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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE RISE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN
AND ITS IMPACT ON ELEMENTS OF JAPANESE
MARITIME SECURITY**

by

Richard J. Coillot

June 2011

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Robert J. Weiner
Jeffrey W. Knopf

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**THE RISE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN AND ITS IMPACT ON
ELEMENTS OF JAPANESE MARITIME SECURITY**

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rose to power in the Japanese Diet, marking the first time in more than five decades that a party other than the Liberal Democratic Party controlled the government. Some would assume this monumental shift has the potential to bring about a range of policy changes, especially in the realm of security. This thesis addresses the potential for changes in security policy by evaluating two particular elements of the maritime security realm, ballistic missile defense and antipiracy. When considering the ability of the DPJ to influence security policy in Japan, the country's political environment represents a unique situation, in which party influence must be weighed against the relative influence of societal norms and external factors. Taking this into consideration, it is concluded that DPJ influence will be limited, resulting in little potential for changes in security policy, as reflected in the assessment of elements of maritime security.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
HOA	Horn of Africa
IR	International Relations
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
JSP	Japanese Socialist Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
MDA	United States Missile Defense Agency
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSDF	Maritime Self Defense Force
NDPO	National Defense Program Outline
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
SCD	SM-3 Cooperative Development Project
SDF	Self Defense Force
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SM-3	Standard Missile-3
UN	United Nations

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Recent elections in Japan have seen a new party emerge, which has resulted in a new political dynamic. The rise to power of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has been a shift from the relatively stable, one-dimensional system of government under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that had been in place for over five decades, and which saw limited challenges to its rule.¹ Based on the stability of rule over the years, Japanese security policy was highly consistent. Some might suggest it was shaped more by the interaction of perspectives across society,² the lone ruling party and the evolving security environment the country found itself in, rather than competing ideologies of multiple domestic parties. Therefore, given the election results of the last few years, the potential exists for a new approach to Japan's security policy. This assumption is based on the ideology and rhetoric to emerge from the DPJ during its years as an opposition party, which questioned the nature of Japan's security alliances under the LDP—for example, the country's relationship with and reliance on the United States.

Taking this into consideration, this thesis aims to address the possibility of a shift in Japanese security policy under the new domestic political conditions. More succinctly, now that the DPJ is the party in power, and the potential exists for a more dynamic party system, is it fair to assume Japan's security policy will change—in particular, elements of its maritime security policy? Alternatively, is the expectation that the current approach to maritime security will remain the status quo?

Addressing each element of Japan's maritime security would be no small task. Therefore, this thesis examines those aspects of maritime security policy that pertain to Japan's stance regarding its bilateral relationship with the United States, and its pursuit of broader multilateralism. Japan's approach to ballistic missile defense is of particular

¹ "Press Upbeat on Japan's Elections," *BBC News* August 31, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8230317.stm>.

² The argument that security policy has been shaped by societal norms in Japan is drawn from authors, such as Peter J. Katzenstein, Thomas U. Berger, and Andrew L. Oros.

interest to the bilateral relationship with the United States. Likewise, analyzing Japan's handling and involvement abroad in antipiracy efforts highlights potential interest in pursuing a more multilateral approach to maritime security. These two examples offer a foundation for discussing the potential for change based on the emergence of the DPJ, and whether or not the LDP will continue to influence security policy under this new two-party dynamic.

In the course of answering the primary research question, this thesis addresses any potential underlying domestic factors that enabled the Japanese government to maintain its relatively consistent security policy while the LDP was the ruling party. Subsequent consideration is given as to whether those factors have or will remain in place under the DPJ, as well as what new factors may arise and have a similar effect. Additionally, while this thesis centers on the emerging domestic differences previously mentioned, consideration is also given to the role external influences have had on shaping Japanese maritime security policy throughout the years, in an effort to determine what relationships exist between the foreign and domestic elements.

