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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

**POST-UNIFIED KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS:
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS**

by

Laura S. DeJong

September 2002

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Edward A. Olsen
H. Lyman Miller

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**UNIFIED KOREA FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS:
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS**

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First Lieutenant, United States Air Force
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ABSTRACT

Following the prospective unification of Korea, presumably under Seoul's guidance, the government would face the choice between policies of alignment and nonalignment with each major Pacific power. This choice will be influenced by historical predispositions, the path of reunification, Korea's domestic situation, and its relations with each power. As long as the present North Korean threat continues to plague the political and security considerations of South Korea, the ROK has no other viable alternative than the U.S.-ROK security alliance. However, after the elimination of the North Korean threat, a unified Korea will be able to redefine its foreign policy options. Currently, given the predominance of the ongoing war on terrorism, the foreign policy options of a unified Korea are not a top consideration for Washington. This permits the People's Republic of China to play a larger role in the reunification process, which could predispose a unified Korea to tilt toward China. In order for the United States to anticipate and prepare for this event, this thesis analyzes foreign policy options of a unified Korea and the possible political, economic, and military ramifications within the realm of international relations that could conceivably occur with the unification of North and South Korea.

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Most of all, I thank my Lord and Savior, the most powerful guiding light in my life.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the influence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States on a possible post-unified Korean state. For these purposes, the thesis assumes the long-term inevitability of a unified Korean peninsula under a single government. In addition, it recognizes that the particular path of reunification may affect the foreign policy orientation of the resulting unified Korean regime. The scenarios presented offer a construct of possible political, economic and military ramifications within the realm of international relations that could conceivably occur with the unification of North and South Korea.

Since the creation of Choson in the 4 Century B.C., the first Korean tribal kingdom in history, China has continuously influenced Korean affairs. Due to the geo-strategic location of Korea, placed between the great powers of Russia, Japan, and China, the Koreans have suffered repeated invasions throughout history. However, of all of the major powers, China had by far the greatest influence and was the most acceptable to Koreans. Sinic influence remained prominent through the first Korean unification of 688 A.D., and lasted until Japan subjugated Korea in 1910. China's role in the Second World War against Japan was influential in shaping postwar expectations regarding Korea. Unfortunately, the postwar era led to the creation of a bifurcated peninsula in 1945.

Throughout the Cold War, the PRC maintained a strong level of influence over the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite occasional tensions in their bilateral relations. The Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960's forced the DPRK to vacillate between the Soviet Union and the PRC, occasionally leaning toward Moscow but more often leaning toward Beijing. Even to this day, the PRC is one of the few countries that continuously exerts influence over the domestic and foreign policy of the DPRK. Kim Jong Il's two visits to the PRC in 2001 again illustrated the durability of their lasting relationship.

While the PRC-DPRK bilateral relationship remained strong during the Cold War, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States also grew increasingly closer throughout the Cold War. The alliance between the two was fundamental to the security

of the ROK during and after the Cold War. During this period, the United States played the predominant external role in directing and influencing the internal economic and political orientation of South Korea. Many categorized their relationship as a “client-state relationship,” because the ROK depended on the United States for its very existence. Toward the end of the Cold War, however, the PRC also became an important factor in ROK policy-making, even before the establishment of normal bilateral relations in 1992. Recently, South Korean leaders actively began to engage China politically, economically, and socially.

In 1992, the normalization of Sino-Korean ties initially focused on the creation of a mutually beneficial economic relationship. Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the developing Chinese market, with record-breaking growth and tremendous potential, continues to provide an excellent opportunity for South Korea. As the ROK looks for profitable markets, South Korean industries increasingly find the promising Chinese market’s potentials to be more attractive than American or Japanese markets where South Korea has struggled with the persisting trade deficits. In addition, in the current international political situation, ROK leaders sometimes have found the PRC more helpful in facilitating inter-Korean reconciliation than other countries.

In this context, since the end of the Cold War, the PRC has retained significant influence on the DPRK while developing relations with the ROK at the same time. In addition, Beijing has been quite willing to persuade Pyongyang to respond to Seoul’s courtship, which turned out to be significantly effective in bringing about the first inter-Korean summit in June 2000.

In contrast, the current Bush administration has not been as willing as the Clinton administration to actively engage North Korea on terms compatible with President Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy.” In 2000, Washington began a process of attempting to normalize relations with Pyongyang, in return for concessions on missile development and sales, and the ceasing of its nuclear program. The current Bush administration differentiated its approach from that of its predecessor’s and toughened Washington’s stance toward the Kim Jong Il regime. President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union address exemplified Washington’s stance by including North Korea in the “axis of evil.”

In addition, since the historic 2000 summit between Seoul and Pyongyang, North Korea has continuously blamed the stalled talks with the South on the United States. Since the DPRK recognizes that Washington is not eager to improve relations, it resumed a hard-line approach against both the United States and the ROK for most of 2001 and early 2002.

Recent trends in the PRC also present significant challenges to policymaking in Seoul and Washington, and the development of their bilateral alliance. Given its rising economy and military modernization efforts, the PRC is becoming an evident regional power and a potential strategic competitor of the United States. The PRC's regional diplomacy is highlighted by the move to create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the formalization of its ties with Russia through a new friendship treaty, and summit exchanges with the DPRK, which signaled Beijing's interest in continually asserting itself as a dynamic security player in Northeast Asia.

While many authors disagree about the significance of China's rise as a regional economic and military power, most agree that the PRC has become a major consideration for the ROK's policymaking and United States' regional security interests. The PRC is likely the only other major power with the motives and means to facilitate the reconciliation process leading to the reunification of Korea. For several years, China has supplied the DPRK with substantial economic and political support. Furthermore, China has the obvious incentive to avoid instability because it shares a border with Korea.

The intent of this thesis is to examine the relationship between China and both Koreas in order to identify factors that could cause a unified Korea to strengthen its ties with the PRC. The hypothesis to be tested is as follows. As the world becomes more integrated through globalization, there is an increasing recognition among Asian countries of the need to strengthen relations within the region. However, the ongoing tension between China and Japan continues to complicate regional politics and security. Chinese regional ambitions will actively involve Beijing in the inter-Korean unification process in order to promote regional stability and to create a favorable power balance, utilizing the unified Korea against the United States and Japan. In addition, several leaders in the DPRK as well as the ROK perceive the current United States policy toward

North Korea as a contributing factor to the inability of the Koreans to unify. As such, a continuation of Washington's current hard-line stance against the DPRK would impede the process of reconciliation and may compel a modification of a unified Korea's foreign policy options. A compilation of all these factors increases the likelihood that a unified Korea may seek an alternative alignment with the PRC.

This thesis seeks to answer the following questions:

Historically, what factors have affected relations between China and the Koreans?

What are the different unification paths available for the Koreans?

What are the main foreign policy options available for a unified Korea?

What factors may lead to a post-unified Korea aligning with the PRC?

The relevance of this thesis stems from the vital role the United States has played in the security on the Korean Peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia since the end of World War II. Since the United States military presence in the Korean Peninsula contributes to the security of Northeast Asia and Korea's potential alignment with China could eliminate the American presence on mainland Northeast Asia, the future of a unified Korea is an important United States security consideration. The removal of an American military presence from the Korean peninsula also calls into question the viability and Japanese desirability of the United States maintaining troops in Japan; thus potentially eliminating an American forward deployed presence from the entire Northeast Asian region.

This thesis will consist of five chapters, including this Introduction. Chapter Two will survey the historical evolution of the relationship between China and Korea. Furthermore, it will examine, in this context, the impact of the United States-PRC relationship and its influence on the Korean peninsula, as well as the U.S. historical relationship with North and South Korea. Chapter Three will summarize the foremost unification paths available for the Koreans to pursue. The path of reunification and the intervention by the four Pacific powers (United States, Russia, China, and Japan) will largely determine the foreign policy options of a unified Korean state. These scenarios include unification through peaceful reconciliation, collapse and absorption, military

conflict, or external intervention. Chapter Four will examine several post-unified Korea scenarios. These scenarios include maintenance of the South Korean status-quo alliance with the United States following unification, the formation of a security alignment with Russia, China, or Japan, and the desire for a unified Korea to become an independent regional power. Furthermore, this chapter will examine the particular factors that could lead to a unified Korea aligning with the PRC. These factors include the changing relationship between the Washington and Beijing, the potential for a diplomatic separation of Korea from the United States and both Koreas, and the influence of the changing regional and global situation on the PRC. Finally, Chapter Five will offer a summary of the principal conclusions and policy recommendations.

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II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Since the Korean peninsula was locked in a postwar geopolitical settlement beginning in 1945, it was externally divided, an episode that outlived the Cold War rivalry. The United States and Soviet Union agreed to a shared occupation of the Korean peninsula following Japan's defeat in 1945, resulting in a North-South division and eventual coexistence of competing Korean states throughout the Cold War period. The bilateral structure of the Cold War compelled the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south to turn away from the People's Republic of China (PRC), despite Korea's historical affiliation with Chinese dynasties, and look toward the United States as an ally. Conversely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north maintained close bilateral ties with the PRC, despite some ideological differences. Unfortunately, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which ended the Cold War, did not terminate the Cold War on the Korean peninsula. The pursuit of a "Northern Politics" policy by the South Korean government and the end of the Cold War facilitated PRC-ROK normalization in 1992. The current relationship the PRC has with both the DPRK and ROK enables it to play a potential role in the future of the Korean peninsula. As such, it is important to examine the historical ties between China and both Koreas, in conjunction with a Chinese interest in regional security and the current United States hard-line stance against the DPRK because it may raise a question of what a unified Korea's foreign policy options toward China might be.

A. PRE-WORLD WAR II

Due to the strategic location of the Korea peninsula among the great powers of Russia, Japan, and China, the Koreans have suffered repeated invasions throughout Korean history. These invasions may be categorized into five major periods of foreign occupation, including encroachment by China, the Mongols, Japan, and -- following World War II -- the United States and Soviet Union. However, of all of the major powers, China had by far the greatest influence and often was more acceptable to

Koreans, making Korea the most sinicized non-Chinese state in East Asia.¹ In fact, Chinese influence on inter-Korean relations was critical in the first unification of Korea in 668 A.D., when the Silla kingdom overwhelmed the other two Korean states.²

Although the Koreans adopted many aspects of Chinese culture, they always maintained unique Korean characteristics. Similar to other countries bordering on the Middle Kingdom, the Koreans embraced Chinese culture, paid tribute to the Chinese emperor, and received recognition and protection in return. In the wake of the Japanese invasion under Hideyoshi during the sixteenth century, Korea had established a rigid policy of excluding foreigners, except for the Chinese and a small Japanese enclave.³ For two centuries, Korea maintained itself as the “hermit kingdom,” using its younger brother status in relation to China in the Confucian system of East Asia to maintain its isolation from the rest of the world.⁴ The isolationist period in Korea ended forcibly in 1876, after Japan sent warships to open Korea to trade. In 1882, as a diplomatically defensive measure against its neighbors, Korea signed a “Treaty of Amity and Commerce” with the United States, the first treaty with a Western power, in which America promised to provide good offices in case of external threats.⁵

The old Korean proverb, “when whales fight, the shrimp in the middle gets crushed,” exemplified the Korean peninsula in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.⁶ During this period, both Imperial Japan and later Czarist Russia recognized Korea as an important strategic area along the rim of China. Ultimately, the Manchu dynasty of China, staggering from internal decay and Western incursions, could not shield Korea from a rapidly modernizing Japan or an ever-expanding Russia.⁷

¹ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 3.

² For further background on the first unification of Korea, see: Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story of a Phoenix (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).

³ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 4.

⁴ William Struick, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 13.

⁵ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 4.

⁶ William Struick, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 13.

⁷ Ibid.

Following the opening of Korea in 1876, the Chinese continued to insist on its suzerainty over Korea, and Japan sought to overturn it. In addition, Korean reformers began to look toward the Japanese for inspiration and support for liberation. When an anti-foreign mob in Seoul attacked the Japanese legation in 1882, both China and Japan responded by sending troops to the aid of the opposing side. In 1884, a coup attempt by Koreans ended with a clash between the Chinese and Japanese. To calm the situation, China and Japan had signed the 1885 Treaty of Tientsin stipulating each nation would not station its troops in Korea. In the event that either decided to do so, it would inform the other nation beforehand. During the next decade, the Japanese became more involved in Korea and tried to contain China's effort to reinforce its privileged position in Korea, while the Chinese simultaneously intensified their efforts at modernizing their military forces. In 1894, at the request of the Korean king, China sent a small body of troops, and in retaliation, Japan sent in a larger force and demanded reforms of Korea. On 1 August 1894, the Chinese and Japanese entered into the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War.⁸ The eventual Japanese victory effectively eliminated China from the Korean peninsula.⁹

Following the Sino-Japanese War, Russia felt its interests in East Asia threatened, and therefore emerged as a new protector of Korea's independence, however, to the Koreans protection meant exploitation and domination. After the Russians refused to divide the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel in order to forgo a conflict with Japan, the Russians and Japanese entered the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, when Japan suddenly attacked and defeated Russian forces at Port Arthur and Inchon. Although Korea announced its neutrality, the peninsula found itself occupied by Japanese forces. A combination of factors, including the Japanese alliance with Great Britain in 1902 and United States' neutrality in return for Japan's assurances it would not threaten the American position in the Philippines, enabled the Japanese military to defeat Russia in 1905.¹⁰ Later in the same year, Japan's paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea were codified in the Treaty of Portsmouth, in which President

⁸ Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story of a Phoenix (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 553.

⁹ William Strueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 13.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Theodore Roosevelt played peacemaker between Russia and Japan, and for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War put it in a position to dominate Korea.

Following the Russo-Japanese War, Korea felt its first perceived betrayal by the United States in 1905 after Secretary of War William Howard Taft approved Japan's domination of Korea. The agreement was arrived at in secret with the Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Taro in return for assurances from Tokyo that it would not challenge the American colonial domination of the Philippines. With no opposition in sight, Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and Tokyo annexed it outright as a Japanese possession in 1910. The Japanese then ruled as harsh colonial masters of the peninsula until Japan's defeat in World War II.¹¹

During Japanese colonization, Japan increasingly incorporated Korea into its empire. In 1919, a nationwide, unarmed demonstration of the Korean nationalist movement took place. In the hope of impressing the statesmen at Versailles and appealing to the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination, Koreans secretly organized and launched a protest, demanding freedom.¹² Although the independence movement failed, it convinced the Japanese colonial authorities they needed to increase their efforts aimed at assimilation.¹³ The Japanese forced the Koreans to take Japanese surnames and use Japanese textbooks. Furthermore, the Korean language press was nearly eliminated, and in the late 1930s, use of the Korean language in an official capacity was banned. By the onset of World War II, Koreans were integrated into the Japanese empire, however, their identity remained firmly Korean.¹⁴

During World War II, policymakers within the United States believed the global instability between 1919 and 1939 was derived largely from the failure of the United

¹¹ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 5.

¹² John K. Fairbanks, Edwin Reischauer, Albert Craig. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, rev. ed. (Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 909.

¹³ William Strueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 14.

¹⁴ John K. Fairbanks, Edwin Reischauer, Albert Craig. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, rev. ed. (Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 911-12.

States to assume a responsible position in the world community.¹⁵ Since the projected defeat of Japan in World War II threatened to provoke another great power rivalry in Asia and over the peninsula, the United States displayed a greater interest. The concern for the Korean peninsula grew early in the war as the Nationalist regime in China pushed for American recognition of the Korean Provisional Government, then based in China. It appeared to the United States that the pressure represented a Chinese effort to reestablish the position it had on the peninsula before the Sino-Japanese War. In addition, the internal condition of Korea due to the years of colonization made it apparently unprepared for independence. It was for this reason during the Allied powers' international wartime conferences between 1943 and 1945 that President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed an international trusteeship for Korea. The proposed trusteeship, which only received partial support, involved multinational participation of the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, and the United States.¹⁶

Following the Cairo Conference of 1943, the joint communiqué issued on 1 December 1943 contained a statement on Korea that Japan will “be expelled from...all territories which she has taken by violence and greed...The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”¹⁷ Furthermore, it became clear that World War II would not last much longer after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. This accelerated the Soviet Union's declaration of war against Japan on 8 August 1945. When Stalin declared war on Japan, Soviet troops occupied the northern part of Korea before Japan surrendered to the United States. A week later, on 15 August 1945, Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced the unconditional Japanese surrender to the Allied powers.

At Yalta in February 1945, the leaders of the Allied powers had agreed to disarm the Japanese troops in Korea, yet did not specify how to do it until the Potsdam

¹⁵ William Strueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 17.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story of a Phoenix (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 165.

conference held between 17 July – 2 August 1945. Regardless, the Koreans were overjoyed after liberation from the Japanese.¹⁸

B. GLOBAL COLD WAR

Following the end of World War II, the United States initially placed a still occupied Korea under a temporary multilateral administration in cooperation with other great powers, including the Soviet Union, and China. However, in December 1945, while attending a foreign ministerial conference, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to a modified version of the trusteeship idea, which only included the two superpowers. The trusteeship failed for several reasons, particularly the inability of the two superpowers to agree upon a leader of Korea. The Soviet Union backed communist leader Kim Il Sung, while the United States backed a more democratic Syngman Rhee.¹⁹

The United States operated a full military government while occupying Korea between 1945-48. A group of Koreans established the People's Republic of Korea (PRK) within weeks of Japan's surrender, not recognized by the Americans. Instead, the United States established a military government in Korea until 1948. In the North, the Soviets allowed local committees of the PRK to operate but increasingly controlled them.²⁰ The United States proposed the 38th parallel as a military demarcation line, which was accepted by the Soviets. The United States officials did not consult any Koreans before coming to the decision of dividing the Korean peninsula; nor did they consult with the British or Chinese, both of whom expected to take part in a trusteeship for Korea.²¹ A hasty decision in Washington created the demarcation line dividing Korea into two occupation zones, to prevent the Soviet forces from overrunning all of Korea.²² Due to the Soviet-American competition in Northeast Asia following the end of World War II, Korea, which was not a formal participant in the war, was the only non-belligerent to

¹⁸ Ibid., 166.

¹⁹ Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 190.

²⁰ Ibid., 85.

²¹ Ibid., 187.

²² Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story of a Phoenix (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 166.

undergo a military occupation.²³ Thus, it was the political and ideological differences associated with the Cold War that contributed to the division of Korea before the formal onset of the global Cold War. This geographical and ideological division would separate the Koreans in the south from continuing its historically based relationship with China through most of the Cold War period.

Kim Il-Sung sensed the strategic importance of a communist victory in China; therefore, in early 1947, he began dispatching thousands of Koreans to fight with the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong. The reinforcements sent by North Korea came at a crucial time in the Chinese civil war, following a communist succession of defeats and heavy losses, and ultimately contributed to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).²⁴ Consequently, and in response to the crossing of the 38th parallel by United Nation forces during the Korean War, the Mao government later reciprocated the support of the DPRK.

Starting in early 1947, the United States was unwilling to withdraw troops from the Korean peninsula because of its growing importance to Washington's dual strategies of containing communism and reviving the Japanese economy. However, many in the United States continued to balk at a major commitment in Korea. For this reason, a few advisors in Washington utilized the UN in order to reposition and contain North Korea through collective security mechanisms.²⁵ The American-dominated United Nations (UN) formed the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to observe the democratic elections in Korea. The UNTCOK-observed elections in May 1948 foreshadowed the final emergence of a separate southern government and thus raised the issue of Korea's permanent division.²⁶ The Soviet Union and North Korea refused to participate in the supervised election to unify Korea; therefore, only the South held elections. This democratic election inaugurated the Republic of Korea on 15 August

²³ Some Koreans participated in the Japanese Armed Forces during the Pacific War and were used in both Korea and Japan to build up the Japanese industry in support of the war effort. For more in-depth information, see Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 174-84.

²⁴ Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 239.

²⁵ Ibid., 210.

²⁶ Ibid., 187.

1948, led by newly elected Syngman Rhee. Since 15 August also marked Japan's defeat in World War II, it had added significance. Subsequently, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed on 9 September 1949, with Kim Il Sung as its premier.

