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insurgencies in Peru and Nepal

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**NAVAL  
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**THESIS**

**A RATIONALE FOR THE OUTCOMES OF  
INSURGENCIES: A COMPARISON CASE STUDY  
BETWEEN INSURGENCIES IN PERU AND NEPAL**

by

Manoj Thapa

December 2014

Thesis Advisor:  
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Feroz H. Khan

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.			
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>	<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> December 2014	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Master's Thesis	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> A RATIONALE FOR THE OUTCOMES OF INSURGENCIES: A COMPARISON CASE STUDY BETWEEN INSURGENCIES IN PERU AND NEPAL		<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Manoj Thapa			
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> N/A		<b>10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number _____.			
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b>	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b>  The left-wing insurgency in Peru waged by the Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso (SL), and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal launched by the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN(M)) have impacted their respective states and societies. Despite similarities in the social, economic, and political grievances in the two states, the insurgencies had dramatically different trajectories and outcomes. The SL leadership did not exploit political opportunities effectively, and when its leader was captured, the SL collapsed. In contrast, the CPN(M) leadership applied pragmatic approaches and exploited political opportunities. The CPN(M) entered into mainstream politics and even won the general election of 2008. This thesis argues that SL leadership developed around a cult of personality, applied a dogmatic military approach, and adopted a violent approach in "elimination of class enemies," whereas the CPN(M) leadership style developed around moderate communists, applied "progressive ideology," and embraced the grievances of the indigenous people. Whatever the trajectory, insurgencies have demonstrated a potential threat affecting state and society. Furthermore, given that terrorism is transnational and that insurgents engage in terrorist activities, it is imperative for such armed struggles to be ended expeditiously and effectively. This thesis highlights the importance of a political approach as an important means for ending an insurgency successfully.			
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Maoist insurgency, Nepal Communist Party (Maoist), Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), terrorism, leadership, pragmatic, political approach, insurgencies, outcomes		<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 97	
		<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UU

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**A RATIONALE FOR THE OUTCOMES OF INSURGENCIES: A COMPARISON  
CASE STUDY BETWEEN INSURGENCIES IN PERU AND NEPAL**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(COMBATING TERRORISM: POLICY & STRATEGY)**

from the

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## **ABSTRACT**

The left-wing insurgency in Peru waged by the Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso (SL), and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal launched by the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN(M)) have impacted their respective states and societies. Despite similarities in the social, economic, and political grievances in the two states, the insurgencies had dramatically different trajectories and outcomes. The SL leadership did not exploit political opportunities effectively, and when its leader was captured, the SL collapsed. In contrast, the CPN(M) leadership applied pragmatic approaches and exploited political opportunities. The CPN(M) entered into mainstream politics and even won the general election of 2008. This thesis argues that SL leadership developed around a cult of personality, applied a dogmatic military approach, and adopted a violent approach in “elimination of class enemies,” whereas the CPN(M) leadership style developed around moderate communists, applied “progressive ideology,” and embraced the grievances of the indigenous people. Whatever the trajectory, insurgencies have demonstrated a potential threat affecting state and society. Furthermore, given that terrorism is transnational and that insurgents engage in terrorist activities, it is imperative for such armed struggles to be ended expeditiously and effectively. This thesis highlights the importance of a political approach as an important means for ending an insurgency successfully.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APRA	American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
CCOMPOSA	Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
CPN(M)	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)
CPN (UML)	Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist)
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IRA	Irish Republic Army
IU	United Left (Izquierda Unida)
MCC	Maoist Coordination of Committee
MRTA	Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
NA	Nepalese Army
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PWG	People's War Group
RIM	Revolutionary International Movement
SL	Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
SPA	Seven Party Alliance
UPFN	United People's Front, Nepal
U.S.	United States of America

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor S. Paul Kapur, my thesis advisor, for his kind guidance and support. His persistent valuable input persuaded me to be focused and provided me with enthusiastic encouragement throughout my thesis-writing process. I am also grateful to Professor Feroz H. Khan, my second reader, for his valuable input and guidance.

I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to all support staff members and technicians at the Naval Postgraduate School, including the National Security Affairs Department, and the Dudley Knox Library. Special thanks to Meg Beresik for thoroughly editing and contributing to my thesis.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my dear wife, Shirish, for being a source of inspiration and taking care of both me and our child, and for demonstrating extreme patience during stressful hours. I am also thankful to my daughter, Sneh, for her kind understanding.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Revolutionary wars take place when the “government is distant—politically, socially, and even geographically—from a significant counterelite.”<sup>1</sup> In particular, armed rebellions inspired by Marxist principles are commonly called leftist insurgencies. Their main goal is to overthrow the existing political and social system. Many leftist insurgencies employ the strategy of people’s war conceived by Mao Tse Tung, a Chinese strategist. The Maoist strategy consists of three stages: a strategic defense, a strategic stalemate, and a strategic offense.<sup>2</sup> Some scholars contend that leftist insurgencies employing these strategies disappeared after the Cold War. However, in the late twentieth century and early part of the twenty-first century, some countries were faced with the challenge of responding to insurgents who employed the Maoist strategy for inciting political change.

During the final years of the Cold War, Peru witnessed a left-wing insurgency by the Shining Path, Sendero Luminoso (SL), to capture state power. The insurgency began in 1980, just as Peru was undergoing a political transition after 17 years of autocratic rule. During the 1970s and 1980s, the living standard of the peasants in rural areas had declined, creating an environment of severe poverty and hopelessness, which led to a violent conflict resulting in the death of 69,000 people. However, after the capture of its leader in 1992, the Shining Path was doomed.<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, a few countries in South Asia have faced left-wing insurgencies after the Cold War. Among them, Nepal, a small land-locked country, has witnessed the most

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<sup>1</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Violence in World Politics,” in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 558.

<sup>2</sup>Mahendra Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 13.

<sup>3</sup>Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 18–19.

successful Maoist insurgency in recent decades.<sup>4</sup> The Communist Party of Nepal, CPN(M), led this insurgency in February 1996 following a transition period in the 1990s, when democracy was established after 30 years of autocratic rule. Grievances had mounted in Nepal due to the complex social and economic disparity between rich and poor. However, after the death of 13,000 people and the subsequent signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006, the conflict ended with the CPN(M) joining the political mainstream.<sup>5</sup>

Before the start of these insurgencies, Nepal and Peru faced similar political, social, and economic challenges. Both countries underwent left-wing insurgencies that grew in strength and effectively challenged the central government. Both organizations adopted Mao's doctrine of the people's war, and both insurgencies lasted for almost the same period—ten years for Nepal and nearly 12 years for Peru. Thus, the major research question is: “Despite the similarity in the conditions of political, economic, and social challenges in Peru and Nepal, the adaptation of Mao's strategy by both insurgent groups, and the duration of the insurgencies, why did Nepal's insurgency end with a political settlement, whereas Peru's insurgency did not?”

## **B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION**

Many theorists of revolution believe that transitions from authoritarianism to democratic regimes decrease the likelihood of armed insurgency as democracy is supposed to diffuse violence by transforming such tendencies into non-violent conflicts through electoral politics and non-violent protests.<sup>6</sup> However, the insurgencies in Peru and Nepal have challenged this premise as both countries faced armed conflicts after achieving democracy. Researchers can further explore why violence erupts during a transition to democracy, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

This thesis explores how the internal dynamics of a state and external factors, such as international actors, shape an insurgent leader's decision making. Communists

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<sup>4</sup>Rabindra Mishra, “India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency,” *Asian Survey* 44, no. 5 (2004): 627.

<sup>5</sup>Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 4–12.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

traditionally focus on class inequalities; however, the CPN(M) exploited the political opportunity provided by rudimentary political institutions and focused on ethnic grievances more prominently to strengthen their organization into a formidable one. In the wake of countermeasures after 9/11, the CPN(M) leadership drew the attention of the international community, which placed the CPN(M) on the terrorist watchlist. Thus, this study facilitates an understanding of the role of internal and external dynamics in shifting organizational goals.

Leftist insurgencies continue to pose a serious concern to both domestic and foreign communities since many of these insurgencies use terror tactics. India is currently experiencing a left-wing insurgency in the form of the Naxalite Movement. The former Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, stated on many occasions that the Maoist insurgency was the most serious internal security threat for India.<sup>7</sup> To address this insurgent threat successfully, India and other states need to understand the reasons why the CPN(M) made a compromise in Nepal. At the same time, states need to acknowledge how the CPN(M) changed the politics of Nepal and the environment in which the future government must work. Though the CPN(M) was unsuccessful in establishing a communist regime, the party initiated other changes—abolition of the monarchy, election of a constituent assembly to draft a new democratic constitution, and a process for adopting federalism.

This thesis facilitates an understanding of how such insurgencies may deviate from their goals and thus cause a state to face new non-violent challenges. Furthermore, this research investigates another mystery: the rise of a communist revolution in Nepal in the twenty-first century when communist regimes were falling. The Maoist conflict expanded despite an unfavorable international climate following the Cold War. After the Cold War, the world witnessed a collapse of communist ideology due to the breakdown of Soviet Union. However, only a few countries faced left-wing insurgencies. This study explores how the CPN(M) was able to survive under such conditions.

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<sup>7</sup>John Harriss, “What Is Going on in India’s ‘Red Corridor’? Questions about India’s Maoist Insurgency,” *Literature Review, Pacific Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2011): 310.

Both the insurgencies in Peru and Nepal used terrorism as a tactic, before and after the Cold War. Many domestic insurgencies continue to draw important lessons from terrorist organizations due to the correlation between them: “Terrorism and insurgency are not the same thing; but they are cousins, distinguished by the strength of the movement and differences in the targeting.”<sup>8</sup> Given the entangled nature of terrorism and insurgency, this thesis does not make a clear demarcation between insurgency and terrorism, but assumes terrorist organizations devise new tactics that insurgents follow. Thus, it may guide other researchers who attempt to devise a clear-cut demarcation between insurgency and terrorism.

Lastly, since most terrorist groups do not negotiate,<sup>9</sup> why did the CPN(M) do so? Many scholars posit that conflicts come to an end and negotiations take place when there is a “hurting stale mate”—a situation in which both the state and the insurgent group can neither win nor accept loss. Nepal’s insurgency may be considered as having reached a hurting stalemate. The CPN(M) entered into its first round of negotiations with the government in 2001, before the mobilization of the Nepalese Army. The second was in 2003. By contrast, the Shining Path never opted for negotiations. Thus, this study explores the timing of a negotiation in light of the interests of both the state and the rebel leadership. It also highlights lessons for countries facing insurgencies to enable them to formulate counterinsurgency measures.

### C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Overall, the literature on socio-revolutionary movements in Peru and Nepal has focused on the causes, motivations, and methods of insurgency. The literature explains the prevailing conditions that led to the rise of the insurgencies and the effects of the insurgencies. The available literature also explains that both insurgent groups used terror tactics, and both states used repressive counterinsurgency measures to curtail the insurgency. The available literature largely depicts the outcome of the insurgencies in terms of success or failure. Manuel Ruben Abimael Guzman Reynoso, commonly known

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<sup>8</sup>Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 147.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 42.

as “Guzman,” led the Shining Path, and his organization is seen as a failure, whereas Pushpa Kamal Dahal, known as “Prachanda,” led the CPN(M) and his organization is observed as a success. However, what is missing among the literature is the rationale behind the shift in Prachanda’s thinking, which contributed to this success. The literature also does not consider Guzman’s unyielding approach, which contributed to the failure of the Shining Path.

Audrey Kurth Cronin in her book *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* looks historically at how terrorist campaigns end, and portrays Guzman as an autocratic and adamant leader. Cronin states that Guzman consolidated his power by expelling or executing dissenters and engaged in highly individualistic and personalized leadership. Guzman never negotiated, and according to her, most terrorist groups do not choose to negotiate. She adds that groups that negotiate have a longer average life span. Her analysis correlates groups’ ages with their propensities to engage in negotiations. However, her theory may not seem to address the case of CPN(M), which negotiated and had a shorter life span. Moreover, Cronin did not relate groups’ tactics, ideologies, and regional locations to the longevity of a terrorist organization.<sup>10</sup>

Jeremy M. Weinstein in his book *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* claims that “initial endowments accessible to rebel leaders shape and constrain their strategies.”<sup>11</sup> His main argument is that rebel groups that emerge in a resource wealthy environment or with external support tend to commit a higher level of indiscriminate violence than groups that emerge in a resource poor environment. Weinstein argues that rebels in a resource wealthy environment will attract opportunistic individuals, whereas rebels in a resource poor environment are forced to rely on “social endowments.” In the case of the CPN(M), which emerged in a resource poor environment, the theory does seem to fit; however, the leadership seems to exploit both

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<sup>10</sup>Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 19.

<sup>11</sup>Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11.

opportunity and social endowments. His argument that a resource poor environment builds a long-term relationship with civilians can be counter-argued in the case of Shining Path. According to Weinstein, the inception of an insurgency, and the attraction of people to the rebel group, shape rebel strategies. Weinstein argues that ideological commitment was central to membership in the Shining Path, whereas “divergent practice” was the focus of Prachanda’s leadership.<sup>12</sup> However, an examination of what led the Maoist leadership to indulge in divergent practice is missing.

Jo-Marie Burt in her book *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society* provides an analysis of the social, political, and economic crisis of Peru during the 1980s. The book furthers the understanding of political violence and its impact on civil society and democratic governance. The book provides insight about how autocratic leaders can exploit the legacies of political violence. After the Shining Path grew in strength, its authoritarian leader and the state head were in a contest for consolidating power at the cost of the civil society. The Shining Path never planned to join hands with the democratic-left group.<sup>13</sup> The acts of alienation and their effects on the Shining Path require analysis, as alienating other rebel groups was counter-productive for the Shining Path. The effects of the alienation slowly diminished popular support.

Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati in *A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003* analyze the root and proximate causes that gave rise to the Maoist insurgency. They argue that state’s neglect caused the people’s war, and explore a detailed account of the chronological development of the insurgency until 2003.<sup>14</sup> However, the book does not consider the challenges that Maoists faced after the deployment of the Nepalese Army. According to Thapa, the organization collected funds internally, but as the Maoist organization expanded, how the organization was sustained is not explained. Furthermore, the role of international players after 9/11 seems to be missing.

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<sup>12</sup>Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 32.

<sup>13</sup>Jo-Marie Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 10.

<sup>14</sup>Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, *A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003* (Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 2003), 181.

Mahendra Lawati and Anup K. Pahari in their book *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century* argue that the Maoist conflict was more of an ethnic conflict. They claim that the Maoist conflict was an amalgamation of classic communist ideology of class struggle, which gained momentum and became effective only after the CPN(M) exploited ethnic identity issues. During the conflict, the Maoists did not use violence indiscriminately. They further argue that the “absence of lootable natural resources” turned out to be a blessing for the CPN(M).<sup>15</sup> Krishna B. Bhattachan suggests that the Maoist conflict was an ethnic conflict because of two indicators—political opportunities and the indigenous organizational strength.<sup>16</sup> The literature discuss the leadership adopting ethnic lines as an opportunity, but do not explain why it became essential to shift the class struggle to ethnic lines.

S. D. Munni in *Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace* analyzes the context, dynamics, and key players that have shaped the insurgency and state politics. Munni portrays Prachanda as a leader who wanted to unite the leftist organizations and is believed to have facilitated the merger of India’s People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Coordination of Committee (MCC).<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, he states that the Maoists were caught in an internal conflict between the two approaches: a revolutionary struggle to achieve an ultimate ideological goal, and a pragmatic and gradual movement towards the ultimate goal. The Maoists adopted the gradual movement because of national and international pressure. However, the CPN(M), which had grown in strength, accepted the gradual approach not only due to national and international pressure. The work needs further analysis on the CPN(M)’s willingness to compromise.

Thomas A. Marks and David Scott Peter argue that structural factors like poverty, economy, culture, and politics were not strong grounds for insurgency in both countries. Rather, they argue that the principal actors—the insurgents and government—were the

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<sup>15</sup>Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 12.

