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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE SMO-COIN NEXUS: USING SOCIAL MOVEMENT
THEORY TO DEMOBILIZE INSURGENCY**

by

Robert Steve Lewis
Mark D. Metzger

June 2009

Thesis Co-advisors:

Doowan Lee
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**THE SMO-COIN NEXUS: USING SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY TO
DEMOBILIZE INSURGENCY**

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ABSTRACT

Victory in irregular war and insurgency is not simply a matter of combat actions and civic aid; it is a matter of population mobilization. Winning the sympathy of the population will do little good for either the state or the insurgent if he fails to mobilize the population in a manner that allows him to reap the resources and legitimacy that either side needs to win. A winning strategy by the state must be one that either limits the insurgent's ability to mobilize the population or allows the state to mobilize the population more efficiently than the insurgent. The use of social movement organizations offers an effective method for insurgents to mobilize a population during an insurgency. In many cases, the use of social movement organizations is more efficient as a mobilization strategy than are other strategies such as coercion or persuasion. A strategy by the state that disrupts the insurgent's ability to use a sympathetic social movement organization offers the state an effective means to limit the resources available to the insurgents. In these cases, the state can also create its own social movement organizations to allow it to mobilize the population effectively in support of the government.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The world is currently faced with a variety of insurgencies, civil wars, separatist movements, fragmenting states, and other violent non-state challenges to existing states. The number of these internal wars has steadily increased since the end of World War II.¹ This trend has become extremely important to the United States and its allies with the rise of globalization and the inter-conductivity of the global economy. Conflicts around the world can rapidly impact citizens in the west.² This conflict or “irregular war” presents a challenge that the U.S. has had difficulty coming to terms with as many experts believe it exemplifies the kind of conflict the U.S. is facing for the foreseeable future.³

Irregular war, as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.07, is “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations(s).”⁴ In an irregular war, the state has lost its monopoly on violence⁵ and on the governance of its population.⁶ This “war amongst the people”⁷ is a struggle by both state and non-state actors to employ strategies that gain influence and control over the “relevant population(s);” thus, the key question in an

¹ J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2008* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007).

² The argument that the world is more connected, and thus, more susceptible to the effects of internal conflict and irregular war is most notably presented by Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (Osceola: Zenith Press, 2006); John Robb, *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization* (Hoboken: Wiley, 2008); Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000).

³ Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. to Raise ‘Irregular War’ Capabilities,” *The Washington Post*, December 4, 2008.

⁴ Department of Defense, Directive, *DoD Directive 3000.07 Irregular Warfare (IW)* (Washington, D.C.: DoD USD(P), 2008).

⁵ Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 192.

⁶ Sir Frank Kitson describes how insurgents displace the influence of the state over the population either through subversion of the state-population relationship or through the application of force. Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 1974), 32.

⁷ Paraphrasing General Rupert Smith. Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (New York: Knopf, 2007), 280.

irregular war is ‘*how does one gain influence and control over a population?*’⁸ Gaining control and influence over the imponderable mass of a population, whether in one’s own country or to aid an ally, may seem a Sisyphean task;⁹ one in which small gains are quickly destroyed through the shifting attitudes of the population. Day after day, the state seeks to wrest control of the population from the insurgent, balancing protecting the population without engaging in excessive repression.¹⁰

Insurgency, one form of irregular warfare, has inspired strategists to create methods for influencing a population from a soft “hearts and minds” strategy¹¹ to a more coercive strategy based on force and the threat of violence.¹² The U.S. Army’s recent counterinsurgency doctrine has recognized the central role the population plays in an insurgency, “At its core, COIN (counter-insurgency) is a struggle for the population’s support.”¹³ Furthermore, they have discovered what Mao, McCuen, Thompson, and

⁸ “The battlefield in COIN is in the people’s minds” and “irregular wars are won or lost in the minds of the local people. If we do not understand what is in those minds, what they value and how much they value it, success secured against terrorists and other insurgents will most likely be only temporary.” Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 22, 25.

⁹ A task that is pointless and unrewarding—<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sisyphus>.

¹⁰ “The abuses brought about by “search-and-destroy” operations by the military against the Muslim secessionists contributed to the collective outcry of the Moro people to rise in arms against the government.” SOT Center, AFP, *FM 3-5-2 SALA’AM Manual* (Quezon City: SOT Center, Armed Forces of the Philippines).

¹¹ The term “hearts and minds” is generally credited to Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner during the insurgency in Malaya from 1948-1960. Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004). Although Templer did not use the phrase to describe a purely persuasive strategy, the term has come to represent a “gratitude” strategy which uses nice behavior and “gifts” in the form of civic action projects to encourage the population to feel gratitude. Seeking gratitude as a strategy is rarely successful as it does little to alter the population’s existing loyalties and it is easily overcome by enemy coercion. The use of persuasion as a mobilization method will be explored in Chapter III.

¹² Several phrases are often used to exemplify the coercive strategy such as “if you have them by the balls then their hearts and minds will follow.” The phrase is attributed to a member of Congress during a discussion about the war in Vietnam in response to the “hearts and minds” strategy. Ralph Keyes, *The Quote Verifier: Who Said What, Where, and When* (New York: St. Martins Press, 2006). Another phrase used during the first years of the Iraq war is “I did not come here to hand out bread I came here to hand out lead!” Coercion as a mobilization method will be addressed in Chapter III.

¹³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), Chapter I, 28.

Galula¹⁴ already knew—that control and influence go to the organization that can best mobilize the population.¹⁵ Simple popular sympathy or fear does little to forward the cause of the insurgent or the state.¹⁶ Sympathetic but dormant people watch passively as one side slaughters the other or as one group slowly disintegrates from lack of resources and recruits. Mobilization of the population offers access to resources, potential political pressure, and means to gain legitimacy. More critical than how to win over the population is how to mobilize the population. In an internal war,¹⁷ whichever side can mobilize the population most efficiently is most likely to be victorious. According to FM 3-24, “The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy.”¹⁸ Whether the method is through coercion, persuasion, or some other method, the goal is to mobilize the population better than the opponent.¹⁹

A. CONCEPTS

In the study of insurgencies, the role of the population is usually cited as the essential component for victory for either side.²⁰ The phrase “the population is the center

¹⁴ Much of the U.S. Army’s current counterinsurgency doctrine as expressed in Field Manual 3-24 is based on the work of these authors. Specific points of these books are referenced as the thesis progresses, but in general, the classics are Tse-tung Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1961); Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 1974); David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964); John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1966); Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1966).

¹⁵ Tse-Tung Mao, *On Protracted War* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1967), 60.

¹⁶ David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Seminar 07,” Briefing, *Small Wars Center of Excellence*, September 26, 2007, <http://babylonscovertwar.com/Analysis/COIN-Kilcullen%20Small%20Wars%20Center%20of%20Excellence%20Seminar.pdf>, slides 19, 54 and 67.

¹⁷ Internal war is used by FM3-24 to describe certain conflicts that fall into the irregular war category such as insurgency, civil war and separatist conflicts. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*.

¹⁸ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, Chapter 1, 8.

¹⁹ The U.S. Army identifies five mobilization means—persuasion, coercion, reaction to abuses, foreign support and apolitical motivations. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, Chapter I, 8. This thesis will explore the utility of social movement organizations as an additional mobilization means.

²⁰ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, 8.

of gravity” is used often but it is difficult to translate into operational application.²¹ Thus, the counterinsurgent seldom takes full advantage of the potentially crucial role of the population in defeating an insurgency even though the underlying principle is well-known.

While analyzing/researching how the state or the insurgent mobilizes the population to gain victory, the authors noticed a potential trend: many successful insurgencies have utilized social movement organizations to organize and mobilize a population.²² In many cases, the military component of an insurgency is physically separate from population centers but still manages to maintain a strong connection to the population. If an insurgent needs to draw upon the population for resources, information, and recruits,²³ what is he doing to gain control or influence of the population? In other words, how does an insurgent mobilize a population to support the insurgency? This thesis examines whether the use of social movement organizations offer insurgencies a relatively more efficient method of population mobilization. In many classic insurgencies, the insurgents created a social movement organization to fill the political space between armed insurgent member and the civilian population. From the peasants associations created by Mao Tse-Tung in his fight against the nationalists in China²⁴ to

²¹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, xii, and reinforced through authors’ experience. In one author’s experience, a “hearts and minds” population-centric strategy relied heavily on hunting high value targets HVT or wanted terrorist leaders. The logic being that the people’s hearts and minds would change once the insurgent leaders were eliminated.

²² This trend was first observed by the authors during deployments in Southeast Asia and the Middle East and reinforced during the study of insurgencies at NPS. Organizations such as the Communist New People’s Army NPA in the Philippines appear to gain substantial benefit through their association with a variety of sympathetic social movement organizations.

²³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, Chapter I, 28; Mao, *On Protracted War*, 60, 105.

²⁴ Tse-tung Mao, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1954), 34-35.

the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam²⁵ to the current social organizations supporting Hezbollah in Palestine²⁶ and the Mahdi Army in Iraq,²⁷ social movements organizations have been instrumental in mobilizing the population.

The subtle but substantial difference between a strategy based on “population is the key to victory” and “mobilization of the population is the key to victory” is important to note. The recognition that the insurgent or the counterinsurgent must mobilize a portion of the population provides a more easily understood idea/principle/concept with which to craft a strategy.²⁸ Knowing the methods used by an insurgent to mobilize the population can be used by the counterinsurgent to create more appropriate tactics to fight with. Trying to understand how an insurgent “wins” the population is so vague, it is almost without value. It is more practical to analyze how an insurgent mobilizes the population. This can be accomplished through understanding the environment and good intelligence.

Systematic intimidation, co-optation of traditional leaders or organizations, and exploitation of social movements are all methods the insurgent uses to mobilize a population continually and can be countered by the counterinsurgent through the creation of town councils, village defense teams, and farmers’ cooperatives. The distinction between the insurgent’s methods and the counterinsurgent’s methods is important and is explored in depth.

Given the observation noted earlier that many insurgencies, which exploited social movement organizations had been successful leads to the fundamental question: Does the creation or co-optation of social movement organizations offer insurgent organizations a relatively efficient method to mobilize the population? If this is true, then

²⁵ Nguyen Van Thieu, “Our Strategy for Guerilla War,” in *Guerilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 310-316; specifically the various worker coopeartives that were part of the NLF.

²⁶ Asef Bayat, “Social Movements, Activism, and Social Development in the Middle East,” *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development* (November 3, 2000): 15.

²⁷ Anthony Cordesman and Jose Ramos, “Sadr and the Mahdi Army: Evolution, Capabilities, and a New Direction,” in the Google Scholar database, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, August 4, 2008, 3.

²⁸ According to FM 3-24, “The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy.” Thus, mobilization of the population not simply winning their affection is the true objective. The concept of mobilization will be expanded upon in Chapter II.

it presents a second question: Can the state use the fact that insurgencies gain a relative advantage through their use of social movement organizations as a point of weakness and thus target the social movement organization as a method of weakening the insurgency?

Mao points out that a movement is required to mobilize and sustain the masses, “if the masses alone are active without a strong leading group to organize their activity properly, such activity cannot be sustained for long or carried forward in the right direction, or raised to a higher level.”²⁹ Essential to this analysis is the concept of relative efficiency in mobilization. The insurgent need not always select the most efficient method to mobilize the population, merely a method that provides him greater mobilization utility than his opponent. If the insurgent selects the most efficient mobilization available to him and if done using social movement organizations, then by taking this option away from the insurgents, the state can force the insurgency into a more expensive, less efficient method of mobilization. The side with a more efficient method can mobilize a greater number of the population, thus reaping more resources. To follow this analysis further, if the state can limit the insurgency’s ability to use the social movement organizations to mobilization and simultaneously empower their own social movement organizations, then the state can potentially de-mobilize and then counter mobilize the population.

In cases where insurgents use a social movement organization, it is most probably because the insurgents believe that these movements are the most efficient means available to mobilize the population. The authors are assuming that an insurgency is acting rationally and selecting the most efficient method based on its understanding of the environment and its available resources. If a nascent insurgency selected an inefficient method of mobilizing the population, then logically it would not be able to grow and would quickly be defeated. In cases where insurgencies use social movement organizations to mobilize the population, an effective strategy for the state is to demobilize the social movement organization; thereby, isolating the insurgency and limiting the insurgency’s ability to gain needed resources from the population, and thus,

²⁹ Mostafa Rejai, *On Revolution and War: Mao Tse-tung 1893-1976* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 349.

leading to its collapse. To determine what such a strategy entails, it is essential to seek a framework and tools to analyze a social movement organization. Fortunately, these exist in the form of modern social movement theory propagated by scholars such as Douglas McAdam and Charles Tilly. The authors hypothesize that the state can use social movement theory to better analyze and eventually demobilize an insurgency's sympathetic social movement; thereby, leading to the defeat of the insurgency.

B. DEFINITIONS

It is helpful to define some of the common terms used to state the argument. Insurgency can have a variety of definitions, but in this thesis, the definition used is from the U.S. Army's new counterinsurgency field manual (FM) titled *Counterinsurgency FM 3-24* and based on the Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Publication 1-02.³⁰ *Insurgency* is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government using subversion and armed conflict. *Internal war* is a concept mentioned frequently in the U.S. Army's new Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) 3-24, but without a definition.³¹ Internal war as used by FM 3-24 is a broad concept that includes wars between competing indigenous groups within a country. This concept includes the possibility of external influences, but the main protagonists are indigenous. FM 3-24 also postulates that internal war, which includes insurgency, civil war, and separatist movements, is a struggle to mobilize the population. A *social movement* is a rational attempt by excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through non-institutional means.³² Thus, *social movement organization* are a subset of social movements with a more formalized organizational structure and created to allow the direct participation of constituents with consensus built around common goals, which are usually oriented on making claims against the authorities.³³

³⁰ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 37.

³³ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 136.

C. METHODOLOGY

The historical success of insurgencies using social movement organizations as well as the number of modern insurgencies that have a relationship with sympathetic social movement organizations led the authors to inquire—are these insurgencies gaining a comparative advantage in their mobilization competition against the state through the use of these social movement organizations? To examine this phenomenon, this thesis will first explore the insurgency environment to determine what role the population plays in an insurgency, why mobilization competition is important, and what elements of the environment an insurgency desires to alter to give it a better chance of success. Since the concept of mobilization and social movement organizations are elements of social movement theory, this thesis will next use social movement theory as a tool to analyze what a social movement organization does and how it may assist in mobilization of the population. Finally, this thesis will examine four case studies in which social movement organizations played an important role in the course of an insurgency in order to examine whether these social movement organizations provided the insurgency with any real benefits.

1. Insurgency Environment

First, the current counter insurgency (COIN) theory is explored. Most COIN theorists agree that the role of the population is critical in a counterinsurgency; however, in this thesis, classic and modern COIN theory is used to examine and help define exactly what role the population plays in an insurgency and what kind of influence is really required by the state or the insurgent to harness the power of the people. What does it mean to mobilize a population and what ways have successful and unsuccessful insurgents used in the past? In addition, COIN theory is used as a lens to help understand the form of an insurgency. Why does the insurgency need popular support and how does it transform popular support into power that defeats the state? In the end, the authors confirm three assumptions that helped develop their hypotheses. These assumptions are as follows.

- An insurgency is a political and social struggle. It can be thought of as a competition fought through the population to gain social and political space.
- Mobilization is the tool that allows competitors in this struggle to gain social and political space.
- Mobilization of the population is a continuous and tailorable process that may be accomplished by a variety of methods. The competition for political and social space generally goes to the competitors that best or most efficiently mobilize the population.

2. Social Movement Theory

Modern social movement theory (SMT) is examined to determine its usefulness to understanding social movement organizations. This examination seeks two outcomes: first, how can social movement theory be used to understand what role a social movement organization would play in a relationship with an insurgency, and, second, how can the tools of social movement theory be utilized to develop a method to demobilize the participants of the social movement organization. Although every social movement organization is different, some general principles are gained to develop a demobilization strategy.

3. Hypotheses

The combination of the examination of the insurgent environment and the use of social movement theory to explore the role that social movement organization play in popular mobilization will assist in examining two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is: Use of social movement organizations by insurgencies as a tool for popular mobilization in general offers the insurgency a relatively efficient method to mobilize the population. If this hypothesis is true then a second hypothesis becomes apparent: If an insurgency used a social movement organization as a tool to mobilization a population, then the state can employ strategies that limit the effectiveness of the social movement organizations, which would thus limit the insurgency's ability to mobilize the population. The insurgency would lose ability to mobilize or be forced to use a less efficient method of

mobilization. In order to examine the veracity, and thereby the utility, of these two hypotheses, this thesis will examine four case studies in which social movement organizations played an important role in the evolution of an insurgency.

4. Case Studies

The elements of social movement theory are then applied to analyze four case studies in which social movement organizations have played an active role in an insurgency. The connection between the social movement organization and the insurgency is demonstrated and the effects of state actions on the social movement organization on the insurgency are examined. It also shows that in cases where the state took action to demobilize the social movements, this had second order effects that damaged the insurgency, and conversely, when the state failed to address the social movement organization, the insurgency prospered.

These cases have been selected for their homogeneity in independent variables, as each is fairly comparable in terms of extraneous variables, and for maximum variation on the dependent variable. The case of the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java, Indonesian from 1948 to 1962 was chosen because it offered an example of an insurgency that developed a strong relationship to a social movement organization and one in which the government eventually targets the social movement organization with much success. The current Jemaah Islamiyah movement offered a case in which the government has yet to target the social movement and the insurgency persists. By looking at the Ba'athist overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, a state's failure to demobilize a movement is seen and more prudent actions the state might have taken are examined. Finally, in the analysis of the Sunni insurgency, a partially successful demobilization is shown. The authors look at what the state has done to disband the movement and what future actions the state might take to demobilize the Sunni insurgency further.

The thesis concludes by connecting the theoretical and empirical analysis to develop a strategy to demobilize a social movement organization and make specific policy recommendations. The authors provide the counterinsurgent tools to both demobilize and counter-mobilize a population.

II. INSURGENCY

A. INTRODUCTION

The two hypotheses, in proof of which the authors seek to explore the relative efficiency social movement organizations can provide to insurgencies and the utility that the state can gain through demobilizing social movement organizations as a method to diminish the insurgency, first requires an attempt to describe the insurgency environment and its characteristics. This chapter examines the insurgency environment and attempts to quantify what the insurgent and the state are attempting, as well as what provides each side an advantage and what leads to victory.

1. An Insurgency

Insurgency, as described by the U.S. DoD, is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government using subversion and armed conflict.³⁴ All sides³⁵ in an insurgency seek to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population while diminishing the perceived legitimacy of the opposing side.³⁶ An insurgency movement generally consists of a core of leaders supported by intermediate leaders that comprise the political cadre and military leadership. The balance of the movement consists of a matrix of supports and auxiliaries.³⁷ The movement then must work to enhance its own legitimacy and ability to influence and control the population while simultaneously working to

³⁴ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001), 268.

³⁵ An insurgency is not limited to only one challenger at a time. There are frequently a variety of insurgencies at once. Although this thesis and many of the references refer to the insurgent state interaction, this does not presuppose that there is only one insurgency in the environment. David Kilcullen calls the environment a conflict eco-system and it includes a variety of insurgents, criminals and other challengers to state influence. The population is a complicated environment composed of ethnic groups, tribes, villages, neighborhoods, towns, cities, temporary alliances, key influential communications and formal and informal leaders. The environment that Dr. David Kilcullen refers to as the “conflict ecosystem” requires intensive analysis but for the purposes of this thesis, it is referred to as the population or the civil terrain.

³⁶ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), cp 1, 2-3.

³⁷ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, cp 1, 11.

diminish the states legitimacy and ability to control and influence the population.³⁸ A prominent French counterinsurgency expert during the 1950s and 1960s and author that heavily influenced the U.S. Army's current counterinsurgency doctrine is David Galula. He argues that for the insurgent to change the perception of legitimacy of the state in the minds of the population, the insurgent must have some mechanism to maintain contact with the population. The insurgents then must preserve a strong link to the population³⁹ with which they will attempt to leverage the population's grievances and any weakness in the state.⁴⁰ Through these links to the population, the insurgents work to diminish the state's legitimacy.

2. A Social/Political Struggle

An insurgency conducts his competition for legitimacy through a struggle to gain control of social and political space.⁴¹ FM 3-24 further describes the insurgency environment as the struggle to gain political power: "Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate."⁴² The political power that FM 3-24 refers to is gained through the control and influence of the socio/political space. The struggle then, as described by FM 3-24, is one not to gain or control physical terrain but to control political and social space. In the words of FM 3-24, it is, "an organized, protracted

³⁸ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, cp 1, 7.

³⁹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, 49.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁴¹ **Political space** as defined by Nic Cheesman refers to the arena within which political actors engage in political activities in the absence of coercive pressure. These arenas can be both formal and informal and include influence on the formal and informal institutions that connect the population to governing bodies. Nicholas Cheeseman, "Introduction: Political Linkage and Political Space in the Era of Decolonization," *Africa Today* (2006): 8; Kumar Ramakrishna defines *political space* as the level of sympathy or legitimacy a political actor can create from his/herself. Kumar Ramakrishna, "Countering Radical Islam in Southeast Asia," in *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*, ed. Paul J. Smith (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 2005), 153. Taken together, this offers a definition for *political space* as the level of legitimacy and influence that a political actor creates for him or her to participate in the political dialog and the process of decision making of a state or within a population. This legitimacy thus offers the political actor some level of freedom from repression. **Social space** is similar as it is based on a level of legitimacy and influence an actor has created for him or her to participate in a social dialogue and within the matrix of relationships that define how individuals and groups relate to each other.

⁴² Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*.

politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”⁴³

Galula casts insurgency as “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”⁴⁴ The intermediate objectives he highlights are the accumulation of control or influence of the socio/political space, which supports the growth of the insurgency and the decrease of the state’s control. As an example, the simple discussion of the perceived grievances of the population may offer the insurgent greater political space. If the state is unwilling or unable to address the grievances, it may be understandably reluctant to discuss the matter. That vacated role, which the insurgency fills in by encouraging the voicing of the grievances of the population, allows it to displace some of the state’s political and social space.⁴⁵

One of the most famous insurgency strategists is Mao Tse-Tung, the Chinese guerrilla leader who fought the Chinese nationalist government and the Japanese occupying army through most of the first half of the 20th century and eventually defeated both to become premier of China. Mao saw insurgency as a political competition in which violence was sometimes necessary if it supported a political objective. Violence or military activities without a political objective were useless or counterproductive.⁴⁶ Political activities are the reason the insurgency movement exists.⁴⁷ These definitions taken together provide a picture of an insurgency as a protracted struggle to gain control of a social space through violent political competition.

⁴³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, cp 1, 1.

⁴⁴ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, 4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 18-24.

⁴⁶ Although the use of violence is a defining characteristic of an insurgency, it does not limit the insurgency from using non-violent methods as well. In fact, Mao argues that military action and violence should only be used when the action has a direct impact on the socio/political space.

⁴⁷ Tse-tung Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 88-89.

B. THE ROLE OF THE POPULATION (BROTHER CAN YOU SPARE A DIME—AND YOUR OLDEST MALE CHILD?)

This description of the insurgent struggle indicates that the population is the focus of the struggle and this argument is supported by a variety of insurgency theoreticians. The population is the objective of the struggle.⁴⁸ Mao argues, “Because guerilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.”⁴⁹ Mao continues to argue, “Without question, the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people”⁵⁰ and that “weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, which are decisive.”⁵¹ In his most famous quote, Mao states that, “[T]he guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.”⁵² Galula supports Mao’s argument when he writes that the objective of insurgency is the population.⁵³ He further highlights the population’s importance in saying that it is the very terrain in which the conflict must be fought.⁵⁴ If the population is the goal, then why is the population the goal? What role does the population play in an insurgency? The population is important because it plays two critical roles for whichever side gains legitimacy and influence. These are the role of resource and the role of “cogs in the state system.”

⁴⁸ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, 6.

⁴⁹ Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 44.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁵¹ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 44.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 93.

⁵³ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, 7.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 7-9.

1. Source of Resources (Who Brings the Popcorn to the Guerrilla Theater?)⁵⁵

Insurgencies generally start with limited resources and only a few committed members. The insurgency then must find a method to expand its organization to challenge the state and convince the people they are capable of resisting and eventually defeating the state and gain their support in doing so.⁵⁶ The population plays a “defensive” role, when it supplies the insurgency with resources such as money, weapons, recruits, food, and other needed resources such as intelligence. The population also contributes to maintaining the security of the young insurgency, either by limiting the information the state receives about the insurgency or by providing safe locations for the insurgent or both. Mao states that, in his opinion, the first condition that must be satisfied to make the insurgency situation favorable is that “the people give active support to the Red Army.”^{57,58} In Mao’s protracted war, the population provided the resources with which he and his fellow rebels could defeat a stronger, better equipped, and richer opponent. Mao’s protracted war would allow his small guerrilla group to grow into a force capable of defeating their stronger opponents, and while he was growing stronger, his opponents would become weaker and weaker through exhaustion and inefficiency.⁵⁹

2. People Power

The second role, as Mao and Galula agree, is the most valuable: that of securing socio/political power. Galula argues that “politics becomes an active instrument of

⁵⁵ Guerrilla Theater is a tactic developed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as a method to dramatize the “evils” of the insurgents in specific villages. SOT Center, AFP, *FM 3-5-2 SALA'AM Manual* (Quezon City: SOT Center, Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP n.d.), 92.

⁵⁶ “The insurgent thus has to grow in the course of the war from small to large, from weakness to strength, or else he fails.” Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, 7.

⁵⁷ The Chinese communist’s military wing during their insurgency against the Japanese and the Chinese nationalists.

⁵⁸ Mao, *Selected Works*, 215.

⁵⁹ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 30.

operation” meaning that the operation or the tool to defeat one’s opponent is found in the population.⁶⁰ Mao also sees in the population the tools for the state’s exhaustion and eventual defeat.⁶¹

This role could be viewed in terms of the population’s offensive or proactive role when it is mobilized to slow or stop parts of the state’s system, or create pressure on the state. Farmers producing fewer crops for the state or bus drivers failing to meet schedules or soldiers failing to participate in the fighting are all cogs that when broken, slow down the system and damage the state.

McAdam supports Mao’s and Galula’s argument about the potential political power of the people. He argues that the people comprise the system upon which the state gains its power. In other words, the people are the “cogs” that run the system. Even if they have limited power as an individual, they have real power as a collective; so the people, while running the system, have the seeds of the system’s destruction.⁶²

As organized challengers to the state appear successful in the eyes of the population, this encourages other individuals to test the state’s limits. As Sidney Tarrow points out, “Ordinary people begin to test the limits of social control.”⁶³ This action in itself can widen the political opportunities available to the insurgent’s movement as it “unhinges old [state] institutions.” Instability and confusion may arise as “disruption obstructs the routine activities of opponents, bystanders or authorities and force them to attend to the protesters.”⁶⁴

To engage the population in either or both of these two roles, mobilization of the population is then required.

