



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

2010-12

Fusion centers securing America's heartland from threats

Saari, Shane C.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5053>

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



Calhoun is a project of the Dudley Knox Library at NPS, furthering the precepts and goals of open government and government transparency. All information contained herein has been approved for release by the NPS Public Affairs Officer.

Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**FUSION CENTERS: SECURING AMERICA'S
HEARTLAND FROM THREATS**

by

Shane C. Saari

December 2010

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Robert E. Looney
Erik J. Dahl

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2010	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Fusion Centers: Securing America's Heartland From Threats			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Shane C. Saari				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N.A.____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The attacks of September 11, 2001, were a wakeup call for the United States. In the aftermath, the U.S. government created the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate the efforts of securing the nation's porous borders. One of the many tools developed to secure the nation was the development of a network of state and local fusion centers throughout the country. This thesis examines the effectiveness of fusion centers as a network of information collaboration to counter illegal activity by involving rural residents and local law enforcement as force multipliers in sparsely populated border states. This study incorporates case studies from the states of North Dakota and Washington, as both are northern tier states whose geographical diversities and challenges are representative of problems facing any northern border state. The results of this study suggest that fusion centers, while still in their infancy, are an effective tool to enhance information flow and provide leadership the ability to centralize efforts to leverage resources to counter both natural and manmade events.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Fusion Center; Border Security; Homegrown Terrorism; All-hazards			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 75	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

FUSION CENTERS: SECURING AMERICA'S HEARTLAND FROM THREATS

Shane C. Saari
Major, United States Air Force
M.H.R., University of Oklahoma, 2000
B.A., B.S., Moorhead State University, MN, 1996

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2010**

Author: Shane C. Saari

Approved by: Robert E. Looney
Thesis Advisor

Erik J. Dahl
Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

The attacks of September 11, 2001, were a wakeup call for the United States. In the aftermath, the U.S. government created the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate the efforts of securing the nation's porous borders. One of the many tools developed to secure the nation was the development of a network of state and local fusion centers throughout the country. This thesis examines the effectiveness of fusion centers as a network of information collaboration to counter illegal activity by involving rural residents and local law enforcement as force multipliers in sparsely populated border states. This study incorporates case studies from the states of North Dakota and Washington, as both are northern tier states whose geographical diversities and challenges are representative of problems facing any northern border state. The results of this study suggest that fusion centers, while still in their infancy, are an effective tool to enhance information flow and provide leadership the ability to centralize efforts to leverage resources to counter both natural and manmade events.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	FUSION CENTERS: SECURING AMERICA’S HEARTLAND FROM THREATS	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION	1
B.	IMPORTANCE	2
C.	PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS	5
D.	LITERATURE REVIEW	6
E.	METHODS AND SOURCES AND THESIS OUTLINE	10
II.	DEVELOPMENT OF FUSION CENTERS	13
A.	INTRODUCTION	13
B.	FUSION CENTERS	14
C.	SLFC DEVELOPMENT BACKGROUND	15
D.	FUSION CENTER EFFECTIVENESS AND SECURITY OF SOURCES AND METHODS	17
E.	POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH SLFCS	20
F.	USE OF A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH	24
G.	CONCLUSION	27
III.	FUSION CENTER CASE STUDY: NORTH DAKOTA	29
A.	NORTH DAKOTA	29
B.	HISTORICAL EVENTS	30
C.	NORTH DAKOTA FUSION CENTER ORIGINS	32
D.	GEOGRAPHICAL CHALLENGES	33
E.	INTERAGENCY COOPERATION—FARGO FLOOD 2009	35
IV.	FUSION CENTER CASE STUDY: WASHINGTON STATE	39
A.	WASHINGTON	39
B.	HISTORICAL EVENTS	40
C.	FUSION CENTER ORIGINS	42
D.	GEOGRAPHICAL CHALLENGES	43
V.	CONCLUSIONS	47
	LIST OF REFERENCES	51
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	59

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	State and Local Fusion Centers.....	17
Figure 2.	Population Density in North Dakota.....	30
Figure 3.	NDDES Organizational Chart.....	32
Figure 4.	Number of North Dakota Fusion Center Incidents	35
Figure 5.	March 27, 2009: Thomas Muir briefs Secretary Napolitano about the flooding in North Dakota and Minnesota at the National Operations Center..	38
Figure 6.	State of Washington Population Densities.....	40
Figure 7.	Washington State Hazards	45

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
CBP	Customs and Border Patrol
CIKR	Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
COINTELPRO	Counter Intelligence Program
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO	Government Accountability Office
IC	Intelligence Community
ICE	Immigration and Custom Enforcement
IRTPA	Intelligence and Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
ISE	Information Sharing Environment
JTTF	Federal Bureau of Investigation's Joint Terrorism Task Force
NDDES	North Dakota Department of Emergency Services
PCA	Posse Comitatus Act
SBI _{net}	Secure Border Initiative network
SLFC	State and Local Fusion Centers
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
WAJAC	Washington Joint Analytical Center
WSFC	Washington State Fusion Center

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Looney and Professor Dahl for their support and guidance through the thesis process. Their expertise and positive approach during these last few months made the completion of this thesis an enjoyable one.

Most importantly, I want to thank my wife and our beautiful baby daughter for their continued support and understanding during this period. Without their encouragement and tireless patience, this project would not have been possible.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. FUSION CENTERS: SECURING AMERICA'S HEARTLAND FROM THREATS

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, were a wakeup call for the United States.¹ In the aftermath, the U.S. government created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take control over 22 federal agencies,² and today the number of federal agencies within DHS has grown to 27.³ Since DHS's inception, it has spent over \$360 billion.⁴ One of the main priorities for the U.S. government was to secure the nation's northern, southern, and coastal borders against all external threats, to include international terrorists, drugs, foreign disease, and other dangerous intrusions.⁵ It is not possible, however, to fully secure large, open areas such as America's border states from all forms of terrorism.⁶

One of the many tools developed to keep the country secure is the development of a network of state and local fusion centers throughout the country. This thesis will examine the effectiveness of Fusion Centers as a network of information collaboration centers to counter illegal activity by involving rural residents and local law enforcement as force multipliers in sparsely populated border states to more successfully counter and respond to extremist activity.

¹ President George W. Bush, "Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation," (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), 2.

² DHS Budget In Brief, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "FY2005."

³ DHS Organizational Chart, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Organizational Chart."

⁴ DHS Budget In Briefs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "FY 2004–2011."

⁵ Bush, "Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation," 16.

⁶ Michael O'Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, "Introduction," *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, ed. Michael d'Arcy, Michael O'Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 6.

B. IMPORTANCE

Looking at the southern and northern borders of the United States, there have been two different approaches due to the unique characteristics of each. Historically, the focus on the 1,900-mile U.S. southern border has been on security issues related to significantly higher drug trafficking and illegal immigration.⁷ The emphasis has recently been to guard against the spillover of violent crime into the United States from the Mexican government's crackdown on drug cartels.⁸ The focus on the nearly 4,000-mile northern U.S. border has traditionally been with illegal smuggling of drugs and weapons; however, DHS reports indicate that the terrorist threat actually is higher on the northern border, due to the large expanse of area with limited law enforcement coverage.⁹ This seam, or gap in attention—the focus is primarily on the southern border while northern border security has been often overlooked¹⁰—suggests a terrorist could navigate through the woods, farmlands, rivers, and lakes in the northern-tier boundaries and present a significant threat to national security.¹¹

North Dakota is the nineteenth-largest state in terms of land area,¹² it shares a common 310-mile border with Canada, and it is one of the least populous states in the nation.¹³ It thus falls directly into the criteria identified by DHS as a state where the terrorist threat may be high. With 18 border crossings (only three open 24 hours),¹⁴ there

⁷ Government Accountability Office, *Report Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities*, GAO Report GAO-09-93 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2008), 1.

⁸ Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, testimony before Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

⁹ Government Accountability Office, *Report Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities*, GAO Report GAO-09-93 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2008), 5.

¹⁰ Ike Skelton, Representative (MO), Comments from "U.S. Northern Border Security— National Security Implications and Issues for the Armed Services Hearing," U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.: 2007), 3.

¹¹ John Conyers, Jr., Representative (MI), comments from "U.S. Northern Border Security— National Security Implications and Issues for the Armed Services Hearing," U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington: 2007), 7.

¹² U.S. Census Bureau, "Quick Facts."

¹³ Encyclopedia Britannica, "North Dakota."

¹⁴ State of North Dakota, "North Dakota Department of Transportation Tourism Map."

are a lot of open areas for illegal crossings for illicit purposes. This thesis will propose that the most effective way for this sparsely populated area of the nation's border to work to counter terrorist and other illegal activity is through the use of international, federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement coordination along with the most important aspect—the involvement of local citizens through the use of Fusion Centers.

The use of this collaborative network nationally will also be critical to help identify the ever-rising threat of “homegrown” terrorists. There is more than just one type of terrorist organizations, and America has been struck severely before by one of these other groups. The second-deadliest terrorist attack after 9/11 in the United States—the 1965 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which killed 169 people—was carried out by Timothy McVeigh, who had received backing from a Christian militant group.¹⁵ Empowering the resources of all law enforcement agencies and informing America's citizens, similar to what was done during the millennium threat,¹⁶ will greatly enhance the capability to detect and deter both transnational and homegrown extremists.

This threat of homegrown violent extremism has recently been brought back to the forefront of national attention due to the highly publicized cases of “Jihad Jane” in March 2010,¹⁷ the Fort Hood, Texas, attacks late last year,¹⁸ and the failed bombing of Times Square in May 2010.¹⁹ These cases illustrate the threat from within the United States, as in the past two years more than a dozen people with U.S. citizenship or residency have been accused of supporting, attempting, or carrying out attacks on U.S. soil.²⁰

¹⁵ Bruce Schneier, *Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World*. (New York: Springer, 2006), 239.

¹⁶ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), 358–359.

¹⁷ “Jihad Jane, “American who lived on Main Street,” *CNN*, 10 March 2010.

¹⁸ Martha Raddatz, Brian Ross, Mary-Rose Abraham, and Rehab El-Buri, “Senior Official: More Hasan Ties to People Under Investigation by FBI,” *ABC News*, 10 November 2009.

¹⁹ “Times Square suspect charged in terror plot,” *MSNBC*, 4 May 2010.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

One of the main failures identified in the 9/11 Commission Report was the inability of the government's intelligence agencies ability to work together to "connect the dots,"²¹ which resulted in several missed opportunities.²² To facilitate intelligence sharing and law enforcement coordination throughout the nation, the development and integration of State Fusion Centers was formalized by the signing of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.²³

DHS has proposed a multilayered approach of border security, comprised of a balance of tactical infrastructure, technology, and personnel at our borders.²⁴ Much of this can be found in the language of the Secure Fence Act of 2006. For the northern border, this legislation directed DHS to conduct a study to encompass the northern border's feasibility to be secured by a state-of-the-art infrastructure security system.²⁵ The results of the DHS February 2008 study were critically reviewed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in November 2008, which stated that DHS was not fully responsive to the legislative requirements to provide information for improving northern border security.²⁶

One of the proposed technologies that is being pursued is the Secure Border Initiative network (SBInet), through which DHS is procuring and deploying a virtual fence along the borders comprised of detection equipment, sensors, cameras, and other high-tech tools.²⁷ Currently, the focus for this network is on the southwest border and parts of the northern border.²⁸ A specific stretch of the southern border has recently

²¹ "Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers," *NGA Center for Best Practices*, 1.

