



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Faculty and Researchers

Faculty and Researchers' Publications

2017-03

The Guinea-Bissau case

Bruneau, Thomas C.

Cambria Press

Bruneau, Thomas C. "The Guinea-Bissau Case". From Paul Shemella, Nicholas Tomb (eds.), "Security forces in African states: cases and assessment", Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS) Series, March 2017.
<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/52412>

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

CHAPTER 4

THE GUINEA–BISSAU CASE

There is general agreement that the Third Wave of democratization began on April 25, 1974 in Lisbon, Portugal with a military coup that overthrew the Salazar–Caetano authoritarian regime that had been installed since the late 1920s.¹ The Third Wave has continued, with fits and starts, until today, 42 years later. In fact, the military coup of April 25, 1974 began in Guinea–Bissau in 1973 when the Soviet Union furnished the guerrilla movement, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) with surface-to-air missiles, thereby denying air superiority to the Portuguese, who had been fighting the PAIGC since 1963. Despite efforts by the junior officers (and finally the Portuguese military commander, General António de Spínola, who knew that Portugal had lost Guinea–Bissau, and should negotiate independence there while retaining the incomparably more valuable settler colonies of Angola and Mozambique) to convince Premier Marcelo Caetano, the regime was intransigent. Consequently, the junior officers formed the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), and overthrew the regime on April 24, 1974. In the resulting turmoil Portugal underwent a revolution, losing not only Guinea–Bissau, but also Angola, Mozambique, and East Timor.²

Unfortunately, Guinea–Bissau has not participated in the Third Wave of democratization, or in the reforms of civil-military relations that have been part of the democratization process in most parts of the world.³ As stated in the “Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau” (UNIOGBIS),

United Nations Security Council January 19, 2015: “Since its independence in 1974, the country has never seen a Government complete its term in office. *Coups d’etat* took place in 1980, 1998-99, 2003, and 2012, attempted coups took place in 1985 and 1993, and alleged attempts took place in 2009, 2011 and 2012. The political instability in the country has been accompanied by repeated gross violations of human rights, including politically motivated assassinations, abductions, cases of torture, arbitrary arrests, detentions of political opponents and civil society representatives, and restrictions on the freedom of expression and assembly.”⁴ The coup in 1998 resulted in a civil war that lasted most of a year. During that conflict, what professional armed forces that remained from the independence movement against the Portuguese were replaced by armed gangs.⁵ The lack of professional armed forces—and training facilities to help make them professional—continues until the present. The civil war also destroyed what infrastructure there was at the time, including the closing of the United States embassy which was shelled resulting in the death of a guard.

The armed forces of Guinea–Bissau is, more than anything, a criminal enterprise. According to one analyst “Indeed narco–trafficking is not only the ‘core business’ of the Armed Forces in Guinea–Bissau, it is also, due to the financial weight of cocaine trafficking, the reason the military has assumed previously unimagined levels of importance.”⁶ To paraphrase the Grand Jury document for the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, United States of America v. Antonio Indjai, Defendant: In April 2010, Antonio Indjai, the defendant, helped lead a military coup which resulted in the detention of the Prime Minister.

By June 2010, Indjai had become Chief of Staff of the Guinea–Bissau Armed Forces. On or about April 12, 2012, the military staged another coup. In the aftermath of the coup, the first public communiqué by the “Military Command” that took responsibility for the coup was issued by the Armed Forces General Staff, led by Antonio Indjai. He was a defendant, and pleaded guilty on four counts. The first was to engage in a narco-terrorism conspiracy with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The second was to import cocaine from Colombia and to oversee its distribution—including in the United States. The third was to support the FARC, a terrorist organization, with arms, including SAM missiles. And the fourth was to acquire the SAM missiles ostensibly for the Guinea–Bissau Armed Forces that would be transferred to the FARC with the intention to shoot down US helicopters in Colombia.⁷ Later, in 2013, the chief of the Guinea–Bissau Navy was caught in a sting operation, involving drug trafficking, and pleaded guilty at the US District Court in Manhattan.⁸

SOME POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION

There is no single reason for the current sad situation in Guinea–Bissau.⁹ There are, instead, at least seven reasons that must be reviewed and analyzed with the goal to identify what might be changed so that the overall political situation, including the security forces, could be improved.