Before the 1950 invasion by North Korea, nine months of battles and guerilla fighting occurred along the 38th parallel throughout 1949.²⁷ Upon hearing reports of heavy fighting in Korea, the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) dispatched a delegation to the peninsula. The delegation arrived via a South Korean naval vessel, guided around by the ROK Army. After a few days, the UNCOK members returned to Seoul, from where they filed a report to the UN blaming the "northern invaders" for the trouble, asserting the North Koreans policy aimed to overthrow of the Republic of Korea.²⁸ Although it was probable that the North was more to blame, UNCOK failed to investigate and report on the provocations conducted by the South.

Before 1950, Korea had little significance in the contest between the Soviet Union and the United States; therefore, neither power very closely supervised its dependent government. In a speech before Washington's National Press Club on 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson did not regard South Korea as having any great strategic importance, describing a "defensive perimeter of the Pacific" the United States would defend, encompassing countries like Japan and the Philippines. Acheson argued that Korea was an area of "lesser" interest, susceptible to "subversion and penetration" that "cannot be stopped by military means."²⁹ This statement implied that Korea did not have intrinsic importance, however, it did have contextual importance to Washington. Acheson's statement, combined with the lack of response by the United States when mainland China fell to Communists, contributed to the Korean Communist leaders' belief the United States would not intervene in a Korean civil war.

²⁷ Ibid., 247.

²⁸ "Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea," 15 December 1949 – 4 September 1950, obtained from "U.S. Policy in the Korean Conflict," July 1950 – Feb 1951, *U.S. Department of State Publication* No. 4263 (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1951) 14-16

²⁹ "Crisis in Asia--An Examination of U. S. Policy," remarks by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, National Press Club, Washington, 12 January 1950, in *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XXII, no. 551 (23 January 1950), 111-18.

North Korea, in its 25 June 1950 invasion of South Korea, gambled heavily on its ability to conquer the southern portion of the peninsula before an effective defense line could be established below the 38th parallel. However, the Soviet Union, the PRC, and the DPRK did not believe the United States would intervene, thus no security plans were created in the event it did.³⁰ Fortunately for South Korea, four American divisions, forty percent of the United States Army's strength, along with the relatively strong United States Fifth Air Force and Seventh Fleet, were all stationed close by, mainly in Japan and the Philippines.³¹ Moreover, President Truman decided quickly to commit American forces to the peninsular war, General MacArthur acted swiftly to implement the administration decisions, and Secretary of State Acheson quickly rallied troops to supplement the American military build-up in defense of South Korea.³²

Truman responded to the Communist attack, largely because he believed an attack on Korea was a major test for the policy of containment as laid out in NSC-68, a formative document in the Cold War policy of the United States.³³ Furthermore, if the United States allowed Korea to fall to the Communists, it might send a message to the Soviet Union that Americans would not back up its commitments to Western Europe. NSC-68, presented to President Truman in April 1950, stated the Soviet Union's strategic and tactical policy was affected by the estimate that the United States was the greatest immediate obstacle which stood between the Soviet Union and world domination, and was the only power that could release forces to destroy it. It further stated that Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States. Therefore, the Korean War became the political instrument that put NSC-68 into effect seventy-two days after the finalization and presentation of the directive to President Truman.

³⁰ Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 21.

³¹ D. Clayton James, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 157-58.

³² *Ibid.*, 158.

³³ To view NSC 68 see: "NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," dated 7 April 1950, available from: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm>, Internet, accessed 21 Sep 2002.

On the Communist side, there was a continuous distrust between Mao and Stalin, however, both supported Kim Il-Sung in his attempt to reunify Korea forcibly.³⁴ The Korean War eventually proved to be somewhat beneficial to the Soviet Union because it ensured that a possible accommodation between China, and either the United States or ROK did not occur. Furthermore, the Soviets pushed the North-South conflict as a strategy within the East-West conflict with the United States during the Cold War. Although they were active behind the scenes, Soviet representatives appeared to stay in the background, letting the Koreans rule the Pyongyang government. In actuality, Washington was unable to withdraw American troops because it did not have as strong of a hold over the South as Moscow had over the North.³⁵

While the superpowers considered the Korean War a limited war, both North and South Korea were fighting an unlimited war, one that demanded the eradication and complete elimination of the opposing regime. Although it appeared the Cold War environment dictated the terms of the Korean War and its consequences, in actuality it was the superpower rivalry and the fear of escalation that dominated the war. In many respects, the Korean War was a product of clients who had their own agenda and were able to manipulate the two superpowers. This was illustrated by North and South Korean rhetoric, which implicitly supported the need to fight any group that threatened Korean unity.³⁶ On one hand, South Korea blamed Soviet imperialism and the spread of communism for the North Korean invasion. On the other hand, Kim Il Sung held the United States and its “puppet regime” in the South responsible for the division of Korea. The Kim Il Sung accusation of South Korea being an American puppet state remained a prevalent theme throughout the Cold War, which dissuaded the DPRK in engaging in bilateral negotiations with the South.³⁷ Moreover, North Korea attempted to play the two

³⁴ Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 44.

³⁵ Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 209.

³⁶ Steven H. Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949 – 1954 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill–Queen's University Press, 1995), 93.

³⁷ A message sent by the DPRK to the PRC and Russia noted that “a socialist country by nature cannot deal with the puppets raised by the imperialists, much less recognize them.” For more information, see Zachary Davis, Larry Nicksch, Larry Nowels, Valdimir Pregelj, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Robert Sutter, “Korea: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Regarding Possible Normalization of Relations with North Korea,” *Congressional Research Service*, Report for Congress 94-933S, 29 November 1994.

Communist powers against one another to gain support for an attack against the South. To strengthen his hand when dealing with Stalin, who feared a Chinese challenge for leadership in the Communist world, Kim Il Sung attempted to secure Mao's blessing for a southern invasion.³⁸

Largely due to General Douglas MacArthur's success during the Inchon operation and the possibility of the UN troops crossing the 38th parallel, on 30 September 1950 Premier Zhou Enlai proclaimed in a speech the strongest official word yet of possible Red Chinese entry into the war, maintaining that the people of China "will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely wounded by imperialists."³⁹ However, similar to leaders in Washington, General MacArthur discounted this threat as one of many rumors of possible use of force by the Communist Chinese. As such, the decision to cross the 38th parallel was intricately linked to miscommunication between both sides. Communist Chinese leaders exaggerated the threat that American troops in North Korea would pose to Chinese security. Moreover, General MacArthur stated "now that we have our bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter."⁴⁰ In addition, those who did not underestimate the Chinese strength mistakenly believed the intervention was unlikely.

By October 1950, after heavy casualties on both sides, the North Korean soldiers retreated and the South Korean army moved ahead to occupy the North. After the UN troops crossed the 38th parallel, Mao sent Chinese People's Volunteers to Korea, to fight against the United Nations forces moving rapidly toward the Chinese-Korean border.⁴¹ Many Chinese scholars argue that the PRC's decision to enter the Korean War in October 1950 was largely based on concern for Chinese national security and a reaction to the

³⁸ Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 251-53.

³⁹ D. Clayton James, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 185.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 186.

⁴¹ Chen Jian, "China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation," *Cold War International History Project* [Online] (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.); available from:

<http://cwihip.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf/16c6b2fc83775317852564a400054b28/762e66e025786ead852564b90074429c?OpenDocument>; Internet; accessed 22 Jan 2002.

imminent threats to the physical security of Chinese territory. In addition, due to China's economic reconstruction and political consolidation, Beijing did not necessarily want to enter the war. Chinese scholars further believe the American decision to cross the 38th Parallel triggered Chinese intervention, which could have been avoided if the UN forces did not cross the parallel.⁴² Other North Korean and Chinese literature argues that China did not enter the war as a defensive measure to protect its borders. Rather, Mao determined early in the war that if North Korea faltered, the Chinese had an obligation to come to the aid of North Korea because they sacrificed many Koreans in the Chinese revolution and anti-Japan resistance.⁴³ Regardless, the Chinese intervention during the Korean War again demonstrated Chinese willingness to assert influence on the Korean peninsula.

Secretary of State Acheson, Warren Austin, the United States ambassador to the UN, and several other American policymakers worked successfully behind the scenes in getting eight friendly nations, led by the United Kingdom, to sponsor a resolution changing the UN's objective in the war. Since late June 1950, the objective had been to restore the status quo antebellum on the peninsula. On 7 October 1950, a resolution passed calling for appropriate action to ensure the conditions of stability throughout Korea and the holding of elections under the auspices of the UN, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea. While three UN resolutions had passed between 1947-49 calling for unity, freedom and democracy in Korea, this one appeared to commit the UN to achieving unification by force, which it obviously failed to do.⁴⁴

The United States called the action of China a "fresh and unprovoked aggressive act following the beginning of the Sino-Korean offensive."⁴⁵ Unlike the support provided by Stalin, the Chinese were ready to fight down the middle of the peninsula in

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 284.

⁴⁴ D. Clayton James, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 187.

⁴⁵ Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 289.

support of the DPRK. After another two years of bloody fighting, accompanied by several threats by the United States regarding the potential use of atomic weapons, the fighting ceased on 27 July 1953. On that date, the United States, North Korea, and China signed an armistice agreement, however, South Korea refused to sign. The armistice created a “demilitarized zone” across the middle of Korea, which currently exists. With no peace treaty signed, the two Koreas remained technically still at war; only the armistice agreement and demilitarized zone kept a tenuous peace. Both Koreas watched as the war ravaged their country and turned the expectation of a unified Korea into a nightmare.⁴⁶ The war devastated both Koreas, damaging the infrastructure and cities, wiping out ten percent of the Korean population, fifteen percent of the GDP in the South, and thirty percent in the North.⁴⁷

The PRC’s entrance into the Korean War effectively heightened the country’s stature in relation to the DPRK and propelled the Chinese to a position of influence in North Korea similar to the Soviet Union. In November 1953, Kim Il Sung led a large delegation to Beijing, where he negotiated agreements for long-term military, economic, and cultural cooperation with the northern neighbor. Kim gave thanks for the “magnificent contributions to the Korean War, which will remain immortal as Korea’s rivers and mountains.” In response, the Chinese treated the manpower and material provided to North Korea as gifts and promised \$200 million in aid for reconstruction during the next several years.⁴⁸

The Geneva Conference of 1954 convened to address several issues, including the issue of Korean unification. The British proposed a plan that called for an internationally supervised election by the entire Korean peninsula to establish a new all-Korean government. After the elections, the American and Chinese troops would withdraw from Korea. Under this proposal for unification, the status quo within Korea would be maintained, presumably with Rhee remaining president. However, the ROK government

⁴⁶ Ibid., 298.

⁴⁷ J. Barkley Rosser and Marina Rosser, “Korea: The Lingering Shadow of the Cold War,” Comparative Economics In a Transforming World Economy (Chicago: McGraw-Hill Company, 1995), 441.

⁴⁸ William Strueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 362.

violently opposed any concessions to the Communists and fought for the withdrawal of Chinese troops and the surrender of North Korea. President Rhee claimed he did not support the elections held in the South because they went against the constitutional processes of the government. Rather, President Rhee attempted to obtain American-UN backing of an offensive against the communists to finally expel them from the peninsula. Ultimately, they were not able to reach a settlement of the Korean issue; therefore, the ROK and DPRK governments had to accept a temporary division of the peninsula.⁴⁹ The end of the Korean War marked the integration of Korea into the Cold War system.⁵⁰

Following the division of Korea and subsequent war, the DPRK became a divergent case of postwar Marxist-Leninist ideology, witnessing a profound reassertion of native Korean political practices that encompassed an elevation of the role of the leader and a policy of self-reliance. In addition, contrary to Western belief during the Cold War, the Soviet Union competed with Chinese influence in the DPRK, and both conflicted with the North Korean indigenous ideology.⁵¹ Kim Il Sung systematically played the PRC and USSR against one another throughout the Cold War, securing millions in economic and military aid, and trade subsidies.⁵²

Despite some divergence in their bilateral relations, the PRC maintained a strong level of influence and maintained a warm official friendship with the North Korean state throughout the Cold War. The Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s forced the DPRK to vacillate between the two countries, occasionally leaning toward Moscow, but more often leaning toward Beijing. In 1970, prior to the opening of China to the United States and Japan, Premier Zhou Enlai declared that “China and Korea are neighbors linked by mountains and rivers...This friendship cemented in blood was forged and has grown in the course of the protracted struggle against our common enemies, United States and Japanese imperialism...Common interest and common problems of security have bounds

⁴⁹ Steven H. Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949 – 1954 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1995), 213-17.

⁵⁰ Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 36.

⁵¹ Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 235.

⁵² Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton: The Century Foundation, 2002), xiv.

and united our people together.”⁵³ Even during the period of self-reliance in China, Beijing still maintained a close relationship with the DPRK.

In contrast to the DPRK’s relationship with the other communist regimes, American influence penetrated into every branch of the South Korean administration after the establishment of the ROK, supported by U.S. dollars.⁵⁴ Many categorized their relationship as a “client-state relationship,” because the ROK depended on the United States for its very existence.⁵⁵ Throughout the Cold War period, the ROK continued a strong alliance with the United States, while increasing its multilateral ties with other countries. Moreover, following entering into the Armistice Agreement, the United States and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 October 1953, creating a formal security alliance.⁵⁶

The DPRK-PRC relationship throughout the Cold War remained relatively strong. The nature of the alliance between the DPRK and PRC was illustrated in 1979, after Deng Xiaoping told President Carter that North Korea “trusts” China and that “we cannot have contact with the South or it would weaken that trust.” However, the ROK was eventually able to break through the alliance. The first crack in the political firewall between the PRC and ROK occurred in 1983, after a Chinese airliner was hijacked by Chinese citizens and forced to fly to South Korea. Despite protests by the North Korean leaders, Beijing sent an official delegation to Seoul, where the two countries smoothly negotiated a deal for the return of the plane and its passengers.⁵⁷ During October of the same year, a terrorist bomb in Ragoon, Burma took out much of the South Korean cabinet and narrowly missed the then South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan. A Burmese court determined the North Koreans were behind the bombing.⁵⁸ The Ragoon

⁵³ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 230.

⁵⁴ Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 255.

⁵⁵ Steven H. Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949 – 1954 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1995), 93.

⁵⁶ Attached as Appendix I.

⁵⁷ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 241.

⁵⁸ Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 462.

bomb incident increased the Chinese fear of North Korea again attacking the South.⁵⁹ While the relations between the ROK and PRC began to improve during this period, United States relations with North Korea, hindered by the Ragoon bombing incident, showed no signs of improvement.

Throughout the 1980s, South Korea and China developed bilateral economic relations by using the route through Hong Kong.⁶⁰ The progression of total trade between the PRC and ROK increased from \$187,906 in 1980 to \$1,486,612 in 1987.⁶¹ By 1987, the ROK's trade with China was valued at three times the level of Chinese trade with the North.⁶² South Korea had its own economic and security interests in pursuing relations with China. During the late 1980s, the size of the South Korean economy more than doubled that of the North.⁶³ Toward the end of the Cold War, under President Roh Tae-woo, South Korea successfully developed "*Nordpolitik*," based on West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, in order to cultivate relations with the DPRK, PRC and Soviet Union. Specifically, President Roh stated that "I will approach the Communist bloc more vigorously in order to realize peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea and ultimately peaceful unification."⁶⁴ President Roh offered three reasons for the emphasis and implementation of this northern policy. First, increased ROK ties with the PRC and USSR would provide an opportunity to resolve the question of national reunification between the two Koreas. Secondly, the policy would facilitate the movement of South Korea beyond its peripheral status within Asia in order to assume a prominent role in the center stage of the international community. Finally, the northern diplomacy would

⁵⁹ Park Sang-seek, "Northern Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations," in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations, ed. James Cotton (Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd., 1993) 225.

⁶⁰ Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 97.

⁶¹ Park Sang-seek, "Northern Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations," in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations, ed. James Cotton (Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd., 1993) 225.

⁶² Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 97.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Park Sang-seek, "Northern Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations," in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations, ed. James Cotton (Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd., 1993) 218.

economically strengthen South Korea.⁶⁵ Following the end of the Cold War, this eventually resulted in the signing of the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea” on 13 December 1991, the “Joint Press Communiqué on the Occasion of President Roh Tae Woo’s State Visit to the PRC,” dated 30 September 1992, and the “Treaty on Basic Relations,” between the ROK and Russia, dated 19 November 1992.⁶⁶

C. END OF THE COLD WAR

The termination of Sino-Soviet tension in 1989 eliminated the Chinese fear that stronger relations with the ROK would push the DPRK into the arms of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Beijing saw the potential domestic political gain in establishing diplomatic relations with Seoul, because it would force South Korea to terminate official relations with Taiwan. Moreover, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and ROK was economically beneficial to the developing markets of both countries. It was for these reasons that early in the post-Cold War era, and against the wishes of the DPRK, China decided to support the entrance of South Korea in the UN, which compelled the North to join, both of which occurred on 17 September 1991.⁶⁷ Finally, in 1992 the ROK-PRC laid their Cold War animosities to rest and normalized their relations.

Despite student demonstrations calling for the removal of United States bases, the South Korean government remained under the protection of the security treaty and militarily dependent upon the United States to cope effectively with the largest threat facing them, the North Korean threat of war. However, the ROK continued the trend of greater independence from the United States with the establishment of multilateral economic and security ties. Since the establishment of its northern policy, the ROK government continued to enhance its efforts at establishing and strengthening economic, military and diplomatic relations with various countries. As such, the security

⁶⁵ Kim Hak-Joon, “Northern Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations” in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations, ed. James Cotton (Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd., 1993) 258.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 315.

⁶⁷ United Nations, “List of Member States,” *United Nations* [Online]; 18 December 2000; Internet; available from: <http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>; accessed 7 Jun 2002

environment in the region required a flexible approach to develop cooperative military relations with the neighbors of South Korea, anchored on the existing axis of the ROK-U.S. alliance.⁶⁸

During the 1990s, an increase in the internationalization of Korea occurred due to the issue of North Korea's nuclear option, which threatened the security of Northeast Asia. In December 1991, pressure stemming from the PRC, the ROK's northern diplomacy, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, coupled with the United States' objective to remove all nuclear weapons from the peninsula, facilitated the DPRK and ROK in signing an "Agreement of Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation." Although the nuclear issue was not included in the agreement, at the end of December both sides agreed not to test, manufacture, produce, received, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.⁶⁹

In 1992, during a period of mutual accommodation, the ROK canceled its Team Spirit exercise with the United States, which led to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of Yongbyon, North Korea. Unfortunately, the 1992 proposed nuclear inspection was unproductive. Later in 1993, the IAEA discovered that the DPRK tried to conceal nuclear material, and Pyongyang denied the IAEA access at Yongbyon, upon which the ROK declared the launching of a new Team Spirit exercise. North Korea ultimately threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1985, citing the escape clause in the treaty on defending supreme national interests.⁷⁰ IAEA Director General Hans Blix presented a report on North Korea to the UN General Assembly in November 1993, which resulted in a vote of 140 to 1 urging the DPRK to cooperate immediately with the IAEA. Only Pyongyang dissented; China abstained.⁷¹ Through the next several months, American-North Korean

⁶⁸ "ROK Policy on National Defense," *Korean National Defense Policy: Military Exchange and Cooperation with Foreign Countries* [Online], available from: <http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/korea/milit2c.html>; Internet, accessed 12 Feb 2002.

⁶⁹ Donald Kagan and Fredrick Kagan, *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusions, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 344.

⁷⁰ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 278-80.