B. IMPORTANCE

While it may be too soon to tell the full impact the recent elections will have on Japan's security policy, the fact remains that for the first time, a party other than the LDP has a significant upper hand in the Diet, the country's legislative body.³ In parallel with the longevity of the LDP, security policy in Japan had been fairly consistent and was shaped in an effort to support as stable an environment as possible in the Northeast Asia region. For Japan and the LDP during its period of rule, stability of the region was based on a strong alliance with the United States in the face of communism, while maintaining a balance between a capable yet constrained Self Defense Force (SDF). However, as new powers and threats emerge in the wake of the Cold War (particularly China and North Korea), the manner by which the new leadership of Japan involves the country in the region and in the international arena becomes increasingly important. For example, it will

³ Yoshihide Soeya, "Japanese Domestic Politics and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," *Council on Foreign Relations*, December 2009, 1.

be interesting to see how the new government reacts as the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to project power into the Western Pacific, as it did in 2009,⁴ or should North Korea continue to conduct missile tests. Therefore, the importance of this thesis centers around identifying what aspects of Japan's historical approach to security have the greatest potential to be changed under the DPJ, particularly in the maritime realm, thereby influencing policy, which in turn, has important implications for the United States.

If a shift in security policy were to occur under the DPJ, the implications could affect the current dynamic of U.S.–Japan security relations. In its current state, the long-standing alliance has been heavily reliant on U.S. military might, which has done much to shape the security environment of the region. However, if policy shifts were enacted in Japan that might enhance its military's strength or change the manner in which the country employs its military, it could have a significant impact on the U.S.–Japan security alliance, as some suggest the United States would likely re-evaluate the necessity to contribute as heavily to security in the region.⁵ The trickle-down effect could also result in potential changes to greater U.S. security strategy and have implications for regional stability.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

The research question can be further broken down into clearly defined independent and dependent variables. The independent variable can be identified as the as the ruling party and nature of the governing process, in this case the DPJ and the new shape of the government. This thesis seeks to establish the potential impact such a variable may have on the dependent variable, Japan's maritime security policy. However, this potential oversimplification of the two variables does little to establish a clear

⁴ Russel Hsiao, "PLAN East Sea Fleet Moves Beyond First Island Chain," *China Brief* 10 (2010): 1–2.

⁵ Scott Snyder, "U.S. Domestic Politics and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," *Council on Foreign Relations*. December 2009, 5.

relationship between them. Both the independent and dependent variables must be further divided into specific elements or factors that have the greatest potential to establish a causal relationship. Challenges to achieving this do exist.

The first challenge is related to the DPJ. Although the party has been in existence for more than a decade, this is the first instance in the DPJ's brief history that it is in control of the government. This is uncharted territory for the party, which has had few opportunities to implement policy and address those issues its leaders deem important. Therefore, based on the party's short history, the challenge lies in identifying trends and factors within the party that may influence maritime security into the future. These could include the emergence of influential individuals within the party, such as Ichiro Ozawa, and their ability to promote a particular security policy; the party's lack of governing experience;⁶ divisions within, and the general youthfulness of the party; and where security issues rank within the party's overall policy agenda. Again, this is not an exhaustive list, but the importance in identifying factors such as these is to determine which have the greatest potential to effect change. Although the differences between the DPJ and LDP will be addressed in greater detail later in this thesis, it is important to recognize that for each factor indicating the DPJ's ability to introduce policy change, the LDP is arguably different, whether it is based simply on party longevity and experience, or relative cohesiveness among party members on any number of security related issues.

Likewise, a similar challenge can be found under the new multiparty dynamic. Although this dynamic is not the focal point of the thesis, consideration must be given to the fact that the approach to security in Japan over the years (to include maritime security), had occurred within the context of a single party system dominated by the LDP. Now that a second party has emerged (independent of the fact it has gained control of the government), the dynamics of a multiparty system have the potential to influence future security policy. For example, the potential exists for the decision-making process to change as party ideologies clash and compete with one another like never before. It is also conceivable that the new system dynamic could impact relationships that have been

⁶ "6th LD: Ozawa to Run Against Kan in DPJ Leadership Race," *Breitbart*, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9HR59CG0&show_article=1.

built over the years between parties (particularly the LDP) and the bureaucracy. This dynamic could alter the policy implementation process, and perhaps make it considerably slower because of competition between the parties and the need to establish new relationships and rapport with bureaucrats. Countless other factors may come into play, but again, the challenge is in identifying those most relevant to the new ruling party that may have the greatest impact on maritime security policy. While much of the discussion on the independent variables centers on domestic elements and internal intricacies of parties and political systems, consideration must be given to the impact external factors have had and will have in the future.

