressing contentious issues, Yazov stated his opposition to a proposal before the Supreme Soviet releasing students on active military service. Yazov told the Supreme Soviet that as a result of the reduction of 500,000 personnel in the Armed Forces, over 300,000 students of "higher and secondary education establishments" had not been called up. As far as releasing an additional 176,000 students already on active service from 1987 and 1988, Yazov commented that roughly half of the questions he received from deputies (he claimed to receive over 400 total) dealt with the possibility of releasing the students early. Yazov maintained that these students were "a very highly trained part of the Armed Forces" and that releasing them early from service "would undoubtedly have an effect on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces." Realizing that "any decision could be made," Yazov nevertheless stated unequivocally that "at the

⁴⁴ "Yazov Addresses 3 July Session," FBIS-SOV-89-127, July 5, 1989, p. 40.

present moment there is no possibility of discharging these comrades, and they must do the length of service that is laid down by the law."⁴⁵

The Defense Minister then turned his attention to another contentious issue. Yazov also received "a great many questions" about the possibility of servicemen being assigned to their home regions. General Yazov pointed out that such a practice would lead to conflicts about determining who would serve in the Armed Forces in the area of the Warsaw Pact countries and, by extension, to any branch of the Armed Forces. Calling such questions "impermissible," he did say however, that it was "another matter" to allow some troops to serve in their home republics "in order to have a trained contingent of personnel" for mobilization purposes.⁴⁶

On other issues, Yazov believed that the recent decision to unilaterally reduce the Armed Forces was "appropriate to this specific historical time" and to "the state of tension in the world." However, Yazov noted that as of yet the NATO countries had not responded to Soviet reductions. Regarding the issue of a "professional army," Yazov stated outright that it was a suggestion the Soviet Union "cannot afford." Yazov reminded the deputies that the Soviet Armed Forces are already 50% professional. As far as what to do with the money saved from reduced defense spending, Yazov thought that it would "be better" to release it to military science, but he acknowledged that "other questions have to be

⁴⁵ Ibid., emphasis added.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

resolved as well." In the end, Yazov deferred to the Supreme Soviet, saying that whatever it decided, "that's the way it should be." He stated that the Ministry of Defense would merely submit a request and live with the decision of the Supreme Soviet.⁴⁷

Yazov's speech was essentially conciliatory in tone, perhaps reflecting his anticipation of a possible hostile grilling by the Supreme Soviet deputies.⁴⁸ The General was supportive of recent Party decisions regarding military policy (though his comment that the political leadership was responsible for reductions indirectly underscored the military's late hour opposition to the idea), arms control, and relations with the West. Yazov did once again, however, stake out his claim on areas which he had spoken of before. He repeated in no uncertain terms his opposition to the early release of students from service, to the proposal for stationing troops on their home territory, and to the formation of a professional Army. He agreed with the calls for reduced defense spending to address other problems of society, though true to his bureaucracy, he hoped that money saved would go towards research and development. He did however, defer all final decisions on the allocation of resources to the Supreme Soviet. Yazov had made a gesture of goodwill towards the Supreme Soviet, doubtless hoping he would receive the same.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 42-43.

⁴⁸ Stephen Foye, "Yazov Survives Hostile Reappointment Debate," Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty Research Report, July 24, 1989, p. 4. (Foye points out that Yazov took a "particularly conciliatory attitude towards the operations of the Supreme Soviet" in the weeks prior to his reappointment hearings.)

The questioning of General Yazov by Supreme Soviet deputies has been described by several analysts as "difficult," "intense criticism," "grilling," "attacked vigorously," "acrimonious," "contentious," "hostile," etc.⁴⁹ Certainly Yazov was one of the most thoroughly "grilled" ministers up for confirmation and the "rough" treatment accorded him as standing Minister of Defense was unprecedented from a body that previously had been viewed as a "rubber stamp" parliament. General Yazov's irritation at such treatment was clearly evident in the curt, often defensive manner with which he answered some of the deputies inquiries. Yazov was asked about measures to "increase discipline" in the Armed Forces, especially efforts to cut back the incidents of *dedovshchina*. He was asked to explain if there was any residual radioactivity affecting the country as a result of the country's nuclear testing program and was criticized for the military's conducting nuclear tests on 6 August, the date of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Deputies criticized a number of issues relating to the military including the role of "political bodies" in the Army as "wholly negative," and the "overly generous retirement conditions" for Army generals. One deputy criticized the lack of professionalism in the Army and the unilateral reductions. Yazov came under personal criticism as well. He was

⁴⁹ Stephen Foye, "The Soviet Armed Forces in 1989," Report on the USSR, January 26, 1989; "Yazov Survives Contentious Confirmation Debate," Report on the USSR, July 21, 1989, George C. Weickhardt, "Moiseev versus Yazov: Backlash in the Armed Forces?" Report on the USSR, Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev Discloses Details of Defense Council," Report on the USSR, September 15, 1989.

too old, "insensitive to people's needs," and had not lived up to the "high hopes" that had initially been placed in him. Deputies also suggested that Yazov be replaced. General Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff, and General Colonel Boris Gromov, the last commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and then commander of the Kiev Military District, were put forward as possible replacements.⁵⁰

Yazov was not without his supporters though. Two members of the KOGB, Chairman Lapygin and Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev, spoke out in support. But the most crucial support for the embattled Defense Minister came from the man who gave him his job, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Gorbachev. Gorbachev chose to speak out because the debate over Yazov's appointment had gotten to the point that Gorbachev believed he had to speak out as Chairman of the Defense Council. Gorbachev first pointed out that the Supreme Soviet was "going to have to think through...how we are going to discuss the problems of the Army." He reminded deputies that "all issues relating to defense and security" should not be discussed in the Supreme Soviet. That, after all, was why committees had been established. Based upon his interpretation of the questioning of Yazov, Gorbachev observed that "we are exaggerating the role of the USSR Defense Minister." Gorbachev pointed out that the Defense Council (of which Yazov is only one member), by making the "decision on all key issues," bears a lot of

⁵⁰ "Yazov Answers Deputies' Questions," FBIS-SOV-89-127, July 5, 1989, p. 45-48. "Yazov Candidacy Discussed," FBIS-SOV-89-129, July 7, 1989, pp. 62-63.