⁷¹ Donald Kagan and Fredrick Kagan, *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusions, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 354.

tensions on the peninsula increased seriously. Furthermore, inter-Korean negotiations over the implementation of the North-South denuclearization accord were broken off by North Korea, arguing that the nuclear issue should be resolved only through bilateral talks with Washington, not with South Korea or the IAEA.⁷²

Former President Jimmy Carter received permission from the Clinton administration and traveled to Pyongyang for a meeting with Kim Il Sung. As a result, a third round of United States-North Korean talks opened on 8 July 1994, but was cut short by Kim Il Sung's death.⁷³ The Geneva Accords talks resumed on 5 August 1994, which produced an agreement to resolve the differences on the North Korean nuclear program between the United States and the DPRK on North Korea's nuclear program. The essence of the deal was that the United States would provide North Korea with a light-water reactor, arrange for interim energy alternatives for the DPRK, and work to reduce barriers to trade and investment to improve the North Korean economy. In response, North Korea agreed to freeze construction of its nuclear activities.⁷⁴ During the next month, the technical details of the agreement were hammered out, and the Geneva Accord talks resumed on 23 September 1994.⁷⁵ Finally, after seventeen months of on-and-off negotiations, the Carter deal and the White House response formed the basis of the "Agreed Framework" between the United States and the DPRK, signed on 21 October 1994 at Geneva after talks held between September-October 1994.⁷⁶

Since North Korea is a close neighbor to China, the Chinese were also concerned over the nuclearization of North Korea. As such, the Chinese played a large, behind the scene role in effecting the Geneva Accords of August and October 1994 between the

⁷² Zachary Davis, Larry Nicksch, Larry Nowels, Valdimir Pregelj, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Robert Sutter, "Korea: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Regarding Possible Normalization of Relations with North Korea," *Congressional Research Service*, Report for Congress 94-933S, 29 November 1994.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Pyongyang and the U.S. Nuclear Gambit," Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, *House Republican Research Committee*, 11 August 1994.

⁷⁵ Zachary Davis, Larry Nicksch, Larry Nowels, Valdimir Pregelj, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Robert Sutter, "Korea: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Regarding Possible Normalization of Relations with North Korea," *Congressional Research Service*, Report for Congress 94-933S, 29 November 1994.

⁷⁶ Donald Kagan and Fredrick Kagan, While America Sleeps: Self-Delusions, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 354. A copy of the agreement is attached as Appendix II.

United States and DPRK. For the most part, China has been cooperative with the United States in attempting to restrain North Korea's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development. In fact, one argument made by the Clinton administration regarding close Sino-American ties was based on Beijing's positive role as an interlocutor with Pyongyang.⁷⁷ However, China supported dialogue and was against the imposition of sanctions on North Korea. The PRC argued that peaceful dialogue was the only way to obtain a political solution with North Korea concerning nuclear weapons. The aim of the Chinese policy was to bring about a relaxation of the situation and ultimately the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. China's stated intent was enhance the security of Northeast Asia by helping North Korea become more involved in international affairs, as had the PRC, in order to develop its economy and improve the living conditions of its people.⁷⁸

The Chinese involvement during the nuclear crisis on the peninsula demonstrates that while the PRC-DPRK relationship remained strong, Chinese interests on the peninsula were mixed. China has a formal alliance with North Korea, however, the Chinese refused to allow it to dictate their policies toward South Korea. This was demonstrated by the rising importance of the ROK as one of the Chinese economic partners following formal recognition in 1992. Additionally, China did not support the DPRK in the potential nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. However, the PRC was also against sanctions imposed on the DPRK by the United States.

While the relationship between China and South Korea remained strained throughout the Cold War, since normalization in 1992 their bilateral ties have dramatically improved. Currently the South Koreans view China as more of an economic challenge than a military threat. Furthermore, South Koreans heavily favor active ROK-PRC interactions, and overwhelmingly view China as a positive economic and diplomatic force on the Korean peninsula.⁷⁹ Recently, South Korean leaders actively began to

⁷⁷ Kook-Shin Kim, "Political Future of the Korean Peninsula: A New Challenge to Unification Strategies," *International Journal of Korean Studies* V, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2001), 150.

⁷⁸ Sing Yimin, "China and North-East Asia's Regional Security," *North-East Asian Regional Security* (Japan: The United Nations University Press, 1997), 51-52.

⁷⁹ Norman D. Levin, Yong-Sup Han, The Shape of Korea's Future [Book Online] (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999); available from: <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1092/>; Internet; accessed 15 Mar 2002.

engage China on several levels. In 1997, Asia experienced sharp economic reversals, triggered by the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997. Following the Asian financial crisis, the developing Chinese market, with record-breaking growth and tremendous potential continues to provide an excellent opportunity for South Korea to relieve its IMF bailout situation. As the ROK looks for profitable markets, South Korean industries find the promising Chinese market increasingly more attractive than American or Japanese markets, where South Korea has struggled with the persisting trade deficits.⁸⁰ The increased strength of the PRC-ROK economic relationship was again exemplified in 2001, as direct investment in China by South Korea rose in 2001, while dropping in the United States over the same period.⁸¹ Hyundai Motor, one of the South Korean corporate giants, plans to invest \$250 million in a joint-venture manufacturing plant near Beijing.⁸² In addition, in the current international political situation, South Korean leaders often have found the PRC more helpful in facilitating inter-Korean reconciliation than other countries. As part of the Chinese attempt for regional security, Beijing has taken a proactive role in maintaining inter-Korea peace, especially by encouraging North Korea to adopt the Chinese style of multilateralism.

Following President Kim Dae Jung's inauguration in 1997, he implemented his North Korean policy called the "sunshine policy". The primary goal of the sunshine policy was peaceful coexistence, eventually leading to ultimate reunification. The three principles President Kim laid out as a foundation for his policy were: no tolerance of military provocation by North Korea, no attempt by South Korea to absorb the North, and an active promotion by the South of reconciliation and cooperation with the North. In another aspect of the sunshine policy, President Dae Jung urged both the United States and Japan to proceed with their respective rapprochement with the DPRK without having to consider inter-Korean relations as a necessary condition.⁸³ The intent of the sunshine

⁸⁰ For more information on the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, see: *Asian Economic Trends and Their Security Implications* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999).

⁸¹ "Korean Investment in China Up, US Down," *Asian Times Online* [Online], 7 February 2002; available from: <http://www.atimes.com/koreas.DB07Dg01.html>; Internet, accessed 12 Feb 2002.

⁸² Louis Hau, "South Koreans Fall for all Things Chinese," *The Christian Science Monitor* [Online], 19 March 2002; available from: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0319.p07s02-woap.htm>; Internet, accessed 21 Mar 2002.

⁸³ Jung-Hoon Lee, "Project Analysis and Policy Recommendations: Strengthening US-South Korea-Japan Trilateral Relations," *A CSIS International Security Program Report* (Washington DC: Center for

policy was to increase confidence between the two countries and improve the political and economic conditions of the DPRK by reducing military tension and increasing economic and social exchanges.

Currently South Koreans still maintain support for the underlying principal of the sunshine policy, which called for the ROK to embrace and support the DPRK in order to build trust and peace. However, many argue the national interests of the ROK should not come second to the policy. Furthermore, the Kim Dae Jung administration's perceived appeasement toward North Korea decreased the efficacy of the sunshine policy to critics because it has come to lack adaptability to reality, flexibility, and efficiency.⁸⁴

The implementation of the sunshine policy and subsequent break-through in North-South dialogue again demonstrated the importance of Korean reconciliation to the ROK, as illustrated by the meeting of President Kim Dae Jung and General Secretary Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in June 2000. At the summit, the region's past tensions seemed to give way to a new cooperation. This historic summit was the first meeting of the leaders of the two countries since the end of the Korean War.⁸⁵ The Chinese played a large behind-the-scene role in the orchestration of the summit. Within a little more than two months, North and South Korea agreed to build roads and railways across the DMZ, re-establish a liaison office in a village in the DMZ, and complete a series of visits between family members, an event that has not occurred for nearly fifty years.⁸⁶ In some respects, China encouraged North-South dialogue as a countermeasure to strong influence by the United States on the Korean peninsula. The Chinese believed the ramifications of the inter-Korean summit would likely alter the dynamics of Northeast Asia's geopolitical balance. Furthermore, many in South Korea hold the view that the ROK government should utilize the PRC and Russia to coax North Korea to participate as a member of international society, and to encourage it to adopt a flexible response

Strategic Studies, August 2001), 4.

⁸⁴ Song Chin Hok, "No Sunshine on a One-Way Street," *Joong Ang Ilbo* [Online], dated 11 Jul 2002, available from: <http://english.joins.com/article.asp?aid=20020711103239&sid=G00>, Internet; accessed 14 Aug 2002.

⁸⁵ "Kim Dae Jung: Nobel Peace Prize Laureate," *The Nobel Prize Archive* [Online], available from: <http://almaz.com/nobel/peace/2000a.html>, accessed 14 Aug 2002.

⁸⁶ Kent E. Calder, "The New Face of North East Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, (January/February 2001), 106-7.

toward the resumption of North-South and DPRK-US dialogue. In this aspect, the ROK government continuously maintains bilateral ties with each of the four major powers, in order ease tension and establish peace on the Korean peninsula.⁸⁷

Under the Clinton administration, the United States was poised for a breakthrough with North Korea. The Clinton administration strongly engaged the DPRK at the end of his tenure, as illustrated by several high-level visits between the two countries. Washington began a process of attempting to normalize relations with Pyongyang in return for concessions on missile development and sales, and the ceasing of its nuclear program. President Clinton seemed to be prepared to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in December 2000 and hammer out an accord to compensate the isolated state for curtailing its missile program. This was again demonstrated by Secretary Madeline Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2001. During the visit, Kim Jong Il offered to curb missile defense in exchange for foreign aid to compensate for lost income from missile exports.⁸⁸ However, due to the debacle surrounding the 2000 presidential election results, pre-negotiations broke down and the Clinton visit never occurred. Since the inauguration of the current Bush administration, the relationship between the United States and the DPRK abruptly changed.

Currently, the PRC is one of the few countries that regularly exerts influence over the domestic and foreign policies of the DPRK. Since the end of the Cold War, the PRC has retained significant influence on the DPRK while developing relations with the ROK at the same time. In addition, Beijing has been quite willing to persuade Pyongyang to respond to Seoul's courtship, which turned out to be significantly effective in bringing about the June 2000 inter-Korean summit. Kim Jong Il again illustrated the durability of their lasting relationship in 2001 after his two visits to the PRC. Although Kim discussed various issues with Chinese leaders, one focus of his visit was to examine China's economic reforms. While in China, Kim paid visits to the Shanghai stock market, and branches of foreign-invested joint ventures. Following the visits, Kim reportedly began

⁸⁷ Kim Kwi Kun and Kwon Kyong Pok, reprinted as "New Year's Special: North-South Relations by Ko Yu Hwan," *Seoul Yonhap News* (20 December 2001), translated by FBIS-EAS-20011221000008, 21 Dec 2001.

⁸⁸ Murray Hiebert, "The Bush Presidency: Implications for Asia," *Asia Society Publications* [Online], January 2001, available from: http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/update_bush.html; Internet, accessed 27 Aug 2002.

to consider adopting market-style economic reforms and opening the North Korean economy. However, many hard-line critics argue that Kim was only taking these measures to preserve his autocratic rule, and that liberal democracies should refuse to deal with Pyongyang.⁸⁹ Therefore, only time will tell how and if North Korea will be able to implement and sustain market reforms.

Since the historic 2000 summit between Seoul and Pyongyang to the present, North Korea has continuously blamed the stalled talks with the South on the United States. The current Bush administration has not been as willing as its predecessor to engage North Korea actively, differentiating its approach by toughening Washington's stance toward the Kim Jong Il regime.⁹⁰ Professor Ko Yu Hwan, Tongguk University, argued that the United States, following the inauguration of President Bush, was a contributing factor to the breakdown of relations between North and South Korea. He stated the demonstration of "skepticism" by the United States about the North Korean leader, the pursuit of a hard-line policy against North, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack, and the war on terror all served to amplify North Korea's sense of crisis.⁹¹ Furthermore, President Bush's January 2002 State of the Union address exemplified Washington's stance by including North Korea in the "axis of evil," as part of the United States-led global war on terrorism.⁹² Since the DPRK recognizes that Washington is not eager to improve relations, they resumed a hard-line approach against both the United States and the ROK.⁹³

⁸⁹ Daniel A. Pinkston, "DPRK Economic Reforms and U.S. Security Policy in Northeast Asia," *Nautilus Institute* [Online], available from, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0102B_Pinkston.html; Internet, accessed dated 20 Feb 2001.

⁹⁰ Tim Shorrock, "Is George W Ignoring George Sr's Advice on Korea," *Asian Times Online* [Online], dated 16 February 02; available from: <http://www.atimes.com/koreas.DB16Dg02.html>; Internet, accessed 19 Feb 2002.

⁹¹ Kim Kwi Kun and Kwon Kyong Pok, reprinted as "New Year's Special: North-South Relations by Ko Yu Hwan," *Seoul Yonhap News* (20 December 2001), translated by FBIS-EAS-20011221000008, 21 Dec 2001.

⁹² 2002 Presidential State of the Union Address, White House [Online], 29 January 2002; available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>; Internet, accessed 7 Jun 2002.

⁹³ For more information on the ramifications of the "axis of evil" categorization in the State of the Union, see: *JoongAng Ilbo*, "Promote Diplomacy to Ease Tension," *Korea Focus* 10, no. 1 (January-February 2002), 29-30.

After the “axis of evil” speech, the United States and ROK views on inter-Korean reconciliation continue to diverge, as strong criticism arose from South Korea. One view expressed by many South Koreans concerned the inconsistency of United States policy, especially in the Cold War era in comparison to recent events. Specifically, during the Cold War, South Korea suffered several terrorist attacks by North Korea, however, Washington called for “self-restraint” on the part of Seoul as not to disrupt the East-West détente. During the war on terrorism, similar to the United States during the Cold War, many South Koreans cautioned Washington not to overreact in its interaction with North Korea.⁹⁴ While the United States-ROK relationship became more strained when dealing with inter-Korean issues, the relations between the ROK and the PRC continued to improve.⁹⁵

In response to this new hard line approach, North Korea appeared to not only pull away from negotiations with the United States, but also derailed ongoing efforts to reconcile with South Korea. However, North Korea did maintain the moratorium on missile launches that it declared in 1999 and continued to abide by the Agreed Framework, still the only recent agreement it has with the United States. Late in the summer of 2001, the Bush administration attempted to revive negotiations by dropping its preconditions, but North Korea did not respond. In the spring of 2002, the Bush administration asserted that it would not certify North Korea as abiding by the 1994 agreement designed to freeze its nuclear weapons program.⁹⁶ Unfortunately, the reality is that North Korea perceives the United States’ first strike nuclear policy and the conventional force presence in the South as a potential threat to its survival. Additionally, even to this day both the United States and North Korea have been slow in honoring the key provisions of the 1994 freeze agreement. Therefore, if Washington and Seoul want North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons option, they must be prepared

⁹⁴ Paik Jin-hyun, “Key Issues at South Korea-U.S. Summit,” *Korea Focus* 10, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 2002), 27-28.

⁹⁵ For more information on the ramifications of the “axis of evil” categorization in the State of the Union, see: *JoongAng Ilbo*, “Promote Diplomacy to Ease Tension,” *Korea Focus* 10, no. 1 (January-February 2002), 29-30.

⁹⁶ Peter Slevin, “North Korea Not Following Nuclear Pact, US to Say,” *Washington Post*, 20 March 2002 [Online]; available from: <http://ebird.dtic.mil/mar2002/e20020320nkorea.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 Mar 2002.

to create a common negotiating position capable of persuading North Korea to forgo that option. The principal question then becomes how likely is a compromise between North Korea and the United States and how will it affect the overall relationship between the United States, China and both Koreas?

III. PATHS TO UNIFICATION

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the division of Korea ceased to be an imperative dictated by the logic of a greater global struggle. However, the Korean peninsula remained divided. Conditions in North Korea have increased its diplomatic isolation and mounting economic problems, and call into question the state's continued viability.⁹⁷ External involvement within the unification process, either working in support of peaceful unification or acting as a hindrance, will subsequently shape each state's respective relationship with a post-unified Korean state. The United States, more than any other state, can work to ensure that the unification process will be peaceful and that Korea's subsequent reintegration will succeed. Regrettably, Washington's policies regarding the Korean peninsula have been plagued by miscommunication and missed opportunities.⁹⁸

In the absence of American support of reunification, the Korean peninsula will look to other countries to provide assistance. Currently, the PRC is the only other major power with both the motives and the means to facilitate the reconciliation process leading to the reunification of Korea. For several years, China has supplied the DPRK with substantial economic and political support. Furthermore, China has an obvious incentive to avoid instability because it shares a border with Korea. In the end, any one of the four Pacific powers (United States, China, Japan and Russia) may not be able to object to reunification if the two Koreas agree to carry it out peacefully and democratically. Therefore, assuming the eventual integration of the Korean peninsula will occur, the pace and paths leading to reunification will certainly affect the foreign policy options of the new Korean state.

Following the end of the Cold War between the two superpowers, the events of 1991-92 in Korea held the promise for an eventual reunification of the peninsula. Ensuing from the policy of "northern politics" implemented by President Roh, on 13 December 1991, North and South Korea signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-

⁹⁷ Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Unification (New York, M.E. Sharpe: 1995), xxiv.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, xxv.

aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation.⁹⁹ Furthermore, the acceptance by Pyongyang of IAEA inspections and the initiation of high-level talks with Washington fostered the hope of normalized relations between the United States and North Korea, one that would contribute to the eventual unification of the peninsula. The reunification of Germany in 1992 also inspired South Korea with the hope the peninsula would soon reunify peacefully. Unfortunately, the resistance of the DPRK to IAEA inspections halted the conciliatory advances between the ROK and DPRK. Additionally, the chronic economic problems of the DPRK and the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 increased speculation that the door to the unification of Korea would be opened similar to Germany, through the collapse of the communist government. Obviously, the DPRK did not collapse. As time went on, the political, social and economic costs of West Germany integrating the East decreased the ROK's desire for quick reunification, reinforced by the ramifications of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the unification of Germany increased North Korean consternation concerning the perceived desire for absorption by the South following a collapse of the Communist regime.

It would no doubt be preferable if a transformation in the North unfolded gradually and free of major violence or internal upheaval, enabling a systematic process of peninsular integration and diminished levels of military confrontation.¹⁰¹ The sunshine policy implemented by President Kim Dae Jung reaffirmed South Korea's desire for a protracted period of peaceful coexistence between the DPRK and ROK by maintaining the status quo of two Korean states in order to forestall the collapse of North Korea, build up the North's economy, and improve relations between the two states.¹⁰² Additionally, the historic June 2000 summit held between North and South Korea illustrated the desire for gradual reconciliation and again triggered the hope for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas.

⁹⁹ "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation," [Online], signed 13 December 1991, available from: <http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/korea-agreement.htm>; Internet, accessed 13 Aug 2002.

¹⁰⁰ Michael H. Armacost, "The Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Northeast Asian Affairs," *Brookings Northeast Asia Survey, 2001* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2002), 14.

¹⁰¹ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), xiii.

¹⁰² Michael H. Armacost, "The Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Northeast Asian Affairs," *Brookings Northeast Asia Survey, 2001* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2002), 15.

When evaluating a reunified Korean state's foreign policy possibilities, it is important to examine the different paths leading to reunification due to the complex nature of inter-Korean and each Korea's relationship with the Pacific powers. While the road remains unclear, one thing remains certain: the onset of unification will definitely constitute one of the most decisive changes in Northeast Asia since the outbreak of the Korean conflict.

In late 1996, then CIA Director John Deutch testified before the United State Senate that the DPRK had three options in the years ahead: it might "invade the South over one issue or another; it could lead over time to some peaceful resolution and reunification with the South; or it will collapse internally or implode because of the incredible economic problems the country faces."¹⁰³ Many different unification scenarios exist, however, only four predominant alternatives will be examined within the confines of this thesis, drawing mainly on the 1997 *RAND* Study "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication." While there is a possibility of the DPRK maintaining control over the Korean peninsula following reunification, most studies agree the maintenance of a state similar to the ROK is far more likely. Therefore, the scenarios examined within this chapter begin with the premise of the North's integration into the South.

