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**NAVAL
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THESIS

**FIXING THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH IN
FAILED STATES—A MODEL FOR SECURITY FORCE
ASSISTANCE**

by

James Cliff Keller

June 2010

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Anna Simons
Kalev Sepp

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**FIXING THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH IN FAILED STATES—A
MODEL FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis proposes an organizational and operational model for developing Partner Nation Special Operations Forces (SOF) in failed states and under-governed spaces. The Partner Nation SOF would be designed to improve and expand sovereignty throughout the country. Accordingly, the model organization would provide the basic functions of governance while supporting the development of social capital and national civic identity. To achieve this, this thesis also proposes a Security Force Assistance framework for U.S. forces to develop the Partner Nation program. Within this framework, United States involvement would be reduced to the minimum; advisors would guide and direct the Partner Nation in the development and employment of their SOF. The thesis uses the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a potential Partner Nation; specific recommendations are made for application of this model to the DRC. Finally, some suggestions are made about adapting this model to other failed states and under-governed areas.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CNDP	Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Counterterrorist
DDR	Disarm Demobilize Reintegrate
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAC	Forces Armees Congolaises
FARDC	Forces Armees de la Rebulique Democratique du Congo
FDLR	Forces Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda
FM	Field Manual
FSF	Foreign Security Force
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
JPAT	Joint Planning and Assistance Team
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MILGROUP	Military Group
MONUC	Mission des Nations Unies au Congo
NSS	National Security Strategy

ODA	Operational Detachment - Alpha
PRCM	Population Resource Control Measure
SEAL	Sea Air Land
SOCAFRICA	Special Operations Command Africa
SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFLE	Special Operations Forces Liaison Element
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
UN	United Nations
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has suggested that in the foreseeable future the U.S. military "will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of its local partners."¹ He then notes that, while the U.S. military has improved its focus on developing an advisory capacity, U.S. foreign assistance requires a unified effort from both the Department of Defense and the Department of State. Secretary Gates further describes his proposal to pool funds from both Departments to facilitate U.S. interagency foreign assistance programs in failed states.² However, as important as the whole-of-government debate may be within Washington, it still misses the point in much of the developing world.

Furthermore, even as U.S. counterinsurgency efforts are finally returning to Edward Lansdale's concepts of advising and shaping local forces to fend for themselves, U.S. development programs continue to focus on U.S.-centric outputs.³ In *Closing the Sovereignty Gap*, Ashraf Ghani suggests that current United States and international aid programs suffer from four systemic problems: (1) they create parallel government structures, (2) there is a lack of harmonization between programs, (3) non-state provision of basic services undermines state legitimacy, and (4) aid

¹ Robert Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 2-6, 2.

² Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," 2.

³ Edward Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972).

programs provide unpredictable support.⁴ In both U.S. counterinsurgency operations and development projects, the stated objective is to build partner nation capacity.⁵ The fact that these two distinct activities have a similar goal suggests that there may also be a singular way to achieve greater effectiveness. This thesis will argue that, indeed, greater effectiveness can be achieved by reducing direct U.S. involvement and increasing U.S. advisory (not training) activities focused on teaching Partner Nations to teach themselves.

Very few developing nations are enthusiastic about inviting U.S. government agencies to conduct direct activities in their country, as evidenced by the rather cool response of African nations to United States Africa Command.⁶ Moreover, the division of authority and labor between security forces, law enforcement, and government entities in failed states, does not mirror what we are used to in the developed world. This mismatch is one reason that this thesis argues for a Partner Nation Special Operations Force (SOF) that is designed to provide the basic functions of governance where the state has very limited penetration.

The model presented in this thesis shifts the focus from the *form* of government, and "proper" divisions of power, to the *functions* of sovereignty—security, economics,

⁴ Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005), 10.

⁵ Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," 3.

⁶ Dennis Penn, "Africa Command and the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy," in *Short of General War: Perspectives on the Use of Military Power in the 21st Century*, ed. Harry Yarger, 39-55 (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 40.

governance, and justice. More importantly, U.S. personnel would not directly participate in providing these services. The security improvements and development projects outlined here are to be conducted and sustained solely by Partner Nation forces. U.S. Special Operations Forces' role, instead, is to assist in building the Partner Nation's capacity. To those ends, this thesis concentrates on how such forces would be configured, trained, and advised in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Democratic Republic of the Congo represents a particularly challenging test case. It is so large and broken that no current "whole-of-government" approach could possibly work. Instead, it begs a significantly different design, but one that could potentially then be adopted for other failed states.

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II. FRAMING THE PROBLEM—THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

A. WHY FAILED STATES MATTER

Failed states and under-governed spaces are typically only considered strategically important to the United States if an identifiable security threat, such as a Violent Extremist Organization (VEO), is present or operating in that area. Accordingly, much attention has been given to the 2006 *U.S. National Security Strategy's* (NSS) suggestion that failed states and under-governed territories are likely havens for terrorists and VEOs.⁷ In response, the current Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAFRICA) strategy is specifically designed to develop Partner Nation capabilities to counter VEOs in Africa through the development of rapid-strike forces with key Partner Nations, such as a Special Capabilities Battalion in Kisangani, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).⁸

However, the focus on identifiable, current threats in Africa, and in failed states in general, may not sufficiently justify commitment of U.S. troops and resources. For example, political scientist Aiden Hehir suggests that the supposed link between failed states and international terrorism was developed by supporters of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) in order to justify

⁷ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, 2006), 15.

⁸ Special Operations Command-Africa, *SOCAFRICA Strategic Overview* (Stuttgart, 2009).

increasing intervention in international politics.⁹ Hehir goes on to argue that of the African nations listed in the top 20 failed states of the *Foreign Policy* 2006 Failed States Index, only Sudan and Somalia were known to have any recognized Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) from the 2005 list, and that was al Qaeda.¹⁰

This leads to at least two problems with the U.S. Department of Defense's current focus on international terrorism and VEOs. On one hand, the demand to respond to perceived and potential VEOs and terrorists requires that the United States and its allies undertake an expensive and involved program to develop a local Counterterrorism (CT) capability. On the other hand, for those who would prefer to focus on the absence of identified VEOs and FTOs, this assumes that the situation in under-governed areas will not change faster than the U.S. can react. Both points of view rely on a best-case scenario that (a) a U.S.-resourced CT development program would be successful, and (b) the Partner Nation would properly employ and sustain a new CT capability once the U.S. helped build it. Clearly, however, the U.S. cannot count on either of these.

Rather than orienting ourselves to only be able to counter known threats, eliminating the conditions that support VEOs may better suit U.S. and Partner Nation needs for a variety of reasons. For instance, a less-quoted section of the 2006 NSS recognizes that development and security are essential to countering future threats in

⁹ Aidan Hehir, "The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no. 3 (2007): 307-332, 307.

¹⁰ Hehir, "Myth of the Failed State," 312.

under-governed areas.¹¹ The argument is that the strategic importance of a failed state can not be determined by its current significance (or lack thereof) alone. What also needs to be taken into account is that state's potential future significance by the time it is better developed. The assumption that states that are failing now will never improve, or never become threats, will only constrain U.S. options for helping assist a fragile state to become a Partner Nation later.

Additionally, even those failed states that are not current threats can have a significant destabilizing impact on their neighbors and the region.¹² This is particularly true of the DRC. As Gerard Prunier amply demonstrates in *Africa's World War*, the "softness" of Zaire in the 1990s created a situation whereby the problems of the surrounding nations could not be contained, but spilled into Zaire, mixed together, and nearly destabilized the entire continent.¹³

B. SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES IN THE DRC

One of the most complex problems facing failed states is gaining and maintaining sovereign authority and control over their territory. In this respect, the DRC is no exception. The initial conception of the DRC as a single country occurred not because most of its eventual inhabitants considered themselves to belong to a nation with a shared historic homeland, common myths, and historical

¹¹ *National Security Strategy* (2006), 33.

¹² *National Security Strategy* (2006), 15.

¹³ Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 73.

memories, and a common economy bound together by common legal rights.¹⁴ Rather, the Congo territory was formed in 1884 by the near obsessive colonial desires of Belgium's King Leopold.¹⁵ Since then, the Congo has been plagued by both internal and external problems which have helped prevent it from developing *de facto* sovereignty.

