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Controlling International Terrorism: Alternatives Palatable and Unpalatable

By JOHN W. AMOS II and RUSSEL H.S. STOLFI

ABSTRACT: Operating from the premise that the literature on the control of international terrorism is inadequate, the authors systematically develop general alternatives for mastering international terrorism. Using a representative terrorist incident as the vehicle for considering the general strategies to be followed within the framework of ongoing international terrorism, the authors analyze the incident as a historical event. As such, the event can be set within a given historical context and examined comprehensively from the viewpoint of alternate possible beginnings, strategies to be followed and tactics to be effected within the framework of the incident itself, and systematic consideration of a range of possible outcomes. The authors consider that adequate control of international terrorism and the incidents that reflect its essential character must include strategies encompassing at least factors of politics, law, law enforcement, propaganda, armed military force, psychology, and time.

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NOTE: The views herein are those of the authors and should not be regarded as representing those of the Naval Postgraduate School or any other agency of the U.S. government.

TERRORISM, international terrorism, or transnational terrorism, or however else it is styled, has become a ubiquitous phenomenon of twentieth-century politics.¹ As a consequence, a large body of literature has grown up on this topic.² Most of this literature is historical,³ with only a small body of psychological or behavior studies.⁴

1. Although some authors prefer to date international terrorism from the French Revolution, and in so doing stress its connection with the emergence of nationalism, it is properly considered a post-World War I phenomenon. Prior to that time, terrorism was used by small groups protesting selected political orders; afterward, the protest was dramatically broadened to include almost all forms of violence directed at established regimes in general. For a concise view, see J. Boyer Bell, *Transnational Terror* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1975).

2. For recent compendiums, see Edward F. Mickolus, *Annotated Bibliography on Transnational and International Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1976); M. Cherif Bassouni, ed., *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1975); Yonah Alexander and Seymour M. Finger, eds., *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (New York: John Jay Press, 1977); Robert A. Freidlander, ed., *Terrorism Documents of International and Local Control*, 2 vols. (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1979); Augustus R. Norton and Martin H. Greenberg, eds., *International Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); Richard H. Schultz and Stephen Sloan, eds., *Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980); Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason, eds., *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).

3. For example, the work of Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

4. On the psychological approach see, for example, Abraham Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism," *Terrorism*, 1, 3, and 4:237-58 (1978); for one of the better quantitative summaries, see Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller, "Profiles of Terrorists," *Military Review*, Aug. 1977, pp. 21-34.

Additionally, much of the work is broken down by world areas and consists of case studies or anecdotal descriptions.⁵ Finally, there is a much smaller, specialized literature concerning the measures to be employed against terrorists.⁶ Taken as a whole, then, this literature is unfocused.⁷

Part of the reason for this unfocused quality is that there is no single accepted definition of the topic itself. Each discipline, even each writer, tends to treat terrorism, local or international, from a given, narrow perspective shaped by the parameters of the discipline or the author's orientation. But part is also due to the nature of terrorism itself. As Jenkins has pointed out, terrorism involves acts which in themselves are crimes, specifically, violent crimes. This criminal violence is then coupled with a set of demands, and the perpetrators in question generally go to some lengths to publicize both their responsibility for the crimes and their demands. Moreover, almost all terrorist attacks are the product of advanced organization; in a strictly criminal law sense, they are premeditated and the product of an extended conspiracy.⁸ So far, these

5. For example, Colin Smith, *Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976); Christopher Dobson, *Black September: Its Short, Violent History* (New York: Macmillan, 1974); or Claire Sterling, *The Terrorist Network* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981).

6. For instance, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, *Disorders and Terrorism* (Washington, DC: National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards).

7. But there are brilliant individual exceptions. See Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (New York: John Wiley, 1974).

8. On the implications of this, see D. U. Segre and J. H. Adler, "The Ecology of Terrorism," *Encounter*, 401:17-24 (Feb. 1973).

acts would—or could—fit into existing criminal law frameworks. However, terrorism involves one more element, that of a claimed political motive, and on the basis of that motive, a claimed immunity from standard law enforcement.⁹ It is the combination of crime and political motive that has led to definitional problems and, consequently, to problems of enforcement.¹⁰

Where the terrorist act is perpetrated in an international context, the problem is even more complex because of contrasting political values. As one author put it: "One man's terrorism is another man's heroism."¹¹ Two sorts of problems are involved here. First, there is the problem of the "right" to rebel against oppressive governments, whether native or colonial.¹² Also,

9. See Richard H. Schultz and Stephen Sloan, "International Terrorism: The Nature of the Threat," in Schultz and Sloan, *Responding to the Terrorist Threat*, pp. 1-17; and Brian M. Jenkins, "The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems," in Alexander and Gleason, *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*, pp. 3-10.