First, according to the single most thorough and authoritative study of Guinea–Bissau, Professor Joshua Forrest claims that the Portuguese, in fighting the insurgents, including the PAIGC, engaged in what he terms “state terror” to retain the colony.¹⁰ Having defeated the Portuguese, and taken control over the independent country, the PAIGC replicated the “state terror” and continued to use it after independence in

September 1974.¹¹ From the beginning, then, extreme violence became the common currency in politics, including, but not limited to, the armed forces and politics. Correia de Nóbrega also highlights the use of extreme violence in all that concerns the armed political party that led the country to independence, the PAIGC.

Second, Guinea–Bissau, unlike Angola and Mozambique, was not a settler colony. In contrast to these two colonies, Guinea–Bissau lacked the size, climate, and natural resources that could sustain a sizeable Portuguese settler population. Consequently, there was minimal investment in infrastructure and in human capital. Guinea–Bissau became independent with virtually nothing. For example, at independence only 2% of the population was literate.¹² In short, Guinea–Bissau began life as an independent country with minimal assets. Politics, including violent politics, was a matter of attempting to capture the very limited resources that were available.

Third, Guinea–Bissau is among the bottom ten countries in the world in terms of economic and social development. Its only legal export crop is cashew nuts, virtually all of which go to India for processing. According to the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index, 2015, Guinea–Bissau is 178 out of 187 countries.¹³ The misery and poverty are obvious in every imaginable respect. While there is a port in Bissau, it is in total disrepair, and even lacks cranes. There is an international airport at Bissau, but scheduled flights are few and far between. The Portuguese Airline TAP/Air Portugal, no longer provides service to Bissau. The country began its independent existence poor, and has remained poor.

Fourth, unlike other post–colonial countries, including Angola and Mozambique, Guinea–Bissau did not begin its independence with an acknowledged leader. The main

leader of the independence movement, Amílcar Cabral, was assassinated, apparently by rivals within the PAIGC, in January 1973, before independence. Much of the “state terror” that Professor Forrest refers to, was caused by rival elements in the PAIGC fighting for power. There was no independence leader, such as an Agostino Neto (of Angola) let alone a figure of the stature of Nehru, who could lead the newly independent country. Not only was Amílcar Cabral murdered, but other, similar leaders from Cape Verde were also marginalized, and the two independent countries, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde later went their separate ways.

Fifth, while the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP) of the PAIGC was, as noted above, riven by factions and all were prone to use violence to assert themselves, with the civil war of 1998-99 what little element of military professionalism there was disappeared completely. Whereas in 1990 there were 2, 500 personnel in the armed forces, today the estimated numbers are at least double. Further, they are extremely top-heavy.¹⁴ The armed forces are not professional. Indeed, there is no military academy, and there are absolutely no other training facilities for the armed forces. Based on the author’s experience at a seminar in Bissau the week of August 16, 2015, a great many of the senior officers seem illiterate and unable to read or speak in Portuguese. They can converse only in creole. Guinea-Bissau lacked, and still lacks, a professional armed force.

Sixth, in view of the poverty of the country and the political instability, salaries and pensions for the armed forces are extremely problematic. We will see below that this fact may offer leverage for potential reform in civil-military relations. Everything very quickly becomes a matter of the use of force to obtain resources. In the meantime,

however, there is a temptation for the military to engage in drug trafficking, and as we saw above—and will see even more below—this takes place at the highest levels of the armed forces. Even if they were not involved, the lack of resources, including boats, would make it impossible for the armed forces to control the archipelago of islands off Bissau.