The sovereignty of the modern state is no longer determined solely by a state possessing a "monopol[y of] the legitimate use of physical force."¹⁶ Along these lines, the World Bank has published several research reports entitled *Governance Matters* that seek to define and qualify "good governance." The eighth edition of this report, published in June 2009, lists six indicators of governance designed to measure the authority of the state. These include: Voice and Accountability, Political Instability and Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Burden, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.¹⁷ Likewise, Ashraf Ghani lists 10 functions of the state that include many non-security aspects, such as investment in human capital and formation of markets.¹⁸ For her part, Heather Gregg distills four essential pillars of a functioning state, to include

¹⁴ Jack David Eller, *Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 17.

¹⁵ Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 44,78.

¹⁶ Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," 1918, <http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/weber.pdf> (accessed April 13, 2010).

¹⁷ Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters VIII* (Washington: World Bank, 2009).

¹⁸ Ghani, et al., *Closing the Sovereignty Gap*, 6.

security, economics, governance, and justice.¹⁹ In other words, while physical security may be a necessary first step to a functioning state, any program designed to extend and improve sovereignty in a failed state should also address these other aspects of good governance.

1. Sub-National Issues

A full exploration of the complex and inter-related difficulties plaguing the Democratic Republic of the Congo is beyond the scope of this thesis. There are, however, at least two types of sub-national obstacles to sovereignty in the DRC that should be discussed in terms of their distinct impact on state function and governance. One challenge is local tribal, demographic, and ethnic problems that have practically always existed in the Congo. In many agrarian, poorly developed areas, like the Kivu provinces of the DRC, land is *the* source of wealth and power, and land belongs to the tribes. So, for instance, if members of Tribe A want to expand their holdings, they must physically wrest the land away from Tribe B.²⁰ The easiest way to do this is to attack the members of Tribe B.

These pre-existing tribal and ethnic rivalries have been exploited by nearly every ruling power in the Congo. For instance, Belgian colonialists supported various internal rivalries in order to expand colonial control and increase the extraction and export of resources.²¹ Later, once independence was granted on 4 July 1960 and direct

¹⁹ Heather Gregg, "Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency," *Parameters*, Autumn 2009: 18-31, 21.

²⁰ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 326.

²¹ Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost*, 124.

Belgian control was lifted, the internal rivalries that had been encouraged by the Belgians fractured the new nation with Katanga and Kasai provinces attempting to secede before the end of the first month.²² Perhaps the most damaging exploitation of ethnic rivalries occurred later still, during former President Mobutu's rule. He was a master of manipulating political appointments based on ethnicity and making use of power brokers known as the "Big Vegetables."²³

The second type of sub-national challenge grows out of the recent regional conflicts that preceded Joseph Kabila's election to the presidency in 2006. A multitude of "rebel" groups, such as the Mayi Mayi and the Ituri warlords that operate in the eastern provinces of the Congo, continue to cause problems. During the conflict with Rwanda (officially from 1998 to 2003), these "rebel" groups operated in conjunction with the *Forces Armees Congolaises* (FAC), to varying degrees.²⁴ As a result of their assistance to President Laurent-Desire Kabila (Joseph Kabila's father), these groups received much better weapons than village security forces and remained better equipped and more heavily armed once the conflict formally ended. Partly because the economy in east Congo is practically non-existent, and partly because these "rebel" groups are so well armed, they now act like semi-autonomous raiding

²² Larry R. Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 36.

²³ Michela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz* (New York: Perennial, 2001), 97-103.

²⁴ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 211.

parties, looting what they need to survive from the local villages before returning to the under-governed bush.²⁵

Another, more subtle and pervasive internal threat to sovereignty lies beyond the armed nature of ethnic and tribal rivalry. This is the "take what I can to take care of myself" attitude that abounds in Congolese government offices from the national level down through the village level. This concept was principally known during President Mobutu's reign as Article 15, or "Je me débrouille," which translates as "I manage for myself."²⁶ Years after Mobutu's reign had ended, journalist Tim Butcher encountered the lingering effects of this attitude and subsequently describes how one must individually bribe Congolese officials in order to accomplish anything.²⁷ Butcher also details one spectacular example of the crippling effect that this self-centered, what's-in-it-for-me governance had on the attempt by one international aid organization to install new electrical generators in Kisangani. Although the equipment had been purchased and was ready for installation, the project was derailed by the asinine bribe requirements of government officials to move the equipment through Matadi.²⁸

These sub-national, or internal, obstacles to decent, never mind good, governance are perpetuated, if not magnified, by the lack of infrastructure and state penetration that normally connect countries internally, and

²⁵ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 321.

²⁶ Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, 151-153.

²⁷ Tim Butcher, *Blood River* (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 62.

²⁸ Butcher, *Blood River*, 287.

provide the markets and access necessary to make armed activity and looting less economically attractive. While such an assessment may seem to simply point out the obvious, many current programs specifically claim they focus on targeting armed groups for either disarmament or neutralization in order to address these issues, but they do so without taking into account the underlying factors that contribute to the situation arising in the first place.²⁹ Here is where what Andrew Natsios describes for reconstruction and development could be applied to the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process, especially since two of the activities he mentions are missing from most of U.S. Special Operations Command's CT development programs: transferring technical skills to locals, and supporting local institutions.³⁰ Consequently, I have made both integral to the program proposed in this thesis.

2. Trans-National Issues

The external challenges to effective sovereignty in the DRC are as varied and complex as the internal challenges. Likewise, external interference in the Congo can be divided into two broad categories: regional and international. Regional interference in this case refers to activities by other African countries. International interference refers to actors outside Africa.

²⁹ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 308.

³⁰ Andrew Natsios, "Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development," *Parameters*, Autumn 2005: 4-20.

Regional interference in the DRC from the fall of Mobutu's regime has been extensively analyzed in Gerard Prunier's book, *Africa's World War*. His analysis of the situation before the 2006 election of Joseph Kabila as president illustrates how difficult it is to cleanly separate regional interference from domestic divides in the Congo case.³¹ For example, the militaries of Uganda and Rwanda "donated" much of their artillery and heavy equipment to local proxies in the DRC as they disengaged and returned to their own countries in 2003.³² Hence, there are very few, if any, completely autonomous and non-aligned internal "rebel" groups within the Congo.

Three regional "rebel" groups require specific mention: the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and the Rwandan Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR). Each of these groups is active within the DRC primarily because Congolese territory offers a safe haven that does not exist in their "parent" country. Hence, the primary objective of these groups is not to influence or control the Congo, but to influence or control their "parent" country. This exemplifies the potential destabilizing effect of under-governed space at the regional level.

International interference in the Congo, while almost always framed as "assistance," has both undermined and retarded the development of a stable, proficient Congolese government. The original, horrific, example of this is King Leopold's creation of the International Association of the

³¹ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 320-325.

³² Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 293.

Congo in 1879 to “found a chain of posts or hospices” in Africa that opened the door to one of history’s most brutal colonial experiences.³³ Later, when the Congo declared independence on July 4, 1960, the Cold War was in full swing and both sides immediately grappled for positioning through offers of military and economic aid. Even the subtitle of Central Intelligence Agency Chief of Station Larry Devlin’s book, *Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone*, underscores the view of Africa as a proxy battlefield for fighting the Soviets.³⁴

The most recent iteration of international interference has been conducted with much loftier intentions and increased oversight, but without appreciably different results.³⁵ The Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) is the largest United Nations (UN) mission ever assembled, with over 24,000 personnel currently deployed to the DRC and continuous operations since 2001.³⁶ To illustrate the ineffectiveness of the UN mission, Tim Butcher describes how MONUC personnel consider themselves, and are considered to be, visiting “another world.”³⁷ In one particularly striking vignette, he describes a UN worker pointing to a crowd of 200 Banyamulenge refugees camped outside the gate of the UN post in Kalemie. They had come to the UN for protection, but

³³ Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost*, 66.

³⁴ Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo*.

³⁵ Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, 215.

³⁶ United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, *MONUC Facts and Figures—United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, February 28, 2010, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml> (accessed April 18, 2010).

were forced to remain outside the compound.³⁸ This and other failures by MONUC to protect the local population have resulted in DRC government requests that UN forces leave the Congo by 2011.³⁹ To make matters more complicated, it is not clear whether official Congolese statements condemning MONUC are not just another attempt to procure more aid from other international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

C. SOCIAL CAPITAL ISSUES

There are many definitions of social capital, but two definitions that are particularly relevant are from the U.S. Army Field Manual *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, and from the World Bank. The U.S. Army describes social capital as "the power of individuals and groups to use social networks of reciprocity and exchange to accomplish their goals."⁴⁰ The World Bank provides additional detail by defining social capital to include "the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions."⁴¹ The repeated exploitation of ethnic and tribal rivalries, meddling by neighboring states, and international interference have created an environment

³⁷ Butcher, *Blood River*, 268.