⁶⁰ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, 9.

⁶¹ Mostafa Rejai, *On Revolution and War: Mao Tse-tung 1893-1976* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 250.

⁶² Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 36-38.

⁶³ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24-25

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 24.

C. MOBILIZATION, NOT JUST HEARTS AND MINDS (“MY PEOPLE LOVE ME AND THAT’S ALL THAT MATTERS” VS. “GET OFF THE COUCH AND ON TO THE STREETS”)

Both Mao and Galula agree that the population is the goal and the terrain of the conflict and that the population represents a source of resources as well as a weapon with which to defeat the state. In addition, they both agree on one more point. It is the mobilization of the population that empowers the insurgent, not just gaining its sympathy. The entire Chinese population may have been sympathetic to Mao’s rebels but until he was able to mobilize it, it was useless to the struggle. McAdam et al., present the problem like this, “Under what conditions will” the people become mobilized.⁶⁵

Mao’s says, “The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming difficulty in the war.” Mao sees the mobilization of the people as the key to victory. He continues to say, “To wish for victory and yet neglect political mobilization is like wishing to go south by driving the chariot north, and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory.”⁶⁶ Galula sees the other side of the struggle when he articulates that the problem of the counterinsurgent is to “find the favorable minority, to organize it in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority.”⁶⁷ *FM 3-24* recognizes this as it states, “The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy. Insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to mobilize popular support for their cause.”⁶⁸

Mobilization is defined by *The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* as “The process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active

⁶⁵ Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, September 10, 2001), 38.

⁶⁶ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 60.

⁶⁷ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, 77.

⁶⁸ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 1-8.

participant in public life (demobilization is thus the reverse process).”⁶⁹ In addition to mobilization and demobilization, there is also counter-mobilization. The *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* does not define counter-mobilization but it does define counter-movement as an “organized response to a social movement, with the purpose of blocking the movement’s activities, resisting change, and presenting alternative points of view.”⁷⁰ This definition is used as a basis to create a unique definition for this thesis for *counter-mobilization*, which is *the process a group goes through when its political mobilization is realigned*. It may be helpful to think of this from the point of view of the insurgency: whereas demobilization is a neutral position, mobilization is a positive position and counter-mobilization is a negative position actively moving away from the insurgency and closer to the state (or vice versa if looking at the definitions from the state’s point of view).

To frame the conflict in terms of mobilization as opposed to gaining sympathy or winning hearts and minds provides a more useful measure of effectiveness with which to determine the true effects of insurgent and state actions. One might gain the sympathy of a segment of the population but without effective mobilization, it may be of little use. Conversely, one might mobilize unsympathetic portions of a population through coercion or social pressure and these unsympathetic but mobilized individuals may be quite helpful to the mobilizing organization.⁷¹

D. ELEMENTS OF MOBILIZATION (OR HOW TO MOBILIZE) (*SADDLE UP FREE RIDER*)

At this point, it would be helpful to examine several brief examples of successful and unsuccessful socio/political mobilization in support of insurgencies.

⁶⁹ John Scott, and Gordon Marshall, *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 420.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁷¹ One interesting example is from Karl Jackson’s study of the Darul Islam insurgency in Indonesia in the 1950s. Jackson argues that the mobilization of insurgency supporters was primarily a function of whether a village leader supported the insurgency. If he did then social pressure mobilized the entire village to support DI whether the individuals were sympathetic to the insurgency or not. See Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).

1. National Liberation Front (NLF)

Nguyen Van Thieu was a member of the National Liberation Front's (NLF) central committee working to overthrow first the French colonial government and later the South Vietnamese government. Thieu explains their strategy in his article *Our Strategy for Guerrilla War*. He sees the population as the key to victory, "[R]evolutionary war is the people's war. In other words, the role played by the population is not just important: it is fundamental."⁷² Having clarified that the people are the focus of the struggle, Thieu continues to explain that the NLF process is to establish and maintain daily contact between the population and the cadre of the NLF. Thieu sees the best way to mobilize the population is to maintain continuous contacts with individuals as much as possible. Through these contacts, the NLF examines and develops the grievance and discontent of the peasants, "then their discontent can be elevated into positive hatred of the regime, and then they will join the struggle for a better life."⁷³ According to Thieu, to mobilize the population, the NLF must establish their position inside a village to maintain the required constant contact and they must study the village and develop a deep understanding of the villager's social structure and their needs and goals.

In Thieu's description of the NLF insurgency strategy, he focuses on the process of daily interaction between the cadre of the NLF and the population of the cadre's assigned village. Thieu clearly saw the continuous one on one grassroots contact as the best way for the NLF to mobilize the population. In his concept, the NLF can create a self-sustaining relationship through the creation of a village organization in which the political cadre provides support to individuals in the village and the villagers provide needed support to the cadre. When successful, this type of organizational relationship can

⁷² Nguyen Van Thieu, "Our Strategy for Guerilla War," in *Guerilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 310-316.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 311.

create more resources than it consumes by harnessing the power of collective action and overcoming the free rider problem through collective pressure on individual members.⁷⁴

Frances FitzGerald describes the NLF activities in her book *Fire in the Lake* as a process of slow integration as the NLF cadre develops a relationship with individuals in a community and evaluates potential grievances with which to build an organization element to address those grievances. Once the NLF cadre had determined the appropriate grievances, it would build an organization by connecting these individual relationships and help the community develop an appropriate response to its grievances. Groups such as farmers' organizations empower individual farmers through a "collective effort" in which farmers pool their resources and are then able to increase their outputs with the same amount of inputs.⁷⁵

2. Mao

The NLF strategy was based on the works of Mao. During Mao's struggle against the nationalist regime, he directs his insurgents to help local villagers form peasant associations. This is how Mao mobilized the population, first through creating local organizations and then helping them act collectively to address their grievances.⁷⁶ One particular example is the peasants in China's Hunan province, who were struggling under the harsh rule of the landlords and the corrupt government officials. Mao's cadre helped the peasants use collective action to first diminish the landlord's position in society. The peasants refused to offer the landlords the traditional symbols and gestures of subservience, thus expanding peasant control of social space, and then by collectively refusing to deliver material goods (agricultural products and labor) to the landlords and government representatives, the peasants' group began to expand their political space.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Thieu, "Our Strategy for Guerilla War."

⁷⁵ Frances FitzGerald, *Fire in the Lake* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), 155-182.

⁷⁶ Once organized and mobilized, the insurgents can move the peasants toward acting more and more in the insurgent's interest.

⁷⁷ Mao, *Selected Works*, Volume I, 34-40.

3. Give the People a Ba'ath

In Iraq, the National Unity Front, a social movement of sorts, motivated those who overthrew the Iraqi monarchy. The Front, an alliance of the Ba'athist party, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the National Democratic Party, were formed in opposition to the monarchy. This organization also did a successful job of providing voice to the disaffected Iraqi populace and mobilizing them in opposition to the monarchy.⁷⁸ Across Iraq, labor strikes, work stoppages, and demonstrations erupted. This outpouring of public discontent provided the motivation to the Army officers who would topple the monarchy.

4. New People's Army (NPA)

A fourth useful example is articulated in an article in *Asian Survey* in 1986. Jose Magno and A. James Gregor recorded the New People's Army (NPA) insurgent activities in the Arakan Valley area on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines. The NPA used a mobilization method based on an in-depth analysis of each village (called *barangay* in the Philippines) and then a process of individual contacts. The NPA system, which resembles the NLF method in the first example, focused on building individual relationships at low levels, the *barangay*, and ensured these relationships were continuous. The NPA would then form these villagers into a self-sustaining organization. The NPA's methods were very successful and effectively turned the area into a NPA stronghold.⁷⁹

E. LOCAL FOCUS

One might argue that insurgents, due to their deficiency of resources, insurgents are forced into operating only locally and cannot administer a broader "mass market"

⁷⁸ Mesut Ozcan, "Political and Social Reasons for 1958 Revolution in Iraq," *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies* 15 (Annual 2004), 342.

⁷⁹ Jose P. Magno, and A. James Gregor, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines," *Asian Survey* (1986): 501-517.

attempt to mobilize the population. Whereas the state, with its plentiful resources, uses a “wholesale” method of mobilization, which takes less effort and appears more efficient.

Wholesale mobilization overlooks the advice by Mao and Galula to study the individual needs of the population, which are different, based on the smaller social groups and the geographic environment, and tailor one’s mobilization efforts to the specific environment.⁸⁰ In addition, many social scientists have examined the high degree of influence that one-on-one personal contacts have, as opposed to a broader but impersonal proselytizing method, on individual decision making.⁸¹

In one brief example of the utility of local continuous methods even when used by the state is the previously cited NPA example in the Arakan Valley. Once the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) identified the NPAs effective methods, they copied them by forming barangay development and protection groups and expanding their relationship through individual contacts. They also committed their soldiers assigned to the area to stay for an extended period of time to ensure a continuous influence. This method was far more successful than the AFP’s previous attempts and within several years, the AFP successfully displaced the NPA’s influence in the Arakan valley.⁸²

1. Egypt

However, successful insurgencies do not always use concomitant social movement organizations. Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and his Free Officer Movement successfully overthrew the Egyptian monarchy with little help from the quiescent Egyptian population. Nasser tried to mobilize the population,⁸³ but the predominantly conservative Egyptians failed to respond. Now, it is possible to argue that whereas Nasser was unsuccessful in mobilizing the population for his cause, he was very effective in

⁸⁰ Andrews documents the Viet Cong following Mao’s advice and deploying study teams to individual villages for analysis. William R. Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964* (Univ. of Missouri, 1973), 42-50.

⁸¹ Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (Back Bay Books, 2002).

⁸² Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines.”

⁸³ Lawrence Cline, “Egyptian and Algerian Insurgencies: A Comparison,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 9, no. 2 (August 1998).

keeping the population from mobilizing in support of the monarchy. His anti-imperialistic, nationalist policies and economic reform were well-received by the population and Nasser is still seen as a hero in Egypt and throughout the Arab world.⁸⁴ While unable to develop his own sympathetic social movement organization, Nasser was very effective at ensuring the state, and thereafter any would-be insurgent, would not be able to do so either.

2. Algeria

Similarly, in Algeria, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) did not make use of a social movement organization, turning against what were cooperative populations. In fact, Islamic fundamentalist candidates fared well in elections, winning the first round of parliamentary elections. These elections were overturned by the government, which was subsequently deposed in a military coup. GIA arose out of this conflict and began a campaign of indiscriminate violence. Between 1992 and 1998, GIA is estimated to have killed around 100,000 civilians.⁸⁵

As shall be seen in the subsequent chapter, this method of coercion of the population is the most inefficient strategy for the insurgent to pursue. GIA could arguably better pursue its aims through a social movement organization that leveraged the population's proclivity for Islamic fundamentalism. Moreover, perhaps this strategic mistake is best illustrated by the fact that almost 18 years after it started its campaign, GIA has been unsuccessful in its attempts to overthrow the Algerian government.

⁸⁴ Binnaz Demircioglu, "Nasser and Arab Nationalism," *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies* 15 (2004).

⁸⁵ Colin Robinson, "In the Spotlight: Armed Islamic Group GIA," *Center for Defense Information: Terrorism Project*, February 5, 2003.

F. MANIPULATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

In the end, the insurgent seeks to manipulate his environment to give him an advantage to execute his political program.⁸⁶ As discussed, the link to the population is essential to the insurgent for him to deliver his political program.⁸⁷ The insurgent also needs a method to exploit government weaknesses, whether real or perceived, and if possible, to use these weaknesses to limit the state's ability to repress the insurgency.⁸⁸ Finally, the insurgency wants to manipulate real or perceived grievances to exacerbate the lack of legitimacy of the state and allow the insurgents access to political space and legitimacy.⁸⁹

G. RECONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM

The problem for either side that wishes to compete in this environment is—who to mobilize the population in a way that is better than my opponent? The insurgent might say” what can I do to either change my organization to enable me to mobilize better, damage my opponent so he mobilizes worse or alter the environment so I gain some comparative advantage? The insurgent is looking for the best available method to improve his ability to mobilize and diminish his opponent's ability to mobilize.

⁸⁶ Andrews gives an excellent example of the communist insurgents in South Vietnam altering village political dynamics to adjust the village environment to make it more conducive to the Viet Cong programs. Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964*, 25-31.

⁸⁷ Mao calls for his insurgent leadership to maintain contact with the population at the lowest level and to use community organizations as one method to achieve this. Rejai, *On Revolution and War: Mao Tse-tung 1893-1976*, 348-351.

⁸⁸ Lack of political will or interagency cooperation, general reluctance to authorize repression due to fear of alienating political constituents,' and misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict are all frequently cited weakness of the state.

⁸⁹ Galula highlights the insurgents desire to select grievance that the state will have difficulty to address. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*, 20-21. Jones in his book about the communist insurgency in the Philippines, highlight the role the insurgents—the New People's Army NPA leverage grievance the state cannot or will not address to gain popularity and political legitimacy. Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla Movement* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

H. CONCLUSION

The insurgent struggle is one of attempting to control a political/social space through violent political competition. This socio-political struggle for control and influence of the population is expressed through a competition to mobilize one's supporters more efficiently and to limit the ability of one's opponents to mobilize his supporters. Although the mobilization of the population is the goal, a variety of methods exists to mobilize the population. Each method has advantages and disadvantages but successful mobilization tends to be continuous as most individual actions to mobilize lose their influence and dissipate in the mind of the population rapidly. In addition, most methods tend to be more effective when executed at the lowest (grassroots) level possible allowing for tailored implementation based on individual community's circumstances, as well as allowing personal relationship to develop between the mobilizing group or individual and the mobilized population.

This analysis of the insurgency's environment indicates that for social movements to be of utility to insurgencies, it would have to mobilize the population effectively and generally focus on "grass roots" organization while providing continuous mobilizing influences. The next chapter explores this application.

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III. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

A. INTRODUCTION

The exploration of insurgency has helped distill some concise descriptions about the insurgency environment. The first is that the true goal of the insurgent is the *mobilization* of the population as opposed to simply winning the affection of the population. The next element of the environment noted is that the process of mobilization is a continuous process as opposed to one that relies on singular events. The final element distilled from this analysis of the insurgent's environment is that the continuous mobilization process is more effective when organized at a local level as opposed to a regional or national level.

This helps create a model for the mobilization of the population with which it is possible to examine potential methods to be used to achieve the continuous local mobilization of the population. To be successful, the insurgent would have to use a mechanism that creates a locally based continuously mobilized population. This leads to the first hypothesis, that most successful insurgencies use a social movement organization to create that continuous local mobilization they need to grow and win.⁹⁰

The authors argue that an insurgency selects a social movement organization method because it is the most efficient method available to the insurgency to produce a local continuously mobilized population. This means that the elements of a social movement organization fit the requirements of the insurgency. Thus, it is beneficial at this point to explore what a social movement organization is and if it, as argued, satisfies the requirements created by the conclusions based on the exploration of the environment of insurgency.

⁹⁰ As demonstrated in Chapter II, insurgencies need to grow to win.

B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

According to John Lofland's *Social Movement Organizations*, a social movement organization is an "association of persons making idealistic and moralist claims about how human personal or group life ought be organized that, at the time of their claim-making, are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society..."⁹¹ McCarthy and Zald explain social movement organizations as a "complex, or formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals."⁹² To describe a social movement organization further, Della Porta and Diani quote Kriesi in describing the internal structure of a social movement as having formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation and division of labor, and a system of horizontal and vertical integration.⁹³ Social movement organizations are generally locally organized groups of individuals with an established cadre that works to support and expand the organization. The organization is focused on an issue or range of issues that they believe should be changed within their society. A social movement organization usually has an established organization structure, a professional cadre (meaning some elements of the leadership or support structure have committed to the organization on a full time basis as their job/career), and it usually has some type of overt identification. This is in contrast to an insurgency, which usually has a covert existence. This contrast highlights one benefit an insurgency can gain from their relationship with the social movement organization; its ability to communicate with and recruit from the public.

To examine the hypothesis that social movement organizations are a more efficient method to create a local, continuous mobilization of the population, the authors explore some other potential methods of mobilization, persuasion and coercion.

⁹¹ John Lofland, *Social Movement Organizations: Guide to Research on Insurgent Realities* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 1996), 2-3.

⁹² Donatella Della Porta, and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 140.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 140.

C. PERSUASION

Insurgents and counterinsurgents alike have long considered *persuasion*, the use of real or implied incentives to encourage an individual or a group to take certain desirable actions, a mobilization tool. Persuasion can avoid the animosity, which is common when coercion is used and may require fewer resources initially than does coercion. Many researchers argue that the population makes a rational decision to support whichever side can supply them the most benefits.⁹⁴ Many counterinsurgency strategies involve actions to bolster the state's legitimacy through the delivery of social services and improvements in the efficiency of governance as an attempt to persuade the population that the state can meet their needs better than the insurgency.⁹⁵ Insurgents commonly have less access to material resources and use devices such as religious or political ideology, or highlight a popular grievance held by the population.⁹⁶ The population's belief that the insurgency can either alleviate this grievance, or align the country closer to the proper religious or political ideology may persuade them to support the insurgency.⁹⁷ Ideology and grievances are important to mobilization but persuasion without some type of organizing structure such as a social movement organization will have limited utility.

There are several challenges to the use of persuasion alone as a mobilization method. First, the terms of persuasion, the benefit that the population may receive, may not be understood or believed by the population. Obviously, if the population do not understand or believe the persuader (the insurgents or the government), then they will not change their behavior.

The next challenge is the difficulty of tying potential benefits to desired actions. This is articulated in *Rebellion and Authority*. Leites and Wolf argue that increases to the resources available to an individual do not necessarily change their preferences. In fact,

⁹⁴ David C. Gompert and John Gordon, *War by Other Means* (Final, Arlington: Rand Corporation, 2008), 90-92.

⁹⁵ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986).

⁹⁶ Gompert and Gordon, *War by Other Means*, 92.

⁹⁷ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations*.

they argue that if the state uses improved social services as a method to persuade the population but fail to tie access to these social services to quantifiable action then the population's actions may not change and they will simply have more resources available to support the insurgency.⁹⁸ The same argument could be made for the insurgents, if they supply increased resources to the population without any corresponding mechanism to alter the population's actions then there is no reason for the population's preference to change. This makes persuasion alone an unreliable and inconsistent source of mobilization.

Another challenge with the use of persuasion as the sole method of mobilization of the population is the problem of the "free-rider."⁹⁹ According to the *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* a free-rider is "a person who takes advantage of a public good, or other collectively funded benefit, while avoiding any personal cost, or evading personal contributions to collective funding."¹⁰⁰ An individual may appreciate the effort of a group to increase his standard of living but he may see no reason to support the conflict actively because he feels others will take the risk and he will still receive the benefits.

An example of the failure of a strategy based predominantly on persuasion can be seen in the communist insurgency in the Republic of the Philippines from 1945 to 1953. The insurgents called the *Hukbalahap* (contraction of *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* or National Anti-Japanese Army and later *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* or Army of National Liberation, sometimes called HMB, or more simply *Huk*) emerged as a strong and well-organized guerilla movement during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Once the Japanese Imperial Army withdrew from the Philippines, the Huks began to fight the newly formed independent government installed and supported by the United States. The Huks were well-organized and well-armed, and by 1950, the Philippine government in Manila was in fear for its very existence. The Huks based their movement on the

⁹⁸ Nathan Leites, and Charles Wolf Jr., "Rebellion and Authority" *Rand Corporation*, February 1970, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R0462.pdf>, 38-39.

⁹⁹ Will H. Moore, "Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem," *Political Research Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (1995): 417-454.

¹⁰⁰ John Scott, and Gordon Marshall, *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

grievances of the peasants unsatisfied with rampant poverty, abuse and misrule by the absentee landlords that controlled the rural areas and the corruption and inattention of the national government. Although things looked extremely dim for the national government in 1950, by 1953, the tide had turned and the Huks were all but defeated. Much of the credit goes to Secretary of Defense, and later President, Ramon Magsaysay, but the strategy of the Huks also contributed to their own defeat.

William Pomeroy, an American who supported the Huk movement and joined them in the jungles of the Philippines, kept a journal of their activities, which he later published.¹⁰¹ This journal provides insight into the attitudes and strategy of the Huks. In *The Forest*, Pomeroy saw that the “reserve” for both the government forces and the Huks were the “unenlightened, uncommitted masses of the people” and he saw that the key to the conflict was being able to persuade the masses that the Huks were right and the government was wrong. The Huks’ tools were “propaganda of word” and “propaganda of action.” By “explaining to the people” and by setting an example for the people to see they thought that they could expand the HMB. Pomeroy and the Huks seem to believe that propaganda and demonstrations of Huk power could mobilize the population to leave their villages and join the Huks. However, the Huks were unable to overcome the “free-rider” problem and mobilize individuals to join the insurgency. President Magsaysay’s land reform programs and his reorganization of the military successfully diminished even the passive support for the Huks. The Huks were eventually defeated in 1953, never having persuaded the peasant population to mobilize and rise up against the government.¹⁰² Pomeroy puts it best when in July 1951 he writes, “we thought the people moved at our pace, to the rapid click of the mimeograph machine... we have been living in a fool’s paradise.”¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ William J. Pomeroy, *The Forest* (New York: International Publishers Company Inc., 1963).

¹⁰² Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice* (New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1965), 135-139.

¹⁰³ Pomeroy, *The Forest*, 157.

D. COERCION

Coercion can, in the short term, be an effective tool of mobilization. As FM 3-24 points out, “Insurgents may use coercive force to provide security for people or to intimidate them and the legitimate security forces into active or passive support.”¹⁰⁴ Coercion gives insurgents rapid supply opportunities, or in other words, they may take what they need when they need it (at least until their victims find a way to hide their valuables). There are several drawbacks to using coercion and many successful insurgent leaders sternly command their followers to avoid using coercion.¹⁰⁵ Excessive coercion could potentially turn the population against the insurgency and destroy their possibility of popular support. James Scott argues that the very act of coercion creates an underlying attitude in the people subject to it and that they will seek out opportunities to resist the will of the coercing power. He states, “forced compliance not only fails to produce attitudes that would sustain that compliance in the absence of domination, *but produces a reaction against such attitudes*” (emphasis mine). Scott further argues that, “Coercion, it would seem, can produce compliance but it virtually inoculates the complier against willing compliance.”¹⁰⁶ Scott summarizes various research programs on the effectiveness of coercion:

Providing the threat is sufficiently imposing, overt agreement and compliance may prevail but covert reactance will increase. Overt compliance in the presence of a threat was often secured only by close surveillance to detect and punish deviance. Once the surveillance was withdrawn, the compliance evaporated quickly, and it was found that the surveillance itself, as an emanation of compulsion, further increased the degree of reaction.

This indicates that coercion not only creates a resistance to compliance on the part of the population but it also increases the transaction cost to the group trying to coerce the population. This would logically follow that insurgent groups that start with a force

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2006a), 1-9.

¹⁰⁵ The most well known is Mao Tse-tung in his *Guerilla Warfare* in which he outlined rules for his soldiers in dealing with the people to ensure they do not coerce or mistreat the population.

¹⁰⁶ James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

disadvantage (as opposed to the state with a force advantage) would find coercion less effective and more costly and would choose coercion as a method for mobilization only if they had no other options. This argument would also follow that selection of coercion, as an insurgency's sole method of mobilization, would limit the life of the insurgency, barring other factors. At the very least, coercion gives the population a reason to conceal information from the insurgents, and in an environment where the people are the prime source of intelligence for the insurgency, this can be a fatal mistake.

A second drawback to using coercion is that it requires some overt threat of force on the insurgent's part. This could potentially expose the insurgents to direct repression by the state. In addition, the population generally act in their own best interest and seek strategies to avoid losing resources to the insurgency.

To illustrate the drawbacks of using a predominantly coercive insurgency, the Greek Communist insurgency of 1946 to 1949 can be briefly examined. The post World War II insurgency in Greece grew out of the organized resistance to German occupation of Greece from 1941 to 1944. The main resistance group was the National Liberation Front (EAM in Greek) and their armed forces the National Liberation Army (ELAS). The German occupying army was forced to withdraw in 1944 and was defeated by the Allies in 1945. The Greek Communist Party (KKE) saw this as an opportunity to gain power over the weak Greek Government returning from exile. The KKE formed the Democratic Army (DA) from the victorious ELAS.¹⁰⁷

The DA/KKE started the insurgency in 1946 with a number of advantages over the Greek government including significant popular support, a weak opponent (the Greek government had legitimacy problems due to perceived collaboration with the Nazis), and a weak, untrained, and poorly led Greek Army.¹⁰⁸

Initially, the DA/KKE did not depend on the population for resources as it was supplied by the communist Yugoslavian government through the open border of Greece with Yugoslavia and it made a decision based on expedience to use coercion to gain

¹⁰⁷ Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice*.

¹⁰⁸ Anthony James Joes, *Modern Guerilla Insurgency* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 13-52.

recruits.¹⁰⁹ By the second year of the insurgency, the main source of new recruits for the insurgency was teenagers forced to join through threats to their families.¹¹⁰ When the international situation changed and the insurgents lost their support from Yugoslavia, they were forced to depend on the population for food and other resources. The insurgent leadership chose coercion as the most convenient method to gain resources. The DA/KKE used violence against potential government sympathizers in an attempt to coerce the people's support. This tactic backfired and instead of building popular support, it exacerbated the population's fear and resentment of the insurgency. This resulted in the further alienation of the population from the insurgents.

In 1949, the insurgency attempted a conventional engagement with the Greek Army, but due to British and U.S. material support, advice, and training, the Greek army was able to defeat the insurgent's conventional attacks soundly. After the defeat of their conventional attacks, the insurgency was unable to revert to guerilla tactics because their coercive tactics had completely isolated them from the population. The insurgency was finished by the end of 1949.¹¹¹

E. SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION INTERACTION

To expand the understanding of a social movement organization and how it may interact with an insurgency, one example is examined. The farmer's liberation association (FLA) was a social movement organization that developed in South Vietnam in the late 1950s and lasted until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, although its most active time was 1960-1967. The FLA was created by the Vietnamese Communists but it was not simply a tool of the "Viet Cong;" it was a true social movement organization with bimonthly meetings, members' dues, and elected leaders. Its public goals were the improvement of the lives of its member farmers. Although it was a nationwide organization, the organization's focus was at the hamlet (small village or rural neighborhood equivalent) level. The FLA's activities included developing a mutual aid

¹⁰⁹ Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice*, 144.