the responsibility for defense issues. Gorbachev then recited the familiar litany of problems in the Soviet military. Commenting on Yazov, Gorbachev pointed out that the General "occupied progressive positions," but that Gorbachev, like other deputies, was "not satisfied with his replies on a number of questions." Gorbachev attributed this to Yazov's apprehension about revealing state secrets, but that he had not "found the best answer on a number of issues." Gorbachev faulted Yazov for becoming "irritated," calling it "impermissible" for anyone in the Supreme Soviet.⁵¹ But Gorbachev did eventually come to Yazov's defense pointing out that he had been recommended by the Defense Council and that Gorbachev "would not interrupt his activities now, seeing all the pluses and minuses of this man." Gorbachev stated that Yazov had not been in office long enough "to fully master this business," but that he had the "potential for doing so." Gorbachev closed his comments by siding neither with Yazov or the republics on the stationing of troops issue, faulting each side for "trying to score points," and felt that "more work should be done on the student's question." Then bringing the discussion on Yazov's nomination to a close, he called for a vote. Out of the deputies present, 256 voted in favor of Yazov, 77 voted against, and 66 abstained.⁵¹

⁵¹ "Gorbachev Speech Supports Yazov," FBIS-SOV-89-127, July 5, 1989, pp. 48-51. (There is some question as to how many deputies were present for the Yazov vote. Gorbachev mentions 429, but the total vote figures account for only 399.)

Thus General Yazov survived his ordeal. But as Foye points out, this may have been due in large part to changes in the Supreme Soviet's voting rules that had been adopted the morning of the debate. This begs the question as to whether the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (headed by Gorbachev) anticipated difficulty with Yazov's confirmation. The new rules allowed a candidate to be elected after receiving a majority of the votes of deputies present. The earlier rules required an absolute majority (272 votes out of 542) for confirmation.⁵² Yazov's 256 votes were a clear majority of the deputies present. Whether he would have survived a vote of the full Supreme Soviet can only be guessed at. It certainly would have been close either way.

Yazov's grilling by deputies demonstrated the enthusiasm with which delegates approached their first opportunity to have some input in defense policy and the degree of dissatisfaction many felt with the military's performance, especially with its being a voracious consumer of state resources. Yazov became a lightning rod for these frustrations, but his own mediocrity (as perceived by the deputies) also acted as a magnet for criticism. Gorbachev's speech in defense of Yazov was certainly crucial to his confirmation. But this was probably due more to Gorbachev's assertion that the role of the Defense Minister was "overrated" and that the Defense Council had the leading part in defense policy than to any defense of Yazov's performance to date. Essentially, Yazov owes his

⁵² Stephen Foye, "Yazov Survives Hostile Reappointment Debate," p. 4.

election to the downplaying of his role rather than the weight of his influence. The military high command as a whole could not have been very happy with Yazov's confirmation process in that, in its first appearance before the Supreme Soviet, it met with widespread criticism. It also did not help that to most observers Gorbachev had to intervene to save the Defense Minister. For the high command, this was yet another example of anti-military feeling generated by criticism of the military permitted under glasnost. In its first encounter with the Supreme Soviet, the high command had survived a close, but highly embarrassing call. The next would be a resounding defeat.

2. The Vote on Early Release of Students

As mentioned earlier, the issue of the early release of students from military service was to be put to a vote before the Supreme Soviet. The high command, in the person of Yazov before the same body and on several other occasions, had come out decisively against the idea. On 11 July, one week after Yazov's confirmation hearing, in which the Defense Minister stated there was "no possibility" of realizing students early, and after "more work" was supposed to have been done on the issue on the behest of Chairman Gorbachev, Prime Minister Ryzhkov brought the motion up before the Supreme Soviet for a vote. As laid out by Ryzhkov, the discharge of 176,000 students would reduce combat troop strength "in terms of sergeants and soldiers" 4.8%. After some questioning over whether the reductions would include the Navy (it would), the vote was taken. There were only five votes against the proposal and three

abstentions. As First Vice-Chairman Lukyanov, who was presiding over the vote, put it, the proposal "passed...by the overwhelming majority."⁵³

The vote to release students early from military service was a stinging defeat for the high command especially after it had come out so strongly against the proposal and given the overwhelming majority of the affirmative vote (probably at least 400).⁵⁴ Soviet media reported the event in an almost gleeful tone, with TASS noting the "storm of applause" that greeted the proposal and domestic radio even reporting that it was "strange" that "five deputies voted against the decision."⁵⁵ Lukyanov also laughingly pointed out that the Supreme Soviet was sent "huge bunches of roses" after the vote.⁵⁶

C. THE FIRST SUPREME SOVIET: AFTERMATH

The first session of the Supreme Soviet was a watershed for both the military high command and the Supreme Soviet deputies. In its first two encounters with the new legislature, the military

⁵³ "Ryzhkov Speaks to Assembly," FBIS-SOV-89-132, July 12, 1989, pp. 57-58.

⁵⁴ Author note: I was not able to find a total affirmative count, but regardless of the actual number, given the total membership of 542 (of which some were undoubtedly absent), it was still, as Lukyanov stated, overwhelming.

⁵⁵ "Proposal on Student Conscripts Passed," FBIS-SOV-89-132, July 12, 1989, p. 59. (originally by TASS, July 11, 1989.) "Radio Reports Conscript Decision," FBIS-SOV-89-132, p. 59.

⁵⁶ "Lukyanov Interviewed on Supreme Soviet Results," FBIS-SOV-89-152, August 9, 1989, p. 28.

leadership had narrowly averted defeat at the confirmation hearings of Defense Minister Yazov and suffered an embarrassing defeat over the student draft issue. Both of these incidents could hardly be reassuring to the high command about the level of influence it would be able to exert over the Supreme Soviet as a whole. However, given the unprecedented criticisms of the military that had become vogue under glasnost, the high command possibly was not expecting to wield overwhelming influence in the Supreme Soviet. The high command is probably more optimistic about the degree of influence it can wield in the KOGB and thus, through it, wield more influence on defense policy debates.