³⁸ Butcher, *Blood River*, 89.

³⁹ Henri Boshoff, *23 Sep 2009: ISS Today: Is MONUC Withdrawal from the DRC by 2011 Realistic?*, September 23, 2009, <http://www.issafrica.org/pgcontent.php?UID=17441> (accessed April 18, 2010).

⁴⁰ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington: Department of the Army, 2006), 3-10.

⁴¹ World Bank, *Social Capital - What is Social Capital*, April 18, 2010, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,contentMDK:20185164~menuPK:418217~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html> (accessed April 18, 2010).

marked by the lack of what Jennifer Widner suggests makes social capital work: trust.⁴² The problems created by a lack of trust lead to two kinds of damaged relationships.

The first set of damaged relationships are those between local groups, and include inter-tribe and inter-family relationships, as well as inter-ethnic relations. These relationships can be characterized by varying degrees of in-group/out-group rivalry. Prunier describes this situation as the result of "instrumentalized tribalism."⁴³ This kind of in-group/out-group rivalry and competition is also detailed in Michela Wrong's account of President Mobutu's distribution of government largesse and political appointments over the course of his 30-year reign.⁴⁴ As Butcher notes, the effect of this constant rivalry has been that many Congolese now see no benefit in working to provide for themselves when they can simply wait and take what they need from someone else.⁴⁵

The second category of broken relationships are those between the government and the governed. The negative impact of Mobutu's Article 15 continues to permeate the political landscape of the Congo.⁴⁶ An important secondary effect of widespread government corruption is that soldiers have often been the last to get paid, if they are paid at all. Accordingly, many young men with weapons resort to

⁴² Jennifer A. Widner, "Building Effective Trust in the Aftermath of Severe Conflict," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 222-236 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 222.

⁴³ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 170.

⁴⁴ Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, 102, 125, 175.

⁴⁵ Butcher, *Blood River*, 310.

⁴⁶ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 318.

taking care of themselves.⁴⁷ In this environment, even when national political reforms are made, the lack of state penetration into much of the national territory makes it difficult, if not impossible, to ensure those reforms are reflected at the local level.⁴⁸ The effect of this broken relationship is a severe mistrust of the government in general, and of the military in particular.

D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PROBLEMS

Years of regional conflict and state mismanagement have created considerable problems for civil-military relations in the DRC. Prunier concludes his account about the continental conflict centered on the Congo by pointing out that a lack of security continues to be the primary problem. He also points out that the concepts of *mixage* (recruiting from multiple ethnicities) and *brassage* (employing soldiers away from their home villages) have not been employed in the Congo.⁴⁹ Many former "rebels" become "integrated" into the FARDC, but then remain in the same location where they can all too easily resume their looting. The Institute for Security Studies reports that the 12 rapid response battalions and 18 other FARDC brigades have yet to undergo *brassage*.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 171.

⁴⁸ Butcher, *Blood River*, 260, 269.

⁴⁹ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 306.

⁵⁰ Boshoff, *MONUC Withdrawal from the DRC*.

Most accounts of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the DRC echo pessimistic reports by the Global Facilitation Network for SSR⁵¹ and the International Crisis Group.⁵² Continued instances of indiscriminate violence and military brutality by soldiers against civilians have kept thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from returning to their homes. Likewise, concessions made to the CNDP in the 2009 Peace Agreement provided amnesty to many perpetrators of the violence in eastern Congo.⁵³ Common sense alone suggests that such circumstances require a program that will employ *mixage* and *brassage*, will help strengthen the image of the Congolese government, and will include mechanisms that ensure accountability to and by local authorities.

⁵¹ Vincenza Scherrer, *Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform*, February 2008, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/ssrbulletin/dr_congo.php#dcaf (accessed April 19, 2010).

⁵² International Crisis Group, *Conflict in Congo - International Crisis Group*, June 16, 2009, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/conflict-in-congo.aspx> (accessed April 19, 2010).

⁵³ International Crisis Group, *Conflict in Congo*.

III. A SINGLE-ORGANIZATION MODEL FOR A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH

There are three primary obstacles to taking action against Violent Extremist Organizations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as described in the previous chapter. The first problem is the predominance of under-governed spaces throughout the country. The second is the lack of social capital and trust, particularly of the military. The last problem is the near-total deterioration of infrastructure except for a few pockets of development outside the cities of Kinshasa, Kisangani, and Matadi.

Any security sector reform or development program that hopes to effectively prevent or counter the rise and proliferation of Violent Extremist Organizations and Foreign Terrorist Organizations in the Eastern Congo, or any other failed state, must address all of these primary problems.⁵⁴ Any attempt to focus on one problem area to the exclusion of the others will at best only yield short-term success, and may deepen the difficulties in the neglected areas.

The model this thesis proposes for organizing and employing Partner Nation Special Operations Forces is designed to address these obstacles holistically. My model, which draws on Colonel Eric Wendt's and the oil-spot counterinsurgency models, addresses security, infrastructure construction and improvement, and support for the development of social capital.

⁵⁴ A. J. Bacevich, James D. Hallums, Richard H. White and Thomas F. Young, *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador*, Special Report, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 11, 12.

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE MODELS

1. Colonel Wendt's Military Elements of Counterinsurgency Model

In 2005, U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel Eric Wendt proposed an operational model for counterinsurgency in Iraq that included three military components.⁵⁵ These three components are a constabulary force, a movement-to-contact force, and a quick reaction force, as shown in Figure 1. In Colonel Wendt's model, each of these components was composed of, or led by, U.S. forces operating in the country.⁵⁶

The constabulary force is the key operational element in Wendt's model. In counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the focus of military activities is meant to shift from fighting the current insurgents to removing future insurgents' base of operations, also known as population-centric operations. Since the insurgents rely on support from the population, the constabulary force is critical to removing or disrupting that support.⁵⁷

The constabulary force in COIN serves as the foundation for improving security via the provision of community security and the gathering of local intelligence. According to Colonel Wendt, the constabulary force should be empowered to control both Human Intelligence (HUMINT) networks and Population Resource Control Measures (PRCM). In his model,

⁵⁵ Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare*, September 2005: 1-13.

⁵⁶ Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 7.

⁵⁷ Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 7.

the constabulary force is ideally led by U.S. Special Forces who live in the area of responsibility.⁵⁸

The movement-to-contact force, meanwhile, provides security beyond the constabulary force's area of responsibility. By operating between the boundaries of local constabulary forces, the movement-to-contact force would deny insurgents a safe haven and staging area for future attacks. According to Wendt's model, the movement-to-contact force must patrol continuously and aggressively to force the insurgents to either engage and fight, or move and flee.⁵⁹ The movement-to-contact force requires more resources than the constabulary force, but fewer resources than the quick-reaction force. In areas where the United States has a large number of forces deployed, such as Afghanistan, the movement-to-contact force should be composed of infantry or light armor units that combine significant firepower with mobility.⁶⁰

Finally, the quick-reaction force provides reinforcement and assistance when the threat is beyond the capacity of either the constabulary or movement-to-contact forces to efficiently neutralize. The quick-reaction force requires more training and resources than the other elements in order to be successful. For example, it must have constant communications, night fighting capability, and the mobility to respond quickly over distance. U.S. Rangers, SEALs, or Marines are Colonel Wendt's examples of quick-reaction forces.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 7.

⁵⁹ Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 7.

⁶⁰ Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 8.

⁶¹ Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 7.




Figure 1. WENDT MILITARY ELEMENTS OF COIN MODEL

2. The Oil-Spot Counterinsurgency Model

The oil-spot model for counterinsurgency was historically introduced by the French in Morocco and has since been incorporated in the latest U.S. COIN doctrine as clear-hold-build operations.⁶² Oil spot operations are designed to help develop a Partner Nation's long-term security and governance capacity.⁶³ An "oil spot" is created by focusing on individual communities and establishing a secure area within each community.

⁶² United States Army, "Tactics in Counterinsurgency," *Field Manual 3-24.2* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, April 2009), 3-18.

⁶³ United States Army, "Tactics in Counterinsurgency," 3-18.

According to this model, as the small secure areas mature and develop, the area to be secured can be enlarged. This model was employed by the Citizens Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program to develop community security capacity in Vietnam.⁶⁴ The CIDG example illustrates the concept of focusing on the security of local communities and empowering the community to provide its own security. The idea is that as oil spots spread toward each other, insurgents will lose room in which to maneuver. Once the oil spots begin to connect, the larger secured areas can expand faster and more easily through mutually supporting relationships.