<sup>16</sup>Krishna B. Bhattachan, “Ethnopolitics and Ethnodevelopment: An Emerging Paradigm in Nepal – with a Postscript,” in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990*, eds. Mahendra Lawati and Susan Hangen (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2013), 43.

<sup>17</sup>S. D. Munni, “Bringing the Maoists down from the Hills,” in *Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace*, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 321.

main cause for the initiation and expansion of the insurgency. The literature further argues that the inappropriate state response by Peru and Nepal caused the Shining Path and the Maoist insurgencies, respectively, to incorporate terrorism in their campaign to form a counter state. In such situations, terrorists are interchangeably used with insurgents. The literature portrays the leadership of both groups as educated and charismatic and further states that both leaders saw themselves as “ideologically pure.” However, it can be argued that Prachanda’s actions were never ideologically pure, and furthermore, the literature does not discuss both the leader’s pragmatism in dealing with new challenges.<sup>18</sup>

According to the empirical tests conducted by S. Brock Blomberg, Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler, terrorist groups “fare better if they are larger in size, diversify their attack modes, and are animated by religiosity rather than a secular political goal.”<sup>19</sup> They argue that over the years, there has been a shift from nationalists/separatists to leftists, and then to the religious fundamentalists, who have dominated since 1990s. So why did the Maoist insurgency, which was not a religious fundamentalist movement, turn out victorious in the elections after the conflict?

Sean DeBlieck argues that Maoism had inspired regions in South Asia, including Nepal, as Maoism employs tactically effective methods, launches from political organizations that are prone to extreme schisms, and targets rural people that are economically and politically weak. He argues that Maoism is malleable and so claims that the CPN(M) adapted to the changing environment willingly.<sup>20</sup> The adaptation to the changing environment may not just be willingness, but it is also a necessary means for survival due to the challenges.

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<sup>18</sup> Thomas A. Marks and David Scott Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics: Comparing Peru and Nepal,” *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 13, no. 2 (2005): 91–116, doi: 10.1080/09662840500347280.

<sup>19</sup>S. Brock Blomberg, Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler, “Terrorist Group Survival: Ideology, Tactics, and Base of Operations,” *Public Choice* 149 (2011): 441–463.

<sup>20</sup>Sean DeBlieck, “Why Mao? Maoist Insurgencies in India and Nepal,” *Peace Conflict and Development* Issue 9 (July 2006): 1–37.

#### D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

Insurgent groups use terror tactics and so pose a major threat to a state. A state needs to address the threat in a most effective way, but with a minimum loss of human lives. Peru and Nepal, as this thesis shows, witnessed a vast difference in the magnitude of the loss of human lives. This was due to the variation in the tactics of both the insurgent groups and the government forces of Peru and Nepal. Both the insurgent groups performed acts of terrorism right from the start of their campaigns, and both groups were described as terrorists at different points during their campaigns. The *U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the dictionary defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political.”<sup>22</sup>

Again, according to a leading terrorism expert, Martha Crenshaw, a terrorist organization’s goal is to challenge the legitimacy of the existing political and social structure by calling for a redistribution of power.<sup>23</sup> She further adds that such a group uses violence to achieve its goal. Thus, looking at the definitions, the common factor is the use of political violence. Since both the insurgent groups used political violence to fulfill their goals, their campaigns should not be strictly defined in terms of insurgency. As discussed earlier, insurgency and terrorism are inter-related; the insurgencies in this study need to be viewed as acts of terrorism as well.

As groups turn to terrorism, the groups’ organizational effectiveness depends on the leader’s rationale regarding the use of resources, opportunities, and threats, and on the

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<sup>21</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 8, 2010, as amended through September 15, 2011): 165.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 342.

<sup>23</sup>Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” *Orbis* (1985): 466.

decision to react.<sup>24</sup> During their campaigns, such groups are likely to face challenges, which are in turn contingent on the internal and external environmental factors. However, the magnitude of the factors may be different. Thus, the organizations' adaptation to the various challenges caused a variation in the organizational effects of the two insurgencies.

The Shining Path met challenges and reacted in a more coercive manner. It is generally argued that if the insurgent is confronted by powerful counterinsurgents, then the insurgent "has no recourse but to wait until his opponent is weakened by some internal or external crisis."<sup>25</sup> However, this was not the case with the Shining Path, which was entangled in indiscriminate killings of non-combatants. This led to confrontation with the civil population.

Also, during the Shining Path's campaign, another rebel group called the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) existed for a common objective of destroying the standing regime.<sup>26</sup> The Shining Path could have gained if it had formed a coalition with MRTA or other left-wing parties. However, the Shining Path never tried to form an alliance with a group that had similar objectives, rather it confronted the MRTA. The Shining Path leadership never opted for negotiation, as ideology remained the center of its politics. The group believed in a dogmatic military approach to overthrow the incumbent regime, as Guzman adopted an authoritarian way of making decisions.

By contrast, the CPN(M) seemed to exploit available opportunities in trying to achieve organizational effectiveness. The CPN(M) waged a people's war during a transition period, when the state institutions were still incipient and could not fully address the expectations of the people. During the people's war, the Maoists avoided indiscriminate violence. Also, the communist revolution occurred when there was an unfavorable international environment after the demise of Soviet Union and the fall of

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<sup>24</sup>Crenshaw, "Organizational Approach," 465–467.

<sup>25</sup>David Galula, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 580.

<sup>26</sup>Gordon H. McCormick, *Sharp Dressed Men: Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement* (R-4276) (Arlington, VA: RAND, 1993), 1.

Berlin Wall in 1989. Jack Snyder states, “Liberalism had triumphed over its two ideological competitors in the twentieth century, communism and fascist nationalism, and no new challenges were in sight.”<sup>27</sup> So, how did the insurgency sustain itself without external support or the state’s natural resources? This thesis explains that though the conflict initially started as an inequality dispute between the feudal class and the landless, the class conflict could not gain momentum. The CPN(M) sought an alternate strategy along ethnic lines that was gaining momentum during the period.

The CPN(M) sought negotiations as a tool to exploit the situation to its advantage. The willingness of the CPN(M) for a compromise was an important factor for the Maoists to negotiate. After the CPN(M) started facing a set-back with the deployment of the Nepalese Army (NA) and the consequences of 9/11, the CPN(M) tried to take the opportunity of forming an alliance with other political parties in order to alienate the monarch, under whose command was the army. The switchover of strategies was possible because the leadership cell of the CPN(M) had national-level political experience, which supported the decision making. The CPN(M)’s readiness to negotiate did settle the conflict by a political compromise, as it is principally and practically accepted that “political power is the undisputed boss” over the military power.<sup>28</sup>

The rebel leaders’ decision making is shaped by many aforementioned factors. However, it depends on the rationality of the leaders to accept the available options, which results in the variation of the outcome. Thus, my hypothesis is that the outcomes of the two insurgencies differed because the CPN(M) leadership was more pragmatic in managing organizational resources by exploiting available opportunities, whereas the Shining Path leadership was rigid and restricted to its ideology, thus missing political opportunities.

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<sup>27</sup>Jack Snyder, “Nationalist Elite Persuasion in Democratizing States,” in *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W.W Norton and Company, 2000), 16.

<sup>28</sup>Galula, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 589.

## **E. RESEARCH DESIGN**

This thesis employs a comparative study to determine the rationale behind the respective leadership's decisions related to managing organizational resources, which caused the variation in the outcomes of the conflicts. The focus of this comparative study is Peru's Shining Path insurgency and Nepal's Maoist insurgency, led by the CPN(M). First, the study provides background to both insurgencies to provide the reader a comparison of the settings. Then, the thesis compares the leadership in both insurgencies and the approaches they adopted toward organizational resources. Variables such as leadership, ideology, and popular support will be analyzed as part of the organizational resources.

Also, during the research, the effect of internal and external factors on the organizational resources of both groups is examined. As both groups were deemed terrorists at a certain point, the thesis refers to many sources pertaining to terrorism. As outlined earlier, insurgency and terrorism have a correlation; thus, this thesis at times discusses them interchangeably. The research is drawn from primary and secondary sources: scholarly journals, books, government reports, newspapers for this purpose.

## **F. THESIS OUTLINE**

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I covers the background, the research question and hypothesis, and the significance of the study. This chapter also includes a literature review. Chapter II deals with the Shining Path. This chapter explores the possible grievances that caused the insurgency and describes the SL leadership approach, ideological objectives, and popular support. Chapter III deals with the CPN(M). This chapter also explores the possible grievances that caused the insurgency and describes the CPN(M) leadership approach, ideological objectives, and popular support. Chapter IV makes a comparative analysis of the two leadership approaches to demonstrate that CPN(M) leadership was adaptive in managing its organizational resources, whereas the Shining Path leadership, which was based on personality cult, was adamant in ideology and coercive towards the population. Chapter V concludes the thesis

with findings of the analysis to draw key lessons to recommend for a state's effective counterinsurgency measures.

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## II. SHINING PATH (SENDERO LUMINOSO)

Insurgencies have posed increasingly complex problems to state and society. From the insurgents' perspective, their desire to restructure a state may be analyzed as an act of political violence to vent their grievances. This chapter will examine the emergence and expansion of political violence in Peru. It will deal with the political, economic, and social grievances that Peru witnessed before the SL's campaign. Furthermore, the chapter will demonstrate how such challenges paved way for the emergence of the SL insurgency, which was led by the SL leadership by initiating a self-proclaimed *people's war*. People's war, which was adopted in the lines of Mao's protracted warfare, impacted the state and society.

As noted in Chapter I, in 1980, the SL initiated a people's war against the Peruvian state to establish a "new democracy." Some journalists and academics described the SL as a "dogmatic, uncompromising, and vicious movement rejecting any option other than violent revolution."<sup>29</sup> The leader of the SL, Guzman, had so much authority in the organization that he could tailor the movement according to his wishes, but he was reluctant to follow a political approach. His movement of violence and coercion provoked resistance that could not be suppressed. After 12 years of violent conflict, the movement that had turned out to be the "world's deadliest revolutionary movement,"<sup>30</sup> collapsed with the capture of its leader in 1992.

A few critical variables of insurgency are considered minimum prerequisites for a successful insurgency. The study of such variables will facilitate understanding the SL's leadership approach. In this chapter, SL's application of some of the variables, which are organizational resources, such as leadership, ideology, and popular support, will be described to explain how the SL leadership centered on one individual, adapted a fixed violent ideology, and relinquished popular support. The study of the SL would be incomplete without first considering the history of the emergence of the SL in Peru.

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<sup>29</sup> James Ron, "Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Tactical Escalation," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 5 (September 2001): 572, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/424776>.

<sup>30</sup> Marks and Palmer, "Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics," 96.

## A. HISTORY OF THE SL IN PERU

The origins of the SL are rooted in the ideology of Jose Carlos Mariategui, a Peruvian intellectual, considered the father of Peruvian Marxism. Mariategui had formed the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) in 1928 to fuse communist ideology with indigenous *Indian* nationalism. He believed that a peasant-based uprising by oppressed highland Indians could recapture the society that was destroyed by the Spanish conquerors and the urban elite in Lima.<sup>31</sup> In 1964, the PCP was divided by an ideological dispute, which was brought about by the Sino-Soviet split. The pro-Moscow wing of the PCP supported a traditional non-violent strategy to struggle for power. The pro-Peking group formed the PCP-Bandera Roja (Red Flag) and supported an armed struggle, which was meant to encircle Lima and eventually capture state power.

Furthermore, the Red Flag split in 1967 on charges that the group was not initiating an armed struggle. In 1970, radical members, including Guzman, were expelled from the group for ideological heresy. At this point, Guzman solidified his core followers and formed a more radical organization, named the Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui (simplified as the Shining Path).<sup>32</sup> Guzman became the founder of the SL and focused on overthrowing the Peruvian government. The military regime had generated a plethora of new political organizations such as unions, peasant federations, and rural cooperatives, thus increasing the political left-wing protests. This process in turn increased the number of communists. During the 1978 elections, the far left groups “earned an impressive” 29 percent of the popular vote.<sup>33</sup> In spite of the far left increasing in power, some grievances led the SL leadership to believe that an increase in communists was not sufficient to shift power to the oppressed.

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<sup>31</sup> Paul W. Staeheli, “Collapsing Insurgent Organizations through Leadership Decapitation: A Comparison of Targeted Killing and Targeted Incarceration in Insurgent Organizations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010), 54.

<sup>32</sup> Gordon H McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru* (Report No. R-3781) (Arlington, VA: RAND, National Defense Research Institute 1990), 3–5.

<sup>33</sup> Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 580.

## B. GRIEVANCES LEADING TO INSURGENCY

At the start of the twentieth century, a small elite group turned the state into an oligarchic society as they “privatized and monopolized” the politics and economics of the state for their interests.<sup>34</sup> The group, which was an alliance between the owners of large land estates, known as *gamonales*, and the commercial and financial elites, controlled Peru. The elites maintained a controlled system that restricted citizenship and repressed those who challenged their rule. Furthermore, the oligarchy marginalized the masses by excluding illiterates from political life, especially in the highland regions. The Ayacucho region, consisting mainly of defensive rural indigenous Indian people, the *Incas*, had a long history of racial domination by oligarchy and *haciendas*.<sup>35</sup> The communist party, which emerged in the 1930s, was weakened by state repression and unable to challenge the oligarchy rule, which endured until the 1960s.<sup>36</sup>

The oligarchic government was dominated by authoritarian rule and was centered in the national capital, Lima. The oligarchic government was broken by military intervention in 1968, under the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado. Velasco attempted a broad reform program, *Plan Inca*, which was first conceived by a small group of left-leaning military officers.<sup>37</sup> The reform was the most ambitious state building and nation building project in Peru.<sup>38</sup> However, the program stumbled as the military viewed it as Velasco’s personal rule. The reform alarmed the traditionalists within the armed forces, which created a cleavage within the military, and the economic elites. Such situations, exacerbated by other domestic issues, resulted in Peru facing an economic crisis in the 1970s, which further deepened by the late 1980s. The average GDP per capita started falling in the negatives. It dropped from 2.5 percent in the 1960s

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<sup>34</sup>Burt, *Political Violence*, 26.

<sup>35</sup> Carlos Ivan Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980–1999*, ed. Steve J. Stern (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 4.

<sup>36</sup>Burt, *Political Violence*, 25–26.

<sup>37</sup> Mario Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant Self-Defense Organizations in Ayacucho,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20, no. 4 (October 2001): 472. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3339025>.

<sup>38</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 26–27.

to 0.9 percent in 1970s to -3.2 percent in 1980s.<sup>39</sup> All these state activities incited the SL under the leadership of Guzman to organize and take up arms against the state.

### C. PEOPLE'S WAR IN PERU

In May 1980, SL started their armed struggle against the Peruvian government to establish a people's democracy in the small town of Chuschi, in Ayacucho. The SL leadership initiated the people's war to liberate the countryside, end the market-oriented agricultural production, and destroy the capitalistic economic system.<sup>40</sup> The struggle was initiated with the burning of electoral ballots on the eve of the country's presidential elections. The government downplayed the developing insurgency through the end of 1980. By early 1981, the government passed an antiterrorist law, which imposed stiff penalties against any individual or group that willingly aided and cooperated with the terrorists. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, a brutal internal conflict continued in other parts of Peru.

By early 1992, Lima was almost under siege and the SL was seen on the verge of capturing state power. In May 1991, *El Diario*, a weekly newspaper, asserted that SL had achieved strategic balance: a phase in protracted warfare where the rebel forces are capable of launching an offensive against the state's military. The advance of SL so alarmed the United States that in March 1992, then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Bernard Aronson, warned congressional leaders that the United States should prevent SL's rise to power in order to prevent a "third genocide."<sup>41</sup>

On September 12, 1992, an elite police intelligence unit raided a house in Lima and captured Guzman. His second-in-command, Elena Iparraguirre, and two high-ranking members of SL were arrested as well.<sup>42</sup> Though the SL had a second-in-command, there is no evidence that Guzman appointed a successor prior to his capture.<sup>43</sup> The SL

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<sup>39</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 82.