10. For contrasting approaches to defining terrorism, see R. R. Baxter, "A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism," *Akron Law Review*, 7(3):380-87 (Spring 1974); Jordan J. Paust, "An Approach to Decision in Regard to Terrorism," *Akron Law Review*, 7(3):397-403 (Spring 1974).

11. John F. Murphy "International Legal Controls of International Terrorism: Performance and Prospects," *The Illinois Bar Journal*, Apr. 1975, pp. 444-52.

12. This is sometimes also expressed as the issue of state terrorism: at what point are the activities of a state, as distinct from private individuals, to be considered "terrorism" when directed either at its own population or against populations in neighboring countries? As can readily be seen from this formulation, this issue is bound up with a complex of definitions and value judgments about the appropriate role of governmental force, the nature of government legitimacy in general, and the use of force in international relations. With respect to the problem of dealing with fugitives who claim asylum because they are

there is the problem of the right of self-determination: at what point are colonial or excolonial populations entitled to use violence¹³ against Western "imperialists"? As long as there is a preconceived connection between the use of terrorism as an extension of insurgent war,¹⁴ there will be continued resistance by Third World states to the imposition of strictly enforced sanctions against terrorists who attack Western targets.¹⁵

To summarize the situation in international terrorism from the viewpoint of the literature, there exists a substantial body of material in which the phenomenon is described, analyzed, defined, and projected from the viewpoints of widely different intellectual disciplines running the gamut from history through law, sociology, psychology,

"political offenders" in their home country, see Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, "The Problem of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law," *Virginia Law Review*, 48: 1226-57 (1962); and "The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and Asylum," *University of Pittsburgh Law Review*, 14:371-96 (1953).

13. The term "violence" is subject to its own definitional problems. See Henry Bienen, *Violence and Social Change* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968); *Criminal Violence*, eds. Marvin E. Wolfgang and Alan Weiner (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982); and Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, *The Subculture of Violence* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982).

14. As Jenkins has demonstrated, this connection is by no means a simple one: insurgent warfare and its terrorist extensions have become a new style of strategic conflict waged by proxy. Brian Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1974).

15. Robert A. Freidlander, "Terrorism and International Law: What is Being Done?" *Rutgers-Camden Law Journal*, 8:383-92 (1977); Jordan J. Paust, "A Survey of Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment, and Cooperative Action," *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 5 (1975).

and political science to probability and statistics. The same body of literature contains only a small amount of material on the subject of the application of controls from the viewpoint and direction of the states under attack. International terrorism may perhaps be considered to have been adequately studied. Indeed, the subject may be said to have been studied to death. From the viewpoint of controls applied by the states under attack, fortunately, various governments have developed and applied effective countermeasures that have been supported by the corpus of descriptive material, but that have suffered from the lack of studies involving comprehensive consideration of the application of controls. Comprehensive and systemic controls over international terrorism suggest the requirement for a broad and realistic model of terrorist and government action and emphasis on concrete controls rather than studies that stop at descriptions of the phenomenon.


Perhaps the most effective framework of action both broad and realistic enough to stimulate an accurate appreciation of the alternatives for control is an historical one. Figure 1 presents, accordingly, a simplified view of the historical framework of terrorism. The figure shows that the considerations and actions that comprise international terrorism develop in real, that is, historical, time and involve a wide range of activity that can be analyzed most naturally and drawn together most usefully under the umbrella of history. The figure is laid out as a band of international terrorist activity unfolding in real time and involving several systematically determined categories of consideration and action on the part of the adversaries. In order to extract useful guides to

the control of international terrorism, we have centered the model on a single "terrorist incident," sketching in around it the more general historical framework and, in systematic detail, the necessary considerations and actions on the part of the human adversaries in the historical confrontation.