The oil spot approach to counterinsurgency has been made popular recently thanks to Major Gant's article, "One Tribe at a Time."⁶⁵ Major Gant argues that community capability can be developed by empowering the tribal militias to provide for their own security against insurgents.⁶⁶ As each village becomes capable of securing itself, the insurgents' support base would shrink and eventually vanish, thereby ending the insurgency. This is also the approach that Andrew Krepinevich recommended for Iraq.⁶⁷ As Krepinevich has written, an oil-spot strategy should focus on securing the population in one location first before then expanding control into the rest of the country.

⁶⁴ Thomas L. Ahern Jr., *CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 53.

⁶⁵ Jim Gant, "One Tribe at a Time," *Steven Pressfield Blog*, 2009, http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf (accessed January 20, 2010).

⁶⁶ Gant, "One Tribe at a Time," 10.

⁶⁷ Andrew Krepinevich, "How to Win in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 87.

B. ADAPTATION AND APPLICATION OF MODELS TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Where the thesis proposal borrows from, but then deviates from, places both these models in its consideration of the overall mission or objective. If the mission, or objective, of the new Partner Nation Special Operations Force is to prevent or counter Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), by addressing and alleviating the sovereignty problems described above, then the unit must be designed to operate without the direct leadership of U.S. soldiers. It must also be capable of addressing more than the security aspects of insurgency and VEOs. The unit must be designed to bring law and order to under-governed spaces, to act as the protector of the local population, and to effect noticeable improvements in the quality of life for locals through infrastructure development.

What both Wendt's and the oil spot models suggest for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and for failed states in general, is the development of a highly proficient movement-to-contact force that is then employed in an oil spot fashion, as shown in Figure 2. One difference between what Colonel Wendt's model addresses and what working with Partner Nation forces requires, however, is that U.S. forces should only contribute in an advisory and training capacity; U.S. forces should not themselves conduct these missions in the DRC. Therefore, the priority should be to modify the design of the Partner Nation SOF to match local needs using resources that are sustainable.

Second, in the DRC, the movement-to-contact force needs to take precedence over the constabulary force, at least

initially. This is because it is the movement-to-contact force that projects governance and sovereignty by providing the means by which the oil spot spreads. With the support of a local movement-to-contact force, local administrators and government offices would have the freedom of action to begin community improvements without having to worry about being looted by roaming militias. Roaming militias who attack from, and retreat back to, the safety of the under-governed "bush" frequently overwhelm local constabulary forces. A properly trained and employed movement-to-contact force would presumably deny roaming militias the safe haven of the bush.

Each movement-to-contact element should be permanently assigned an area of responsibility, or set of oil spots, and these in turn need to be aligned with the existing local administrative structure. This, too, represents a deviation from Colonel Wendt's model in that the DRC movement-to-contact forces would be tied to particular areas and would not operate independently from the local administration, or patrol from a separate military installation. The aim would be for these movement-to-contact forces to expand zones of security in oil-spot fashion until individual communities can reinforce one another.

A highly proficient movement-to-contact force could also assist with training local constabulary forces, and could reinforce them until they are sufficiently robust to operate on their own. It should be remembered that development of the intelligence networks Wendt describes may be necessary to enable U.S. forces (or any foreign military) to accurately target and take action against insurgents

hidden among the locals. However, local security forces do not face this dilemma; they presumably know exactly who the insurgents are, but simply lack the capacity to take action. This capacity to act would be provided by a proficient movement-to-contact force.

By the same token, the quick-reaction force as described in Wendt's model is less useful in regions where the threat is locally based and relatively small. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, very few militia groups cooperate together for any length of time. They also lack the individual mobility or motivation to overthrow the government.⁶⁸ Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, few developing nations have the logistical capacity to employ a competent quick-reaction force. Certainly, the DRC does not.

Rather than developing a quick-reaction force, what this thesis proposes is the introduction of a civic action force—one designed to operate in conjunction with the movement-to-contact force. One critique of the otherwise highly touted U.S. intervention in El Salvador is that civic action programs were not sufficiently funded or coordinated with the military security effort.⁶⁹ What this thesis envisions, is a civic action force trained in basic infrastructure development (described in greater detail below) that would be capable of moving into secured areas behind the movement-to-contact force to help permanently expand the boundaries of the oil spots. Such a civic action force would likewise work closely with the local

⁶⁸ Butcher, *Blood River*, 260.

⁶⁹ Bacevich, et al., *American Military Policy in Small Wars*, 12.

administration to improve and develop community infrastructure and lines of communication.




Figure 2. KELLER PARTNER NATION SOF MODEL

C. DEVELOPING A DISTRIBUTED CAPACITY FOR SOVEREIGNTY

In his article "The New Rules of War," John Arquilla outlines three maxims for future conflicts: (1) Many and small beats few and large, (2) Finding matters more than flanking, and (3) Swarming is the new surging.⁷⁰ By extending Arquilla's tenets beyond the security sector to governance as a whole, this helps describe what this new, proposed operational design for SOF in formerly failed/still broken states attempts to do. By deploying movement-to-contact and civic action forces in oil-spot fashion

⁷⁰ John Arquilla, "The New Rules of War," *Foreign Policy*, no. 178 (Mar/Apr 2010): 60-67.

throughout the state's territory to conduct sovereignty operations, the Partner Nation SOF would develop the capacity for governance in under-governed areas.

In order to employ what may be called "sovereignty operations," it is helpful to examine how this Partner Nation SOF model would support good governance in failed states in slightly more detail. For example, Andrew Natsios offers nine principles of reconstruction and development. These principles are: (1) local ownership, (2) local capacity building, (3) local sustainability, (4) project selectivity based on local requirements, (5) assessment in accordance with local conditions, (6) clearly defined results, (7) partnership with locals, (8) flexibility, and (9) accountability.⁷¹ Local involvement is mentioned in his descriptions for six of these principles, again suggesting that the distributed employment of the oil-spot method may be much more useful than a centralized SOF. While the article in which he lists these principles is intended to inform U.S. foreign aid policy, Natsios' advice for reconstruction and development could easily be adopted by SOF to serve as the conceptual framework around which to build the separate missions and activities of the movement-to-contact and civic action forces outlined here.

For example, because security operations would be the primary focus of the movement-to-contact units—which we will refer to as Rangers—reconnaissance and movement-to-contact patrols would be conducted continuously. Under the objective of expanding security not just around the clock, but beyond the immediate vicinity, a critical supporting

⁷¹ Natsios, "Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development."

mission would be to coordinate link-up patrols with neighboring Ranger units in order to strengthen and expand the security network. By developing this network, if a threat is identified that is too large for the Ranger unit assigned to one area to address, combined offensive operations could be conducted. Among other things, this would demonstrate to rebels, insurgents, and criminals that they can no longer exploit the seams between local jurisdictions

At the same time, it would be up to the Civic Action units to conduct activities to support economic and infrastructure improvement. As will be explained in greater detail below, the primary missions of the various Civic Action sections (e.g., Agriculture and Construction) would develop, improve, and expand local markets along with access to those markets. In some areas of the DRC, this might begin with the basics, such as improving farming techniques and dirt roads so that the local diet can include more than just protein-deficient cassava and cassava bread.⁷² With improved access to markets would come other economic developments, and eventually, ideally, a shift to vocational training, for instance.⁷³

Both the Ranger and Civic Action units would coordinate their actions to improve and expand governance and accountability. The Rangers would improve governance by providing the security necessary for citizens to participate in community projects. Likewise, the Civic Action unit

⁷² Butcher, *Blood River*, 169-171.

⁷³ The United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 9-158.

would support both governance and accountability by improving the basic infrastructure in the area and transferring the necessary skills to citizens who want to cooperate and participate. Additionally, the services provided by the Medical/Sanitation Civic Action section (also described below) would significantly improve the quality of basic services. Together, these types of operations would create a supportive environment that should impel local citizens to want to cooperate and participate in the administration of their area.

Also, as it works with the local constabulary, the Ranger unit would exemplify the rule of law through its professional and ethical conduct on a daily basis. Presumably, too, it would provide local police with the skills and competence required to perform crime prevention duties without having to resort to illegitimate methods. While the Ranger unit would not be designed to directly conduct law enforcement activities, Rangers could be tasked to support particular high-risk missions or to assist law enforcement in dealing with criminal organizations that exceed the local constabulary's capacity to handle.