This thesis also addresses external factors that have historically influenced Japanese maritime security, and which have the potential to influence it in the future.⁷ The challenge is to identify those external factors and events first that have led to consistency in policy over the years. These factors may include Japan's political and economic concerns stemming from the country's geographic nature as an island nation, the influence of the country's post-World War II experience and subsequent adoption of Article 9 of the constitution on foreign and security policy, or the international context within which longstanding relationships, such as those with the United States, were built. Second, likely factors that have, or would result in changes to policy do exist. For example, the same relationships that may have been a steadying influence could change, or new relationships could be formed that result in a new approach to maritime security. Also, while Article 9 in its current state may have led to continuity in maritime security policy, if amended, it could potentially be a source for change. Finally, fluctuations in the international political environment, such as the end of the Cold War, may result in changes. Identifying these external factors will add another dimension to the thesis, as it will frame the greater security environment in which Japan has forged an existence and the influence it has had when formulating policy. More importantly, these factors can help to identify further differences between the LDP and the DPJ based on what was

⁷ For the purpose of the thesis and this proposal, external factors are considered those influences independent of political party and system characterizations, and may be foreign or domestic in nature.

historically important to the LDP and what may not carry the same weight for the DPJ. The international relations theories of constructivism and realism are used in hopes of facilitating this aspect of the thesis.

Lastly, another important challenge to consider pertains to the potential for change in DPJ's security policy, and subsequently, analyzing whether or not important elements of maritime security in particular will be changed. Based on the discussion of the independent variables above, it might be safe to assume that general security policy could change, perhaps even fairly quickly, under the new government and party dynamic. However, the question is whether or not such changes will permeate into maritime security in particular, and if they do, how so? For example, it is often noted that the DPJ promotes a shift in security policy more toward multilateralism and the United Nations over the U.S.–Japan alliance.⁸ Should this policy become precedent, could it result in ending Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) support to U.S. maritime assets in the Indian Ocean or a more active role in anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) region? Similarly, what implications would such a policy shift have on maritime ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the relationship Japan maintains with the United States? Do the potential outcomes in each case speak to policies of multilateralism abroad, while maintaining strong bilateral ties to the United States regionally?

Having addressed the challenges associated with the independent and dependent variables, and determining factors that could reasonably effect and be influenced by change, the hypothesis of this thesis is that the newly elected DPJ alone will do little to change Japanese maritime security policy in the near term, as a number of variables independent of the party exist that have a greater potential to influence security policy. Among the factors to be considered are the nature of the security environment itself and how it has changed since the end of the Cold War, the role of societal norms, and the continued presence of the LDP.

The influence of the factors listed above support the hypothesis in a number of ways. As for the nature of the security environment, the post-Cold War period has proven

⁸ Mari Miura, Kap Yun Lee, and Robert Weiner, "Who Are the DPJ?: Policy Positioning and Recruitment Strategy," *Asian Perspective* 29 (2005): 72.

to be a dynamic period that has seen the communist threat replaced by a variety of other threats (China, North Korea, and terrorism) that the Japanese government must be willing to address. This process began under the LDP, and it remains for the DPJ to maintain the country's security. Given the circumstances, it would not be fruitful for the newly elected party to simply alter maritime security policy as a result of party ideological divides, particularly if it comes at the expense of the country's security in general. Realist concerns with security represent a real challenge to the DPJ's ability to influence and change maritime security policy, but domestic influences are also present as well.