Understanding that the international terrorist confrontation is part of a complex picture of human development, which is sketched in lightly in Figure 1 as the unfulfilled and continuing lines of consideration for possible future terror, we center attention on six categories of consideration and action on the part of governments against terrorists: (1) political policy, (2) law, (3) police (law enforcement), (4) news media, (5) foreign policy, and (6) military action. We examine each of the categories from the viewpoint of the alternatives for control of the hypothetical representative terrorist incident in the center of the band of activity in Figure 1. A representative international terrorist incident involving the U.S. government would be the January 1982 assassination in Paris, France of the U.S. assistant defense attaché by a group claiming to be part of a Lebanese political organization.

Forewarned in the particular incident by the earlier attempted assassination of the U.S. *chargé d'affaires* in what proved to be a similar tactical *modus operandi*—namely, a single assassin armed with a handgun attacking in a public street—the U.S. government was faced with a range of alternatives concerning both its overall political policy in France relative to international terrorism and its immediate policy with respect to an attempted assassination. Within the model of action represented by Figure 1, the

FIGURE 1
 HISTORICALLY STYLED MODEL OF THE ALTERNATIVES FOR CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TERROR



U.S. government found itself at the extreme left side of the band of activity, considering essentially what policy to effect within the framework of a locally accelerated situation of international terror. The situation can be visualized as a classic one in strategy in which an objective must be clearly envisioned and described, and must serve as the guide for all parties to the situation. In conjunction with the State Department, the U.S. government in France—the embassy, consular service, and so on—was forced to articulate the objective to be achieved and the general course of action to be followed in combating international terrorism in France.

Faced with the necessity to articulate a counterterrorist strategy, governments can be seen to have an infinite range of alternative actions that might be pursued. Fortunately for them, the entire range of actions can be categorized as either effective or ineffective from the point of view of controlling international terrorism. It is probably not too much to say that an effective objective of government counterterrorist policy is the prevention of acts of terror, and to suggest that such a statement of policy, even within the framework of government reaction to a terrorist incident, can serve as a viable and decisive strategic objective. The point is more subtle than it may appear at first glance. A human tendency exists to view terrorist incidents from the tactical perspective of the details unique to the ongoing incident, particularly in barricade, hostage, and kidnapping situations. The result of such a tendency has been concentration on reducing loss of life and damage in each particular incident at the expense of deterring terrorism by a broad, consistent strategy aimed at

making all incidents unattractive to terrorists.¹⁶

TERRORISTS' EXPLOITATION OF THE MEDIA

As a guide to the control of international terrorism, the question may be asked, What goals are achieved by political groups employing international terror, or alternatively, what makes international terror attractive to such groups? Perhaps the single most significant attraction of the terrorist incident is publicity for the terrorist organization, including its very existence, its goals, and its enemies. Publicity can be seen generally to rank above the goal of forcing a target government to carry out some immediate action, for example, release of prisoners, distribution of food, or payment of tribute. In an era in which the news media have become overwhelming in their presence and effects in terms of television, radio, the cinema, newspapers, and news magazines, the publicity afforded by the terrorist incident is incalculable.¹⁷ It is therefore appropriate to consider the alternatives for control of international terrorism in terms of the government strategy for dealing with the news media during both periods of quiescence—that is, no existing terrorist incidents—and periods of government response in dealing with active terrorist incidents.

When an incident has taken place that bears the unmistakable signs of

16. See the comments along these lines in Task Force, *Disorders and Terrorism*, pp. 29-35.

17. For analyses along these lines, see Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism, the Media and the Police," *Police Studies*, 1(2):45-62 (Jun. 1978); and "Communications Aspects of Functional Terrorism," *International Problems*, 16(1-2):55-60 (Spring 1977).

an international act of terror, the government with jurisdiction has a range of alternatives for dealing with the situation. These run between two extremes: (1) no controls over news media and (2) total blackout of information. The former extreme, which may be referred to as an information glut, represents an advantage to virtually all terrorist groups and comprises in many cases the predominant goal: publicity for the terrorists. The latter extreme, which may be referred to as total control, presents tremendous potential advantages to a government under attack by denying a basic rationale for the terrorists in conceiving, planning, and launching a terrorist incident, as well as by denying many advantages to the terrorists within an ongoing incident.