¹¹⁰ Joes, *Modern Guerilla Insurgency*.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 22-25.

system to facilitate farmers to assist their peers, an emergency loan program, and an opportunity to allow farmers to seek redress for damages and perceived wrongs. The FLA cadre also ensured that the organization received ideological training and was organized to support the Vietcong or create pressure on the South Vietnamese government.¹¹² Robert Andrews, a former Special Forces Officer who served in Vietnam, addresses how the Vietcong would use a social movement organization in his book *The Village War*, “Once in a mass organization, villagers became subject to more intense indoctrination.”¹¹³ This allowed the Vietcong guerillas to maintain a relationship with the farmers in each hamlet and use them to support the insurgency. The Vietcong used the FLA (as well as many other organizations) to create a local and continuous mobilization of the population.

The apparent trend as exhibited by this insurgency provides the initial indication that social movement organizations could potentially be extremely relevant to the success of an insurgency. However, instead of conducting a broad statistical analysis of all the world’s insurgencies, the focus is on a few case studies allowing the analysis of not only whether the insurgency used a social movement organization but also whether it was used throughout the life of the insurgency and in what ways it was used.

F. SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DIFFERENT METHODS OF MOBILIZATION

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the findings.

¹¹² Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge: M.I.T Press, 1966).

¹¹³ William R. Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964* (University of Missouri, 1973).

	Social Movement Organization	Persuasion	Coercion
Advantages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Reliable source of resources - Resource availability increases over time - Population is self-motivated to provide support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does not engender hostility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Reliable “one time” source of resupply
Disadvantages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Requires organization to be stood up before resources are available 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Free rider” - Provides unreliable source of support - Inconsistent source of resupply - Requires continuous effort to maintain support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creates resistance attitude -Resource availability decreases over time - Exposes the insurgent to repression from the state

Table 1. Comparison of Methods of Mobilization

	Social Movement Organization	Persuasion	Coercion
Strategic Framing	(+) strengthens frames by tying insurgent issues to larger movement goals, both gaining constituents and making insurgent aims appear more palatable	(+) does not damage master, diagnostic, or prognostic frame, but might not be enough for proper motivational frame	(-) overemphasis on motivational frame possibly damages other frames
Mobilizing Structures	(+) provides largest, most willing flow of labor and intellectual capital to insurgency	(-) by its nature, insurgents can not always count on support from the populace	(-) must rely solely on internal MS; by its nature, coercion limits the effectiveness of MS external to the insurgency (+) can provide a reliable "one time" use of MS
Political Opportunity Structures	(+) SMO more effective than insurgency at creating and leveraging political opportunities	(-) minimal control over creation and exploitation of political opportunities	(-) limits insurgency to a very unilateral response to political opportunities

Table 2. Comparative Effectiveness of Methods of Mobilization

If an insurgency gains an advantage from using a social movement organization, then the argument is that if there was a way to damage the social movement organization, then the second order effect would be to damage the insurgency. The exact type of damage the state could inflict on the insurgency would depend on the way in which the insurgency used the social movement organization. However, it seems logical that if an insurgency chooses to use a social movement organization, then, whatever way it is used, removing that option from the insurgency leadership would force them to select a less efficient option or to operate without the advantages supplied by the social movement organization.

G. ANALYSIS OF SMO-INSURGENCY NEXUS

The political process model put forth by Doug McAdam is a valuable tool in analyzing how a social movement organization-insurgency nexus really works and what makes it grow and die. By using the political process model, it is possible to analyze a

social movement organization and determine what methods the state could use to damage or more specifically *de-mobilize* the social movement organization. This leads to the second hypothesis, that an insurgency can be damaged through the de-mobilization of its sympathetic social movement organization.

The political process model (PPM) used to analyze the social movements examined in this research is based on the work of prominent social scientist such as Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow and synthesized into its present form by McAdam.¹¹⁴ The PPM is used to describe the factors that cause the emergence and growth of a social movement organization and is a useful set of tools with which to dissect and examine individual movements. As McAdam et al. state:

Increasingly one finds movement scholars from various countries and nominally representing different theoretical traditions emphasizing the importance of the same three broad sets of factors in analyzing the emergence and development of social movements/revolutions. These three factors are (1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; (2) the forms or organization (informal as well as formal), available to insurgents; and (3) the collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action. Or perhaps it will be easier to refer to these three factors by the conventional shorthand designations of *political opportunities*, *mobilizing structures*, and *framing processes* (emphasis mine).

Each of these three elements is expounded upon briefly.

H. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES (AND CONSTRAINTS)

The political structure in the environment in which the movement exists offers opportunities or constraints based on the actions and attitudes of the members of that structure. The interaction of the movement and the members of the polity, and especially the elites in a polity, create an environment that offers opportunities or constraints to the movement. According to McAdam et al., "... social movements and revolutions are

¹¹⁴ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Zald N. Mayer, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, 8th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2.

shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded.”¹¹⁵ A recent example of changes in political opportunities is the change in attitude in much of the polity in Columbia with regard to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC after the Columbian military’s successful rescue of several FARC-held hostages.¹¹⁶

This definition might be extended to include a global context because in the age of globalization, opportunities and constraints can come from abroad; although they are still filtered through the local context before they have an effect on a movement. An example is the international pressure brought to bear on the Apartheid government in South Africa, which created domestic political opportunities for the African National Congress.¹¹⁷

Some “dimensions” of political opportunities that McAdam et al., illustrate are as follows.

- The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system
- The stability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity
- The presence of elite allies
- The state’s capacity and propensity for repression

I. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES

McAdam et al., describe mobilizing structures as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective

¹¹⁵ McAdam, McCarthy and Mayer, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, 3.

¹¹⁶ *Washington Report on the Hemisphere Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, 28, no. 15-16 (July 31, 2008): 1-2, www.coha.org.

¹¹⁷ “South Africa Returns to the Field after Decades of Banishment, Nation being Welcomed back into World Sports Arena. As Apartheid Crumbles,” [All Edition] *Christian Science Monitor* (pre-1997 Full text) Boston, MA: April 26, 1991. From Proquest database <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=69654455&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=11969&ROT=309&VName=POD>; “South Africa; Freedom Brings Few Jobs, but the ANC Still Rules; The Vast Majority of South Africans Seem to Settle, a bit Warily, for Single-Party Dominance,” [HOME EDITION] ed. Douglas Foster. *Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles, CA, April 11, 2004, M.2.

action.”¹¹⁸ This describes the way or the method that the movement uses to organize its members. One component of this element is the argument by McAdam et al., that the mobilizing structure provides far better insight into the ability of the movement to mobilize the population than does an examination of the grievances or issues upon which the movement is based. Using this reasoning would lead to the conclusion that it is not poverty that causes terrorism to spread; it is well-organized terrorists that cause terrorism to spread.

A second point concerning the mobilizing structure argument is the greater utility seen by McAdam et al., in “grassroots” organizing at places of work and at the neighbor/village level. They see local institutions as having a superior ability to form and maintain effective mobilizing structures.¹¹⁹

J. FRAMING PROCESSES

McAdam et al., see the strategic frame as the cognitive function of the people that connect the environment (the political opportunity and the mobilizing structure) and the actions the movement leadership wants the people to take. As McAdam et al., explain it, the framing process is, “mediating between opportunity, organization and action are the shared meaning and definitions that people bring to the situation.”¹²⁰ The shared meaning and definitions are expressed in a common ideology that the movement uses, either intentionally or unintentionally, to hold the imagination of the people.

An example can be seen at the conclusion of World War II throughout Southeast Asia. Many countries in Southeast Asia were colonies of European powers. The invading Imperial Japanese Army easily defeated these powers. The ease with which the Japanese drove out the colonial armies as well as President Roosevelt’s anti-colonial remarks created a strategic frame in many Southeast Asian countries that they should be independent and that it was within the ability of the indigenous population to defeat the

¹¹⁸ McAdam, McCarthy and Mayer, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, 3.

¹¹⁹ McAdam, McCarthy and Mayer, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

returning European armies and gain their independence.¹²¹ McAdam calls this “cognitive liberation,” for the shift in the common perception that indigenous defeat of European armies was really possible.

K. SYNTHESIS OF THE THREE ELEMENTS

These three elements (political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes) of the political process model describe the environment and how the movement is organized within that environment and finally what the common ideas are of the people in the environment. When these three elements are synchronized, either by work of the movement leaders or as unintentional consequences of other events, the movement emerges as viable. McAdams et al., illustrate the use of the PPM to study the emergence of a movement, but the PPM is used not only to study the emergence of a movement, but also its growth and decline. It is interesting and, more importantly, potentially of enormous practical importance to determine the utility of the PPM as a tool to limit the support a social movement can offer an insurgency. If the PPM describes three legs that support a movement then does the removal of one of the legs bring about the collapse of the movement? This thesis attempts to answer this question.

Upon examining the chosen cases for this thesis, the corresponding social movement organizations are deconstructed according to the political process model; after which it becomes possible to ascertain more clearly and more definitely why certain demobilization efforts were or were not effective.

The goal of this thesis is not simply to offer evidence to prove an abstract hypothesis (or two) but to distill from this evidence policy suggestions and methods that may be of value to counterinsurgent practitioners in the field. The goal is to create something of value that the U.S. government and allies can apply. This goal has influenced the authors to select a case study methodology with which to conduct this thesis. A statistical study method might possibly support the arguments just as well but the results of this study may not offer the in-depth analysis that could potentially lead to

¹²¹ The insurgencies in Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaya are examples.

policy gold (or at least silver). Thus, having determined that the case study method or, as named by Lofland, “the qualitative case study method” is the most appropriate for the goals, it is then necessary to determine which case studies to examine and how to examine them. Lofland’s ideas on this are helpful and were used in the choosing process. He argues for the use of four steps in the case study examination selection to include collecting, asking questions, and answering questions posed. To select the appropriate case study, Lofland suggests using ones that are pertinent, practical, and in which passion exists.¹²² In this regard, case studies relevant to either current conflicts involving the U.S. Government (Iraq) or areas relevant to the wider global war of terror (Indonesia) are selected so as to be pertinent to current conflicts. The authors have each selected two cases each from countries in which they have spent considerable time. In all of these four cases, data is available, as well as the access to historical records and individuals that participated on one or both sides of the conflict. These satisfied the practical requirement. In addition, since both authors participated in conflicts related to these case studies, it has invested them with a motivation to seek solutions, which also satisfies the passion requirement. Beyond Lofland’s advice, case studies were chosen that allowed for the exploration on the change in an insurgency with and without the presence of a social movement organization. Identifying and comparing distinct time periods in the evolution of an insurgency, when it had and when it did not have the support of a sympathetic social movement organization, affords additional evidence as to the utility (or lack thereof) that social movement organization provided to the insurgency. In addition, the analysis of each case study may offer evidence as to why insurgents either gained or lost the connection to social movement organizations; whether through internal decisions, believing it was unnecessary for success, or through specific government action, believing the disruption of the social movement organization was necessary for the insurgents’ defeat.

¹²² Lofland, *Social Movement Organizations: Guide to Research on Insurgent Realities*.

IV. DARUL ISLAM CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

The Darul Islam (*Dar-ul Islam* or abode of God) insurgency in West Java started in 1948 and lasted until the capture of most of its leaders in 1962.¹²³ At its height, Darul Islam fielded a force of over 13,000 fighters¹²⁴ and maintained the sympathy of a majority of the population in their area of control.¹²⁵ They had sufficient military capability to keep the Indonesian Armed Forces at bay and they had created and maintained their own civil administration through which they filled the role of legitimate government for many of the people in West Java. The conflict cost the people of Indonesia over 25,000 in war dead and 120,000 homes destroyed, but far more important than the damages inflicted by the conflict was its longevity. Darul Islam gained and maintained substantial popular support and lasted over 14 years, representing one of the greatest challenges to the Republic of Indonesia.¹²⁶ Darul Islam is an interesting case as they grew out of a social movement organization and maintained an active partnership with a variety of SMOs up until the Indonesian government adapted a COIN strategy that included creating their own SMOs with which they counter-mobilized the population. This new strategy changed the SMO-COIN relationship and lead to Darul Islam's defeat.

¹²³ Darul Islam is used to describe several Islamic-based insurgencies that broke out in post-independence Indonesian from 1950 through 1965 including conflicts in West Java, Central Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh. Although there was some level of cohesion of ideology, most branches of Darul Islam had distinct causes for its emergence and eventual defeat. The most well-known and the most threatening to the Indonesian government was the first Darul Islam insurgency, led by S.M. Kartosuwiryo, which started in the last years of the Indonesian fight against the Dutch for independence. . The focus of this case study is the West Java Darul Islam, which was defeated in 1962.

¹²⁴ Linda G. Brakenridge, *The Darul Islam Movement in West Java: A Study of Religion and its Relationship to Insurgency* (Thesis (B.A. Hons)-Australian National University, 1975), 15.

¹²⁵ TNI History Division, *Penumpasan Pemberontakan DI/TII S.M Kartosuwiryo DI Jawa Barat* (Bandung: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 1982).

¹²⁶ B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), 54.

B. BACKGROUND

The Netherland East Indies existed as a colony of the Netherlands from the establishment of Batavia (present day Jakarta) in 1615 until the defeat of Dutch forces by the invading Japanese Imperial Army in 1942.¹²⁷ During the colonial period, various indigenous political organizations developed as educated native Indonesians worked to develop a political role for themselves and to mobilize their countrymen under the Dutch colonial rule.¹²⁸ One such organization was Sarekat Islam (SI), which emerged in 1911 as a collective organization for Islamic merchants with a goal to empower these merchants with some political leverage to resist the expanding influence of ethnic Chinese Christian merchants.¹²⁹ H.O.S. Tjokroaminato, an astute political entrepreneur who understood and successfully leveraged collective action and mobilization to build a powerful and influential organization, led SI.¹³⁰ Tjokroaminato's two most well-known students were future Indonesian president Sukarno, and future Darul Islam leader S.M. Kartosuwiryo.¹³¹

Kartosuwiryo was heavily influenced by SI's success in political mobilization and the role that social movement organizations play to mobilize the population and create political opportunities. Kartosuwiryo remained politically active in SI and later in its successor organization Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) until 1938 when he split with PSII and formed his own social movement organization after a disagreement with PSII leaders over their cooperation with the Dutch administration.¹³²

¹²⁷ Norman G. Owen, ed. *The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2005).

¹²⁸ Jean Gelman Taylor, *Indonesia: People and Histories* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 293-296.

¹²⁹ Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973).

¹³⁰ C. van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal Land-en Volkenkunde (KITLV), 1981), 24. At its peak, SI had over two million members and Tjokroaminato was one of the principal spokesmen for Indonesian nationalism.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹³² S. Soebardi, "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (March 1983): 113.

Through Kartosuwiryo's new organization, he created the Suffah Institute in Malangbong, West Java, the hometown of his wife, as a training center to teach young Muslims political as well as religious curricula.¹³³ Malangbong was an opportune location as it allowed Kartosuwiryo to tap into his father-in-law's large informal network of religious leaders and scholars throughout West Java.¹³⁴

In early 1942, the Japanese invaded the Netherland East Indies or Indonesia, as the various nationalist groups had begun calling the colony.¹³⁵ The Japanese initially limited all political activity but as the war started to turn against them, the Japanese started to encourage political and social movements in an attempt to mobilize the population to support the Japanese war machine and prepare for possible defense of Indonesia by invading allied forces.¹³⁶ As part of this mobilization, the Japanese allowed several Islamic groups to form or reform. In 1943, the Japanese created the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims or **Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (MASYUMI)** as a non-political social organization.¹³⁷ Kartosuwiryo quickly took an active role in the West Java branch of MASYUMI and eventually moved to a senior leadership role in the national headquarters in Jakarta.¹³⁸

In mid-1945, as World War II was drawing to an end, Indonesian nationalists started preparing for independence and the potential conflict with returning Dutch forces.¹³⁹ Nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesian Independence on August 17, 1945 and the new Republic of Indonesia began building their own armed forces out of militia organizations created by the Japanese and former Indonesian

¹³³ Soebardi, "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia," 113-114.

¹³⁴ Kartosuwiryo's father-in-law was a well-respected religious leader and associated with the NU social organization. Farihin Ibnu Ahmad (former member Jemaah Islamiyah, son and grandson of Darul Islam members), interview by author,

¹³⁵ Owen, ed. *The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia*.

¹³⁶ van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, 41-45.

¹³⁷ Soebardi, "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia," 115; Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, 42.

¹³⁸ Harry Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1958), 150-169; Soebardi, "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia," 116.

¹³⁹ Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, ed. *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 498.

members of the Dutch colonial security forces (KNIL).¹⁴⁰ The new Indonesian National Army called Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI was assisted by a variety of irregular militias formed by various groups. MASYUMI became a political party and created two irregular military organizations—Sabilillah and Hizbullah¹⁴¹—in West Java. Kartosuwiryo’s Suffah Institute was reopened to train these two militias.¹⁴²

Indonesia’s fight for independence lasted from 1945 until 1949 and included ongoing negotiations between the Dutch and the Republican government formed by the rebels, as well as a series of convention and guerilla engagements between the Dutch army and the rebel forces. During 1948, the Republican government and the Dutch negotiated a cease-fire agreement¹⁴³ (the Renville Agreement) that included Republican forces withdrawing from West Java,¹⁴⁴ thus, leaving only the MASYUMI irregular militias behind to fight the Dutch Army.¹⁴⁵ Kartosuwiryo saw this as a betrayal and this greatly diminished his faith in the Republican government. It is probably at this time that Kartosuwiryo’s latent desire for an Islamic state was brought to surface in response to this deemed betrayal. He has come to a prime position of influence, now that the Republican forces had left West Java, only leaving behind guerrilla forces with local loyalties, many of which had received guerrilla training at the Suffah Institute. Note that as of that time, Kartosuwiryo already had control of the West Java MASYUMI, MASYUMI’s armed militias—Sabilillah and Hizbullah, as well as a youth movement (known as GPII), a women’s movement, and various affiliated social movements.¹⁴⁶ The withdrawal of the TNI made him the main person of authority in the resistance movement against the Dutch in West Java.

¹⁴⁰ Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*.

¹⁴¹ Created during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia to assist the Japanese in defending Indonesia.

¹⁴² Soebardi, “Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia,” 114-117.

¹⁴³ The Renville Agreement was ratified on January 19, 1948. Karl Jackson, *Political Authority and Rebellion in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

¹⁴⁴ Jackson, *Political Authority and Rebellion in Indonesia*, 10.

¹⁴⁵ Hiroko Horikoshi, “The Dar-ul Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process,” *Indonesia* 20 (October 1975): 69-70.

¹⁴⁶ van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, 80-86; Soebardi, “Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia,” 117.

Soon after the Renville Agreement, the Dutch captured many of the Republican Government's leaders, including President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta.¹⁴⁷ Kartosuwiryo remained in West Java during this period, He was determined that he and the West Java group of MASYUMI organization continue as the only remaining free elements of the Indonesian independence movement. He renamed and reorganized the West Java MASYUMI into Majelis Ummat Islam (MUI) and began developing a constitution¹⁴⁸ and a civil administration for the future Islamic state.¹⁴⁹ When the TNI were eventually able to return to West Java, they were forcibly resisted by the MUI military organization formed out of Sabilillah and Hizbullah and now called the Islamic Army of Indonesia (TII).¹⁵⁰ Kartosuwiryo declared the Islamic State of Indonesian or NII on August 7, 1949; it had a standing army of about 4,000 soldiers, a written constitution (Kanun Azasi or Islamic Constitution), a civil administration, and political structure down to the village level based on the MUI organization.¹⁵¹

The Dutch released President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta in August 1949. The Netherlands and Indonesia eventually signed a peace agreement, with sovereignty transferred in December 1949. Once Indonesia gained its sovereignty from the Dutch, the Republican government set about the challenging task of transforming a revolutionary movement into a state government capable of stabilizing the diverse people and areas of Indonesia.¹⁵² MASYUMI played a significant role in many of the cabinets of the new governments, especially in the first three years of the Republic.¹⁵³ As MASYUMI continued to play a significant role in the new national government, their former colleagues now in the Kartosuwiryo-led Darul Islam continued to maintain their Islamic State in West Java and resisted calls for a peaceful conclusion to the insurgent

¹⁴⁷ Owen, ed. *The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia*, 296-311.

¹⁴⁸ Soebardi, "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia," 121.

¹⁴⁹ Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo* (Jakarta: P.T. Badan Penerbit, 1964), 80-113.

¹⁵⁰ Soebardi, "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia," 117-124.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 118-122.

¹⁵² Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1962).

¹⁵³ Feith and Castles, ed. *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, 498.

movement.¹⁵⁴ The Indonesian military was thus tasked with the suppression of the West Java Darul Islam insurgency but with limited and inconsistent support from the national government¹⁵⁵ and a lack of inspired military strategy.¹⁵⁶ The TNI was unable to overcome a movement with popular support¹⁵⁷ and the legitimacy that came from its prominent role in the Indonesian revolution and the defeat of the Dutch in West Java.¹⁵⁸ Kartosuwiryo's influence and those of his followers were also well-embedded in the religious and social networks throughout West Java.¹⁵⁹ The TNI's strategy from 1950 to 1958 was one based on a static defense of valuable terrain and cities and occasional forays into the countryside in response to the actions of DI.¹⁶⁰ The strategy described by the TNI's own history of the conflict was "conventional and incidental" and the stationing of TNI forces was designed for the "passive" defense of key areas. The deployment of TNI forces was designed to be static and immobile. This allowed the DI to make the initiative in all military encounters as well as to maintain and expand their civil administration system.¹⁶¹

MASYUMI, which played a significant role in the national government until at least 1955, also contributed to an environment that did not support a "whole-of-government" or inter-agency response to the DI problem. Many members of MASYUMI were personal friends of the DI rebels and both organizations believed in the necessity of

¹⁵⁴ Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 172.

¹⁵⁵ Howard M. Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) 1923 to 1957* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

¹⁵⁶ Dinas Sejarah TNI AD, *Penumpasan Pemerontakan DI-TII/SMK di Jawa Barat* (Bandung: TNI AD, 1974).

¹⁵⁷ Sartono Kartosuwiryo (son of S. M. Kartosuwiryo leader of Darul Islam), interview by author, February 25, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia. Recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

¹⁵⁸ Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 412.

¹⁵⁹ Farihin Ibnu Ahmad (former member Jemaah Islamiyah, son and grandson of Darul Islam members), interview by author, March 4, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

¹⁶⁰ Dinas Sejarah TNI AD, *Penumpasan Pemerontakan DI-TII/SMK di Jawa Barat*.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 98.

an Islamic state.¹⁶² The difference was that DI was willing to resort to violence and MASYUMI did not advocate violence as part of their official policy. However, the public repudiation of violence to achieve an Islamic state did not diminish MASYUMI's role as obstructionist to coordinated civil military action to keep the DI from achieving independence until the dissolving of MASYUMI in 1958.¹⁶³

In 1957 to 1958, the TNI, under pressure from TNI Chief of Staff General Nasution,¹⁶⁴ undertook a review of their counterinsurgency strategy.¹⁶⁵ General Nasution had spent the last ten years thinking and writing about how to conduct a counterinsurgency. In 1953, he wrote a primer on insurgency and counterinsurgency.¹⁶⁶ He stated, "During the three years of anti-guerilla war, we have not succeeded in providing a political-psychological and socio-economic basis to put an end to the revolts. It is a fact that the general condition has not improved, but deteriorated."¹⁶⁷ He not only believed that the grievances of the population must be addressed as part of any effective counterinsurgency strategy. He also believed that the population must be mobilized as an active ally of the counterinsurgency effort: "We are still awaiting the moment when a hopeful people can become the ally in an anti-guerilla war and spontaneously¹⁶⁸

¹⁶² Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) 1923 to 1957*, 200-201.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 234-237.

¹⁶⁴ General Abdul Haris Nasution was considered a hero of the revolution and was a former commander of the Siliwangi Division. He was active in the initial post-independence development of the Indonesian Armed forces but fell out of favor of President Sukarno and was removed from active service. While he was removed from power, he spent his time thinking and writing about how a relatively weak country could defend itself from foreign aggressors and internal rebellions. General Nasution was returned to power in 1957.

¹⁶⁵ The 1958 Committee on Army Doctrine reviewed the Armed Forces strategy for internal and external defense. The committee was heavily influenced by General Nasution's theory. Guy J. Parker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management (RM-3312-PR)* Research Memorandum, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963).

¹⁶⁶ General Nasution lost his position as Chief of Staff of the TNI in late 1952 thus giving him time to author his book *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. He returned to his former position in late 1955.

¹⁶⁷ A. H. Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), 100.

¹⁶⁸ General Nasution's use of the word "spontaneously" may seem to indicate that he believed mobilization may occur without organization, especially SMOs; however, his actual execution of guerrilla war fighting the Dutch and later "anti-guerrilla" war against the DI movement clearly indicted he valued the role of a variety of social organizations in mobilization.

participate actively in solving its security problems.”¹⁶⁹ Nasution envisioned a strategy in which all of the government cooperated to address the population’s grievances and then organized the population to improve their own environment and isolate and defeat the guerrillas.¹⁷⁰ This strategy was not possible until the civilian government was prepared to participate and the military was prepared to consider means beyond purely military ones.

With General Nasution’s concept as a starting point, the TNI conducted a thorough analysis of their counterinsurgency strategy. The primary outcome from their analysis was that the state could not hope to be victorious in a COIN environment “unless they could rely on a large measure of popular support.”¹⁷¹ The strategy clarifies the need to create and maintain active popular support, not just inactive sympathy; or in other words, mobilization of the population. The doctrine that emerged from this conclusion became known as “The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management.” This meant that the Army would have to play a developmental role to address some of the population’s grievances as well as a political role to organize and mobilize the population.¹⁷² At the tactical level, the employment of this doctrine specifically in fighting the DI insurgency was known as P4K (*pokok pelaksanaan pemulihan keamanan*) or implementation of basic security recovery.¹⁷³ The P4K program included analysis and classification of individual villages, depending on their level of support for the Darul Islam movement and it included active deployment of TNI forces to block the lines of communications between DI commanders and individual villages.¹⁷⁴ The TNI would assign military representatives in each village to organize a village defense organization (OKD), and to coordinate village development and reconstruction,

¹⁶⁹ Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare*, 100.

¹⁷⁰ C. L. M. Penders, and Sundhaussen Ulf, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985), 60-61.

¹⁷¹ Guy J. Parker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management (RM-3312-PR)* (Research Memorandum, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963), vi.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 1-49.