<sup>40</sup> Robert B. Kent, "Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru," *Geographical Review* 83, no. 4 (1993): 442.

<sup>41</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 95–101.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 172–173.

<sup>43</sup> Staeheli, "Collapsing Insurgent Organizations," 60.

collapsed and was no longer a serious threat to the Peruvian state. The SL became something like “a rare wild animal still on the loose in the mountains but hardly seen.”<sup>44</sup> Currently, Guzman is in solitary confinement in a prison in a naval base located on a small island. It is only from prison that the SL leadership began to consider a pragmatic approach in its dealings with the government and called for a negotiated peace.<sup>45</sup> This indicates that SL leadership realized the importance of a political approach. However, some scholars speculate about Guzman’s call for peace, whether it was an intention or force of coercion. Although we cannot know the true reason for the call for peace, this thesis will argue that it was intentional.

#### **D. LEADERSHIP**

Guzman, founder of SL was born in 1934, and has remained the spiritual head and the chief strategist of the SL. Guzman was a professor of philosophy at the National University of San Cristobel de Huamanga in Ayacucho. During his childhood, he was a smart and studious boy. Guzman received two degrees—a Ph.D. for his dissertation on Immanuel Kant’s theory of space, and a degree in law for his thesis on “The Bourgeois Democratic State.” He was later involved in communist party politics and portrayed as a theorist of the highest level. Guzman is viewed by his followers as “the Fourth Sword of Marxism” as his work and ideological contributions stand along the lines of Marx, Lenin, and Mao. He has been SL’s “spiritual leader and guiding light.”<sup>46</sup>

The SL centered on the cult of personality of Guzman as his followers called him President Gonzalo and even worshipped him.<sup>47</sup> Guzman exercised and shaped the SL in his own image and doctrinal orientation, and he single-handedly directed SL operations.<sup>48</sup> He carefully cultivated an image of genius and omnipresence among his

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<sup>44</sup> William Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of U.S. Army Psychological Operations,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 4 (August 2009): 651–666, doi: 10.1080/01402390902987087.

<sup>45</sup> Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 111.

<sup>46</sup> McCormick, *Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 3–5.

<sup>47</sup> Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 19.

<sup>48</sup> Staeheli, “Collapsing Insurgent Organizations,” 54.

followers. He had a stronghold over the movement's agenda; he devised strategies of coercion rather than cooperation. According to Guzman, the revolution would triumph after the Peruvian people "cross over the river of blood."<sup>49</sup>

Guzman's followers were obligated to follow the rules of the leader over their own conscience. The leader controlled his organization by a process of criticism and self-criticism, a mechanism developed during Lenin's time to control groups and individuals.<sup>50</sup> In the process, condemned individuals faced harsh questioning and analysis. If the individual failed to convince the SL of his or her own shortcomings, that individual faced severe punishment or even death. Mao argued that only when discipline is self-imposed are guerillas able to understand the cause of the fight and obedience to orders. According to Mao, all subordinates must obey superiors, but the "basis for guerilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With guerillas, a discipline of compulsion is ineffective."<sup>51</sup>

The organization had a series of regional commands, which were responsible for establishing bases. Guzman exercised his influence through a Central Committee, which together oversaw the movement's operations. Guzman's tight authority over the organization was based on four properties:

The group leader, in this case Abimael Guzman, is believed to possess a unique vision of the future and superhuman qualities; group followers unquestionably accept the leader's views, statements, and judgment; they comply with his orders and directives without condition; and they give the leader an unqualified devotion.<sup>52</sup>

According to Carlos Ivan Degregori, Guzman believed in power. The SL party considered itself a "privileged instrument for taking power," since "everything but power is an illusion."<sup>53</sup> According to Manwaring, the primary objective of Guzman's

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<sup>49</sup> *The Threat of the Shining Path to Democracy in Peru: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992), 127.

<sup>50</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 118.

<sup>51</sup> Mao Tse Tung, "On Guerilla Warfare," trans. Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith, in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 548.

<sup>52</sup> McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 7.

<sup>53</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 114.

insurgency was power, which is achieved by "... a vision and purposeful long-term program for gaining control of a state or society. Power is maintained as that organization replaces the state."<sup>54</sup> According to philosophers, power and human nature are the key factors for aggression. Thucydides, an ancient scholar, argues that power, fear, honor, and interest all remain key factors in war.<sup>55</sup> This does suggest that the main objective of Guzman was to gain power through armed struggle. He showed no interest in engaging the government of Peru in any kind of dialogue and did not compromise even though there were elements within the organization that preferred moderate lines.<sup>56</sup> Since "central to all dictatorships is extreme obedience,"<sup>57</sup> Guzman had developed a dictatorship over his organization. For these reasons, Guzman's actions closely parallel the actions of the Viet Cong and Khymer Rouge leaders.<sup>58</sup>

James Ron contrasts Guzman with other communist leaders of the former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. In the states mentioned, the leaders tended to develop a personality cult after the leaders came to power, but Guzman developed an autocratic position from the beginning of the armed struggle.<sup>59</sup> Guzman developed a personality cult before taking power, which is unique in a revolutionary movement.<sup>60</sup> Guzman held supreme authority over the hierarchical organization not only in the operational role of the SL, but also in the personal affairs of its members. He regulated everything from meetings to marriages of its members and even set their wedding dates.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Max G. Manwaring, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 541 (1995): 158, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1048282>.

<sup>55</sup> Thucydides, "The Melian Dialogue," in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 69–73.

<sup>56</sup> *The Threat of the Shining Path: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs*, 70–71.

<sup>57</sup> Fathali M. Moghaddam, *The Psychology of Dictatorship* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2013), 8.

<sup>58</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, "The Purpose of Terrorism within Insurgency: Shining Path in Peru," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 3, no. 2 (1992): 171, doi: 10.1080/09592319208423019.

<sup>59</sup> Ron, "Ideology in Context," 575.

<sup>60</sup> Yaworsky, "Target Analysis of Shining Path," 651–666.

<sup>61</sup> David A Siegel and Joseph K. Young, "Simulating Terrorism: Credible Commitment, Costly Signaling, and Strategic Behavior," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 42, no. 4 (Oct 2009): 768, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40646685>.

His personality cult had developed a psychological impact upon the members of the SL as they sought to achieve a sense of obedience to the authoritarian to fulfill the goal. Stanley Graham states that: “Obedience is the psychological mechanism that links individual action to political purpose.”<sup>62</sup> Guzman established a dictatorial rule as he maintained power within his organization. Guzman prevented creative decision making due to his control of decision making, such that Marks and Palmer remarked that Guzman had highly centralized decision-making capability, but lacked the adaptability to meet new challenges.<sup>63</sup> To understand why Guzman did not envision any concessions in exchange for power makes it necessary to analyze the ideological objectives of the revolution.

### **E. IDEOLOGY**

Observing the success of the Chinese people’s war, Guzman believed that an armed revolution employing Mao’s strategy of the people’s war could successfully lead to the capture of state power in Peru. In his visit to China during the Cultural Revolution, he developed contacts with top communist leaders and was able to intensify his ideology. In the 1970s when other small parties that formed the Peruvian Left “went to the masses,” SL leadership with the initial nucleus withdrew to the University of Ayacucho to dedicate itself to the study Marxism. The formation of the organization itself was a reason for its commitment to SL ideology. Guzman and the initial nucleus of the organization, which consisted of radical students, were “ideologically and organically very compact” and converted itself into an orthodox party from the top to down, and from ideology to organization.<sup>64</sup>

Guzman applied ideology in a Peruvian context, referred to as Gonzalo Thought, which was a synthesis of Marx, Lenin, Mao’s peasant-based revolution, and Mariategui’s

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<sup>62</sup>Stanley Milgram, “How Good People Do Bad Things,” in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 183.

<sup>63</sup> Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 109.

<sup>64</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 114.

“native socialism.” His followers accepted the ideology without question.<sup>65</sup> He opted for the Maoist strategy of people’s war as it employed the peasants and applied the three magic wands—the party, the armed struggle, and the front. He visualized a complete peasants’ armed struggle and focused on it, but did not properly visualize the front, whether it should consist of a class front or a front made of parties.<sup>66</sup>

Guzman’s ideology advocated complete social change through violence. The revolution was to provide an ideological basis for a new socialist Peruvian state. His ideological approach to capture power and create a “nationalist, Indian, and popular democracy” in accordance with Peruvian socialism in the pre-Columbian (Quechua) community<sup>67</sup> was not a tangible political objective. Instead of embracing local cultures of indigenous communities, the party’s position became antagonistic to local culture and traditions in the name of purifying Peruvian culture.<sup>68</sup>

SL interpreted the doctrine to view violence as an end in itself in order to drive out traditional ways of thought.<sup>69</sup> Guzman attempted to impose “scientific” aspects of Marxism as his ideology and rejected local values, practices, and traditions. His ideology did not embrace popular support as he challenged all those not supporting the SL. For SL, “those who stood in its way were the enemy, and—even if they were unarmed civilians—should be assassinated ....”<sup>70</sup> Some analysts view SL’s ideology as within the frame of the “Gang of Four” Maoism: a strand of Chinese political thought that became fiercely anti-reformist during the Cultural Revolution.

He considered other leftists ideologically impure and revisionists. Guzman viewed Communist revolution in other parts of the world, such as China and the former

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<sup>65</sup> *The Threat of the Shining Path: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs*, 41.

<sup>66</sup> Abimael Guzman, “‘Exclusive’ Comments by Abimael Guzman,” *World Affairs* 156, no. 1 (1993): 55–56, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672373>.

<sup>67</sup> Manwaring, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,” 158.

<sup>68</sup> Harmon, “The Purpose of Terrorism,” 181.

<sup>69</sup> Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 575.

<sup>70</sup> Maiah Jaskoski, *Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013), 39.

Soviet Union, as revisionist dictatorships and unworthy of the Marxist-Leninist legacy because they had lost the legitimacy of ideological principles.<sup>71</sup> Guzman condemned International leftists as “fascists,” condemned the Soviet Union for its corruption and “treasonist ideology,” called Che Guevara a “choir girl,” and singled out China for betraying Mao Tse Tung. He assumed the leadership role in a pure ideological revolution, and considered his party to be the vanguard of the world’s communist revolution. For this reason he had to obtain resources locally.<sup>72</sup> Guzman reportedly said in 1984, “Blood makes us stronger,” and some academics agree that SL’s ideology had its roots in the leadership’s political socialization with Maoists, rather than in a blend of Mao and Mariategui’s thoughts.<sup>73</sup>

Peter Waldman argues that socio-revolutionary terrorists’ use of violence is complicated as the attacks are designed to induce the state to overreact and represent a call for a general uprising of the “oppressed and exploited mass.”<sup>74</sup> SL leadership adopted a strategy of provoking the armed forces to violence. The ideology of violent methods against the state and civil population was expected to ruin the reputation of the state, first among the rural population and later among the rest of the Peruvians.<sup>75</sup> This, in turn, would allow for the establishment of a new society. The violence was so intense that SL leadership asserted that the “triumph of the revolution would cost million deaths.”<sup>76</sup> The violence made the party take up methods similar to those of terrorist-like organizations rather than an insurgent group, as SL turned out to be “explicitly military and unabashedly terroristic.”<sup>77</sup> There was so much violence on the local population that the United States was alarmed and drew a parallel that if Guzman’s power was

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<sup>71</sup> Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path,” 653.

<sup>72</sup> Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 97–98.

<sup>73</sup> Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 575.

<sup>74</sup> Peter Waldman, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,” *International Social Movement Research* 4 (1992): 246.

<sup>75</sup> Mika Kerttunen, “A Transformed Insurgency: The Strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the Light of Communist Insurgency Theories and a Modified Beaufrean Exterior/Interior Framework,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 22, no. 1 (2011): 87, doi:10.1080/09592318.2011.546583.

<sup>76</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 25.

<sup>77</sup> Harmon, “Purpose of Terrorism,” 170.

consolidated, then his regime would be “as bloody and radical as the Khymer Rouge in the 1970s.”<sup>78</sup>

## F. POPULAR SUPPORT

David Galula argues that an insurgency is a “two-dimensional war fought for the control of the population,” which has no front, no safe rear.<sup>79</sup> As the support of population is necessary for insurgents and counterinsurgents, population plays a vital role in an insurgency. Peasants provide the insurgents with the most basic need—popular support,<sup>80</sup> which is required for the supply of recruits, information, logistics, funds, hiding places, and thus, “the allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.”<sup>81</sup>

Degregori concludes that SL leadership manipulated the local population to attract them to SL for two reasons. First, for novelty, was power. The SL leadership incited local people with the idea that their movement would lead them to become ministers, military commanders, and judges. Exercising power in a local community provided opportunities for the rural youth. They were given roles as justices in local courts and collectors of revenues for the party. Youth were attracted also to adventure in the movement as they learned about weapons and explosives. The awareness and enthusiasm about the idea of power fascinated more rural youth due to an increase in literacy rate. Between 1960 and 1980, the youth population enrolled in secondary or tertiary education had increased from 19 to 76 percent.<sup>82</sup>

Second, the SL leadership created the hope of progress. The SL enjoyed peasant support initially as the organization preached a “message of new life; a government of the people, of the peasants; a New Democracy in which there would be no more exploitation

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<sup>78</sup> *The Threat of the Shining Path: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs*, 42.

<sup>79</sup> Galula, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 579.

<sup>80</sup> Raj Desai and Harry Eckstein, “Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion,” *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (Jul 1990): 443, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010510>.

<sup>81</sup> Colonel Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: The Folly of Counterinsurgency,” in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 183.

<sup>82</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 96–114.

or corruption, a society without the rich.”<sup>83</sup> The SL also punished corrupt and unpopular leaders, and distributed confiscated goods such as livestock of wealthy individuals and merchandise. Some observers estimate that by the mid-1980s, 25 to 40 percent of Peru’s population was under SL influence or control.<sup>84</sup>

Rural youth, who formed the key links in SL’s chain of expansion, found themselves caught between the cadres and the peasants, as shown in Figure 1. Rural youth were trapped between party orders to destroy livestock and the weeping peasants. One of SL’s principle slogans: “The party has a thousand eyes and a thousand ears,” caused the peasants to live in a state of fear.<sup>85</sup> The SL killed whoever did not accept or support the SL dictates, and informers were threatened. This suggests that rural youth, which formed the key links of expansion, also formed a weak link between party cadres and peasants. This weak link could be one possibility for resistance from peasants during the campaign.




Figure 1. The relationship between the SL party and the masses.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas,” 474.

<sup>84</sup> Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path,” 657.

<sup>85</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 123–125.

<sup>86</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 124.

Most scholars of revolution agree that peasants “will consider rebellion when they judge their right to subsistence to be seriously threatened.”<sup>87</sup> The SL’s strict and unpopular policies, such as curfews, prohibition of the consumption of alcohol, restriction on fiestas, and restriction on the marketing of local goods to urban areas angered the peasants.<sup>88</sup> The SL’s increasing demands were seen as exploitative, which the peasants denounced. Thus, the peasants in some hilly regions of Peru started growing disenchanted with the SL by the second half of the 1980s.<sup>89</sup> The SL started losing the trust and confidence of the population. The SL also contested and competed in the *barriadas*, the shanty towns on the outskirts of Lima. They assassinated grassroots leaders, created fear, and faced confrontation from other community organizations.

Conservative philosophers argue that when an autocratic leader prescribes an action that is evil, people tend to “carry out the act [rather] than to wrench at the structure of authority.”<sup>90</sup> The SL coerced the local population to discourage and deter the public from opposing them. Civilians were also killed if they refused to live in accordance with the movement’s rules.<sup>91</sup> The violence was intense. SL committed 54 percent and MRTA 1.5 percent of political killings.<sup>92</sup>

In an insurgency, Weintein argues that rebels and the population strike a deal, where rebels provide security in exchange for public support.<sup>93</sup> The SL did not provide necessary security against state repression. As SL started expanding, the Peruvian armed forces were authorized for a counterinsurgency role on December, 29, 1982, and launched brutal military repression, described as “aggressive counterinsurgency.”<sup>94</sup> Between 1983 and 1984, the military had killed one-third of the total victims in the entire

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<sup>87</sup> Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas,” 472.