For the Supreme Soviet deputies the experience of the Yazov confirmation debate and the vote to release students from their military service has probably engendered a sense of confidence regarding its ability to take on the Ministry of Defense on certain issues. It is likely to entertain more criticism and questioning of military prerogatives like high command opposition to a "professional" army and calls for reevaluating or canceling major weapons system programs such as construction of aircraft carriers.⁵⁷ This challenging of high command prerogatives is also likely since, as the controversy over the composition of the KOGB demonstrated, the deputies evidently are skeptical about the committee's ability to act impartially with regards to defense issues.

⁵⁷ Andrei Kortunov, and Igor Malashenko, "'Tbilisi,' 'Riga,' and the Rest," *New Times*, December 19-25, 1989, p. 28.

With the new Supreme Soviet and its committees now established and functioning, the legislative debate over Soviet defense policy would move to the mechanism set up for that purpose - the Committee for Defense and State Security.

V. THE KOGB AND DEFENSE POLICY

A. THE ROLE OF THE KOGB

As its title would suggest, the Committee on Defense and State Security could conceivably deal with a wide range of issues dealing with Soviet defense policy including oversight of the budgets of the Ministry of Defense and KGB, confirmation of the two organization's ministers, and consent (in conjunction with the Committee on International Relations) on ratification of international treaties affecting Soviet security policy.⁵⁸

However, as the House Armed Services Committee report on the committee points out, much of what the KOGB is doing at this time is "ad hoc" and several members have indicated the committee's agenda has not been fully decided upon.⁵⁹ This stems not only from the wide variety of issues that could conceivably fall within the KOGB's area of interest, but also because organizationally, the committee is not yet up to its tasks. Nonetheless, the committee has begun its work on four issues: defense spending, conversion of defense industries to civilian production, drafting a law on defense, and military reform. This chapter examines the work of the committee on the issues of the defense budget and military reform.

⁵⁸ Report of the Committee on Armed Services, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 4 & 8.

B. THE KOGB AND DEFENSE SPENDING

The issue that has taken up most of the KOGB's time to date is determining the level of Soviet defense spending. Committee member Stanislav P. Golovin described the defense budget and the "budget of defense industry" as the committee's "main work."⁶⁰

1. The Defense Budget for 1990

The Supreme Soviet's second session dealt primarily with the state budget. As part of determining the state budget, the KOGB reviewed proposed figures for Soviet defense spending for 1990 in October 1989. According to one Soviet source, the KOGB's "working groups" (presumably subcommittees) "undertook a clause by clause analysis" of the draft 1990 defense budget.⁶¹ This seemingly contradicts the statement of one KOGB member who stated that defense spending figures provided to the committee were general, non-specific figures with details concerning specific programs not provided.⁶² At least some KOGB defense budget deliberations were also attended by representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defense, and State Planning Committee (Gosplan).⁶³ According to committee chairman Lapygin, the KOGB meetings were

⁶⁰ "Supreme Soviet Defense, Security Work Described," FBIS-SOV-89-194, October 10, 1989, p. 55. (See also Lapygin's interviews with Krasnaya Zvezda (pp. 13-15) and Izvestia (pp. 20-24) above.)

⁶¹ World Economy and International Relations, No. 1, January 1990, p. 82.

⁶² Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," p. 10.

⁶³ "Defense Security Panel Deliberations Viewed," FBIS-SOV-89-199, October 17, 1989, p. 54.

first addressed by Minister of Defense Yazov who presented an assessment of the political-military situation on the world, and Chief of the General Staff Moiseev, who spoke on the state of the Armed Forces.⁶⁴ The committee also planned to hear from the commanders of the military services (Ground, Strategic Rocket Forces, Navy, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, etc.) who would outline their plans for the funds allocated to their respective commands.⁶⁵ According to *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the committee recommended that certain "points" be considered in discussing the draft defense budget. These were: that in "conditions of defense cuts" the emphasis on defense budget considerations must be on "developing and supplying the country's Armed Forces with modern, highly effective military equipment;" that consideration be given to discontinuing the production of obsolete equipment thus reducing "the product range" of defense equipment; and that the "social thrust" of the defense budget be reinforced noting that the "poverty line runs quite close to military settlements."⁶⁶

These initial KOGB meetings on the defense budget were not without controversy. Committee member Golovin pointed out that he was "not satisfied" with General Yazov's report and the figures given to the committee regarding military spending. Golovin stated that the figures were "not specific," that no comparative figures

⁶⁴ "Defense Committee Chairman Interviewed," *FBIS-SOV-89-194*, October 10, 1989, p. 56 (originally published in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, October 6, 1989, p. 1.)

⁶⁵ *Report of the Committee on Armed Services*, p. 9.

⁶⁶ "Defense Security Panel Deliberations Viewed," p. 55.

were provided, and that some of the "formulations" were not backed up by specific figures. Saying, "We have many questions for the general staff and Defense Ministry on this report," Golovin called for more detailed figures on the defense budget.⁶⁷ Reportedly, one deputy said that the KOGB still did not know how much was being spent on defense and that the government's system made arriving at a figure very difficult.⁶⁸ G. Sturua, in *World Economy*, also pointed out that KOGB'S discussion of the military budget "has been of a general nature" because of the "lack of detail in available figures." He also implied criticism of the KOGB's handling of the budget hearings, noting that "very little time was available for such a serious matter."⁶⁹ In contrast to fellow committee member Golovin's negative impression, KOGB chairman Lapygin, when asked by *Krasnaya Zvezda* how the discussion of the defense budget was proceeding, assessed the committee's discussion of the defense budget as "positive as a whole."⁷⁰ *Krasnaya Zvezda* also pointed out that, evidently in committee discussion of the military's "social issues," the "most varied opinions and sometimes diametrically opposed viewpoints, have been expressed."⁷¹ Reflecting the limits of glasnost regarding the committee's work, Lapygin stated that

⁶⁷ "Supreme Soviet Defense, Security Work Described," pp. 56.

⁶⁸ *Report of the Committee on Armed Services*, p. 9.

⁶⁹ *World Economy and International Relations*, No. 1, January 1990, p. 80.

⁷⁰ "Defense Committee Chairman Interviewed," p. 56.

⁷¹ "Defense, Security Panel Deliberations Viewed," p. 55.