¹⁷³ Executed by the Siliwangi division and its commander COL Ibrahim Adjie. David J. Kilcullen, *The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99*, (PhD diss., New South Wales: University of New South Wales, 2000), 63.

¹⁷⁴ Couriers were the predominate means of communication for DI.

sometimes referred to as the village mutual development and assistance organization or *gotong royong*.¹⁷⁵ The military representative known as the village manager or Babinsa (*Bintara Pembina Desa*) also helped coordinate the local economic projects sponsored by the Siliwangi Institute (*Yayasan Siliwangi*),¹⁷⁶ which consisted of economic development projects staffed by villagers but supported by the military.¹⁷⁷

The DI's response to P4K's success was to declare "The Order of Total War," and DI members were authorized to attack villages and kill people not supporting the insurgency.¹⁷⁸ Their strategy was an attempt to use coercion to mobilize the population as their ability to use SMOs or the DI civil administration rapidly declined. The increase in death and destruction further alienated the population of West Java, especially when the TNI offered security from the increasingly belligerent actions of DI. DI's actions in the early 1960s stand in sharp contrast to their actions in the early 1950s. Discriminate and limited violence against symbols and representatives of the national government had degenerated into indiscriminate violence and common banditry against any target of opportunity, which seriously diminished their popular appeal.¹⁷⁹

As DI's popularity plummeted along with its village organizations, DI was forced into isolation in the mountainous terrain outside of the villages. DI had to depend on force to collect needed resources for its military operations, which further degraded their relationship with the local population. As the TNI soldiers worked to organize and mobilize the villagers, the relationship between the military and the local population began to improve. TNI commanders worked to ensure their men were demonstrating a companionate attitude and proper religious piety around the village inhabitants. By 1960, the TNI had developed the village defense organizations (OKDs) sufficiently to allow

¹⁷⁵ Gotong royong is the traditional cooperation and mutual assistance between villagers. The military used this term as well as *pembangunan desa* community or village development. Parker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management (RM-3312-PR)*, 38.

¹⁷⁶ The Siliwangi Institute was a development organization sponsored by the Siliwangi Division.

¹⁷⁷ David J. Kilcullen, *The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99*. PhD Dissertation (New South Wales: University of New South Wales, 2000), 28-78.

¹⁷⁸ Jackson, *Political Authority and Rebellion in Indonesia*, 17.

¹⁷⁹ Kilcullen, *The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99*, 57.

them to assist in “counter-guerrilla” operations searching for the isolated DI fighters. The TNI organized sweeps of the mountains around each village, with the majority of the manpower coming from the village OKD. This tactic was called *pagar betis* or fence of legs and was proven to be very successful.¹⁸⁰

In 1962, an isolated and wounded Kartosuwiryo was captured in a *pagar betis* operation in the mountains southeast of Bandung.¹⁸¹ Once Kartosuwiryo was captured, he was persuaded to issue a public command to his subordinates to surrender. Many DI leaders had already surrendered in the year before Kartosuwiryo’s capture because of the TNIs’ successful strategy and Kartosuwiryo’s call allowed many of the final commanders to surrender. The West Java Darul Islam insurgency was effectively over by the end of 1962.¹⁸²

This analysis of the change in the role of SMOs demonstrates that 1958 is a critical year. The role that SMOs played in supporting DI was diminished due to general neglect, perhaps due to lack of need as DI maintained a civil administration to administrate resources, and connect with the population as needed. The role that SMOs began to play in support of the state as the TNI shifted its strategy to engage the population is also most apparent in 1958, so the elements of SMT before and after 1958 will be examined.

C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

1. POS before 1958

The most evident element of POS available to DI before 1958 is the role that MASYUMI played in the government. In the early 1950s, MASYUMI was the largest

¹⁸⁰ LTC Nurwasis (Indonesia Army TNI-AD), interview by author February 26, 2009, Bandung Indonesia. TNI History Division, *Penumpasan Pemberontakan DI/TII S.M Kartosuwiryo DI Jawa Barat*, Kilcullen, *The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99*, 28-78.

¹⁸¹ Hiroko Horikoshi, “The Dar-ul Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process,” *Indonesia* 20 (October 1975): 76-77.

¹⁸² Soebardi, “Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia,” 129-130.

political party in Indonesia and its leader, Muhammad Natsir, was a member of the cabinet on and off from 1946 to 1951; and he continued to play an influential role afterwards.¹⁸³

Natsir and MASYUMI had high expectations for a parliamentary election in 1955; however, MASYUMI failed to gain the popular support it expected. MASYUMI only gained about 20% of the seats in parliament in combination with other Islamic parties. They all still fell short of a majority. MASYUMI's influence began to diminish after the 1955 election as well as the loss of confidence by many members that democracy was the way to achieve an Islamic state.¹⁸⁴ Natsir eventually supported a regional rebellion known as the PRRI¹⁸⁵ led by disenfranchised military officers. This betrayal, combined with MASYUMI's poor results in the 1955 election, allowed President Sukarno the opportunity to dissolve MASYUMI completely in 1958. Thus, any role that MASYUMI as an organization or individual leader in MASYUMI may have played as obstructionist to the government campaign to defeat DI was severely diminished by 1955 and mostly finished by 1958.¹⁸⁶

The second element of POS before 1958, and arguably the most important, was the absence of a political role played by the TNI. In DI-controlled villages, the representatives of the national government's civil service were forced to evacuate under pressure from DI fighters. Thus, the DI civil administration was the only organization playing the role of legitimate government.¹⁸⁷ The TNI strategy of static defense only of population centers in West Java allowed the DI the freedom to maneuver and gave them

¹⁸³ One example of MASYUMI's obstruction to TNI efforts was related to one of the authors by Professor Karl Jackson. A certain DI insurgent was captured in West Java by the TNI. MASYUMI demanded the prisoner be transferred to Jakarta. Once the prisoner was transferred to Jakarta, he was released and he quickly returned to West Java and rejoined the fighting. Apparently, the TNI overcame this problem when the same DI fighter was recaptured in West Java and once again, MASYUMI demanded he be sent to Jakarta. The TNI beheaded the prisoner and sent both the head and body to MASYUMI in Jakarta as requested.

¹⁸⁴ Feith and Castles, ed. *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, 202.

¹⁸⁵ For information on the PRRI Rebellion, see Herbert Feith, and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the Rebellion," *Pacific Affairs* 36, no. 1 (1963).

¹⁸⁶ Brakenridge, "The Darul Islam Movement in West Java: A Study of Religion and its Relationship to Insurgency," 59-68.

¹⁸⁷ van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, 102.

the political space to expand and maintain their influence, first through the MUI and later through the established DI civil service.¹⁸⁸ The TNI's neglect of the political space at the village level created political opportunity, of which the DI took advantage.¹⁸⁹ The TNI, in effect, gave up the political space in the villages to the DI insurgents.

2. POS after 1958

The exclusion of MASYUMI from the government in 1958 combined with President Sukarno's declaration of martial law and eventual adaptation of "Guided Democracy" shifted the available political opportunities away from any political opposition groups.¹⁹⁰ Thus, this limited the utility for other Islamic political parties or SMOs to make common cause with DI.

The TNI's new freedom to operate, combined with the shift in strategy outlined by General Nasution and the TNI strategy committee, led to the Siliwangi Division's successful application of the P4K strategy.¹⁹¹ The political and operational limitations placed on the TNI before 1958 may have been a blessing in disguise. Without the P4K strategy and the recognition of the role of popular support, simply allowing the TNI more freedom to operate may have resulted in more destruction and more civilian casualties. This would have made what was later to become a successful mobilization effort far more difficult to achieve because the population would probably have been less supportive of the TNI.¹⁹²

Instead, in 1958, armed with new political leeway and a new strategy focused on building popular support and mobilizing that supportive population to assist the government's forces, the political opportunities available to the DI quickly began to evaporate. The TNI development strategy reestablished legitimacy of the central

¹⁸⁸ Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo*, 80-102.

¹⁸⁹ TNI History Division, *Penumpasan Pemberontakan DI/TII S.M Kartosuwiryo DI Jawa Barat*.

¹⁹⁰ Horikoshi, "The Dar-ul Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process," 77.

¹⁹¹ Kilcullen, *The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99*.

¹⁹² As discussed in Chapter III, mobilization strategy based primarily on coercion has limited utility in the long term.

government and their organization of local SMOs allowed the counter mobilization of the population. As the TNI began to invade the political space of each village, the military and civilian representatives of DI were forced out. By the beginning of the 1960s, DI's hold on village life was severely diminished.¹⁹³

D. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES

1. MS before 1958

The foundation of the DI network comprised four identifiable but somewhat overlapping elements. The first element was the two MASYUMI-sponsored militias that fought the Dutch in West Java, which became the only representative of the armed struggle for independence when the republican forces evacuated West Java after the Renville Agreement in January 1948.¹⁹⁴

The second element was former students of Kartosuwiryo's political-religious Suffah Institute in Malangbong.¹⁹⁵ The Suffah Institute was a training institute in the "religio-political field." Its graduates were trained to focus on building political space for the future Islamic State through mobilization and military operations.¹⁹⁶

The third element was the religious and political leaders that were part of Kartosuwiryo's father-in-law's network and eventually came to support Kartosuwiryo during his work for political mobilization to defeat the Dutch. This group, known as *kiyayi*, were bound together through a network of personnel connectors with the teachers of their respective religious boarding schools known as *pesantrens*. As an example the West Java town of Tasikmalaya had 983 *pesantrens* with approximately 170,000 students all tied into this network.¹⁹⁷ This element also included the village leaders who eventually supported DI.

¹⁹³ LTC Nurwasis (Indonesia Army TNI-AD), interview by author, February 26, 2009, Bandung Indonesia.

¹⁹⁴ Feith and Castles, ed., *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, 498.

¹⁹⁵ Soebardi, "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia."

¹⁹⁶ Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, 56.

¹⁹⁷ Jackson, *Political Authority and Rebellion in Indonesia*, 8.

The last element was the former members of the West Java branch of MASYUMI that created a new SMO with Kartosuwiryo in 1948—the MUI, which was part of Kartosuwiryo’s process for building an Islamic State.¹⁹⁸

In addition to these elements, there also existed an organization called Urban DI, which supported the DI from the national capital in Jakarta. This organization built relationships with overt Islamic SMOs in Jakarta to access their resources. Urban DI would collect information and resources in Jakarta and smuggle them to DI-controlled areas.¹⁹⁹ These elements made up the military and civilian components of DI and were responsible for mobilizing the population, controlling resources and defending the territory of DI.²⁰⁰

2. MS after 1958

The mobilizing structure, in which DI was created and maintained, began to change as a result of the shift in the TNI strategy in 1958. The two most important components of P4K that led to TNI’s successful counterinsurgency efforts were first, the strategy to secure individual villages and eliminate the lines of communication between DI elements; and second, the mobilization of villagers through TNI-supported security and development organizations. This forced local DI representatives to operate in a vacuum and began to cause the breakdown in DI’s organizational cohesiveness.

Simultaneously, the focus on village security and popular support limited the role that DI’s civilian administration could play in a village. Once DI civil servants were forced out of a village, then the DI lost their best method for mobilizing the population and DI became an isolated network existing only in the nearby mountains.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ Sartono Kartosuwiryo (son of S. M. Kartosuwiryo, leader of Darul Islam), interview by author, February 25, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia. Recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

¹⁹⁹ Farihin Ibnu Ahmad (former member Jemaah Islamiyah, son and grandson of Darul Islam members), interview by author, March 4, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

²⁰⁰ van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, 69-126.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 125.

E. STRATEGIC FRAMES

1. SF before 1958

The ideology of building an Islamic state, combined with the protection of traditional roles of village and religious leaders, comprised the foundation for DI's strategic frame. The strategic frame built by Kartosuwiryo and his followers was based on two main themes. The first theme was the idea that an Islamic State was a "gift from God;" as such, it was the duty of every Muslim to strive for the implementation of an Islamic State. Thus, DI's efforts to create and maintain the NII were blessed by Allah and should be supported by all good Muslims. A government that was not based on Islamic law such as the secular Indonesian Republic was thus argued to be a government of infidels regardless of whether the actual leaders were Muslims or not.²⁰²

The second theme was that DI was the only legitimate government that defended and cared for the people of West Java. Since the Republican forces withdrew from West Java under Dutch pressure in 1948, and the Dutch captured the Republican leadership soon after, the DI, with its military and civilian arms, were the only organized government the people of West Java had during much of 1948 and 1949. In fact, Kartosuwiryo claimed that the Indonesian secular rebellion had failed and that DI was the only real rebellion still fighting for independence.²⁰³ After the withdrawal of the Dutch and with formal sovereignty passing to the Republican government, many people in West Java still saw DI as the only truly legitimate government, only DI had proved themselves worthy of the respect and obedience of the people of West Java.²⁰⁴

²⁰² Jackson, *Political Authority and Rebellion in Indonesia*, 5.

²⁰³ Sukarno, "The Dynamism of Revolution," in *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, ed. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 112.

²⁰⁴ Jackson, *Political Authority and Rebellion in Indonesia*, 1.

After 1958, members of Urban DI still worked through Islamic SMOs in Jakarta to funnel resources to DI in West Java. However as the TNI's security strategy progressed, the TNI were able to limit the access that DI members in Jakarta were able to have with members in West Java.²⁰⁵

Several other elements facilitated the acceptance of these two main themes of religious duty and proven loyalty. First, Kartosuwiryo maintained a reputation as a mystic leader with an aura of invincibility. This resulted from Sufi tendencies many Muslims in West Java favored. The Sundanese²⁰⁶ have a legend of a just king returning to lead the people out of turmoil, which also inspired many to believe that Kartosuwiryo was that just king. Regardless of whether the people of West Java truly believed Kartosuwiryo was a returning just king or invincible to gunfire, they did see him and DI as protectors of traditional values, which many people found appealing after the turmoil of Japanese occupation and the anti-Dutch rebellion.²⁰⁷

2. SF after 1958

Leading up to the TNI change in strategy in 1958, the TNI had maintained a propaganda effort to cast the DI members as criminals and thugs; naturally, it was more successful in non-DI areas than in areas where DI had popular support.²⁰⁸

Since the TNI units remained static before 1958 (especially even more so just prior to it), they ceded the strategic frames to the DI; but after 1958, when TNI units became active in the villages, they then had the opportunity to counter DI's strategic frames directly.

²⁰⁵ During one of the author's interview with Fahirin, he related the story of his grandfather who was a member of Urban DI and also associated with several Islamic SMOs in Jakarta. Fahirin's father was arrested at a train station in West Java in 1957 by the TNI as he was smuggling medicine he received from his grandfather in Jakarta and was taking it to DI members in West Java.

²⁰⁶ Sundanese are the ethnic group comprising the majority in West Java.

²⁰⁷ Horikoshi, "The Dar-ul Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process," 73-76.

²⁰⁸ Interview with resident of Bandung, Indonesia (name withheld). Interview by author, February 27, 2009, Bandung Indonesia. Interview was conducted in confidentially, and the interviewee is withheld by mutual consent.

DI's argument that they, and not the republican government, were the only adherents to a just Islamic government began to fall apart as the TNI made an effort to treat the villagers with respect. TNI soldiers would participate in worship with local villagers and demonstrate that they were as devout as the DI fighters were. As the TNI strategy progressed and DI lines of communication and resource lines broke down, DI members frequently abused locals in an effort to gain resources, which simply added to the TNI's position that cast DI members as criminals. Once Kartosuwiryo declared his total war strategy and allowed his soldiers to kill any Muslim that did not actively support DI, their reputation even worsened.

DI's second theme, that of being the only legitimate government, also broke down as the TNI established themselves as protectors of the villagers and defenders against the crimes of DI. As the Siliwangi Division organized villages to conduct development programs as well as self defense, they eventually regained much of the legitimacy they had lost in 1948, which critically affected the cohesiveness of DI's strategic frames.²⁰⁹

F. THE BENEFITS OF USING SMOS

1. For Darul Islam

During the emergence of the DI insurgency, the insurgent leaders already had relatively unrestricted access to the population but they needed a mechanism to mobilize and organize the population to support the insurgency. They also needed a mechanism to overcome potential free-rider tendencies in the population. The SMO of the local MASYUMI, and later the MUI, offered the solution. SMOs formed the basis for Kartosuwiryo to create his Islamic state. In the words of his son, "MASYUMI, the MUI the Islamic constitution, and finally the DI civil administration were all part of the process to develop the Islamic State."²¹⁰ The use of the West Java branch of MASYUMI

²⁰⁹ Colonel Murwoto (Indonesia Army–TNI-AD), interview by author, February 26, 2009, Bandung, Indonesia. TNI History Division, *Penumpasan Pemberontakan DI/TII S.M Kartosuwiryo DI Jawa Barat*.

²¹⁰ Sartono Kartosuwiryo (son of S. M. Kartosuwiryo leader of Darul Islam), interview by author, February 25, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia. Recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

allowed Kartosuwiryo a readymade organization with deep ties into individual villages with which he could organize and mobilize individual population groups. Once West Java MASYUMI was converted to MUI, it became even more his vehicle to transform the society of West Java into his vision of an Islamic state.

In the latter stages of the insurgency, DI continued to gain benefits from SMOs, but in a different way. Using sympathetic members of SMOs outside of the conflict area—mostly in Jakarta, DI gained material resources through supplies and information passed to them from members of Jakarta-based SMOs such as PERSIS.²¹¹

2. For the State

In 1958, when the state began its revised COIN strategy, it needed a mechanism to reconnect with the population, mobilize the population for development and security, and push DI representatives out of the village political space. For the state, SMOs initially provided a mechanism to assist the TNI in implementing their security and development programs. The development strategy was critical to reestablishing the state's legitimacy and the use of SMOs to assist in the implementation allowed a limited number of TNI resources to be multiplied through collective action. It also had an added benefit of keeping a local “face” on much of the development. In this way, they could overcome the local population's concern about potential dominance of the central governance. SMOs also helped the TNI overcome a natural free-rider response as villagers may appreciate the development programs provided by the state but may still have the inclination to support the insurgency.

G. STATE RESPONSE

The initial state response to the DI insurgency could be described as inconsistent. The conflict began when the TNI returned to West Java in 1948 and expected the DI to play the role of an ally just as they were before the Renville Agreement. Thus, the TNI

²¹¹ Farihin Ibnu Ahmad (former member Jemaah Islamiyah, son and grandson of Darul Islam members), interview by author, March 4, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

were completely ill-prepared to fight the DI and continued to focus on defeating the Dutch. Once the Dutch were defeated, the Indonesian government's first priority was to develop an effective government to manage the vast territory they had just inherited. Part of the new government's new organization included some MASYUMI members as part of the cabinet. The national organization of MASYUMI, although distinct from the regional MUI organization that supported DI, was still sympathetic to DI's goals and advocated a strategy of negotiations. The TNI application of an amnesty and integration policy in conjunction with large-scale search and destroy operations had little effect on DI. By 1957, which was to be the high-water mark for DI, the rebellion had about 13,000 active soldiers, not including supporters or sympathetic social movement members; and they were able to recruit approximately 1,000 new members each year.²¹²

DI's growth in 1957 coincided with the return of TNI General Nasution's focus on the conflict in West Java. General Nasution had been the Siliwangi Division commander during the fight for independence against the Dutch and was very familiar with West Java and the events during the Renville Agreement, but even more important was his eventual success against the Dutch and his understanding of insurgency and guerrilla warfare as a guerrilla.²¹³

During the formation of the newly independent Indonesia, General Nasution developed a strategy called "Total People's Warfare" as a way for a relatively weak Indonesia to defend itself from a stronger invading force. Nasution developed a plan to mobilize the population to replay their guerrilla role just as they had against the Dutch for a future conflict. This required the TNI to maintain and develop a close relationship with the rural population on which this "guerrilla force" would depend and to cultivate effective organizations with which to mobilize the population when needed.²¹⁴ He also theorized that the application of this strategy is a useful tool to counter guerrilla warfare. Although Nasution had developed this strategy in the early 1950s and articulated it in a book called *Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare*, which he wrote in 1952, national and

²¹² Jackson, *Political Authority and Rebellion in Indonesia*, 14-15.

²¹³ Penders and Ulf. *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography*.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 59.

personal events kept him from applying his strategy in West Java until 1958.²¹⁵ Up to 1958, when Nasution had turned his attention the conflict in West Java, the TNI's Amnesty and Integration strategy, combined with a short duration search and destroy mission, has produced little effects.²¹⁶

H. CONCLUSION

The success of the TNI strategy lies with the change in the TNI attitude toward the people of West Java and in their concept of how to conduct an anti-guerrilla war. However, does their success cast any light on the research question? Did the change in DI's use of SMOs as a mobilization tool alter their effectiveness?

DI originated as an SMO, with its foundation in the West Java MASYUMI branch, which became the MUI. When the DI's military strength grew strong enough to allow them to keep Republican civil servants out of the villages, the DI's own civil servants filled government roles. At this point then, West Java DI no longer needed a local SMO to make contentious claims against the government because they were the government and thus worked to limit contention in their villages. Where DI continued to need SMOs was at a national level as a provider of resources. Because the DI-controlled area was limited and they were limited in the amount of overt trade they could conduct with other areas of Indonesia, DI needed some method to access resources beyond their geographic limitations. DI depended on resources provided through their relationship with SMOs such as MASYUMI, GPII and PERSIS.²¹⁷ DI's relationship with these SMOs, mostly located in Jakarta, allowed DI to facilitate a surrogate mobilization of sympathetic Muslims outside of the TNI reach, and thus, laid claim to resources beyond their geographic scope.

The TNI did not initially consider SMOs in their strategy, reasonable since DI was not using SMOs but an overt civil service, which was effectively disrupted as TNI

²¹⁵ Penders and Ulf. *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography*.

²¹⁶ Jackson, *Political Authority and Rebellion in Indonesia*, 17.

²¹⁷ Farihin Ibnu Ahmad (former member Jemaah Islamiyah, son and grandson of Darul Islam members), interview by author, March 4, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

troops returned to individual villages. The TNI strategy did have the effect of counter-mobilization but not on demobilization. To implement Nasution's strategy, Colonel Adjie, the Siliwangi commander built his own SMOs: the village defense committee and the village development committees, which were designed and supported by the TNI and were maintained by the Babinsa, the TNI village coordinator.

Clearly, the role of SMOs on both sides, although not the only factor in the conflict's outcome, played a critical role in the outcome. The utility of SMOs as a mobilizing element allowed DI to emerge and grow. DI grew enough to the point where it displaced Republican influence and in effect allowed them to establish a secure geographic area. Then, the DI turned their SMOs into a civil administration. Once the TNI changed their strategy and began working in villages to displace the DI influence, they were successful; and the DI, which by then was without any local SMOs on which they could depend, were defeated.

The TNI executed a successful *counter*-mobilization of the population after 1958 where they harnessed the population through their own SMOs and mobilized them to counter DI's influence. The most famous military tactic used by the TNI in West Java was the *pagar betis*; this was a direct result of that successful counter-mobilization. The success of this tactic serves to indicate the triumph of TNI counter-mobilization on the population of West Java.

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V. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

This case study explores the relationship between the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) movement and several social movement organizations, some created by Jemaah Islamiyah and some that have emerged independently but with sympathy for Jemaah Islamiyah's goals. This case study shows that JI has become more resilient to state repression since it switched its strategy of mobilization following the aftermath of the Bali bombing.

To test the hypothesis that insurgencies that use social movement organizations mobilize populations more efficiently, the JI movement is examined from its emergence in 1993 to its current operation. JI has been responsible for a series of terror attacks in Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia since its inception. A string of church bombings on Christmas Eve 2000, a bomb attack in 2000 against the Philippines ambassador to Indonesia, and the devastating Bali bombing of 2002 are just a few of the attacks attributed to JI.²¹⁸ JI began as an insurgency with a focus on building a small underground organization or vanguard with limited desire to mobilize a mass base;²¹⁹ thus, it had little use for social movement organizations then. However, over the course of its development, JI changed its strategy to include mobilization of the population.²²⁰ To build popular support and develop a mass appeal, JI's leadership began to utilize social movement organizations.²²¹ This shift in strategy presents an opportunity to examine the relative efficiency of JI as an insurgency before and after they started using social movement organizations (SMO).

²¹⁸ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003).

²¹⁹ Elena Pavlova, *From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to the PUPJI*. Working Paper # 117 (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2006).

²²⁰ Noor Huda Ismail (Indonesian analyst, social entrepreneur, former student at JI associated boarding school), interview by author, March 5, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²²¹ Badrus Sholeh (lecturer Islamic University of Indonesia), interview by author, February 24, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

B. BACKGROUND

1. The Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah

The group Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah, or more commonly known as Jemaah Islamiyah or simply JI, was created in early 1993 by two Islamic militants associated with the Darul Islam movement.²²² The founders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, developed a difference of opinion with the Darul Islam leadership, which prompted them to split from DI and form a new organization. JI was built around the existing network of DI supporters, especially some of the DI members that Sungkar had helped travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1980s to receive military training in camps sponsored by the organization that would later become Al-Qaeda.²²³ Initially based in Malaysia to avoid Indonesian government repression,²²⁴ Sungkar and Ba'asyir created their organization from the readymade cadre of trained and experienced militants drawn from the DI network.²²⁵ The goal of JI, similar to DI, remained the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia or, in Sungkar's words, "to establish Dawlah Islamiyah (an Islamic state) by means of jihad."²²⁶

²²² More specifically, a "second generation" of Darul Islam based on the remnants of the DI insurgency that was defeated in the early to mid 1960s in various areas inside Indonesia. See Chapter IV for analysis of the West Java branch of Darul Islam.

²²³ Many of these militants had a stronger sense of loyalty to Sungkar as he had actively facilitated their training in Afghanistan and many saw him as their true inspirational leader. International Crisis Group, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing* (Singapore: International Crisis Group, 2005).

²²⁴ Sungkar and Ba'asyir fled to Malaysia in the early 1980s to avoid re-arrest by President Suharto's authoritarian regime. President Suharto was a former general who displaced President Sukarno in 1965 and established the "New Order." Suharto's regime actively repressed Islamist and radical Islamic groups until the early 1990s. Suharto's regime collapsed in 1998 and Indonesia struggled through a transition to democracy. Sungkar and Ba'asyir remained in Malaysia as they created and developed their new organization until the fall of Suharto. Sungkar and Ba'asyir returned to Indonesia in 1999. Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing Pte Ltd., 2004), 178-179.

²²⁵ International Crisis Group, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*.

²²⁶ Sally Neighbour, *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia* (Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004), 104. Quoting from an interview published in *Nida'ul Islam*, February-March 1997.