<sup>88</sup> Kent, “Geographical Dimensions,” 444.

<sup>89</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 178.

<sup>90</sup> Milgram, “How Good People Do Bad Things,” 183–184.

<sup>91</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 240.

<sup>92</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 2.

<sup>93</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 191.

<sup>94</sup> Jaskoski, *Military Politics*, 113.

conflict, and most of them were civilians.<sup>95</sup> The SL leadership also followed an aggressive military posture, and Burt argues that popular support for the SL started decreasing when the SL failed to protect the peasants from the military repression of 1983–1984.<sup>96</sup>

The brutal methods of coercion and violence by the SL led to the emergence and spread of *rondas campesinas* or self-defense committees, which expanded in almost all regions by the end of the conflict.<sup>97</sup> Mario Fumerton and Christopher C. Harmon argue that *rondas* was not a government strategy, but a popular invention, created by the anger and frustration resulting from SL intervening in village life.<sup>98</sup> Though there was evidence that the number of active peasant participation in village self-defense increased from 1985, it was only after Fujimori came into power that the strategy was incorporated as a counterinsurgent strategy.<sup>99</sup>

The emergence of the *rondas* backfired on the organization because the same peasants who defended the SL started turning against the SL. In spite of the growing resentment among the local population, the SL did not stop its killings. The SL was still engaged in rampages in later years as 16 massacres of 12 or more persons were committed between December 1987 and February 1992.<sup>100</sup> Sigmund Freud notes such violent attitudes, and documents that human instincts are of two types—those that conserve and unify, and those that destroy and kill.<sup>101</sup> Observing SL's actions, one surmises that Guzman had the instincts to destroy. This could be one reason why the SL never gained international sympathy. In 1992, Alexander Wilde, then executive director

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<sup>95</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 22.

<sup>96</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 122.

<sup>97</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 275.

<sup>98</sup> Harmon, "The Purpose of Terrorism," 178.

<sup>99</sup> Fumerton, "Rondas Campesinas," 488.

<sup>100</sup> Mahendra Lawoti, "Ethnic Dimensions of the Maoist Insurgencies: Indigenous Groups' Participation and Insurgency Trajectories in Nepal, Peru, and India," in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 144.

<sup>101</sup> Sigmund Freud, "Why War," in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 179.

of the Washington Office on Latin America, stated that the SL used extensive and vicious terror tactics because they “strike directly at human rights figures and popular leaders, the foundation of democracy.”<sup>102</sup>

## G. CONCLUSION

The Shining Path was “the most brutal guerrilla group that has ever appeared in the Western Hemisphere:”<sup>103</sup> an individualized movement that posed a threat to the Peruvian state. Guzman’s authoritarianism and strong control over his organization made his leadership indisputable. Guzman considered his organization as a pure revolutionary group. Guzman’s strategy of using coercion and violence in which the SL embarked on ruthless punitive expeditions against Peruvian civilians resulted in SL’s loss of popular support. Despite the significant success won by the SL, the organization collapsed due to SL leadership’s ideology, which was not based on a foundation of the people, but rather on the cult of personality.

The capture of Guzman on September 12, 1992, by a special police intelligence unit, the National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE),<sup>104</sup> created a vacuum in the leadership of the SL. Guzman’s subordinates were unable to fill the gap as there was no successor. Guzman was not killed in military operations, nor sentenced to death after his capture. This is significant as “the preservation of Guzman is likely to perpetrate a leadership vacuum in Shining Path because while he remains alive, nobody is likely to seize the initiative too boldly.”<sup>105</sup> With a clear understanding of the SL movement, the discussion now turns to another insurgency that was framed under similar lines of protracted warfare. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal grew out of almost similar backgrounds of environment and grievances, but the two insurgencies had a dramatic difference in outcome.

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<sup>102</sup> Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 571.

<sup>103</sup> Harmon, “Purpose of Terrorism,” 170.

<sup>104</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 154.

<sup>105</sup> Staeheli, “Collapsing Insurgent Organizations through Leadership,” 60.

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### III. COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEPAL (MAOIST)

This chapter examines an insurgency similar to the one discussed in Chapter II to show the different approaches adopted by the leaders of the two groups. The Maoist insurgency led by the CPN(M) was a unique revolution because it is rare for a left extremist party to join hands with bourgeoisie parties to resolve a decade-long insurgency.<sup>106</sup> The insurgency was also unique as it expanded when international communist movements had taken a back seat and communist regimes worldwide were experiencing a backlash.<sup>107</sup> Many scholars argue that transition from authoritarianism to elections decreases the likelihood of armed insurgency; the Maoist insurgency challenged that view. Nepal was witnessing a transition to democracy when the country was plunged into an armed struggle. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue that: “Democratization typically creates a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable domestic coalitions, and high-energy mass politics.”<sup>108</sup> Nepal faced a similar situation, in which Prachanda was able to exploit and lead the people’s war. The Maoist people’s war was a ten-year-old violent conflict that left 13,000 dead, but ended in a different outcome from the one experienced by the SL.

This chapter will attempt to show that the leadership of the CPN(M) did not adopt the Maoist insurgency as a cult of personality, but rather the leadership adapted to the changing environment. The chapter will describe the conditions that led the CPN(M) to launch an insurgency when Nepal’s democracy was still at its incipient stage. During an insurgency, the internal dynamics of a state and external factors play a crucial role in shaping an insurgency. The chapter will portray the ideological objectives to show how the leadership of the CPN(M) adapted to the internal dynamics and external factors. The CPN(M) gradually modified their classic Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideology to form an alliance with democratic parties.

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<sup>106</sup> Munni, “Bringing the Maoists down from the Hills,” 313.

<sup>107</sup> B. C. Upreti, “The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Nature, Growth, and Impact,” *South Asian Survey* 13, no. 1(2006): 36–50, doi: 10.1177/097152310501300103.

<sup>108</sup> Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 387.

As in the previous chapter, this chapter will also deal with CPN(M)'s application of specific organizational resources—leadership, ideology, and popular support—to show that the Maoist insurgency was not an individualistic movement. The study of the aforementioned variables will demonstrate that the leadership of CPN(M) did not follow the Maoist dogmatic approach, but rather switched strategies that would best suit the organization. The CPN(M) leadership was assisted by moderate ideologues who tried to bring other leftist organizations together rather than execute in isolation. Initially, though the struggle was a class struggle, it adopted ethnic lines to win the support of the indigenous population, and unlike the SL leadership, the CPN(M) leadership relied more upon selective violence than indiscriminate killings. Before examining with the insurgency, it is necessary to introduce the historical background of the CPN(M) in Nepal, which will be discussed in the next section.

#### **A. HISTORY OF CPN(M) IN NEPAL**

The root of the Communist movement in Nepal dates back to the birth of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in 1949 in Calcutta, India.<sup>109</sup> Since its beginning, the party has witnessed many personality clashes, splits, and reunions. When the general secretary of CPN, Dr Keshar Jung Rayamajhi, supported the autocratic rule of King Mahendra in December 15, 1960, the party split into two factions—the pro-Moscow faction led by Rayamajhi and pro-Peking faction consisting of Pushpa Lal, Man Mohan Adhikari, among others.<sup>110</sup> B.C. Upreti referred the pro-Moscow faction as royalists and the pro-Peking faction as revolutionaries.<sup>111</sup> The split within the communist parties continues until today.

The formation of the CPN(M) can be traced back to 1974 in Banaras, India, after the formation of the CPN(Fourth Convention). When the central nucleus of the CPN was facing leadership challenges due to ideological differences within the party, Mohan Bikram Singh and Nirmal Lama sought to bring the various communist parties under one

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<sup>109</sup> Lawoti, "Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 5

<sup>110</sup> Thapa and Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, 20–23.

<sup>111</sup> Upreti, "Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 36–50.

umbrella. The CPN (Fourth Convention) became the strongest communist group in advocating an armed rebellion against the state. However, the king announced a referendum in 1979 for a transition to multiparty democracy, which diverted attention from an armed rebellion.

This further splintered the communist party into CPN(Masal), which was formed by Mohan Bikram Singh and Mohan Baidya, and CPN(Mashal). Babu Ram Bhattarai became the general secretary of CPN(Masal) in 1980. Mohan Baidya broke away and formed another party in which Pushpa Kamal Dahal became the general secretary. However, in 1990, various hardcore Maoist groups formed the CPN Unity Center with Dahal as the chairman.<sup>112</sup> In 1995, after a number of Maoist leftist parties joined together, including the United People's Front Nepal (UPFN), the largest Maoist front organization, the CPN(M) was formed. Most members of CPN(Masal) can be considered as the main group of people that later emerged as the CPN(M) leaders.<sup>113</sup>

History shows that by 1990, the communists of Nepal had established themselves as a major political force in Nepal despite the world heading towards a post-communist global order. However, the aspirations of the communists were not being met due to certain grievances.

## **B. GRIEVANCES LEADING TO INSURGENCY**

Prior to 1990, Nepal was an autocratic regime ruled by a king, with a persistent legacy of inequalities, interconnected caste, ethnic, and gender-based exclusions. According to Michael E. Brown, "a single factor explanation, in short, cannot account for significant variation in the incidence and intensities of internal and ethnic conflict."<sup>114</sup> Jack Snyder puts forward a connection between democratization and conflict and claims that as more people take a larger role in politics, conflict within a country becomes more

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<sup>112</sup> Upreti, "Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 37.

<sup>113</sup> Thapa and Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, 24–45.

<sup>114</sup> Michael E. Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview," in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (revised edition), eds. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 4.

likely.<sup>115</sup> Similarly, Thapa argues that internal conflicts arise in countries in transition, as the state is not in a position to work out a peaceful settlement or use “all-out force” to subdue challenges to its authority.<sup>116</sup> Though there are various conspiracy theories leading to the development of the Maoist insurgency, some underlying factors suggest the conflict.

First, because of the weakness of the state, the structural factor can be applied. The establishment of a democracy created a vacuum of power, which was filled by rudimentary political institutions. Starting from 1846, the Ranas ruled Nepal for about 104 years and vested all the state power in them. They reduced the power of Shah kings to that of a ceremonial figurehead. However, after the end of colonial period in South Asia, the Rana rule ended in 1951 and paved the way for a short and experimental popular rule that also ended with the takeover by King Mahendra in 1960, also called the Panchayat years. The Panchayat era ended with the re-establishment of democracy in 1990. During the initial period of 1990 democracy, there was a continuous seesaw battle between the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) for grabbing of power. This led to instability in Nepal to such an extent that none of the incumbent governments could retain power for even one year.<sup>117</sup> This suggests that by 1996, when the CPN(M) launched their struggle, the democratic parties had not garnered sufficient political experience as they were still at their rudimentary stage.<sup>118</sup>

Second, the economic and social factors were important, as people’s aspirations were not met. Economically and socially it is viewed that “relative deprivation or the gap between expected and achieved well-being—can increase alienation and push groups towards violent conflict.”<sup>119</sup> State powers were invested in a few feudal elites. Also, Nepal had remained in extreme poverty and the gross national income per capita was

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<sup>115</sup> Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*, 27.

<sup>116</sup> Deepak Thapa, “The Making of the Maoist Insurgency,” in *Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace*, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 50.

<sup>117</sup> Upreti, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 42.

<sup>118</sup> Thapa, “Making of Maoist insurgency,” 38–42.

<sup>119</sup> Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 7.

U.S. \$290 in 2006. In 1996, the mid-western and far western regions were facing poverty rates at 76 percent as compared to 4 percent in Kathmandu.<sup>120</sup> There was disproportionate regional distribution of resources as the Central Region, where Kathmandu is located and the power-elite has a strong hold, was far more developed than the mid-western and far western regions. The social order was exclusionary as it classified all groups in distinct castes within the broad framework of the Hindu system.

Third, political factors, such as adopting discriminatory or exclusionary politics, increased resentment amongst marginalized groups. The 30 years of autocratic rule ended in 1990, establishing democracy and enacting a new constitution, which guaranteed civil liberties to all citizens, regardless of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe, or ideology. The new constitution established Nepal as a Hindu Kingdom, with Nepali as the official language. The constitution barred the Election Commission from registering or recognizing any political party explicitly on basis of religion, caste, community, tribe, or region.

Fourth, the perceived cultural discrimination against ethnic minorities was another cause of the conflict. The marginalized group, who had been discriminated against by the state, had hoped that the new constitution would recognize their identity based on ethnicity, language, culture, and religion. Writing on and discussing ethnic issues were discouraged during the democratic period. The state was only able to give “definitions of multiethnic and multilingual” as a form of recognition of the country’s diversity.<sup>121</sup> Social transformation that was expected by the public was ignored. Some scholars argue that when state institutions grant privileges to one group and exclude others, resentment is likely to build up. In the early 1990s, Nepal was undergoing a cultural shift that encouraged the excluded groups to engage in political activism. Whatever the possible factors which acted together as a motivator and facilitator, and caused the insurgency, the leadership of the CPN(M) was highly effective in manipulating the deprived people to strengthen its military and political fronts to launch the people’s war.

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<sup>120</sup> George Graham, “People’s War? Self Interest, Coercion and Ideology in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18, no. 2 (2007): 233, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310701400853>.

<sup>121</sup> Thapa and Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, 48.

### C. PEOPLE'S WAR IN NEPAL

According to many social movement theorists, collective mobilization is based on three factors—the structure of political opportunities and constraints; mobilizing structures; and framing strategies and tactics for mobilization.<sup>122</sup> Solely on the basis of economic matters, 38 percent of Nepal's population is extremely poor and cannot meet their basic needs.<sup>123</sup> Furthermore, legitimate political parties' inability to be inclusive and the state's entrenchment in the feudal, caste, and patriarchal institutions have led to the radicalization of economically weak and marginalized indigenous groups. These indigenous groups constitute about 37 percent of Nepal's population.<sup>124</sup> Given such socio-economic and political conditions, politics is expected to play a significant role in facilitating contending demands.

On February 4, 1996, the CPN(M)'s open political wing, the UPFN (United People's Front, Nepal), had submitted a 40-point list of demands to the government with a warning of an armed struggle if the grievances outlined in the list were not fulfilled.<sup>125</sup> The 40-point demand was for an end to foreign elements' intrusion and domination of Nepal; for a secular state free of all discrimination and oppression, with the monarchy stripped of its privileges; and for a wider range of welfare provisions consisting of social and economic reforms. As the government paid little attention to their demands, the CPN(M) laid plans for the people's war, which was a "well-tested and efficient mechanism for seizure of state power."<sup>126</sup>

The CPN(M) followed Mao's strategy of guerilla warfare and mass political mobilization in the pursuit of a communist republic. On February 13, 1996, the people's war waged by the CPN(M) caught the Nepalese people by surprise as the war was signaled by an attack on police posts in the districts of Rolpa, Rukum, and Sindhuli. The

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<sup>122</sup>Bandita Sijapati, "In Pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madhesi Identity and the Madhesh Andolan," in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Susan Hagen (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 155.

<sup>123</sup>Thapa and Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, 58.

<sup>124</sup>Lawoti, "Ethnic Dimension," 150.

<sup>125</sup>Thapa and Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, 85.

<sup>126</sup>Marks and Palmer, "Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics," 91.

CPN(M) initially followed Mao's three-stage strategy of guerilla warfare—strategic defense, strategic balance, and strategic offense. Accordingly, they mobilized the peasants and the poor in the rural areas, which presumably would surround the capital and succeed in securing their aim. On November 26, 2001, the Nepalese government declared a state of emergency, promulgated the TADO (Terrorist and Disruptive Activities [Control and Punishment] Ordinance), and declared the Maoists as terrorists.<sup>127</sup> The conflict witnessed variations in the strategy and expanded over time to include wide swaths of the countryside.