²² Amy B. Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 112–113.

²³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers Concept of Operations," 3–5.

²⁴ Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, testimony before Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 2–3.

²⁵ *Secure Fence Act of 2006*, Public Law 109-367-October 26, 2006, Sec 4.

²⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Report Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities*, GAO Report GAO-09-93 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2008), 3–5.

²⁷ "Factsheet," U.S. Department of Homeland Security Press Release.

²⁸ U.S. Customs and Border Protection. "SBInet Program, Program-Specific Recovery Act Plan" May 15, 2009, 4.

received criticism from congressional oversight for costing “\$770 million after four years and we are still waiting for the testing of a 23-mile stretch in the Tucson sector.”²⁹ DHS has estimated the cost of this program to secure a majority of only the southern border is \$6.7 billion.³⁰ In contrast, the creation of 72 Fusion Centers in 50 states has cost the DHS \$254 million.³¹

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

A majority of the efforts regarding homeland security have focused on preventing the last attack.³² In the pre-9/11 era immigration, visa, customs, and border security lapses enabled terrorists (1993 World Trade Center attack, the Millennium Plot, and the 2001 perpetrators) to gain entry and to threaten and attack the U.S. homeland.³³ With the emphasis on strengthening our nation’s Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and tracking of transnational extremists through a variety of intelligence methods, the primary focus appears to be the use of a top-down, technology-led approach to secure our nation’s borders.

Technology is generally an enabler that allows people to do things, whereas security is the opposite, as it tries to prevent people from doing things.³⁴ An over-reliance on technology can often lead to poor security, or even the opposite of security.³⁵ These technological advances to deter the last attack do little to anticipate new and innovative means for terrorists to plan new attacks, as policymakers often focus on preventing another 9/11 and fail to realize the threat has morphed.³⁶ Radical terrorism

²⁹ Senator Joseph Lieberman, Opening Statement from the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Border Security: Moving Beyond the Virtual Fence, April 20 2010.

³⁰ “Work to cease on 'virtual fence' along U.S.-Mexico border,” *The Washington Post*, March 16, 2010.

³¹ “DHS Fusion Center Fact Sheet.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

³² Michael O’Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, “Introduction,” *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, 4.

³³ Darwina S. Bugarin, “Training, Sevis, and NSEERS: Will They Stop Terrorists From Entering the U.S.?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, (March 2007), 13.

³⁴ Schneier, *Beyond Fear*, 13.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Daniel Byman, *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), 132.

has altered its methods and has adopted new and innovative tactics and operational shifts while increasing the recruitment of U.S. and European nationals to evade detection.³⁷ With the use of rural residents³⁸ and local law enforcement as a force multiplier³⁹ in northern-tier states, such as North Dakota, enforcement will facilitate in shoring up the gaps for the nation's porous borders.⁴⁰

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature on the use of rural residents in the war on terrorism is generally unavailable, fragmented and uncoordinated.⁴¹ William Eller provides a detailed analysis for the use of rural American citizens in his thesis, "Leveraging Rural America in the Fight Against Terrorism," which focuses on Washington State. The author argues convincingly that these resources are an untapped capability that will be needed in these sparsely populated areas where terrorist organizations can and do plan, prepare, and execute attacks.⁴² Establishing an information-collective system in rural America will leverage rural America as a force multiplier in the war on terror.⁴³

David MacGregor's study, "Fusion 2.0: The Next Generation of Fusion Centers in California: Aligning State and Regional Fusion Centers," provides recommendations for collaboration at the state and regional centers to better align them.⁴⁴ He compares California's multiple State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs) with other states that had

³⁷ Angel Rabasa et al., *Beyond al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement*. RAND, Project Air Force Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2006, xviii–xix.

³⁸ Brian Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy Strengthening Ourselves* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2006), 156.

³⁹ Michael O'Hanlon, "Roles of DoD and First Responders," in *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, ed. Michael d'Arcy, Michael O'Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 122.

⁴⁰ Michael O'Hanlon, "Border Protection," in *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, ed. Michael d'Arcy, Michael O'Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 101.

⁴¹ William L. Eller, "Leveraging Rural America in the Fight Against Terrorism In America Through the Use of Conservation Districts," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 6–8, 11.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 89.

multiple SLFCs, and the Joint Intelligence Centers in the United Kingdom and Germany.⁴⁵ The key, he argues, is not only to create collaboration through interpersonal relationships, but to ensure their sustainability, which could be challenged if one of the commanders of these SLFCs should leave his/her assignment.⁴⁶

Gregory Brunelle provides insight on New York State's robust information sharing environment and highly functioning state-level fusion centers in "Achieving Shared Situational Awareness During Steady-State Operations in New York State: A Model For Success."⁴⁷ He provides recommendations to synergize New York's effort to manage all phases of emergency management.⁴⁸

Additionally, research has been conducted concerning New Hampshire's Information and Analysis Center and how it can protect citizens' rights while achieving the mission of the center.⁴⁹ The author states that the difficulties of coordinating multiple state and federal agencies' laws and regulations compounds efforts to have a single place to go to develop a privacy policy that takes into account all risks and vulnerabilities.⁵⁰

Since the formal inception of SLFCs, resulting from the signing of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,⁵¹ much has been written both for supporting the operations of and cautioning against the potential violations of American citizen's civil liberties from these centers. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has asked questions about who runs and is responsible for these organizations, the physical location and layout of these centers, the purpose for, the

⁴⁴ David S. MacGregor, "Fusion 2.0: The Next Generation of Fusion in California: Aligning State and Regional Fusion Centers," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 141–143.

⁴⁵ David S. MacGregor, "Fusion 2.0: The Next Generation of Fusion in California: Aligning State and Regional Fusion Centers," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 11, 141–143.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 143.

⁴⁷ Gregory T. Brunelle, "Achieving Shared Situational Awareness During Steady-State Operations in New York State: A Model For Success," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School 2010, 1.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 87–88.

⁴⁹ Jennifer L. Harper, "Fusion Center Privacy Policies: Does One Size Fit All?," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 6.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 68–70.

⁵¹ DHS, "Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers Concept of Operations," 3–5.

personnel staffing⁵² and private sector participation in these organizations.⁵³ The ACLU's primary concerns regarding potential citizen's civil rights issues from SFLCs are the ambiguous lines of authority, private sector and military participation, data fusion/data mining, and excessive secrecy.⁵⁴ This thesis will argue that, with proper oversight, the concerns regarding civil liberty violations can be minimized while gaining the benefit of better securing our nation.

Another study by NPS students describes fusion cells as being in their infancy.⁵⁵ The authors examined the characteristics that enable three types of fusion cells—Department of Defense-led, State and Local Fusion Centers, and Department of Justice/Other Government Agency-led fusion cells. They describe fusion cells as hubs in an interagency network which, if properly resourced, manned, and utilized, could tie together the best insights and capabilities of national level organizations in using a network to fight a network.⁵⁶ This provides the best example in today's fight against extremist terrorism of how to effectively conduct the counter-network warfare that is required to defeat today's enemies.⁵⁷

It is, however, well understood that we cannot protect everything and everybody all the time.⁵⁸ The use of technology is important, but the use of a bottom-up approach in conjunction with the current technical and organizational infrastructure is critical to augment resources in securing our nations northern border. A step in the right direction to exponentially assist in this effort has been the creation of 72 Fusion Centers⁵⁹ to include North Dakota.⁶⁰ The use of local law enforcement structure will prove to be a

⁵² Todd Masse and John Rollins. *A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report RL34177, 2007), 7–12.

⁵³ *What's Wrong with Fusion Centers?* American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 2007, 11–17.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 3–4.

⁵⁵ Christopher Fussell, Trevor Hough, and Matthew Pedersen, "What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?" Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 73.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Michael O'Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, "Introduction," *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, 6–7.

⁵⁹ "DHS Fusion Center Fact Sheet," U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

⁶⁰ "North Dakota Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Center," State of North Dakota.

force multiplier and the awareness and involvement from the local citizens will enhance this capability. This thesis will examine two specific states, North Dakota and Washington, to provide for the variation of physical, geographical and disparate population densities that are prevalent throughout the northern border. Current literature does not provide much information regarding Fusion Center operations in North Dakota, while on the other hand there is substantial research available for Washington State.

This bottom-up approach, building on local law enforcement and local citizen involvement will also prove to be essential for the best opportunity to detect, identify, and respond to extremist who currently reside within the United States and are U.S. citizens or legal residents. In addition, as many of these centers have evolved into an all-hazards approach, it provides a centralized information sharing center that is quickly able to leverage local, state and federal resources to both natural and manmade events. Technology is important, but the use of local citizens for human intelligence (confidential informant) is the dominant collection discipline at the state level.⁶¹

With the stagnating pace of implementing new and unproven technology, securing the northern border in the sparsely populated areas of North Dakota will be more effectively accomplished by focusing more on sharing intelligence between international partners, all levels of law enforcement agencies, and private citizens.⁶² In those large, vastly unpopulated regions of state where people reside and work there will notice when something seems out of the ordinary, and when afforded the information and understanding of knowing what to look for, to report these instances to their respective regional authorities. They will provide the eyes and ears in these areas where and when law enforcement is not readily available. Additionally, they will most likely be the first on scene when something does occur, as with the Times Square failed car bomb, found and reported by a local street vendor.⁶³

⁶¹ James E. Steiner, "Improving Homeland Security at the State Level; Needed: State-level, Integrated Intelligence Enterprises," in *Studies in Intelligence: Journal of the Intelligence Professional*, vol. 53, no. 3 (September 2009).

⁶² Henry A. Crumpton, "Intelligence and Homeland Defense" in *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*, edited by Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 213–214.

⁶³ "Times Square hero breaks silence," *MSNBC*, 3 May 2010.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES AND THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis will be based on a combination of primary sources, government studies and secondary sources. It will utilize process tracing, deductive analysis and the comparative study method, and will focus on two separate aspects of homeland security. The first is shoring up the northern border through the use of a bottom-up approach of local law enforcement and residents in sparsely populated areas through the use of SLFCs. This thesis will examine the question of how to best protect the country's borders by a comparative analysis of the Fusion Centers in the states of Washington and North Dakota.

Second, the use of these Centers to collaborate information nationally will also possibly provide a critical part in the increased likelihood of identifying not only transnational extremists living and planning within our borders, but also the more likely identification for the increased threat of "homegrown" terrorists through the use of shared intelligence and response. Additionally, the synergistic efforts of these Centers and agencies represented there will also prove invaluable when responding to a catastrophic event, manmade or natural, by effectively coordinating the response and allocating necessary resources to counteract the event.