To achieve the goal of establishing Islamic state, Sungkar's political analysis or *ijtihad politik* is that JI should remain an underground organization until time is ripe.²²⁷ He saw the establishment of a strong Islamic community or *jama'ah* as the first step in the eventual conversion of Indonesia from a secular liberal democracy into a strict *sharia* state.²²⁸ Sungkar believed that his *jama'ah* must remain a small elite community or vanguard focused on building its strength. This indicates that Sungkar did not see the need to build popular support as a requirement to replace the Indonesian government. Sungkar and Ba'asyir designed their organization as a secret isolated organization, not a mass movement.²²⁹

To facilitate the development of the organization, the leadership of JI drafted the PUPJI (the General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah) in 1996 to give the senior leadership guidance on how to develop the organization. The PUPJI set up a well-defined organizational structure for JI and defined the method by which JI should achieve its goals. The PUPJI outlined geographic commands called *Mantiqis* with responsibility to control individual *fiah* (cells) within its area of responsibility. To establish an Islamic state, the PUPJI called for a core group (*Qiy'adah Rosyidah*) to be used as a vanguard to create and nurture a solid base (*Qoi'dah Sholabah*) of followers. These followers were expected to provide mutual support to other members but remain a secret organization (*Tandzim Sirri*) building its military strength until such time they were able to establish a secure base (*Qoi'dah Aminah*) from which JI was able to launch

²²⁷ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates* (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2002b), 3.

²²⁸ According to Australian journalist Sally Neighbor, Sungkar saw the future of jihad in Southeast Asia as the development of three elements of the Islamic community—faith, brotherhood and military strength. Neighbour, *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, 103-105.

²²⁹ Pavlova, *From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to the PUPJI*.

military operations against the rest of Indonesia.²³⁰ As one JI member described JI under Sungkar this way: “[W]e are not a mass organization...we want people who will be loyal to the aims of the group.”²³¹

2. Reconsidering the Role of Popular Support (Mobilize or Die)

JI, as a movement, changed its mind about the necessity of mobilization of popular support and political engagement soon after the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in Indonesia and the death of Abdullah Sungkar, both of which occurred in the late 1990s.²³² During 1999 (after Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia and near the time of Sungkar’s death), JI conducted a strategy seminar. The members decided that the Muslims of Indonesia were weak in their religious devotion thus “the people are not ready” and “*sharia* [may be] perceived as a burden.”²³³ Therefore, the participants agreed on a hybrid strategy to focus on building a safe area or a “secure base” within Indonesia from which they could establish *sharia* as well as launch military operations against the rest of Indonesia in conjunction with a program to prepare the rest of the population of Indonesia for eventual implementation of *sharia*. Whether Sungkar attended this seminar is unclear but it is about this same time that Sungkar died and was replaced as JI emir by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.²³⁴ Whether Ba’asyir already had a method in mind for preparing of the population at this point is also unclear but the success of another radical Islamic organization was to show him a potential solution.

During 1999, another radical Islamic group emerged with similar goals to JI but diametrically different methods to achieve those goals. Laskar Jihad or The Jihad

²³⁰ JI analyst Elena Pavlova describes this strategy as first, a *counter society* strategy as JI tries to establish an isolated community separate from the rest of Indonesian society, and then once sufficient strength is acquired, JI moves into their *counter-state* strategy, at which time they will try to change the Indonesian government by force. Pavlova, *From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to the PUPJI*.

²³¹ Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 129.

²³² President Suharto stepped down in May 1998 and Abdullah Sungkar died of heart failure in November 1999.

²³³ Neighbour, *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, 160.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 159-169.

Paramilitary Force emerged during the turmoil following Suharto's resignation.²³⁵ Laskar Jihad (LJ) was an overt Islamic social movement organization dedicated to shifting Indonesian's secular government toward an Islamic state.²³⁶ Some Islamic elements in the TNI as well as the Indonesian civilian government saw the utility of a radical Islamic group publicly calling for more Islamic influence in the Indonesian government. Starting in January 2000, LJ organized several mass rallies in Jakarta to protest the communal violence occurring between Christians and Muslims in the Maluku Islands (an area in eastern Indonesia); the largest rally was in April 2000 with approximately 100,000 participants.²³⁷ LJ claimed that the government was failing to protect Muslims so they organized a militia to travel to the conflict area and fight the local Christians. LJ's activities had the support of elements in the government (Amien Rais, speaker of Parliament, and Hamzah Haz, a future Indonesian vice president, both spoke at LJ rallies) and the military (military units provided training, transportation and possibly weaponry). Even politicians who were opposed to the vigilantism of LJ were reluctant to speak out against them for fear of alienating their constituents.²³⁸ LJ accumulated popular support and at its height had about 10,000 members. It garnered support from civilian and military leaders including financial, training, and logistical support and its popularity effectively shielded its members from government repression as in the case of LJ's founder Jafar Thalib who was arrested, then released, rearrested and tried but acquitted.²³⁹

The popular support and resources that LJ quickly accumulated, as well as the political shield against repression, most likely influenced Ba'asyir as he was considering

²³⁵ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise of The Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia," *Indonesia* (2002): 145-169.

²³⁶ The actual social movement organization was Communication Forum of the Followers of the *Sunna* and the Community of the Prophet or FKAWJ; however, Laskar Jihad as its militia manifestation is better known.

²³⁷ Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise of The Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia."

²³⁸ Damien Kingsbury, and Clinton Fernandes, "Terrorism in Archipelagic Southeast Asia," in *Violence in between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*, ed. Damien Kingsbury, Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2005, 9-52.

²³⁹ Zachary Abuza, "Sectarian Bloodletting in Indonesia's Troubled Sualwesi and Maluku Provinces: Jemaah Islamiyah's New Lease on Life," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 2007.

the evolution of JI after Sungkar's death. Along with current events, the Darul Islam (especially the West Java conflict led by S.M Kartosuwiryo), had always influenced Ba'asyir.²⁴⁰ Ba'asyir looked to Kartosuwiryo as a role model and Kartosuwiryo grew his rebellion out of a social movement organization.²⁴¹ The combination of Kartosuwiryo's example and the mobilization success of LJ seem to have prompted Ba'asyir to consider popular mobilization through SMOs as a better course of action to achieve JI's goals than a completely secret vanguard organization, which had shown little success.

Ba'asyir established the MMI (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* or Indonesian Mujahidin Council) in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in August 2000, as an umbrella organization that sought to link various social and political organizations committed to the establishment of Islamic law in Indonesia.²⁴² MMI is an overt public organization using the Indonesian political system²⁴³ to mobilize resources to support its *sharia* goals.²⁴⁴

MMI and JI followed in the footsteps of LJ and mobilized their own associated militias to respond to communal violence in the Maluku Islands as well as Central Sulawesi. These militias, known as Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah, were more overt or public than JI and traveled to the conflict areas with much media fanfare. This offered MMI an opportunity to conduct paramilitary training for its members without the

²⁴⁰ The International Crisis Group highlights the inspirational role that the Darul Islam insurgency played on the development of JI. International Crisis Group, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia* (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2002a).

²⁴¹ The West Java branch of MASYUMI and the creation of the MUI assisted Kartosuwiryo in creating his Islamic state. See Chapter IV for analysis of the Darul Islam Insurgency in West Java.

²⁴² International Crisis Group, *Indonesia Background: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*, 3.

²⁴³ Professor Zachary Abuza sees MMI as using a "patina of democracy," an organization using the democratic system to achieve undemocratic goals. Abuza, "Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model: Assessing Hezbollah's Influence," 15-26.

²⁴⁴ Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf, *The Image of the Other as Enemy: Radical Discourse in Indonesia* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2006).

fear of government repression. It also allowed MMI, in cooperation with KOMPAK, another Islamic SMO, an opportunity to distribute videos of the conflict to donors and potential recruits in Java.²⁴⁵

The creation of MMI exacerbated an existing schism in JI. Hambali, the operational chief of JI as well as commander of Mantiqi 1 and many other members of Mantiqi 1, still favored Sungkar's concept of a secret vanguard organization as well as the Al Qaeda model of attacking targets associated with the West. This faction remained more influential due to greater resources²⁴⁶ and also because, simply, it was more active. The Philippine Ambassador and Christmas Eve bombings of 2000 were mostly Mantiqi 1 projects that probably did not have Ba'asyir's full support.²⁴⁷ Many JI members, especially from Mantiqi 1, had been disappointed with Ba'asyir as emir and were less influenced by his leadership. As Ba'asyir worked to expand JI's ability for *dakwah* or outreach, Hambali worked to expand JI's preparation for *jihad*. For operational matters, Hambali was the strategist and leader.²⁴⁸ By 2001, JI members had built an infrastructure to harness popular support for mobilization. However, JI had limited success as more influential members were still focused on bombing and other terroristic acts rather than popular mobilization.

²⁴⁵ International Crisis Group, *Indonesian Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi* (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2004).

²⁴⁶ Greater resources by the "non-mobilization" element in JI would seem to contradict part of the argument of this thesis; however, this was a temporary anomaly due to the relative immaturity of the "pro-mobilization" element and the resources that the non-mobilization Mantiqi 1 received from Al-Qaeda. International Crisis Group. *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia*.

²⁴⁷ Sidney Jones and the International Crisis Group ICG have documented the rift between the "pro-bombing" faction in JI and the faction that supports a long-term insurgency strategy. The "pro-insurgency" element does not have problems with violence; however, they saw violence as a means to an end not the end itself. This faction sees violence used to exacerbate communal violence or assassinate government officials as productive for mobilization but violence against western targets harmful as it does not support mobilization and draws increased government repression. See Sidney Jones, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies ISEAS, Singapore, Presentation, July 5, 2005, http://nettv.1-net.com.sg/iseas/sidney_july05/#.

²⁴⁸ Neighbour, *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, 167-168.

3. The Bali Bombing

The Bali bombing in 2002 that killed 202 people,²⁴⁹ many of them foreigners, brought a quick response from the Indonesian government.²⁵⁰ The Indonesian National Police (INP), with technical assistance from the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and the U.S. Government's Anti-terror Assistance Program (ATA), were very successful in capturing the bombing cell and eventually capturing or killing most of the JI members directly associated with the bombing.²⁵¹ The bombing also encouraged the INP to form a specialized anti-terror police unit known as Densus 88 or Detachment 88.²⁵² This unit continues to be very successful in breaking up JI bombing cells.²⁵³ The indiscriminate nature of the Bali bombing gave the Indonesian Government greater legitimacy to break up what some people had seen as a religious community.²⁵⁴

The effective Indonesian repression of JI, especially on elements of Mantiqi 1, allowed Ba'asyir's followers to gain ascendancy inside JI but caused the deterioration of the formal structure of JI. JI morphed into a less rigid structure of like-minded individuals, many of whom have accepted Ba'asyir's desire to engage in the political process to achieve specific goals through SMOs, mobilize popular support, and focused

²⁴⁹ JI used a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) and two smaller bombs set off by two suicide bombers. The blasts on October 12, 2002, which killed 202 people, mostly Australians, was set off in front of two nightclubs in the Kuta Beach area of Bali. A smaller bomb was also left outside the U.S. consulate.

²⁵⁰ Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia* (Singapore: Ridge Books, 2004), 8-12.

²⁵¹ Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia*.

²⁵² Tempo Interactive, "Jakarta Police Inaugurates Special Anti-Terrorism Detachment," *Tempo Interactive*, August 27, 2004, <http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2004/08/27/brk.20040827-01.uk.html>.

²⁵³ Greg Barton, "Indonesia's Year of Living Normally: Taking the Long View on Indonesia's Progress," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2008): 123-145.

²⁵⁴ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

violence;²⁵⁵ JI's leadership has not given up the use of violence but it now simply sees random acts of violence, especially against innocent Muslims or western targets, as counterproductive.²⁵⁶

In addition to targeted violence, former JI emir Ba'asyir has dedicated considerable energy to building up the MMI as a social organization that can create political pressure on local and national governments, as well as enhance the public image of radical Islam.²⁵⁷ Recently, Ba'asyir has left MMI and created a second overt social movement organization called Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid or JAT. Although members of MMI and JAT disagree on some administrative issues, they all share the desire to install an Islamic State in Indonesia. Thus, the covert JI organization along with overt MMI and JAT, have formed an overt/covert team with fairly effective division of labor and specialization of mobilization tasks.²⁵⁸

4. Jemaah Islamiyah and Social Movement Organizations

Sometime in late 1999, the ascendant leadership in JI decided that SMOs can play a valuable role in the development and expansion of its own underground organization and in the mobilization of the population.

Jemaah Islamiyah is an insurgency, an underground movement and it uses above ground organizations [SMOs] in order to channel and facilitate their political activities...MMI was created by Ba'asyir in order to facilitate JI's political activities... although there was some debate within JI, Ba'asyir insisted that MMI was needed...Ba'asyir knows that the environment in Indonesia is favorable to [Islamic] movements as long as they are not committing violence against Muslims...Ba'asyir knows that he will be immune from government repression as long as they do not incite people directly to commit violence...there is a reluctance of law enforcement agencies to apply strict measures against Ba'asyir's above ground organization...the environment [in Indonesia] will not allow stern

²⁵⁵ Sidney Jones (senior analyst, International Crises Group, Indonesia), interview by author, March 3, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia.

²⁵⁶ Zachary, "Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model: Assessing Hezbollah's Influence."

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Interview with Indonesian analyst (name withheld), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement.)

measures against organizations that are threatening but not actively engaged in violence...MMI and JAT can grow and expand and can challenge government without fear of repression.²⁵⁹

Ba'asyir and his supporters see the role of SMOs as the most effective way to gain resources and, more importantly, challenge the government.²⁶⁰

JI has adopted three methods for use of SMOs. First, it creates, or more accurately, some of its members facilitate the creation of an SMO aligned with the goals of JI and can fill gaps in JI's operation that it cannot fill as an underground organization. The most apparent examples of the method are MMI and JAT, which are explored later in this chapter. As addressed in Chapter II, insurgencies desire a strong link to the population. In this case, MMI and JAT provide JI's that link.

Second, JI partners with or allows its associated SMOs to partner with other SMOs that have similar short-term or long-term goals. This is apparently justified by the concept of *tansiq bainal jama'ah* or collaboration.²⁶¹ The most apparent example of this is JI's partnership with groups such as KPPSI, HTI, FPI, and KOMPAK.²⁶²

Lastly, JI has also taken the opportunity to allow its operational cells to infiltrate other SMOs, usually sympathetic but legitimate non-violent organizations and then use that membership to gain access to the organization's members and resources to facilitate JI's activities. The most recent example of this strategy was exposed in June 2008 when

²⁵⁹ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

²⁶⁰ Noor Huda Ismail (Indonesian analyst, social entrepreneur, former student at JI-associated boarding school), interview by author, March 5, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁶¹ As described by Noor Huda Ismail. This type of collaboration is allowed by the Koran, Noor Huda Ismail (Indonesian analyst, social entrepreneur, former student at JI associated boarding school), interview by author, March 5, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁶² KPPSI–South Sulawesi Islamic Organization affiliated with MMI focused on incorporating Islamic law in South, Sidney Jones (senior analyst, International crises group, Indonesia), interview by author, March 3,d 2009, Jakarta Indonesia; HTI–Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami–radical Islamist organization founded in Jordan but now with members in Indonesia, Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia*; FPI–Defenders of Islam–tried to recruit mujahidin to fight U.S. troops in Afghanistan, organized 10,000 people to demonstrate in Jakarta against U.S. actions in Afghanistan, Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia*; KOMPAK–Komite Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis–Action Committee for Tackling the Consequences of Crisis–Java based established by DDII also produced propaganda videos to raise funds, recruit mujahidin and purchase weapons, Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia*.

police in Indonesia arrested a JI cell planning the bombing of a café in Palembang, Sumatra. The JI bombing cell members were also members of a local SMO known as FAKTA (Anti-apostasy Movement Forum). Analysis of this bombing cell by the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)²⁶³ indicates that the use of FAKTA by the JI bombing cell was an intentional strategy to enable JI to gain access to FAKTA's resources and operate more effectively.²⁶⁴

A pattern emerges where JI intentionally uses an SMO either through deception such as in the Palembang/FAKTA case, through a temporary partnership with like-minded organizations such as the HTI and KOMPAK, or through the intentional creation of a sympathetic social movement organization as in MMI or JAT.²⁶⁵

C. ACTIVITIES OF MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA AND JAMA'AH ANSHARUT TAUHID

To explore the relationship between JI and social movement organizations further, the examination focuses on MMI and JAT.

1. Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir organized the "first national congress of mujahidin"²⁶⁶ in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in August 5-7, 2000 to bring together various groups that were striving for the implementation of *sharia* law in Indonesia. The conference was attended by representatives of radical groups as well as mainstream organizations such as NU²⁶⁷

²⁶³ The ICPVTR is a research center based in Singapore. See their website at <http://pvtr.org>.

²⁶⁴ Interview, ICPVTR Analyst, (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

²⁶⁵ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

²⁶⁶ Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise of The Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia."

²⁶⁷ NU is Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Islamic social organization with about 40 million members. NU is considered moderate and usually not associated with radical groups. See NU's website at <http://www.nu.or.id>.

and Muhammadiyah²⁶⁸ (according to Ba'asyir).²⁶⁹ The conference concluded with the formation of MMI as an SMO²⁷⁰ with the goal to harness the collective energies of the other groups to install *sharia* in Indonesia. Although MMI and JI have basically the same goals and many of the same members,²⁷¹ MMI has been careful to define its goal as implementation of *sharia* law and not the change of the Indonesian government. This allows them to operate overtly without the threat of a government charge of treason.²⁷² MMI has about 100 radical groups within its organization and about 30 branches throughout Indonesia. Its leadership consists almost entirely of radical Islamists.²⁷³

Zachary Abuza interviewed Ba'asyir about the role of MMI and states:

The MMI is an institution where a lot of people from a lot of Muslim groups including NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah²⁷⁴ gather at one table to discuss how to get our vision of *sharia* implemented into national laws... The long-term strategy is to get Indonesia 100 percent based on *sharia*. As long as Muslims are in the majority, the country should be ruled by *sharia*.²⁷⁵

Recently, MMI has focused on changing *peraturan daerah (PerDa)* or local government regulation. These are regulation set by local governments such as city mayors or town councils.²⁷⁶ MMI representatives and local affiliates place pressure on local government officials to encourage local government to implement certain elements

²⁶⁸ Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia with about 29 million members. Muhammadiyah is generally considered moderate but more aligned with the modernist movement and thus more affiliated with stricter interpretation of the Quran. See the website at <http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/>.

²⁶⁹ Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 142.

²⁷⁰ MMI calls itself a civil society NGO.

²⁷¹ "MMI membership is a who's who of Southeast Asian Terrorism." Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 142.

²⁷² Ahnaf, *The Image of the Other as Enemy: Radical Discourse in Indonesia*.

²⁷³ Gordon P. Means, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2009).

²⁷⁴ NU and Muhammadiyah are two social movement organizations that are moderate and mainstream and have a combined membership of about 59 million Muslims, making them two of the largest Islamic organizations in the world.

²⁷⁵ Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 142.

²⁷⁶ In Indonesia, a district level government is either a kota in an urban area or a kabupaten in a rural area. Each has a mayor for a kota or a bupati in a kabupaten and a local council.

of *sharia* law. As examples of this trend, some local governments in West Java and South Sulawesi have made it illegal for women to leave their homes without wearing the Islamic headscarf or to travel after dark without a male escort. Their plan is to pressure local governments gradually to enact some laws now so that in the future, when there is a nationwide struggle to implement complete *sharia* law, then those areas already operating under partial *sharia* law will be supportive of a complete *sharia* law.²⁷⁷ Some Indonesian analysts call this “*sedikat-sedikat*” or Indonesia for “just a little” to describe this strategy of piecemeal implementation of *sharia*.²⁷⁸

This strategy of “eroding the margins” may make eventual change in Indonesian government more acceptable.²⁷⁹ In the short term, it allows JI to expand the perceived legitimacy of their activities; thus, giving them more “political space.”²⁸⁰

MMI also plays the role of offering radical foreign elements, such as from Saudi Arabia, a point of contact for transfer of resources.²⁸¹ Donors include the Islamic International Relief Organization, Al Haramain, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, which may share the goals of JI but would have difficulty in donating funds directly to the underground organization.²⁸²

2. Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)

JAT was also created by Ba'asyir as an SMO to mobilize Indonesian popular support for *sharia*. JAT was created in mid-2008 in a suburb of Jakarta, focused its

²⁷⁷ Interview, ICPVTR Analyst, (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

²⁷⁸ Interview with Indonesian analyst (name withheld), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

²⁷⁹ LTC James Robinson, interview by author. February 23, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁸⁰ Political Space is a term used by Kumar Ramakrishna to describe the perceived legitimacy and credibility of a group. Kumar Ramakrishna, “Countering Radical Islam in Southeast Asia,” in *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*, ed. Paul J. Smith (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2005), 156.

²⁸¹ Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model: Assessing Hezbollah's Influence.”

²⁸² Means, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia*, 171.

energy on *dakwah* or religious outreach, and has begun to play the role of contact organization for potential JI members. JAT is becoming the “open face” of JI, thus allowing members of the community inspired by JAT or other radical Islamic groups’ message to have a public point of contact.²⁸³ Many members of JI and JAT believe that the “community is not yet ripe for jihad” so more preparation, recruitment, and mobilization is required.²⁸⁴ For this task, JAT is filling the role that an underground and secretive organization such as JI could not play without drawing rapid government repression. JAT is the mechanism that allows JI members unrestricted access to the population to proselytize and exacerbate grievances all without fear of government repression.²⁸⁵

One senior Indonesian National Police (INP) counterterrorism officer believes that MMI and JAT have worked out a division of labor. MMI is responsible for rebuilding the former JI and DI network,²⁸⁶ building political pressure especially at local governments,²⁸⁷ and facilitating the receipt of donations from Middle Eastern Islamic charities.²⁸⁸ On the other hand, JAT has the role of recruiting new members not formerly in JI’s network, making common cause, and building collaboration with other Islamic

²⁸³ Farihin Ibnu Ahmad (former member Jemaah Islamiyah, son and grandson of Darul Islam members), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

²⁸⁴ Noor Huda Ismail (Indonesian analyst, social entrepreneur, former student at JI associated boarding school), interview by author. March 5, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁸⁵ Badrus Sholeh (lecturer Islamic University of Indonesia), interview by author. February 24, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

²⁸⁶ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

²⁸⁷ Interview, ICPVTR Analyst, (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

²⁸⁸ Means, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia*, 171.

radical groups to facilitate their goals.²⁸⁹ Both organization share overlapping membership with JI, as an ICPVTR analyst puts it, “it’s the same people,” just working at complementary goals through complementary organizations.²⁹⁰

3. Examination of the Changes in JI Using Social Movement Theory (SMT)

JI’s shift in strategy to include mobilization of the population and its decision to use SMOs took place between 1999 and 2002. SMT is used to explore JI’s efficiency before and after its decision to use SMOs to mobilize the population.

D. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

1. Jemaah Islamiyah’s Political Opportunities without Social Movement Organizations

The original Darul Islam insurgency and especially the West Java branch under S. M. Kartosuwiryo heavily influenced Sungkar and Ba’asyir.²⁹¹ In addition, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were already active in the radical Islamic movement when one such group called *Komando Jihad* was created by former Darul Islam members and then efficiently dismantled by Suharto’s security apparatus.²⁹² The apparent lesson Sungkar learned from both these movements was that an organization must remain secret and underground until it has sufficient military capacity to challenge the state.²⁹³

Political dissent, especially radical Islamic dissent, was not allowed under the Suharto regime and would elicit rapid and harsh repression. There was an underlying

²⁸⁹ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

²⁹⁰ Interview, ICPVTR Analyst, (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

²⁹¹ See Chapter IV for West Java DI history.

²⁹² International Crisis Group, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia*, 5.

²⁹³ Neighbour, *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, 167.

frustration with many disenfranchised Indonesians and some were able to funnel that frustration through participation in non-political religious activities. This was how Sungkar, Ba'asyir, and other frustrated radicals worked to build their network first as part of a second generation DI movement and later as their own organization. However, the members remained a select few that were either members of DI or had participated in Sungkar- and Ba'asyir-affiliated religious schools.²⁹⁴ The limited political opportunities in Indonesia in the early 1990s forced Sungkar and Ba'asyir to remain in Malaysia until the fall of the Suharto regime.²⁹⁵

2. Jemaah Islamiyah's Political Opportunities with Social Movement Organizations

The fall of the Suharto regime and the rapid shift from a centralized authoritarian government to a decentralized democracy presented JI with a dramatic reorientation of political opportunities. These dramatic changes not only allowed Sungkar and Ba'asyir to return safely to Indonesia, they also facilitated the rise of overt Islamic militias and civil society organizations such as Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). The rapid changes in Indonesian's institutions of power also allowed simmering communal and ethnic competition to spiral into violence.²⁹⁶

Just as political opportunities were opening for JI, the Bali bombing jarred many Indonesians with the glaring reality that there were groups inside Indonesia that were radical and saw violence and the death of innocent civilians, even fellow Muslims, as a legitimate tool with which to achieve their objective. Whereas the INP had been reluctant or lacked political support to crack down on overt groups such as Laskar Jihad and the Indonesian government had been somewhat slow to participate in regional anti-terrorism coordination, the Bali blast motivated the government to reexamine its attitude. The INP partnered with foreign law enforcement agencies to catch and try the Bali bombers

²⁹⁴ Peter Chalk and Carl Ungerer, *Neighbourhood Watch: The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia* (Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008).

²⁹⁵ Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 48-61.

²⁹⁶ Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing Pte Ltd., 2004).

quickly and the Indonesian president²⁹⁷ accepted more substantial cooperation in anti-terror activities.²⁹⁸ JI's political opportunities began to diminish as the INP followed the evidence and arrested more and more JI leaders.

In the years since the first Bali attack, the political opportunities available to JI have shifted again, from limited political opportunities under Suharto, to a widening under a new democratic government in 1999, to new limitations after the Bali 2002 bombing, and finally now again to a broadening of political opportunities as the Indonesian population began to resent any perceived police heavy handedness. The shock of the bombing has faded and world events have given Muslims in Indonesia reason to consider the message of Islam under attack. JI has taken advantage of this shift in public opinion and thus, "JI has changed their image in order to get popular support."²⁹⁹ With the coming of democracy and the rather abrupt decentralization of the Indonesian government, JI found itself in a country where members of government were extremely sensitive to popular will. This combination of limited public patience for terrorism but popular disagreement with broad government repression limits the tools available to the Indonesian police. Thus, political opportunities have expanded for opposition groups willing live in the seam between violent opposition and peaceful political participation.

E. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION OR MOBILIZING STRUCTURES

1. Jemaah Islamiyah's Mobilizing Structures without Social Movement Organizations

JI's method to build its mobilizing structure relied on four components—friendship, kinship, madrassa, and mosque.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ At this time, it was President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

²⁹⁸ Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia*.