After a decade, the conflict ended through a negotiated political settlement that co-opted some of the CPN(M)'s demands. Upon signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006, the CPN(M) joined the mainstream political parties in parliament. The CPN(M) also succeeded in heading the national government after the party was declared victorious in 2008 democratic multiparty elections. Furthermore, state politics changed as the formation of political parties based on caste/ethnicity was legalized. In May 28, 2008, Nepal was declared a Federal Democratic Republic, which ended 239 years of monarchy rule.<sup>128</sup>

#### **D. LEADERSHIP**

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias “Prachanda,” was an average student in school. While studying in Patan Campus in Kathmandu, he made connections with communist leaders and was able to acquire communist literature. It was after joining an agricultural institute that he started developing his communist career by keeping a close affiliation with local communist leaders. Prachanda joined communist politics as a full-time underground

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<sup>127</sup> Michael Hutt, ed. “Monarchy, Democracy and Maoism in Nepal,” in *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 11.

<sup>128</sup> Mallika Shakya, “Nepali Economic History through the Ethnic Lens: Changing State Alliances with Business Elites,” in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990*, eds. Mahendra Lawati and Susan Hangen (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2013), 53.

activist in the 1970s, and his organization followed communist principles, quite similar to the moderate communist models.<sup>129</sup>

Weinstein argues that the expansion of the insurgency was mainly due to the highly educated and ideologically “sophisticated core of leadership members.”<sup>130</sup> Many leadership members had university degrees from abroad, except one member of the standing committee who was self-taught.<sup>131</sup> Prachanda holds a Bachelor of Science degree in agriculture. Baburam Bhattarai, considered as Prachanda’s chief ideologue and one of the members of the standing committee, holds a Doctor of Philosophy from a university in India with a dissertation on “Natural and regional issues in Nepal’s underdevelopment.”<sup>132</sup>

It is interesting to note that Prachanda was elevated to the rank of chairman quite rapidly. In 1984, at the age of 29, after leading a students’ union for three years, he was elected as a member to the Central Committee of CPN(Masal). After the split among Maoists, he associated himself with the Vaidya group. Some of the Maoists, under the leadership of Vaidya, conducted an operation code-named Sector Kanda to attack isolated police posts and blacken the faces of the king’s statues located in the capital. In the incident, a few members were arrested and the group became public. The event was criticized by the central committee members, who then raised Prachanda to the post of general secretary of the CPN(M) in 1989. He then became the chairman of the CPN(M).

The organizational hierarchy of CPN(M) under the chairman consisted of standing committee, politburo, central committee, divisional commands, regional bureaus, sub-regional bureaus, district, area, and cell committees. Prachanda is the chairman of the politburo’s seven-member standing committee and the supreme commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Prachanda has the authority to take all immediate decisions, which are generally discussed by party committees. Though he

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<sup>129</sup> International Crisis Group Report, *Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aim, Structure and Strategy* (Kathmandu and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005), 7.

<sup>130</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 303.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> International Crisis Group, 2005, 34.

holds a tight grip on the party, the party committees have the power to endorse, revise, or reject the decisions.<sup>133</sup>

Prachanda was aware of the importance of international politics and realized the importance of establishing connections with revolutionary leaders and international communist organizations in supporting its armed struggle. Prachanda was also calculative in taking risks. He was willing to take risks to prevent a split in the organization and for the survival of the organization.

### **E. IDEOLOGY**

Citing Charles Tilly, Graham notes that ideology can become salient for drawing conditions for conflict when brokers “sharpen previously blurred us-them boundaries.”<sup>134</sup> Ideology builds conflict when it constitutes a new belief to alter the social conditions of people. Based on the principles of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, the insurgency in Nepal drew inspiration from other revolutionary movements, like Peru’s Shining Path. One of the reasons for the Maoists leadership to initiate the armed struggle was disparity amongst the class system. The CPN(M) initiated its people’s war with a goal to “overthrow bourgeois democracy, defeat imperialism, abolish the feudal monarchy and establish a communist people’s republic.”<sup>135</sup> The Maoists used binary oppositions like oppressed-oppressor, proletariat-feudal, reactionary-revolutionary to incite and mobilize people for their cause,<sup>136</sup> and fanaticized promises of equality amongst rural people.

According to Amanda Snellinger, “the basis for all political agendas is political ideology,” which depends on the internal process and the organizational structures to demonstrate to what degree the theory and practice is linked.<sup>137</sup> The CPN(M) ideology

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<sup>133</sup> International Crisis Group, 2005, 34.

<sup>134</sup> Graham, “People’s War,” 241.

<sup>135</sup> Winne Gobyin, “From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoist’s Strategic and Ideological Thinking,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, (2009): 420, doi: 10.1080/10576100902831578.

<sup>136</sup> Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of Maoist Insurgency,” 17.

<sup>137</sup> Amanda Snellinger, “The Repertoire of Scientific Organization,” in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 74.

was expressed in their agenda through an appealing and populist 40-point demand.<sup>138</sup> Furthermore, the CPN(M) adopted a military and political approach simultaneously. Thus, though some scholars argue that the Maoists were involved in extensive coercion and violence, it can be argued that their ideology did not revolve around the politics of violence.

When fulfilling objectives seems to be failing, then revising strategies remains an important integral part of leadership qualities. The Maoist leadership revised their strategies and became adaptive to the changing environment to develop a “correct” ideology<sup>139</sup> on three accounts. First, the Maoist movement was a class struggle, but its leadership augmented the strength of its organization by mobilizing the ethnic line, which will be discussed in the next section.

Second, as their envisioned strategy of encirclement of the capital city was not possible, the CPN(M) leadership sought alternate means for survival. The leadership made a new master plan for carrying out a propaganda campaign in order to incite a general uprising among the bureaucracy and army.<sup>140</sup> However, this strategy did not work either as most of the bureaucrats belonged to the middle class and they did not support the CPN(M). The CPN(M) leadership could not create a cleavage within the Nepalese Army, as the army always remained united because it had a strong legacy in the formation of Nepal as a state.

Third, the CPN(M) embarked on a pragmatic path after its second National Conference in February 2001. The decisions of the conference empowered the chairman and declared that the party would adopt and follow Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the Prachanda Path. According to the Prachanda Path, the rural masses were to be complemented with urban mobilization as it called for a move “from the periphery to the center” in the form of labor and student unionism.<sup>141</sup> But in the urban areas, where the

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<sup>138</sup> See Annex III for 40-point demands in Deepak Thapa, *Kingdom under Siege*, 189.

<sup>139</sup> Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of Maoist Insurgency,” 12.

<sup>140</sup> Thapa and Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, 169.

<sup>141</sup> Shakya, “Nepali Economic History,” 74.

majority is middle class, the party lacked the necessary support from the middle class.<sup>142</sup> Their approach toward the population may be analyzed as a mixture of “ethno population centric” and coercion.

## F. POPULAR SUPPORT

The importance of insurgency thriving on popular support is established by Mao’s dictum that the population is to insurgents what water is for fish. Therefore, it is essential for insurgent leaders to devise strategies to gain popular support, as Huntington argues that the decisive aspect of revolutionary war is the “struggle for the loyalty of the vulnerable sector.”<sup>143</sup> Though there are various means of achieving popular support, addressing the grievances of the population may be one key method.

The Maoist leadership targeted the rural peasants based on Mao’s strategy in achieving its goal. Many scholars argue that addressing the grievances of rural peasants motivated the peasants, who were oppressed by the landed elites, to join the struggle. Nepal is an agrarian country with more than 80 percent of the population employed in agriculture, where majority of them are landless peasants, smallholders, or tenants. The Maoists established the rights of peasants to the land they farmed and emancipated the peasants from debt servitude.

However, the strategy attracted peasants from only a few of the hilly areas. The appeal did not succeed as expected. The tenancy arrangements between the peasants and the landed elites constrained the peasants from joining the conflict for fear of retaliation by the landed elites, and so it “reduced the costs for peasants to join the insurgency.”<sup>144</sup> Furthermore, the Maoists executing the landed elites was seen as a horrendous act by the tenants, as the legacy of landed elites and tenants had established a kind of bonded relationship between the two. The conflict was not garnering as much popular support as

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<sup>142</sup> Gobyn, “From War to Peace,” 425.

<sup>143</sup> Huntington, “Patterns of Violence,” 565.

<sup>144</sup> Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason, “Land Tenure, Democracy, and Patterns of Violence during the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1996–2005,” *Social Science Quarterly* 91, no. 4 (2010): 995.

expected, and so the CPN(M) leadership switched their strategy and supported the ethnic people's issues.

According to Weinstein, the inception of the insurgency and the attraction of people to the rebel group shape a rebel group's strategies.<sup>145</sup> In the words of Polletta: "Organizational forms ... are often appealing for their symbolic associations, and especially, their association with particular social groups."<sup>146</sup> According to Lawoti, a shift in adjusting ethnic identities in a communist revolution is not difficult as class oppression and ethnic exclusion overlap. When the two types of grievances are capitalized within a single revolution, then the movement becomes powerful.<sup>147</sup> Likewise, Graham argues that class coalition is a weak basis for collective action because people are dependent on inter-class networks for daily living, whereas ethnicity is marked by distinct social practices that result in more determinate collective action.<sup>148</sup> Thus, this view implies that if an indigenous group is attracted to a class struggle, then the class struggle becomes more powerful, but may also change its course.

According to Mansfield and Snyder, democratization brings new social groups and classes onto the political stage.<sup>149</sup> The failure of the 1990 Constitution caused ethno politics and ethno development to emerge as a new paradigm.<sup>150</sup> Prachanda was able to exploit the situation when Nepal was witnessing a rise of ethnic grievances. After the inception of democracy in 1990, the newly formed indigenous organizations required a strong platform to voice their demands. As the CPN(M) leadership raised indigenous related issues like language equality, recognition of self-determination rights, declaration of autonomous ethnic regions, support to ending Hindu state and Hindu caste chauvinism,

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<sup>145</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 11.

<sup>146</sup> Snellinger, "The Repertoire of Scientific Organization," 73.

<sup>147</sup> Lawoti, "Ethnic Dimension of Maoist Insurgencies," 136.

<sup>148</sup> Graham, "People's War," 242.

<sup>149</sup> Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and War," 387.

<sup>150</sup> Bhattachan, "Ethnopolitics and Ethnodevelopment," 36.

the indigenous groups were convinced to join the struggle. The shift to ethnic issues occurred politically in 1998 after two years of the struggle.<sup>151</sup>

The CPN(M) also garnered popular support by establishment of local committees, which were given authority to include policies for social reform—agriculture, land-reform, industry, finance, infrastructure development, education, health, social welfare, caste, women to name a few. In some areas, the CPN(M) commissioned “people’s governments” and “people’s court” that served as the de facto political authority. The Maoists slogans of equal rights for women, an end to caste oppression and exploitation, distribution of land, and provisions for raising living standards was an apparent reason for popular support in rural areas.

Furthermore, George Graham argues that CPN(M) used the strategy of spreading fear as a powerful means of control.<sup>152</sup> He claims that the CPN(M) use of indirect coercion and intimidation tactics, which used sporadic acts of violence and use of threat, ensured cooperation from the local people. During the insurgency, the Maoists abducted and kidnapped a large number of people, which according to INSEC records amounted to 85,185 victims.<sup>153</sup> Many abductees were released, but some of these people joined the movement voluntarily or under pressure after they had been indoctrinated.

In addition, the CPN(M) leadership emphasized the use of mass media for attracting local people to their cause. Cultural programs were the most important and appealing form of propaganda, which included songs, dances, dramas, poems. They also used radio, newspapers, and pamphlets as other means of media communication. In some areas they even covertly established their own Frequency Modulation (FM) stations. Amongst all various strategies applied by CPN(M) to garner popular support, the adoption of the ethnic line became the most effective. The ethnic line increased its

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<sup>151</sup> Bhattachan, “Ethnopolitics and Ethnodevelopment,” 49.

<sup>152</sup> Graham, “People’s War,” 238.

<sup>153</sup> Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, “Violent Conflict and Change: Costs and Benefits of the Maoist Rebellion in Nepal,” in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 310.

organization and created a cleavage within a democratic political party by infusing it with identity issues.

## **G. CONCLUSION**

The Maoist insurgency, which was waged by the CPN(M) in 1996, expanded and posed a threat to the unstable government. The CPN(M) leadership led the insurgency with a pragmatic approach and exploited the available political opportunities. The leadership did not adopt a dogmatic Maoist approach and was able to strike a balance in the political and social mobilization in response to the changing internal dynamics of the state. The leadership formulated strategies that best fit the organization, and adopted strategies that allowed a political approach, through which the leadership's tangible goals could be communicated. The CPN(M) leadership raised identity issues that elevated this group's strength. Thus, CPN(M) leadership applied a military and political approach while considering public support.

The CPN(M) is a crucial political actor as it falls within the "big three" political parties in current Nepalese politics. The CPN(M) has reshaped Nepalese politics and created a new dimension as it has transformed the socio-political and cultural landscape of Nepal. The next chapter will make an analysis of the two insurgencies that have been described earlier. It will analyze the variables to find practical adaptations that account for the different outcomes of the insurgencies.

#### IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SL AND THE CPN(M)

No political party can possibly lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless it possesses revolutionary theory and knowledge of history and has a profound grasp of the practical movement.<sup>154</sup>

–Mao Tse-tung

This chapter will compare two insurgencies, the Shining Path or Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Peru and the insurgency in Nepal waged by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists), CPN(M), to demonstrate their leadership approaches. The approaches will be based on variables like organizational resources—leadership, ideology, and popular support. The variables will demonstrate that one type of leadership developed on a cult of personality, applied a dogmatic military approach, and adopted violent approach in “elimination of class enemies,” whereas the other leadership style developed around experienced and moderate communists, applied “progressive ideology,” and embraced grievances of the indigenous people. This chapter will argue that one leadership style was better able to cope with challenges, which allowed the movement to survive. The chapter will facilitate an understanding of the two leaders’ variation in pragmatic approaches by analyzing whether the leadership was able to exploit opportunities.

To understand the approaches, it is necessary to consider the definitions of *pragmatic* and *leadership*. Pragmatic is defined as “dealing with matters in accordance with practical rather than theoretical considerations or general principles; aiming at what is achievable rather than ideal.”<sup>155</sup> Some scholars define leadership as the act of making a difference, which may occur in different ways but not limited to

... changing a failed strategy or revamping a languishing organization. ... [Leadership] requires us to make an active choice among plausible alternatives, and it depends on bringing others along, on mobilizing them

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<sup>154</sup> J. A. Kortze, “Party Structure and People’s War” (master’s thesis, Graduate and Research Committee of Lehigh University, 2011), 12.

<sup>155</sup> Online Oxford English Dictionary, <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/149289?redirectedFrom=pragmatic#eid>.

to get the job done. Leadership is at its best when the vision is strategic, the voice persuasive, and the results tangible.”<sup>156</sup>

From the aforementioned definitions, a pragmatic leader devises strategies that are tangible, rather than lingering in failed strategies.

This chapter will demonstrate that the two insurgencies’ styles of leadership apply pragmatic approaches unevenly, resulting in the different outcomes. The SL style of leadership relied on the cult of personality, which lacked a pragmatic approach and missed opportunities. This resulted in the collapse of the organization. In contrast, the CPN(M) style of leadership was more pragmatic and exploited available political opportunities. The CPN(M) leadership style conceived a compromise and negotiated for a political process in order to legitimize its organization. Thus, the chapter demonstrates that one leadership style was more effective than the other. This chapter will analyze pragmatic approaches on issues like decision and organization control, ideological strategies, unity of effort, negotiations, and gaining legitimacy.

#### **A. DECISION AND ORGANIZATION CONTROL**

Crenshaw argues that decisions of leaders in a hierarchical organization are critical as it is the leaders’ perception of resources, opportunities, threats, and decisions to react that determines the outcomes of a campaign.<sup>157</sup> She argues that operational decision making is conducted by small groups for security and maximum efficiency, but adds that decisions should be conducted in face-to-face discussions rather than handed down through an impersonalized hierarchy. As both the groups had a hierarchical organization, this section will compare the two insurgencies’ leadership on three accounts—decision committee, experience, and timing for initiating a people’s war.