Pacifist norms and the LDP (now as an opposition party) represent further impediments to the DPJ's ability to influence maritime security policy. Each date back to the post-World War II era and became entrenched in Japanese society. It is unlikely that the influence of either will diminish simply because of the DPJ's rise to power, particularly in the near term. Each of these factors contributes to the argument that the DPJ is unlikely to influence and change elements of maritime security policy in the near future.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

For the purpose of this thesis, the review of existing literature is divided into two parts. The first section focuses on those factors to which authors attribute Japan's historical approach to security, and serve as a backdrop for addressing maritime security. This will be followed by a discussion of the literature surrounding current domestic political dynamics and the DPJ since the recent elections, and how the party may handle maritime security. The information is used to identify the greater context within which this thesis fits, and how it contributes to greater research in the field.

1. Maritime Security: Historic Factors

A number of factors are identified in the existing literature that authors agree have historically influenced Japan's leaders when making security-related decisions. The first factor mentioned often is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁹

Many authors use this as the foundation for their discussions, especially when identifying how and why the Japanese government has historically handled security related issues. For example, Richard Samuels offers one perspective as to how the constitution has been an influence, stating it has been “the primary formal restraint ... and at the center of Japan’s most hotly contested legal disputes ... about [its] original intent.”¹⁰ Other authors, while agreeing with this assessment, offer additional factors believed to have influenced Japan’s leaders and how they have shaped security policy.

The greater international and regional security environments have also been identified in the literature as significantly influencing Japanese security policy through the years. Evelyn Goh cites shifts in international security conditions following the Cold War as an example of how Japan had to reevaluate its alliance with the United States based on “uncertainty about the American commitment to Asia.”¹¹ Other events, such as September 11, the rise of China, or provocations on the part of North Korea, provide further examples of how shifts at the international and regional level have forced Japan to review its security policy. However, in addressing these issues, one factor pertaining to Japan’s security already mentioned has remained intact.

Many of the authors who address the historical nature of Japanese security policy in the context of international and regional security describe one factor as having been consistent and influential. The strength of the U.S.–Japan alliance has endured, despite shifts in the realm of international security and subsequent “uncertainties” mentioned above. Kazuhiko Togo offers a relatively recent example of the importance Japan has

⁹ Japanese Constitution, Chapter II, art. 9

¹⁰ Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 45.

¹¹ Evelyn Goh, “Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8 (2008): 366.

placed on the alliance, and references its position during the first round of the Six-Party Talks. Among Japan's priorities for the meeting was "cooperation with Washington and consolidation of the U.S. and Japanese positions."¹² This alliance is an important example of how external security issues and relationships impact Japan's security policy; however, other factors from the literature need to be discussed.

While much of the literature discussed thus far has emphasized external factors that have influenced Japanese security policy, to include the role they played in the formation of the country's constitution,¹³ domestic factors must be considered as well. The first factor to consider is the LDP and single party politics, which have been described as having had an equally important role in determining security policy for over 50 years. Samuels describes how domestic politics under "mainstream LDP dominance" impacted security through the party and bureaucracy's interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution.¹⁴ The relationship between the two would lead to the very formation of the SDF and further interpretation as to how the SDF would be permitted to operate into the future. The groundwork of this dynamic was laid during the immediate post-World War II and Cold War years, after which carefully balanced interpretations of "war potential" from Article 9 and achieving "minimum necessary [levels]" for self defense were continuously made, which allowed the LDP to eventually field a capable SDF without having to revise Article 9.

Authors also go to great lengths to describe how the dynamics mentioned above have generated much debate in Japan over security. Although the LDP was the dominant party for so long, and the single-party system afforded it the opportunity to dictate security policy as it saw fit, the literature is quick to acknowledge that the party itself could not escape fracture on the issue of security. For example, debate over the SDF stemmed from interpretation of the constitution (as mentioned above), and as a result, divisions within the LDP have been evident for some time:

¹² Kazuhiko Togo. "Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Multilateralism," in *East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability*, ed. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 185.

¹³ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 33.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 46.