A comparative analysis will be utilized to evaluate the states of Washington and North Dakota, as they are both located in the northern tier and have a sparse population density along their shared borders with Canada. Although there are differences (Washington State also has maritime boundaries), the purpose is to solidify the benefits and efficiencies gained from using a bottom-up approach by utilizing the largely untapped resource (local citizens) in providing information to their respective states' Fusion Centers to aid in securing these borders.

Through process tracing, this thesis will examine how Fusion Centers were established and how their roles and responsibilities were clarified to address lingering concerns regarding civil liberties. Incorporating these centers with other federal law

enforcement technological, organizational, and personnel infrastructures will enhance the capability of sharing critical information and leveraging appropriate assets to counter threats.

After this introductory chapter, Chapter II will examine the history and background of fusion centers. Chapter III will analyze what has been done to shore up the border in North Dakota through technology, coordination, and the interactive collaboration of the SLFCs in processing and sharing. This analysis will then be applied to Washington State in Chapter IV. The concluding chapter will demonstrate how the interactive collaboration of these centers in processing and sharing information will enhance the capabilities for the nation as a whole to work as a network to deter, detect, and respond to extremists threats. These threats are both transnational terrorists who live and plan within our borders and those who are a part of the increasing homegrown extremists.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. DEVELOPMENT OF FUSION CENTERS

A. INTRODUCTION

As stated in the previous chapter, the costs to secure the nation through technology far outweigh the costs of State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs). Again, technology is generally considered an enabler that allows people to do things, compared with security, which is the opposite as it tries to prevent people from doing things.⁶⁴ An over-reliance on technology can often lead to poor security, or even the opposite of security.⁶⁵ These technological advances to deter the last attack do little to anticipate the new and innovative means terrorists use to plan new attacks, as policymakers often focus on preventing another 9/11 and fail to realize the threat has morphed.⁶⁶ To leverage any technological advancement in any meaningful manner will require actionable information, and this information will most likely reside with and be initiated by local citizens. When provided this information, the state and local officials work through the SLFCs who are more able to properly analyze it with state and federal resources which can “connect the dots” and leverage proper agencies and resources to deter extremist activity.

Radical terrorism has altered its methods and has adopted new and innovative tactics and operational shifts while increasing the recruitment of U.S. and European nationals to evade detection.⁶⁷ Complicating this alteration of terrorist tactics is the physical geography of the United States: it is not possible to fully secure large open

⁶⁴ Schneier, *Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World*, 13.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Byman, *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad*, 132.

⁶⁷ Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sarah A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O'Brien, William. Rosenau, *Beyond al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement*. RAND, Project Air Force Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2006, xviii–xix.

areas, such as America's border states and sparsely populated rural regions, from all forms of terrorism or extremist activity.⁶⁸ According to statements made by DHS Secretary Napolitano:

The way to secure our country from this type of terrorism is the same way we must secure it from terrorism in general. This is a shared responsibility in which all Americans have a role to play. The federal government; law enforcement on the state, local, and tribal levels; and the American people are the lines of defense against terrorism, whether foreign-affiliated or homegrown. They complement each other, and they must work together...As a critical part of our efforts, DHS is reinvigorating its coordination and collaboration with our state, local, and tribal partners—the Nation's first preventers and first responders. The work of state, local, and tribal law enforcement at the local level puts them in the best position to notice when something is out of place and warrants a closer look—which is often the first step to thwarting a domestic terrorism plot.. DHS is also strengthening the Department's intelligence enterprise by supporting the state and major urban area fusion centers where state, local, tribal, and federal law enforcement and other emergency response providers share information and intelligence.⁶⁹

It would appear one of the more effective ways to defend against terrorist threats is through the use of Fusion Centers as an information collaboration network to counter illegal activity. Utilizing local residents⁷⁰ and law enforcement as force multipliers⁷¹ in enforcement will facilitate in shoring up the gaps for the nation's porous borders.⁷²

B. FUSION CENTERS

Fusion centers have been defined as the “collaborative effort of two or more Federal, state, local or tribal government agencies that combine resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of these agencies to detect, deter,

⁶⁸ Michael O'Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, “Introduction,” *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, 6.

⁶⁹ Testimony of Secretary Napolitano before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,” September 30, 2009.

⁷⁰ Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy Strengthening Ourselves*, 156.

⁷¹ O'Hanlon, “Roles of DoD and First Responders,” in *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, 122.

⁷² O'Hanlon, “Border Protection,” in *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, 101.

investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal activity.”⁷³ Sharing terrorist-related intelligence between law enforcement and security officials at all levels of government is important, because any terrorist attack in the homeland will necessarily occur within the state or tribal area, and the initial response will be by local responders. The plotting and preparation for a terrorist attack will also occur within these communities, and the information acquired for one purpose or under one set of authorities may provide insights when combined with seemingly unrelated information from other sources.⁷⁴ If, or more likely when, a terrorist attack occurs on U.S. soil, the planning will occur here and the first on scene will be local first responders.⁷⁵

With the stagnating pace of implementing new and unproven technology, securing the homeland will be more effectively accomplished by focusing more on sharing intelligence between international partners, all levels of law enforcement agencies, and private citizens⁷⁶ through the use of SLFCs. In these areas, the people who live and work there will notice when something seems out of the ordinary or unusual, and with knowledge of knowing what to look for they will be more likely to report these occurrences to their respective authorities. They will provide the eyes and ears in areas where and when law enforcement is not readily available.

C. SLFC DEVELOPMENT BACKGROUND

In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the 9/11 Commission Report identified multiple lost opportunities to derail the attacks. Most of those opportunities revolved around the lack or inability to properly share information.⁷⁷ To rectify many of the issues

⁷³ P.L. 110-53, August 3, 2007, section 511, 121 STAT, 322. Amends *Homeland Security Act of 2002* by adding section 210A (j) as cited in Mark A. Randol, *Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, November 5, 2009), 1.

⁷⁴ Randol, *Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 3–4.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁶ Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense” in *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*, edited by Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber, 213–214.

⁷⁷ *Nation At risk: Policy Makers Need Better Information to Protect the Country*, Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, March 2009.

relating to the failure of the government to “connect the dots” relating to intelligence collection and analysis from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Intelligence and Reform and Terrorism Protection Act (IRTPA) in 2004, which mandated the creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE). The intent for the ISE was to be a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment with appropriate protection of legal standards regarding civil liberties and privacy.⁷⁸

The creation of SLFCs was largely the result of pressure from the state and local governments to help improve information sharing and prevent terrorism and other threats.⁷⁹ This effort was enhanced by as a result of the signing of the 9/11 Commission Act which directs DHS to establish a State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative.⁸⁰ These actions were in response to the terrorist threat, as the American people and way of life being the primary target for terrorists. Leveraging state and local law enforcement agencies against this threat was needed, as they have an important role to play in homeland defense and security.⁸¹

This act facilitated the needed involvement of state and local officials, as the SLFC organizations would fall under the respective local authority (e.g., governor, mayor, police chief). Frustrations with the pre-9/11 information-sharing environment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and other federal agencies also helped fuel the development of SLFCs.⁸²

Starting in 2004, federal funding for initial startup of SLFCs from DHS and continued through grants from DHS and other federal programs which has facilitated the growth of these organizations. The state and local governments are responsible to identify centralized locations and to provide for ongoing, long-term funding for running

⁷⁸ Randol, *Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative*, 1.

⁷⁹ Government Accountability Office, *Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced By State and Local Fusion Centers*, GAO Report GAO-08-636T, (Washington, DC., April 17, 2008), 3.

⁸⁰ DHS, “Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers Concept of Operations,” 5.

⁸¹ Todd Masse and John Rollins. *A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress, RL34177 (Washington, D.C.: 2007), 2.

⁸² *What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?* ACLU, 2007, 11–17.

these centers.⁸³ To date, as mentioned earlier, there are currently 72 SLFCs spread among each of the 50 states, the establishment of which has cost the DHS \$254 million.⁸⁴ See Figure 1.




Figure 1. State and Local Fusion Centers⁸⁵

D. FUSION CENTER EFFECTIVENESS AND SECURITY OF SOURCES AND METHODS

Since terrorism is a complex multidimensional phenomenon, effective responses to this threat may need to take into consideration the evolving goals, strategies, tactics and operating environment of different terrorist groups.⁸⁶ A common pitfall for

⁸³ “Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers,” *NGA Center for Best Practices*, 11.

⁸⁴ DHS Fusion Center Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

⁸⁵ From Professor Erik Dahl’s lecture, *Intelligence for Homeland Security: Organizational and Policy Challenges*, Naval Postgraduate School, May 2010.

⁸⁶ Raphael Perl, *Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 12, 2007), 2.

governments that seek success through quantitative indicators (i.e., money spent on anti-terror measures) is that such measures do not necessarily take into account the terrorists' evolving characteristics.⁸⁷ However, for the purposes of this paper, effectiveness will be measured against the number of successful and/or planned attacks.

There has not been a successful attack by a terrorist group within the United States since Sept 11, 2001. However the number of global terrorist attacks has risen from 348 in 2001 to 14,499 attacks in 2007.⁸⁸ Although in the United States there have not been any "successful" attacks, there have been several jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States. From May 2009 to March 2010, there were 12; by comparison, during the seven years since the 9/11 attacks through May 2009 there was an annual average of two such plots, of which none resulted in attacks.⁸⁹

Where Fusion Centers' effectiveness is gained is through the ability to cross multi-agency lines and produce a true interagency effort. Critical to this is the ability to share actionable information.

Strong information sharing is essential to law enforcement's ability to assess data and analyze threats. As the primary information-sharing entity within the Department, DHS' Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is taking the lead in meeting this need. I&A is currently undergoing an important realignment to strengthen to delivery of useful, actionable intelligence to state and local law enforcement, based on their particular needs. This focus on information sharing with our state, local and tribal partners has elevated the Department's role at the Nation's 72 state and major urban area fusion centers. These centers, established by state and local authorities themselves, are the primary way that DHS shares

⁸⁷ Raphael Perl, *Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 12, 2007), 2.

⁸⁸ Christopher Fussell, Trevor Hough, and Matthew Pedersen, "What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?" Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 1.

⁸⁹ Mark A. Randol, *The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress*, (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, March 19, 2010), 56.

intelligence and analysis with our homeland security partners and are key tools for stakeholders at all levels of government to share information related to threats.⁹⁰

The ability of these centers to provide an avenue to bridge the gap between the intelligence community (IC) and state, local and tribal authorities is crucial to ensuring actionable information flow to protect America's local communities.⁹¹ The collection of raw information hinges on the local citizens, who have a high degree of physical and social interconnectivity within their home areas.⁹² In passing this information through local authorities to the SLFCs, this raw information can be analyzed with the appropriate government intelligence agencies to produce actionable intelligence for local authorities to act upon. This point is further emphasized in a recently released report from the Institute of Homeland Security Solutions where they identified since 1999, out of sixty eight foiled terrorist plots; thirty five were initiated by local law enforcement and public reporting.⁹³

Terrorism's complex webs of characteristics, along with its inherent secrecy and compartmentalization of both terrorist organizations and government responses, limits available data⁹⁴ that meets the classification level of this paper. Historically, however, when dealing with information from federal agencies, one of the barriers to information sharing with the state, local, and tribal officials has been the need to protect the sources and methods used to obtain the intelligence information.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ DHS Secretary Napolitano Testimony.