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<sup>156</sup> Maryann Glynn and Heather Jamerson, “Principled Leadership: A Framework for Action,” *Leading with Values: Positivity, Virtue, and High Performance*, eds. Edward D. Hess and Kim S. Cameron (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 156.

<sup>157</sup> Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 466–473.

First, the SL leadership consolidated the decision-making process, but it constrained itself from seeking advice. Its Permanent Bureau of the Central Committee, the highest level of leadership, was highly compact, consisting of three members,<sup>158</sup> Guzman, Augusto La Torre Carrasco, and Elena Iparraguirre. Guzman's wife, Carrasco, alias Norah, served as the second-in-command of the organization, and after her death in 1988, Guzman married Iparraguirre and made her the second-in-command.<sup>159</sup> SL's other top-ranking members wanted familial connections to be abandoned, but Guzman solely "fantasized about being alone, surrounded by women in the Political Bureau."<sup>160</sup> Guzman had ideological differences with Norah,<sup>161</sup> and it is further speculated that Norah was killed internally for her disagreements. This confirms that whoever had disagreements with Guzman knew the consequences. Furthermore, as Guzman was the founder of the organization, there was no one to challenge his leadership from within the organization.

Second, the leadership instigated an armed struggle even though its members lacked experience in national politics. The leadership members were university educated and had participated only in provincial university politics.<sup>162</sup> Degregori argues that leadership and mid-level Senderista commanders consisted mainly of professors, university students, and teachers.<sup>163</sup> Crenshaw also notes that the SL leadership consisted mainly of radical intellectuals, composed mainly of students, who were led by a philosophy professor.<sup>164</sup> This suggests that Guzman's personalized cult supported by immature leaders lacked experience in national politics necessary to advance the conflict with military and political approaches simultaneously.

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<sup>158</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 27.

<sup>159</sup> Jaymie Patricia Heilman, "Family Ties: The Political Path Genealogy of Shining Path's Comrade Norah," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 29, no. 2 (2010): 155.

<sup>160</sup> Heilman, "Family Ties," 159.

<sup>161</sup> Guzman, "Exclusive Comments," 57.

<sup>162</sup> Marks and Palmer, "Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics," 110.

<sup>163</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 114.

<sup>164</sup> Crenshaw, "Organizational Approach," 472.

Third, the SL leadership's selection of timing to take up arms at the exact moment the military government handed power to the elected government was regressive. At this point, the legislative branch had a "sizeable contingent from the legal Marxist Left."<sup>165</sup> Furthermore, due to the reform policy by the military government, the peasants were already experiencing a shift in distribution of power and wealth.<sup>166</sup> Cynthia McClintock documents that large landholdings were transferred to peasants in Ayacucho.<sup>167</sup> As such, the SL leader did not provide the state any opportunity to bring about changes through transition. For SL, "electoral democracy was merely window dressing for the bureaucratic-capitalist state."<sup>168</sup>

In contrast, the CPN(M) leader, a hardliner, had strong control over his organization, but its leadership was influenced by moderate communists. The nine-member Politburo was assisted by 25-member Central Committee. A number of the key figures of the CPN(M) leadership had participated in national politics in an open forum.<sup>169</sup> In the 1991 general elections, the UPFN had nine members of 205 in the parliament,<sup>170</sup> making it the third largest party in parliament. Nepali Congress secured 110 members and the Nepal Communist Party (UML) secured 69. The UPFN members included one from the Eastern region (Siraha), four from the Central region (Ramechhap, Kavrepalanchowk, Lalitpur, and Chitwan), four from the Mid-west region (Rukkum, Humla, and Rolpa x 2). UPFN later joined the CPN(M). This suggests that the CPN(M) leadership was assisted by members who had some experience in handling issues at the national level.

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<sup>165</sup> Gustavo Gorriti Ellenbogen, "Latin America's Internal Wars," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 1 (1991): 93, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v002/2.1gorriti.html>.

<sup>166</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 187.

<sup>167</sup> Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," *World Politics* 37, no. 1 (October 1984): 49, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010306>.

<sup>168</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 5.

<sup>169</sup> Marks and Palmer, "Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics," 110.

<sup>170</sup> Anup K. Pahari, "'People's War' in Nepal and India," in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 196.

The CPN(M) leadership initiated the armed struggle when Nepal had already witnessed six years of an unprogressive transitional period. The 1990 democracy had generated optimism from an “ethnicization of the state,” but little was being done to shift to an inclusive democracy.<sup>171</sup> Also, the CPN(M) initiated the conflict in the mid-western region of Nepal, where much leftist activism had occurred since the 1950s.<sup>172</sup> Likewise, western Nepal was a stronghold of revolutionary communists.<sup>173</sup> The Magars, an indigenous group, who were affiliated with communism, dominated the area, though other higher-class society controlled the resources. The Magars were also a warrior group, who had a legacy of skillful fighting during the unification campaign of Nepal. This illustrates that the armed struggle was initiated where a mass was already “primed” by the state. Also, the CPN(M) leadership exploited the skills of the Magars. Furthermore, Prachanda was not a founder of the CPN(M), but rather he was elevated to the post of the chairman. This implied that the leadership post could be challenged on the basis of competition, merit, and experience.

## **B. IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGIES**

Leaders of an organization play a crucial role in balancing incentives to maintain the organization’s viability. Citing James Q. Wilson, Crenshaw argues, “The fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself,” where survival is the minimal goal for an organization.<sup>174</sup> According to her, people may not actually join an organization for fulfilling ideological goals, as it is a “tenuous connection” when ideology is ambiguous. It is leaders who manipulate the constraints and opportunities created by these non-political incentives for people’s commitment.

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<sup>171</sup> Sijapati, “In Pursuit of Recognition,” 161.

<sup>172</sup> Avidit Acharya, “The Political Economy of Violence,” in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 267.

<sup>173</sup> Upreti, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 44.

<sup>174</sup> Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 473.

The ideological commitment was the central focus of SL members,<sup>175</sup> and the commitment was believed to be “fiercely ideological.”<sup>176</sup> Degregori argues that unlike in other Latin American states, the Peruvian armed forces and the SL “treated the civilian population with equal brutality,” affecting the indigenous peasants mainly.<sup>177</sup> McClintock argues that all revolutions in Latin America were successful because they were “broad-based and ideologically tolerant,”<sup>178</sup> but the SL did not assign much importance to the broader section of the population. The main core of SL’s military strength consisted mainly of rural youth, considered an energetic and vibrant mass. SL leadership’s strategy attracted some peasants mainly of the highlands, but did not consider the coastal peasants and urban citizens.

Guzman envisioned the scope of the revolution not only to Peru, but also to a larger Latin America to include the Quechua-speaking peoples of Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Chile. Though the SL insurgency occurred during the Cold War period, the establishment of a socialist Latin America was quite an intangible objective as Guzman never sought assistance from international leftists, and he even condemned international leftists. The armed struggle continued in isolation.

Guzman used the language of violence and power against the masses as his ideological strategy. Citing Guzman, Degregori notes the relationship between the party and the SL:

The masses must be taught with convincing facts. You must drive home ideas into them. ... The masses in Peru need the direction of a Communist Party, we hope that with more revolutionary theory and practice, with more armed actions, with more popular war, with more power, we may arrive at the very heart of the class and of the people, and really win them over. What for? To serve them, that is what we want.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 196.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>177</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 22.

<sup>178</sup> McClintock, “Why Peasants Rebel,” 83.

<sup>179</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 170.

Guzman institutionalized his Gonzalo Thought through newspapers, indoctrinations, or executions.<sup>180</sup> He adopted a policy of “propaganda by the deed,” which was rounding up the traitors and opponents, subjecting them to trials, and executing them publicly. Crenshaw remarks that “propaganda of the deed” are acts of terrorism as they are different from organized collective violence that accompany strikes, demonstrations, riots, and other expressions of mass discontent.<sup>181</sup> This suggests that SL leadership applied an inflexible ideology that was based on violence and terrorism.

Turning to CPN(M), Sean DeBlieck notes that Maoism is malleable and remarks that the CPN(M) leadership adopted strategies to adapt to the changing environment.<sup>182</sup> Crenshaw argues that ideological doctrines are rarely as well formulated as ideas are because they are borrowed loosely from other theorists.<sup>183</sup> The CPN(M) leadership followed people’s war theories unevenly as it was a “divergent practice.”<sup>184</sup> The leadership’s flexible ideological approach that exploited pre-existing group affiliations, benefited the CPN(M) in terms of expanding militancy and cohesion. Furthermore, it is assumed that CPN(M) did not have an explicit and dogmatic ideology. The CPN(M) leadership conducted a military and political approach simultaneously. Applying two approaches gave the CPN(M) an alternative to make a bargain with the government. As the CPN(M) leadership perceived military victory was impossible, the CPN(M) ended the time-consuming armed conflict and entered into mainstream politics.

### C. UNITY OF EFFORT

Weinstein argues that a rebel organization performs better and benefits from cooperation and specialization with other organizations.<sup>185</sup> In El Salvador, for example, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was formed by the unification of

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<sup>180</sup> Christina Meyer, *Underground Voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru* (R-3299) (Arlington, VA: Rand, 1991), 24.

<sup>181</sup> Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 466.

<sup>182</sup> DeBlieck, “Why Mao?” 1–37.

<sup>183</sup> Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 471.

<sup>184</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 32.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

five rebel groups. The unification posed such a threat to the national government that the conflict ended after a negotiated peace accord between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government in 1992.<sup>186</sup> Now the FMLN is a major legal political party. Likewise, an example of unity of effort was demonstrated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which had the strength of 1,000 members in 1925. The CCP's association with the Kuomintang, though it was brief, expanded its strength to 59,000 in 1926, and enabled them to fight against the warlords and the Japanese imperialists.<sup>187</sup>

The SL never formulated strategies for trying to unite with other leftist groups. They rather confronted the leftists, which proved to be counterproductive for the organization. The anti-left violence focused on assassinating activists from mainly two legally recognized leftist groups—the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and United Left (Izquierda Unida, or IU). Though the assassinations of prominent Peruvian leftist figures were small in number, they had a major impact on the way the SL was perceived at home and abroad as some leftists began to cooperate with state security forces.<sup>188</sup> SL leader wanted to remain as the idealist communist leader and rejected group unity as other leftists were considered revisionists. As Crenshaw notes, “unity is much more difficult to preserve when there are rivals,”<sup>189</sup> and Guzman must have perceived that unity is difficult to preserve in leftist organizations.

Likewise, Guzman never tried to form an alliance with the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which was established in 1982 for fighting for the same objective to destroy the standing regime.<sup>190</sup> Competition between two or more rebel groups increases terrorist incidents.<sup>191</sup> Thus, the struggle between the MRTA and SL for the same resources in the same environment led to an increase in terrorist activities. The

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<sup>186</sup> Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 241.

<sup>187</sup> Galula, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 581.

<sup>188</sup> Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 570.

<sup>189</sup> Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 483.

<sup>190</sup> McCormick, *Sharp Dressed Men*, 2.

<sup>191</sup> Erica Chenoweth, “Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity,” *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 1 (2010): 16–30.

SL attacked and expelled MRTA organizations whenever they came in contact with them, especially in the coca growing areas.<sup>192</sup> The leadership must have perceived that unity could divert the focus of the armed struggle, as it might offer alternatives to the direction which SL spearheaded. The SL could have gained some of its objectives if its leader had devised strategies for unity between leftist groups.

On the other hand, the CPN(M) leader favored unity and was able to lead the party as one powerful organization. As described earlier, communists have a tendency to split; the CPN(M) leadership succeeded in avoiding the “break-up disease.”<sup>193</sup> As “all leadership takes place through communication of ideas to the minds of others,”<sup>194</sup> so at times of contentious issues, Prachanda was tactful in balancing the views of different leaders and factions, and incorporating issues in official party line. It is speculated that Baburam Bhattarai propounded a line of joining the political mainstream, which was adopted in the Chunwang plenary in 2005 in order to prevent a breakaway.<sup>195</sup> Prachanda cleverly adopted Baburam’s line in order to preserve his leadership in the organization.<sup>196</sup>

Some scholars argue that “leadership is not a position but rather a relationship,” as leaders should reach out to their members and make connections not only within their organization but also to other organization members beyond their organizational unit.<sup>197</sup> It is viewed that the response of leaders to others has a transformative impact. There was no other rebel group with which CPN(M) could compete in Nepal, but CPN(M) leadership attempted to unite other revolutionary groups abroad. Prachanda is believed to have facilitated the merger of India’s People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist

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<sup>192</sup>Carlos A. De Izcue, “Peru’s Shining Path and MRTA Analyzed with the Manwaring Paradigm,” *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 12, no.2 (2006): 52–66, doi:10.1080/09662840500063473.

<sup>193</sup> Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency,” 13.

<sup>194</sup> Glynn and Jamerson, “Principled Leadership,” 157.

<sup>195</sup> Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency,” 13.

<sup>196</sup> Munni, “Bringing the Maoists down from the Hills,” 315.

<sup>197</sup> Edward H. Powley and Scott N. Taylor, “Values and Leadership in Organizational Crisis,” in *Leading with Values: Positivity, Virtue, and High Performance*, eds. Edward D. Hess and Kim S. Cameron (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 195.

Coordination of Committee (MCC).<sup>198</sup> Furthermore, in 2004 Prachanda facilitated bringing the scattered Maoists of India into forming the Communist Party of India, CPI(Maoist),<sup>199</sup> which has become a threat to India's internal security.

According to Waldman, left-wing terrorists lack support and need to develop international connections.<sup>200</sup> The CPN(M) leaders took assistance from various communist groups in India and exploited the advantage of the open and porous borders with India. The CPN(M) conducted their activities and took shelter across the borders. International communist groups like Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), provided moral, physical, and intellectual support, and increased the Maoist influence.<sup>201</sup> It is also speculated that the Maoists received training, weapons, and ammunition from the Indian Maoist groups.

#### **D. LEVERAGE ON STATE'S ACTIONS**

Thomas Hobbes stated that it is in human nature that quarrels are caused by "competition," "diffidence," and "glory," and accordingly, competition causes men to "invade for gain."<sup>202</sup> The SL leadership considered competition with the Peruvian armed forces in terms of military power as Guzman only applied a military approach. According to the 1984 Human Rights Watch, Peru's military repression was criticized as the "abdication of democratic authority"<sup>203</sup> and was recorded as having the worst human rights violations in the world.<sup>204</sup> Guzman did not capitalize on the opportunities

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<sup>198</sup> Munni, "Bringing the Maoists down from the Hills," 321.

<sup>199</sup> Harriss, "What Is Going on in India's 'Red Corridor'?" 317.

<sup>200</sup> Waldman, "Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism," 244.

<sup>201</sup> Bishnu Raj Upreti, "External Engagement in Nepal's Armed Conflict," in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 232.

<sup>202</sup> Thomas Hobbes, "The State of Nature and the State of War," in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 78.

<sup>203</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 6.

<sup>204</sup> Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 126.

presented by Peruvian armed forces' repression; rather, the SL got entangled in indiscriminate killings of non-combatants.

Though Huntington argues that domestic wars encourage civil-military relations and demand subjective civilian control;<sup>205</sup> the Peruvian armed forces were out of civilian control, which reduced the army's autonomy and held the military accountable for human rights abuses that created a rift between the military and the civilian authorities.<sup>206</sup> In addition, a rift existed within the military in confronting the SL members—whether to continue with repressive measures or adopt developmental measures. Similarly, when President Fujimori's *autogolpe* of April 5, 1992, dissolved constitutional rule and centralized economic and political decision power in the hands of the executive branch and the armed forces,<sup>207</sup> it presented a political opportunity to the SL. The removal of democratic checks and balances in congress and the judiciary created a rift between the executive branch and other institutions of government. The SL leadership did not exploit the opportunity to appeal to the international community nor did the SL attempt to associate itself with the “abducted” democratic authorities. For example, in El Salvador, the FMLN had leveraged the abusive government policies into international sympathy for its cause.<sup>208</sup> Though the United States had supported the Salvadorian armed forces, Washington was embarrassed by the persistent human rights violations by the military and caused the United States to initiate negotiations.<sup>209</sup>

By contrast, as the Nepalese Army (NA) prevented the use of heavy repression; the Maoists used selective violence rather than indiscriminate violence.<sup>210</sup> The NA had sufficient experience in United Nations peace keeping missions, and so the army was quite aware of the “winning hearts and minds” strategy as opposed to pure repression.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Huntington, “Patterns of Violence,” 555.