Seventh, as stated in the UNIOGBIS Report: “At the root of the cycle of instability in Guinea-Bissau lies the fact that there has not been serious and genuine dialogue aimed at national reconciliation among the various stakeholders in the country.”¹⁵ The country’s political and military history since independence in September 1974 demonstrates again and again the accuracy of this profound statement. The most recent analyses of Guinea–Bissau by virtually all observers highlight the lack of dialogue and resulting instability. In its report of February 12, 2016, UNIOGBIS, states the following on page 1 under “Major developments in Guinea-Bissau: “The political environment in Guinea-Bissau has continued to be marked by tensions and divisions within the ruling African Party of the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) and among the sovereign organs of the State.”¹⁶ And, in its most recent report, of August 2, 2016, UNIOGBIS states: “Since my previous report, the political situation in Guinea–Bissau has deteriorated.”¹⁷

The International Crisis Group, in their *Crisis Watch Database* of February 1, 2016 has a long paragraph detailing the factional struggle within the PAIGC; the fragility of political institutions; and the disruption and chaos in the political system.¹⁸ And, in *Jeune Afrique*, its article on February 11, 2016 was entitled “*Guinée-Bissau: face à l’impasse politique, la communauté internationale exaspérée*”¹⁹ The most recent

UNIOGBIS Report, of August 2, 2016, provides chapter and verse on the political stalemate and the many efforts by other countries and international organizations to resolve the stalemate.²⁰ In short, the domestic political actors, which clearly include the armed forces, are so far unwilling and maybe even *unable* to negotiate and find solutions which might lead to political stability, and in which the armed forces are not the central political actors.

On the basis of this political background, which of course extends back to even before independence in 1974, it is no surprise that Guinea–Bissau is extremely negative in terms of our assessment framework. In fact, it would be negative in terms of any assessment framework, as indeed virtually all of the articles about the country by social scientists are extremely negative. While the author of this chapter normally gives the highest priority in the analysis of politics to *domestic* factors, he found in the case of Portugal in the 1970s from coup, to revolution, and ultimately to democracy, there was a very important role for foreigners in politics, national defense & security, and the economy. Portugal did indeed lead the Third Wave, but events there were very heavily influenced by foreign states (especially Germany and the United States), NATO, the IMF, World Bank, and European Investment Bank.²¹

In the current situation of Guinea–Bissau, the author believes that if there is to be any solution to the seriously unstable political and political–military situation, it will to some degree have to be externally influenced if not externally imposed. There are a huge number of external actors involved in Guinea-Bissau. This should not be surprising considering the country’s instability in a region where terrorism is making inroads; its role as a transit location for illegal drugs; the concerns of European countries regarding

the implications of both instability and drugs; the aspirations of Portugal and Brazil regarding a Lusophone country; and the unscrupulous behavior of some military leaders who were prepared to provide SAMs to the FARC for money to be derived by selling cocaine.

While there is a great deal of overlap, as one would expect in a small town such as Bissau, the author believes the main themes, or issues, to be described and analyzed are three. First (clearly a power issue), are the roles of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) attempting to impede the use of Guinea–Bissau as a transit location for illegal drugs, mainly cocaine. Second is the role of neighbors (Brazil, across the South Atlantic) and Nigeria (mainly through ECOWAS) in attempting to bring political stability to Guinea–Bissau. And third is the role of UNIOGBIS in attempting to coordinate the policy of the donor community for the progress and benefit of Guinea–Bissau.

DRUGS

There is an abundant literature on Guinea–Bissau as a drug transit state. Indeed, monograph titles capture the general sense. One is “Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa’s First Narco-State.”²² Another telling title is, “Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a Drug Trafficker’s Dream.”²³ Authors such as Eduardo Costa Dias go into great detail on the how, why, and implications of the transit of drugs through Guinea–Bissau.²⁴ The journal *Perspectives of the UNODC* published a lead article entitled “Guinea-Bissau: New hub for cocaine-trafficking.”²⁵ And, most recently, the US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in their 2015 International Narcotics Control