⁹¹ DHS Secretary Napolitano Testimony.

⁹² William L. Eller, "Leveraging Rural America in the Fight Against Terrorism in America Through the Use of Conservation Districts," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 28.

⁹³ Kevin Strom, John Hollywood, Mark Pope, Garth Weintraub, Crystal Daye, and Don Gemeinhardt, "Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009," *Institute for Homeland Security Solutions*, October 2010, 9–13.

⁹⁴ Raphael Perl, *Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness*, (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, March 12, 2007), 2.

⁹⁵ Mark A. Randol, *The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress*, (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, March 19, 2010), 13.

In the context of Fusion Centers and where raw information comes from (local citizens), this could also be incorporated into the analyzing of the raw information by federal agencies/representatives within these cells into intelligence. To aid in alleviating the classification and “need to know” issue, the federal government is providing a portion of the state and local representatives with appropriate security clearances to allow access to previously restricted intelligence⁹⁶ to facilitate the actionable information aspect sought in these cells collaboration effort.

With these SLFCs having the means and ability to obtain raw information, analyze it, and in turn be able to respond appropriately to intelligence provided through these SLFCs, the local authorities will be able to better respond to potential local threats with the input of actionable intelligence. This is where the interagency collaboration is maximized and the intended purpose of the Fusion Center—to facilitate the information-sharing environment.

E. POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH SLFCS

Since the development of SLFCs in the post 9/11 era, several criticisms have been raised regarding these organizations. Many of these issues have centered on potential violations of American’s civil liberties, standardization and operational structure for each SLFC, the use of military in these centers in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, and private sector participation within SLFCs.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has addressed potential violations of civil liberties by the creation and use of SLFCs. They note the “dark history” of U.S. law enforcement, in which use of secret intelligence powers have created an invitation to abuse in the past.⁹⁷ This abuse had occurred in the 20th century during the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) era, and involved the availability of law enforcement’s easy access to information, which resulted from the unrestrained collection

⁹⁶ DHS Secretary Napolitano Testimony.

⁹⁷ *What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?* ACLU, 6.

of domestic intelligence. This collection originally grew from a legitimate effort to protect national security into an effort to suppress political dissent on activities of individuals or groups/organizations.⁹⁸

These concerns with information sharing and data collection from SLFCs have been further criticized with the lack of a standardized organizational structure, lines of authority and rules for information sharing. These issues can lead to potential “data warehouse shopping” for data collection and sharing as the laws have not been specified to regulate what to share with law enforcement and non-law enforcement participants.⁹⁹

This point was also addressed by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) which recommended the creation of a National Fusion Center Strategy to provide these organizations legal guidelines in the protection of civil liberties.¹⁰⁰ As a result, the U.S. government has produced several guiding documents, to include “Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era” in 2006, the “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers” and the “DHS Interaction with State and Local Fusion Center Concept of Operations” in 2008. Central to these documents and the government’s interaction with SLFCs is the need to:

Ensure that information shared fulfills Constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and other legal and policy requirements, as appropriate, including applicable Privacy and Civil Liberties standards. These include, but are not limited to, the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; the Privacy Act of 1974; 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23; Executive Order 12333; directives issued by the President, DHS, the Department of Justice, and the Intelligence Community; and other guidance provided by the Program Manger Information Sharing Environment; the National Strategy for Information Sharing.¹⁰¹

Clearly, the issue of privacy and civil liberties for information collection and sharing will continue to be evaluated as this balance of security and civil liberties will be

⁹⁸ *What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?* ACLU, 6.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7–8.

¹⁰⁰ Todd Masse and John Rollins. *A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report RL34177, 2007), 5–8 and 15–16.

¹⁰¹ DHS, “Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers Concept of Operations,” 7.

driven by the country's collective sense of security and safety.¹⁰² However, all state or local governments are required to maintain the federal standards of protection for constitutionally guaranteed civil rights or risk being in violation. The first concern of any Fusion Center is to ensure the compliance with all federal laws and regulations regarding the protection of privacy and civil liberties.¹⁰³ Through proper organizational and legal oversight, both federal and state/local levels will be able to adequately ensure the rights of citizens are maintained.

Another issue, the lack of standardization of operations for these centers, has been addressed. According to the CRS report for Congress, roughly 15% solely focus on counterterrorism, 40% focus on "all crimes", and roughly 40% focus on "all-hazards."¹⁰⁴ Of the 72 SLFCs recognized by DHS, each is designed differently, being able to respond to the unique requirements specific to the creation of that cell.¹⁰⁵ In the case of the all-hazards SLFCs, the ability to have a center to coordinate efforts in the event of a natural or manmade disaster to leverage local, state and federal resources and capabilities is essential.

Having one "standard" for these centers is nearly impossible, as each individual location or state where these centers are located does not have identical concerns. Since a majority of the funding and resources for the operations of these organizations resides with each respective jurisdiction, the operations of these centers must be tailored accordingly.¹⁰⁶

To amplify this point, the threats for SLFCs located at the southern and northern border have resulted in two different approaches due to the unique characteristics of each. As mentioned in the previous chapter, historically the focus on the 1,900-mile U.S.

¹⁰² Todd Masse and John Rollins, *A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report RL34177, 2007), 7.

¹⁰³ Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers," *NGA Center for Best Practices*, 5–6.

¹⁰⁴ Todd Masse and John Rollins, *A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report RL34177, 2007), 9.

¹⁰⁵ Christopher Fussell, Trevor Hough, and Matthew Pedersen, "What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?" Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 31.

¹⁰⁶ Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers," *NGA Center for Best Practices*, 1–2.

southern border has been on security issues related to significantly higher drug trafficking and illegal immigration.¹⁰⁷ The emphasis has recently been to guard against the spillover of violent crime into the United States from the Mexican government's crackdown on drug cartels.¹⁰⁸ The focus on the nearly 4,000-mile northern U.S. border has traditionally been with illegal smuggling of drugs and weapons; however, DHS reports indicate that the terrorist threat is higher on this border due to the large expanse of area with limited law enforcement coverage.¹⁰⁹ Suffice it to say that each locale must justify these centers to accommodate those threats and provide capabilities to deter and combat these threats to satisfy the constituents they represent.

The concerns for the use of military and private sector participation in these centers have also been raised. Many of the SLFCs have incorporated the use of National Guard members in these centers. Since these personnel are assets of the State and the Governor, this is not a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878. However, in some SLFCs there are active-duty members who are a part of the SLFC, as in the case of the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center.¹¹⁰

The rules and laws for use of federalized military members to be involved in domestic law enforcement are specific: most notably the PCA, the Insurrection Act (10 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 331-335), and the Robert T. Stafford Act for use by State Governors in requesting federal support during disasters (42 U.S.C. Sections 5121-5206). Under both the Insurrection Act¹¹¹ and the Stafford Act,¹¹² only when the state governor requests federal aid or resources from the president, will the use of federalized military members waive PCA limitations for direct involvement in law enforcement

¹⁰⁷ Government Accountability Office, *Report Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities*, GAO Report GAO-09-93 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2008), 1.

¹⁰⁸ Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, testimony before Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

¹⁰⁹ Government Accountability Office, *Report Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities*, GAO Report GAO-09-93 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2008), 5.

¹¹⁰ *What's Wrong with Fusion Centers?* ACLU, 2007, 11–17.14–15.

¹¹¹ 10 U.S.C. Section 331, U.S. Code online.

¹¹² 42 U.S.C. Sections 5121-5206, U.S. Code online.

activities by these forces. Only in rare exceptions will the use of these federalized forces will be empowered without a governor's request. When the president considers unlawful rebellions or obstructions against the authority of the government of United States, the use militia and armed forces to enforce federal authority will be empowered without a state governor's request.¹¹³

In today's environment, having resources at the ready is critical to ensure an adequate, timely response. Having federalized military members in centers again refers back to the uniqueness of each Fusion Centers location. Having them located there is not a legal violation; the problem arises with how they are utilized.

Private sector participation within these centers is also addressed as an issue, as nearly 85% of the critical infrastructure is owned by private interests.¹¹⁴ The Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) partnership, as identified by the DHS, is essential to assess risk from scenarios as a function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat¹¹⁵ to identify and improve strategies to support national level through comparative risk assessment, investments, incident response planning and resource prioritization.¹¹⁶

A majority of the nation's critical infrastructure, including communications and electrical power supplies, is owned by private interests. These privatized companies need to be involved to work through planning and coordination for potential responses to protect these respective assets. However, the sharing of any information again falls back to the respective legal rules regarding constitutionally protected privacy and civil liberties identified earlier.

F. USE OF A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH

The use of local law enforcement in conjunction with local community members to provide for and secure their respective jurisdictions is critical to ensure the safety and

¹¹³ 10 U.S.C. Section 332, U.S. Code Online.

¹¹⁴ *What's Wrong with Fusion Centers?* ACLU, 11.

¹¹⁵ Department of Homeland Security, "National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency," 2009, 32.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

security of the nation as a whole. The federal government, with limited personnel and resources, cannot do it all by itself. State and local authorities employ roughly 800,000¹¹⁷ to 1.1 million¹¹⁸ law enforcement officers, whereas the federal government employs roughly 25,000.¹¹⁹ The threat of attacks has changed from state-supported to non-state actors and this threat of radicalization and extremism has morphed even further.

We are now seeing the threat change from a 9/11-type of attack with the use of multiple foreign hijackers to the increasing threat of homegrown extremist who currently reside and are U.S. citizens or legal residents. In a period of less than one year (May 2009-March 2010), there were twelve “homegrown” terrorist attacks or plots by citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States¹²⁰ This threat of potentially radicalized homegrown terrorists has recently been brought back to the forefront of national attention due to the highly publicized cases of “Jihad Jane” in March 2010,¹²¹ the Fort Hood, Texas attacks¹²² and the failed bombing of Times Square in May 2010.¹²³

The importance of state and local law enforcement’s utilization for combating domestic terrorism is more than just resources or constitutional correctness. It is because a majority of the state and local agencies rely upon one or more of the three policing techniques to secure their jurisdiction—community policing, intelligence led policing, and problem-oriented policing.¹²⁴ Federal agents typically enter into a community during active investigations, whereas the state and local authorities live and work there.

¹¹⁷ *What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?* ACLU, 2007, 9.

¹¹⁸ Matt Mayer, “Effective Counterterrorism: State and Local Capabilities Trump Federal Policy,” A Report of the Heritage Center for Data Analysis, June 3, 2009, 1.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Mark A. Randol, *The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 19, 2010), 56.

¹²¹ “Jihad Jane, American who lived on Main Street,” *CNN*, 10 March 2010.

¹²² Raddatz, Ross, Abraham, and El-Buri, “Senior Official: More Hasan Ties to People Under Investigation by FBI,” *ABC News*, 10 November 2009.

¹²³ “Times Square suspect charged in terror plot,” *MSNBC*, 4 May 2010.