<sup>206</sup> Jaskoski, *Military Politics*, 51.

<sup>207</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 161.

<sup>208</sup> Ron, “Ideology in Context,” 570.

<sup>209</sup> Porch, “Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War,” 241.

<sup>210</sup> Lawoti, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency,” 14.

<sup>211</sup> Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 105.

NA was deployed only after its barracks was targeted. As the Human Rights Watch was active in Nepal, human rights violation cases in Nepal were low as compared to Peru. Weinstein argues that the CPN(M)'s leadership was cautious in not escalating the violence, which was marked by "selective violence with attacks on police posts, military barracks, and political leaders as their dominant strategy."<sup>212</sup> Their actions did not generate widespread resistance. Nepal's government was responsible for 63 percent of those killed in the insurgency; the Maoists were responsible for 37 percent.<sup>213</sup> Thus, from a comparison of the number of deaths in the two conflicts, it is clear that Nepal's insurgency did not escalate as much as the insurgency in Peru.

### **E. NEGOTIATIONS**

Generally, two conflicting parties conduct negotiations when in a "hurting stalemate" position. Each of the parties has its own objectives for negotiations. States negotiate as a "potential exit strategy" as means to manage terrorist violence and also when the rebel group's cause is gaining legitimacy.<sup>214</sup> Insurgents use political organizations as a cover for fulfilling their goals, which "aims at achieving strategic goals such as acceptance, or tactical goals such as cease fire."<sup>215</sup> However, progress in negotiations can be made only when there is a convergence of both parties' interests and political will.

The SL pursued its goal only militarily without trying to seek political means to end the conflict. Galula documents that "a revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political."<sup>216</sup> The SL decision not to negotiate does correspond to Cronin's argument that most terrorist groups choose not to negotiate, and only 18 percent of terrorist groups have actually negotiated.<sup>217</sup> The leadership was confident that they

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<sup>212</sup> Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, 304.

<sup>213</sup> Lawoti and Pahari, "Violent Conflict and Change," 309.

<sup>214</sup> Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 125–127.

<sup>215</sup> Kerttunen, "Transformed Insurgency," 78–118.

<sup>216</sup> Galula, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," 589.

<sup>217</sup> Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 40.

could capture state power with its guerillas and never opted for negotiations.<sup>218</sup> Peru's government did not call on the SL leadership for negotiations, nor did the SL leadership declare a unilateral ceasefire. The SL leadership thus missed the opportunity for gaining through negotiations. Unlike the CPN(M), the SL could not fulfill certain covert tactical goals, and neither could it fulfill some of its objectives.

The CPN(M) opted ceasefires for covert purposes. The first ceasefire in 2001 was initiated as a "cover for military operations,"<sup>219</sup> or as a "strategic pause" to advance the campaign to a higher level.<sup>220</sup> During this ceasefire, the Maoists consolidated and trained their guerillas to launch an offensive against the Nepalese Army, and restructured their "People's Army" into a "People's Liberation Army (PLA),"<sup>221</sup> which entailed the United People's Revolutionary Council. After the formation of the PLA, the Maoists claimed that they had achieved the phase of "strategic equilibrium." In doing so, the Maoists prepared for a larger struggle against the state. After combating the Nepalese Army, a position of "hurting stalemate" was reached.

Some scholars argue that after three incidents in 2001, including the royal massacre on June 1; the formation of CCOMPOSA on July 1; and the September 11 terrorist attack in the United States, India decided to take an aggressive position against the Nepali Maoists in controlling the spread of Maoism, as it was alarming India as well. The CPN(M) continued its offensive against the NA, and enjoyed covert support from Indian territory for some time. The CPN(M) launched its offensive against the NA in November 2001 and intensified the attacks. This also demonstrates the calculated risk taken by the CPN(M) leadership.

The CPN(M) initiated the second peace talks in January 2003 for their own advantage for three reasons. First, the CPN(M) leadership wanted to reinvigorate the organization, as they started lacking resources and started facing organizational problems. Financially, it was becoming difficult to sustain the CPN(M) organization.

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<sup>218</sup> Marks and Palmer, "Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics," 106.

<sup>219</sup> Marks and Palmer, "Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics," 102.

<sup>220</sup> Lawoti and Pahari, "Violent Conflict and Change," 304–305.

<sup>221</sup> Thapa and Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, 168.

Organizationally, NA had captured and killed a large number of Maoist leaders, cadres, and sympathizers. Also, the strength of NA had expanded and this affected the recruitment for Maoist cadres.

Second, the Maoist leaders wanted to pressure the government to fulfill their demands. Their preconditions for the negotiations were that the state should withdraw the “terrorist tag,” remove the bounty that was placed on the heads of top Maoist leaders,<sup>222</sup> and to restructure Nepal by a Constituent Assembly. Though the United States did not designate the CPN(M) a foreign terrorist organization, it had included the CPN(M) on the “terrorism exclusion list” since 2003.<sup>223</sup> The word “terrorism” is “one of the most powerfully condemnatory words in the English language” that serves as a delegitimizing insult.<sup>224</sup> Moreover, as terrorism is cross border in nature, the multilateral and international community could react to combat terrorism. Perceiving the consequence, the CPN(M) leaders initiated the move just after they had assassinated the chief of the Armed Police Force to demonstrate their capabilities.

Third, the Maoists entered the second ceasefire agreement to appeal to the Nepalese people and the international community, insinuating that they had favored a way out for solving the conflict through dialogue. The CPN(M) leadership succeeded in buying time, and achieved its tactical goal of providing grounds for isolating the monarch.<sup>225</sup> This was important as it clearly defined the demands of the Maoists and paved way for future negotiations. Cronin argues that rebel groups that negotiate have a longer average life span than those who do not negotiate.<sup>226</sup> According to her, negotiations are prolonged and take several sittings, and groups who have negotiated span between 20 and 25 years. However, her theory seems not to fit in the case of CPN(M), which negotiated and had a similar life span to that of the SL, which rejected

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<sup>222</sup> Thapa and Sijapati, *Kingdom under Siege*, 167.

<sup>223</sup> Teresa Whitfield, “Nepal’s Masala Peacemaking,” in *Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace*, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 161–164.

<sup>224</sup> Richard English, *Terrorism: How to Respond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19–20.

<sup>225</sup> Lawoti and Pahari, “Violent Conflict and Change,” 306.

<sup>226</sup> Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 40–41.

negotiations. Thus, the CPN(M) leadership proved that they could innovate and adapt to counter the challenges.

## F. LEGITIMACY

Huntington argues that in class and ideological conflicts, people could choose and change sides as the key question was “Which side are you on?”<sup>227</sup> An insurgency is a struggle of the masses; therefore, it is important to devise strategies for gaining local support and to prevent the local support from changing sides. As leaders wish for ensuring the viability of an organization,<sup>228</sup> whoever retains the popular support is more likely to come out victorious. Winning popular support means gaining legitimacy.

The SL leadership was unable to build consensus in retaining the support of the peasants. Rather Guzman started losing credibility as his organization exercised coercive actions against the public. According to Stanley Milgram, if obedience to authority serves a malevolent cause “then it is transformed into a heinous sin.”<sup>229</sup> As the SL began imposing its ideology-based policies on the indigenous peasants and diverging from the local people’s concern and interest, the SL started to face resistance from *rondas campesinas*. The SL leadership expected a general uprising to support the SL, but instead it witnessed a backlash. The first “strategic defeat” came from the peasants, who were supposed to be their “natural ally.”<sup>230</sup>

Guzman believed in violence as he stated in his interview, “Revolutionary violence is what allows us to resolve fundamental contradictions by means of an army, through people’s war.”<sup>231</sup> Only 17 percent of SL victims were members of the police or military; most were unarmed civilians.<sup>232</sup> All such horrendous actions and the SL leader’s perception of all international communist states as revisionists suggest that

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<sup>227</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 38.

<sup>228</sup> Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 473.

<sup>229</sup> Milgram, “How Good People Do Bad Things,” 183.

<sup>230</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 25.

<sup>231</sup> Kortze, “Party Structure and People’s War,” 30.

<sup>232</sup> Jaskoski, *Military Politics*, 39.

Guzman never thought of legitimizing his group. This prevented the group from gaining any legitimacy domestically and from the international community. Rather, the atrocities drew international attention and sparked a national Truth and Reconciliation Commission process during 2001–2003.

By contrast, the CPN(M) leadership implemented strategies that would allow its group to gain legitimacy. Citing Rothschild, Sijapati argues that ethnic identity, “unlike other emblems of personal identity, ... has the capacity to arouse and to engage the most intense, deep, and private emotional sentiments.”<sup>233</sup> While other democratic political party leaders of Nepal did not exploit the opportunity of raising the indigenous people’s issues, the Maoist leadership raised the ethnic issues more forcefully than any other political mainstream,<sup>234</sup> and the identity issues received more attention and legitimacy.<sup>235</sup>

Furthermore, the CPN(M) gained some degree of legitimacy from the international community by allowing international organizations to operate in areas under the Maoists’ de facto control, demanding election of a constitution through a Constituent Assembly (though parliamentary parties were against such demands). The leadership also showed readiness to engage in dialogue with the United Nations, thus creating grounds for attaining legitimacy.<sup>236</sup> Moreover, the international community was against the king’s takeover of autocratic powers in February 1, 2005. The CPN(M) exploited the situation and started forming an alliance with other democratic parties in order to isolate the monarch, resulting in an agreement between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the CPN(M) in November 2005.

So, the CPN(M) leadership pragmatically started alienating the monarch, who commanded the army. The CPN(M)’s approach convinced the international community that the CPN(M) favored peace and was not a terrorist group. The leadership availed itself of the opportunity to enter into competitive politics, which indicated a permanent

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<sup>233</sup> Sijapati, “In Pursuit of Recognition,” 160.

<sup>234</sup> Susan Hangen, “Creating a ‘New Nepal’: The Ethnic Dimension,” *Policy Studies* 34, (2007): 37.

<sup>235</sup> Susan Hangen and Mahendra Lawoti, “Introduction: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal,” in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Susan Hangen (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 17.

<sup>236</sup> Whitfield, “Nepal’s Masala Peacemaking,” 161–164.

shift in their ideology. Thus, the CPN(M) emerging triumphant was not by military victory, but “owing to political foresight and strategies.”<sup>237</sup>

## **G. CONCLUSION**

The differences in the outcomes of the two insurgencies lies in the variation in the leaderships’ rationale for utilizing organizational resources, including leadership, ideology, and popular support. The SL leadership was autocratic and followed a dogmatic ideological approach in fulfilling its goals and employed extensive violence towards peasants. As the SL leader believed in power, he continued his struggle with military dominance and never called for negotiations. The group missed the opportunities that it could have derived if the organization had engaged in political approaches. The SL’s leadership proved to be a weakness as it undermined the ability of the organization to make rational decisions and to operate in the absence of the leader. As such, the SL collapsed after the capture of its leader.

The CPN(M) leadership adopted various strategies and exploited available opportunities. The CPN(M) exploited ethnic grievances and shifted the class struggle to ethnic lines to gain popular support. As the international community raised its voice against terrorism, the CPN(M) sought alternatives. In 2005, when the monarch took autocratic rule, the CPN(M) took advantage and formed an alliance with other democratic parties and joined the political mainstream. The CPN(M) even won the general elections in 2008. Thus, this chapter has demonstrated that the two insurgencies had different trajectories mainly because Guzman’s individualistic leadership prevented the SL from taking a pragmatic approach. By contrast, the CPN(M) applied military and political approaches and sought pragmatic alternatives. The choice of the insurgent leadership to retain a strategic flexibility for engaging in the political process appears to be the primary reason for the different outcomes.

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<sup>237</sup> Ashok K. Mehta and Mahendra Lawoti, “Military Dimensions of the ‘People’s War.’ Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Nepal,” in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 191.

Now that the variation of pragmatic approaches applied in the two insurgencies has been established, the next chapter addresses the major findings from the comparison of the conflicts to draw recommendations for counterinsurgency measures.

## **V. FINDINGS OF ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION**

Insurgencies have posed increasingly complex problems for weak states, which find themselves challenged by violent conflict. Since most insurgencies use terrorist tactics, such armed struggles have great significance at present. Insurgencies are often studied in order to make recommendations on foreign and defense policies in general, and on military interventions and counter-insurgent operations in particular. Moreover, insurgencies are better understood when multiple cases can be examined. This chapter will analyze the two insurgencies initiated in Peru and Nepal to enhance the broader understanding of insurgencies.

This chapter will demonstrate a general trend of such insurgencies and their impact on a state, a society, and a rebel group. The major findings of the research will facilitate in demonstrating a general trend. Furthermore, the findings will lay a foundation for the recommendations section that will inform policy makers in designing counterinsurgent strategies to end conflicts. As insurgency and terrorism overlap, these recommendations may similarly overlap in counter strategies. The chapter will also make concluding remarks on the research that will provide an overall picture of the thesis.

### **A. MAJOR FINDINGS**

This section will analyze the two insurgencies, taking into account three main actors: a rebel group, a state, and society. It will attempt to examine the interaction between these actors during an insurgency. It will also touch upon the significance of external actors during an insurgency. In doing so, it will answer a few basic questions concerning how insurgency is driven, why terrorism is incorporated into an insurgency, when violence escalates, how ethnicity affects insurgency, who becomes a major victim in a conflict, what modifications are applied by insurgents, and how insurgency ends.

Some scholars claim that class-based ideology drives socio-revolutionary conflict. However, it is observed that ideology did not have a significant role in either case examined in this thesis. Though the insurgent leaders in Peru and Nepal employed

Marxist class-based ideology, neither movement was class based. Ideology may be a driving tool for a conflict only at the beginning. Galula argues that the importance of a cause for an insurgency, which becomes an essential factor at the outset of an insurgency, gradually decreases in importance as the insurgents gain strength.<sup>238</sup> The war itself then becomes a driving tool, which forces the population to take sides. It suggests that members in an organization may have “only a slight connection with the organization’s ideological objectives.”<sup>239</sup> If an organization focuses only on its ideological objectives, it could limit the organization’s survival: “if a political system leans too far in either direction, then disaster awaits.”<sup>240</sup> This can be assumed in the SL case as they leaned too much on the extreme left.

Since class-based ideology is insignificant, insurgencies invariably incorporate terrorism in their campaigns to form a counter-state.<sup>241</sup> There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, but in general, terrorism is political in nature, involving “commission of outrageous acts designed to precipitate political change.”<sup>242</sup> Insurgencies are asymmetric warfare, which tend to meld with other forms of conflict like terrorism, ethnic struggles, separatism, class struggles, and ideological conflict.<sup>243</sup> Thus, political violence is the common factor in terrorism and insurgency as “terrorism often overlaps with guerilla violence.”<sup>244</sup> This makes insurgency a complex and dangerous threat to a state and society. Though both the movements examined here initiated a people’s war for social change, both the insurgencies employed terrorism violence in varying ways. It demonstrates that insurgent leaders are likely to take up terrorism at some point. This implies that a group, which lacks power and numerical strength as compared to the conventional state forces, will employ the dictate: “terrorism is a weapon of the weak.”

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<sup>238</sup> Galula, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 575.

<sup>239</sup> Crenshaw, “Organizational Approach,” 482.

<sup>240</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, “Was Democracy Just a Moment?” *The Atlantic Monthly* 280, no. 6 (December 1997): 64.

<sup>241</sup> Marks and Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics,” 91.

<sup>242</sup> Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 7.

<sup>243</sup> Thomas A. Marks, “Insurgency in Nepal,” *Strategic Studies Institute* (Dec, 2003): 1–40, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub49.pdf>.