Strategy Report state the following: “Guinea-Bissau is a transit hub for cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe. The country’s lack of law enforcement capabilities, demonstrated susceptibility to corruption, porous borders, and convenient location provide an opportune environment for traffickers. The complicity of government officials at all levels in this criminal activity inhibits a complete assessment and resolution of the problem. Despite a newly elected government that is seeking to establish the rule of law, Guinea-Bissau’s political system remains susceptible to and under the influence of narcotics traffickers.”²⁶

These facts are well known. What is most important is that something is being done about the involvement of the highest levels of government (including the armed forces) in the trafficking of illegal drugs. The US Drug Enforcement Administration has a regional office in Dakar, Senegal, which is responsible for Guinea–Bissau (as there is no United States embassy in Bissau). General Antonio Indjai, Chief of Staff of the Guinea–Bissau Armed Forces was arrested in a West African country on April 4, 2013, and transferred to American custody, where he was subsequently indicted in New York for trafficking in cocaine owned by the FARC, with distribution planned for the United States, and plans to furnish the FARC with surface-to-air missiles which would be used to shoot down American helicopters.²⁷ And, on April 2, 2013, in a sting operation, the DEA arrested the chief of the Guinea–Bissau Navy, José Américo bubo Na Tchuto for trafficking in cocaine. He was also transferred to New York and indicted.²⁸ Both of these highest-level officers from the Guinea–Bissau armed forces are serving time in prisons in the United States. The arrests demonstrated that while these officers might enjoy impunity within Guinea–Bissau, the international community could reach out, extradite

them, try them, and put them in prisons in the United States for a very long time. In the words of one of the author's contacts in Bissau, the arrests demonstrated the vulnerability of the officers, and it really got their attention.²⁹

In short, while impunity might exist within Guinea-Bissau, it is strictly limited globally. In this regard, that of power, Guinea-Bissau is under a United Nations sanctions regime in which eleven designated individuals are under travel bans. The United Nations document states the following: "...the impact of sanctions in Guinea-Bissau has transcended the travel ban restrictions imposed by resolution 2048 (2012)...sanctions had acted as a deterrent to the direct involvement of the security and defence forces in the political crisis the country had faced since August 2015."³⁰

SUPPORT BY REGIONAL POWERS

Even discounting for exaggerated rhetoric, the regional power, Brazil, in the South Atlantic, has been active in supporting democracy and democratic civil-military relations in Guinea-Bissau. This includes initiatives at the level of the United Nations and also within the country.³¹ Probably most important for the purposes of this chapter are those concerning education and training for the police and the armed forces. The Brazilian Federal Police created the *Centro de Treinamento de Forças de Segurança* and the Brazilian military, began a *Centro de Formação de Oficiais*, for the Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces. However, with the military coup of 2012 work on this center was halted.³²

With the support of Portugal, elements in the military have now migrated into two new police organizations, roughly based on the models in Portugal of the *Guarda Nacional Republicana* and the *Pólicia de Segurança Pública*. In Guinea-Bissau these are the *Guarda Nacional* and the *Pólicia de Ordem Pública*. These two major police forces

have been recently created, they total 4,758 officers and men, but so far their tasks or functions have not been delineated nor has professional training been provided. They are formally under the Ministry of the Interior, and not Defense.³³

At the regional level, ECOWAS, and in particular Nigeria, have been very active. ECOWAS has been involved in attempting to build peace in Guinea–Bissau since at least 1998.³⁴ At an Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS on September 12, 2015 the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS extended the mandate of its Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMID) through June 2016. They also mandated the presidents of Senegal and Guinea, in their respective capacities as ECOWAS Chair and ECOWAS Mediator for Guinea–Bissau (with the assistance of the former president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, in his capacity as Special Envoy of the President of Nigeria) to facilitate dialogue with all stakeholders to find a lasting solution to the political crisis. Former President Obasanjo returned to Bissau in October 2015 to pursue consultations with political stakeholders. ECOWAS, the UN, African Union, EU, and the *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* (CPLP) were heavily involved in negotiations between President Vaz and the government in February of 2016. ECOWAS—with the support of the EU, Nigerian troops—continues to maintain a presence in Guinea–Bissau.

SUPPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

International donors include individual countries such as East Timor, France, Great Britain, Portugal, and the United States, as well as a myriad of international organizations including the EU, UNICEF, UNDP, CPLP, the World Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Peace-building Fund, the African Development Bank, and the West African Development Bank. In March 2015, at an international partners' round-

table, pledges were made for approximately \$1.3 Billion. In an effort to coordinate programs and policies, the United Nations established in Guinea–Bissau a UN Peace-building Support Office on March 3, 1999. On January 1, 2010 it was replaced by the UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS. Since that time, its mandate has been extended every year.³⁵ As Guinea–Bissau stumbles from crisis to crisis, the UNIOGBIS continues until today, but little of the pledged \$1.3 billion has been released.³⁶

In addition to informing the UN and other sponsors, the UNIOGBIS has as its main task the implementation of several key elements in terms of a mandate. In the most recent report of the Secretary-General, dated February 12, 2016, they review the status of these ten elements. A review of this report will provide substantial information on the status of developments. They are as follows:

A. Inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process. Some, but fairly modest progress.

B. Strategic and technical advice and support for national authorities in implementing the national security sector reform and rule of law strategies. Again, some progress, but little progress on demobilization efforts and on pensioning off excess military personnel.

C. United Nations good offices. Several meetings and ongoing tensions among state institutions and the PAIGC.

D. Support for the Government of Guinea–Bissau in the mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance. Several meetings to establish effective mechanisms for aid coordination.

E. Strengthening democratic institutions and enhancing the capacity of State organs to function effectively and constitutionally. Numerous seminars and meetings.

F. Strategic and technical advice and support for the establishment of effective and efficient law enforcement, criminal justice, and penitentiary systems. Again, numerous meetings and training sessions.

G. Promotion and protection of human rights and human rights monitoring and reporting activities. Some progress, but “[D]espite intense lobbying by UNIOGBIS, efforts to review the status of the country’s National Human Rights Commission to make it compliant with the Paris Principles have been delayed.”³⁷

H. Strategic and technical advice and support for the Government of Guinea–Bissau to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. Again, several meetings and training sessions.

I. Incorporating a gender perspective into peace-building, in line with UN Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). More meetings and training sessions.

J. Work with the Peace-building Commission in support of Guinea-Bissau’s peace-building priorities. One meeting.

Finally, under “Observations,” the result of progress on these mandates is summed up in the following terms: “The political crisis within the main political party, PAIGC, and among the political leadership in Guinea-Bissau, which has prevented the country from moving forward with its national reform agenda for more than six months, is concerning. The current stagnation undermines the bright outlook for the country following the successful partner’s round table in March, during which international

partners expressed unprecedented support for the country's strategic and operational plan for the period 2015-2020. The crisis has the potential to further damage the already fragile State institutions and the overall peace-building process.”³⁸

ASSESSMENT

National Brand. Given the extremely low degree of readiness, the country's armed forces are incapable of defending its borders (although there is some deterrent effect from simply *having* armed forces). The conduct of international peacekeeping operations, which require specialized skills and a high level of professionalism, would seem to be far in the future. By virtue of the military's central role in trafficking drugs, Guinea-Bissau is certainly a Troublemaker country. If the armed forces were better organized and more professional, it might be possible for the government to use them for a variety of public purposes, including law enforcement.

Most Significant Threats. There are traditional threats at the borders with Guinea-Conakry and Senegal, both of which have intervened in Guinea-Bissau. There is currently concern with Jihadist movements from the West Africa region, and particularly Mali. Guinea-Bissau is extremely vulnerable to smuggling activities. The country's geography, characterized by remote islands and rivers, has turned Guinea-Bissau into a regional hub for illegal trafficking.