The first two scenarios are the most likely to occur, and therefore, the most acknowledged and studied. The first scenario of peaceful integration occurs through conciliatory measures leading to the integration and peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. The onset of peaceful unification through integration is vastly preferable because the transformation of the North would occur gradually and be free of any major violence or internal upheaval, enabling a step-by-step process of peninsular integration.¹⁰⁴ The second scenario of absorption occurs through the collapse of the DPRK and the assimilation into the ROK. Many states in the international community, including the United States and the PRC, as well as the Kim Dae Jung administration have consistently declared no desire for the South to absorb the North. However, the

¹⁰³ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Korea," *Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose 2001-02*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research: 2001) 136.

¹⁰⁴ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), xiii.

instability within the North may act independent of the preferences of the ROK and the international community.¹⁰⁵ The third scenario -- reunification through conflict -- would occur through the onset of an overt military action between North and South Korea. The likelihood of this scenario stems from the continuous investment by North Korea in major conventional and nuclear modernization programs, despite the South's endeavors to close the gap in various military capabilities.¹⁰⁶ The fourth scenario of external intervention examines the possibility of the DPRK's disequilibrium and the potential intervention by foreign powers.

A. INTEGRATION AND PEACEFUL UNIFICATION

For the ROK and the four major Pacific powers, peaceful unification through integration would occur through the implementation of confidence-building measures, major threat reduction activities, and the onset of comprehensive political and social reconciliation between the two Koreas. However, the acute ideological, political, and security animosities in place between the divided Korea for a half-century increases the difficulty in integrating the two states.¹⁰⁷ Before peaceably creating a unified Korean government, the two Koreas will not only have to come to terms politically at the highest level, but mutual confidence and agreement must also be reached at all other levels.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, further economic decline of the DPRK would make integration of the two Korea's even more difficult and costly. As such, the recent overture of Pyongyang to incorporate a type of market reform is a significant step toward possible future peaceful unification.¹⁰⁹ Finally, external intervention by the major powers, especially the United States and PRC, influences inter-Korean dynamics, and will ultimately affect the path of Korean unification.

The sunshine policy implemented by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung illustrated his desire for peaceful unification by creating a favorable environment in

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 67.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 50.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 54-55.

¹⁰⁹ John Larkin, "North Korea: Mysterious Reform," *Far Eastern Economic Review* [Online], dated 8 August 2002, available from: <http://www.feer.com/cgi-bin/prog/printeasy>; Internet, accessed 8 Aug 2002.

which North Korea can change through dialogue and cooperation with the outside world, while still maintaining national security. The main idea of the sunshine policy can be categorized by three elements – peace, reconciliation, and cooperation – and is aimed at removing the political and military tension on the Korean peninsula.¹¹⁰ The sunshine policy is designed to create a unified Korean state in which democratic ideals are guaranteed and a prosperous market economy flourishes by a gradual implementation of an integration process. As stated by Kim Dae Jung, the unification process would ideally undergo three steps: the settlement of peace and reconciliation, establishment of a North-South confederation, and finally a unified state.¹¹¹

During the accommodation and integration phase, peaceful coexistence would have to first be established and would subsequently lead to the diminution and elimination of North Korea's military threat to the ROK.¹¹² To achieve this, both states must undergo a change in attitudes and assumptions about the other and implement a series of steps allowing for structural changes.¹¹³ The major distinguishing characteristics of the integration phase are agreement and compliance, which are essential during and after unification. Agreement must be reached at all levels of both systems before the creation of a functioning unified government can occur. To do so, both Koreas would first have to accept each other as full negotiating partners and as equal legal entities before commencing negotiations that would potentially lead to a mutually binding political settlement.¹¹⁴

Politically, this would include adherence to the previously signed South-North accords, mutual recognition across political institutions, routinized high-level exchanges including summit meetings, and the abrogation of national security and espionage laws within both Koreas. Additionally, it would be essential for the citizens in both Koreas to

¹¹⁰ Keun-Sik Kim, "Inter-Korean Relations and the Future of the Sunshine Policy," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* XVI, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002), 99.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 101.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 50-51.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 51.

engage in political activities in North and South Korea.¹¹⁵ The recent overtures made by both North and South Korea to reinstate talks potentially foreshadows eventual reconciliation under this scenario. After nine months of deadlock, ministers of the two Koreas held the 7th North-South Ministerial Talks in Seoul between 12-14 August 2002. During the talks, the two sides confirmed their willingness to carry out the 15 June 2000 North-South declaration. Furthermore, the two states agreed to work toward the signing of a military security pact that would lead to the beginning of railway and road construction inside the demilitarized zone along the border.¹¹⁶ Following the talks, on 19 September 2002, North and South Korea opened parts of their heavily fortified border to remove land mines, in conjunction with the project to reconnect railways and roads that were cut half a century ago. A cross-border road is scheduled to be reconnected as early as November 2002, and a cross-border railway built by the end of the year.¹¹⁷

Militarily, security measures would have to be implemented, including the cessation of diplomatic competition between the two Koreas and of all military activities construed as provocative or offensive, the acceptance of prenotification and mutual observation of military exercises, and fully verifiable force reductions. Additionally, during the reconciliation process, both governments would need to create and agree to a replacement of the 1953 Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace treaty.¹¹⁸ Finally, unified security and military policies would have to be implemented under a single sovereign entity, which would focus on countering potential regional instability and preventing the domination of the region by a single power.¹¹⁹

Socially and economically, both Koreas would have to increase the freedom of movement and travel within and between the two Koreas and abroad, cease government censorship and propaganda, and allow citizens of both states to enroll freely in schools

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 53.

¹¹⁶ “Joint Press Release of the 7th Ministerial Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks,” *Ministry of Unification* [Online], dated 14 August 2002, available from: <http://152.99.76.131/en/>; Internet, accessed 4 Sep 2002.

¹¹⁷ “Korean Remove Landmines,” *Washington Post* [Online]; dated 20 September 2002, available from: <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sep2002/e20020920koreas.htm>; Internet, accessed 23 Sep 2002.

¹¹⁸ “Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications,” *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 52-54.

¹¹⁹ This was recognized before the “sunshine policy” was launched. For an example see: Jonathan D. Pollack, and Young Koo Cha, A New Alliance For the Next Century: The Future of U.S. – Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica: RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, 1995), 38.

and educational institutes. Furthermore, both Seoul and Pyongyang would need to decouple economic exchanges from reciprocal political measures, create constitutional and legislative changes that would allow for unconstrained economic activity between North and South Korea and make currencies fully convertible between both Koreas.¹²⁰

Korean relations with external powers will also play a contributing role in the peaceful reunification process. The relationship between the DPRK and the United States has been a fundamental factor affecting bilateral Korean relations and the reconciliatory progress. In order for the North Korean regime to participate in the reconciliatory process, the DPRK would have to be allowed unconditional participation in the four-party talks, unhindered construction of the light-water reactors under KEDO should occur, and full compliance is necessary by both North Korea and the United States with the Agreed Framework. Furthermore, the establishment of diplomatic ties between North Korea and both the United States and Japan would play a fundamental role in the integration of the Korean peninsula, as seen by the Trilateral Coordination Group (TCOG).¹²¹ The normalization of Tokyo's relations with North Korea would potentially bring Pyongyang economic aid, expanded trade, private investment flows and end Japan's opposition to North Korean membership in international financial institutions.¹²² On 17 September 2002, the Japanese leader, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, paid a one-day visit to Pyongyang in an effort to smooth bilateral relations and possibly pave the way to formal diplomatic ties. No Japanese leader had ever visited North Korea and previously relations between the two countries have often been rocky.¹²³

In addition to the United States and Japan, Chinese influence on the peninsula is essential to the process of peaceful unification. The influence of the PRC on the DPRK has been prevalent in the media recently, speculating about North Korea adopting market reforms similar to China. The reforms being implemented by Kim Jong Il have been

¹²⁰ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 53-54.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹²² Michael H. Armacost, "The Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Northeast Asian Affairs," *Brookings Northeast Asia Survey, 2001* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2002), 22.

¹²³ Robert Marquard, "Historic Parley in Pyongyang," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 September 2002, 6.

hailed as the most radical blueprint for pro-market economic reform in North Korea's history, and they are essential to decreasing the costs of unification under this scenario.¹²⁴ After a half-century of economic control so complete that even cash had fallen into disuse, North Korea has begun introducing the most significant liberalization measures since the start of communist rule. After two trips to China and Russia in 2001, Lim Dong-won, a South Korean presidential advisor on national security and foreign policy, reported that Chairman Kim Jong Il issued directives for the reform of economic management. He further described the move as similar to the early days of China's economic reforms.¹²⁵

Operating in his typically secretive manner, Kim Jong Il has issued no major statements explaining the changes. However, according to Western diplomats who live in Pyongyang, North Korean workers confirm that they have received as much as a 20-fold increase in their wages, while prices for commodities, including rice, have increased by as much as 30 times since the measures were introduced in July 2002.¹²⁶ Although Chairman Kim has not issued a statement regarding the reforms, *Chosun Shinbo*, a pro-North Korean publication in Japan, corroborated the report of changes in North Korea.¹²⁷ While the market reforms appear promising, many are skeptical about the similarity of policies between the two countries. One significant difference is the Chinese goal of setting aside politics and changing the economy, versus the North Korean goals of reform, which are to fix the negative side effects of the state-planned economy.¹²⁸ Only

¹²⁴ See John Larkin, "North Korea: Mysterious Reform," *Far Eastern Economic Review* [Online], dated 8 August 2002, available from: <http://www.feer.com/cgi-bin/prog/printeasy>, Internet, accessed 8 Aug 2002.

¹²⁵ "North Korea Following Chinese Model," *JoongAng Ilbo* [Online], dated 25 July 2002, available from: <http://english.joins.com/article.asp?aid=20020725165457&sid=E00>, Internet, accessed 31 Jul 2002.

¹²⁶ Howard W. French, "North Korea Adding a Pinch of Capitalism to Its Economy," *New York Times* [Online], dated 9 August 2002, available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/09/international/asia/09KORE.html?ntemail1>, Internet, accessed 12 Aug 2002.

¹²⁷ Oh Dae-young, "Pro-North Newspaper Acknowledges Reform," *JoonAng Ilbo* [Online], dated 26 July 2002, available from: <http://english.joins.com/article.asp?aid=20020726230236&sid=200>, Internet, accessed 31 Jul 2002.

¹²⁸ Jung Chang-hyun and Lee Dong-hyun, "Economic Reforms in China, North Korea: Looks Can be Deceiving," *JoongAng Ilbo* [Online], dated 30 July 2002, available from: <http://english.joins.com/article.asp?aid=20020730164932&sid-F00>; Internet, accessed 31 Jul 2002.

time will tell how and if North Korea will be able to implement and sustain market reforms and how much it will affect the unification of Korea.

The role of China, motivated by a desire to avoid instability on its border, has not only been beneficial in influencing the DPRK's pro-market economic reforms, but also in promoting peaceful integration of the Korean peninsula. One reason Beijing is interested in facilitating improvements on the Korean peninsula and between the DPRK and the United States is that it would reduce the urgency with which the Bush administration has sought to deploy ballistic missile defenses, a plan opposed by Beijing. Since the PRC has supplied the DPRK with substantial economic and political support for years, it is affected by the economic decline in North Korea and is therefore keen on persuading Pyongyang to adopt reforms that would make its government less dependent on outside aid and create market-oriented reforms.¹²⁹

To peacefully integrate the Korean peninsula under this scenario, it is essential for both Koreas to find common ground and reach an agreement about a peaceful reunification path. Political, social, military, and economic factors will all contribute to the reconciliatory period leading up to unification. Additionally, international support will act as a critical variable for lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and future unification.

B. COLLAPSE AND ABSORPTION

Another plausible scenario leading to the reunification of the Korean peninsula occurs through the collapse of the DPRK, defined as the inability of the regime in power to maintain effective political, economic, social, and military control, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the regime.¹³⁰ Furthermore, a collapse implies loss of government legitimacy and authority, widespread public confusion, the possibility of major civil discord, and perhaps a massive humanitarian crisis.¹³¹ Under this scenario, a systemic

¹²⁹ Michael H. Armacost, "The Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Northeast Asian Affairs," Brookings Northeast Asia Survey, 2001 (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2002), 21.

¹³⁰ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 57.

¹³¹ Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination (Seattle, National Bureau of Asian Research: 1999), 27.

economic failure in North Korea would precipitate the demise of the DPRK political structure and thereby end the post-1948 two-state framework in the Korean peninsula.¹³² With the end of the Soviet bloc's aid and subsidized trade and the inability to continue playing off the rivalry between the USSR and the PRC, the DPRK's extraordinarily militarized economy went into a tailspin it has yet to recover from.¹³³ The dire food and energy shortages North Korea is currently suffering have given rise to the scenario of unification centered on the presumed disintegration of North Korea and the absorption of a crumbling North by the South.¹³⁴ On the one hand, the economic difficulties of North Korea lead many to believe the collapse of the DPRK is inevitable.¹³⁵ On the other hand, such an implosion seems less likely now than it appeared during the early to mid-1990s, as demonstrated by the DPRK regime is staying in power.

The collapse of the communist regimes across Eastern and Central Europe that led to German unification prompted a surge of interest in the possibility of a similar situation on the Korean peninsula.¹³⁶ The German model of unification provides a useful analogy. However, there are many fundamental differences between the collapse of East Germany and the collapse of North Korea. Unlike Germany, the two Koreas fought a bloody war between 1950-53, creating hostilities on the peninsula that still currently exist. Additionally, East and West Germany agreed to simultaneous recognition in 1972, permitting full diplomatic relations and a quasi-normal political relationship for nearly two decades before unification. Lastly, when the East German ruling structure collapsed in 1990, the possibility of any armed hostilities between the Warsaw Pact and NATO had virtually ceased, which is not the case in North Korea.¹³⁷

¹³² Nicholas Eberstadt, "Korea," Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose 2001-02, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research: 2001) 131-132.

¹³³ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Korea," Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose 2001-02, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research: 2001) 131-132.

¹³⁴ Chae-Jin Lee, "Diplomacy After Unification: A Frame For Policy Choices in Korea," Korea: Dynamics of Diplomacy and Unification, ed. Byung Chul Koh, monograph series; no. 12 (Claremont: The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 2001), 162.

¹³⁵ P.H. Koo, "Resolving the North Korean Crisis: What Should be Done by the Business Community?" The Two Koreas and the United States: Issues of Peace, Security and Economic Cooperation, ed. Wonmo Don, (New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 2000) 267.

¹³⁶ See Goohoon Kwon, "Experiences with Monetary Integration and Lessons for Korean Unification," *International Monetary Fund Working Paper*, WP/97/65, May 1997.

¹³⁷ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy*

The unification of Korea under this scenario is not a preferred long-term solution for any state involved. The four Pacific powers all share concerns about the expense of keeping a viable Korean economic system afloat following a North Korean collapse, and the potential disruption to the current balance of power in Northeast Asia. Korean unification under this scenario would present greater prospects of a regional upheaval than in the case of Germany's unification, bringing tensions centered on the possible advent of intense economic and diplomatic rivalry with Japan and the rival historical suspicions of China, Russia, and Korea.¹³⁸ Domestically, since the South Korean economy was hit hard by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, and required massive assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the ROK's vulnerability has also slowed its desire for rapid national unification.¹³⁹

Undoubtedly, Kim Jong Il does not view unification through a collapse of the North Korea as a favorable option. Pyongyang views the historical example of German unification following the end of the Cold War as fraught with major risks to the survival of the North Korean regime. As such, the collapse of the Soviet Union following the implementation of the *perestroika* policy is not an endorsement for North Korea on the virtues and benefits of a North Korean-style *perestroika*.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, the North Korean dilemma, at least hypothetically, is that a fundamental transformation can occur only in the context of a sweeping regime change. Obviously, the current leadership under Kim Jong Il is unlikely to choose that path. Therefore, fundamental structural changes in North Korea would most likely not occur until all other policy options are exhausted and a systemic atrophy reaches unmanageable levels.¹⁴¹

The decisive factor leading to a collapse in North Korea would likely be economic, and the catalyst will be acute disaffection or pressures for change from somewhere or someone on top of the system. However, the desire for economic reform

Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 57-58.

¹³⁸ Chae-Jin Lee, "Diplomacy After Unification: A Frame For Policy Choices in Korea," Korea: Dynamics of Diplomacy and Unification, ed. Byung Chul Koh, monograph series; no. 12 (Claremont: The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 2001), 165.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 165.

¹⁴⁰ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 61.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 62.

is not the only vehicle for removing Kim Jong Il from power. A discontented leadership within the Korean People's Army (KPA) could also act as a vehicle in which to remove the current North Korean regime by pooling its resources together to remove Kim from power.¹⁴² Likewise, if a reversal of the DPRK's economic crisis does not transpire, another possibility leading to the collapse of the regime would occur through the ousting of Kim Jong Il by members of the elite that believed the survival of the North Korean system was at stake.¹⁴³ Under this scenario, the people most victimized would be the general population of North Korea. Furthermore, a humanitarian catastrophe in North Korea, arising from the declining economic situation, has the potential to spark civil disorder and massive immigration into the neighboring countries and would raise major questions about who is in control of North Korea's nuclear materials while all this is occurring.¹⁴⁴

Although the indicators for detecting an imminent major political or military crisis are limited due to the closed nature of the system, certain signals could be likely precursors to more ominous developments. An increase in North Korean defectors to neighboring countries, sudden shifts in the leadership hierarchy, and oblique criticism of Kim Jong Il's legitimacy and rule would signal a weakening of the political ties. Socially and economically, a continued decline in grain harvests and increased requests for food and related humanitarian assistance, an increased crackdown on crimes, and an increased surveillance of hostile classes would signal the downward spiral of the regime and the attempt to maintain control over an increasingly dissatisfied state. Military and security indicators include a growing militarization of the party through allotment of key party posts to senior military officers, unexpected or unusual military appointments, and withdrawal from four-party talks and negotiations regarding counter proliferation.¹⁴⁵

In May 2001, a DPRK official admitted that hundreds of thousands of North Koreans had died in the country's famine. The true mortality toll in this famine is

¹⁴² Ibid., 65.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 59-60.

¹⁴⁴ Michael H. Armacost, "The Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Northeast Asian Affairs," *Brookings Northeast Asia Survey, 2001* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2002), 20.

¹⁴⁵ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 62-64.

unknown, but the 2002 Worldwide Refugee Information country report on North Korea reported up to two million North Koreans, or nearly ten percent of the population, have died from hunger or famine-related disease since 1994; some mortality estimates range as high as 3.5 million.¹⁴⁶ Recent census data suggest that an estimate of one million deaths from North Korea's population of twenty-some million would not be unreasonable.¹⁴⁷

It is interesting to note that the shock of this catastrophic famine was not sufficient, in and of itself, to unsettle North Korea's leadership, to destabilize the state, or to subvert the system, which brings out two points. First, even though the famine entailed massive loss of life, the food scarcity was not so severe as to provoke a regime-threatening internal political crisis. Moreover, leaders in Pyongyang never found the food scarcity so pressing that they had to deny vital resources to the key pillars upon which the regime's power rests, specifically the military, security systems and top echelons of the party. Secondly, North Korea was able to prevent an economic collapse, mainly through skillful, assiduous and sometimes extortive aid-seeking diplomacy.¹⁴⁸

The assistance provided by the major powers has been and remains an essential factor in moderating the crisis in North Korea. Over the past six years, North Korea secured millions of tons of multilateral food aid from the UN's World Food program, supplies primarily financed by United States government donations. North Korea has also elicited bilateral food transfers from the governments of Japan and the ROK. Moreover, North Korea's aid diplomacy has enabled the regime to negotiate, free of charge, energy supplies from Western sponsors, most significantly the 500,000 tons a year of heavy fuel oil that the United States has pledged to provide under the Agreed Framework.¹⁴⁹ The amount and type of assistance provided to the DPRK may prevent a collapse in the North, buying time for the possibility of peaceful reunification or at least influencing and possibly moderating the collapse. Preventing a North Korean collapse

¹⁴⁶ "Worldwide Refugee Information Country Report: North Korea," *United States Committee For Refugees* [Online], 2002, available from: http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/easia_pacific/north_korea.htm, Internet, accessed 16 Sep 2002.