Total control of communications, however, is anathema to the fundamental principles of a democratic order. The relationship between the authorities responsible for controlling or limiting the media impact of a terrorist act and the news media presents one of the thorniest problems in dealing with terrorism. In the United States, a considerable body of law has grown up around this problem in the context of the First Amendment rights of speech and assembly. The general rule applied to instances where the exercise of these rights would produce a danger of civil disorder is that government officials, upon proper showing of the danger, can curb the rights. Such a rule offers some guidelines, but given that terrorist strategy is to exploit certain characteristics of contemporary mass media, especially those characteristics having to do with immediate visual impact and broad scope of dissemination, a new set of guide-

lines will have to be developed.¹⁸ It may well be that news coverage may be restricted, not by its content, which would clearly violate both the spirit and the letter of guarantees of free speech, but by media characteristics and transmission range.¹⁹

It is difficult to imagine terrorists engaging in a wide range of international terrorist activity in which no publicity would be forthcoming in the news media. It is equally difficult to imagine a situation in which a government with jurisdiction, for example, France, and a government under direct attack, for example, the United States, would attempt to enforce total control. It is easier to imagine a situation with rules of engagement, developed by governments, that would allow the news media or some of them to report systematically selected information to the public but that would deny publicity and propaganda effects to the terrorists. Potential charges of arbitrary behavior on the part of the executive branch of the government could be overcome by coordinating committees of executive branch officials, judges, and legislators who would (1) rule on the existence of a terrorist incident, as opposed to ordinary criminality, accident, and so on; and (2) determine the extent

18. Task Force, *Disorders and Terrorism*, pp. 65-68, considers this problem in some detail.

19. In the United States, both of these have been the subject of administrative regulation for some time, without excessive interference with First Amendment rights. Note that there is some research on the impact of media, among other factors, on the diffusion of terrorism, specifically on the imitation effect in connection with terrorist acts. See Edward Heyman and Edward Mickolus, "Imitation by Terrorists: Quantitative Approaches to the Study of Diffusion Patterns in Transnational Terrorism," in Alexander and Gleason, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, pp. 175-228.

and duration of the controls over the news media. In effect, the committees would have the power to declare a carefully circumscribed state of emergency surrounding the terrorist incident that would involve the release of the least damaging material to the news media and have the specific purpose of discouraging the terrorists from repeating such incidents for their media value, that is, publicity and propaganda.²⁰ But again, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that governmental policies must be extremely sensitive to the dangers of restricting the news flow in a free society. It may be that these dangers outweigh any gains achieved by denying terrorists access to the media.

PROBLEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Perhaps the most important categories of consideration and action by governments under attack by international terrorists are those of law and law enforcement. Such governments have enormous leeway for imaginative thinking both on the application of the law and on the operations of law enforcement authorities. The alternatives range from the unmodified application of ordinary criminal law through the declaration of emergency security zones and the passage of laws increasing the authority of law enforcement officials. The argument, of course, that has constrained U.S. lawmakers and law enforcement authorities to remain within the outskirts of unmodified criminal law is that the treatment of international terror through change in law and law enforcement must automat-

ically be accompanied by the unacceptable danger of abuse of the increased authority, that is, that the possible cure is worse than the disease.²¹ In an era characterized by the geometric advance of applied knowledge (technology), as well as experimentation with alternatives in most areas of human experience, it is incongruous for states under attack by international terrorists not to have a preselected set of legal and law enforcement alternatives.²²

Understanding the need for caution in applying legal and law enforcement alternatives while facing the necessity for action beyond the present laws and constraints, the leaders of modern states are confronted with a situation in which they must plan in advance a flexible graded legal response to international terrorism. Alternatives for control include both substantive actions and imaginative new concepts in the application of law. It is not unreasonable to suggest, for example, the possibility of a state declaring acts of international terror not only as criminal but also as

21. Along these lines, see Clive C. Aston, "Restrictions Encountered in Responding to Terrorists Seiges: An Analysis," in Schultz and Sloan, *Responding to the Terrorist Threat*, pp. 59-92; and George Schwartzberger, "Hijackers, Guerreros and Mercenaries," *Current Legal Problems*, 24:257-82 (1971) for the argument that unless the governmental response is very carefully controlled, terrorism "almost invariably begets counterterrorism and sets in motion a downward spiral towards intensified competition of all concerned in the refinements of barbarism." Also see John B. Wolf, "Controlling Political Terrorism in a Free Society," *Orbis*, 19:1289-1308 (Winter 1976); Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorists and the Liberal State* (New York: John Wiley, 1977).

22. This is, of course, the thrust of the National Advisory Committee argument. See Task Force, *Disorders and Terrorism*, pp. 409-16.