While building social capital and national identity may not be direct functions of government, both remain important. Again, drawing on Gregg, the primary pillars of strengthening a state are security, economics, governance, and justice, with building social capital and national identity the two supporting pillars.⁷⁴ Jennifer Widner describes social capital as a pentagon. The sides of her pentagon are composed of trust, willingness to cooperate to

⁷⁴ Gregg, "Beyond Population Engagement."

solve common problems, pre-disposition to participate, feeling better-off, and optimism.⁷⁵ Although developing social capital would not be a direct mission for either the Rangers or the Civic Action units, their operations would strengthen each side of Widner's pentagon.

Developing a national identity in failed states would likely be more difficult, and especially in the DRC where lingering associations with President Mobutu's efforts at "Zairianization" from 1973 into the 1990s are negative.⁷⁶ Perhaps national identity in the DRC cannot be pro-actively built, but instead will indirectly emerge as a result of the local actions of the Rangers and Civic Action units that would comprise the DRC's new SOF. This is especially likely if the SOF Groups draw from a mix of ethnicities and localities via *mixage* and *brassage*. Then, the general perception of Congolese helping Congolese could eventually prevail over the older in-group/out-group rivalries.

⁷⁵ Jennifer A. Widner, "Building Effective Trust in the Aftermath of Severe Conflict," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 222-236 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 223-224.

⁷⁶ Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, 96-101.

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IV. WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF STATE PENETRATION—CONDUCTING SOVEREIGNTY OPERATIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The current U.S. concept of the “whole-of-government” approach to foreign assistance seems to be designed on the assumption that the way the U.S. conceives of its division of labor and responsibilities corresponds to the division of labor in Partner Nations. When and if the functions of government in the Partner Nation correspond to those of the United States at the national level—the assumption seems to continue—then the functions of government must be similarly divided at the local level, just as they are in the U.S. However, as evidenced in the DRC, authority at the local level in failed states is hardly neatly separated between security and administrative functions or powers.⁷⁷ Consequently, what on-the-ground realities suggest is that if there is minimal state penetration in under-governed spaces, development projects that count on the separation of function, with security, economics, governance, and rule of law neatly delineated, are not just misguided, but will not succeed.

A. EMPLOYING THE OPERATIONAL GROUPS

1. Key Functions of the Operational Groups

The Operational Groups envisioned in this thesis would plan and conduct operations and development projects with three broad aims. First is to expand and improve security

⁷⁷ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 320.

and governance. Second is to develop local capacity and thereby build human capital. Third is to understand the operational environment, a never-ending, iterative task that links the Operational Groups to each other and to the broader SOF enterprise.

Both the Ranger and Civic Action units would help expand and improve security and governance. Examples of how they would do so include: security and reconnaissance patrolling by the Rangers, crop rotation planning, road improvements, sanitation projects, and operation of a medical clinic by the Civic Action units.

The more security, and the more confidence locals have in their constabulary under the tutelage of a highly professional SOF Group, the more likely locals will be to assume responsibility for projects. As stability takes hold and local capacity builds, the local oil-spot would grow, and the resources of the Operational Group would be available to push sovereignty outward. This virtuous cycle would, in turn, help reinforce local capacity and locals' desire to assume yet more responsibility for additional projects.

The third task of understanding the operational environment, would be both a consequence of these other sovereignty operations and, in turn, would provide the context needed to conduct ever more successful security and development projects. Additionally, as local situational understanding builds and oil-spots grow and merge, over time the Operational Groups would develop a more coherent, comprehensive operational picture of the state. National identity *per se* might not result, but as an improved

understanding of the operational environment develops, resources could be more effectively shifted from one area to another, thereby demonstrating the government's reach and concern.

2. Ranger Units

Because the Ranger units should be primarily concerned with supporting the twin pillars of security and justice, they would conduct two mutually supporting missions: patrolling and training. Neither of these activities would be conducted in isolation; local security forces should be included as often as possible. Both types of missions would also be conducted as frequently as possible to avoid losing territory to rebel forces and/or losing proficiency due to lack of practice.

Patrolling beyond the current security limits would be the constant theme for all Ranger activities. Considering the under-governed nature of the operational area, the objective has to be to maintain a continuous presence; after all, limiting the activities of rebel groups depends on a persistent presence throughout the operational area. In support of active patrolling, the Ranger unit would also conduct continuous training and education. Training and education would include both proficiency training and education of local security forces (e.g., the constabulary). Local forces would be incorporated into the Rangers' training program so that they could conduct joint patrols throughout the operational area with mutual confidence.

One method for managing the resources and activities of the Ranger unit would be via the Green-Amber-Red cycle as shown in Figure 3. With this method, each of the three Ranger platoons would be responsible for the separate tasks of each color phase for a specific time period. At the end of the time period, the platoons would rotate responsibilities. For example, a common progression would have a platoon in Green cycle conduct pre-mission training while remaining ready to respond to emergencies in the area. In the next phase, the platoon would move to the Amber cycle, also called the mission cycle, when the platoon would conduct patrols throughout the area. Once the platoon had completed its mission cycle, it would move into Red cycle tasks that would include recovery and refit from patrolling, administrative duties, and leave and pay activities.




Figure 3. EXAMPLE GREEN-AMBER-RED CYCLE

3. Civic Action Units

Like the Ranger units, the Civic Action units would also conduct development activities and infrastructure

projects, as well as build up local capacity for sustaining these projects. The organization of the Civic Action units into Agricultural, Construction, and Medical/Sanitation sections would facilitate the planning, coordination, and conduct of comprehensive, albeit basic, development projects. Each section would execute projects within its respective area of expertise, as well as participate in larger projects that combine the skills and resources of other sections in order to meet the Group's objectives of being as holistic and complete as possible.

The training and education activities of the Civic Action unit would be given the same emphasis as its building and development of projects. Transferring the skills of each section to as many citizens as possible is arguably the most effective way to truly develop the operational area.⁷⁸ Additionally, ensuring that locals can sustain their own infrastructure projects would free up the Civic Action unit to expand its activities beyond the initial "oil-spot."

Two vehicles for expanding the influence and impact of the Civic Action unit would be via Assessment Teams and Assist Teams. The exact composition of these teams could well vary between Operational Groups and depend on the region and the situation, but the concept would remain the same. The Assessment Team should consist of representatives from each Civic Action section and would thus be comprised of individuals who possess the skills to adequately assess the development requirements in a new area. The Assessment Team would accompany Ranger patrols in order to assess the requirements and resources within the area of operations as

⁷⁸ Natsios, "Nine Principles," 8.

depicted in Figure 4. Once the team has assessed the area, then a more robust Civic Action Assist Team can be assembled to carry out the actual Civic Action work. The Assist Team would be organized and resourced to accompany an extended Ranger patrol to the target area in order to begin the identified development projects and education activities, as illustrated in Figure 5.

4. Sample Missions

a. Initial Capabilities Around Base Village

The sample mission in Figure 4 depicts a typical mission cycle as the immediate operational area is being developed. In line with the oil-spot approach, the local area must be brought to a level of self-sufficiency before security and governance can be expanded into neighboring areas. In this example, the Ranger unit patrols and the Civic Action unit engages in projects in order to expand security and governance, while the training and education activities of both units support developing human capital. Finally, all of these activities and missions contribute to a better understanding of the operational environment.




Figure 4. EXAMPLE BASE VILLAGE MISSION

b. Expanded Capabilities to Satellite Village

As development projects in the local operational area are completed, to include training and education of local citizens to sustain the projects, the Operational Group can begin to expand sovereignty beyond the immediate

area. The mission depicted in Figure 5 illustrates how an operational group can expand to include a neighboring village.




Figure 5. EXAMPLE SATELLITE VILLAGE MISSION

5. Working Themselves Out of a Job

While the SOF organization proposed here replicates and supports the functions of governance, it does so at a very basic level. As the Partner Nation continues to develop and the state successfully penetrates under-governed areas, this

SOF model should become less relevant and SOF themselves may need to be reconfigured. To prepare for this eventuality, the SOF Headquarters and School would plan for the transition of the SOF into a force more relevant for a developed nation. One possible transition is that the Rangers would assume the role of Gendarmerie and support justice and rule of law in the spaces between local police jurisdictions. Likewise, the Civic Action units could transition into a national Civil Service and continue to provide public services to the nation. In this way, the soldiers that contributed to the development of sovereignty for their nation would continue to work toward its improvement.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTNER NATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE

Here, in somewhat more detail, is how the Partner Nation SOF for the DRC would be organized.