¹⁴⁷ Daniel Goodkind and Loraine A. West, "The North Korean Famine and its Demographic Impact," *Population and Development Review* 27, no. 2 (June 2001), 219-38.

¹⁴⁸ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Korea," *Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose 2001-02*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research: 2001) 136.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 137.

would be beneficial to South Korea, which would inherit the consequences of a destabilized situation. In addition, economic assistance would benefit the North Korean populace, the true victims during the collapsing North Korean regime. It is therefore essential that the current North Korean economic crisis be closely watched by all states involved.

In addition to Western, Japanese and South Korean sources of aid, the DPRK still relies heavily upon economic assistance from China. It would appear, however, the Chinese leadership operates with a complex and opportunistic calculus when it comes to aid for North Korea. On the one hand, to the extent that it can do so, Beijing seems willing to transfer the burden of aiding North Korea to other countries and to reduce its own allocations accordingly. On the other hand, preventing a DPRK implosion or explosion and forestalling turmoil on China's Korean border appears to be a motivator for providing aid to Pyongyang. The Chinese leadership is reconciled to the DPRK's economic decline, but not to its collapse. China has implicitly assumed the role of donor of last resort for Pyongyang, to the extent that external resources can be sufficient to prevent a collapse in North Korea.¹⁵⁰

Not only does the PRC provide economic assistance to the DPRK through aid, it has also influenced the North Korean regime to pursue a quasi-Chinese style, economically driven foreign and domestic policies, potentially unleashing societal changes of the kind that have occurred within the DRPK. It is for this reason the reported implementation of Chinese-style market reforms in North Korea is significant. Regardless of whether or not the DPRK treads on the same path as the PRC, implementation of market reforms will likely increase Beijing's control over the Pyongyang.¹⁵¹

North and South Korea, and the four Pacific powers all recognize that integration through the collapse of the North Korean regime would create a pace of unification detrimental to the Korean peninsula. Therefore, to prevent the collapse of North Korea

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 138.

¹⁵¹ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 61.

from becoming a reality, it is essential that all parties involved monitor the economic situation of the DPRK to avoid a potentially costly reunification.

C. INTEGRATION THROUGH CONFLICT

In 1973, South Korean President Park Chung Hee stated that “we should guard against the theory that [unification] should be attained whatever the cost. What meaning would unification have, if what we united was just a heap of debris.”¹⁵² Despite unpredictable events in the following three decades, this statement continues to mirror the attitude of South Korea and the Pacific powers. The unification of Korea through conflict would occur if either regime, more than likely the North, decided to reunify the peninsula through military means or some other form of conflict, possibly destroying a majority of the peninsula. While unification under this scenario would likely occur after a North Korean military attack on the South, some Americans and South Koreans advocate a joint use of pressure against the North to bring about unification.¹⁵³ Especially given the current “war on terrorism,” and the possibility of its extension into Iraq, unification through military means instigated by the United States and/or South Korea is highly unlikely. The plausibility of the DPRK initiating a military conflict is derived from the continual investment by North Korea in major force modernization programs, despite evidence of systemic decline and even as the South endeavors to close the gap in various military capabilities.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, North Korean policies and practices account for most of the volatility within Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War, augmented by the inability of foreign analysts to thoroughly understand or predict with great accuracy North Korean behavior.

Despite North Korea facing increasingly problematic economic prospects, its primary military objectives appear to have changed little since the end of the Cold War. The DPRK continues to: (1) maintain the military capabilities needed to achieve

¹⁵² Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 232.

¹⁵³ For an example, see: Jim Doran, “Axis of Evil, Asian Division; Liberation of North Korea Should be the Goal,” *Weekly Standard*, 25 March 2002.

¹⁵⁴ “Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications,” *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 67.

strategic and operational surprise in wartime and to sustain strategic momentum so that break through operations can be successfully concluded before the arrival of major reinforcements; (2) prepare to utilize massive firepower against the Combined Forces Command (CFC) through its artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles; (3) seek to isolate Seoul and capture all air and naval facilities capable of supporting United States reinforcements and resupply efforts; (4) aim to neutralize ROK and United States air power; and (5) seek to foster widespread internal confusion and panic in the South Korean population. All of these are meant to create domestic pressure in the ROK for a settlement on terms advantageous to the DPRK.¹⁵⁵ A robust military arsenal allows North Korea to diminish its sense of strategic vulnerability stemming from the disparity between the North's dwindling economic assets and the South's economic capabilities and from the inability to substantially weaken the United States – ROK alliance.¹⁵⁶

It is difficult to speculate about Pyongyang's motivation, since North Korea has employed a policy of strategic deception since its creation. For example, the preparations for North Korea's surprise attack against South Korea in June 1950 remained secret because Pyongyang used diplomacy to help keep its target off guard, offering Seoul a new peace and unification initiative just a week before it launched its assault. North Korea's practice of strategic deception again occurred in early 1992, when the DPRK submitted falsified data to the IAEA about the status of its nuclear program after the initiation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's reputation for unpredictability and its ability to continuously utilize it is testimony to the success of this official government policy.¹⁵⁷

On the positive side, the danger on the Korean peninsula continues to recede, since the balance of powers on the peninsula has shifted toward South Korea and against the North. With more than twice the population, Seoul's economy is now at least 25

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 67-68.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 68.

¹⁵⁷ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Korea," *Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose 2001-02*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research: 2001) 135.

times as large as Pyongyang's.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, while devoting a declining percentage of its GDP to defense, South Korea is able to finance larger annual increases in its defense budget than the North can muster. Thus, the North is in no condition to initiate conflict and the South has no interest in doing so. Additionally, regardless of the differing interests possessed by the Pacific powers, all share an interest in avoiding a renewal of conflict or proliferation of nuclear weapons on the peninsula.¹⁵⁹ On a less positive side, the concerns about North Korea's nuclear proliferation persist, which prompted President Bush to include the DPRK in his "axis of evil" during the 2002 State of the Union address. While the 1994 nuclear framework agreement managed to freeze North Korea's nuclear activities, Pyongyang may have hidden away a small cache of weapons or weapon-grade material. Additionally, North Korea's links to terrorism remain a concern.¹⁶⁰

Conjectures about North Korean use of force arrive from two principal circumstances. First, Kim Jong Il could make an irrevocable decision to employ his military assets before they degrade further to exploit South Korea's internal preoccupations and to gain major political advantage for the North. Secondly, domestic instability in the North could precipitate political and military disintegration, which in turn could result in unauthorized applications of force or limited military probes by contending factions within the Korean People's Army (KPA).¹⁶¹ Reports of corruption among North Korean border guards and officials are a sign that the regime may be losing its grip, despite its efforts to maintain the current totalitarian infrastructure.¹⁶²

Rather than initiating an overt military attack or invasion on South Korea, the DPRK could engage in limited forms of military acts or continue to engage in overt terrorist acts, as seen throughout history. For example, in October 1983, a North Korean assassination attempt on the South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon,

¹⁵⁸ Michael H. Armacost, "The Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Northeast Asian Affairs," Brookings Northeast Asia Survey, 2001 (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2002), 18.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 20.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 72.

¹⁶² Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: Challenges for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 2000), 2.

Burma missed the president but killed 17 members of his cabinet. Additionally, a South Korean passenger jet was downed on 29 November 1987, after Kim Jong Il allegedly ordered North Korean agents to put a bomb on a South Korean airliner. All 115 people on board the Korean Airlines plane died.¹⁶³ The willingness of Pyongyang to continuously engage in terrorist acts is the reason the United States included it on the state-sponsored terrorism list.

Another possibility is for North Korea to embark on a series of incursions, including renewed efforts to undermine the Armistice Agreement and ad hoc missions similar to the submarine infiltration incidents of September 1996 and June 1998. The first submarine infiltration occurred on 18 Sep 1996, after a North Korean submarine infiltrated South Korean territory, coming aground along the coast of the East Sea. Among the 26 North Korean infiltrators 11 of them were allegedly executed by the AK rifle of their colleagues. Strangely, none of the victims carried an AK rifle.¹⁶⁴ A similar incident occurred in in June 1998, when a North Korean submarine was captured not far from the previous submarine infiltration.¹⁶⁵

Similarly, a change of the discord within the status quo relationship between the DPRK, and/or the ROK and the United States may adversely affect the standing of the DPRK military, economically, politically and socially. If the military felt threatened enough by the potential of elimination arising from the reconciliation of the two Koreas, it would be beneficial to maintain the tension. The recent Naval clash between the DPRK and ROK may be an example of the North Korean regime preparing for a future overt military clash against South Korea.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ Ronald Meinardus, "Terrorism, Summit Diplomacy, and North Korea," *Liberal Times* [Online], dated 19 October 2001, available from: http://www.fnfkorea.org/fnst_eng/Liberal%20Times/liberal/times69.html, Internet, accessed 12 Aug 2002.

¹⁶⁴ "North Korean Submarine Incident, September 1996: ROK's Position Regarding the Military Provocation Caused by the Infiltration of a North Korean Submarine" [Online], available from: <http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/korea/militref4.html>, Internet, accessed 12 Aug 2002.

¹⁶⁵ "South Korea Catches Suspected North Korean Sub," *CNN.com* [Online], dated 22 June 1998, available from: <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9806/22/s.korea.submarine/index.html>, Internet, accessed 12 Aug 2002.

¹⁶⁶ See: "South, North Korea Clash at Sea," *CNN.com* [Online], dated 30 June 2002; available from: <http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/29/korea.warships/>, Internet, accessed 21 Sep 2002.

A North Korean option aside from resorting to a full-scale war, or engaging in limited military or terrorist attacks include destabilization campaigns within South Korea, against the ROK and/or the United States. Within South Korea, the DPRK could provide support for radical student movements through discreet financial support, or attempt to influence public attitudes on unification, security, or the American presence on the peninsula. Under this scenario, the DPRK would attempt to trigger a massive collapse of the morale in South Korea and a decrease of support in the United States. In early 1983, North Korea launched an ultra-nationalistic, anti-American propaganda offensive designed to create social and political unrest. This campaign was designed to create social and political unrest in the South. Moreover, it capitalized on the increasingly anti-American sentiment in South Korea, in the wake of the 1980 civil uprising in Kwangju, suppressed in a bloody crackdown by U.S.-backed South Korea troops. Pyongyang sought to incite South Korean students and dissidents to anti-American actions, blaming the United States for the continuing territorial division and the resulting “agony and misery of the Korean people.”¹⁶⁷ Through clandestine publications, North Korea urged South Koreans of all walks to rise up in “anti-American, pro-independence” struggles. Subsequently, in August 1985, Pyongyang inaugurated an anti-American/ anti-ROK underground organization called the “South Korean National Democratic Front to be used as an instrument of propaganda, agitation, and disinformation against United States/ROK interests.”¹⁶⁸

Currently, it would not be difficult for the DPRK to inflame anti-American protests, which increased following the 13 June 2002 accidental deaths of two 13-year old South Korean girls hit by a U.S. Army convoy passing through their village.¹⁶⁹ Although the United States Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard apologized for the death of the girls, many South Koreans felt it was not enough.¹⁷⁰ Additionally, Washington’s

¹⁶⁷ Zachary Davis, Larry Niksch, Larry Nowels, Valdimir Pregelj, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Robert Sutter, “Korea: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Regarding Possible Normalization of Relations with North Korea,” *Congressional Research Service*, Report for Congress 94-933S, 29 November 1994.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Don Kirk, “Deaths In Korea Ignite Anti-American Passion,” *International Herald Tribune* [Online], dated 31 July 2002, available from: [http://www.iht.com/ihsearch.php?id=66236&owner=\(International%20Herald%20Tribune\)&date=20020801153515](http://www.iht.com/ihsearch.php?id=66236&owner=(International%20Herald%20Tribune)&date=20020801153515), Internet, accessed 31 Jul 2002.

¹⁷⁰ Lee Chul-jae, “U.S. Ambassador Apologizes for Deaths of Girls in June Accident,” dated 30 July

apologies have received little reporting in the South Korean press, which has prompted the United States command to issue a complaint over “inaccurate reports that have created false impressions in the [South] Korean public.”¹⁷¹

The political and economic indicators within the DPRK include an increase of hard-line senior military officers, accusations alleging ROK offensive actions directed against the North, and a primary emphasis on maintaining a war-sustaining economy. Furthermore, the North Korean regime could engage in exhortations by the top leadership to overcome economic difficulties through even greater ideological indoctrination, and a propagation of war preparations to maximize mobilization efforts. Socially, the DPRK could increase the control over internal population movements, and enhance surveillance of the citizens. The military indicators would include an abrogation of the Agreed Framework, and acceleration of training regimes for key military units, and an increase in North Korean activities near the Joint Security Area (JSA) and around missile sites.¹⁷² Although there is no indication of a likely North Korean attack on South Korea or any other type of military conflict, many of the indicators within the DPRK have been occurring throughout the last half-century.

The current war on terrorism occurring in Afghanistan and the rising potential of an attack on Iraq as of this writing could act as a catalyst for the North Korean military to attack the South. The United States for many years has been concerned about Pyongyang's support for international terrorism, thus including North Korea on its list of terrorism-sponsoring nations, with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria. It has been one of the major aims of North Korean diplomacy vis-à-vis the United States, to get off this incriminating list; therefore special attention was paid as to how Pyongyang reacted to the 2001 terrorist attacks against America. On more than one occasion, the North Koreans declared they reject "all forms of terrorism and any support of it". On the other

2002, *JoongAng Ilbo* [Online], available from: <http://english.joins.com/Article.asp?aid=20020730235022&sid=300>, Internet, accessed 31 Jul 2002.

¹⁷¹ Don Kirk, “Deaths in Korea Ignite Anti-American Passion”, *International Herald Tribune* [Online], dated 31 July 2002: [http://www.iht.com/ihsearch.php?id=66236&owner=\(International%20Herald%20Tribune\)&date=20020801153515](http://www.iht.com/ihsearch.php?id=66236&owner=(International%20Herald%20Tribune)&date=20020801153515), Internet, available from, accessed 31 Jul 2002.

¹⁷² “Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications,” *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 71-72.

hand, the communist regime condemned in clear terms the United States' military attacks against Afghanistan, warning that the "vicious circle of terrorism and retaliation may plunge the world into the holocaust of war."¹⁷³

If an overt military plan of attack were to occur, the DPRK would likely be acting independently of any support from the PRC and Russia. In fact, North Korea would most likely go to extreme measures to ensure operational security or non-disclosure of any planned military operations because both countries could seek to preempt an impending crisis on the Korean peninsula by high-level political pressure on Pyongyang and may engage in simultaneous consultations with the ROK and/or United States, informing them of the North Korean's actions. Ultimately, the execution of North Korean war plans under this scenario would entail extraordinary risks, with little possibility it would result in the end of the North Korean regime and unification of the peninsula with terms favorable to the ROK.¹⁷⁴

The devastation of the Korean peninsula following the Korean War eliminates the desire for the ROK or any of the Pacific powers to unify Korea through military force. In addition, the danger of war on the peninsula continues to recede following the power shift toward South Korea. However, the only hope North Korea currently possesses to unify Korea under its control is through military conquest. Furthermore, the DPRK's possible acquisition of nuclear weapons and potential power struggles within North Korea forces one to consider the possibility of integration of both Koreas through conflict in order to prevent its initiation.

D. DISEQUILIBRIUM AND EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

The fourth scenario examines an environment characterized by sustained disequilibrium but not necessarily chaos or conflict. Arguably, the most serious crisis on the Korean peninsula has been the possibility of an unexpected, internal crisis in North Korea that the current leadership does not have the capacity to manage. Such a crisis

¹⁷³ Ronald Meinardus, "Terrorism, Summit Diplomacy, and North Korea," *Liberal Times* [Online], dated 19 October 2001, available from: http://www.fnkorea.org/fnst_eng/Liberal%20Times/liberal/times69.html; Internet, accessed 12 Aug 2002.

¹⁷⁴ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 73.

could arise from the continued decline in North Korea's economic and energy capabilities, combined with a loss of cohesion, disintegration, or inability by the top leadership to impose central political control. Continuing under this circumstance, North Korean leadership may initiate a desperate and destructive policy response, it may lead to the possibility of economic collapse, or it may result in a transition in political power from the current regime to a new leadership.¹⁷⁵ However, another option would entail external intervention to avoid a collapsing or destructive North Korean state. The two predominant permutations under this scenario include: (1) a "hollowed out" North Korea, which would be a minimally functioning state for all practical purposes, on the edge of collapse or (2) a weakened North Korean state requesting and obtaining support from an external state, likely the PRC or United States, in order to forestall outright collapse. This is not to predict, however, that any of the Pacific powers are anticipating such an intervention.¹⁷⁶

The most likely external intervening power under this scenario would be China due to the enduring ties between the PRC and DPRK. The Chinese may intervene in the event that North Korea, despite a clear aversion to dependence on China, signals a readiness to "tilt" toward China in exchange for enhanced economic and political support. Also, China may consider an intervention if the indicators of instability in the North and its possible repercussions for stability and security in contiguous border areas of China convince Beijing that it must act to protect its own interests. It would be problematic for the PRC if the ROK and United States were to embark on a unilateral course of action to counter the instability in the DPRK, especially if Beijing believed it would undermine China's long-term political and security interests.¹⁷⁷

North Korea tottering on the brink of collapse poses a major policy dilemma for the PRC. If the Chinese leadership decided that the dissolution of the DPRK through collapse was inevitable, and that -- despite the historical affinities -- it was not in China's

¹⁷⁵ Scott Synder, "North Korean Crisis and American Choices: Managing U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," The Two Koreas and the United States: Issues of Peace, Security, and Economic Cooperation (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 246.

¹⁷⁶ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 75-76.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 76.

interest to prolong the state's existence, Beijing would most likely seek to contain the risks within the North Korean territory and ensure its strategic and economic interests in a unified Korea under the auspices of the ROK. Furthermore, China may attempt to dissuade the ROK and the United States from direct involvement in the North.¹⁷⁸ Alternatively, the PRC may significantly accelerate its cooperation and communication with the United States and ROK, enabling all three states to manage an endgame crisis in the North, while simultaneously reducing the risk of misperception or an overt clash of interests among them. Regardless, the PRC would have to prepare for the influx of refugees into China, the political and economic consequences of a unified Korea led by the ROK, the possibility of the United States maintaining troops in Korea following unification, and the ramifications of a strong American-Japanese security relationship in addition to a robust U.S.-ROK alliance.¹⁷⁹

Although an overt and massive Chinese intervention in North Korea akin to the Korean War is highly unlikely, the possibility of certain forms of intervention cannot be excluded given the past role of North Korea as a buffer zone for China and the socioeconomic implications of a highly unstable North Korea. China would likely want its actions to be purposeful and decisive because a protracted, inconclusive situation does not serve Chinese interests. Beijing has no incentive to take on an open-ended commitment. If North Korea were to rely on the PRC for support for an extended period, China may decide that a collapse, followed by absorption by the ROK, is a preferable alternative.¹⁸⁰

Additionally, if the PRC intervened with the assistance of the United States and/or Japan, China may either seek to ensure that any American forces deployed in Korea after unification would remain below the 38th parallel and that major U.S. strategic assets were not maintained on the peninsula; or China could seek to coax South Korea into signing a friendship treaty in return for China's tacit support for unification under ROK auspices, while seeking to limit the scope of future ROK-United States security collaboration.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 76-77.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.77

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 80.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

The important consideration is that China has both the capabilities and political-security equities to shape the ultimate outcome, and has few incentives to remain passive during the unification process.¹⁸²

The United States is another potential source of external intervention in the event of a drastically weakened North Korean state, possibly with the assistance of Japan. Due to the presence of American troops in the ROK, and the United States commitment under the Mutual Defense Treaty, conflict or instability on the peninsula would automatically involve U.S. troops, and would therefore require the attention of American policy makers at the highest level.¹⁸³ Unfortunately, anything less than overt conflict on the Korean peninsula does not appear to be a top priority for policy-makers. Not only do the United States and South Korea have differing priorities placed on maintaining stability versus facilitating a peaceful unification, there are debates within the United States on supporting a “soft-landing” for North Korea versus the belief that Washington should not attempt to save North Korean leaders from collapsing under the weight of its own failed policies.¹⁸⁴ Increasingly, many in Washington are adopting the view that enhanced deterrence is the answer to the North Korea dilemma, and the United States should cease propping up Pyongyang and let its inevitable collapse come sooner rather than later.¹⁸⁵

Absent a crisis in North Korea, Americans attention to Korean issues is usually sporadic and inconsistent. In many ways, the DPRK “state of crisis situation” has almost become normalcy for the United States, numbing American policymakers not only to the possibility that instability could potentially lead to conflict, but also raising questions about whether one exists at all – at least one that would require United States intervention. Similarly, North Korean tactics of brinkmanship and its zero-sum approach has created a “boy who cried wolf,” syndrome. Since there have been so many false alarms on the Korean peninsula, United States policymakers have either become immune to calls for crisis or have failed to discern between a real crisis and tactical attempts to

¹⁸² Ibid., 81.