20. Task Force, *Disorders and Terrorism*, suggests this approach.

embodying special elements of danger that require special law enforcement authority internally and international cooperation externally.²³ The contention by some political groups that they are using international terror as a legitimate political weapon can be negated by defining a class of such acts as criminal and therefore subject to prosecution.²⁴ Within the framework of analysis sketched previously, the following range of alternatives exists for selective, graded application: special²⁵ intelligence gathering,²⁶ special authority in investigation, special training and techniques in international terrorist search and confrontation, additions to or changes in the law that contribute to the effectiveness of the law enforcement authorities, and consideration of the special detention of

23. See, for example, the proposal put forth some years ago by Luis L. Kutner, "Constructive Notice: A Proposal to End International Terrorism," *New York Law Forum*, 19:325-54 (1973).

24. As does the 1972 West German anti-terrorist legislation. See Subcommittees on Criminal Laws and Procedures, *West Germany's Political Response to Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978).

25. The word "special," as used here, is meant to have the connotation of being applied to situations of international terrorist threat and action.

26. This, of course, raises the issue of to what extent a government is entitled to invade an individual's privacy. But the extent of this invasion can be handled in terms of local search and seizure law. See the comparative cases in Ronald D. Crelinsten et al., eds., *Terrorism and Criminal Justice: An International Perspective* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1978); Frank Gregory, *Protest and Violence: The Police Response—A Comparative Analysis of Democratic Methods* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976); H.H.A. Cooper, "Terrorism and the Intelligence Function," *Chitty's Law Journal*, 73:24-35 (Mar. 1976), discusses the problems of intelligence problems in a free society.

suspects in international terrorist investigations.

THE FOREIGN POLICY COMPONENT: JURISDICTION AND DETERRENCE

In situations involving international terrorism, news media, law, and law enforcement alternatives for control are subject to unique loopholes in terms of the relationship between the government under attack and the one with jurisdiction. In the incident of January 1982, for example, involving the assassination of the U.S. assistant defense attaché in Paris, the French government possesses jurisdiction and will press the investigation according to its style, motives, and energy. Such an investigation involves relatively more important matters for the U.S. government—the one under direct attack—and yet it is constrained to be a bystander in the protection of its own interests. Such a situation largely rebounds to the benefits of the international terrorists and demands alternatives to the ad hoc independent operations of two different governments. The governments of states under attack overseas require a strategy comprising a range of foreign policy options in third party states designed (1) to reduce the attractiveness of terror and (2) to counter successfully terrorist attacks once they have taken place in third party states.

Many alternatives for the control of international terrorism exist within the area of foreign policy initiatives designed to reduce the attractiveness of terrorist acts. One of the most prevalent forms of international terror has been the kidnapping for ransom of employees of the more advanced states working overseas, particularly in South Amer-

ica.²⁷ The U.S. government has established a policy of not paying ransom, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that such a policy has severely discouraged attacks against U.S. government employees and officials with the purpose of extracting ransom. The same government, however, has neglected to formulate a similar foreign policy that would forbid U.S. commercial enterprises operating overseas from paying ransom for kidnapped, non-government employees.²⁸ Although legal questions concerning the authority of governments representing states under attack to enforce anti-ransom and similar policies would arise, and significant hurdles would have to be mastered in coordinating such policy with the governments possessing jurisdiction, it can be seen that potentially viable but untried alternatives exist to control kidnapping and other terrorist actions. Governments under attack, for example, have numerous other options, including financial aid to commercial enterprises under potential attack in foreign countries

27. See, for example, *International Terrorism in 1977* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1978), pp. 2, 4, 6, 10, which summarize 10 years of international terrorism.

28. See Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason, "Introduction," in *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives*, pp. xvii-xviii. According to Alexander and Gleason, the business community is the most vulnerable of all terrorist targets. Between 1970 and 1980, 45 percent of all terrorist acts were business-connected. There is a growing body of literature dealing with the protection of business executives and installations: E. H. Adkins, Jr., "Protection of American Industrial Dignitaries and Facilities Overseas," *Security Management*, 18:14-16 (Jul. 1974); Paul Fuqua and Jerry Wilson, *The Executive's Guide to Survival* (Houston: Gulf, 1978); F. Rayne, "Executive Protection and Terrorism," *Top Security*, 1:220-25 (Oct. 1975).

and specific action to reduce the attractiveness and possibility of bombing, barricade and hostage situations, armed attack, break-in, sniping, and other actions. Specific options include government support for the hardening of selected installations, the employment of special indigenous security personnel, information networks, antiterrorist propaganda, rewards, and so on.