(for at least Generals Yazov's and Moiseev's presentations before the committee) KOGB hearings were closed and no stenographic record made. Lapygin did say, however, that an open session was planned for the discussion of defense conversion.⁷²

The Soviet defense budget for 1990 as finally approved by the KOGB and Supreme Soviet was R70.9 billion, or 8.2% (R6.3 billion) less than the figure for 1989.⁷³ While the KOGB was still discussing the draft defense budget (which evidently passed with little changes), some committee members went out of their way to justify the "sufficiency" of the proposed reductions, evidently sensitive to charges that proposed cuts were not deep enough. Marshal Akhromeyev believed that reducing the defense budget by "even" R6.3 billion would "take a great struggle," though he acknowledged the threat of further defense cuts saying, "Clearly, the Supreme Soviet committees and commissions could propose a larger reduction in defense spending." Despite the "struggle" that would entail from reducing defense spending, Akhromeyev believed the proposed reductions were "well thought out" and satisfied the "minimum needs of the Armed Forces." However, Gorbachev's military

⁷² "Defense Committee Chairman Interviewed," p. 56.

⁷³ "Defense Ministry Reports 1990 Military Spending," *FBIS-SOV-89-241*, December 18, 1989, p. 122. (This is the official Soviet figure for defense spending. This thesis does not endeavor to discuss the accuracy of this figure which is a cause of considerable controversy both in the West and in the USSR. For discussion of the debate about estimates of Soviet defense spending, see Alexander R. Alexiev and Robert C. Nurick, *The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev*, Rand Corporation, February 1990, pp. 36-40, and George G. Weickhardt, "Recent Discussion of Defense Economics," *Report on the USSR*, March 9, 1990, pp. 9-10.)

advisor did feel that reductions in research and development allocations were "undesirable" but deferred to the Supreme Soviet, saying it had the "final say."⁷⁴

Lapygin also was emphatic in stating that the defense budget had been cut as much as was possible. Speaking on behalf of the committee, he pointed out that "in the current international situation" the proposed R6.3 billion reduction for 1990 was the "maximum by which the military budget can be cut." Any further reductions "would raise serious doubts about the sufficiency of our defense." Lapygin said that the USSR was the only country "currently" reducing its defense spending, contrasting this with the alleged planned defense spending increases in the U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany.⁷⁵

KOGB member and Deputy Minister of Defense Army General Vitaliy Shabanov also underscored the "impossibility" of further reductions in defense spending. Speaking before the Supreme Soviet, Shabanov also referred to the planned reduction in the 1990 defense budget as a "maximum," saying it was "impossible to move further." Then indicating that the military had been rebuffed on the issue of reducing R & D funds,⁷⁶ Shabanov said that reducing defense spending had also been achieved by "unfortunately halting or rescheduling" several "scientific research and experimental design

⁷⁴ "Akhromeyev Interviewed on Defense Budget," FBIS-SOV-89-193, October 6, 1989, P. 74.

⁷⁵ "Lapygin on Discussion of Defense Spending," FBIS-SOV-89-207, October 27, 1989, p. 50.

⁷⁶ see Akhromeyev's comments above.

projects." In the face of continued Western research and development, this was doubtless "undesirable."⁷⁷ Shabanov repeated his opposition to reductions in R & D funding again early in 1990, saying that while it was something he did not agree with, it was something that could not be helped. He stated that by reducing the amount of funding for "purchasing weapons and military construction," it was possible to increase officer's pay.⁷⁸

Chief of the General Staff Moiseev also voiced his opposition to reduced R & D funding, saying that the USSR could not "lag behind the leading states and their armies..."⁷⁹

2. Future Budgets: Controversy Over Further Cuts?

As the above comments illustrate, some of the members of the KOGB and the high command have gone to considerable lengths to point out the "sufficiency" of proposed defense reductions for the 1990 budget. They have also made the case that the 1990 budget could not be reduced further without an adverse impact on Soviet defense efforts. But what about future defense budgets? Will the Soviets continue to reduce their defense spending as they have indicated? There appears to be some division in the KOGB over whether any additional cuts are necessary and under what conditions the budget will be further reduced.

⁷⁷ "Shabanov Address," (to 31 October Supreme Soviet Session) FBIS-SOV-89-210, November 1, 1989, p. 64.

⁷⁸ "Reaction to 8.2% Cut in Defense Budget: Deputy Minister Shabanov," FBIS-SOV-89-003, January 4, 1990, p. 103.

⁷⁹ "General Moiseev Discusses the Defense Budget," FBIS-SOV-90-038, February 26, 1990, p. 85. (originally in Izvestia, February 23, 1990, p. 3.)

Akhromeyev's comment that the Supreme Soviet could have called for further cuts in the defense budget for 1990⁸⁰ probably also reflects military concern over calls for further cuts in defense spending in future budgets. In anticipation of this, some are attempting to set the conditions under which future cuts can be made.

Akhromeyev specifically addressed the issue of further reductions in military spending saying that any "radical reduction" in spending must be the result of a "bilateral process."⁸¹

KOGB chairman Lapygin sought to "make it clear" that Soviet intentions to keep reducing the defense budget "largely depends on the result of disarmament talks." Should these talks prove successful, Lapygin thought it would be possible to reduce defense expenditures by half-to R38 billion by 1995.⁸² In a joint interview with U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Chairman Les Aspin, Lapygin said that while the aim of the KOGB was "to steadily reduce defense spending...this will depend on the results of the arms talks." Lapygin also stated that the KOGB would "watch the military budget discussion of the U.S. Congress" and then make conclusions "about our own defense spending."⁸³

⁸⁰ see p. 43.

⁸¹ "Akhromeyev Discusses Military Issues," FBIS-SOV-89-197, October 13, 1989, p. 97.

⁸² "Defense Official on Plans to Half Expenditures," FBIS-SOV-89-170, September 5, 1989, p. 89.

⁸³ "Lapygin, Aspin on Defense Oversight," FBIS-UMA-89-028. November 27, 1989, p. 2.