¹⁸³ Scott Synder, “North Korean Crisis and American Choices: Managing U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” The Two Koreas and the United States: Issues of Peace, Security, and Economic Cooperation (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 246.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 250.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

create an atmosphere of crisis.¹⁸⁶ Unfortunately, the current war on terrorism and potential military intervention in Iraq will only amplify this phenomenon. This is not to discount American involvement in Korean unification, however, the PRC would likely play a larger role under this scenario.

E. SUMMARY

The “how” of Korean unification, not the “if” or “when” represents the most pressing and immediate challenge to policy-makers and analysts because the ultimate outcome will determine whether a unified Korea is able to move forward in a coherent way to shape its regional strategies and policies. In addition, unification raises several strategic issues, such as the orientation and policies of the new government, the composition of a post-unification military establishment, the economic priorities and policies it would undertake, and the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance.¹⁸⁷

The internal problems Korea will face following unification will vary depending upon the unification path pursued, and will affect all Pacific powers. If unification occurs through any means other than peaceful integration, a period of instability and possibly violence would occur. This is a concern to the United States given the large number military forces and civilians present in South Korea, and mindful of the weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, it would be more difficult for the United States to negotiate with a weakened Korean state on the nature of post-unification foreign policy options. A vulnerable and unstable Korea government would be more easily swayed by powerful neighbors, and might find it difficult to create a coherent foreign policy, especially one favorable to the United States.

Therefore, the central challenge of any future unification scenario on the Korean peninsula is the disparity between the ultimate objective and the means to achieve it. From the South Korean perspective, the desired outcome is the ultimate creation of a unified, democratic, and internationalist Korea. To the degree that United States has been intimately linked with the ROK since its creation, it appears to share this overriding

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 245-46.

¹⁸⁷ “Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications,” *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 83.

objective. However, as recent events unfold on the peninsula, especially since the initiation of the United States-led war on terrorism, it remains to be seen whether the ROK and United States will achieve full agreement on this fundamental goal. It is unlikely the United States has a hidden agenda for the Korean peninsula, however, the respective roles of Washington and Seoul in the unification process remains to be determined. Additional factors, such as the contribution of neighboring Japan, China and even Russia, provide for major and lasting consequences on the Korean peninsula.¹⁸⁸ Therefore, the path Korea embarks upon during the reunification of the peninsula will ultimately establish its foreign policy following unification.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 84.

IV. UNIFIED KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS

A post-unified Korea faces the choice between policies of alignment and nonalignment with the Pacific powers. Many believe a continuation of an alignment with the United States would be the most advantageous and viable option for the new Korean state. Likewise, many argue following the reunification of Korea, Northeast Asia will remain a region of ample and growing United States economic, political, and security interest. While Korea has many incentives to maintain close relations with the United States following unification, major uncertainties exist that will likely influence its foreign policy options. As such, a continuation of the U.S.-Korean security alliance cannot be assumed.

While the North Korean threat continues to plague the political and security considerations of South Korea, the ROK has no viable replacement for the United States-ROK security alliance. The American forces stationed in Korea reduce both the likelihood of war and the costs of defending the Republic.¹⁸⁹ However, it is apparent the ROK government has started to readjust its security role to lessen its independence on the United States and increase its multilateral ties. Because of the recent United States-led “war on terrorism” and the possibility of a military involvement in Iraq, the foreign policy options of a unified Korea are not a top consideration for Washington at this time. Moreover, since the categorization of North Korea as part of an “axis of evil,” tension between the United States and North Korea has worsened and increased the strain in the U.S.-ROK relationship. South Korean leaders are divided between those who agree with and others who object to President Bush’s remarks. Such divisiveness undermines peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and South Korean public support for the U.S.-ROK alliance.¹⁹⁰

After the elimination of the North Korean threat to the peninsula, a unified Korea will be able to redefine its foreign policy options. Consequently, Koreans may take

¹⁸⁹ Robert Dujarric, *Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 22.

¹⁹⁰ Editorial from *JoongAng Ilbo*, “Promote Diplomacy to Ease Tension,” *Korea Focus* 10, no. 1 (January-February 2002), 29.

advantage of the end of the North Korean threat to remove American military forces from Korea and achieve equidistance from the various powers in Asia.¹⁹¹ Alternatively, Korea may look to another Asian power, such as Japan or the PRC, to provide security and stability within the peninsula following unification. A unified Korea closely aligned with and under the protection of either China or Japan is sure to make the other regional powers uneasy. For this reason, President Kim Dae Jung currently attaches a high priority to simultaneous close relations with the four major powers and the continuation of a strong alliance relationship with the United States.¹⁹²

China's rapid economic advancement, its prospective emergence as a more fully developed major power, and its search for regional stability will absolutely factor into Korean foreign policy options. On one hand, the history of Chinese relations with its neighboring states may undermine the post-unification Sino-Korean relationship. Due to the previous tributary relationship between the two states, it is hard to believe the Chinese will interact in an equal partnership fashion that unified-Korea will no doubt demand.¹⁹³ On the other hand, following unification Korea may become a strong enough regional power to avoid regressing in its relations with China. As such, it would be detrimental for China to attempt to control Korea, which would no doubt generate an anti-Chinese reaction.¹⁹⁴

According to Kenneth Waltz in "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," the expected outcome of state interaction within the international system is the formation of a balance of power.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, states are unitary actors which, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and at a maximum, drive for universal domination.¹⁹⁶ A potential balance of power shift in any direction within Northeast Asia following unification

¹⁹¹ Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 23.

¹⁹² Ralph A. Cossa, "U.S. Asia Policy: Does an Alliance-Based Policy Still Make Sense," *Pacific Forum CSIS*, Issues and Insights No. 3-01, September 2001, 15.

¹⁹³ Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 43.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 44-45.

¹⁹⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," ed. Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 117.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 117.

concerns all of the Pacific powers, as well as both Koreas. Thus, the strategic calculations of a unified Korea and all the Pacific powers vary concerning the post-unification dynamics of the Korean peninsula and its subsequent regional implications.

Each of the Pacific powers regards the Korean peninsula as falling within its own strategic sphere. Moreover, Koreans have long recognized their own geographic and security predicament. Thus, the Korean peninsula is still seen by many as the most important security nexus within Northeast Asia. This is significant because the world's heaviest concentration of military and economic capabilities currently reside in Northeast Asia.¹⁹⁷ In addition, the contribution and influence of each country on the reconciliation process varies. Each state will differ in its interaction with the unified Korean state in the context of their historical legacies with the peninsula, as well as its prospective involvement in a unified Korea's future development. However, all countries involved do share one similarity: none has an incentive to see disorder or instability, either during the transition process or in the aftermath of unification.¹⁹⁸ Within this context one can begin an examination of unified Korea's foreign policy alternatives, and the subsequent regional implications.

A. ONE KOREA

The possibility exists following the unification of Korea that Korean nationalism might reassert itself against the United States, Japan, Russia and the PRC. In this context, the Koreans may choose to dissolve the security alliance with the United States after the removal of the North Korean threat of war and operate as an independent regional power. It would be beneficial for Korea to achieve independence from the United States and all of the regional powers to avoid being forced into choosing sides and tilting the regional balance of power toward one side or another. Furthermore, Korea may seek distance from the United States to avoid being drawn into America's perceived anti-Chinese policies. This does not mean that Korea would follow an anti-American

¹⁹⁷ Samuel S. Kim, "China, Japan, and Russia in Inter-Korean Relations," *Korea Briefing 2000-2001: First Steps Toward Reconciliation and Reunification*, ed. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 110.

¹⁹⁸ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 84.

policy, only that it would seek to avoid the occasionally suffocating embrace of the United States.¹⁹⁹ Obviously, if Korea decides to sever its alliance with the United States, Washington will have to accept this decision.²⁰⁰

Koreans possess a strong sense of nationalism and an understandable feeling that they have been subjected to unjust treatment for most of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, Korea after unification will still be a small country surrounded by two continent-sized nuclear powers, China and Russia, and an economic superpower, Japan. Therefore, maintaining a strategic balance of power within Northeast Asia will be a foremost goal of unified Korea. In addition to balance of power considerations, reunification will be a national victory for Korea, and Koreans may not want foreign troops to remain for long in their homeland.²⁰¹

Koreans have several reasons to be ambivalent about America and preserving the current security alliance following reunification. During the last century, despite the American perception that Koreans completely support the United State's role on the peninsula, Washington's inconsistent policy toward the Korean peninsula frequently diminished the support of the Korean people. Following the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, Washington acquiesced to Japan's dominance of Korea in exchange for the Japanese consent to the American occupation of the Philippines. In 1945, following the end of World War II, American bureaucrats cut the Korean peninsula in half without any Korean consultation, and made no great effort to apprehend Japanese guilty of war crimes against Koreans.²⁰² Additionally, in 1953, the United States unilaterally signed an armistice that prolonged the division of Korea, despite the opposition of President Syngman Rhee. The effects of these perceived American betrayals, combined with the current anti-American sentiment, decrease the likelihood of a Korean desire to maintain a U.S. military presence following reunification.

¹⁹⁹ Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 23-24.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 23.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 21.

²⁰² Ibid., 23.

Moreover, since Korea was freed from Japan in 1945, the ROK's military dependence on the United States has limited its sovereignty. Currently, a United States Army general sits at the top of the military chain of operational command of the South Korean armed forces in wartime. Additionally, the large compound occupied by the United States military in the center of downtown Seoul is a symbol of America's weight in Korean affairs. The fact that the United States defends the ROK does not mitigate the psychological scars caused by America's role in Korea throughout the past century.²⁰³

Whatever the benefits the ROK retains from a United States military presence on the peninsula, the forward deployed troops also brings a high cost to the South Korean hosts. As illustrated by the June 2002 protests over the two teenage girls killed by a United States military vehicle, the American presence has inadvertently damaged the property of and caused bodily injury to South Korean civilians. Likewise, when the behavior of young American soldiers in South Korea is less than exemplary and a South Korean law is broken, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) under which American troops serve in the ROK protects them from local prosecution if the alleged crimes carry a sentence of less than three years in prison.²⁰⁴ This type of provision undoubtedly strikes many South Koreans as coming close to the old colonial extraterritoriality.²⁰⁵ Following the reunification of Korea, would the free people of a stronger peninsula be willing to continue to pay this price?

Obviously, Pyongyang also has its own reasons for the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. In the wake of the June 2000 summit, the DPRK has a plausible argument against the American military troops stationed in South Korea if the two Koreas are moving toward reconciliation, undoubtedly a point also shared by many South Koreans. In May 2001, *Nodong Sinmun*, the official North Korean party newspaper wrote:

In the past, the United States said that the U.S. forces should be stationed in South Korea to deter our southward invasion...The North and South

²⁰³ Ibid., 22.

²⁰⁴ Kil Byung-ok, "White Paper on SOFA Highlights Unfairness of Korea-U.S. Agreement," *Korea Herald*, 8 Nov 2000.

²⁰⁵ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Korea," *Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose: 2001-02*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), 155.

have adopted an agreement on no aggression in the 15 June Joint Declaration. It is our steadfast stand to implement them to improve the inter-Korean relations and stabilize the situation on the Korean peninsula.²⁰⁶

A few weeks later, the official North Korean news agency KCNA expounded on the point:

The United States is left with no justification to claim any longer that the U.S. forces should stay in South Korea to “deter southward advance” of the Soviet Union and repel the “invasion of the South” by the North. The Soviet Union does not exist any more and the North and South of Korea adopted the historic June 15 Joint Declaration in which they stated their will to achieve the independence and peaceful unification of the country based on the basis of reconciliation and unity.²⁰⁷

Unfortunately, the exhilaration following the June 2000 summit meeting between North and South Korean leaders was soon overshadowed by North Korea’s violations of the 1994 agreement. Soon thereafter, North Korea decided to boycott the scheduled fifth round of ministerial talks with South Korea following the return of Kim Dae Jung from his visit to the United States. Since then, the relations between the United States and DPRK have not improved, and Pyongyang appeared to have strengthened its negotiation hand by consolidating relations with Russia and China.²⁰⁸ Furthermore, North Korea continues to improve its relations with Western countries aside from the United States, as illustrated by the high-level delegation of the European Union (EU) by Goeran Persson, president of the European Council and prime minister of Sweden, a first time visit to Pyongyang by an EU President.²⁰⁹ During the same period, North Korea deliberately froze inter-Korean relations and blamed the United States for the deadlock.

A unified Korean state acting as its own regional power would dramatically change the dynamics within Northeast Asia. A disintegration of the U.S. security alliance

²⁰⁶ Reprinted as “DPRK’s Nodong Sinmun Demands Withdrawal of U.S. Forces Stationed in the South,” *Nodong Sinmun* (28 May 2001), translated by FBIS-EAS-2001-0718, 19 July 2001.

²⁰⁷ Reprinted as “DPRK’s KCNA: U.S. Forces Pullback from South Korea Urgently Demanded by Times and Nation,” *KCNA* (18 Jul 2001), translated by FBIS-EAS-2001-0718, 19 Jul 2001.

²⁰⁸ Jinwook Choi, “The Impact of U.S.-North Korea Relations on Inter-Korean Relations,” *Korea and World Affairs* XXVI, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 178.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 179.

with South Korea following reunification may create a security vacuum in the area and recreate a modern day version of *realpolitik*, a recurring theme throughout Korean history. As such, some Korean politicians may argue that a reunified Korea choosing to maintain distance from all the Pacific powers in pursuit of its own regional strength should keep the North's missile and nuclear programs. Not to do so would leave Korea unilaterally disarmed against China, Russia, and Japan.²¹⁰ A 1999 survey conducted by RAND revealed that forty-six percent strongly agree and forty percent somewhat agree that if the United States-South Korean alliance is ended, South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, a majority of fifty-five percent strongly agree and thirty-two percent somewhat agree that South Korea should develop nuclear weapons if Japan does.²¹¹ Korean nuclearization, even if limited to discussion, would frighten Japan because it lacks a nuclear deterrent.²¹² Moreover, the Chinese would be affected because a unified Korea possessing nuclear weapons could prove a less cooperative neighbor than the two halves of a divided Korea that are focused on and compete for Chinese favor.²¹³

Without strong and continuing American support throughout the reunification process, it is possible the United States-Korean military alliance may decay or dissolve altogether following unification. The end to this alliance has the potential to set further strategic changes in motion throughout the region. Such potential change is the withdrawal of the United States military from South Korea, which would leave Japan as the single East Asian country basing American forces on its soil.²¹⁴ Furthermore, such an arrangement may not be acceptable to the Japanese electorate, which may also demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Washington's somewhat maladroit initiatives intended to stimulate inter-Korean rapprochement could actually trigger a series of unexpected and uncontrollable events, in which the United States would for the first time in over a half-

²¹⁰ C.S. Elliot Kang, "Korean Unification: A Pandora's Box of Northeast Asia," *Asia's Perspective* 20, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 1996) 9-43.

²¹¹ Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, The Shape of Korea's Future: South Korean Attitudes Toward Unification and Long-Term Security Issues (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 23.

²¹² Mike M. Mochizuki, Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 80

²¹³ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1997), 145.

²¹⁴ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Korea," Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose: 2001-02, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), 134.

century have no forward military presence in an East Asia region potentially containing several nuclear states.²¹⁵ In addition, an American military pullout from South Korea, not to mention all of East Asia, would naturally decrease the amount of U.S. influence on the region, creating a more unstable region.²¹⁶

B. JAPAN

Following Korean unification, Japan will no longer face a weak and divided peninsula. Achieving a more amicable long-term Japanese-Korean relationship will depend on efforts by both countries, each of which may hope to maintain a close relationship with the United States.²¹⁷ Furthermore, Korean unification will also have a major impact on American-Japanese relations. As long as the North Korean threat remains, the United States is unlikely to alter its military deployment in Japan. However, once the threat is removed, the need for U.S. protection will be less obvious.²¹⁸

Japan has an immense stake in the outcome of unification because it will determine the fundamental nature of the strategic relationship with the post-unified Korea. A unified Korea that retains nuclear weapons, tilts toward China, refuses to continue its security relationship with the United States and the American military presence, or is hostile toward Japan in its vision of the future would create a problem of great concern for the stability of the Japanese future.²¹⁹ Additionally, Japan's commercial interests are also affected by the outcome of the reunification process because Japan and the ROK have developed close economic ties since the end of World War II. The interdependence of the two countries' economies became evident following the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea, after Japan contributed billions of dollars to help rescue the ROK economy. Moreover, Japan has become South Korea's second leading

²¹⁵ Ibid.,134.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 158-59.

²¹⁷ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Young Koo Cha, A New Alliance For the Next Century: The Future of U.S. – Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica: RAND's National Defense Research Institute, 1995), 19.

²¹⁸ Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 25.

²¹⁹ Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1999), 6.

trade partner, even though the two countries compete in steel, consumer electronics and shipbuilding. However, it is also important to note that Japan's own economic troubles have also caused troubles for the South Korean economy. The stagnation of the Japanese economy has dried up major Korean export markets, and Japan's banks had to withdraw credit facilities from neighboring countries, including the ROK.²²⁰

Moreover, Korean reunification will influence the future structure of international relations within Northeast Asia, which will bear heavily with other powers whose interests intersect on the Korean peninsula, including Japan. Currently, Japan's greatest concern is the future relationship with the United States and the shape of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. A post-unification U.S.-Korean alliance and a continued American presence on the Korean peninsula would reassure Japan that a unified Korea would be disposed to improve its ties with Japan.²²¹ Retention of United States military forces in a reunified Korea will also affect the military presence in Japan.

In addition, the course that unification takes will also affect Japan's relationship with Russia and China. A unified Korea that tilted toward China or even stood equidistant between China and Japan would complicate the Japanese future strategic position.²²² While Japan wants to balance the growing influence that China has acquired on the peninsula, it is also not eager to engage in a confrontation with the Chinese over Korea. Japan has sought to separate economics from politics in its relationship with the PRC, and it has been able to do so due to the triangular relationship with the United States.²²³ With regard to Russia, Japan has been actively pursuing a stronger connection as a way of diversifying diplomatic options and cultivating the potential common interests the two countries may have in balancing Chinese influence on the Korean peninsula, with the hope of affecting the foreign policy of a reunified Korea.

Currently, Japanese-ROK relations have improved under the Kim Dae Jung administration, as exemplified by the joint statement released in October 1998 during President Kim's visit to Tokyo. The joint declaration of the two nations' new partnership,

²²⁰ Ibid., 7.

²²¹ Ibid., 7-8.

²²² Ibid., 8.