In a somewhat more conventional mode, states under direct attack in foreign areas and the states occupying those areas and having jurisdiction have many alternatives for the control of international terrorism through bilateral as well as multilateral agreements. In a potentially useful analogy, the governments under direct attack and those with jurisdiction operate with interests similar to those of states with status of forces and data exchange agreements. Such a style of understanding has become common between the United States and several foreign states in which terrorism has reached dangerous levels—for example, West Germany, Italy, and France—and suggests a similar pragmatic approach to cooperation over the issue of international terrorism.²⁹ Bilateral executive agree-

29. Vittorfranco S. Pisano, *Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Countermeasures* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1979), pp. 93-100, suggests strong and well-established overseas connections on the part of Italian terrorist organizations. The remainder of the material concentrates on the domestic legal controls available to the Italian authorities. The foreign and domestic legal ramifications of Italian terrorism are covered, but the subject of international cooperation and control is noticeable by its absence. See also the material in Claire Sterling, *The Terrorist Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York, 1981), which documents the international connections and targets of many terrorist organizations and suggests measures of international control.

ments negotiated at the intermediate level of authority by technically and operationally oriented personnel could (1) fill in numerous gaps in the static defenses of the governments under attack, and (2) foster the development of an offensive strategy designed to carry an effectively conceived and coordinated attack by those governments against terrorist organizations.

The defense of states under attack could be improved by agreements that extract special policies and actions from the states with jurisdiction. Within the framework of the applicable law, the governments of the jurisdictional states would then have systematic alternatives for the protection of foreign embassies and properties that could be spelled out in bilateral agreements. The affected governments could define existing levels of terrorist threat, for example, ongoing terrorist incident, impending terrorist operations, general threat, and quiescence, and could structure both short- and long-term alternatives for control. An unpalatable but effective short-term response would be the setting aside of the writ of habeas corpus by law in cases involving investigation of terrorist incidents—that is, persons suspected of terrorist activity could be detained for the period established by law—although this draconian measure might not be necessary since ordinary penal legislation provides for some period of detention before an arraignment is required. The establishment of levels of terrorist threat by governments would be open to debate and controversy, but once the levels were established they would support systematic and appropriately forceful responses to international terrorism. The resulting alternatives for control within the framework of

executive agreements between two foreign states are vast and include the setting up of pervasive counterterrorist information networks, the employment of appropriate existing law enforcement forces in additional missions in defense against terrorism, and the development of special counterterrorist surveillance, evasion, and protection techniques.

Pervasive information networks involving systematic saturation of appropriate cities and city areas with volunteer informants and professional controllers could be set up on the basis of costs shared between the governments under direct attack and those with jurisdiction. Existing law enforcement forces have been reorganized, for example, in the case of the quasi-military West German border defense and law enforcement units trained and used for special operations against terrorists. In Paris, possibilities exist for counterterrorist employment of 2000 men of the city police force who are retained normally for employment on riot control duty and organized into 18 intervention companies covering the nine city districts.³⁰

Under appropriate agreements, such a force could provide special protective vehicles and equipment in support of foreign embassies and effect a massive uniformed presence for brief, irregular periods of time. Terrorist attacks have also devel-

30. See R. H. Stolfi et al., *Gradient and Less Lethal Devices in Control of Urban Violence* (Aberdeen, MD: U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, 1973), pp. 45-59. Note also that a variety of special organizations have been set up in other states for employment against both domestic and international terrorists, including, for example, the Special Air Service (SAS) in the United Kingdom and the Blue Light units in the United States.

oped in well-defined patterns that provide security forces with clues to the effective disruption of many terrorist operations.³¹ Terrorist assassinations, armed attacks, and kidnappings almost without exception depend on lengthy surveillance of the intended targets specifically in order to discover a persistent pattern of activity.³² With the coordination and additional resources available under executive agreements, governments can cooperate systematically to disrupt such operations by countersurveillance and the enforcement and support of random changes in activity.