In his comments on Soviet defense spending for 1990, General Shabanov acknowledged the possibility of future defense cuts but that "this would be carried out on a reciprocal basis."⁸⁴ Possibly reflecting concern over future military cuts and doubtless sensitive to glasnost-inspired criticism of the military, Shabanov apparently felt he had to go so far as to justify the existence of the armed forces. He reminded the Supreme Soviet that "every country inevitably has to have Armed Forces," and that for the "foreseeable future," security could not be achieved through "political methods alone."⁸⁵

Chief of the General Staff Moiseev held out the possibility of further reductions "in the event of progress at the talks in Geneva and Vienna." Moiseev also answered critics of some Soviet weapons programs who questioned whether it was "sensible" to build "heavy aircraft carriers and large nuclear submarines and other expensive military equipment."⁸⁶ For Moiseev the answer was "clear" in that the Soviets could not "lag behind" now because they would "not be able to catch up later."⁸⁷

Moiseev and Shabanov also pointed out the increased cost of modern weapons, thus implying another reason for skepticism regarding further defense cuts. Moiseev noted that defense industries had "switched to full economic accountability and self-

⁸⁴ "Reaction to 8.2% Cut in Defense Budget," p. 103.

⁸⁵ "Shabanov Address," p. 65.

⁸⁶ see p. 38.

⁸⁷ "General Moiseev Discusses the Defense Budget," p. 85.

financing" with the result that the cost of "some types of [defense] work has increased 2-3 times and more."⁸⁸ Shabanov has repeatedly made the same argument, calling the increase in prices "considerable" and faulting many defense enterprises for "exceeding the established rates."⁸⁹ He has also repeatedly argued (in keeping with the Soviet's "defensive doctrine") that defensive weapons "are more costly than offensive weapons."⁹⁰

But the reluctance for further unilateral cuts in defense spending may not be shared by all KOGB members or members of the Supreme Soviet as a whole. Mikhail P. Simonov, Sukhoi aircraft chief and chairman of the KOGB subcommittee on defense industry, has stated that while the 1990 defense budget is "perfectly sufficient for our country...we can and should take the path of a further cutback in our military spending." He gave little indication that further cuts could only result if the west did likewise. Simonov was critical of past defense spending saying, "we have not always spent the money allocated for defense needs,...in a proprietary economical and careful fashion." Simonov believed that reduced military spending would "force the defense industry and Defense Ministry to adopt a more thoughtful attitude towards resources allocated to them."

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ "Yazov, Others on U.S. Ties, Military Budget," *Communist of the Armed Forces*, No. 1, January 1990.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. ? (See also George C. Weickhardt, "Recent Discussion Of Defense Economics," and John Tedstrom, "Military Opposition to Cuts in Defense Expenditure," Report on the USSR, March 16, 1990, pp. 3-5.)

Simonov also evidently did not buy Shabanov's argument that production of "qualitatively new arms" would be necessarily more expensive. On the contrary, he said that the Soviets "could organize production to make spending on arms manufacturing even lower." According to Simonov, this could be accomplished, for example, by reducing the "serial production" of military aircraft. By cutting back on the production of "current models of combat equipment," more money would be saved that could be allocated towards developing "new types of arms."⁹¹

Committee members Lt. Col. Viktor S. Podziruk and Senior Lt. Nikolai D. Tutov have also pointed to areas of the budget that can be reduced. Podziruk has called attention to non-combat formations in the military that could be reduced such as mid-level chains of command, political organs in the military, and sporting companies. Podziruk has also been very critical of the privileges accorded the military leadership. Tutov has pointed out the waste in defense industry where several design bureaus work on a single type of military equipment.⁹²

The KOGB's first attempt at budget oversight on the surface appears to have gone relatively smoothly (considering this was new business for the KOGB and despite *Krasnaya Zvezda's* account of "varied opinions" and Ryzhkov's statements regarding KOGB budget discussions⁹³). But there is some question as to just how much

⁹¹ *Communist of the Armed Forces*, No. 1, January 1990.

⁹² *Communist of the Armed Forces*, No. 1, January 1990.

⁹³ see pp. 25 and 42.

oversight the committee performed given its unfamiliarity with the subject and the amount of time it had to review the budget. The committee was probably presented with a draft budget drawn up by the Ministry of Defense that already contained most of the budget cuts that were eventually approved. Where the committee does appear to have taken the initiative however, is in the areas of R & D funding, increasing officer's pay, and the amount of money allocated for military "social issues." This may have involved a compromise between these three issues where the money saved from reducing the former was transferred to the latter two. There are some underlying problems that, while possibly resulting from the experience of being at the bottom of the learning curve, the KOGB will have to overcome if it is to function properly in the future. Criticism of defense spending figures provided by the Defense Ministry and the fact that a committee member would comment that the committee still does not know just how much the Soviets are spending on defense underscore the seriousness of the problem of access to the "correct" numbers. Also it appears that some members of the committee and the high command are attempting to take the high ground regarding any further defense cuts. As the Soviet economy continues to decline (it is expected to get worse before it gets better) or at the very least remains at its present comatose state, there are likely to be increasing calls for further cuts in defense spending. Mounting consumer frustration will also add to the pressure. In addition, as Lapygin's comments indicate,

increased calls for further defense reductions are likely as the West cuts back its spending.⁹⁴

C. THE KOGB AND MILITARY REFORM

Another issue that the KOGB is grappling with could have profound impact on the Soviet military and is likely to cause considerable controversy within the KOGB and the Supreme Soviet. This is the issue of military reform, which is already causing divisions in the Soviet military.⁹⁵ The question of military reform can be seen as a natural result of glasnost, perestroika, and demokratizatsia in Soviet society and in the military. While civilian critics of the military have often called for reform, the most active proponents of reform come from the ranks of the officer corps.

1. The Military Reformers

The "young turks" pressing for radical reform of the Soviet military are 17 uniformed deputies in the Congress of People's Deputies.⁹⁶ The military deputies, including two members of the KOGB (Lt. Col. Vikyor Podziruk and Senior Lt. Nikolai Tutov), after forming a commission on military reform, presented a

⁹⁴ see p. 47.

⁹⁵ For a discussion of this topic, see Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and 'The Young Turks'," Report on the USSR, April 13, 1990, pp. 8-10, and "Military Debates of the 1920's and Contemporary Defense Policies," Report on the USSR, April 6, 1990, pp. 9-13.