²²³ Ibid., 20.

signed on 8 October 1998 after the ROK-Japan summit, was an attempt to resolve the issue of past history recognition, in order to create a future foundation for joint efforts toward peace and prosperity. In the declaration Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo "expressed deep remorse and extended a heartfelt apology to the people of South Korea, having humbly accepted the historical fact that Japan inflicted heavy damage and pain on the people of South Korea through its colonial rule."²²⁴

Likewise, the possible normalization of Japanese-North Korean relations were recently exemplified following the 17 September 2002 meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang. During the visit, Kim Jong Il admitted that the DPRK had kidnapped 12 Japanese, allowing for a historic agreement between the two countries. North Korea agreed to freeze missile launches indefinitely, and Japan promised to move toward diplomatic recognition of the country and a hefty aid program of compensation for Japan's wartime occupation. More importantly, talks scheduled to start in October 2002 will hopefully lead to full normalization of ties between Japan and North Korea and put an end to more than a half-century of bristling hostility.²²⁵

While the recent overtures by Japan to improve bilateral relationship with both North and South Korea has been significant, the Japanese relationship still carries the heavy baggage of mistrust that will not evaporate in just a few years. Both Koreas remain bitter over the suffering during the Japanese occupation period. Thus, while Japan has critical issues at stake in the foreign policy of a reunified Korea, it unfortunately labors under several constraints that lessen the likelihood it would take the lead in resolving the complexity on the Korean peninsula.²²⁶

In addition, the memory of recent tensions between Japan and the DPRK undoubtedly remain. On 24 March 1999, Tokyo alleged that two North Korean spy ships

²²⁴ "South Korea's Kim Offer Forgiveness in Japan's Speech," *CNN.com* [Online], dated 8 October 1998, available from: <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9810/08/korea.japan.02/>; Internet, accessed 11 Sep 2002.

²²⁵ Doug Struck, "North Korea Admits it Abducted Japanese: Disclosure Clear Way for Historic Summit," *Washington Post* [Online], dated 18 September 2002, available from: <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sep2002/e20020918nkorea.htm>; Internet, accessed 20 Sep 2002.

²²⁶ Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1999), 6.

off the coast of Japan fired upon Japanese planes and ships.²²⁷ The relationship between the communist pariah state and the economic giant further eroded following the sinking of a North Korea spy ship in Japanese waters on 22 December 2001. The ROK government supported Japan's actions in this incident, but the public reaction in South Korea to this development was of concern about Japanese militarism.²²⁸ The fear of a reversion back to Japanese militarism also increased following Japan's participation in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Opponents within Japan and the Asian region, many of whom suffered the brunt of Japanese militarism during World War II, feared it could be a first step toward loosening constitutional constraints on Japan's armed forces.²²⁹ As such, while the recent overtures between Japan and North Korea are significant, there still exists a great deal of baggage that both countries must overcome before normalization can occur.

As a result and despite the importance of Korean unification on Japan's future, Tokyo is unlikely to play a proactive or assertive role on Korean issues. Rather, it is more likely that Japan would be reactive and adaptive in the unification process, accommodating to the changing circumstances of unification in a cautious and incremental fashion. Nevertheless, Japan cannot afford to resist unification. Neither can the Korean peninsula dispense with the resources that Japan can bring to bear.²³⁰ Given Japan's extensive political and economic linkages with the ROK and its strategic interdependence with South Korea in the context of their respective bilateral security ties with the United States, the prospect for complementary relations through a unified Korea seems promising.²³¹ There seems to be an incentive for both leaderships to pursue in earnest an increasing and ongoing consultative relationship.²³² Moreover, Japan will

²²⁷ See: "North Korea Denies Spy Ship Charge," *BBC Online Network* [Online], dated 26 March 1999, available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/303411.stm>, accessed 11 Sep 2002.

²²⁸ Robert Dujarric, *Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 34.

²²⁹ "Japanese Warships Set Sail," *CNN.com* [Online], dated 9 November 2001, available from: <http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/11/08/ret.japan.warships/>; Internet, accessed 11 Sep 2002.

²³⁰ Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination* (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1999), 6.

²³¹ "Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications," *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 84.

²³² *Korea News Review*, October 10, 1998, 4-6.

most likely play a substantial economic and financial role in the rebuilding of the north.²³³ Therefore, the role of Japan will go a long way toward determining an enduring settlement on the peninsula and achieving a stable new order in Northeast Asia.²³⁴

C. UNITED STATES

Following Korean unification, Washington will face several choices regarding its role in Asia. The key issue likely being in the military sphere. Similarly, the desires of a post-unified Korean state will decide whether the American presence will remain in Korea. As such, the role of the United States during and after Korean reunification will greatly influence the dynamics of Northeast Asian stability.²³⁵ The obvious desire of the United States would be to maintain a clear focus on East Asian security, allowing Washington and the unified Korean state to retain their relationship, subject to periodic adjustment. A shortcoming of this scenario would be the desire of the Korean state to retain American forces on the peninsula after the elimination of the North Korean threat. Furthermore, many Americans believe the United States “hegemony” should be replaced in Northeast Asia by a traditional balance of power among China, Japan, Russia, Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Under this scenario, the United States should rely on multilateral institutions to transfer some of the burden onto the shoulders of others.²³⁶ Either way, it is important to consider the implications for Korea’s neighboring states, such as the PRC, Japan, and Russia.

John Mearsheimer, in The Great Tragedy of Power Politics, argues against the claim that “security competition and war between the great powers has been purged from the international system,” especially since the end of the Cold War. He asserts that the United States maintains military troops in both Europe and Northeast Asia because it recognizes the dangerous rivalries that would likely emerge among the major powers in

²³³ “Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications,” *Report Sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 85.

²³⁴ Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1999), 6.

²³⁵ Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 12.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

these regions following a withdrawal of American troops.²³⁷ Under this rationale, the United States should keep forces in both Japan and Korea to prevent Japanese-Korean tensions, in a sense “protecting” them from one another. The United States can also act as a catalyst to foster Japanese-Korean military cooperation and thus improve relations between the two allies.²³⁸ Additionally, if China becomes an economic powerhouse, the possibility exists for the Chinese to translate its economic prosperity into military might and attempt to dominate Northeast Asia.²³⁹ A newly reunified Korean state would most likely not possess the ability to resist the PRC under this scenario. Inevitably, this would create tension in Northeast Asia, resulting in an intense security competition.

Currently, there are several debates in Washington concerning the continuation of a United States military presence in Korea following the elimination of the North Korean threat. On one hand, many argue that a continuation of the United States military is essential to post-unified Korea. Since the end of the Korean War, the U.S. security policy toward Korea has been instrumental in promoting peace and stability on the peninsula. The strong defense alliance relationship between the United States and South Korea contributed immeasurably to regional stability and has the potential to continue to do so following reunification. Common ideals, values, and objectives between the United States and a reunified Korean state can provide the basis for a continued robust security relationship, one that will prevent a resumption of historic strategic rivalries and thus ensure peace and stability on the peninsula.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, the U.S. presence will demonstrate to Koreans and foreigners that the United States stands by and supports the newly unified Korean states.²⁴¹

Similarly, a continuance of a strong American military presence can convince Koreans that, in exchange for a continued credible American commitment, the Korean

²³⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 2.

²³⁸ Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 35.

²³⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 4.

²⁴⁰ Ralph A. Cossa, “U.S. Asia Policy: Does an Alliance-Based Policy Still Make Sense,” *Pacific Forum CSIS*, September 2001, 14.

²⁴¹ Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 20.

state need not develop long-range missiles and nuclear warheads. A nuclear-armed Korea would not be a threat to the United States under this scenario, but it would open the door for a competitive arms race in the region that would destroy Japanese-Korean and Sino-Korean relations.²⁴² Ideally, maintenance of the U.S.-Korean security relationship will enhance prospects for simultaneous good relations between a reunited Korea and all its giant neighbors. In today's geopolitical setting, the U.S. role as a regional stabilizer and balancer within Northeast Asia contributes to Korean security, and allows Seoul to simultaneously pursue close and cordial relations with all of its neighbors. Without the U.S. security guarantees, the options are limited.²⁴³

On the other hand, others within the United States argue that the ROK has been democratic for many years now, despite a few military coups. Few nations have undergone such rapid urbanization and industrialization as South Korea without major social upheaval. Furthermore, the U.S. military presence did not contribute to the successful transition of Taiwan to a liberal democratic state. Therefore, under this rationale, a reunified Korea does not need a continued military presence to maintain its domestic stability.²⁴⁴

A third line of reasoning sees the continuing presence of American soldiers as counter-productive because of the increasing anti-American sentiment in Korea. Additionally, a continued U.S. presence might also entangle American in factional disputes in Korea and ultimately damage the U.S.-Korean relations.²⁴⁵ Even today, despite the obvious North Korean threat, many South Koreans dislike the presence of American soldiers. Up to the late 1970s, the U.S. military presence was generally viewed in a positive light. Since the 1980s, anti-American sentiment in South Korea has been on the rise due to such factors as the U.S. culpability in the division of Korea, continued American support for authoritarian regimes in Korea, and concerns over the U.S. cultural

²⁴² Ibid., 35-36.

²⁴³ Ralph A. Cossa, "U.S. Asia Policy: Does an Alliance-Based Policy Still Make Sense," *Pacific Forum CSIS*, September 2001, 15.

²⁴⁴ Robert Dujarric, *Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 21.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 21.

imperialism.²⁴⁶ While these issues have diminished, issues related to United States forces in Korea, environmental pollution, Washington's hard line stance against North Korea, and the Status of Forces Agreement have been cited as factors behind the rising anti-American sentiment.²⁴⁷ In this context, to maintain a good relationship with Korea, Washington should consider removing its forces after the elimination of the North Korean threat.²⁴⁸

The most important factor contributing to a unified Korea's foreign policy alternatives is what the Koreans themselves want. On the one hand, as previously argued, Korean nationalism may work against maintaining U.S.-Korean security ties. On the other hand, Seoul may want to continue its defense relationship with the United States. The Korean government may decide that the United States is necessary to provide protection against Chinese regional "hegemonism" or Japanese "militarism."²⁴⁹ The current division of Korea has attenuated the Japanese-Chinese rivalry within Asia. The DPRK has provided the Chinese with a solid barrier against Japanese inroads on mainland Asia toward China. For Japan, the ROK and United States military in Korea ensure that China will not attempt to control the entire peninsula.²⁵⁰

Currently, the United States policy contributes to Northeast Asian security. If America's credibility as a power within Asian were to diminish, concern over the rise of Japan and China may threaten the newly unified Korean state. Following the removal of an American military presence from the Korean peninsula, the potential of Japan to expand its military in order to protect its own interests throughout Asia may increase. This would likely prompt China to augment its military power, potentially contributing to a Sino-Japanese arms race, with the Koreans again caught in the middle.²⁵¹ Furthermore, while Russia is still fairly weak it still exists as a potential threat, either offering

²⁴⁶ Ahn Young Sop, "Assessing Anti-American Sentiment in Korea," *Korea Focus* 10, no. 1 (January–February 2002), 22.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

²⁴⁸ Robert Dujarric, *Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 21.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.

²⁵¹ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1997), 99.

opportunities for Chinese expansionism or because of the destabilizing impact of its large, albeit disorganized military. The United States, because of its distance from Asia, may be the best, or the least bad, ally. Since the United States is the most powerful nation on the planet, Korea as a medium size power, and most likely recovering from the costs of reunification, may consider having an ally that is powerful but far away is the best alternative.²⁵²

Until the unification of the Korean peninsula, the current security relationship between the United States and South Korea is essential for continued peace and stability and remains a potentially relevant factor in assuring peace on the peninsula post-unification. The American security blanket provided through a continued alliance relationship will continue to make it possible for Seoul to pursue cordial relations with its three giant neighbors, while relying on a power that has no territorial or colonial ambitions in Korea.²⁵³ Absent such assurances, Seoul may feel compelled to establish a security link with one of its larger neighbors, to the perceived detriment of the other two. This would be a destabilizing prospective, especially if it resulted in a Sino-Korean strategic relationship seemingly aimed at Japan.²⁵⁴

D. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing's strategic calculations continue to focus on preserving a peaceful and stable international environment to ensure Chinese economic development and political stability. Thus, for over a decade, China has increased its power and strategic weight in East Asia, and achieved sustained economic growth. While the two Koreas do not currently possess the power status of China or Japan, neither are they passive participants in Northeast Asian politics. Korean unification would cause the regional security environment to be reconfigured and would immediately affect Chinese vital national security interests. For the first time in its modern history, China would be adjoined to a strong, unified Korean state, allowing it to

²⁵² Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 24.

²⁵³ Ralph A. Cossa, "U.S. Asia Policy: Does an Alliance-Based Policy Still Make Sense," *Pacific Forum CSIS*, September 2001, 16.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

define new power realities in Northeast Asia in dramatically different terms.²⁵⁵ For this reason, despite Chinese security concerns surrounding the Korean peninsula, there are also opportunities to meet the PRC's interests. Beijing's dominant interests in Korean unification center on maintaining a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula and ensuring the peninsula is free of any external military presence. Furthermore, Chinese views on Korean unification, far from being cast in stone, evolve with the Chinese domestic, Northeast Asian regional, and the global situation including changes in Sino-American relations and the situation in the Taiwan Straits.²⁵⁶

On one hand, many argue that the PRC benefits from the maintenance of a divided peninsula and a fraternally allied socialist state on its border.²⁵⁷ The reunification of Korea would potentially remove the DPRK as a buffer zone and a major bargaining chip between the PRC and the United States. Moreover, by providing more aid in a variety of forms -- direct government-to-government aid, subsidized cross-border trade, and private barter transactions -- Beijing has played a more active role in promoting North Korean political regime survival.²⁵⁸ To the extent possible, China appears to continually invest only a necessary minimum of political and economic capital in its relationship with the two Koreas in order to enhance its advantage in inter-Korean affairs. Thus, its two-Koreas strategy appears more reactive than proactive and does not appear to include a long-term strategic vision other than maintaining North Korea as a buffer zone by slowing down the reunification process.²⁵⁹

On the other hand, China has been the major loser in developments on the Korean peninsula over the last several years. The August 1998 North Korean missile test spurred

²⁵⁵ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Young Koo Cha, A New Alliance For the Next Century: The Future of U.S. – Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica: RAND's National Defense Research Institute, 1995), 17.

²⁵⁶ Samuel S. Kim, "The Making of China's Korea Policy in the Era of Reform," The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 400.

²⁵⁷ Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 373.

²⁵⁸ Samuel S. Kim, "China, Japan, and Russia in Inter-Korean Relations," Korea Briefing 2000-2001: First Steps Toward Reconciliation and Reunification, ed. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 125.

²⁵⁹ Ralph A. Cossa, "U.S. Asia Policy: Does an Alliance-Based Policy Still Make Sense," *Pacific Forum CSIS*, September 2001, 122

an unprecedented degree of military cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul, encouraging both an increase in Japanese military expenditures and a more assertive national security posture in Japan. This incident severely undercut Chinese diplomatic efforts in opposition to the development and deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) in Northeast Asia, a threat to the China due to the potential of the system being extended to include Taiwan.²⁶⁰

In addition, the problem of North Korean refugees escaping into China continues to plague the Chinese government. Chinese leaders are faced with the unfortunate dichotomy of either upholding the PRC-DPRK treaty and returning North Koreans who enter China illegally or abiding by the United Nations' 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, which prohibits the forcible return of refugees to countries where they risk serious human rights violations.²⁶¹ From the Chinese perspective, North Korea's reluctance to adopt Chinese-style economic reforms until recently perpetuates a potentially unstable situation in which China could be inundated with unwanted refugee flows, or worse yet, potentially drawn into another confrontation with the United States on the Korean peninsula.²⁶²

In the current international political situation, Chinese leaders have recognized that the ultimate balance of power to shape the future on the Korean peninsula has already shifted to Seoul. The active high-level ties between Chinese and South Korean leaders demonstrate this recognition. Likewise, the ROK leaders have found the PRC more helpful in facilitating inter-Korean reconciliation than other countries. In the past two decades, of the three neighboring powers, China has managed to maintain a more stable two-Korea policy, establishing bilateral relations with both states.²⁶³ Moreover,

²⁶⁰ Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 373.

²⁶¹ "China steps up repatriation of North Korean refugees," *Human Rights Without Frontiers* [Online], dated 23 July 2001, available from: http://www.hrwf.net/newhrwf/html/north_korea_countries_polic.html#ChinaandtheInternationalAsylum; Internet, accessed 11 Sep 2002.

²⁶² Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 373.

²⁶³ Samuel S. Kim, "China, Japan, and Russia in Inter-Korean Relations," Korea Briefing 2000-2001: First Steps Toward Reconciliation and Reunification, ed. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 122.

the Chinese participation in the four party talks process, generally viewed as positive, reflects a continuation of China's historical involvement in Korean affairs.

A 1999 RAND study revealed that South Koreans heavily favor active ROK-PRC interactions. In fact, South Koreans overwhelmingly see China as a positive force on the Korean peninsula. A majority of South Koreans, seventy-seven percent, characterized China's role on maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula as very helpful or somewhat helpful.²⁶⁴ The South Korean response no doubt arises not only due to the cultural affinities between the two countries but also because China has been extremely skillful in its diplomacy toward the Korean peninsula over the past decade. More than any other power, the PRC has been influential in the inter-Korean rapprochement process, as reflected by the Chinese influence on the June 2000 summit in Pyongyang. Kim Jong Il's visit to China a couple weeks before the summit exemplifies the behind the scene role-played by Chinese leaders in the peninsula's reconciliatory affairs.²⁶⁵

The PRC accepts, and in fact prefers, that it be given great power responsibility in the Asian-Pacific Region, in order to "rightfully" fulfill its role of regional "balancer."²⁶⁶ This was described during the May 2001 Conference in Shanghai on "The Political Economy of Korean Reconciliation and Reform," after several Chinese participants emphasized the importance of China's role in North-South reconciliation, which was categorized as "irreplaceable."²⁶⁷ Furthermore, many in the PRC argue that China "must seize the opportunity...and further strengthen our position and function in our neighboring areas... and grasp the initiative in the management of affairs in our neighboring regions...to skillfully handle the several triangular relationships for the strategic interests of China."²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, The Shape of Korea's Future: South Korean Attitudes Toward Unification and Long-Term Security Issues (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 38.

²⁶⁵ Samuel S. Kim, "China, Japan, and Russia in Inter-Korean Relations," Korea Briefing 2000-2001: First Steps Toward Reconciliation and Reunification, ed. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 124.

²⁶⁶ Wang Fei-Ling, "Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China's Views and Policy on Korean Reunification," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1999, 172.

²⁶⁷ Joseph Winder, "Inter-Korean Reconciliation, Economic Cooperation, and the Role of the Major Powers," *The Political Economy of Korean Reconciliation and Reform* (Washington D.C., Korea Economic Institute of America: 2001), 3.

²⁶⁸ Wang Fei-Ling, "Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China's Views and Policy on

Currently, Beijing views the American forces on the peninsula as a stabilizing force on the peninsula, one that has temporarily maintained the balance of power between North and South Korea. However, the Chinese also assert that while the role of the United States is critical in shaping the environment for North-South reconciliation, the American “hegemony” could potentially lead to increased tension in the region. As such, the growing differences between the United States and China could eventually create turmoil in North-South relations. Furthermore, the PRC argues that the United States does not want to see a speedy resolution of the Korean peninsula because it would remove a rationale for ballistic missile defense.²⁶⁹

In this context, the state of Sino-American relations contributes to the foreign policy options of Korea. A diminishing relationship between the United States and PRC poses a significant problem for a reunified Korea, particularly if it chooses not to support the United States in a policy against China. Regardless of Korea’s pro-American stance, it is logical for Seoul to have a policy toward Beijing that is sometimes at odds with Washington. While the United States has the option of either engaging or severing ties with China, Korea does not have the option to ignore its most powerful neighbor. Furthermore, Korea has a greater stake than the United States in avoiding a confrontation with the PRC.²⁷⁰

Concurrently, China’s strategic objectives and power potential in Northeast Asia are being watched closely by all regional states. China clearly aspires for a central position in the future regional order, and it is increasingly willing to achieve this through semi-cooperation and effective consultation with its neighbors. However, many of China’s regional neighbors, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the ASEAN states, are concerned about the implications of its emergence as a genuine power.²⁷¹ Furthermore, with the

Korean Reunification,” *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1999, 173.