1. Special Operations Forces Headquarters

The SOF Headquarters, with command and control of all the Operational Groups, should include four functional divisions: command, personnel, logistics, policy and legal, along with a School. These four functional divisions would enable the headquarters to provide resources for the Operational Groups, which would consist of the movement-to-contact and civic action forces described above. The express absence of an operations and plans division is designed to eliminate the temptation for the central headquarters to become directly involved with the missions of the Operational Groups. As Hy Rothstein describes, many

operational units are, for all practical purposes, incapacitated by their headquarters' operational "assistance."⁷⁹ Assistance in this case should be limited to provision of human and material resources

The Headquarters command section should be closely aligned with the national government and military policy in order to achieve unity of effort regarding the development and employment of the Special Operations Forces. However, the SOF command structure should not be buried under layers of military bureaucracy, which will only introduce additional objectives and tasks such as border defense or national counter-terrorism direct action missions. Every additional task and secondary mission given to the SOF will only distract the unit from its primary mission to develop and expand sovereignty, security, and infrastructure, oil spot by oil spot, throughout the state's territory.

The Headquarter personnel and logistics sections should be responsible for resourcing the separate Operational Groups, in addition to personnel management. While logistical resourcing may be straightforward, care must be taken that any redistribution of national resources to SOF does not disrupt the functioning of the rest of the military and/or create a political power struggle involving the new SOF. Personnel management is particularly important for the new SOF, as will be examined in greater detail in Chapter V.

⁷⁹ Hy Rothstein, "Less is More: the Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of Collapsing States," *Third World Quarterly* (Routledge) 20, no. 2 (2007): 275-294, 281.

The policy and legal section should ensure that SOF missions are aligned with government objectives, and that misconduct is dealt with properly. The specter of powerful leaders "going native" and megalomaniacs creating individual fiefdoms using "official" military power looms large in the memory of many people in failed and previously failed states. This is particularly true of the Congo. Therefore, any program to develop a Special Operations Force must include strict legal oversight and internal prohibitions to dissuade the tendency of an aggressive commander from becoming a minor king.⁸⁰

2. Operational Groups

The operational element for the DRC SOF would, again, be the Operational Group, as depicted in Figure 6. Each Group would consist of a Group Headquarters, the Ranger unit (the movement-to-contact force), and the Civic Action unit. The Group will be responsible for extending law and order into local under-governed spaces, and developing and improving community infrastructure.

a. Group Headquarters

The Group headquarters should be divided into four functional sections: the command section, operations and intelligence, logistics, and communications. These four sections will enable the Group to accomplish its objectives with very little need for guidance and support from any central authorities. Self-sufficiency is especially

⁸⁰ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 73.

critical in failed states that lack a robust logistical infrastructure, which is certainly the case in the DRC.

The Group headquarters command section should be closely aligned with the local civilian administration and develop unity of effort at the local level. In the case of the Group headquarters working with the local administration, the unity of effort required needs to be cross-functional. The Group commander and the local administrator need to share the same situational understanding of the community and have the same vision for what should be done to improve the situation.

The responsibilities of the operations and intelligence sections of the Group headquarters would be to plan and coordinate the operations of the Ranger unit and the Civic Action unit. The operations section would be responsible for interacting with the local administration to determine which development projects should be planned and prioritized, as well as identify which areas should be patrolled by the Ranger unit. The operations and intelligence section should also develop the means and designate personnel to coordinate relations with all the local security forces within the Group's area of responsibility.

The communications section of the Group headquarters would develop and maintain communications with neighboring Groups and the SOF Headquarters. The logistics section, similarly, would be responsible for acquiring and managing the resources required for administering the Group and supporting operations. Since the Groups are designed to operate independently in support of the local

administration, it is vital that each of the sections just described be fully manned and functional. This will be a critical task for the central Headquarters.

b. Ranger Units

Because the mission of the Ranger units will be to extend law and order into the under-governed "bush," they will need to be organized much like a U.S. infantry company, with a small headquarters and three platoons, but without indirect fire weapons like mortars. Such an organizational structure should provide the unit with enough separate elements to have one platoon on patrol, one platoon on standby as reinforcement and reserve, and one platoon recovering and refitting from the last patrol. Since each Group will conduct planning and coordination, individual Ranger units should not have to be distracted by that task and can instead focus on preparing for and executing their mission.

Each Ranger platoon will itself consist of three squads capable of conducting short-range patrols independently. Each Ranger squad will be organized with a machine gun crew in addition to two fire teams of four soldiers. The firepower provided to the platoon by a machine gun crew in each squad should be sufficient to overwhelm all but the largest militia groups.

While it is important that the Ranger unit does not assume local security duties, a constant coordinating relationship must be developed with local security forces in order to permanently improve sovereignty in the Group's area of responsibility. Consequently, Ranger operations must be

conducted in close coordination with the local constabulary, for instance. At the same time, the platoon that is on standby or the platoon that is recovering from its last patrol would be capable of providing training to community security forces in conjunction with its own sustainment training. In this way, intelligence and lessons learned from both the Ranger unit and the local security forces would be shared. The eventual goal would be to incorporate local security forces into all Ranger patrols.

c. Civic Action Units

The ideal Civic Action unit for the DRC would consist of a small headquarters for planning and logistics, an agriculture section, a construction section, and a medical/sanitation section. Separate from the functional sections, the primary aim of the Civic Action headquarters would be to coordinate with all elements of the local government (such as they may be) and civil society (as unformed as it may be) in order to identify and plan projects that are both desired and supportable given the local environment.

The Civic Action unit would also assist with education and training in agriculture, construction, and sanitation throughout the Group's area of responsibility. As the Ranger unit secures an area, personnel from the Civic Action unit would move in and assess local needs and available resources. With the assessment complete, an instructional program would be designed and implemented to empower the locals to improve their own quality of life and standard of living.

3. The Special Operations School

As for SOF's own training and education, this would take place in the School at SOF Headquarters. The curriculum would include a full range of instruction on governance, and not simply instruction on the legitimate use of force. The School should be capable of producing leaders and units that can expand law and order beyond community boundaries, protect and secure the local population, and build sustainable infrastructure.

To prepare SOF personnel to do this, the School should have three departments: movement-to-contact/Ranger training, civic action training, and service and support. At the same time, the training and development of the Partner Nation SOF soldiers and leaders should include the widest range of civil-military subjects possible. While enlisted soldiers should receive the bulk of their training within their assigned occupational specialty—either Ranger or Civic Action—officers and non-commissioned officers should be cross-trained so that both operational elements can work together seamlessly in their area of responsibility.

The U.S. conception of the civil-military division of labor and authority is not, and may never be, applicable in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or many other failed states. Trying to impose "our" separations may not only fail, but can even be harmful.⁸¹ This is yet another reason why developing proficiency in both areas is necessary. It is also important for leader progression, as will be discussed in the next section.

⁸¹ Bacevich, et al., *American Military Policy in Small Wars*, 11.

The Ranger training group would instruct on individual soldier skills, small unit tactics, and professional ethics. The soldier skills and small unit tactics outlined in the U.S. Army Ranger Handbook and light infantry texts are ideal for movement-to-contact patrols. Instruction in professional ethics, however, must be drawn from other sources as this is not a part of U.S. Ranger School training, but is nevertheless vital for creating a military unit that will protect and not prey on the local population.⁸²

Because the three broad categories of infrastructure development should be agriculture, construction, and medical/sanitation, the civic action unit training group would need to offer instruction in these areas as well as how to locally plan and locally sustain projects designed to noticeably improve a community's quality of life. Instruction in civil administration is also critical for providing the local administration with the skills and resources necessary for rebuilding the state.⁸³ U.S. programs in Africa in the past have often focused on U.S.-executed projects.⁸⁴ The civic action training group would be designed to empower the DRC's SOF to accomplish this without U.S. involvement.

⁸² Bacevich, et al., *American Military Policy in Small Wars*, 25.

⁸³ The United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 3-13.

⁸⁴ Anna Simons and Pat Colloton, "Anthropology and Irregular Warfare Case Study: Somalia" (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, July 2007), 21.

The School's service and support group, meanwhile, should be responsible for range control, training resource management, and assessment and selection. This group would be responsible for resourcing the daily activities of both training groups. For much the same reason that the SOF headquarters should not be subordinate to other military commands, the School's training resources should be separated from general military supplies.

4. Leadership Development

a. Guest Instructor Rotation

A key component of leadership development envisioned here is that leaders at every level would rotate back to the SOF Headquarters and School periodically for a tour as guest instructors. The primary purpose for this would be to incorporate lessons learned from the field into the curriculum. Additional benefits would come from circulating senior instructors back through the operational units. Finally, this type of rotation would help prevent the development of local fiefdoms and corruption.