<sup>244</sup> English, *Terrorism: How to Respond*, 12.

Huntington argues that terrorism is a weapon, however, which is effective not against the strong, but against the vulnerable.<sup>245</sup>

When military force is deployed against an insurgency, violence escalates, which results in a higher rate of killings. In most cases, the state police are initially mobilized. Nevertheless, when the situation is beyond their control, a state resorts to military force. The conflicts in Peru and Nepal have demonstrated that killings reach their peak after the mobilization of military force. In the case of Peru, Figure 2 demonstrates that violence skyrocketed in 1983–1984 after the Peruvian armed forces were deployed in December 1982. According to Degregori, if the SL had a “thousand eyes and thousand ears” to coerce the population, then the military was engaged in “blind repression.” With regard to Nepal, Figure 3 demonstrates that violence reached its peak in 2002 after the deployment of the NA in November 2001. Similarly, in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) case, both warring parties seemed to validate and necessitate “an aggressive response, which in turn stimulated counter-response, and so on.”<sup>246</sup> This suggests that when state military forces are deployed, aggressiveness is unleashed in both warring parties due to the “revenge” impulse that results in a high rate of killings. Though the killing reached its peak after the deployment of military forces, the numbers of those killed by the two insurgent groups varied. Thus, the rebel leaders’ attitude drives the aggressiveness.

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<sup>245</sup>Huntington, “Patterns of Violence in World Politics,” 560.

<sup>246</sup>English, *Terrorism: How to Respond*, 72.




Figure 2. Number of deaths and disappearances reported to the truth commission, Peru, 1980–2000.<sup>247</sup>




Figure 3. Reported killings related to the people's war, Nepal, 1996–2006.<sup>248</sup>

<sup>247</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 23.

<sup>248</sup> Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan, *Nepal in Transition*, 20.

The insurgent leadership's attitude towards indigenous groups impacts collective resistance, which results in the differing outcomes of insurgencies. Class-based rebellions will attempt to attract and mobilize marginalized indigenous groups by promising to address indigenous people's demands. In Peru, although the SL leader belonged to mestizo (mixed race), he and his group initially reflected well the indigenous Indian groups' grievances. However, as the party became antagonistic to local culture and traditions, the rebel group became alienated from these indigenous groups. By contrast, Nepal's Maoists embraced indigenous groups' issues. Though leaders of both insurgent groups did not belong to the indigenous groups of their respective countries, the CPN(M) had more indigenous people in its leadership than did the SL.<sup>249</sup> Nevertheless, it may be noted that the proportion of indigenous people in the leadership may have affected the variation in attitudes between these two insurgent groups and the public support they received. The SL faced collective resistance from the indigenous groups in many parts of Peru, while the CPN(M) faced collective resistance in one district of the western region, but without the involvement of the indigenous group.<sup>250</sup> This demonstrates the impact of the rebel leadership's attitude toward the indigenous group, who are affected by the overall insurgency.

The majority of the victims in a conflict are the same group for whom the insurgency is allegedly being fought. The insurgencies in both cases seemed to fight for the protection of indigenous people. The SL initiated a people's war to liberate the Quechua-speaking people from the Spanish heritage. The national census of 1993 shows the Quechua speakers did not even account for 20 percent of the population,<sup>251</sup> but they accounted for three-fourths of the dead and disappeared.<sup>252</sup> Likewise in Nepal, the CPN(M) raised the issues of the indigenous people, but it was the Magars, an indigenous group, who became victimized the most as they became "cannon fodder." Of the total

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<sup>249</sup> Lawoti, "Ethnic Dimension," 146.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid., 147.

<sup>251</sup> Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, 210.

<sup>252</sup> Ibid., 17.

casualties in 2000, about 24.2 percent were Magars.<sup>253</sup> From 1996 to 2005, of the Maoist victims killed who were identified along ethnic and caste lines, 28 percent were indigenous, while 40 percent were victims of the state.<sup>254</sup> Thus, these findings suggest that when a conflict erupts for the cause of any particular group, then the majority of deaths fall upon that group. Having examined the significance of indigenous groups as a domestic factor related to the outcome of an insurgency, it is now important to consider the influence of external actors on outcomes.

In the present century, insurgent leaders modify their campaign to encompass outside support. As has been shown previously, insurgencies tend to apply the three magic wands unevenly. Thus, Marks presents a new framework consisting of five approaches—mass, political, military, a united front, and international action.<sup>255</sup> The SL applied mainly the military element without considering outside support. In contrast, the CPN(M) leadership applied multiple approaches based on all five elements simultaneously.<sup>256</sup> This suggests that even home-grown insurgent leaders will attempt to fulfill at least some of their objectives by taking into account outside support. This also demonstrates the importance of external actors in shaping an insurgency. In doing so, it implies that the international community has a significant role in ending a conflict, whether to curtail external actors' support to insurgents or to allow insurgents to garner support.

A conflict could end in many ways, but a political approach that prevents any further splintering could be among the best options. Cronin argues that there are six patterns of ending campaigns—decapitation (capturing or killing the group's leader), entry of the group into the legitimate political process, achievement of the group's aim, implosion or loss of the group's popular support, defeat and elimination by brute force,

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<sup>253</sup> Uma Nath Baral, "Ethnic Mobilization towards Democracy and Autonomy: The Magar Perspective at the Local Level," paper presented at an international seminar on 'Constitutionalism and Diversity in Nepal, 2007.

<sup>254</sup> Lawoti, "Ethnic Dimension," 142.

<sup>255</sup> Marks, "Insurgency in Nepal," 1–40.

<sup>256</sup> Kerttunen, "Transformed Insurgency," 85.

and transition from one form to another.<sup>257</sup> The SL ended with decapitation whereas the CPN(M) entered into the legitimate political process. Thus, from a state's point of view, the entry of a rebel group into legitimate political process, implosion or loss of the group's popular support, and decapitation could be the best options. How a state could achieve these best options depends on the strategies formulated by a state, which will be discussed in the next section.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

This section will draw recommendations from research to facilitate a state in formulating counterinsurgent strategies for ending a conflict. In most cases, such recommendations will prepare military practitioners for effective engagement in strategies, operational art, and tactics against insurgencies. Since the variables used for the research were leadership, ideology, and popular support, recommendations will focus on a state's counterinsurgent strategies rather than military operations and tactics.

Counterinsurgent strategy must integrate all elements of national power. Fields related to political, security, the judiciary, finance, technology, and the international community must be integrated. Integrated approaches insulate any component from assuming authoritarian rule and facilitate combating insurgency on the same footing through a united front. An integrated approach will be effective if each of the components assumes its responsibility and contributes to bringing a society into normalcy. Throughout the 1980s, Peru lacked consistency and agreement concerning counterinsurgency policy.<sup>258</sup> The focus should be population centric to minimize insurgents' exploitation of the local population. As insurgents aim to establish a counter state, local security remains a key to restoration of normalcy. Operationally, when security forces are employed, civilian components too must be incorporated, where shared intelligence among the components becomes equally important.

Emphasis must be put on improving intelligence as it is a key element in combating insurgencies. In this research, two case studies demonstrated that even a small

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<sup>257</sup> Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 8.

<sup>258</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 54.

number of individuals can grow to challenge the state if they are committed to making a revolution, irrespective of objective conditions. Most states initially employ state police and later employ military forces to fight an insurgency. Police efficiency depends on force size, competency, loyalty towards the government, and backing from other branches of government such as the judiciary. In such environments, intelligence must be collected and analyzed from the beginning of an insurgency. Information must be coordinated and disseminated in a timely manner. Furthermore, domestic laws should be reviewed with prompt adaptation of the judicial system. Judicial powers should be provided to intelligence agencies. Analytical intelligence techniques will prevent unnecessary deaths, which will generally thwart a state from adapting repressive measures.

State repression or defeating insurgents by brute force may have repercussions and the death toll will be high. In Peru, the state's repressive measures increased human rights violations. Sometimes a strategy of over militarization can end a conflict as in Sri Lanka, but at the cost of human lives. The military's defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 left nearly 30,000 maimed and over 20,000 Tamil civilians killed.<sup>259</sup> Therefore, the lesson is to deploy the military if it is cautious in its military actions; otherwise, the cost could be heavy in terms of lives lost. Security forces deployed should be a neutral force, so that they do not take sides. Also, the ad hoc deployment of forces must be avoided; deployment of forces should be integrated into an overall strategic approach. Furthermore, security forces must stick to rules of engagement and be held accountable for their actions, which may be attained by a mechanism of civilian control.

A state must reform the military to have a civilian control mechanism even in times of emergency. In the case of Peru, the democratic government failed to develop mechanisms of civilian control and oversight of the military's behavior, allowing for complete military autonomy over counterinsurgency matters.<sup>260</sup> This led to a "dirty war,"

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<sup>259</sup> Neil De Votta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separation in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 6 (2009): 1021–1051, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2009.49.6.1021>.

<sup>260</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 54.

which led to thousands of killings. In an emergency, controlling the army in terms of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary may be difficult. However, respecting the orthodox legal framework and adhering to democratically established rule of law should be a general rule. Mechanisms like internal and external control should be exercised which could be in the form of a monitoring team, an observer team, human rights organizations, civil society, and the media. Such organizations should act impartially and not incite other movements.

Ethnic movements or violent ethnic organizations must be prevented from joining rebels during an insurgency. The support of ethnic or indigenous groups could transform the nature of an insurgency. Though the insurgent leaderships' class or caste identification did not matter much, the support from indigenous groups could make a rebel organization more formidable than a pure class or ideological insurgency. Governments should not alienate indigenous groups but rather address their grievances and the underlying root problems and causes of these grievances. Therefore, governments must win the hearts and minds of indigenous groups by considering socio-economic-political reform and winning the confidence of the leadership of such groups.

If the sustenance of violence is partly dependent on key leaders, then drawing those leaders toward politics for a more peaceful means will be vital to ending a conflict. In the case of Nepal, an opportunity was provided to the CPN(M), as both the state and the rebel group negotiated. Also, in the case of the IRA, although the state did not want to negotiate initially, ultimately negotiations ended the conflict. This suggests that negotiations are one of the peaceful means of ending a conflict. In Peru, just as the SL leadership never sought negotiations, the state also never provided an opportunity to negotiate. The state believed in repression. Therefore, from a public perspective, to maintain credibility and confidence, a state must bring the insurgent leadership to negotiation terms. Furthermore, a state must carefully analyze insurgent groups' tangible as well as covert objectives for negotiating. However, if peaceful means is unattainable, other options should be sought for ending conflict.

Decapitation increases the probability of conflict termination if the insurgent leader is a founding member of the insurgent organization. It is likely that there will be

no one to challenge leadership of a founding leader. In decapitation, arresting not killing a leader may be more effective in damaging a group. First, it reflects that the leader is a criminal and so he can be tried publicly in court, which will determine his fate legally. Second, interrogation of the leader may provide valuable information on the organization. Third, keeping the leader in isolation demoralizes the group. However, sometimes arresting a leader may be a disadvantage as the rebel group may use the imprisoned leader as a “bargaining chip.” Thus, a state must analyze the types of liability that it could face if it opts to capture an insurgent leader.

Moreover, some states may be unable to implement such means to ending a conflict. In particular, newly established democracies may be diverted by internal conflict if democracy is not consolidated. In 1992, for example, in response to Western government pressure, the Rwanda regime established a multi-party system, which was transformed into a coalition government. However, the new political parties were ethnically driven, which ultimately led to the genocide in 1994.<sup>261</sup> Similarly, both Nepal and Peru attained democracy, but were plunged into an armed struggle. Both movements challenged the premise as stated by Goodwin and Skocpol, “Ballot box ... has proven to be the coffin of revolutionary movements.”<sup>262</sup> If a newly formed government is not geared up to adopt democratic practices, some amount of time and experience is required to train the leaders at the earliest—before democracy is declared or immediately after declaration of democracy. In such transition cases, “the cure is probably more democracy, not less,” and that rules for democracy should be “go fully democratic, or don’t go at all.”<sup>263</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Kaplan, “Was Democracy Just a Moment?” 60.

<sup>262</sup> Madhav Joshi, “Between Clientelistic Dependency and Liberal Market Economy: Rural Support for the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010), 92.

<sup>263</sup> Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” 392.

### C. CONCLUSION

Insurgencies are a form of asymmetric conflict, which are initiated to overthrow an existing regime. This makes insurgencies a complex and dangerous threat to the strategists who must deal with them. Dealing with an insurgent group depends on rebel leadership as it plays a vital role in shaping an insurgency. Leaders of rebel groups differently manipulate the “oppressed group” and react to a state in trying to transform a society and establish new democracy. This was demonstrated in the Shining Path or Sendero Luminoso (SL) movement of Peru and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal waged by the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)M. Both groups employed terrorist tactics in trying to fulfill their goals. It is argued that terrorists cannot fulfill their strategic objectives.<sup>264</sup> They may be able to fulfill only certain goals. This was demonstrated by the two insurgent groups, both of whom were declared terrorists, as they could not establish their strategic goal—their envisioned “new democracy.” As the CPN(M) was pragmatic, it was successful in fulfilling certain objectives. However, this study illustrated, pragmatic approaches adopted by insurgent leaders may fulfill some of the insurgents’ goals. As leadership of the two insurgent groups applied approaches unevenly, the outcomes of their respective conflicts differed.

The SL leadership pursued an inflexible ideology in a campaign to capture state power. The leadership applied rigid adherence to Maoist ideals and a military approach in a people’s war that was initiated in 1980. Moreover, the leadership exercised and developed a cult of personality that failed to exploit available opportunities. The SL leader, Guzman, believed in defeating the regime militarily and never sought a political approach. Furthermore, the insurgents continued to rely on terrorist violence. In fact, Burt describes the Shining Path as a “group of demented psychopaths engaged in violence for violence’s sake.”<sup>265</sup> The act of violence squandered the popular support that the group had garnered. Moreover, the leadership continued its campaign in isolation without considering the international context. As such, the SL collapsed after the capture of its leader in 1992.

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<sup>264</sup> English, *Terrorism: How to Respond*, 112–113.

<sup>265</sup> Burt, *Political Violence*, 12.

By contrast, CPN(M) leadership demonstrated pragmatic politics in an insurgency that was initiated in 1996. The leadership was flexible in ideology and adopted a combined military and political approach. The leadership took advantage of political opportunities for the organization's survival, as moderate communists directed and assisted the leadership. The CPN(M) leadership exercised adaptability in response to the limitations, constraints, and changing environment. Furthermore, the CPN(M) did not pursue indiscriminate violence, but rather embraced the indigenous people's issues. The conflict ended after a peace agreement was signed between the state and the CPN(M) in 2006. The CPN(M) joined political mainstream politics and became victorious in the 2008 elections. The CPN(M) leadership applied a pragmatic approach, whereas the SL leadership applied a dogmatic approach that resulted in the difference of outcomes. The study of such rebel leadership approaches can guide policy makers in formulating counterinsurgency strategies.

Counterinsurgency strategies are devised to end a conflict. As leaders of rebel groups have personalities guided by various principles, it is a state's role to study the leadership approaches to formulate a viable approach to end a conflict. In most cases, insurgencies incorporate terrorism, which causes fear among the population. Therefore, a state must focus on bringing the situation to normalcy, which can be achieved by winning the hearts and minds of the population. Therefore, states should formulate efficient population-centric rather than repressive strategies in countering insurgency. Though there are various strategies to ending a conflict, states can end conflicts relatively peacefully with a political approach.

In the insurgencies described, many scholars argue that Peru's Shining Path will re-emerge, as it is still functional. They argue that financial support from the illegal drug trade will allow the SL to re-emerge. Similarly, some scholars are skeptical about CPN(M)'s shift to political cooptation. They argue that the CPN(M)'s move was a calculated one to consolidate power only. They foresee Nepal's peace settlement of 2006 as unable to lead to lasting peace since CPN(M) is hungry for power. Whether the SL will re-emerge, or CPN(M)'s move was a genuine step towards peace or a calculated move to consolidate power, only history will tell us.

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