⁹⁶ Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and 'The Young Turks'," Report on the USSR, April 13, 1990, p. 8.

draft of their plan to the second session of the Supreme Soviet. "The Draft Conceptualization of Military Reform" contains several proposals anathema to the Soviet high command. The central idea of the reform proposal is the "professionalism by stages" of the Soviet Armed Forces.⁹⁷ The professional army would be staffed by volunteers with a reserve system built around territorial formations.⁹⁸ According to the "professionalism by stages" concept, the transition to a professional army would begin with the Strategic Rocket Forces and eventually be applied to the other services of the Armed Forces.⁹⁹

The draft military reform would "guarantee the control of the military department by the highest state body and society as a whole."¹⁰⁰ The supervision of defense policy would be firmly planted in the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, and the government.¹⁰¹

Several proposals are also suggested for keeping military spending within the bounds of "reasonable sufficiency." These include: significant reductions in troop strength and numbers of

⁹⁷ "Supreme Soviet Defense Committee Meets," FBIS-SOV-90-068, 9 April 1990, p. 27.

⁹⁸ For a discussion of the debate surrounding territorial military formations, see Scott R. McMichael, "Soviet National Military Formations, 1918-1938," Report on the USSR, April 20, 1990, pp. 3-7.

⁹⁹ Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and 'The Young Turks'," p. 8.

¹⁰⁰ "Supreme Soviet Defense Committee Meets," p. 27.

¹⁰¹ Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and 'The Young Turks'," p. 8.

military educational institutions; revamping the military training system to make it more cost-effective; changes in the administrative system; the increased use of civilian specialists; unification of military and civilian industries; and the elimination of privileges for the military leadership.¹⁰²

The draft military reform also envisions major changes in the role of the political organs in the Soviet military.¹⁰³ The Communist Party would no longer directly determine Soviet defense policies. Communist influence would be exerted through Communist officers. The number and status of the political officers would be lessened. Eventually, the political officers would be elected and their work would primarily center around morale and welfare of the troops.¹⁰⁴

"The Draft Conceptualization of Military Reform" picked up some key support when it was approved by the KOGB subcommittee on armed forces headed by Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov.¹⁰⁵ The next step would be for the draft to pass the full KOGB which is more problematic given the strong resistance of the high command to the reform proposals.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁰³ For a summary of the debate surrounding the political organs, see Foye, "Role of Political Organs in Armed Forces Questioned," Report on the USSR, August 11, 1989, pp. 4-7.

¹⁰⁴ Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and 'The Young Turks'," p. 9.

¹⁰⁵ "Supreme Soviet Defense Committee Meets," p. 27.

2. The High Command and Military Reform

To say that the high command was cool to the ideas expressed in the draft military reform passed by the KOGB armed services subcommittee would certainly be an understatement. The high command has long come out against the "professionalization" of the Armed Forces, with Yazov, Moiseev, and Akhromeyev all speaking out against the proposal, mainly on the grounds that it is too expensive and, as a "mercenary" army, ideologically unacceptable.¹⁰⁶ Evidently demonstrating displeasure at the entire idea of an independent examination of the prospects of military reform, the Ministry of Defense took no part in drafting the proposed reforms though it was provided a draft to review. Not surprisingly, the ministry reportedly came out against publication of the draft.¹⁰⁷ A Soviet source commented that The Ministry of Defense "practically did not take part" in the subcommittee hearing that passed the draft reform proposals, saying, "Somehow they have not shown interest in that work." Indicating that the Ministry of Defense may have begun to take actions against those officers involved in the military reform effort, it also reported that some of the military officers who had participated in the reform commissions work "have begun to experience certain troubles." Reform commission member Lt. Col. Tsalkov reported "pressure" for expressing views that "differ from the views of the leadership of

¹⁰⁶ See "The Defense Minister Before the Supreme Soviet," p. 28.

¹⁰⁷ Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and 'The Young Turks'," p. 9.

the Ministry of Defense." The source also stated that the ministry sought to address "the question in a rather drastic way" by calling for the "dismissal from the ranks of the Armed Forces" of those who have taken part in the commission's work.¹⁰⁸ The Communist Party has also taken action against reformist officers. KOGB member Tutov was expelled from the party in February 1990 and Major Vladimir Lopatin, head of the military reform commission, was expelled in April.¹⁰⁹

While the high command is not completely adverse to the idea of military reform, it almost certainly wants to restrict the effort to within the purview of the Ministry of Defense. From the high command's viewpoint, they are probably "satisfied" with the degree of military reform already resulting from glasnost, perestroika, and demokratizatsia. As they see it, they have enough on their hands without adopting a radical reform of the entire Soviet defense establishment. The high command is taking its turn at military reform through the drafting of a "Law on Defense." This draft law will reportedly be presented at the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet.¹¹⁰ According to TASS, the draft law covers all spheres of defense activity.¹¹¹ Being a product of the Collegium

¹⁰⁸ "Supreme Soviet Defense Committee Meets," p. 27.

¹⁰⁹ "The USSR This Week: Military Reformer Expelled from CPSU," Report on the USSR, May 11, 1990, p. 29.

¹¹⁰ This will reportedly be the fourth draft of the law on defense prepared by the General Staff. The three previous drafts were evidently unsatisfactory and returned by the committee for further work. (Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 9.)

¹¹¹ Radio Liberty Daily Report, April 30, 1990.

of the Defense Ministry, the draft is likely to be conservative in its thinking.

The issue of the pace of military reform has already caused some division within the committee. The House Armed Services Committee report on the KOGB notes the "clear cleavage along generational lines" that exists within the committee on the issue of military reform, with older members more cautious and receptive to the undertaking of "detailed analysis" of issues despite the delay this may cause in addressing issues. Younger members are "more eager to get on with the work of reform, perhaps even preferring to choose any issue as a starting point, rather than do nothing at all while the process of study and review went on."¹¹²

Nonetheless, with the subcommittee on Armed Forces already giving its approval to the draft military reform, the issue is due to be brought before the KOGB before being presented to the Supreme Soviet. Given the makeup of the committee, the draft is likely to be watered down considerably. But as Foye points out, the issue is nonetheless likely to receive a "wider airing" in future Supreme Soviet sessions.¹¹³ Given the past voting record of the Supreme Soviet on military issues, the high command would be justified in being somewhat apprehensive.