The rotational assignments at the School should last at least one year. As an example, say Lieutenant Patrice started his SOF career as a Ranger platoon leader. After his first tour was complete, he would return to the School for additional Civic Action training. Now a senior Lieutenant or Captain, Patrice would next serve in a Civic Action unit in a different area. After a year with the Civic Action unit, Captain Patrice would then rotate back to the Ranger unit in his same Group, and serve as either a staff member or commander. After completing his assignment

with the Rangers, Captain Patrice would return to the School as a guest instructor. In the classroom, Captain Patrice would be able to impart his lessons learned to future SOF leaders and ensure that only the best-prepared people are being assigned to the field while he prepares for promotion and, possibly, rotation back to the Group as its Commander.

b. Training and Duty Requirements for Assignment and Advancement

Officers should be required to receive training in both the military and civic action groups before they are eligible for selection as Operational Group commanders. As discussed previously, SOF officers must be familiar with the full range of government responsibilities necessary to develop sovereignty. Likewise, non-commissioned officers from both Ranger and Civic Action units should receive cross-training in order to progress to senior ranks. Non-commissioned officers should also be utilized as guest instructors and/or primary trainers at the School.

Promotion and progression for officers should be tied to satisfactory performance in each component of the force. In order to advance to Group command, officers, and senior non-commissioned officers alike should have to serve successfully in the Rangers, the Civic Action unit, and as instructors. This will prevent individual Groups from becoming too heavily focused on only one method of expanding the "oil spot." Promoting the rule of law, protecting the local population, and improving the community's quality of life, requires deft security on the one hand, and a civic action sensibility on the other. Both are equally important in restoring sovereignty.




Figure 6. PARTNER NATION SOF ORGANIZATION CHART

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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM

A. UNITY OF VISION, THE SOF CAMPAIGN PLAN, AND THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT

The key to successfully developing and employing the Partner Nation Special Operations Force (SOF), described thus far, is unity of vision. Unity of vision is described by Anna Simons as the ability of certain leaders to "see the forest and the trees."⁸⁵ While Simons' focus is on finding the right "whom" to command,⁸⁶ I want to suggest that a proper, complete operational concept and supporting organizational structure is not only helpful to a visionary leader, but can elevate a merely competent one.

1. The SOF Campaign Plan

The first stepping-stone to unity of vision is a clear, complete operational concept. Clear objectives and goals are important for any military mission, but they become critical when developing a long-range program for failed states like the DRC. For example, some critiques of U.S. military operations in both Afghanistan and Vietnam have pointed to the constant rotation of U.S. leadership as a major flaw in U.S. campaign methodology. Without an overarching concept to guide supporting operations, the United States did not fight one conflict for several years,

⁸⁵ Anna Simons, "Unity of Vision: What it is and Why it Matters," in *Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society Biennial Conference* (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 2.

⁸⁶ Simons, "Unity of Vision," 3.

but re-fought the same conflict year after year.⁸⁷ Additionally, the impact of a lack of unity of vision can be seen in recent analyses of U.S. efforts in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa. Simons suggests that when there is no unity of vision and no unified concept that keeps the objective and the operations aligned, the program is doomed.⁸⁸

The program proposed here to develop a Partner Nation Special Operations Force in the DRC should be conducted under an overarching campaign plan. A campaign plan is defined in the Training and Doctrine Command publication 525-5-500, *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, as a "broad and conceptual" plan that extends through the end of the campaign.⁸⁹ In this case, the end may not come until all organized "rebel" groups within the Congo territory are neutralized. Additionally, campaign design is described in Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, as necessary to "achieve a greater understanding [of the operational environment], a proposed solution based on that understanding, and a means to learn and adapt."⁹⁰

According to *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, the campaign plan must consider the "requirements for reframing" the problem.⁹¹ As security conditions change and the Partner Nation force becomes more proficient and

⁸⁷ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 310.

⁸⁸ Simons and Colloton, "Anthropology and Irregular Warfare," 25.

⁸⁹ United States Army, *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design* (Fort Monroe: Training and Doctrine Command, 2008), 31.

⁹⁰ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency* (2006), 4-1.

⁹¹ United States Army, *Commander's Appreciation*, 28.

professional, the U.S. campaign plan should provide an analytical framework that is flexible enough that the operational environment can be reassessed, but rigid enough to prevent future operations from straying away from missions that support Partner Nation sovereignty. Accordingly, the goal of the SOF campaign should not be to simply prevent or counter Violent Extremist Organizations, but to support Partner Nation sovereignty. Without a campaign plan to direct the activities and efforts of each training and advisory team, the program would likely fall victim to advisors' personal preferences as well as to secondary objectives on the part of the force-providing headquarters.

Ideally, the campaign plan should be designed so that each U.S. advisory element assigned to the mission would be able to continue the mission and effectively move the program forward, no matter when a unit or team enters the field. Likewise, a SOF campaign plan should ensure that each subordinate program and separate U.S. deployment will be mutually supporting and will contribute to the whole. Equally important, the campaign plan should look beyond just the country in question—in this case, the DRC. An important challenge in failed states is a lack of control over borders and an inability to react appropriately to external interference.⁹² As should be more than evident from the DRC example, something more is needed than just limited, time-constrained operational plans developed by successively deployed training teams. A comprehensive campaign plan has to be designed to coordinate the various U.S. efforts

⁹² Angel Rabasa, et al., *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2007), 12-13.

through time and across space, to include taking into account factors beyond the DRC's borders.

2. The Special Operations Command and Control Element

The organizational stepping-stone for ensuring that there is unity of vision is to establish a sub-regional Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) separate from the embassy Military Group (MILGROUP) of the key Partner Nation—much as U.S. Special Forces has done with the Special Operations Command (Forward) in Colombia. As the keeper of the SOF campaign plan, a SOCCE would provide the persistent focus required to successfully develop and employ the Partner Nation Special Operations Force. With oversight for the sub-region, to include the Partner Nation and its neighbors, and with the authorization to direct all U.S. SOF programs in its Area of Responsibility (AOR), such a SOCCE could ensure that all U.S. SOF activities support the SOF campaign plan. Also, a SOCCE could help deflect additional tasks and competing priorities that might otherwise be assigned and would distract the U.S. training team from its carefully tailored SOF campaign plan.

The alternative option of assigning a SOF Liaison Element (SOFLE) to the current MILGROUP with the task of overseeing the SOF program may not be sufficient to orchestrate and oversee such a long-term mission. By its very nature, a liaison element is not normally authorized to command and control the actions of any U.S. forces within the area. A liaison would be able to facilitate command and control from the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) to the operational element and assist with military-to-

military communications. However, liaisons often have limited capacity to advise, and have virtually no command authority.

Along the same lines, a SOFLE or Joint Planning and Advisory Team (JPAT), typically deployed to support a particular country or program, is not usually able to adequately coordinate with U.S. forces or programs in neighboring countries. Consequently, neither of these entities would be sufficient to maintain the Partner Nation SOF development program outlined here. The dual realities of spillover ethnic groups and porous borders, as well as the long-term nature of what will be required to bolster sovereignty and shrink under-governed spaces, necessitates a supervisory element with the authority to ensure that each successive SOF deployment supports the SOF campaign plan. A SOCCE could provide both the oversight and protection needed to achieve this.

3. The Proper Role for U.S. Advisors and Trainers

If the aim is to strengthen the Partner Nation's sovereignty, U.S. forces cannot assume the role or responsibility of being the primary trainers for the Partner Nation forces. If U.S. troops become the primary trainers for the program, the Partner Nation will develop neither the means nor the will to assume that responsibility itself later on. Consequently, this will further undermine the state's legitimacy, as the new force will be all too easy to caricature as a proxy force of the United States, and not one whose primary mission is to look after the local

population.⁹³ Along these lines, it is important to bear in mind how Edward Lansdale initially conceived of civic action: as something the Partner Nation's own forces need to do to convince the citizenry that their security forces are protectors and not predators.⁹⁴ This understanding is echoed in Simons' critique of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa's undertaking of infrastructure development tasks instead of empowering the local administration to accomplish those tasks.⁹⁵

The 2009 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, outlines five phases of assisting a Foreign Security Force (FSF). These phases are: (1) Plan and Prepare, (2) Generate, (3) Employ, (4) Transition, and (5) Sustain.⁹⁶ Following this sequence, the training requirement for U.S. personnel would likely be greatest during the Generation phase, but only until the initial Partner Nation cadre is trained. As the Partner Nation cadre is given responsibility for training and preparing new soldiers, U.S. personnel could shift into advisory roles with less direct participation in training. My own experiences with the Afghan Commando program in Kabul suggest that this offers an excellent example of how shifting responsibility from U.S. trainers to Partner Nation trainers can strengthen the program and encourage Partner Nation ownership of the new SOF.