¹²⁴ Mayer, “Effective Counterterrorism: State and Local Capabilities Trump Federal Policy,” 2.

The familiarity advantage that state and local officials gain of their jurisdictions and of the people who reside and work there, are the result of the community members trusting these local officials. From this trust, they share information about what is going on and law enforcement personnel also develop an instinct that allows them to sense when something is not right.¹²⁵

This practice of a bottom-up approach by state and local officials to gather evidence in order to prosecute criminals differs from the federal top-down model.¹²⁶ A clear and important example that demonstrates this aspect is a local law enforcement agency's ability to work confidential informants. The national level agencies have no comparable state analogue, as this form of collection is a dominant discipline at the state level.¹²⁷ In today's threat environment evolution, the most effective fusion cells brings together the right people from the right organizations that is able to close the bureaucratic-seams that have been exploited by the enemy networks.¹²⁸ Creation of these fusion networks provides the nation a mechanism to combat extremist threats, as "it takes networks to fight networks."¹²⁹

To take this bottom-up approach a step further is the needed involvement of the local citizenry in these jurisdictions. Empowering the resources of all law enforcement agencies and informing and educating America's citizens, similar to what was done during the millennium threat,¹³⁰ will greatly enhance the capability to detect and deter both transnational and homegrown extremists. As part of the information collection system, the use of local and rural citizens will act as a force multiplier,¹³¹ being the eyes

¹²⁵ Mayer, "Effective Counterterrorism: State and Local Capabilities Trump Federal Policy," 2.

¹²⁶ Jin Kim and William M. Allard, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace: A Methodology for Homeland Security Intelligence Analysis," SAIS Review 28/1 (Winter/Spring 2008), 78.

¹²⁷ James Steiner, "Needed: State-Level, Integrated Intelligence Enterprises," *Studies in Intelligence* 53/3 (September 2009), 1-2.

¹²⁸ Christopher Fussell, Trevor Hough, and Matthew Pedersen, "What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?" 27.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 358-359.

¹³¹ William L. Eller, "Leveraging Rural America in the Fight Against Terrorism in America Through the Use of Conservation Districts," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 89.

and ears where local, state, and federal authorities are not. Crucial to the effectiveness of this system is the trust with the citizens of these jurisdictions as this trust was not created by a top-down structure but rather by a bottom-up, dispersed network of local, rural people providing services where needed.¹³²

G. CONCLUSION

The perceived threats to the United States changed dramatically since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. This attack opened the eyes of the United States to the reality and dangers of international terrorism and its impact. The failures of the government's ability to "connect the dots" from the intelligence leading up to the attacks has been well documented and many efforts have been made in an attempt to rectify these failures at the federal level. However, the most important aspect that often is overlooked or under-utilized is the efforts and resources at the state and local level.

Information sharing was considered a critical element of failure throughout the government at all law enforcement levels. Through the creation of SLFCs, state and local governments were able to become more involved in the information sharing environment to ensure improved security of each area. Utilizing and incorporating each respective jurisdictions law enforcement resources as force multipliers, who are able to reach out to the community where they are known and trusted provides an avenue for local citizens to also become force multipliers in this collaboration environment. In those areas where SLFCs have taken an all-hazards approach, not only are they utilized to collect, share information and respond to extremist threats and attacks, but are also able to leverage resources and assets toward other catastrophic events that can be either manmade or natural. Coordination and timely reaction are essential to minimizing these events impact.

The local citizens, when asked to be involved and appropriately educated to know what to look for, become the eyes and ears when law enforcement is not available. They

¹³² William L. Eller, "Leveraging Rural America in the Fight Against Terrorism in America Through the Use of Conservation Districts," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 89.

will know when something does not seem right and can notify the respective authorities who in turn investigate and provide this information up to appropriate federal agencies for analysis to “connect the dots.”

This bottom-up approach amplifies the notion of using a network to fight a network. As any attack in the United States will most likely involve planning, plotting, and with extremists living in the United States, this approach will most likely be the mechanism that would initially tip-off local authorities to indicators that would hopefully deter and apprehend the extremist.

Additionally, the threat of extremism is not only a foreign problem, as the ever increasing threat of homegrown attacks continues to build. U.S. citizens or legal residents who have extremist views can move freely around the country without ever exploiting the Customs and Immigration weaknesses identified by the 9/11 Commission Report at the U.S. border. The improvements in this area made post-9/11 would be ineffective in detecting these types of threats.

Through the use of SLFCs and the involvement of local citizens provides for the best method to detect and deter extremist aggression in the United States. Through education and awareness at all local jurisdictions with citizen involvement and law enforcement levels will hopefully prevent the next attack.

In the next two chapters, this thesis will focus on the states of North Dakota and Washington, as they are both located in the northern tier and have sparse population densities along their shared borders with Canada. Additionally, centering on these two states provides for the variations of the unique geographic challenges of securing the mountainous, maritime/coastal and desolate prairie. The purpose is to solidify the benefits and efficiencies gained from a bottom-up approach by utilizing the largely untapped resource (local citizens) in providing information to their respective state’s Fusion Centers.

III. FUSION CENTER CASE STUDY: NORTH DAKOTA

A. NORTH DAKOTA

North Dakota is the nineteenth largest state in terms of land area,¹³³ it shares a common 310-mile border with Canada, and it is one of the least populated states in the nation.¹³⁴ It thus falls directly into the criteria identified by DHS as a state where the terrorist threat may be high. With 18 border crossings, and with only three open 24 hours,¹³⁵ there are a lot of open areas for illegal crossings for illicit purposes.

The estimated population of this state in 2009 was just over 646,000 with nearly 69,000 square miles which results in an average population density of 9.3.¹³⁶ However, this estimate does not take into consideration that a large majority of the population in this state resides within a few major cities and counties of the state, none of which are located close to the northern border, as illustrated in Figure 2.

¹³³ U.S. Census Bureau “Quick Facts.”

¹³⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica, “North Dakota.”

¹³⁵ State of North Dakota, “North Dakota Department of Transportation Tourism Map.”

¹³⁶ U.S. Census Bureau website, “North Dakota.”




Figure 2. Population Density in North Dakota¹³⁷

B. HISTORICAL EVENTS

With the focus on violent extremist activities being placed in large urban areas such as New York City and San Diego, CA, overlooking the upper Midwest is a fairly common occurrence. Over the course of the past 30 years, there have been incidents that did have substantial regional impact.

In February 1983, Gordon Kahl, a leader of “Posse Comitatus,” a right-wing armed vigilante group opposed to nearly any action by the federal government and especially paying taxes, was stopped by U.S. Marshals who tried to serve him an outstanding warrant near Medina, ND.¹³⁸ This stop led to a shootout that resulted in the deaths of two federal marshals. Kahl escaped, which started one of the largest Midwest

¹³⁷ “Population Shifts in North Dakota and Its Consequences for Water Use,” North Dakota State Data Center.

¹³⁸ “History – No Greater Tragedy – February 13, 1983,” U.S. Marshal History.

law enforcement manhunts in recent history.¹³⁹ He was found in Smithville, Arkansas, in June of 1983, where he died in a shootout and subsequent fire.

Another instance, which affected telecommunications for much of the southeastern part of the state, occurred in January 1995. Michael Damron cut 19 underground telephone cables at five Fargo locations, resulting in the disruption of over 20,000 customers for several days.¹⁴⁰ His motive for attacking this critical infrastructure was not an extremist act, but that of burglarizing a high-end electronics store whose alarms were interconnected to the phone lines.¹⁴¹ This event, however, did highlight the vulnerability of this critical infrastructure.

These examples that occurred in North Dakota demonstrates the potential existence of threats internal to the United States in the remote areas of the country. Extremist activity was noted in the Kahl situation, and Federal authorities were already aware of his violent capabilities prior to serving the warrant. As stated earlier, the 9/11 attacks, in the course of a few years, radically changed how the government perceived this threat and the amount of damage from terrorist attacks can cause in terms of lives lost and financial impact.

The government realized a new structure was needed to facilitate the coordination of the various federal agencies efforts which resulted in the Department of Homeland Security. In order to truly network from the bottom up, the establishment of State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs) was created to better integrate local, state, tribal and federal agencies. The state of North Dakota instituted its own center in 2006 to synchronize the state's efforts.

¹³⁹ "History – No Greater Tragedy – February 13, 1983," U.S. Marshal History.

¹⁴⁰ "North Dakota Homeland Security Fusion Center Information Brief," State of North Dakota, 7.

¹⁴¹ "Fargo phone saboteur set for release from prison," *Bismarck Tribune*, March 20, 2005.

As an all-hazards center¹⁴⁶ run by the North Dakota Department of Emergency Services (NDDDES), it provides a central location for the collection, analysis, fusion, development and dissemination of homeland security information to inform state and federal agencies of actual or potential homeland security threats to the state.¹⁴⁷ In addition, this center also provides the centralized state emergency operations center which is responsible for the coordination of responses for any emergency or natural disaster.¹⁴⁸ Physically located within National Guard facilities¹⁴⁹ is a unique attribute to utilize all of the available resources of the State.

What makes this effective, as with other SLFCs, are the capabilities that each agencies representative brings to the table and their ability to interact and coordinate with one another during emergencies or crises.¹⁵⁰ More importantly, the ability of the members to have access to decision makers and influence on the decision-making process are critical to the success of these centers.¹⁵¹ The coordination of multiple local, state, and federal agencies is especially critical when working with the unique challenges presented by the geographical challenges of this state.

D. GEOGRAPHICAL CHALLENGES

In remote areas of the country where few people live and where law enforcement is not readily available, events or suspicious activity can readily go unnoticed. This is the case regarding the physical geography and population in North Dakota. As stated earlier, it is not possible to fully secure large, open areas such as North Dakota and sparsely populated rural areas from terrorist acts, extremist activity¹⁵² or responding to catastrophic events.

¹⁴⁶ John Hoeven, N.D. Governor, Executive Order 2007-06, 2

¹⁴⁷ “NDDDES at a glance,” State of North Dakota.

¹⁴⁸ “NDDDES at a glance,” State of North Dakota.

¹⁴⁹ *What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?* ACLU, 2007, 14.

¹⁵⁰ Christopher Fussell, Trevor Hough, and Matthew Pedersen, “What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 17.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁵² Michael O’Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, “Introduction,” in *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, 6.

One of the more effective ways to counter this threat and maximize the response to events is the through utilization of the local residents and landowners who reside and work around these areas. They can provide information to local authorities when something seems out of the ordinary¹⁵³ and in many cases be in position to provide assistance in a first response capacity when an event occurs. In turn, those respective local law enforcement agencies who received those suspicious activities reports funnel them through the state centralized collection agency (Fusion Center) for further analysis to determine credible threats, as illustrated by Figure 4.

Utilizing local residents¹⁵⁴ and law enforcement as force multipliers¹⁵⁵ in enforcement will facilitate in shoring up the gaps for the nation's porous borders¹⁵⁶ and can provide assistance as first responders when needed. By using this form of a bottom-up approach toward securing these remote areas requires the support and involvement of residents and cooperation with law enforcement to be effective.