²⁹⁹ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

³⁰⁰ Briefing by Dr. Zachary Abuza, "The Future of Jemaah Islamiyah and the Challenge of Radical Islam in Southeast Asia," given to U.S. Pacific Command PACOM Staff, Honolulu Hawaii, December 2007.

a. Friendship

JI's formal creation in 1993 did not mark the start of a new network, just the adaptation of an existing network. While still part of the DI organization during the 1980s, Sungkar facilitated the training of as many as 800 militants³⁰¹ in camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.³⁰² Once Sungkar and Ba'asyir created their new organization, many of the members of DI, especially those that owed their military training to the work of Sungkar, changed to support JI.³⁰³

b. Kinship

The family connection is one of the strongest foundations upon which the JI network is based. Family members are recruited because they are less likely to betray family loyalties and more inclined to follow their senior family members' ideology. In addition, children raised on a steady diet of radicalism will likely reflect this point of view as adults. As Angel Rabasa puts it, their network is based on a "family history of radicalization."³⁰⁴ Alternatively, as an Indonesian scholar puts it, jihad is family-based.³⁰⁵ JI's network is comprised of family nodes and many alliances are bound through marriages.³⁰⁶

c. Madarassa and Mosque

Sungkar and Ba'asyir also operated an Islamic boarding school (known as *madarassa* or *pesantren*) near Solo, Central Java, Indonesia starting in 1972. This offered Sungkar and Ba'asyir an opportunity to share their radical ideology with the students.

³⁰¹ Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 125-126.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, 132-140.

³⁰³ Farihin Ibnu Ahmad (former member Jemaah Islamiyah, son and grandson of Darul Islam members), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

³⁰⁴ Angel Rabasa (senior analyst RAND Corporation), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Department of Defense Analysis.

³⁰⁵ Badrus Sholeh (lecturer Islamic University of Indonesia), interview by author. February 24, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department.

³⁰⁶ Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 131.

Promising students were selected for specialized training. Students in government-run madrassas were also targeted for recruitment.³⁰⁷ The students would then be invited to more and more study sessions as the radicalization process would continue.³⁰⁸ Then, these special students were encouraged to create other madarassas or were recruited into the JI organization.³⁰⁹ Sidney Jones puts the number of JI-affiliated schools currently operating at about eighteen.³¹⁰

Members recruited through these four methods were installed in the structure Sungkar established with a formal military structure and clear delineation of areas of responsibilities. The formal structure included an Amir or leader (initially Abdullah Sungkar), various administrative sections, and subcommands responsible for specific geographic areas called *Mantiqis* (for example, Mantiqi 1 was responsible for Malaysia, Southern Thailand and Singapore).³¹¹

2. Jemaah Islamiyah's Mobilizing Structures with Social Movement Organizations

Over the first three years of the 21st century, the JI network structure went through several significant changes. With the effective government repression of JI after the Bali bombing, the *Mantiqi* organization that represented JI from its inception through 2002 was effectively broken up. The vanguard organization lost much of its internal communications ability as individual members were arrested, killed, or fled. Thus, the

³⁰⁷ The ICG offers this example. A member of Samudra's group would strike up a conversation with students from a local state-run Islamic high school madrasah aliyah negeri. ... The students would be invited to come to a meeting where the discussion leader showed video CDs about the war in Ambon and Poso, made by KOMPAK, the mujahidin-affiliated organization. The videos inevitably produced outrage from the viewers at the brutality and inhumanity of the Christian side. International Crisis Group. *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*.

³⁰⁸ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*, 21-22.

³⁰⁹ Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 126.

³¹⁰ Jones, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies ISEAS, Presentation, http://nettv.1-net.com.sg/iseas/sidney_july05/#.

³¹¹ Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, 133.

remaining members of JI existed in a flatter and less rigid organization.³¹² As these vanguard leaders lost influence, the “pro-mobilization” elements such as Ba’asyir gained ascendancy. As this group shifted their strategy to use SMOs, the mobilizing network changed. Many JI members also joined MMI and later JAT. This enabled members to continue their activities including some paramilitary training, justified as needed to defend fellow Muslims.³¹³

JI’s core membership built through ties of family and friendship as well as networks of religious educational institutions remained; the inclusion of SMOs offered an influx of new members with which the core could increase its membership. The SMO’s also allowed JI a level of political protection from politicians reluctant to offend their constituents; thus, the elements of JI’s network affiliated with SMOs remained relatively intact.³¹⁴

3. Jemaah Islamiyah’s Framing Process before Social Movement Organizations

Sungkar and Ba’asyir based their networks on shared frame or shared ideology very similar to the shared frame of the former Darul Islam insurgency. Their frame was based on the concept that devout Muslims must use jihad to achieve an Islamic state and devout Muslims must avoid contact with those Muslims and non-Muslims not willing to fight for this state. The *thogud*³¹⁵ should not be allowed to pollute the pure JI network and will not have access to power in the future Islamic state of Indonesia.³¹⁶ JI would

³¹² Angel Rabasa (senior analyst RAND Corporation), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Department of Defense Analysis.

³¹³ Noor Huda Ismail (Indonesian analyst, social entrepreneur, former student at JI associated boarding school), interview by author, March 5, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia.

³¹⁴ Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

³¹⁵ Un Islamic—may refer to people of another religion or Muslims that are seen as acting in an un-Islamic manner.

³¹⁶ Ahnaf, *The Image of the Other as Enemy: Radical Discourse in Indonesia*.

strive to create a state where Islam and politics could be unified and thus “counterbalance the secular forces that had caused the enervation and decline of the Islamic Nation.”³¹⁷

Before JI shifted its strategy to solicit popular support, their frame only had to bind a small audience together; thus, the frame focused on strict adherence to the leader’s interpretation of Islam. The focus was on building the community and preparing to forgo everything to achieve *sharia*. In other words, the common organizational frame was a function of the necessarily small network and not designed for a wider audience.³¹⁸

4. Jemaah Islamiyah’s Framing Process with Social Movement Organizations

Currently, MMI and JAT are having success in building a strategic frame that is “more palatable” to the Indonesian people.³¹⁹ The strategic frame is based on “the other as enemy” model in which all oppression of Muslims around the world is attributed to a Christian-Jewish conspiracy. MMI, and now JAT, have become very adept at harnessing world events to use as a tool to incite the Muslim population. In Muhammad Ahnaf’s book *The Image of the Other as Enemy*, he shows how MMI has used violence against Muslims in other countries, as well as parts of Indonesia, to show how Muslims throughout the world are under siege and require assistance.³²⁰ This frame argues that it is the duty of all Muslims to strive for an Islamic State (or implementation of Islamic law) and that it is the duty of all Muslims to defend Muslims in Indonesia or throughout the world. The MMI and KOMPAK collaboration to produce and distribute videos of “Muslim oppression” during the Central Sulawesi communal violence³²¹ and JAT’s numerous local preaching programs are just two examples of the proliferation of this

³¹⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, “The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiya,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 68 (2005): 71.

³¹⁸ Pavlova, *From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to the PUPJI*.

³¹⁹ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

³²⁰ Ahnaf, *The Image of the Other as Enemy: Radical Discourse in Indonesia*, 17-22.

³²¹ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*.

frame.³²² Where JI had difficulty creating a “sticky message”³²³ that would appeal to the general population, MMI and JAT have begun to have more success.³²⁴ In large part, this is due to their access. Whereas JI was very limited in their ability to access the population with its strategic frames, MMI and JAT have relative freedom to share their frames and ideology with the public.

5. Benefits of JI’s use of Social Movement Organizations

To measure the quantifiable benefits that JI has gained using SMOs is very challenging. Many of these benefits are based on gains of influence or public perception, which defy a simple measure of success. However, it is possible to examine what elements in the environment insurgents would find necessary or preferable to advance the insurgency and see if JI’s sympathetic SMOs have contributed to favorable shifts in the environment. Insurgencies are comprised of a combination of the leadership or vanguard and the mass base drawn from the population.³²⁵ Thus, the vanguard prefers an environment where there are limits on the state’s ability to repress the vanguard and the vanguard maintains unrestricted access to the population for its mobilization efforts. Insurgencies also need an ideology upon which their movement is based and preferably a set of grievances with which to support their mobilization efforts. As part of their mobilization efforts, the insurgent wants to create and expand the “will to revolt” or cognitive liberation³²⁶ in which the population believes change is possible through their support of the insurgents. Insurgents need access to the population to disseminate their

³²² Notices of upcoming JAT sermons can be seen at radical Islamic websites such as <http://www.muslimdaily.net> active as of May 2, 2009. Analysis of individual JAT sermons can be seen at the U.S. Government Open Source Center <http://www.opensource.gov>.

³²³ Sticky as used by author Dan Heath in his book *Made to Stick*. Heath argues that ideas or messages that create empathy with the audience are more likely to “stick” or be remembered and motivate someone to change their behavior.

³²⁴ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author, February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

³²⁵ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 1-11.

³²⁶ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

“revolutionary ideas.”³²⁷ Then, does the use of sympathetic SMOs give JI some defense against repression, greater access to the population, ability to create “cognitive liberation” or to influence the population to accept that support for JI can lead to success? If it does and if the use of SMOs can do this better than other mobilization methods, then use of SMOs is the more efficient.

In recent years, the specialized police unit Detachment 88 has continued to show success in finding and arresting bombing cells associated with JI but it has been limited in its success beyond low-level cells. The political will to break up JI’s organization as well as their sympathetic SMOs does not exist in the government. Detachment 88 is limited to reactionary police work and is not authorized or equipped to address the wider organization of the elements of the environment that facilitate JI’s activities.³²⁸ Moreover, JI has also acted against the police. In 2007, Ba’asyir initiated a lawsuit against Detachment 88, which although eventually dismissed, did place additional scrutiny on the police’s antiterrorism force.³²⁹ The influence of Ba’asyir’s SMOs has also helped him personally resist U.S. government actions when the government of Indonesia denied a request from the U.S. government to extradite Ba’asyir on terrorism charges.³³⁰ Ba’asyir’s extradition request was denied³³¹ because of the Indonesian government’s fear of “political instability” if he were turned over to the U.S.³³²

Ba’asyir was arrested for his connections to JI and the Bali bombing but that conviction was overturned. While he was in prison, Din Syamsuddin, the director of

³²⁷ Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice*, x, 10-12.

³²⁸ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

³²⁹ Antar News, “Court Rejects Indonesian Cleric’s Suit against Police,” *Antara News*, August 21, 2007.

³³⁰ John CK Daly, “Courting Sharia in Indonesia,” *ISN ETH Zurich*, July 8, 2007, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/layout/set/print/content/view/full/73?id=53449&lng=en>.

³³¹ According to Means, the request to extradite Ba’asyir came from President Bush directly to Indonesian president Megawati Sukarno-Putri. She denied his request because of Ba’asyir’s political profile.

³³² Means, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia*, 302.

Muhammadiyah³³³ and a member of MUI,³³⁴ as well as Hamzid Haz, the Indonesian vice president, visited Ba'asyir.³³⁵ This is one example of several in which JI/MMI/JAT member leveraged the SMOs to gain access to national leaders and large civil society organizations. Once Ba'asyir was released from detention, he was invited by the deputy speaker of the house to address the Indonesia parliament.³³⁶ MMI and JAT have also gained access to local government decision makers. Currently, MMI's *PerDa* strategy has contributed to the adoption of sharia law in approximately 40 local governments.³³⁷ MMI believes that adoption of *sharia* law at the local level creates an environment, which influences the people to support MMI and JI more. Although it is difficult to judge the level of support in specific areas, a 2006 survey of Indonesian Muslims conducted by Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) reflects a 17% approval rating of JI and 16% for

³³³ Muhammadiyah is an Indonesian Islamic civil society organization commonly considered to be the second largest in the world with about 29-30 million members. NU, another Indonesian Islamic civil organization, is the largest with about 40 million members. Muhammadiyah is generally considered moderate and with a modernist ideology. The current leader of Muhammadiyah—Din Syamsuddin has been more “activist” than recent leaders and has expressed some radical views about the legitimacy of Islamic militias in communal violence and accusations that the U.S. and other western countries have an “immoral” foreign policy. See Australian Broadcasting Corporation report at <http://www.abc.net.au/ra/programguide/stories/200710/s2053259.htm> and Zachary Abuza's counterterrorism blog at http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/08/indonesias_muhammadiyah_sendin_1.php.

³³⁴ MUI is Majelis Ulama Indonesia—The Religious Scholars Council of Indonesia—a quasi-official body of religious scholars appointed by the national government to review issues of moral, ethical and religious concern affecting the nation. The MUI makes recommendations to the national government based on their interpretation of these issues. Howard M. Federspiel, *The Dictionary of Indonesian Islam* (Athens: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 1995), 150.

³³⁵ Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge Publishers, 2007).

³³⁶ Occurred in July 2007 as experienced by the author.

³³⁷ Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model: Assessing Hezbollah's Influence.”

MMI,³³⁸ and even a 9% approval level for the Bali bombing as a method of defending Muslims.³³⁹ MMI also played a role in the successful lobbying campaign that forced the Indonesian government to outlaw the Islamic sect of Ahmadiyah.³⁴⁰

One final example of the benefit that JI has gained using SMOs is the simple access that these SMOs have given JI to the population. MMI and JAT conduct a variety of public outreach projects including a successful book publishing business,³⁴¹ a monthly magazine, *Risalah Mujahidin*,³⁴² and a variety of public preaching and *dahwak*³⁴³ events.³⁴⁴ JAT commonly conducts outreach sermons at mosques and Islamic centers throughout Indonesia. These sermons encourage violent jihad (although not specifying against whom), encourage recruitment or donations, and endeavor to convince the audience of the righteousness and inevitable victory of the movement.³⁴⁵ These sermons are composed of extremely inflammatory language that the Indonesian government

³³⁸ Intuitively, one might assume that MMI would have a greater level of support than JI as JI was the underground element of the organization. However, during 2006, world events may have incited Muslims temporarily to have a more sympathetic view of the more militant elements.

³³⁹ Interview, ICPVTR Analyst, (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. See also the LSI survey at its website <http://www.lsi.or.id/>. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

³⁴⁰ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree*. Update Briefing, (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2008).

³⁴¹ For example, one senior leader of MMI Irfan S. Awwas wrote a very complementary about the original Darul Islam commander S.M. Kartosuwiryo and his proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Author's collection. See ICG report for examination of JI publishing industry International Crisis Group 2008.

³⁴² International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree*.

³⁴³ This is the Indonesian language adaption of an Arabic word which means religious outreach.

³⁴⁴ Interview with Indonesian analyst (name withheld), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement) See also JAT website. "Living under the Sharia is better than Living under the Mud of Democracy which will bring us to Disaster, and Hell," quoting Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

³⁴⁵ These sermons frequently are against democracy calling it incomparable with Islam. Statements claiming Democracy is a religion and thus Muslims that also practice democracy through voting are apostate and must have their throats slit by the faithful. Democracy is a "mud" that Indonesian's are living under until the day they can be free of it and have an Islamic state. Interview with Indonesian analyst (name withheld), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

allows to continue due to constraints of popularity and political pressure.³⁴⁶ Individual politicians are reluctant to speak out against these groups for fear of alienating their constituents and the government in general. As one analyst puts it, “There is a disturbing level of official indifference.”³⁴⁷

F. STATE RESPONSE

The Government of Indonesia (GOI) response has been focused primarily on the mobilizing structure and the strategic frames.

The INP’s successful breakup of the Bali cell was followed up with successful arrests of cells operating in Yogyakarta, Central Sulawesi, and Sumatra.³⁴⁸ However, beyond the direct action the police take against a cell preparing for a bombing attack, the police are limited in their ability to address JI-affiliated organizations not planning or have conducted violence. According to one senior INP officer, the political will does not currently exist for us to break up the entire network or to stop radical groups from expanding their network.³⁴⁹

The GOI has also begun to address the JI framing process through a counter ideology program. The program is focused on de-radicalizing members of JI that have been arrested and are in prisons. The program also works with the family of the JI member to ensure that when they are released and come home, their environment is less radical. The INP also works with released convicts to help them incorporate into society

³⁴⁶ Interview with Indonesian analyst (name withheld), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

³⁴⁷ Angel Rabasa (senior analyst RAND Corporation), interview by author. March 4, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Department of Defense Analysis.

³⁴⁸ INP Presentation, Jakarta, 2007.

³⁴⁹ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

through further counseling and job assistance.³⁵⁰ In some cases, the police have been successful in changing community attitudes through exemplary police work³⁵¹ and community outreach programs.³⁵²

This leaves a significant gap in the GOI strategy, as they have taken no steps to address the political opportunities available to JI and its SMO affiliates. The lack of political will that allowed JI to partner with SMOs still exists and still allows JI to carry out activities with overt SMOs that are otherwise impossible or difficult to accomplish as an underground organization.³⁵³

What else can GOI do in the future to defeat JI? The GOI's "...best strategy is to co-opt the less extreme members...give them a voice in government."³⁵⁴ Senior members of the INP see the potential of co-opting some members in an effort to de-radicalize the group and split the moderates away from the ultra-radicals and isolate the worse segments of the group.

G. CONCLUSION

This case study initially offers a very direct connection to the first hypothesis—that social movement organization has substantial utility to an insurgent group. In JI's case, they have clearly reaped considerable mobilization benefits from their collaboration with a variety of social movement organizations and to a broader degree, their association with the radical Islamic social movement in general. JI's intentional infiltration of the group FAKTA in Palembang, Sumatra, and the creation of MMI and JAT by JI members,

³⁵⁰ Remarks by Inspector-General ret. Ansyadi Mbai, Head, Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Desk. [http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF~E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation-LT+Final.pdf/\\$file/E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation-LT+Final.pdf](http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF~E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation-LT+Final.pdf/$file/E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation-LT+Final.pdf).

³⁵¹ The role of Detachment 88 in solving previously unsolved crimes in Poso helped relieve community tensions that fostered the message of illegitimacy of the secular government. Sidney Jones (senior analyst, International Crises Group, Indonesia) interview by author. March 3, 2009, Jakarta Indonesia.

³⁵² Local NGO spokesperson, interview by author, October 30, 2007, Poso, Indonesia.

³⁵³ Interview with Senior Officer Indonesia National Police (name withheld), interview by author. February 19, 2009, Singapore, recording on file in CORE lab, Root Hall, Defense Analysis Department. (Interview was conducted in confidentiality, and the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement)

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

certainly suggests that JI sees the role of social movement organizations as extremely useful to its development. In many ways, the political opportunities that allowed JI to grow and expand in the late 1990s and early 2000s have now limited JI's capacity as a standalone organization. Thus, the role that social movement organizations play is one of providing JI with leverage to take advantage of the new political opportunities in Indonesian and Southeast Asia.

How does this case study assist in the examination of the utility of SMOs in the mobilization process? Before the 2002, Bali bombing JI had limited interest in SMOs or mobilization in general. However, the public reaction to the Bali bombing actually demobilized parts of JI because it gave the police legitimacy for repression in addition to causing potential sympathetic segments of the population to distance themselves from JI. Once JI increased its use of SMOs, JI and its SMOs were able to stop the police demobilization effectively and restart their mobilization process, as well as protect this mobilization process by the use of political pressure to hamper government repression.

The second element of this thesis, the utility the state may draw in defeating the insurgency if it were to dismantle the insurgent's sympathetic SMOs, can also be explored in this case study. It can be inferred that the JI leadership has determined that SMOs are the most efficient way to expand, and in this case, protect the insurgency. If the GOI were able to dismantle MMI and JAT, either through co-optation of more moderate members or through manipulation of existing political opportunities, then JI would lose its ability to appeal to its mass base and limit police repression of its underground activities.

VI. BATH INSURGENCY CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

The next case study examined the Ba'athi Revolution in Iraq, an insurgency that started off with a somewhat high reliance on social movement organizations for its initial momentum but came to rely increasingly less and less on SMOs.

How the Ba'athi movement successfully mobilized in order to overthrow the existing government is reviewed. Also analyzed is what the government did, or in some cases failed to do, to stop the mobilization of the movement.

The history of the movement, beginning with the establishment of the Iraqi Republic following the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy is the first focus. Then, the movement in terms of social movement theory is framed. Lastly examined, in relation to the framing and social movement theory, is what actions the government took or should have taken to preclude a successful insurrection.

The Ba'athist insurgency provides a good example of "within case variation." The insurgency successfully used SMOs, political organizations, student unions, and professional trade unions, to achieve power. The insurgent leaders felt they no longer had to rely on these organizations and began to dissolve them. It is at this time that the movement ran into trouble and the insurgent regime was quickly deposed.

B. BACKGROUND

First, however, it is essential to study the history of the movement.

Prior to 1958, Iraq was ruled by the Hashemite monarchy, dating back to its independence in 1932. Conditions under the monarchy were hardly good. The cost of

living had increased fivefold from 1939 to 1957 and 80% of the population was illiterate. Health care was plagued by a shortage of doctors, causing a rise in disease rates. No form of social security existed save for government bureaucrats.³⁵⁵

With the establishment of the monarchy, Iraqi society had been almost completely restructured by the British.³⁵⁶ Seventy percent of farmable land in Iraq was divided between 3,400 tribal sheikhs; in addition, these tribal sheikhs were given almost unlimited power to rule their areas.³⁵⁷ As a result of this land redistribution, almost all of the remaining 3.8 million Iraqis did not own land.³⁵⁸ The average life expectancy for these peasants did not exceed 39 years.³⁵⁹

Despite the poverty that most Iraqis lived under, an interesting phenomenon was occurring. A commercial and industrial faction was beginning to emerge from the bourgeoisie. By 1957, over 90,000 individuals were engaged in foreign and domestic trading and another 9,000 in real estate sales.³⁶⁰ However,

the bourgeoisie as a whole was no match for the real powers in the country, namely the monarchy and its entourage, the great landowners, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, and British economic and military domination. In many ways . . . the grand bourgeoisie were as excluded from political power as the other strata of political power below them.³⁶¹

³⁵⁵ CARDRI, "Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?," (Avon: The Bath Press, 1986), 20. This book was authored by CARDRI, the Committee against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq. Formed in Britain by members of the British parliament and Iraqi expatriates, the mission of the organization is to expose human rights abuses by the Ba'athist regime. While the organization and the work do advocate a position on the former regime, the work, nonetheless, is accurate and fair in its accounting of events.

³⁵⁶ Michael Eppel, "The Elite, the Effendiyya, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (May 1998): 9, JSTOR database.

³⁵⁷ Michael Eppel, "The Fadhil Al-Jamali Government in Iraq, 1953-54," *Journal of Contemporary History* (July 1999): 7, JSTOR database.

³⁵⁸ CARDRI, *Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?* (Avon: The Bath Press, 1986), 20.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Ibid., 19.

The “other strata” consisted of a growing class of businessmen, doctors, teachers, civil servants. Students were also entering the workforce, looking for jobs in a tight economy. These masses of people represented the most educated of Iraqis and also the more likely to become nationalist and anti-imperialist.³⁶²

A political system dominated by wealthy landowners and friends of the regime was quickly becoming out of touch with a growing Iraqi middle class. The Iraqi economy was growing with oil revenues and a more prosperous middle class was demanding greater political involvement and democratic rights. Furthermore, the government’s alignment with Western powers in the Baghdad Pact inflamed nationalist tensions. Demonstrations began to occur and the regime responded with harsh repression.³⁶³

Emboldened by the Free Officers Movement in Egypt five years earlier, three banned opposition parties, the Ba’ath Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the National Democratic Party, formed the National Unity Front in Iraq in 1957.³⁶⁴ It took as its goal social and economic reform, addressing many of the common grievances against the current regime. Just as notable, the Front also captured the imaginations of many officers in the Iraqi military sympathetic to the Free Officers.

The regime sensed a restless population and developed plans to share a greater portion of the oil revenues. However, the mechanisms for sharing, such as constructing irrigation canals, affected too few people to be of any value in calming tensions.³⁶⁵

At around the same time, Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt, further inflaming tensions in Iraq. More protests and riots erupted.

³⁶² CARDRI, *Saddam’s Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?* 19.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 20.

³⁶⁴ John Galvana, “The Baathi Revolution in Iraq,” *MERIP Report 12* (September 1972): 6, JSTOR database.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

A group of young officers began meeting secretly. Their intent was to execute an overthrow of the government and move Iraqi foreign policy in a more nationalistic direction.³⁶⁶ Led by Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassem, the group was known as the Iraqi Free Officers.

By now, events were unfolding in Iraq at a fevered pitch. On June 18, protesting the government, 4,000 demonstrators took to the streets in Diwaniyah; 43 were killed and over 500 were arrested by police. Paramilitary police were called in by the Prime Minister to quell the riots because he no longer had confidence in the army.³⁶⁷

Three events occurred in early 1958, which gave the Iraqi Officers Movement the motivation to act.³⁶⁸ First, Egypt and Syria had formed an alliance, essentially bringing Nasser's control to the border of Iraq. The Free Officers felt they could count on support from Nasser in the event of a coup. Second, the ongoing civil war in Lebanon had split the officer corps in their support of Iraqi foreign policy. Lastly, the declaration of an alliance between Iraq and Jordan gave the Free Officers the opportunity they had awaited.

While the Prime Minister and senior army officers gathered to discuss the impending Iraqi-Jordanian alliance, the Free Officers began the coup. They seized control of the army and killed the Royal Family and Prime Minister.

The Free Officers moved quickly to put a new government in place. Iraq was now ruled by a Revolutionary Council composed of army officers. Brigadier Qassem was the new Prime Minister. He immediately began implementing a series of political and economic policies. He withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, initiated land reform, revised the oil revenue sharing program, drafted a new constitution, started a housing program for low-income families, granted amnesty for political prisoners, and provided food subsidies.³⁶⁹ The new regime quickly gained the support of the Iraqi populace and cemented their status as the new government, thwarting any foreign military intervention.

³⁶⁶ Galvana, "The Baathi Revolution in Iraq," 8.

³⁶⁷ CARDRI, "Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?," 24.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., 25.

However, the new government had an immediate problem of trying to maintain a coalition of nationalists and communists. The new government could not align itself too closely with the Egypt of Nasser for fear of losing the communists in the coalition. Qassem did not favor such an alliance either, fearing that his power would be usurped by Nasser.³⁷⁰ Nonetheless, the popular sentiment in Iraq was for such an alliance. Furthermore, most Iraqis did not want the radical economic reforms that would come with communism.