⁹³ Ghani, et al., *Closing the Sovereignty Gap*.

⁹⁴ Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 70-71.

⁹⁵ Simons and Colloton, "Anthropology and Irregular Warfare," 21.

⁹⁶ United States Army, *Security Force Assistance* (Washington: Department of the Army, 2009), 2-11.

The need for a relatively large number of U.S. advisors and trainers in this first phase could be met through a short-term deployment of a larger U.S. SOF element such as a Special Forces company, which consists of six Operational Detachments—Alpha (ODA) and a company headquarters. Each ODA could be tasked separately to establish a specific component of the Headquarters and School while other ODAs train and prepare the initial Partner Nation instructors and cadre. Once the foundation for the Partner Nation SOF is laid, smaller subsequent deployments of U.S. forces can advise and supervise the Headquarters and School operations.

The *Security Force Assistance* manual also clearly distinguishes between advising and partnering with Partner Nation forces. Whereas advising is defined as building a relationship to influence the advisee, partnering is defined as combining training and operations with U.S. and Partner Nation forces to influence Partner Nation forces.⁹⁷ Given the potential high risk and low yield of U.S. forces operating in a failed state like the DRC, U.S. forces should not lead or direct Partner Nation Operational Groups. Once the Partner Nation SOF has created sufficient security with its Operational Groups, U.S. SOF can then re-evaluate the costs, risks, and benefits of partner operations.

B. RECRUITMENT, ASSESSMENT, AND SELECTION

Recruitment for the Partner Nation SOF is a critical first step in setting up this program for success. *Security Force Assistance* suggests that proper recruitment of minority and disaffected tribal and ethnic groups can

⁹⁷ United States Army, *Security Force Assistance* (2009), 2-9.

bolster the legitimacy of the Partner Nation SOF and strengthen relations between minority groups and with the Partner Nation government.⁹⁸ This is particularly important in states that have a history of using elite military forces as the personal militia of the ruling tribe or family; the Partner Nation SOF must not be seen as the strong arm of a particular political or ethnic group.⁹⁹

Multi-ethnic recruiting, along with *mixage* and *brassage*, could have additional benefits for failed states, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by helping to create a national civic identity. The deployment of the Operational Groups as described above should lead to positive experiences between members of local communities and members of other regions and tribes. The positive relations built by the Operational Groups could begin several virtuous cycles. Among them, improving the image of the SOF program should attract better recruits, which, in turn, should improve the capabilities of the Operational Groups. Over time, this could even help support the evolution of the Civic Action units into a Civil Service organization.

From a practical standpoint, recruiting to create a blended *national* SOF would also mean the Operational Groups should be operationally viable no matter where in the country they might be sent. Much emphasis has been placed on the need to understand the family, ethnic, tribal, and religious factors that define an operational area in long-

⁹⁸ United States Army, *Security Force Assistance* (2009), 2-3.

⁹⁹ Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 306.

term operations.¹⁰⁰ By recruiting countrywide, across all segments of society, the SOF Headquarters and School would be able to conduct cross-training of and by personnel from each segment so that soldiers would not have to be posted to their home area to ensure they have the right sensibilities.

Personnel selection for the movement-to-contact and civic action forces should be conducted along the lines of U.S. Special Operations Forces. Because we are talking about a SOF, personnel selection should be given the highest priority. As noted by the Office of Strategic Services during the World War II pioneering days of creating a Special Operations Force, assessment cannot be conducted on the basis of whether people can accomplish a particular task, but instead has to focus on whether they have the right general characteristics.¹⁰¹ Finding people with the right "dispositions, qualities, and abilities" must take priority over specific military experience and should therefore widen the potential recruiting pool beyond those currently serving in the military.¹⁰²

Initially, the selection of operational personnel should be conducted under close objective oversight in order to prevent favoritism and internal rivalries from crippling the unit from within. The fact that this would be a new U.S.-backed program could lead some to use it—or assume it will be used—as another path to power and status by some members of the Partner Nation military and by political

¹⁰⁰ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency* (2006), 3-3.

¹⁰¹ Donald Fiske, Eugenia Hanfmann, Donald Mackinnon, James G. Miller and H. A. Murray, *Selection of Personnel for Clandestine Operations* (Laguna Hills, California: Aegean Park Press, 1996), 20.

¹⁰² Fisk, et al., *Selection of Personnel*, 20.

elites. At the same time, if selection became a tool—or was perceived to be a tool—for the acquisition and/or retention of political power, the entire organization could be at risk of being subverted for other purposes. Finally, the reverse could occur, and those in power might view it as posing a potential threat to their regime.

Based on my experiences in Afghanistan, the Afghan Commando program again offers an excellent example of how to build a Partner Nation SOF training capacity, and could be used as a model for the proposed program in the DRC. Following the Afghanistan example, the initial pool of recruits would be locally isolated from the rest of the Partner Nation's military for Assessment and Selection into the program. Those who are selected for operations would then continue directly on to training in their respective specialty. Those who are not selected should be given the option to either remain with the SOF in a supporting capacity or return to their previous position.

Likewise, the training for the initial group could be done outside the DRC, at, for instance, the National Counter-Terrorism Center in Nairobi, Kenya, much as the Afghan cadre was initially trained in Jordan. In addition to providing an area where the initial cadre can be fully trained and readied without interference, this training arrangement would help build relations for future regional coordination and assistance. Because Kenya is also a key Partner Nation for Special Operations Command-Africa, this training arrangement would expose members of the new SOF to another African country's more mature organization and its

methods of operations. As with the Afghan Commando example, the original group would then return to the DRC as the initial cadre for the Headquarters and School.

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VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER FAILED STATES

The Partner Nation SOF program outlined in this thesis would enable developing states to increase and improve state penetration into under-governed areas. The low-cost approach of building and deploying small, networked, self-sufficient Operational Groups would be particularly effective in countries like the DRC where there is very little functional infrastructure. Even better, instead of consuming the costly resources demanded by a typical national counter-terrorist unit, such a SOF would actually help generate the human and social capital that would facilitate the spread of other government functions.

While the thesis has concentrated on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, certain concepts described here could easily be exported and applied to other current or future programs elsewhere. The first transferable concept is limited U.S. involvement. Many of the challenges presented by cross-cultural misunderstanding and the frictions it generates would be avoided if U.S. troops did not begin to assume the duties and responsibilities of effecting Partner Nation security and governance. Additionally, limiting direct U.S. involvement, and subsequently lowering costs, would allow an advisory program to be sustained long enough for it to achieve lasting improvement. Following from limited U.S. involvement, Partner Nation personnel should be trained and prepared to take responsibility for every aspect of their SOF from the beginning of the program—from

selection to training to employment. Otherwise, the Partner Nation SOF will always be dependent on U.S. participation or support in one fashion or another.

Also, by focusing on establishing the functions of governance instead of the bureaucracy of government, this program would enhance the responsiveness and legitimacy of the Partner Nation. The development programs of the Partner Nation SOF must be based on an analysis of local requirements and not on preferences in its capital or ours. If the projects are not relevant to local conditions, and not locally sustainable, then even the most "productive" Partner Nation SOF will fail to expand good governance and sovereignty. At the same time, simply assessing needs accurately is not sufficient. The Partner Nation SOF has to be organized in such a way as to assist locals to address them. Sustainability cannot be accomplished in any other way.

Finally, the security to be achieved via this model marries Wendt's operational model, the oil-spot counterinsurgency approach, and Arquilla's "New Rules of War." By deploying the Operational Groups as a dispersed network of sorts, the Ranger units would be able to find and then swarm against security threats. Also, as each Group's oil-spot expands so would its understanding of the operational environment. With improved situational understanding, its ability to respond to local requirements would only become more efficient and effective.

While the DRC presents what many might consider to be a worst-case scenario, many of the specific challenges faced in the Congo mirror those in other failed states and under-

governed spaces. In keeping with the emphasis on the significance of local conditions and the importance of understanding the local operational environment, clearly any application of this model would have to be informed by detailed study of the particular Partner Nation in question, and its region. However, the tenets of this model should have broad applicability elsewhere, and with so many fragile states from which to (unfortunately) choose, it should not be difficult to launch a pilot program somewhere, if not in the DRC itself.

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