Roles of the Security Forces. There is no formal delineation of roles (and the resources that go with them) for security force institutions. The embryonic police institutions complicate rather than complement the activities of the armed forces. Indeed, the clear articulation of roles for all security force institutions should form the first phase of security sector reform.

Political System. Guinea–Bissau’s political development is too nascent for strict labeling, but the country has yet to form institutions worthy of the name. It is not a Collapsed State in the same sense as Libya or Somalia, but it has a lot of work to do. Chronic political instability has deprived Guinea–Bissau of strong leadership for long enough periods to make a difference.

Contribution of the Security Forces to Good Governance. The security forces of Guinea–Bissau contribute nothing to good governance but quite a lot to bad governance. Without serious and major reform of its security forces (armed forces, law enforcement, and intelligence), the country will fail to achieve gains in human security and good governance overall.

Trends for Security Sector Institutions

In a September 2016 seminar in Bissau, the CCMR faculty utilized the Level Two Assessment Framework, introduced in Chapter 2, as a teaching tool with the 50+ participants. The mean ratings for governability and effectiveness were 5.0 and 4.7 respectively. Two police forces have just been founded, but their roles have yet to be delineated with each other, let alone from the military. While the police forces are ostensibly under the Ministry of Interior, they retain a military training profile and mentality.³⁹

Guinea–Bissau is widely considered a failed state in that no president has ever completed his term of office, and political paralysis is more the rule than the exception. So far, however, in the ongoing political crisis, the most positive observation in the February 2016 UNIOGBIS Report—and which still holds—is as follows: “I note with

satisfaction that the armed forces have remained in their barracks and have not interfered in the political affairs of the country.”⁴⁰

The armed forces and the PAIGC were forged in a conflict where there was little distinction between the party and the military. Today, with some rudimentary elements of professionalism, the military may become separate from the government. So far, there is little good governance in any aspect of Guinea–Bissau, including security. In short, all remains a work in progress in security and civil-military relations in Guinea–Bissau.

¹ For the term “the third wave” see Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave:*

Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

² On the origins of the coup see Joshua Forrest, *Lineages of State Fragility: Rural Civil Society in Guinea-Bissau* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), 243. And, Avelino Rodrigues, Cesário Borga, and Mário Cardoso, *O Movimento dos Capitães e o 25 de Abril: 229 Dias Para Derrubar O Fascismo* (Lisbon: Morães Editores, 1974), 248-262).

On August 20, 2015 the author met in Bissau with Manuel dos Santos, “manecas” who went to the Soviet Union in early 1973 to be trained to use the “Estrella” surface-to-air missiles, which ultimately denied air superiority to the Portuguese Armed Forces which used Fiat and DC 6 airplanes. He later supported the MPLA in Luanda by holding off the South Africans with these same SAMs.

³ The issue of democracy and civil-military relations is dealt with in Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, eds, *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006).

⁴ United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau,” January 19, 2015, S/2015/37, 11.

⁵ In his excellent book, *A Luta Pelo Poder Na Guiné-Bissau*, Álvaro Correia de Nóbrega notes that during the civil war many criminals were freed who then joined the military junta. (*Universidade Técnica de Lisboa Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas*, 2003), 121.

⁶ Eduardo Costa Dias, “From the Unbearable ‘Resilience’ of Coupism to Ethicisation: a Short Journey for the Armed Forces of Guinea–Bissau,” *Nordic Journal of African Studies* (2013) 22 (1 & 2), 18.

⁷ United States District Court. Southern District of New York United States of America v. Antonio Indjai. S 6 12 Cr. 839. Available at <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/U.S.%20v.%20Antonio%20Indjai%20S6%20Indictment.pdf>, accessed March 9, 2016.

⁸ Reuters available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-drugs-guilty-idUSKBN0EE2FO20140603>, accessed February 18, 2016.

⁹ Correia de Nóbrega gives particular attention to “heterogeneity” of society, religion and the PAIGC, but in his excellent analysis he includes many more factors than heterogeneity.

¹⁰ Joshua Forrest, 2003, p. 183.