¹¹² Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 12.

¹¹³ Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and 'The Young Turks'," p. 10.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. THE KOGB: A QUESTION OF MEETING POTENTIAL

The policies of glasnost and perestroika have widened the playing field upon which Soviet defense policy formation takes place. The election of new, more democratic Supreme Soviet and its KOGB have the potential for playing an increasingly important role in the formation of Soviet defense policy. These new players are engaged in a struggle with the traditional determiners of defense policy over just how much, if any, influence they will yield. The outcome of this contest will have a large impact upon whether the USSR is able to develop a more balanced system of government after 70 years of highly-centralized, one-party rule.

If the Supreme Soviet is to play an increased role in the formation of Soviet defense policy it would seem that the main avenue for enacting reform would be through the KOGB. The House Armed Services Committee report on the KOGB notes the committee's "potential to be a major player in the national security policy process of the Soviet Union."¹¹⁴ While this potential certainly exists, there are problems facing the committee that, failing solution, remain obstacles to its reaching its full potential. These problems are both structural, in the way the committee is set up and how it operates, and bureaucratic, stemming from the fact that the committee is a new creature attempting to formulate policy

¹¹⁴ Report on the Committee on Armed Services, p. 1.

in a hitherto closed exclusive environment. But resolution of these problems will not be possible in the unstable political climate that exists in the USSR today. Therefore, the survival of the KOGB and its parent body are dependent upon the development of continued political reform in the Soviet Union.

1. Structural Problems

Structurally, the committee is hindered by the fact that members have retained their regular occupations and are not full time legislators and thus unable to devote their full attention to the committee's business. This could also cause, as the debate over the committee's composition in the Supreme Soviet demonstrated, considerable conflict of interest problems within the KOGB given the high percentage of members involved in defense sector work. While some committee members acknowledge that this preponderance of "experts" is essential at this early point in the KOGB's life, they likewise recognize the potential conflict but some have so far attempted to play it down.¹¹⁵ Yet it appears to have already manifested itself on at least one occasion. The House Armed Services Committee report notes that during Defense Minister Yazov's appearance before the committee at which he presented the defense budget, committee member Marshal Akhromeyev sat beside Yazov rather than with his fellow committee members.¹¹⁶ The issue of conflict of interest could pose considerable problems for committee military officers forced to choose between their service

¹¹⁵ Report of the Committee on Armed Services. pp. 6-7.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

on the KOGB and the furtherance, or as the experience of the military reformers would indicate, hinderance, of their careers.¹¹⁷ This potential conflict of interest may also arise among committee members with ties to defense industries.¹¹⁸

Another factor impacting on the day to day workings of the KOGB is the minimum amount of staff support available. Presently the committee is limited to seven staff members. The subcommittees have no staff and committee members have no individual or legislative staff to draw upon.¹¹⁹ Sturua, in *Mirovaya Ekonomika*, has contrasted this with the "large number of excellent specialists" available to the ministries bringing issues before the committee and has noted the KOGB's need for "quite a large group of associates-tens of people" to provide staff assistance.¹²⁰ This is particularly important for providing the committee with alternative analyses of issues.

2. Bureaucratic Problems

As was pointed out earlier, being a new participant in the formation of Soviet defense policy, the KOGB is attempting to

¹¹⁷ The wisdom of allowing active duty military officers to run for political office has certainly been brought home in the division that has arisen in the Soviet officers corps. For a discussion of this, see Stephen Foye, "Rumblings in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Report on the USSR*, March 16, 1990. pp. 1-3.

¹¹⁸ Mikhail Tsytkin points out that this conflict of interest is inevitable. See "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," p. 10.

¹¹⁹ *Report of the Committee on Armed Services*, p. 7.

¹²⁰ *Mirovaya Ekonomika*, p. 84. Sturua also calls attention to the inadequacy of the committee's computer support.

exert influence in a previously exclusive environment. The amount of influence it will be able to yield is directly dependent upon the accuracy of the information it is privy to. And in no greater realm have the traditional players in Soviet defense policy formation had greater predominance than in the realm of information.

While some committee members have told of not actually being denied access to any information requested, they have spoken of the reluctance of the Minister of Defense regarding the amount of detail he should make available to the committee.¹²¹ It seems that while information is being provided to the committee, it does not contain sufficient details to enable the KOGB to perform its own analysis and reach its own conclusions. And as one member's comments regarding the figures presented for the defense budget indicate, there is some question of the degree of accuracy of the information provided.¹²² The lack of sufficient staff also leads the committee to rely, perhaps too heavily, upon information provided by the very ministries the KOGB is supposed to oversee and could limit its access to independent analyses.

All of these issues have combined to place the committee in a situation where its capabilities are not nearly up to its tasks. A situation that could take a considerable amount of time to overcome. Marshal Akhromeyev has spoken of the committee difficulties at this early stage saying that it was necessary for

¹²¹ Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 13.

¹²² See pp. 41-42 above.

KOGB members to first be "trained" for their new responsibilities. Akhromeyev believed this "training" would take "at least several months."¹²³ Chairman Lapygin seems to think the process could take even longer, believing that "organizational issues" within the KOGB (and Congress of People's Deputies and, presumably, the Supreme Soviet) could take five years.¹²⁴

The committee has also yet to determine its relationship vis-a-vis other Soviet governmental bodies. This has become increasingly difficult as Gorbachev has repeatedly modified and/or changed Union government structures. This continued government reshuffling is not only a major factor in the ongoing Soviet political crisis, it also makes it impossible for these structures to delineate their individual responsibilities and exercise their respective duties. For example, what role does the KOGB play if, as it seems increasingly likely, the armed forces are used to quell nationalist/ethnic unrest? Does use of the armed forces in this manner come under the purview of the executive through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or is it a matter for the KOGB? If past events are any indicator, it appears the KOGB plays at best a very limited role in this scenario. On April 9 1989, Soviet troops were used to break up peaceful demonstration in Tblisi, Georgia, killing 19 people. While the incident was brought before the Supreme Soviet and the military commander of the area was subjected to

¹²³ "Akhromeyev Discusses Military Issues," p. 105.