²⁶⁹ Joseph Winder, “Inter-Korean Reconciliation, Economic Cooperation, and the Role of the Major Powers,” *The Political Economy of Korean Reconciliation and Reform* (Washington D.C., Korea Economic Institute of America: 2001), 4-5.

²⁷⁰ Robert Dujarric, *Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 67.

²⁷¹ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Young Koo Cha, *A New Alliance For the Next Century: The Future of U.S. – Korean Security Cooperation* (Santa Monica: RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, 1995). 18.

uncertainty concerning the power change due in the fall of 2002 and the increasingly bold rhetoric from Taiwan proclaiming its independence from the PRC, the Chinese are grappling with the complex challenges of maintaining political and social stability while moving the country toward a market-based economy. Presently, there is no evidence that China's goals over the next two decades are to dominate East Asia militarily.²⁷² However, the PRC does not need to dominate militarily in order to establish itself as a more powerful player in world politics and to obtain more deference in the region.

China likely aspires for a stable, non-threatening North Korea that could act as a buffer state, without continually upsetting strategic calculations in Northeast Asia. However, the absence of significant, constructive change in North Korea may put the historical ties between the PRC and DPRK at risk. While the older generation of Chinese leaders may feel an ideological and historical connection with North Korea, the younger generation, many of whom were victimized in the Cultural Revolution, regards the personality cult around both North Korean Kims with trepidation.²⁷³ While maintaining support for the North Koreans may be China's preferred option, at some point Beijing may conclude that North Korea is irredeemable and that the maintenance of a divided peninsula is unsustainable. At this point, the Chinese may seek to achieve the second-best alternative -- a unified Korea strategically removed from the auspices of the United States.²⁷⁴ Depending on the Chinese role in the reunification of Korea, China will likely request the removal of United States troops from the Korean peninsula and the nullification of the United States-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. Given the circumstances surrounding reunification and the role of the Pacific powers, it is not clear what a unified Korea would choose to do.

China's active posture toward the Korean peninsula in recent years reflects its legitimate strategic interests on Korean unification, its concern regarding strong American influence following reunification and its subsequent effect on Chinese

²⁷² Thomas J. Christensen, "China," *Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose: 2001-02*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), 31.

²⁷³ Marcus Noland, *Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 373.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 374.

security.²⁷⁵ It is for this reason that the PRC contributed to the shaping of developments in Korea toward reunification, not merely following the lead of the United States and Japan. China has consistently used its influence to strive for peaceful unification of Korea and to keep a reunified Korea as a neutral, if not friendly neighbor. Preferably, following reunification, the Chinese would like to ensure that a united Korea would be drawn within China's economic and military sphere.

Chinese analysts estimate that, after reunification, Korea will become a regional power with world influence. The new Korea will likely be one of the largest economies in the world and will constitute a new pole in Northeast Asia.²⁷⁶ Thus, a strategically aligned Sino-Korean relationship would be ideal for both states. Since the first official step to enhance bilateral relations between South Korea and the PRC built on a desire to create mutually beneficial economic ties, this is a fundamental factor underlying their relationship. As such, the economic relations between the two states acts as a central motivating factor behind the aspiration to strengthen relations between the PRC and a reunified Korea.

Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the developing Chinese market's record-breaking growth and tremendous potential has continued to provide an excellent opportunity for South Korea. As the ROK looks for profitable markets, South Korean industries increasingly find the Chinese market's promising potential to be more attractive than American or Japanese markets where South Korea has struggled with persisting trade deficits. Moreover, modernization has played a leading role in the Chinese foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula. China's modernization programs cannot be realized without extensive external support and exchanges from industrialized countries that provide advanced technology, capital, markets, and managerial skills, most easily obtained from its nearby Korean neighbor.²⁷⁷ A stable, prosperous Korean state

²⁷⁵ Scott Snyder, "The Rise of U.S.-China Rivalry and its Implication For the Korean Peninsula," Korean Security Dynamics in Transition, ed. Kyung Ae Park, Dalchoong Kim, and Tal-Chung Kim (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 129.

²⁷⁶ Wang Fei-Ling, "Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China's Views and Policy on Korean Reunification," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1999, 181.

²⁷⁷ Quansheng Zhao, "China's Security Concerns Over the Korean Peninsula," Korea in the 21st Century, ed. Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak (Huntington: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2001), 219.

interacting with the PRC has a mutually beneficial market and foreign investment potential, thus creating a pareto-optimal relationship.²⁷⁸

Another link between the Chinese and Koreans is the keen desire for national unification, an issue that has always occupied central positions in both countries domestic and foreign policy.²⁷⁹ Beijing has the daunting task of managing the reality that China and Korea remain the last two Cold War divided polities. Given the growing chasm between the two halves of Korea, almost any scenario for Korean reunification has implications for China's own unification drive. The divided Korea has been an unwelcome factor in the cross-strait relationship between Beijing and Taipei. Currently, Seoul maintains "unofficial" but active ties with Taipei, and even Pyongyang has established certain semi-official ties with Taiwan.²⁸⁰ Moreover, Korean unification echoes the similar ambition China holds regarding Taiwan, and the maintenance of two Koreas only underscores the fact that the China and Taiwan also appear to be going their separate ways.²⁸¹

Both the historical ties between China and Korea and the Chinese role in Korean reunification also provide grounds for future cooperation between the states. In this context, China and Korea may regard each other as a counterweight to the increasing economic and military strength of Japan and the perceived threat of a reassertion of Japanese militarism. The alternative -- a united and much more powerful Korean state under the influence of Korean nationalism -- would produce undesirable consequences for the PRC. The unfavorable consequences would be of a greater concern should a unified Korea continue its military alliance with the United States and continue to improve its bilateral ties with Japan. While the United States presence on the peninsula following reunification may help to control negative ramifications of Korean nationalism,

²⁷⁸ A relationship is called Pareto-optimal if there is no other solution for which at least one criterion has a better value while values of remaining criteria are the same or better. In other words, one cannot improve any criterion of the relationship without deteriorating a value of at least one other criterion.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 228.

²⁸⁰ Wang Fei-Ling, "Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China's Views and Policy on Korean Reunification," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1999, 183.

²⁸¹ Samuel S. Kim, "The Making of China's Korea Policy in the Era of Reform," The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2001), 407.

having the American military on the other side of the Yalu River would be intolerable because Beijing has a deep suspicion about the role played by the United States in Northeast Asia.²⁸² In addition, some Chinese analysts have openly accused the recent expansion of the American-Japanese military alliance as swiftly evolving from a “defensive shield” to an “offensive lance” against China.²⁸³

Thus, a unified Korean state that sustains stability and peace on the peninsula benefits the PRC because it may eliminate the need for external military and political forces in the region. In addition, a unified, stronger Korea may also serve as an important force in countering Japan in East Asia and to present a new multipolar structure desirable to Beijing. Chinese influence in Korea could dominate, given the PRC’s strength and proximity, and the absence of a countervailing force following a withdrawal of the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. This scenario is more likely to occur than a tilt toward Japan, given the geopolitically weak Japanese military and the mistrust harbored by the Koreans. Furthermore, following reunification not only will Korea be strong enough to avoid becoming a Chinese satellite, the PRC has no stated interest in achieving such a goal, making a strong Sino-Korean relationship more desirable to Koreans.²⁸⁴

E. OTHER STATES

In addition to China, Japan, and the United States, other actors may play a significant role in the reunification process, potentially affecting the foreign policy of a unified Korean state. One actor, the European Union, has considerable diplomatic and financial resources and participates in the KEDO consortium. However, it is far away, and the Korean peninsula is relatively peripheral to its strategic interests.²⁸⁵

In contrast to the European Union, Russia, which borders North Korea, has expressed interest in raising its diplomatic profile in Northeast Asia. President Vladimir

²⁸² Wang Fei-Ling, “Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China’s Views and Policy on Korean Reunification,” *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1999, 179.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 180.

²⁸⁴ Robert Dujarric, *Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 45.

²⁸⁵ Marcus Noland, *Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 374.

Putin is interested in utilizing diplomatic dexterity within Korea to offset the declining weight of Russia's military and economic capabilities.²⁸⁶ Recently, Russia has been improving its relationship with the DPRK, as illustrated by the meeting on 23 August 2002 between the North Korean leader and the Russian President. Following the meeting, Putin stated that the two spoke "mainly about bilateral relations with an accent on the economic theme, relating to the possibility of linking the Trans-Siberian with the Korean railroad."²⁸⁷

Unfortunately for Russia, it currently has few financial resources, which limits its capacity for playing a significant role in Korean affairs, so it will not be able to extend its influence beyond a modest, supporting role.²⁸⁸ Russia's greatly diminished political and military fortunes following the end of the Cold War are among the principal elements of Asian regional instability. The disintegration of the Soviet Union weakened Russia's military presence in East Asia, and it has greatly reduced Moscow's stature, capabilities, and regional influence.²⁸⁹

F. SUMMARY

The state of the Korean peninsula's relationship with each of the Pacific powers will have a major impact on its post-unified foreign policy option. While the answers may remain unclear, it is essential to address the questions surrounding a reunified Korean state in the present in order to influence the factors affecting its future foreign policy decision. Ultimately, however, the final decision will be made by the unified Korean state.

²⁸⁶ Michael H. Armacost, "The Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Northeast Asian Affairs," Brookings Northeast Asia Survey: 2001-2002, ed. Catharin Dalpino and Bates Gill (Washington DC, Brookings Institute, 2002), 22.

²⁸⁷ Doug Struck, "Reclusive Kim Jong Il End Russia Visit," *International Herald Tribune* [Online], dated 24 August 2002, available from: <http://www.iht.com/articles/68658.html>; Internet, accessed 11 Sep 2002.

²⁸⁸ Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 374.

²⁸⁹ Jonathan D. Pollack, and Young Koo Cha, A New Alliance For the Next Century: The Future of U.S. – Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica: RAND's National Defense Research Institute, 1995), 16.

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The choice between Korean alignment and nonalignment following unification will be influenced by a combination of factors, including historical predispositions, paths leading to reunification, the peninsula's domestic situation, Korea's changing relations with each Pacific power, and the new regional environment, particularly the relationship between the United States and China. The reunification of Korea will have far-reaching economic and political repercussions, not only for Korea, but also for Northeast Asia. How Korea reunifies and how the adjacent powers cooperate will effectively determine a new order in the region. The United States and other Pacific Powers concerned about the foreign policy of a unified Korea can and should prepare for this event.

Korea, situated at the center of Northeast Asia, has been a battleground of the four great powers' contending strategic interests. The Japanese regard a reunified Korea as a threat to Japan's own military and economic security plans and are therefore seeking to moderate the growing imbalance between the two Koreas. Russia also is trying to get back into the game in order to curb the growing influence of the other major powers. China has its own reason for its involvement in Korean unification, wanting to check American expansionism and "hegemonism" in the region while simultaneously increasing its own role, thereby effectively safeguarding the peace and stability in Northeast Asia under its watchful eye. The United States, more than the others, views the three other players as threats to its strategic position in Northeast Asia. The United States has attached a high level of importance to coping with Korean unification in order to contain growing Chinese, Russia and Japanese influence.²⁹⁰

While the present North Korean threat continues to plague the political and security considerations of South Korea, the ROK has no other viable replacement for the U.S.-ROK security alliance. The American forces stationed in Korea reduce both the likelihood of war and costs of defending the ROK. However, following the elimination

²⁹⁰ Samuel S. Kim, "The Making of China's Korea Policy in the Era of Reform," The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 402.

of the North Korean threat to the peninsula, a unified Korea will be able to redefine its foreign policy options.

Currently, South Korea has grown to a medium-sized economy, and the post-unified population of the peninsula would be approximately 65 million people.²⁹¹ Ensuring its alliance with technologically advanced nations, such as Korea, enhances United States security. Moreover, Korea has strategic importance to the Japanese, who are interested in maintaining the relationship between Japan, Korea, and the United States to maintain Japanese security. A potential consequence of the removal of American troops within Korea would be to fuel Japanese opposition to the United States maintaining forward deployed troops in Japan. Such an environment would lessen American strength and legitimacy within Asia. This is significant because the breakdown of Asian equilibrium in the past led to many years of fighting and millions of fatalities.

More than any other power at this point in time, the United States can work to ensure the unification process will be peaceful and that Korea's subsequent reintegration will succeed. Not only will a peaceful and successful reunification of the peninsula benefit Koreans, it will also enhance the stability in Northeast Asia. A positive and constructive American policy toward Korea, however, is by no means a foregone conclusion. Washington's myopic policy toward Korea during the past two generations has been regularly punctuated by disasters, unpleasant surprises and missed opportunities.²⁹² Despite the benefits of maintaining an U.S.-Korean alliance following reunification and despite the potential threat to Northeast Asian regional security that would occur if the American forward deployed presence in the region was removed, the foreign policy options of a unified Korea are not a top consideration for Washington. This is even more true given the recent United States led war on terrorism and the possibility of a military involvement in Iraq.

The war on terrorism could potentially bring stability to the Asian region, or it could destabilize a currently tense situation. The present Bush administration has dealt several blows to the South Korean attempts at reconciliation. After 11 September 2001

²⁹¹ Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute Inc, 2000), 86.

²⁹² Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Unification (New York, M.E. Sharpe: 1995), xxiv-xxv.

terrorist attacks, Washington's interest in the Korean peninsula and reconciliatory measures fell by the wayside as the United States concentrated on the war in Afghanistan. Furthermore, in the President's 2002 State of the Union address, the Bush administration incorporated the North Korean threat into its vision of an axis of evil.²⁹³ Since then, the U.S.-ROK views on inter-Korean reconciliation continue to diverge, and strong criticism has emerged from South Korea.

A continuation of diverging views on Korean reconciliation will increase the South Korean tendency toward multilateral diplomacy, which could replace the U.S. role in the unification of Korea. The absence of an active U.S.-ROK collaboration would encourage South Korea to look toward their neighbors for support during reunification, which would no doubt factor into the foreign policy options following unification.

Based upon the historical relationship with China and the current attempt by the Chinese to bring about regional security, one viable alignment option for the ROK is the PRC. Given the Chinese rising economy and military modernization efforts, the PRC is becoming a regional power and a potential strategic competitor of the United States. The PRC's regional diplomacy is highlighted by its continual reassertion as a dynamic security player in Northeast Asia. Moreover, the increasing stature of South Korea in the international system would undoubtedly alter the historical dynamic of a reunified Korea's relationship with China, thus making it more acceptable to the Korean people. While many authors disagree about the significance of China's rise as a regional economic and military power, most agree that the PRC has become a major consideration for the ROK's policymaking and United States regional security interests.

A tilt of a unified Korean state toward the PRC would affect the balance of power in East Asia, an event that may destabilize not only Asia but also the entire international community. Therefore, the PRC and United States should not view each other as adversaries in dealing with the tension on the Korean peninsula. Instead, the two nations should build upon their relationships with each Korea and come together in attempting to bring reconciliation and possible unification to the two Koreas.

²⁹³ Tim Shorrock, "Is George W Ignoring Sr's Advice on Korea," *Asia Times Online* [Online], dated 16 February 2002; Internet, available from: <http://www.atimes.com/koreas.DB16Dg02.html>; Internet, accessed 19 Feb 2002.

It is within the grasp of the Bush administration to take the DPRK up on its offer to improve American-North Korean relations, which would improve Washington's chances of maintaining a security alliance following unification. Washington should support the 1994 Agreed Framework, which promoted unprecedented cooperation between North Korea and its assumed adversaries. Currently, Washington argues that North Korea is in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, the United States has also failed to comply. The projected five-year delay in the construction of reactors specified under this agreement detrimentally affects the North Korean economy, hindering inter-Korean reconciliation.²⁹⁴ Thus, the United States should seize this opportunity to demonstrate its resolve to obtain peace on the Korea peninsula, eventually leading to unification, by observing this agreement.

Furthermore, the administration should consider toning down its rhetoric and support South Korean initiatives for dialogue. Lumping North Korea with Iraq and Iran in an evil trinity is a fundamental misidentification. According to the State Department, North Korea has not engaged in terrorism since the 1980s, however it does maintain links with terrorist organizations. In addition, during 2000 the DPRK engaged in three rounds of terrorism talks that culminated in a joint DPRK-U.S. statement, which the DPRK reiterated its opposition to terrorism and agreed to support international actions against such activity.²⁹⁵ Despite its authoritarian political structure and its anti-American rhetoric, North Korea wants and undoubtedly needs to improve its relationship with the United States.

Moreover, Washington should work to revive the four party talks and encourage North Korea to continue joining international organizations. Once it was inaugurated in 1997, the four party process provided an opportunity for in-depth interaction involving the Chinese, Americans, and Koreans to forward a practical agenda for resolving the Korean conflict and working toward future unification. While profound differences and historical baggage among the countries in the region have made it difficult to find the

²⁹⁴ John Feffer, "Bush Policy Undermines Progress on Korean Peninsula," *Foreign Policy in Focus* 7 [Online], no. 2 (March 2002), available from: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol7/v7n02korea_body.html; Internet, accessed: 19 Apr 2002.

²⁹⁵ "Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism," *U.S. Department of State* [Online], dated 30 April 2001, available from: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2441.htm>; Internet, accessed 23 Sep 2002.

common ground essential to successful multilateralism, the obstacles have not blocked the multilateral policy entirely. A number of organizations and institutions have been created in recent years that would be useful in a multilateral approach to inter-Korean reconciliation. These include APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, the Asia-Europe Meeting, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group bring the United States, Japan, and the ROK together to coordinate policy toward North Korea.

Without strong and continuing public support, it is plausible that the U.S.-Korean alliance will decay or dissolve altogether, which may set further strategic changes in motion throughout the Northeast Asian region. Not least important, a United States military withdrawal from South Korea would leave Japan as the single East Asian country basing American forces on its soil. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that such an arrangement would be politically acceptable to the Japanese electorate. Poorly thought out initiatives intended to stimulate inter-Korean rapprochement could actually trigger an unexpected and uncontrolled cascade of events, at the end of which the United States, for the first time in over a half a century, would have no forward military presence in East Asia. Although many believe the likelihood of such an outcome is small, there is no doubt that an American military departure from East Asia in the foreseeable future would have major reverberations in international commerce and international security, almost all of them adverse.²⁹⁶ It is for this reason that the United States must work to develop and enhance a constructive relationship among all of the regional players in order to ensure a reunified Korean state engages in a foreign policy that will create a favorable regional environment.

²⁹⁶ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Korea," *Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose 2001-02*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001) 133-134.

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**APPENDIX I – MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Signed at Washington: 1 October 1953

Entered into Force: 1 November 1954

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party towards the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

Article 3

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article 4

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

Article 5

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

Article 6

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington, in the Korean and English languages, this first day of October, 1953.

For the Republic of Korea:
(signed) Y.T. Pyun

For the United States of America:
(signed) John Foster Dulles

Understanding of the United States

It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article 3 of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States or lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea.

Source: "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea," *U.S. Forces Korea* [Online]; Internet, available from: <http://www.korea.army.mil/sofa/mutdef.htm>, accessed 25 Sep 2002.

APPENDIX II – AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Geneva, 21 October 1994

Delegations of the governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America (U.S.) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 agreed statement between the DPRK and the U.S. and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 joint statement of the DPRK and the U.S. to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The DPRK and the U.S. decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW (e) by a target date of 2003.

-- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

-- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this document.

-- As necessary, the DPRK and the U.S. will conclude a bilateral agreement, for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy forgone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

-- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.

-- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWRs and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

-- The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.

-- Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

-- The DPRK and the U.S. will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW (e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

4) As soon as possible after the date of this document. DPRK and U.S. experts will hold two sets of experts' talks.

-- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.

-- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.

2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert-level discussions.

3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the DPRK and the U.S. will upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.

2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

3) The DPRK will engage in north-south dialogue, as this agreed framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the treaty.

2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguard agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.

3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Kang Sok Ju- Head of the Delegation for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Robert L. Gallucci- Head of the Delegation of United States of America, Ambassador at Large of the United States of America

Source: "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* [Online]; Internet, available from: <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/koreaaf.htm>, accessed 25 Sep 2002.

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