-
- ¹¹ Joshua Forrest, 2003, 117. In support of Forrest’s allegation see the chronology of some examples of state terror under the PAIGC. Available at <http://www.gbissau.com/?p=1048>, accessed February 17, 2016.
- ¹² Author interview with Manuel dos Santos, Bissau August 20, 2015.
- ¹³ Human Development Index, 2015, Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/GNB>, accessed February 19, 2016.
- ¹⁴ The estimate of 2, 500 was given the author by Manuel dos Santos on August 20, 2015. He was Minister of Finance in 1990 and knew the numbers as he was responsible for paying their salaries.
- ¹⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau,” UNIOGBIS Report, January 19, 2015, 17.
- ¹⁶ “Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau,” UNIOGBIS United Nations Security Council February 12, 2016, 1
- ¹⁷ Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau,” UNIOGBIS United Nations Security Council August 2, 2016, 1.
- ¹⁸ Crisis Watch Database – International crisis Group, “Guinea-Bissau February 1, 2016 available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?>, accessed March 4, 2016.
- ¹⁹ Available at <http://www.jeuneafrique.com>, accessed March 6, 2016.
- ²⁰ UNIOGBIS August 2, 2016, 1 – 5.

²¹ Some of this information is found in Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,” *Democratization* December 2006 Vol. 13, No 5., 776-790.

²² David O’Regan and Peter Thompson, ACSS Special Report No. 2, 2013. Washington, D.C.: Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

²³ *Spiegelonline International* March 08, 2013. Available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/violence-plagues-african-hub-of-cocaine-trafficking-a-887306.html>, accessed March 8, 2016.

²⁴ Eduardo Costa Dias, 2013, especially page 9.

²⁵ *Perspectives* Issue 5, May 2008, Vienna: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, INL, Country Report: Guinea-Bissau. Available at <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol1/238975.htm>, accessed March 5, 2016.

²⁷ DEA Press Release. Available at <http://www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2013/hq041813.shtml>, accessed March 8, 2016.

²⁸ DEA Press Release. Available at <http://www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2013/hq040413.shtml>, accessed March 8, 2016. See also <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/colombian-narcotics-trafficker-sentenced-manhattan-federal-court-25-years-prison>, accessed March 9, 2016.

²⁹ Author meeting with international official in Bissau on August 18, 2015.

³⁰ Report of the Secretary-General on the progress made with regard to stabilization and restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. No place or date, page 3.

³¹ For extensive details on the positive role of Brazil see Adriana Erthal Abdenur & Danilo Marcondes De Souza Neto, “Rising Powers and the Security-Development

Nexus: Brazil's Engagement with Guinea-Bissau," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 9:2 (2014), 1-16. For a more skeptical view see Pedro Seabra, "A harder edge: reframing Brazil's power relation with Africa," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 27:1 (2014), 77-97. For details from the Brazilian Embassy in Bissau website see <http://bissau.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-projetos.xml>

³² For an update on the Brazilian initiatives in security and defense I rely on information provided by a Brazilian officer at UNIOGBIS e-mail of November 25, 2015.

³³ Information on the numbers from meeting with U.N. officials in Bissau on September 14, 2016, and discussion with all seminar participants on September 16, 2016.

³⁴ See John M. Kabia, *Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West Africa: From ECOMOG to ECOMIL* Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate (2009).

³⁵ For further information see <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/02/mandate-renewal-of-uniogbis-and-guinea-bissau-political-crisis.php>.

³⁶ Update on UNIOGBIS see <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/02/mandate-renewal-of-uniogbis-and-guinea-bissau-political-crisis.php>.

³⁷ 2016 Report, 13/18.

³⁸ 2016 Report, 17/18.

³⁹ The 2016 seminar (which followed a similar event in 2015) illuminated an increased awareness among civilians, military, and police that progress on the development of security forces is necessary and possible. That awareness, if combined with commitment and dedication, could well bring about major changes in security and civil-military relations in Guinea-Bissau.

⁴⁰ February 2016 Report, 18/18.