¹²⁴ Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 15.

questioning, the KOGB evidently did not see fit to conduct an investigation of its own.

So as of yet, the committee has not found its voice and the amount of influence it will actually yield vis-a-vis the government and Supreme Soviet remains to be seen. Georgi Arbatov, speaking before the Congress of People's Deputies noted that the committee "has been staffed strangely and works strangely."¹²⁵ Summing up criticism of the KOGB to date, Major General Yuri Kirshin writes in *New Times*, "...the committee has not yet attained a standard of professionalism which would allow it to contribute substantially to defense policy making."¹²⁶

B. PROSPECTS FOR THE KOGB AND MILITARY REFORM

In his study of the KOGB in *World Economy*, Sturua points out three areas where the KOGB must be "comparable" to other parliamentary bodies of the world if it is to be successful. These are: the degree of access to information enjoyed by the executive power, the level of detail in which the defense budget is examined, and the quality of independent analytical material.¹²⁷ The discussion above highlighted some of the problems the KOGB has had in these areas to date. The parliamentary body that the KOGB most

¹²⁵ "Congress Debates Economic Policy-III" *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. XLII, February 14, 1990, p. 23.

¹²⁶ Yuri Kirshin, "Why Military Reform is Needed," *New Times*, March 20-29, 1990, p. 30.

¹²⁷ *World Economy and International Relations*, No. 1, January 1990, p. 84.

aspires to emulate is the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Indeed, according to House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin, the two committees have "embarked on an active exchange of information, both on defense issues and on legislative procedures and practices."¹²⁸ The committees have also hosted exchange visits. Members of the Armed Services visited the Soviet Union in August 1989, while KOGB members visited the U.S. in February 1990. More such exchanges are likely and tentatively planned.

But as the Armed Services Committee report rightly points out, "it is crucial not to think of the Supreme Soviet in American terms, i.e., to mirror-image."¹²⁹ This is also true when studying the KOGB. In his joint interview with Congressman Aspin, Lapygin made this same point saying, "We are ready to consider the experience of the American legislators, but we, of course, are not going to copy their ways."¹³⁰

The report also makes the point (in its discussion of why it is unlikely that the KOGB will propose drastic reductions in defense spending) that "policy confrontations, which are commonplace in the U.S., run counter to the Soviet emphasis on collegial, consensus decisions."¹³¹ The theme of the KOGB arriving at decisions through consensus is repeated several times in the

¹²⁸ Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. IV.

¹²⁹ Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 4.

¹³⁰ "Lapygin, Aspin on Defense Oversight," p. 1.

¹³¹ Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 17.

Armed Services Committee report though, as examination of the committee's handling of the issues of budget and military reform would indicate, there appear to be divisions in the committee that could make arriving at a consensus (at least on these issues) more wishful thinking than reality.¹³² If anything, these apparent divisions within the committee could lead to deadlock between the reformers and the conservatives over several issues. The first indication of this happening may be when the KOGB takes up the radical draft military reform program passed by the armed services subcommittee. If the committee, as it is currently comprised,¹³³ does indeed find itself deadlocked on major issues, its chances of becoming an important player in determining Soviet defense policy will diminish.

This is not to downplay the likelihood of major military reforms emerging from the Supreme Soviet or the significance of the establishment of a defense oversight committee within the Supreme Soviet. On the contrary, given the increasing dire straits of the Soviet economy, the perceived reduced threat from the West and the

¹³² Stephen Foye makes a similar point in "US Congressional Report on Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security," Report on the USSR, May 11, 1990, p. 7. Foye also points out that "While the Congressional report is an important document and provides a number of key insights into the workings of the fledgling Committee for Defense and State Security, the reliance of the American authors solely on the testimony of those ten Soviet committee members who visited the United States in February produced an incomplete portrait of the committee's operations and personnel."

¹³³ One fifth of the members of the Supreme Soviet are supposed to be changed every year. This could also be expected to have an impact on the composition of the KOGB. However, the mechanism by which this rotation is to take place has not been established at the time of this writing.

certainty of reduced Western defense spending, further military reforms are almost a certainty. And the establishment of the KOGB is certainly a key element in the ongoing political reform process. The point here is that the drive for military reform is more likely to come from the Supreme Soviet as a whole and probably not from the KOGB given its current composition and problems. As the debate over the confirmation of the Defense Minister and the vote on the early release of students has shown, the Supreme Soviet has demonstrated a willingness to rebuff the high command. Also, the Supreme Soviet's skepticism about the impartiality of the KOGB will cause it to look at the committee's work with a very critical eye.

But the ultimate success of the Supreme Soviet and its Committee for Defense and State Security is dependent upon the success of continued political reform in the Soviet Union, resulting in stable governmental structures that are able to exercise real power. Unfortunately, political developments have been heading in just the opposite direction. Should the political climate in the USSR fail to progress further and leave the country with a powerless, fragile central government or slip back to increased Stalinist centralization, attempts by the two bodies to overcome their myriad difficulties will become moot. As Mikhail Tsyarkin points out:

"The direction of Soviet political development will determine whether the committee will be able to grow eventually into a watchdog of the national security establishment or whether it will become a mere footnote to a history of failed reform"¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Tsyarkin, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," p. 11.

APPENDIX: THE COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

Chairman Vladimir L. Lapygin (chief designer and director, Moscow automation plant)

Deputy Chairman Col. Valeriy Ochirov (student, Voroshilov General Staff Academy)

Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev (military adviser to President Gorbachev)

Veniamin Beluyev, Chairman, subcommittee on state security (chairman, Byelorussian Republic KGB)

Oleg S. Belyakov (Chief, Defense Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

Vitaliy A. Biryukov, Secretary of the KOGB

Keshrim Boztayev (First Secretary, Semipaltinsk Obkom)

Nikolai Britvin (chief, KGB Border Guards Political Directorate)

Vasiliy Bykov (secretary, USSR Writer's Union)

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Stanislav Golovin (radio apparatus tuner, machine-building plant)

Ivan Gorelovskiy (chairman, Azerbaijan Republic KGB)

Yuroy Isayev (director, production association)

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Munavarkhon Zokirov (chief, a DOSAFF sports club)

* Source: "The New Soviet Legislature: Committee on Defense and State Security," Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, April 11, 1990. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.

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