Concerted action on the part of governments under direct and indirect attack is perhaps most important from the perspective of applying pressure on states that, by default or action, support international terrorists. Concerted action is also necessary for the development of offensive operations intended to seize the initiative from the terrorists and carry the battle to them. Governments under attack can effect bilateral or possibly multilateral action in the form of economic sanctions and political pressures against states supporting terrorism.³³ Such a strategy of the indirect approach against international terrorism has great promise for control of the phenomenon. The strategy is particularly effective

because it brings to bear the power of states under attack uninhibited by constraints inherent in pursuing terrorists under rules of criminal procedure designed to protect ordinary citizens from the misapplication of state power. Under international agreement, concerted action by states operating against terrorists encourages offensive operations that can be characterized by propaganda and psychological war³⁴ and by less palatable but occasional direct action, varying from Israeli-style action against Palestinians in Beirut to the less controversial West German-style action in retrieving hostages at Mogadishu, in the Somali Republic.

The role of military forces in combating international terrorism remains simultaneously limited and open-ended. The armed forces of the highly modernized greater states³⁵ have missions dedicated almost entirely to the external defense of the state. However, because of their fundamental attitudes, the ground forces of those states are well suited for the support of counterterrorist operations. British ground forces that have become engaged in a situation of intense, indigenous—as opposed to international—terrorist operations in Northern Ireland quickly acclimatized themselves to urban terror and have kept the polit-

31. See, for example, Brian Jenkins, Janera Johnson, and David Ronfeldt, "Numbered Lives: Some Statistical Observations from 77 International Hostage Episodes," *Conflict*, 1:71-111 (1968).

32. Thomas Strentz, "The Terrorist Organizational Profile: A Psychological Role Model," in Alexander and Gleason, *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives*.

33. The March 1982 decision of the Reagan administration to suspend imports of Libyan oil is an excellent example of an attempt at intellectual control.

34. In the Middle East, a number of Gulf states have pooled their resources and set up their own version of INTERPOL in an effort to combat Palestinian and Iranian-inspired attacks on oil installations. In this connection, see John K. Cooley, "Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf," *Foreign Affairs*, 57(5):1017-34 (Summer 1979); *The Impact of Iranian Events upon Persian Gulf and United States Security* (Washington, DC: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979).

35. States such as West Germany, Britain, France, Italy, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan.

ical initiative in that area in the hands of the British government. In the less intense milieu of international terrorism, military forces can provide specialized, elite detachments dedicated to the defense of unusual but important targets, such as petroleum platforms at sea, port facilities, and air terminals, and can provide the attack against heavily armed terrorists in barricade, hostage, and similar confrontations.

CONCLUSION

In summary, it can be said that international terrorism has been studied intensively as an important modern phenomenon. Many who have studied the phenomenon have come to understand it, but none has put together an interpretation from which a guiding strategy for control can be derived. The concept of a strategy with its implied decisive objectives may indeed be the missing element, because the alterna-

tives for control of international terrorism are myriad. At its extreme right side, Figure 1 shows the government results from following a line of action or strategy to bring a terrorist incident to a successful conclusion. The figure shows that the government must select alternatives for control from at least six categories of action and further indicates, by the straight line leading from the incident, that the alternatives chosen are unique for each confrontation. The task of the moment for governments challenged by international terrorists is to formulate a decisive strategy that leads to success in the day-to-day contact and dramatic incidents that characterize international terror. Success itself is an elusive concept, but it can be secured in the case of international terrorism by a strategy that (1) prevents terrorist incidents from taking place by making them unattractive to the perpetrators and (2) achieves successful outcomes to ongoing terrorist incidents.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I am Dr. Needleman from Newman College. What I have heard about so far is what I would call petite terrorism, for want of a better term. What I am personally concerned with is what I would call grand terrorism. This is not the shooting of a particular official, but rather the kind of terrorism in which an atomic power station is taken over and forced into some kind of China Syndrome or Apollo Syndrome, or atomic materials are stolen, some kind of an atomic device is released, or if that is too sophisticated, simply the poisoning of a local water supply system. All these things seem to be quite possible and

probable in the context of the assumptions I have heard thus far.