¹⁵³ William L. Eller, "Leveraging Rural America in the Fight Against Terrorism In America Through the Use of Conservation Districts," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 23–25.

¹⁵⁴ Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy Strengthening Ourselves*, 156.

¹⁵⁵ O'Hanlon, "Roles of DoD and First Responders," in *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, 122.

¹⁵⁶ O'Hanlon, "Border Protection," in *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, 101.




Figure 4. Number of North Dakota Fusion Center Incidents¹⁵⁷

While the situations centered on the successes of the intelligence gathering, sharing, and information regarding terrorism requests for assistance remains mostly classified,¹⁵⁸ for the most part these successes are inherently felt throughout the nation as an attack of the magnitude of 9/11 has not occurred since. To demonstrate the interagency effectiveness of this specific Fusion Center, a recent example centered on the local, state and federal coordinated response to the flooding of 2009 in Fargo, ND, will be reviewed.

E. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION—FARGO FLOOD 2009

Over the last few years, this region has experienced some of the worst spring flooding in history as five of the top ten all-time record crests in Fargo have occurred since 1997, of which the highest on record was in the spring of 2009.¹⁵⁹ In that year, the

¹⁵⁷ Sprynczynatyk, “Biennial Report N.D. Office of the Adjutant General,” 58.

¹⁵⁸ Dennis Blair, “Strengthening our nation’s front line of defense,” *Washington Post*, December 18, 2009.

¹⁵⁹ “Historical Crests of the Red River of the North at Fargo.” NOAA.

level and threat was high enough that the City of Fargo and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) decided it would be in the city's best interest to evacuate all of the nursing homes, clinics and two of the area's three major hospitals, along with residents in the affected area in case the water breached the man-made dikes.¹⁶⁰ Within 24 hours, the evacuation was in full force with support from medical airlift,¹⁶¹ ambulance services from three states, along with associated medical personnel to support this herculean effort.¹⁶²

Although this region of the nation is subject to flooding, the experiences from the 1997 flood in Grand Forks, ND and from the results of Katrina weighed heavily in the authorities' decision.¹⁶³ In Grand Forks, 70 miles to the north of Fargo and sharing the banks of the Red River, 60,000 people had to be evacuated after the temporary dikes broke free and devastated the town.¹⁶⁴ The issues of Katrina in 2005 and the inability to evacuate the residents prior to the event occurring and the aftermath in the areas affected by this storm still resonate deeply throughout much of the country and the federal government today.

There is little question whether the citizens of the Red River Valley would have fared as well if they did not have assistance from concerned local citizens, State (National Guard),¹⁶⁵ regional, and federal assistance (FEMA's National Logistics Staging Area in North Dakota¹⁶⁶ and U.S. Northern Command's¹⁶⁷ (USNORTHCOM) personnel and equipment) support. This assistance provided the manpower to build the man-made dikes, provided much of the logistical support for those that helped and lived there (food,

¹⁶⁰ "EVACUATION NOTICE: MeritCare's Fargo hospitals evacuating patients tonight," *Fargo Forum*, March 26, 2009, and "Hospital Evacuation Decision Guide," Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 9, 37.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁶² "Disaster Preparation Pays off in North Dakota," *The Huffington Post*, March 31, 2009.

¹⁶³ "Fargo Resisted FEMA's Evacuation Mandate," *MSNBC*, April 1, 2009.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Spryncznatyk, "Biennial Report N.D. Office of the Adjutant General July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2009," 1, 8-11.

¹⁶⁶ DHS Budget In-Brief FY10, 22 and "National Situation Update: Monday, March 30, 2009," FEMA.

water), and in many cases the additional capability for moving patients to other healthcare facilities in and around the region.¹⁶⁸

This is not to say, however, that every aspect of this effort went smoothly and at times local leaders had heated arguments about whether to evacuate the entire city with federal officials who wanted to ensure everyone's safety.¹⁶⁹ Ultimately city officials won, but worked with the local healthcare infrastructure and persuaded them to evacuate two of three hospitals and all nursing home facilities near the river.¹⁷⁰

During this period, the State Emergency Operations Center operated for 59 days, coordinated an effective response, successfully managed key resources and was able to adapt and modify plans to this quickly changing event.¹⁷¹ Additionally, on-the-ground FEMA representatives, in close coordination local leaders of the flood ravaged area, ensured the focus of the governments resources were applied in an efficient manner. DHS' immediate and coordinated response to this record flooding provided much needed aid and rescued over 100 citizens¹⁷² (Figure 5).

After the natural disaster, the recovery efforts also demonstrated the effectiveness of interagency coordination. The established FEMA Joint Field Office, set up to process claims, in coordination with NDDES, processed nearly 90 percent of over 5,000 claims for the 2009 flood. In comparison, the 1997 disaster, from which approximately 4,000 claims were submitted, took FEMA two years to process.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁷ "USNORTHCOM Images for 2009," United States Northern Command.

¹⁶⁸ "Disaster Preparation Pays off in North Dakota," *The Huffington Post*, March 31, 2009.

¹⁶⁹ "Fargo Resisted FEMA's Evacuation Mandate," *MSNBC*, April 1, 2009.

¹⁷⁰ "EVACUATION NOTICE: MeritCare's Fargo hospitals evacuating patients tonight," *Fargo Forum*, March 26, 2009, and Hospital Evacuation Decision Guide, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 9, 37.

¹⁷¹ Sprynczynatyk, "Biennial Report N.D. Office of the Adjutant General: July 1, 2007 to June 20, 2009," 56.

¹⁷² "Progress Report: Department of Homeland Security," DHS (April 29, 2009), 7–8.

¹⁷³ ND Department of Emergency Services, "Department of Emergency Services Advisory Committee (DESAC) Meeting Minutes," (November 30, 2009).



Figure 5. March 27, 2009: Thomas Muir briefs Secretary Napolitano about the flooding in North Dakota and Minnesota at the National Operations Center¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ “Napolitano Monitors Flooding in North Dakota and Minnesota,” *Department of Homeland Security Leadership Journal*.

IV. FUSION CENTER CASE STUDY: WASHINGTON STATE

A. WASHINGTON

By comparison, Washington State is the 18th largest in the United States,¹⁷⁵ while sharing a common 427-mile land and maritime border with Canada, and the state also contains the Cascade Mountain Range and Olympic Mountains.¹⁷⁶ This state has 13 border crossings, with six open 24 hours (all on the northwestern part of the state) while the remaining crossings are open limited hours.¹⁷⁷ As with North Dakota, there are many, relatively open areas that make it easy for illegal crossings.

The estimated population for the State of Washington is over 6,660,000, with over 66,500 square miles resulting in a population density of 88.6.¹⁷⁸ As with the state of North Dakota, the population density does not take into consideration a majority of the resident's live in and around the state's major metropolitan areas, as illustrated by Figure 6.

¹⁷⁵ U.S. Census Bureau "Quick Facts."

¹⁷⁶ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Washington."

¹⁷⁷ State of Washington, "Washington State Highway Map."

¹⁷⁸ U.S. Census Bureau website, "Washington."




Figure 6. State of Washington Population Densities¹⁷⁹

B. HISTORICAL EVENTS

In recent history, there have been several violent extremist occurrences that have transpired in the state of Washington. During the period from January 1990 to December 1997, of the 25 terrorist incidents reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), four had occurred in this state.¹⁸⁰

In 1993, members of the American Front Skinheads, a right-wing extremist group,¹⁸¹ detonated pipe bombs in Tacoma, WA, on July 20 and 22.¹⁸² Additionally, in 1996, the Phineas Priesthood, a loosely organized group of right-wing extremists,¹⁸³ also

¹⁷⁹ State of Washington Office of Financial Management, “Washington State Population Density.”

¹⁸⁰ Washington Military Department: Emergency Management Division, “Terrorism.”

¹⁸¹ Anti-Defamation League, “Extremists in America.”

¹⁸² Washington Military Department: Emergency Management Division, “Terrorism.”

¹⁸³ Timothy G. Baysinger, “Right-Wing Group Characteristics and Ideology,” *Homeland Security Affairs*, Volume II, No. 2, (July 2006), 5.

exploded a pipe bomb at the Valley Branch office of the Spokane Spokesman-Review on April 1, and then subsequently robbed a branch of the U.S. Bank in Spokane, WA, ten minutes later.¹⁸⁴ Three months afterward, this same extremist group repeated this action again when they placed a pipe bomb at a Planned Parenthood office in Spokane, WA, and robbed the same branch of the US Bank using an AK-47, a 12-gauge shotgun, a revolver and a 25 pound propane tank bomb.¹⁸⁵

Another extremist plan was foiled in July 1996. In this instance the FBI and Bellingham police prohibited a group of terrorists affiliated with the Washington State Militia, another organization with extremist right-wing views,¹⁸⁶ from carrying out their plans.¹⁸⁷ This group planned to bomb multiple targets, to include a radio tower, bridge and train tunnel while the train was still inside.¹⁸⁸

More recently, and unquestionably one of the more famous incidents, brought the spectrum of international terrorism to Washington State occurred in December 1999.¹⁸⁹ This incident involved Ahmed Ressay, a 33 year-old Algerian,¹⁹⁰ better known as the Millennium Bomber,¹⁹¹ who tried to enter the U.S. via ferryboat from Victoria Island, British Columbia through Port Angeles, WA.¹⁹² His intent was to drive to the Los Angeles International Airport and place the suitcase bomb, which he had in the trunk of his car, at the terminal and set the timer and then leave.¹⁹³ His plan was stopped when a

¹⁸⁴ Washington Military Department: Emergency Management Division, "Terrorism,"

¹⁸⁵ "Terrorism in the United States, 1996: Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit," National Security Division, 4-5.

¹⁸⁶ Anti-Defamation League, "The Militia Movement."

¹⁸⁷ Washington Military Department: Emergency Management Division, "Terrorism."

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Byman, *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad*, 26-27.

¹⁹² Schneier, *Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World*, 133.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 133.

U.S. Customs agent began to ask him some questions, decided he looked suspicious by being extremely nervous and fidgeting, asked for other agents to come over and eventually searched his car.¹⁹⁴

As indicated with the previous state, the incidents in Washington State also demonstrate the potential and actuality of extremist activity threats to the United States. A majority of the instances for violent extremist acts originated from right-wing organizations which had a history of violent actions. Arguably the reality for the case of transnational terrorism from Canada came to light when the ‘millennium bomber’ crossed via surface into the Port Angeles, WA.

Again, realizing a new structure was needed to aid in the collection, coordination and dissemination of information through multiple agencies at the local, state, tribal and federal level the creation of a new structure was needed. The state Fusion Center was established in 2002 to facilitate the efforts of multiple agencies at differing levels of government.

C. FUSION CENTER ORIGINS

In 2002, Washington State created the Washington State Fusion Center (WSFC) (formerly known as the Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC))¹⁹⁵ as a result of the Statewide Integrated Intelligence Proposal.¹⁹⁶ The purpose was to establish this agency to be the states fusion center serving as a single point of intelligence collection, regional intelligence groups located throughout the state providing a link to local, state, and federal partners with the goal to investigating crime to prevent acts of terrorism.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ Schneier, *Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World*, 133-134.