In March of 1959, an army officer, Colonel al-Shawwaf, led a failed coup in Mosul. Al-Shawwaf was a Nasserist and supported union with Egypt.³⁷¹ Qassem was able to suppress this revolt with help from the communists.³⁷² However, in the fall of 1959, Qassem took measure to strip power from the communists.³⁷³ This opened up political opportunities for the Ba'athists who were becoming increasingly frustrated with Qassem's regime. In October, the Ba'athists attempted an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Qassem. In response, the regime became increasingly repressive. The government took over the trade unions and professional organizations of students, teachers, and lawyers. Qassem outlawed the communist party while at the same time dismissing Ba'athists and nationalists from his cabinet and from parliament. He effectively alienated himself politically from the right and the left.

On February 8, 1963, the Ba'athists formed an alliance with other enemies of the regime, to include supporters of the monarchy, and toppled Qassem's regime.

The new Ba'athist regime began much more heavily repressive than did Qassem's regime. Torture of the political opposition was commonplace. Communists were massacred.

³⁷⁰ CARDRI, "Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?," 25.

³⁷¹ Ibid., 26.

³⁷² Galvana, "The Baathi Revolution in Iraq," 8.

³⁷³ Ibid.

Like Qassem's regime, this new regime had infighting with which to deal as well. Ba'athists were split between nationalists who wanted to align more closely with Nasser and a more capitalistic bloc which wanted to promote industrialization and economic development.³⁷⁴

Eventually, the more nationalistic forces won out when Abdul Salem Aref assumed power of the new republic and pursued a policy of nationalization of industry, aligning himself with Nasser. However, his government also began pursuing policies favorable to Western interests. For example, he privatized the Iraqi Petroleum Company, something Europe and the United States had long advocated.³⁷⁵

Next, the Ba'athist movement is framed in terms of social movement theory and the components of social movement theory before and after 1958 analyzed. This period is significant because of the Ba'athist change in strategy. Prior to this time, the Ba'athists made effective use of the National Unity Front and various professional unions. After they assumed power, the Ba'athists turned on some of the very groups, such as the communists, that helped propel them to power, and were overthrown.

C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

1. POS before 1958

Looking at political opportunity structures, it is possible to see that the monarchy, unwittingly, created political opportunities for the Ba'athist movement.

The regime inflamed nationalist sensibilities by entering into the Baghdad Pact, which brought Iraq into an alliance with Western powers. Then, the regime pledged military support to the Lebanese President, himself backed by Western powers, during the civil war in Lebanon. Iraq had both a growing Pan-Arabist movement and a growing middle class. These actions further mobilized both these groups against the regime.

³⁷⁴ Galvana, "The Baathi Revolution in Iraq," 9.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

Regime policies created political opportunities for other groups within the movement. The lack of any substantial oil revenue sharing was exploited by the communists to draw support for the movement. Similarly, the lack of any serious land reform was used by many in the movement to mobilize the burgeoning middle class. The regime failed to make the necessary political and economic reforms the populace was demanding, such as political inclusion and economic liberalization. When the regime finally made some attempts, the reforms were too feeble and too late.

Finally, the overreaction of the regime to protests throughout the country created numerous political opportunities for the movement. The Diwaniyah massacre showed the populace the regime no longer had control of the Iraqi army and was not open to reform.

2. POS after 1958

After the fall of the regime, Qassem tried to change these political opportunities to his favor.

First, he did enact the political and economic reforms that had mobilized the population against the monarchy. However, in the eyes of the nationalists and many in the middle class, he did not go far enough to align himself with Nasser's Pan-Arabist movement. This opened up new political opportunities for the Ba'athists and nationalists.

Second, he decreased communist representation in the parliament and repressed the communist movement. While this move was not necessarily unpopular with the populace, they would not have likely tolerated the economic reforms advocated by the communists, this did tilt the balance of power to the Ba'athists.

D. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES

1. MS before 1958

Next to be discussed are mobilizing structures. The main mobilizing structure was the army as it provided the best means of organizing, planning, and communicating. While the Iraqi army at this time was overly politicized relative to most Western armies, it provided the perfect mobilizing structure for the movement leadership. They could

easily recruit like-minded individuals, they had planning resources, they had access to necessary equipment and materiel, and they had influence over a large segment of society.

The second main mobilizing structure was the National Unity Front. This coalition of political parties formed the main opposition to the regime. As already seen, it provided motivation to the Iraqi Free Officers. As its platform, it also captured many of the grievances of the population.

The last mobilizing structure was the professional and political organizations. The communist parties had underground networks and clandestine newspapers.³⁷⁶ Students organized through student unions at the universities; lawyers, teachers, and doctors also mobilized through their respective professional organizations.³⁷⁷ For the rest of the middle class, they had access to not-yet-banned newspapers that described the excesses of the regime.³⁷⁸

2. MS after 1958

Rather than continuing to leverage these mobilizing structures, Qassem attempted to dismantle many of the same organizations that enabled him to seize power. He outlawed the communist party, removed Ba'athists from public office, and took control of professional and trade unions.

Qassem's repression of the communists was successful; the communist party dwindled in numbers and never again was a potent mobilizing structure.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁶ CARDRI, "Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?" 24.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 26.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Samir Al-Khalil, "Republic of Fear: Politics of Modern Iraq," *University of California-Berkeley Press*, 228.

However, the Ba'athist party remained a very potent mobilizing structure. Beginning in 1961, they grew rapidly in numbers, taking control of key unions and crippling Baghdad with worker strikes.³⁸⁰ Before Qassem was toppled, the Ba'athists controlled almost all of Baghdad and vast areas of Iraq disposed to Pan-Arabism.³⁸¹

E. STRATEGIC FRAMES

1. SF before 1958

First examined is the diagnostic frame. According to the movement, the biggest problem was the regime's overly accommodating policy to Western interests. This was at a time when nationalistic fervor was high throughout the Middle East. The regime certainly did not help matters by entering into the Baghdad Pact.

Also part of the diagnostic frame was the lack of political and economic opportunity for much of the Iraqi middle class. Land and wealth was concentrated among the most powerful tribal and political leaders in Iraq. As the Iraqi economy grew from oil revenues, this disparity became even more apparent to the middle class. Political access was restricted to wealthy regime supporters. Many Iraqis saw social injustice but felt they had no way to rectify matters.

Finally, the movement created a diagnostic frame in which the regime was overly repressive and denied citizens their civil rights. As anti-regime demonstrations grew across Iraq, the regime did respond in a very repressive manner, strengthening this frame.

Now, for the prognostic frame. The movement certainly wanted to redirect Iraqi foreign policy away from advocating Western interests. Whether the movement was truly concerned about some of the other issues identified in the diagnostic frame is debatable. The movement most likely saw toppling the regime as the only way to change foreign policy. The regime was certainly never going to become sufficiently nationalistic for the Ba'athists.

³⁸⁰ Al-Khalil, "Republic of Fear: Politics of Modern Iraq," 227.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 228.

The motivational frame was perhaps two-fold. First, by forming an alliance of varied interests (communists, trade unions, and professional associations), the Ba'athists were able to give some assurance that the social and economic problems facing the middle class would be addressed should the Ba'athists come to power. Second, the overreaction by the regime to protests throughout Iraq impressed upon the populace that the regime had to go. Therefore, the Ba'athist movement represented the best vehicle for this.

2. State Response

Now that the Ba'athist movement has been framed in terms of social movement theory, it is easier, therefore, to see what the government did to demobilize the movement and why this was unsuccessful.

In 1957, sensitive to mounting tensions, the regime did initiate a program to increase oil revenue sharing. This program probably would have had some success in defusing the movement. However, it was lacking in its implementation. For example, some of the shared revenues went to increasing irrigation throughout the country with the intent to serve poor farmers better. Whatever the intended effect, the improved irrigation ended up benefiting wealthy landowners the most, likely further escalating tensions between the middle class and the regime.

This tactic had four intended effects. First, it intended to modify part of the diagnostic frame. By sharing more of the oil revenues with the population, this would nullify one of the grievances. Second, this tactic also intended to modify the prognostic frame. If the population felt they were receiving adequate basic services from the regime, they would be less likely to advocate regime change. Following this logic, the motivational frame would be weakened as well. Lastly, this tactic hoped to shift some political opportunities that favored the movement to opportunities that favored the regime. Again, however, because of poor implementation, none of these effects was ever achieved.

Another tactic the regime used was repression. This might have been an effective tactic, but the regime used it indiscriminately. Had the regime made better use of this

tactic and gone solely after movement leaders, both communists and Ba'athists, they might have been able to demobilize the movement. Thus, by repressing students, teachers, and workers, the regime helped to mobilize the movement further.³⁸²

This tactic intended to affect both the motivational frame and the mobilizing structures. By severely repressing protestors, the regime hoped to make the cost of contention too high in the eyes of the movement. Furthermore, the pressure put on the movement would cause the movement members to abandon their current mobilizing structures and seek more clandestine, underground means of mobilizing. This might have worked had the repression been selective. However, because of the repression's indiscriminate nature, the repression had the effect of strengthening the movement as more and more of the population came to see the regime as oppressive.

F. CONCLUSION

The Ba'athi insurgency initially made effective use of social movement organizations to mobilize the populace. However, it was when the first movement leader, and subsequent Prime Minister, Abdul Karim Qassem began to dismantle the very movements that propelled him to power, that he lost power and was overthrown. He became excessively repressive, like the former regime. He no longer relied upon the most effective means of mobilizing, SMOs, and instead relied on the least effective means, coercion.

This case examined the effectiveness of an SMO to mobilize the population. As a counterpoint, also shown was how the leadership of an insurgency can fail when they do not make effective use of an SMO; in this case, the leadership even attempted to demobilize the SMO. The next chapter analyzes a very similar insurgency that initially made very effective use of an SMO, but then saw their movement falter when they began to concentrate on coercion at the expense of leveraging SMOs.

³⁸² Mohammed Hafez, in his work "Why Muslim Rebel," would argue that institutional exclusion coupled with repressive state policies will result in exactly the type of rebellion the regime faced, 103.

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VII. SUNNI INSURGENCY CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

The Sunni insurgency began in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This insurgency had two components: a component that wanted a return to Ba'athism and to the rule of Saddam Hussein, and another component that saw an opportunity to promote a fundamentalist, radical interpretation of Islam in the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Hussein regime. In both cases, the principal adversaries of this insurgency were the Coalition Forces that toppled the former regime and the newly established Iraqi government and security forces.

The insurgency reached its zenith in 2006, just prior to a change in counterinsurgency strategy and tactics by Coalition Forces. The insurgency, which had so successfully mobilized the population through the existing Iraqi tribal structures, failed to maintain its mobilization capacity.

This case study sees “within case variation”—the insurgency initially used social movement organizations fairly effectively. However, as Coalition Forces strategy and tactics changed, the insurgency relied less on SMOs and more on coercion to achieve its aims.

As in the previous case studies, the insurgency, look at how it has attempted to mobilize the Iraqi Sunni populace, and what the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces have done to demobilize this movement and defeat this insurgency are framed.

B. BACKGROUND

The Sunni insurgency is largely composed of two main groups, Iraqi Nationalists and Sunni Islamists.³⁸³

³⁸³ Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (June 23, 2005): 42, Google Scholar database.

The Iraqi Nationalists count former regime loyalists and Ba'athists among their members. Prior to the capture of Saddam Hussein, the goal of this group was the restoration to power of Saddam Hussein. Now the goal is simply to restore the Ba'ath party to power. Some members have sought to pursue this through politics—the Ba'athists have formed a legitimate political party in Iraq—while others have left to join Islamist insurgent groups.³⁸⁴ The Iraqi nationalists are motivated mainly by their loss of power, prestige, and wealth.³⁸⁵ To compound this further, the nationalists fear marginalization within Iraqi politics.³⁸⁶ Despite being in the minority, the Sunni had representation beyond their numbers in government under the Saddam Hussein regime. Now they face a new government in which power must be shared and even risk under-representation.

The composition of the Sunni Islamists is a bit more complex. The Sunni Islamists are made up of both local and international Islamist groups, the most famous being Al Qaeda. These groups are much less restrained than the Ba'athists and do not necessarily favor a return of the former regime; in fact, these groups are willing to, and have tried to, provoke civil war within the country.³⁸⁷ They seek a society governed by a strict interpretation of Islam—to this end, they have declared the Islamic State of Iraq.³⁸⁸

The history of both these factions and how they rose to prominence following the war in Iraq is discussed next.

The insurgency in Iraq began almost immediately following the U.S. invasion of March 2003. Perhaps the insurgency was part of Saddam Hussein's defense plan—well-trained Fedayeen fighters would “go to ground” and later rise up to fight the conquering

³⁸⁴ Cordesman, “Iraq's Evolving Insurgency,” 43.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Michael Eistenstadt and Jeffrey White, “Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency,” *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, no. 50 (December 2005): 17, Google Scholar database.

³⁸⁷ Cordesman, “Iraq's Evolving Insurgency,” 48.

³⁸⁸ Evan F. Kohlmann, “State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq,” *The NEFA Foundation* (August 2007): 1, Google Scholar database.

Coalition Forces.³⁸⁹ More than likely, the insurgency began in the vacuum that was created when the regime was toppled. The U.S. had no real plan for governance or reconstruction and the nation quickly descended into chaos.³⁹⁰

The summer following the invasion saw the first real signs of any insurgency. Initially, the insurgency was mostly characterized by Ba'athists and former members of the Iraqi Republican Guard and Fedayeen.³⁹¹ The goal of the insurgency during these early months was the restoration of the Saddam regime.³⁹²

It was not until November 2003 that ideological splits could be seen forming in the movement. To be sure, a portion of the insurgents still favored the return of Saddam Hussein to power. However, other, more diverse movements were forming; the movements, while Sunni, were also more fundamentally Islamic in nature.³⁹³

To the Islamists, Iraq represented an opportunity, much like Afghanistan in 1979 or Bosnia in the 1990s, for jihad.³⁹⁴ Native Sunnis and foreign fighters began streaming into the country; attack levels against Coalition Forces quadrupled from what they had been over the summer of 2003.³⁹⁵

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was first established as Tawhid wal Jihad by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, who recognized the opportunity presented by the toppling of the former regime.³⁹⁶ In 2004, Zarqawi aligned himself with Al Qaeda and received their tentative endorsement, "tentative" because the Al Qaeda leadership was worried about Zarqawi's seemingly indiscriminate killing of Iraqi civilians.³⁹⁷

³⁸⁹ Eistenstadt and White, "Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency," 1.

³⁹⁰ Kohlmann, "State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq."

³⁹¹ Steve Negus, "The Insurgency Intensifies," *The Middle Eastern Report*, no. 232 (August 2004): 3, Google Scholar database.

³⁹² Negus, "The Insurgency Intensifies."

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Kohlmann, "State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq," 1.

³⁹⁵ Negus, "The Insurgency Intensifies," 3.

³⁹⁶ Andrew Phillips, "How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, no. 63 (March 2009): 1, Google Scholar database, 72.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

Zarqawi saw Sunni tribes as natural allies of his movement. As a response to economic sanctions during Saddam Hussein's regime, tribalism had risen in Sunni areas of Iraq as the central government was less and less able to exert control.³⁹⁸ To maintain tribal allegiances, Saddam Hussein offered generous incentives to the tribes, incentives that ended with the fall of the regime.³⁹⁹ This, coupled with a now enfranchised majority Shi'a population, made Al Qaeda and the Sunni tribes logical allies.⁴⁰⁰

However, the pace of events in Iraq surprised the Islamists. They saw a new government beginning to form and elections scheduled. Greater and greater numbers of Sunni were opting to participate with the new government of Iraq. Abu Musab Al Zarqawi issued a threat on the eve of the first elections in Iraq: anyone voting in the elections would face death.⁴⁰¹ The Iraqi Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars publicly rebuked him. Splits were already forming between Iraqi and foreign Islamists.

In 2005, a schism began to form between the Sunni tribes and Al Qaeda.⁴⁰² Coalition Forces strategists observed this schism and began developing strategies to exploit it.⁴⁰³ Coalition Forces saw an opportunity to begin developing alliances with Sunni tribal leaders. Sunni tribal leaders also saw an opportunity; while fearful of Shia domination and still hostile to the U.S. presence, the tribes saw AQI as their more immediate and threatening enemy.⁴⁰⁴ Coalition Forces began funding, supplying, and augmenting Sunni tribal militates with combat power.⁴⁰⁵

³⁹⁸ Phillips, "How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq," 1, Google Scholar database, 73.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² It is this schism, the authors argue, that was identified and exploited by Coalition Force strategists in the 2007 change in strategy and tactics, commonly referred to as "The Surge."

⁴⁰³ Phillips, "How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq," 1, Google Scholar database, 77.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 78.

In October 2006, AQI announced an Islamic State of Iraq in Ramadi.⁴⁰⁶ This attempt by AQI to exert control over an Iraqi Province and put an Iraqi face on their domination backfired. The Sunni tribes had already turned against AQI. Now, even Sunni Iraqi insurgent groups turned against AQI and established a competing coalition.⁴⁰⁷

Now that the components of the Sunni insurgency and its history have been examined, the movement in terms of modern social movement theory is described next. Just as in the previous case studies, the movement is framed in terms of political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and strategic frames. The authors examine these components both before and after the AQI/Sunni tribe schism.

C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES (POS)

1. POS before Schism

The first element of POS available to the Sunni insurgency was the political vacuum created by the collapse of the Ba'athist regime.⁴⁰⁸ For the Ba'athist component of the Sunni insurgency, this vacuum represented an opportunity to restore at least the Ba'ath party to power. For the Sunni Islamists, this vacuum offered an opportunity to further jihad in Afghanistan and attempt to establish a Caliphate in Iraq.⁴⁰⁹

The second element of POS is the seeming congruence of aims and objectives between the disenfranchised Sunni population and AQI. Both groups favored the expulsion of Coalition Forces and rejected the newly established Shia-dominated government. It makes sense that the two groups saw each other as natural allies.

⁴⁰⁶ Phillips, "How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq," 1, Google Scholar database, 77.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Jon Barnett et al., "Peace and Development in Post-War Iraq," *Working Paper Series, University of Melbourne School of Development Studies* (June 2008): 7, Google Scholar database.

⁴⁰⁹ Phillips, "How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq," 1, Google Scholar database, 78.

2. POS after Schism

The change in Coalition Force strategy and tactics eroded the political opportunities the Sunni insurgency enjoyed prior to 2007.

To be sure, the power vacuum that existed with the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime had yet to be completely filled. However, opportunities were not what they were. A representative Iraqi government had been stood up after national elections in 2005. Sunnis did not participate in these elections, but did participate in large numbers (75-85%)⁴¹⁰ later that year when Iraqis approved their new constitution. This suggests that Sunnis were becoming increasingly politically involved and increasingly saw participation in the political process as a means to achieve their aims.

It also became apparent to the Sunnis that their aims and AQI's aims were not as congruent as once believed. Further, similarities in aims and enemies could no longer excuse differences or AQI's overbearing nature. The Sunni population still wanted to expel Coalition Forces and still disliked the Iraqi central government. However, they saw working through the political system as the way to achieve this best. When AQI decreed that elections were un-Islamic and punished the population for voting and a number of other minor infractions, the population became resentful.⁴¹¹ AQI had now become the more serious threat to the Sunni population, and they were able to form common cause with Coalition Forces.

D. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES (MS)

1. MS before Schism

Prior to 2007, the Sunni insurgency had three main mobilizing structures. The first structure was the officer corps of the disbanded Iraqi Army. Predominantly Sunni, these officers found themselves without employment but with a vast network of military training and experience.

⁴¹⁰ Amy V. Cardosa, "Iraq at the Crossroads," *Nova Science Publishers* (2007): 73.

⁴¹¹ Phillips, "How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq," 1, Google Scholar database, 79.

The second structure was the Sunni tribes. For the Sunni Islamist insurgents, particularly foreign fighters, these tribes provided a support structure. An Al Qaeda strategy used in the Balkans and Afghanistan was to align themselves with key tribes, intermarry with tribal members, and co-opt the tribes' power and influence.⁴¹² The powerful Albu Nasir tribe, the tribe of many of the Ba'ath party inner circle, was an early supporter of Al Qaeda.⁴¹³ In the Sunni Triangle, the Hussein, Al Douri, Hadouthi, Masliyat, Hassan, and Harimyth tribes, to name a few, coordinated and supported Al Qaeda.⁴¹⁴

Lastly, the Ba'athist Sunni insurgency was a mobilizing structure for the Islamist insurgents. By aligning causes, AQI believed they could work together with the Ba'athist insurgency. Also, through actions such as declaring certain regions Islamic States of Iraq and through coercion, the Islamists believed they could commandeer the Ba'athist insurgency, leveraging their organization and experience to support the Islamist cause.⁴¹⁵

2. MS after Schism

These mobilizing structures changed as a result of Sunni tribal disaffection and shifts in Coalition Force strategy.

AQI sought to remake Sunni as a Caliphate according to its own strict social and religious interpretation of Islam. AQI's social and religious strictures often ran counter to customs and traditions of the tribes.⁴¹⁶ As the tribes resisted, AQI became increasingly violent, further alienating the tribes and exacerbating the schism.

Phillips identifies three factors that contributed to the insurgency losing the Sunni tribes as a mobilizing structure. First, Al Qaeda operatives began intermarrying into Sunni tribal families. This standard Al Qaeda practice went against Iraqi tribal customs,

⁴¹² Phillips, "How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq," 1, Google Scholar database, 67.

⁴¹³ Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 38, 44.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴¹⁵ Phillips, "How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq," 1, Google Scholar database, 71.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 69.

erupting into violence between the tribes and AQI. Second, AQI became black market economic competitors to the Sunni tribes. With remittances no longer coming from Baghdad, the tribes relied on black market activity as a significant source of income, a source that was being usurped by Al Qaeda. Finally, AQI tried to impose a very fundamentalist Islamic interpretation on the social and political structure of the tribes. The tribes resented the standards of conduct being imposed upon them. In the case of the 2005 election boycott, they resented being forced to act in a manner inconsistent with what they saw as their political best interest.

The Dulaimi tribe is one such tribe that became disenchanted with AQI. Located in Anbar Province, the tribe provided support to Al Qaeda initially.⁴¹⁷ The tribe grew to resent the influx of foreign fighters into their tribal areas. In May 2005, the tribe entered into a coalition with other tribes to combat AQI.⁴¹⁸

AQI's overbearing nature also alienated the Albu Fahd tribe in Ramadi.⁴¹⁹ The tribe split with AQI in late 2005, and by early 2006, the tribe was cooperating with Coalition Forces and engaged in fighting with Al Qaeda.

E. STRATEGIC FRAMES (SF)

1. SF before Schism

Both components of the Sunni insurgency, the nationalists and the Islamists, have the same diagnostic frame. U.S. occupation of Iraq is seen as the problem.

However, the diagnostic frame for the Islamists is a little deeper. While the frame for the nationalists ended at the U.S. occupation, for the Islamists, it is really just a beginning. The Islamists see non-Islamic governments, or governments deemed too friendly to Western or non-Muslim interests, as the problem. Had the invasion of Iraq

⁴¹⁷ Austin Long, "The Anbar Awakening." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 50, no. 2 (April 2008): 78.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 79.

never occurred, the nationalists would have little need to mobilize. However, for the Islamists, they were mobilizing in response to non-Muslim governments many years prior.

For the prognostic frame, the two camps begin truly to differ. The nationalists still see the solution as restoration to power of the Ba'ath party. The Islamists see the solution as the establishment of a caliphate that applies a strict interpretation of Islam to its governance and laws.

2. SF after Schism

The Ba'athists insurgents still favor a return to power, but, many now see the current political system as their best opportunity to achieve this.

The Islamists still desire to establish a caliphate in Iraq. They have tried to put an Iraqi face on their operations by attempting to co-opt indigenous Islamists groups, but these efforts have been unsuccessful. AQI's strategic frame no longer resonates, partly because of its own over-aggressiveness, but also due to Coalition Force alliances with Sunni tribes. AQI does not seem to have modified its strategic frames in light of these new realities.

3. State Response

Next to be examined is some of the means the U.S.-led Coalition has used to demobilize these movements as well as the effectiveness and ascertain why these means have or have not been effective based upon the framework just developed.

Although the Coalition Forces have initiated numerous programs and policies in Iraq, the authors explore perhaps the three most controversial policies, the "wall surge," the Sons of Iraq, and reconciliation.

Accompanying the surge in troops, Coalition Forces embarked on a large-scale project throughout Iraq to wall off warring ethnic factions from one another. Most notably in Baghdad, the walls separate 11 different Sunni and Shi'a sections of the city.⁴²⁰ This policy has been controversial mainly because it derives more from Israeli lessons learned in Palestine than the counterinsurgency theory so much in vogue.⁴²¹

This policy can be an effective mechanism for attacking mobilizing structures. A series of walls and checkpoints can make it difficult for groups to maintain networks, to meet, and to mobilize. However, Israel, who developed this policy, has had little success disrupting the terror networks within Palestine—in fact, the number of terror groups and severity of terror attacks increased following implementation of this policy.⁴²²

Also, this policy does nothing to modify strategic framing. In fact, Iraqi resistance to this policy (they see themselves as becoming another Palestine)⁴²³ may strengthen the diagnostic frame.

This policy also creates new and stronger political opportunities for the insurgency. The insurgents can seize on and exploit Iraqi objections to the policy.

It is difficult to say precisely if this policy is working or has failed. Attack levels in Baghdad are down,⁴²⁴ but this could easily be the result of other concurrent policies. Nonetheless, based upon the social movement theory framework for the insurgency, it is reasonable to conclude that this policy will not be an effective long-term strategy as it does nothing to address strategic frames and may very well create political opportunities for the insurgency.

Next, the Sons of Iraq are examined. In exchange for their cooperation and assistance, Sunni tribes in Iraq were paid by the Coalition to provide security within their tribal areas. Under the agreement, tribes provide and equip their own security forces.

⁴²⁰ Steve Niva, "Walling off Iraq: Israel's Imprint on U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Middle East Policy* (Fall 2008): 1, Google Proquest database.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

These forces are responsible for ensuring security and combating the insurgency within their tribal areas. In essence, this policy is turning insurgents into allies.⁴²⁵ Of the 31 Sunni tribes in Anbar Province, 25 are now aligned with Coalition Forces.⁴²⁶ AQI no longer has a base of support or mobilization upon which to rely. According to Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, an Anbar tribal leader, a force of 1,300 insurgents is now up against a tribal militia of 30,000.⁴²⁷

This policy does much to modify strategic framing. For the nationalists, the diagnostic and prognostic frames are shifted. Certainly, the nationalists still want to restore the Ba'athist party to power. However, the nationalists are now likely to see the expulsion of Coalition Forces secondary to defeat of the Islamists—once the Islamists are defeated, Coalition Forces may leave on their own accord. Plus, the nationalists are now benefitting from Coalition Force presence.