A (Stolfi): In the historical sense, it is possible that conditions will move in a way that the thing you suggest may not happen at all. That is something about which I took issue this morning with Dr. Kupperman. He was talking ominously of portents of doom, indicating that if you had a terrorist organization that conducted what was formerly a dramatic incident—hostages barricaded inside an aircraft—it would not get any press coverage anymore. What is suggested by that line of reasoning is that the terrorist

line of reasoning is that the terrorist organization must escalate and attack liquid or natural gas container ships or something like that. I do not see that as necessarily being part of a realistic historical picture. Those people can grow older, mellow, die in jail, new movements could come up, and so forth. One has to be very careful about making forecasts. A historical answer would be no, it does not necessarily follow that there will be an escalation. On the other hand, one can see certain types of incidents in certain cases which have been forms of escalation. Hence, there are two ways you can look at it. There is a natural way of saying it has got to be bigger and better, but it does not necessarily follow.

Q: I am John Grice from Guilford College. Brian Jenkins, in a recent article, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" says no, what the terrorists want is a lot of attention, a lot of publicity, and not a lot of casualties. If we are to control the press, as you suggest, may they not then be tempted toward grand terrorism in order to get the publicity? After all, the reason the Russians don't need to broadcast their takeover of Western Europe is that everybody noticed it.

A (Stolfi): That is tough logic. Perhaps you have a committee that is headed by a judge, a lawyer, or a representative of the press to determine in some kind of effective way how and when to cover an international incident, and the press says fine, we will play along and not publicize this. If you imagine that something like that could happen, then in order to get publicity, an incident of necessity has got to be so big that there is no way that it can be hidden.

Q: The thing that I am concerned about is the increasing technological sophistication of terrorist groups. You look back at Andreas Baader and Marie Meinhof and the like. They came out of the old anti-war, anti-Shah peace movements, and in fact they were all known to the police. Anybody out of that kind of group who takes on the German police has to be insane. But look at the third generation of terrorists that we now find not only in West Germany but in Western Europe generally. They are architects, engineers, and lawyers during the day and go out in the evening and build bombs and the like. Moreover, they have much more technical sophistication. Hence, I think it is a distinct possibility for the type of grand outrage that you are talking about to occur. Maybe not the China Syndrome thing. That isn't the kind of thing that concerns me greatly, but container ships, a major power center, and the like, these are very vulnerable.

A (Stolfi): One has to acknowledge that there is an attraction for the more dramatic target. However, gaining access to nuclear materials may not be necessary at all; there are other, more dramatic incidents, let us say a big tanker, an oil rig in the North Sea, or a liquid natural gas ship. However, in spite of the people associated with some of these movements, there are terrible problems in creating such an incident.

There is one other interesting point. Within the terrorist groups themselves, you must remember that these things are historical organisms that are changing and moving. Let us say Baader is dead today. If there has been a replacement or somebody else is in that organization, is he necessarily a person who

has learned and is more technically advanced? Instead of performing a single assassination, he would probably crawl before he would walk. So you can imagine historical situations in which the level of intensity of the events and so on might not get much bigger. Unfortunately, it is certainly possible that some dramatic, bigger event might take place. But the terrorists have problems, just like anybody else, in carrying out things like that.

COMMENT (Lambert): I was interested that you tend to think of terrorism on American soil as largely what was referred to in the earlier articles as third-party terrorism, that is, terrorism directed by the Croats against other Croats, but on American soil. Do we not have enough social tensions in our own society that there could be the development of internal targets for terrorism, and not just terrorism imported to our shores?

Q: Gerald Post, George Washington University. The question about superterror and crisis reaction. While it may be true that in historical evolution, we are not moving toward actual acts of superterror, it seems to me highly likely that the threat of possible superterror will be on the horizon soon, and what government will have to deal with is the question of a plausible target. I

wonder if you could comment on the relationship between a plausible threat of superterror and government policy of hard line, no negotiation, standing firm, and whether you see thresholds being crossed and the likely historical development in these directions.

A (Stolfi): It would seem as if the government, if it is prudent and reasonable, would be in the process of planning, for example, for superterrorist incidents in some fashion. That would be something that is prudent and that simply has to be done. Even though the likelihood of something taking place is very remote, responsible people have to plan for it anyway. Some very curious and interesting things will emerge when the planning takes place. I think that people are going to find that superterrorist incidents are technically more difficult to carry out than one would think. There is also a strong possibility that they will be self-defeating. Let me give you just one quick example. A student of mine did a brilliant thesis over a 15-month period just recently on the liquid natural gas container ships, and he found that it is going to be very difficult to make a credible incident with a liquid natural gas container ship. I mean, you might have to spend 15 months, and I just had that research done for you. So there are going to be some problems with something like that, and there may be some other thresholds that will come out with that type of a superincident.