¹⁹⁵ “2009–2014 Washington Statewide All-Hazards Emergency Preparedness Strategic Plan: A Strategy for Emergency Management and Homeland Security in the State of Washington,” Washington State, (March 20, 2009), 144.

¹⁹⁶ Washington State Legislature, House Bill Report HB 2506, “An Act relating to the Washington joint analytical center.”

¹⁹⁷ Congressional Testimony–“Building a Partnership Strategy,” House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Intelligence Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, 1.

WFSC, co-located with the Seattle FBI Field Intelligence Group,¹⁹⁸ shares real-time information with multiple local, state and numerous federal agencies in the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence information.¹⁹⁹

As an all-hazards center,²⁰⁰ the State utilizes personnel from state and local agencies able to respond to all threats. In 2006, the WAJAC reviewed and disseminated over 2,000 intelligence reports, developed 323 leads to support criminal or terrorism case investigations and provided assistance to homeland security counterparts on 500 separate occasions.²⁰¹

As in the previous chapter, the effectiveness of this center hinges upon the capabilities that each agency representative brings to the table, and their ability to interact and coordinate with one another during emergencies.²⁰² Again, the coordination of multiple local, state, and federal agencies is especially critical when working with the unique challenges presented by the geography of this state.

D. GEOGRAPHICAL CHALLENGES

As previously discussed in this thesis, in remote areas of the country where few people live and where law enforcement is not readily available, events or suspicious activity can readily go unnoticed. The state of Washington also falls into this category. The challenges associated with securing large, open areas that are sparsely populated, and in this case, mountainous regions are unique and difficult. A significant shift from terrorism-centric to an all-hazards focus is essential to addressing all types of potential

¹⁹⁸ “State Intelligence Fusion Centers: Recent State Actions,” *NGA Center for Best Practices*, Issue Brief, July 2005, 11.

¹⁹⁹ Congressional Testimony–“Building a Partnership Strategy,” House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Intelligence Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, 1.

²⁰⁰ Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration.

²⁰¹ Congressional Testimony–“Building a Partnership Strategy,” House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Intelligence Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, 2.

²⁰² Christopher Fussell, Trevor Hough, and Matthew Pedersen, “What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 17.

threats.²⁰³ Again, countering any of these threats can be maximized through the use of the local residents and landowners who reside and work around these areas by providing information to local authorities when something seems not right.²⁰⁴ .

In addition to the challenges associated with the rugged mountainous terrain, in the Washington State there are multiple issues for responding to the various volcanic, tsunami, wildfire, and earthquake activity, as illustrated in Figure 7. Critical to the response of any incident, natural or manmade, is the ability of leaders to coordinate their efforts and leverage appropriate resources to counter the emergency.²⁰⁵ With a large variety of potential hazards as identified in this state, flexibility is essential.

Additionally, the use of local residents²⁰⁶ and law enforcement as force multipliers²⁰⁷ will facilitate in shoring up the gaps of relatively open areas and be able to provide a first response to many of the potential hazards to the varying threats in this state. As stated earlier, this form of a bottom-up approach toward securing and protecting these remote areas requires the support and involvement of residents and cooperation and coordination with applicable agencies and the resources they bring to the table in order to be effective in countering potential manmade and natural events.

²⁰³ “2009 – 2014 Washington Statewide All-Hazards Emergency Preparedness Strategic Plan: A Strategy for Emergency Management and Homeland Security in the State of Washington,” Washington State, (March 20, 2009), iii.

²⁰⁴ William L. Eller, “Leveraging Rural America in the Fight Against Terrorism In America Through the Use of Conservation Districts,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 23–25.

²⁰⁵ “2009 – 2014 Washington Statewide All-Hazards Emergency Preparedness Strategic Plan: A Strategy for Emergency Management and Homeland Security in the State of Washington,” Washington State, (March 20, 2009), iii.

²⁰⁶ Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy Strengthening Ourselves*, 156.

²⁰⁷ O’Hanlon, “Roles of DoD and First Responders,” in *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, 122.




Figure 7. Washington State Hazards²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ “2009–2014 Washington Statewide All-Hazards Emergency Preparedness Strategic Plan: A Strategy for Emergency Management and Homeland Security in the State of Washington,” Washington State, (March 20, 2009), i.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. CONCLUSIONS

The attacks of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era in the United States with the realization by most in this nation that transnational terrorism threat was very real, and can inflict horrific damage. Although prior extremist violent actions had taken hundreds of lives previously in this nation, this “new” threat jolted the government in establishing a new organization to “connect the dots” and protect our homeland.

One of the many tools developed by DHS to help secure the nation was the creation of a collaborative network of Fusion Centers throughout the United States. Chapter II reviewed the history of fusion centers, its effectiveness, identified some potential issues, and outlined a bottom-up approach (local citizens and local law enforcement) through these centers to provide the best possible means to secure not only the nations porous borders, but also to shore up the large less-populated regions of the country. In addition to being intelligence network collection, many of these centers have implemented an all-hazards approach that enables a focused and concentrated application to sourcing local, state and federal resources to respond to incidents or events – either natural or manmade.

In protecting our nation’s borders, most of the focus has been toward the 1,900-mile southern border due to previous illegal immigration, drug proliferation and more recently the violence from the Mexican drug lords spilling over to the United States. However, the 4,000-mile northern border, which is less violent than the southern, reports have surfaced that indicate the terrorist threat is higher due to the large expanse of area with limited law enforcement coverage. In this thesis, the states of North Dakota and Washington were selected due to their sparse population densities along their shared border with Canada and additionally these two states provide the variations of unique physical and geographical diversities and challenges associated with the remaining northern border states.

The states of North Dakota (Chapter III) and Washington (Chapter IV) were examined to determine how Fusion Centers have developed there and how these centers

have been incorporated to more effectively coordinate efforts and resources in response to threats (natural or manmade). Both of these states have implemented an all-hazards approach to their Fusion Centers, which allows the leadership the ability to quickly coordinate and leverage resources at varying stages of an event or potential for an event. While many of the details regarding methods and sources are not available in an open-source capacity, coordination with the varying levels of government has increased with the greater efficiencies of having personnel working in a centralized location (Fusion Center).

The development of the SLFCs is still a relatively new concept and they are still evolving. But when properly resourced, manned and utilized they can provide the best capabilities and leverage resources to counteract and respond to almost any threat, event or occurrence. The cost for the federal government for the development of SLFCs has been relatively small, but there is still a potential in a future harsh budget environment that federal and state funding for these centers may be reduced. This, however, would be potentially detrimental to the effectiveness and potential capabilities of these centers.

While the states outlined in this study have, in the past, responded to a multitude of emergency situations throughout their respective histories, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have brought about new thinking on how to coordinate the intelligence, respond to the event, and restore the areas affected back to normal as possible. The ability of the nation's northern states to shore up and secure their borders and remote, desolate areas are undoubtedly a challenge. Being able to detect, deter, and respond to a catastrophic event is essential in maintaining the resiliency of the area affected. With this understanding and as both states' Fusion Centers have implemented an all-hazards approach, each one is recognizing the synergistic effect of coordinating efforts of local, state, tribal and federal agencies and resources.

Reaching out to the community to share information at all levels, and especially receiving the involvement of the local citizens, aids in these efforts. This is especially critical in the remote areas of these states, as those landowners and citizens who reside and work will not only be more likely to see if something doesn't seem right, but also to possibly aid in the event of a tragic event. As the DHS Secretary testified:

The federal government; law enforcement on the state, local, and tribal levels; and the American people are the lines of defense against terrorism, whether foreign-affiliated or homegrown. They complement each other, and they must work together...As a critical part of our efforts, DHS is reinvigorating its coordination and collaboration with our state, local, and tribal partners—the Nation’s first preventers and first responders. The work of state, local, and tribal law enforcement at the local level puts them in the best position to notice when something is out of place and warrants a closer look—which is often the first step to thwarting a domestic terrorism plot.²⁰⁹

Leveraging the efforts of local citizens will provide needed intelligence to assist in countering extremist plots in these remote areas and also aid in focusing authorities efforts when a natural disaster strikes. Using this information will allow the appropriate government agency to then apply and focus the necessary technological resources, if applicable, to the affected area, event, or person. The SLFCs provide a beneficial conduit to receive, process, analyze and act on this information.

Although most of the situations regarding the detection and deterrence of terroristic threats remain classified for security reasons—due to the protection of sources and methods—nevertheless these centers have demonstrated their importance. While fusion centers are still in their infancy, they have shown their capabilities to counteract hazards, both natural and manmade, and to synchronize efforts at all levels. More importantly the involvement of local citizens in regions where local state and county agencies are spread thin can provide the “eyes and ears” and at times be the first responders in the event of a catastrophe.

²⁰⁹ Testimony of Secretary Napolitano before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,” September 30, 2009.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- “2009–2014 Washington Statewide All-Hazards Emergency Preparedness Strategic Plan: A Strategy for Emergency Management and Homeland Security in the State of Washington.” Washington State (March 20, 2009).
http://www.emd.wa.gov/plans/documents/2009-2014_Washington_Statewide_Strategic_Plan.pdf (accessed September 2010), 144.
- The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004.
- “An Act relating to the Washington joint analytical center.” Washington State Legislature, House Bill Report HB 2506.
<http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/WSLdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/2506.HBR.pdf> (accessed September 2010).
- Baysinger, Timothy G. “Right-Wing Group Characteristics and Ideology,” *Homeland Security Affairs*, Volume II, No. 2, (July 2006), 5.
- Blair, Dennis. “Strengthening our nation’s front line of defense,” *Washington Post*, December 18, 2009.
- Brunnelle, Gregory T. “Achieving Shared Situational Awareness During Steady-State Operations in New York State: A Model For Success,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.
- Bugarin, Darwina S. “Training, Sevis, and NSEERS: Will They Stop Terrorists From Entering the U.S.?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.
- Bush, G. W. “Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation.” The White House, 2002. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/homeland_security_book.pdf (accessed April 2010).
- Byman, Daniel. *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2008.
- Celizic, Mike. “Times Square hero breaks silence.” *MSNBC*, 3 May 2010.
<http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/36911051> (accessed May 2010).
- Crumpton, Henry A. “Intelligence and Homeland Defense.” In *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*, edited by Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005.