Mobilizing structures are also affected. The tribes know their respective areas better than Coalition Forces possibly can. They know where insurgents congregate to plan and to mobilize. Now charged with securing their areas, the tribes are in a better position than Coalition Forces to combat insurgents.

Lastly, this policy also affects political opportunities. The policy is still too new to determine, but the tribes now likely feel more a part of the political process and more likely to participate.

Thus, it can be seen that, based upon this framework, this policy should be effective. It is perhaps impossible to attribute any declines in violence to this policy, but it is a prudent policy nonetheless.

Finally, the policy of reconciliation is investigated. Commonly known as the “benchmarks,” reconciliation is the term for a broad set of legislative measures designed to ease Sunni and Kurdish concerns over inclusion in the new Iraqi government. Oil

⁴²⁵ Steven Simon, “The Price of the Surge,” *Foreign Policy* (May/June 2008): 3, Google Scholar database.

⁴²⁶ Anthony Cordesman, “Iraq Force Development: Conditions for Success, Consequences of Failure,” *CSIS Report* (September 2007), 175.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*

revenue sharing, de-Ba'athification, election law reform, integration of the security forces, and a provincial powers act are just some of the legislative measures Coalition Forces would like the Iraqi parliament to enact.⁴²⁸

A successful program of reconciliation does affect the prognostic and motivational frames for the nationalist component of the Sunni insurgency. As the government becomes more responsive and representative of the Sunni minority, the nationalists lose their ability to recruit among the population. More nationalists may feel they can work within the system to achieve their aims.

This policy does not greatly affect mobilizing structures, but for reasons already stated, this policy creates new political opportunities. These political opportunities are not favorable to the insurgents; rather, these opportunities help to demobilize further the insurgency as movement members see less risk and possibly more reward working through the political process. In addition, the insurgent goals may in fact be modified as movement members increasingly see a government both fair and responsive.

F. CONCLUSION

The Sunni Insurgency initially made effective use of social movement organizations to mobilize the Sunni populace. However, when they began to rely heavily on coercion to compel support from the Iraqi populace, they began to lose the support of Iraqi Sunnis. Insurgents have perpetrated violence on Iraqis participating in elections, Iraqis who have joined security forces, and Iraqis who help or support the new government in any way.⁴²⁹ Also, this violence is not without its operational goals and objectives. Nonetheless, almost six years later, the insurgency has not made significant strides. In fact, the insurgency may even be losing ground. However, this is to be

⁴²⁸ William McDonough, "Time for a New Strategy," *Parameters* (August 2008): 113, Proquest database.

⁴²⁹ Ahmed Hashim, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," *Cornell University Press* (2006): 6, Google Scholar database.

expected. As seen in Chapter II, coercion is the least effective means of mobilizing a population. Yet, it is upon this technique that the Sunni insurgency now almost exclusively relies.

The more effective techniques to mobilize a population, persuasion and use of a social movement organization, could be used effectively by the insurgency. The fledgling Iraqi government still has difficulties providing basic services to certain areas of the country; the insurgency could easily leverage this and take up the role of providing these basic services, as the Mahdi army has done in parts of Iraq. The Sunni insurgency could exploit these political opportunities, but they have not adapted their organization to these new realities. The insurgency has instead pursued a less effective means of mobilizing the population. As a result, the insurgency has been unsuccessful to date, and counterinsurgents have begun successfully counter-mobilizing the population.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis began with two questions. First, is the use of a social movement organization (SMO) by an insurgency an effective method to mobilize a population? To expand on this question, is the use of a social movement organization to mobilize a more efficient method than coercion or persuasion? Second, if an insurgency can successfully use an SMO to mobilize a population, can the state then decrease the insurgency's ability to mobilize by diminishing the effectiveness of the SMO? More importantly, is it productive for the counterinsurgent to employ a strategy that weakens the SMO in this case? This chapter reexamines these questions and discusses methods based upon the thesis research that the counterinsurgent can use to neutralize an insurgency relying on SMOs to mobilize the population.

Four cases were examined in this thesis and based upon which it sought to answer the two questions. The cases and the findings are summarized below.

B. CASE STUDIES AND FINDINGS

1. Darul Islam

The DI insurgency used the MUI as an SMO with which they organized and mobilized the population of rural West Java to resist the influence of the government of Indonesia (GOI). The MUI, the Suffah institute, and the MASYUMI militias eventually formed the civil and military administration of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) in West Java. The use of SMOs allowed the insurgency to mobilize the population successfully to a sufficient level to resist the influence of the GOI from 1948 until 1958. DI's social movement organizations had transformed into a semi-government body once it had displaced all GOI influence from the political space.

In the face of a reinvigorated GOI strategy, DI selected a mobilization method of coercion over a reinvigoration of the SMOs. DI's coercive strategy without the support of

their former SMOs tended to isolate DI's military and civilian members. Once the GOI began forming their own SMOs to assist in village defense and development, then the DI's coercion strategy exacerbated their loss of legitimacy and encouraged the GOI's gain and the DI's loss of political space.

The DI gained considerable advantage from 1948 to 1958 using an SMO but quickly lost this advantage when the state effectively demobilized the DI SMOs and then counter-mobilized the population with their own SMOs. These empirical data indicate that DI's use of SMOs did offer them a greater efficiency than the use of coercion, and on the other camp, the same lack of advantage in using coercion is found as well: the GOI strategy of incidental coercion (reactive military actions and threats and harassment of the population) has little success against the DI but once they shifted their strategy in 1957, then afterwards, their use of SMOs became a very efficient mobilization method.

2. Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah initially developed as a small secret organization without any desire to utilize any public SMOs. However, the openness of the political system in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto combined with the selected and efficient police repression of the "pro-bombing" faction of JI and possibly the successful example demonstrated by other public Islamic militant groups encourage JI to reexamine its strategy.

Once JI members created MMI and later JAT, these SMOs offered JI continued access to the population. This was a mechanism through which they organized and planned without the fear of government repression, a system with which they accessed domestic and foreign resources, and a method with which they built popular support and leveraged that popular support in the form of political pressure against Indonesian national and local governments.

The Indonesian government has, so far, had limited success in limiting the utility of JI's use of SMOs. While effective GOI repression of the operational cells of JI have shown tremendous success and the GOI's counter-ideology efforts have also shown promise with incarcerated JI members, the lack of a plan to narrow the broad political

opportunities available to JI are a glaring strategic shortfall. The GOI's success in selective repression of terror cells combined with their lack of focus on political opportunities available to JI's SMOs have encouraged JI to increase its dependence and utilization of these SMOs.

3. Ba'athist Insurgency

The Ba'athist insurgency made effective use of political alliances, trade unions, student unions, and the Iraqi Army to overthrow the monarchy of Iraq. These SMOs captured the energy of a disaffected middle class and channeled these energies into regime change. When the monarchy responded with indiscriminate repression, these SMOs were able to mobilize the population further. Furthermore, coercion by the regime, in terms of political concessions, did little to keep the population from mobilizing.

Once the Ba'athists had assumed power, the new regime ignored the same SMOs that had propelled the regime to power. It tried ineffectively to demobilize these movements. Political policies and decisions served to mobilize these movements further, resulting in the eventual overthrow of the regime and its replacement by another regime more acceptable to the Ba'athist insurgents.

This case illustrates the effectiveness of social movement organizations when used properly by insurgents to mobilize the population. The case also demonstrates the relative ineffectiveness of coercion and repression as mobilization techniques.

4. The Sunni Insurgency

The Sunni insurgency initially made effective use of the Iraqi tribes as an SMO in their fight against the Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces. Due to common aims, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Sunni tribes were natural allies. For AQI, the Sunni tribes represented a potent mobilizing structure, providing the insurgency a base of support.

Over time, AQI became increasingly repressive to mobilize the populace. This had the effect of alienating the Sunni tribes and depriving AQI of its support. At the same time, Coalition Forces reached out to the Sunni tribes with financial and military support. AQI's one-time supporter aligned with Coalition Forces and openly fought against the insurgent organization.

This case illustrates the comparative values of the three mobilization techniques discussed in Chapter III: SMO, coercion, and persuasion. As AQI was practicing repression on the Sunni populace, Coalition Forces used persuasion to greater success. Moreover, once the Sunni tribes transformed into an SMO of sorts, mobilized in support of Coalition Forces, AQI had lost much of its effectiveness in the region.

The cases were selected for homogeneity of the independent variable while providing maximum variation of the dependent variables. Table 3 illustrates a useful construct for viewing these cases and seeing how they fit within this research.

Demobilization of SMO

		Low	High
Insurgents' Reliance on SMO	Low	Ineffective 2	Effective 3
	High	Ineffective 1	Effective 4

Table 3. Case Study Construct

This table depicts four quadrants. “Demobilization of SMO” refers to the counterinsurgent’s abilities and capabilities to demobilize the social movement organization. “Insurgent’s reliance on SMO” refers to the degree to which the health of

the insurgency is dependent on the sympathetic social movement. “Effective” and “ineffective” refer to how successful the counterinsurgent will be in demobilizing the sympathetic social movement.

Note that in quadrant 1, a counterinsurgent effort is likely to be unsuccessful. Yes, the insurgent relies highly on the sympathetic social movement, but the state has very little capability to demobilize the social movement. The state can still have a chance to wage a successful counterinsurgency, but it will not be successful by targeting the social movement; the state must look to other strategies.

Quadrant 2 is optimal for the insurgent: he does not require a sympathetic social movement for support, and the state has little ability to demobilize the social movement. By contrast, this is the least favorable quadrant for the state. The state must increase its ability vastly to demobilize the insurgents’ sympathetic social movement. Even then, such an increase may only incrementally improve the state’s chance of success since the insurgency relies little on the social movement.

In quadrant 3, the state is favored to some extent. Although the insurgent does not rely heavily on the social movement, the state’s capability to demobilize the social movement is high.

The counterinsurgent can be most successful in quadrant 4, where he has maximum ability to demobilize the social movement organization and the insurgent is most reliant on this social organization.

In each of the cases, this thesis examined the SMO used by the insurgency moved between quadrants over the course of the conflict. This is shown in Table 4.

Demobilization of SMO

		Low	High
Insurgents' Reliance on SMO	Low	Ineffective 2	Effective 3
	High	Ineffective BI	Effective SI
		DI — 1 —>	4

Table 4. Positioning of Cases within the Construct

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) started as a terrorist organization focused on large-scale attacks but with no plan or ability to build popular support or engage SMOs. After the Bali bombing in 2002, effective state repression destroyed much of the JI organization. JI was forced to begin building popular support and make use of SMOs.

Darul Islam (DI) started as a movement highly dependent on SMOs. However, the state eventually recognized this and developed a strategy to demobilize the SMO and counter mobilize the population.

During its lifecycle, the Sunni insurgency (SI) has occupied several quadrants. Initially, both the Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces had little ability to demobilize the insurgency. Further, the insurgency drew on support from the populace. Over time, however, the state has been more and more successful at exploiting AQI excesses and using these excesses to divide the insurgency. As this has occurred, the insurgency has enjoyed less and less support from the populace.

Lastly, the Ba'athist insurgency benefited from a state that had neither the capacity nor the expertise to attempt to demobilize it. The insurgency required less support over time as it took control of the state apparatus and seized control of the military.

The four case studies will demonstrate “within case” variation. Each insurgency made use of an SMO in addition to other methods of mobilization. The case studies will examine how effective each insurgency was when using different methods of mobilization. Within a case, the effectiveness rates will be compared and contrasted.

C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND USING SMT

These findings have certain practical applications to the counterinsurgent. This section will present policy recommendations, extrapolated from the case studies, to the state dealing with an insurgency. This section also discusses how these recommendations can be operationalized. Each recommendation has certain parameters and limits to its effectiveness. These limitations are also discussed.

1. Concept of Mobilization Demobilization and Counter Mobilization

The empirical evidence in all four case studies support the initial analysis of the existing COIN literature—the counterinsurgents task is to stop the insurgent’s ability to mobilize and increase the state’s ability to mobilize—not simply to seek methods to gain public affection. The concepts of mobilization, demobilization, and counter mobilization offer an effective tool with which to analyze the level of support that flows from a

population.⁴³⁰ In the Darul Islam case, actions taken by the state to first demobilize the population supporting DI and later to counter mobilize the population offer distinct phases for analysis.

For future COIN strategy, developing a clear delineation of efforts to demobilize and counter-mobilize the population are necessary as part of a complete strategy. Actions designed to win the support of the population without consideration of mobilization will fall short of success.⁴³¹

2. Counter Mobilization through Building State Sympathetic SMOs

One of the most effective actions apparent in the empirical case studies is that of constructing an SMO sympathetic to the state. In the case of the DI insurgency, the state organized security and development SMOs at the village level. This allowed the state to counter mobilize the population thus reaping the benefits of using an SMO as a mobilization tool while detracting support for the insurgents SMOs. Since the state has greater resources, they can insure their sponsored SMOs are more effective. Again, in the DI insurgency, the TNI used its resources to assist in village development and security SMOs, and thus, making them more attractive to the population.

The application of this concept can be fairly straightforward in the areas of conflict. The state can organize the local population to address grievances that the population has identified. The essential element of this concept is that although the state

⁴³⁰ To remind the reader that the definition for *mobilization* used in his thesis is the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life. *Demobilization* is thus the reverse process, when individuals shift back to a passive state of being. *Counter-mobilization* is the process a group goes through when its political mobilization is realigned. It may be helpful to think of this from the point of view of the insurgency: whereas demobilization is a neutral position, mobilization is a positive position and counter-mobilization is a negative position actively moving away from the insurgency and closer to the state (or vice versa if looking at the definitions from the state's point of view). See Chapter II for an examination of mobilization.

⁴³¹ As an example of activities that rely on building popular affection without mobilization, the U.S. military frequently conducts medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs) in support of counterinsurgency or stability operations. In some cases, the MEDCAPs are conducted with primarily U.S. doctors designed to target acute medical problems. These types of activities—if conducted without local engagement—follow up treatment plans, local medical capacity building and the active participation of the community usually fall short as a tool for mobilization.

supports the SMO, it must be generally a locally run organization. If the state fails to leverage the local population and addresses the grievances without local participation, it will not be successful.⁴³²

One obvious caveat is the danger of a local SMO that gains popularity and begins to make claims against the state outside of the boundaries that the state has created. In many cases, states have created local militias that have grown into uncontrollable local armies abusing the populations they were designed to protect. It is difficult to imagine a purely developmental SMO metastasizing into a violent uncontrollable militia but it could become a challenger to state influence.

3. Comprehensive Demobilization

Demobilization requires a comprehensive effort to address all three facets of social movement theory: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and strategic frames. Often, counterinsurgency efforts concentrate exclusively on strategic frames, if only the population's grievances can be redressed, the population loses its motivation to mobilize. Such a limited approach is inefficient at best.

However, more than inefficient, such an emphasis on strategic framing to the exclusion of political opportunities and mobilizing structures can be disastrous to the counterinsurgent. This is best illustrated by the Iraqi monarchy's response to growing unrest. The monarchy enacted limited reforms to appease the populace, but did little to address the mobilizing structures that would empower the movement that ultimately toppled the monarchy. In Jemaah Islamiyah's case, the state has developed effective strategies to counter JI's strategic frames as well as some of its mobilizing structures; however, the state has taken no significant action to counter the political opportunities available to JI. This has allowed JI to survive and maintain its claim on legitimacy and political space through its use of the MMI and JAT SMOs.

⁴³² One example of a state supported SMO is the area coordinating council (ACC) system in the Republic of the Philippines. In the Sulu province in the southern Philippines, the provincial government established an ACC in all 18 municipalities in Sulu. These ACCs are collective organizations comprised of fishermen, businessmen, religious groups, NGOs and women's groups that have a vested interest in the development of their community. These ACCs operate within state created guidelines and bring claims against the state to facilitate the development of the community.

To be sure, addressing strategic framing is an important component of an effective COIN strategy. However, the strategy has to be comprehensive and address political opportunities and mobilizing structures. The state must first look at mobilizing structures. The state must identify these structures and become familiar with their organization and operation. From where do these structures draw their support? How are they organized? Are there any weaknesses or point of possible exploitation in the structures? Once the mobilizing structures are understood, the state can devise strategies to weaken them. As discussed above, the state can also create competing SMOs with competing mobilizing structures.

The counterinsurgent must also examine existing political opportunities. What political opportunities favor the insurgency and can the state manipulate conditions to nullify or reverse these opportunities? What actions can the state take to produce political opportunities injurious to the insurgency?

Just as it is dangerous for the counterinsurgent to concentrate too much on strategic frames, it would be equally dangerous to develop a strategy that concentrates inordinately on political opportunities or mobilizing structures. The counterinsurgent should use a balanced, comprehensive approach that takes into account all three components of social movement theory and how these components interact and influence each other.

4. Demobilization through an Amnesty Program

A properly incentivized amnesty program can be a very effective technique in a counterinsurgency. Such a program decreases the friction along the demobilization path, making it easier and more lucrative for the insurgent to cease his support for the insurgency. The Sons of Iraq program used by the Coalition Forces in Iraq can be considered just such a program. In exchange for abandoning the Sunni insurgency, Coalition Forces rewarded Sunni tribes with money and weaponry. This program was so well devised the tribes not only left the insurgency but also began actively combating the insurgency in which they formerly supported. In this case, the counterinsurgent had a

comparative advantage in resources to exploit existing mobilizing structures. While this comparative advantage is not a necessary condition, it does greatly assist the counterinsurgent adept at identifying mobilizing structures critical to the insurgent.

A successful amnesty program should have several components. First, it needs to take advantage of existing political opportunities. In the case of the Sunni insurgency, this amnesty program offered increased power and prestige to tribes who saw their influence diminished under a new Iraqi regime. The program also offered a political alternative to tribes disenchanted with AQI's restrictions on participating in the Iraqi political process. Such an amnesty program should examine existing political conditions and leverage or exacerbate key political differences or sources of contention between the insurgent group and the populace.

An amnesty program should also seek to deprive an insurgent group of critical mobilizing structures. In the case of the Sunni insurgency, this critical mobilizing structure was the Sunni tribal system. Due to the tribes' perceived loss in status and power, money and weaponry were effective incentives to cause the tribes to abandon the insurgency. A successful program should identify these structures and determine appropriate incentives based upon what these mobilizing structures value.

Such a program is not without its limitations, however. A carefully conceived amnesty program needs to be sustainable, if insurgents perceive an amnesty program is transitory or not sufficiently supported by the state, the program will be ineffective. The long-term ramifications of an amnesty program also have to be taken into account. How will those seeking amnesty be integrated into society? How will the amnesty program be phased out with no recidivism among those who sought amnesty? An effective method is to transition the former insurgents to state-funded employment. This method ties the livelihood of the insurgent to that of the state and builds loyalty to the state. These factors must be taken into account when planning an amnesty program so such a program appears attractive and credible to insurgents.

D. POTENTIAL POLICY APPLICATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA TO COUNTER JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

Based on the empirical research and social movement theory literature, this thesis offers potential courses of action the Government of Indonesia may take against the JI movement. This thesis examines JI since it is an active insurgency and the empirical evidence indicates that the GOI has developed an incomplete strategy with which to defeat it. This offers the authors an illustrative opportunity to postulate potential strategies for a current insurgency based on this thesis's research.

In JI's case, an attempt was made to research and demonstrate the synergistic relationship that is an outcome of the insurgency SMO nexus. If this relationship creates more resources for the insurgency, then it follows logically that those actions to disrupt the relationship decreases the resources available to the insurgency. This offers several courses of action, which are examined in the context of the JI movement: (1) build a competing SMO that may draw members and resources away from the insurgencies SMO; (2) attempt to co-opt⁴³³ the insurgents SMO so it is more in line with the state's objectives and contributes less resources to the insurgency; (3) disrupt the relationship between the SMO and the insurgency either through limiting communication, or creating crises of trust and legitimacy between the two organizations; (4) attempt to co-opt the insurgency while repressing the SMO and; (5) attempt to co-opt the SMO while repressing the insurgency. Additionally, this thesis highlights the absence of a state strategy to decrease the political opportunities available to JI that has allowed greater political space within which it has used its sympathetic SMO. Thus, it logically follows that whichever course or course of action the state uses, it would be beneficial to the state if it could decrease the political opportunities available to JI.

The option of building a competing SMO was pursued by the TNI during the Darul Islam insurgency and was very effective. The pursuit of this strategy to defeat JI would require a layered application as the state would need to create legitimate village

⁴³³ The term co-opt is an accepted abbreviation of Cooptation, which is defined as the tactic of neutralizing or winning over a minority by assimilating them into the established group or culture. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Co-opt>.

level SMOs to counter the various MMI and JAT affiliated groups gaining influence with local governments and populations in the various towns and villages where MMI/JAT has gained influence. The challenge of creating a legitimate SMO that could represent Indonesians that desire a more Islamic state but will not advocate violence against the state or prejudice and violence against non-Muslims will be challenging but potentially beneficial. This course of action would require the recruitment of leaders with strong religious credentials who possessed the ability to stand up to the more radical members of the Islamic faith and could articulate the fact that commitment to Islam does not require violence against followers of a different faith. This group would have to demonstrate some independence from the state as well.

The option of appropriating existing SMOs, in this case, MMI and JAT, which the insurgency uses, will be very challenging for Indonesia. In this case, the leadership of MMI and JAT are simultaneously members of JI. Both of these SMOs were created by JI leaders so the cleavage of the SMOs away from the insurgency would be very difficult. The only course of action that may offer some potential for success is to attempt to co-opt individual SMO leaders in an attempt to convince them that politics offer them a great potential to achieve their goals over the use of violence. This strategy is very hazardous as it may convince the individual SMO leaders that they need to maintain their connection to the insurgency to maintain the state's incentives to continue offering resources to the SMO leaders. In a case where the insurgency and SMO leaders are not one and the same, this option may offer more opportunities for success.

The third option apparent from SMT literature is that of disrupting the SMO-insurgency relationship. Once again, the actions taken by the TNI in the DI case study offer an example of success. The TNI took control of the road and train networks and limited the ability of the DI civil administration (their SMO acting as a local government) and the insurgency leadership. Obviously, this strategy is far more difficult in the modern age of multiple means of electronic communications. A second potential method to disrupt the relationship of the insurgency and the SMO is by attacking the insurgent's legitimacy, thus, potentially encouraging the SMO to distance itself from the insurgency. This would be difficult in the JI case as MMI and JAT are so closely tied to JI's ideology.

An attack against JI's ideology would probably not encourage MMI and JAT to distance itself from JI at this point. However, as the organizations develop, then a newer generation of MMI and JAT leaders may be more willing to abandon JI relationships to protect their own legitimacy.

The fourth option available to the state would be an attempt to co-opt the insurgency while pressuring the SMO through increased repression and limiting its available POS. This would require some mechanism of outreach from the state to the insurgency without using the insurgency's sympathetic SMO. This would be challenging but not insurmountable. There is also the potential that co-opting the insurgency may deliver to it some legitimacy that would enhance its strength. However, this strategy offers the potential to disrupt the relationship between the insurgency and the SMO and to convince the insurgency that violence is not necessary to achieve its political goals.

The final option that appears available in the JI case is that of co-opting the SMO while repressing the insurgency. This is a strategy that the GOI has attempted through its continued police actions that focus on JI's operational cells while simultaneously allowing MMI to influence local governments and JAT to conduct public sermons and outreach. However, there is no evidence that the GOI is actually following a strategy. It appears that the GOI is allowing events to unfold without a defining starting concept. This limits the GOI from reaping any advantages from this strategy. If the GOI were to create a strategy that incorporated the co-opting of SMOs, then they must develop some type of formalized relationship with MMI and JAT in which the GOI could influence their actions. Presently, they seem to have no such formal relationship.

Whichever option or combination of options the GOI uses, it should be within a strategy that also seeks to limit the political opportunities available to JI. Political opportunities generally grow for insurgents in an environment of political instability⁴³⁴ and this has certainly been the case for JI in Indonesia. This instability combined with an "over-sensitivity" by politicians to the potential popular appeal of the Islamist agenda

⁴³⁴ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 40-43.

continue to allow JI to enjoy broad political opportunities.⁴³⁵ Indonesia's maturing democracy combined with leadership on the part of the national civilian leadership will reverse the trends and begin to collapse the political opportunities available to JI.

E. APPLICATION TO CA AND OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The obvious lesson from this thesis is that some element of the COIN forces must be able to analyze the methods the insurgents are using to mobilize the population and must be able to examine the political opportunity structure, strategic frames, and mobilizing structure of the insurgency-SMO nexus. In the U.S. Army, this responsibility would logically fall to the Civil Affairs branch.⁴³⁶ All of the U.S. Army's Special Operations Forces⁴³⁷ have experience and the doctrinal mandate to organize and train indigenous military forces but have limited doctrinal foundation for creating non-military organizations such as a social movement organization.⁴³⁸ The absence of doctrine does not mean absence of need, however. As this thesis has argued, an insurgency is a war amongst the population. A viable and efficient method, in some cases, to mobilize the population for the state or the insurgent, is through the formation or co-optation of social movement organizations. Logically, this follows that some elements of the U.S. DoD should have the capacity to organize or engage SMOs. The most likely to do so, based on experience, ability, and mission, is the U.S. Army SOF, and specifically, U.S. Army Civil Affairs.

⁴³⁵ Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2007) 92-95.

⁴³⁶ According to the Department of Defense *JP 3-57 Civil Military Operations*, the definition of civil-military affairs is, "The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government." Joint Staff, Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, July 8, 2008, GL-6.

⁴³⁷ This includes U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units.

⁴³⁸ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05 Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006).

F. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the authors have explored the benefits that an insurgency can gain through its relationship with an SMO. Further, this thesis has sought to prove that the state is presented with a potential strategy in which the state can limit the resources available to an insurgency by limiting the resources that the SMO transfers to the insurgency. This thesis has also presented a valuable method the counterinsurgent can use to analyze the insurgency–SMO nexus. The concept of mobilization as well as demobilization and counter-mobilization offer the state a more efficient lens with which to evaluate potential strategies. In addition, the use of social movement theory and the three elements, political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and strategic frames, also offer the state potentially valuable methods with which to evaluate the insurgency-SMO nexus and the state's own COIN strategies. In general, many COIN strategies focus on the mobilizing structures through attempts to counter the insurgency network by killing or capturing members. On the other hand, the COIN strategy may focus on the strategic frames by using a combination of civic actions focused on addressing popular grievances and an information campaign to highlight the state's actions to address those grievances. These two elements are essential to COIN success but social movement theory would show that the third element of political opportunities must be evaluated and addressed just as the other two elements have been. POS is just as essential to a successful COIN campaign as are MS and SF.

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