- Dahl, Erik, "State and Local Fusion Centers Figure." Intelligence for Homeland Security: Organizational and Policy Challenges Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School. May 2010.
- "Department of emergency Services Advisory Committee (DESAC) Meeting Minutes." ND Department of Emergency Services, (November 30, 2009). <http://www.nd.gov/des/uploads%5Cresources%5C560%5Cdesac-meeting-26-exec-sum-11-23-2009.pdf> (accessed September 2010).
- Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration website at: <http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop09003/tmcappb.htm> (accessed September 2010).
- "DHS Budget In Briefs FY 2004-2011." U.S. Department of Homeland Security. <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/budget/> (accessed April 2010).
- "DHS Factsheet." U.S. Department of Homeland Security Press Release. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0938.shtm (accessed April 2010).
- "DHS Fusion Center Fact Sheet." U.S. Department of Homeland Security. http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm (accessed April 2010).
- "Disaster Preparation Pays off in North Dakota." *The Huffington Post*, March 31, 2009. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/propublica/disaster-preparedness-pay_b_181419.html (accessed September 2010).
- Eller, William L." Leveraging Rural America in the Fight Against Terrorism In America Through the Use of Conservation Districts," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.
- "Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers." *National Governors Association Center for Best Practices*, July 2005. <http://www.nga.org/files/pdf/0509fusion.pdf> (accessed May 2010).
- "EVACUATION NOTICE: MeritCare's Fargo hospitals evacuating patients tonight." *Fargo Forum*, March 26, 2009. <http://www.inforum.com/event/article/id/235372/> (accessed September 2010).
- "Extremists in America." Anti-Defamation League. http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/american_front/default.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=3&item=american_front (accessed September 2010).

- “ Fargo phone saboteur set for release from prison.” *Bismarck Tribune*, March 20, 2005. http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/local/article_248b3a3f-5881-5e70-9176-98b8723c9c31.html (accessed September 2010).
- “ Fargo Resisted FEMA’s Evacuation Mandate.” *MSNBC*, April 1, 2009. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30001174/> (accessed September 2010).
- Fussell, Christopher, Trevor Hough, and Matthew Pedersen. “ What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009.
- Government Accountability Office, *Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced By State and Local Fusion Centers*, GAO Report GAO-08-636T, Washington, D.C., April 17, 2008.
- Government Accountability Office, *Report Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities*, GAO Report GAO-09-93, Washington, D.C.: November 2008. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0993.pdf> (accessed March 2010).
- Harper, Jennifer L. “ Fusion Center Privacy Policies: Does One Size Fit All?,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009.
- “ Historical Crests of the Red River of the North at Fargo.” NOAA. <http://water.weather.gov/ahps2/crests.php?wfo=fgf&gage=fgon8> (accessed September 2010).
- “ History—No Greater Tragedy—February 13, 1983.” U.S. Marshal History. <http://www.usmarshals.gov/history/muir-cheshire/kahl.html> (accessed September 2010).
- Hoeven, John. Executive Order 2007-06. <http://governor.nd.gov/exec/docs/2007/2007-06.pdf> (accessed September 2010).
- “ Hospital Evacuation Decision Guide.” Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, May 2010. <http://www.ahrq.gov/prep/hospevacguide/hospevac.pdf> (accessed August 2010).
- Hsu, Spencer S. “ Work to cease on ‘ virtual fence’ along U.S.-Mexico border,” *The Washington Post*, March 16, 2010.
- “ Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers Concept of Operations.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security. <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/conops.pdf> (accessed May 2010).
- Jenkins, Brian, *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy Strengthening Ourselves*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2006.

- “Jihad Jane, American who lived on Main Street.” *CNN*, 10 March 2010.
<http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/03/10/jihad.jane.profile/index.html> (accessed March 2010).
- Kim, Jin and William M. Allard. “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace: A Methodology for Homeland Security Intelligence Analysis.” *SAIS Review* 28/1 (Winter/Spring 2008).
- MacGregor, David S. “Fusion 2.0: The Next Generation of Fusion in California: Aligning State and Regional Fusion Centers,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.
- “The Militia Movement.” Anti-Defamation League.
http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/militia_m.asp?xpicked=4&item=19 (accessed October 2010).
- Masse, Todd and John Rollins. *A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, September 17, 2007, CRS Order Code RL34177.
- Mayer, Matt, “Effective Counterterrorism: State and Local Capabilities Trump Federal Policy.” A Report of the Heritage Center for Data Analysis, June 3, 2009.
- “Napolitano Monitors Flooding in North Dakota and Minnesota.” Department of Homeland Security Leadership Journal.
<http://journal.dhs.gov/2009/03/napolitano-monitors-flooding-in-north.html> (accessed September 2010).
- Napolitano, Janet, Secretary of DHS testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,”
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1254321524430.shtm
- Nation At Risk: Policy Makers Need Better Information to Protect the Country*. Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, March 2009.
- “National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009.
- “National Situation Update: Monday, March 30, 2009.” FEMA.
<http://www.fema.gov/emergency/reports/2009/nat033009.shtm> (accessed September 2010).
- “NDDES at a glance.” State of North Dakota.
<http://www.nd.gov/des/uploads/resources/93/des-ataglance.pdf> (accessed September 2010).

- “North Dakota.” U.S. Census Bureau.
<http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/38000.html> (accessed August 2010).
- “North Dakota.” *Encyclopedia Britannica*.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/419163/North-Dakota> (accessed April 2010).
- “North Dakota Department of Transportation Tourism Map.” State of North Dakota.
http://www.dot.nd.gov/road-map/pdf/tourism/2007_08TouristMap24x36.pdf
(accessed April 2010).
- “North Dakota Department of Emergency Services Organization Chart.” State of North Dakota.
<http://www.nd.gov/des/uploads/resources/267/des-org-chart.pdf>
(accessed September 2010).
- “North Dakota Homeland Security Fusion Center Information Brief.” State of North Dakota.
http://www.nd.gov/risk/files/seminars/05-CI_Fusion_Center.pdf
(accessed July 2010).
- “North Dakota Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Center.” State of North Dakota.
<http://www.nd.gov/des/homeland/fusion-center/> (accessed April 2010).
- O’Hanlon, Michael. “Border Protection.” In *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, ed. Michael d’Arcy, Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
- O’Hanlon, Michael. “Roles of DoD and First Responders.” In *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, edited by Michael d’Arcy, Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
- O’Hanlon, Michael and Shapiro, Jeremy. “Introduction.” In *Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007*, edited by Michael d’Arcy, Michael O’Hanlon, Peter Orszag, Jeremy Shapiro, and James Steinberg, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
- “Organizational Chart.” Department of Homeland Security.
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm (accessed April 2010).
- Perl, Raphael. *Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness*. CRS Report for Congress, March 12, 2007.
- “Population Shifts in North Dakota and Its Consequences for Water Use.” North Dakota State Data Center.
<http://www.ndsu.nodak.edu/sdc/presentations.html> (accessed September 2010).

- “Progress Report: Department of Homeland Security.” DHS (April 29, 2009). http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_progress_report_100_days.pdf (accessed September 2010).
- “Quick Facts.” U.S. Census Bureau. <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/38000.html> (accessed April 2010).
- Rabasa, Angel, Chalk, Peter, Cragin, Kim, Daly, Sarah A., Gregg, Heather S., Karasik, Theodore W., O’Brien, Kevin A., Rosenau, William. *Beyond al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement*. RAND, Project Air Force Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2006. www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG429.pdf (accessed May 2010).
- Randol, Mark. *Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: CRS, November 5, 2009.
- Randol, Mark. *The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress*. CRS Report for Congress, March 19, 2010.
- Schneier, Bruce. *Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World*. New York: Springer Publishing, 2006.
- Secure Fence Act of 2006*, H.R. 6061, Translated by 109th Congress, Vol. Public Law 109–367, October 26, 2006. Washington, D.C.: U.S., 2006, Sec 4.
- “Senior Official: More Hasan Ties to People Under Investigation by FBI.” *ABC News* 10 November, 2009. <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/official-nidal-hasan-unexplained-connections/story?id=9048590> (accessed April 2010).
- Sprynczynatyk, David, Major General. “Biennial Report N.D. Office of the Adjutant General: July 1, 2007 to June 20, 2009.” State of North Dakota. <http://www.nd.gov/des/uploads%5Cresources%5C648%5C2007-09-biennial-report.pdf> (accessed August 2010).
- “State Intelligence Fusion Centers: Recent State Actions.” *NGA Center for Best Practices*, Issue Brief, July 2005. <http://www.nga.org/files/pdf/0509fusion.pdf> (accessed June 2010).
- Steiner, James E. “Improving Homeland Security at the State Level; Needed: State-level, Integrated Intelligence Enterprises.” In *Studies in Intelligence: Journal of the Intelligence Professional*, Volume 53, No. 3 (September 2009).

- Strom, Kevin, Hollywood, John, Pope, Mark, Weintraub, Garth, Daye, Crystal and Gemeinhardt, Don. “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009,” *Institute for Homeland Security Solutions*, October 2010.
- “Terrorism.” Washington Military Department: Emergency Management Division. http://www.emd.wa.gov/hazards/haz_terrorism.shtml (accessed September 2010).
- “Terrorism in the United States, 1996: Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit.” National Security Division, 4–5. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/fbi/terroris.pdf> (accessed September 2010).
- “Times Square suspect charged in terror plot.” *MSNBC*, 4 May 2010. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36892505/ns/us_news-security (accessed May 2010).
- United States Code online, 10 U.S.C. Section 331, <http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t09t12+184+1+++%28%29%20%20AND%20%28%2810%29%20ADJ%20USC%29%3ACITE%20AND%20%28USC%20w%2F10%20%28331%29%29%3ACITE%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20> (accessed June 2010).
- United States Code online, 10 U.S.C. Section 332, <http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t09t12+185+0+++%28%29%20%20AND%20%28%2810%29%20ADJ%20USC%29%3ACITE%20AND%20%28USC%20w%2F10%20%28332%29%29%3ACITE%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20> (accessed June 2010).
- United States Code online, 42 U.S.C. Sections 5121-5206, <http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t41t42+4941+0+++%28%29%20%20AND%20%28%2842%29%20ADJ%20USC%29%3ACITE%20AND%20%28USC%20w%2F10%20%285121%29%29%3ACITE%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20> (accessed June 2010).
- U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. “*Building a Partnership Strategy.*” Congressional Testimony—House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Intelligence Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment.” <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070525162141-32849.pdf> (accessed September 2010).
- U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *U.S. Northern Border Security—National Security Implications and Issues for the Armed Services: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services.* 109th Cong, 2nd sess, 1 August 2006.

- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee. *Border Security: Moving Beyond the Virtual Fence: Hearing before
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs*. 20 April 2010,
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=198481c8-0f75-44cd-addb-ac51c7b1ef16 (accessed April 2010).
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection. "SBInet Program, Program-Specific Recovery Act
Plan" May 15, 2009.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/recovery/CBP_SBI_net_Program_Final_2009-05-15.pdf (accessed April 2010).
- "USNORTHCOM Images for 2009." United States Northern Command.
http://www.northcom.mil/images/Images_2009/index.html (accessed September
2010).
- "Washington." *Encyclopedia Britannica*.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/636305/Washington> (accessed June
2010).
- "Washington." U.S. Census Bureau. <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/53000.html>
(accessed August 2010).
- "Washington State Population Density." State of Washington Office of Financial
Management. <http://www.ofm.wa.gov/pop/popden/colormap.pdf> (accessed
September 2010).
- Washington State Highway Map." State of Washington.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/636305/Washington> (accessed July
2010).
- What's Wrong with Fusion Centers?* American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 2007,
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf (accessed May
2010).
- Zegart, Amy B. *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11*. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California