Since that time [after the war], those who preferred the literal interpretation of Article 9 and those who have endeavored to loosen its constraints have contended for power within the LDP.¹⁵

Other authors also highlight how these divisions over security over time would challenge the integrity of the LDP and single-party system. Nakanishi Hiroshi discusses how these changes to the domestic political structure were a result of “the departure of those... who were dissatisfied with [what had become] the status quo” of foreign policy and security, in turn facilitating the emergence of new parties representing a different stance on these issues.¹⁶ The discussion over divisions within the LDP and subsequent emergence of opposition parties speaks to the broader influence of society in general. A number of authors have furthered the discussion of security policy by considering the influence of society and its associated norms.

The international relations theory of constructivism is offered frequently by a number of authors seeking to explain Japanese security policy, which adds another wrinkle to the discussion of policy evolution. Those advocating the theory and writing on the topic broadly suggest that domestically, there are “central tenets that have shaped Japan’s security practice for the past fifty years,”¹⁷ which is creating an antimilitarist (if not entirely pacifist) security identity subsequently reflected in security policy. While some authors may argue otherwise, this theory in support of a normative identity, combined with other domestic and external influences outlined above, are just a few examples of what authors have identified as driving factors behind Japanese security policy for several decades. It is within the context of these factors that authors are able to provide further granularity when discussing the evolution of Japan’s maritime security policy.

¹⁵ Richard J. Samuels, “Securing Japan: The Current Discourse,” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 33 (2007): 129.

¹⁶ Hiroshi Nakanishi, “The Japan-US Alliance and Japanese Domestic Politics: Sources of Change, Prospects for the Future,” in *The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia*, ed. Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center Publications, 2004), 106.

¹⁷ Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 1.

Some authors of existing literature have been able to provide specific examples of areas in which maritime security has fallen into Japan's broader security policy historically because of the factors mentioned previously. Samuels discusses how the relationship between international factors and Japan's security policy in 1981 led to the decision by the MSDF to "patrol the sea lanes of communication as far as one thousand nautical miles."¹⁸ Similarly, politicians in Japan have been forced to address maritime security issues stemming from the recent rise of China, particularly over the last two decades, and have oftentimes found that shifts in MSDF force posturing are "limited by constitutional constraints,"¹⁹ which, in turn, could be argued has its roots in more general societal norms of pacifism or antimilitarism. Keeping the findings of these discussions on Japan's broader and more focused maritime security policy in mind, a review of existing literature pertaining to the potential impact of the DPJ is now provided.

2. Maritime Security: Discussing the Future

Just as the history of Japan's maritime security has typically been framed by broader security policy, the same could be said for its future. Authors who have attempted to address the future security environment in Japan are quick to raise the fact that the emergence of the DPJ from the recent elections brings with it "a new era in Japanese politics and foreign policy."²⁰ Therefore, in an attempt to determine the future of security policy, some authors first look back to the past to identify initial elements of change. Nakanishi identifies the period of the 1990s as a time when a "semi-two-party system" is first seen, by citing the LDPs brief fall from power in 1993 and the emergence of opposition parties that began to forge a stronger political existence, as the first instance of security policies being brought into question.²¹

Now that the DPJ is in power, and a multiparty system is more of a reality, the areas of security policy in which differences have been identified over the years serve as

¹⁸ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 89.

¹⁹ James Manicom, "Japan's Ocean Policy: Still the Reactive State?" *Pacific Affairs* 83 (2010): 323.

²⁰ Hitoshi Tanaka and Adam P. Liff, "Japan's Foreign Policy and East Asian Regionalism," *Council on Foreign Relations*, December 2009, 1.

²¹ Nakanishi, "The Japan-US Alliance and Japanese Domestic Politics," 107.

the basis for authors to forecast the future of Japanese security. Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon provide some potential areas of departure from the status quo on the part of the DPJ. The two suggest the new party in power will emphasize a “pro-UN and pacifist orientation,” at the expense of relations with the United States, while showing greater concern over the validity of overseas deployments than their predecessors.²² Although more elaborate research establishing concrete evidence of this concept may take time to complete, some writers have commented on recent events that indicate the DPJ is following through on these stances.

In the absence of in-depth literature regarding the future of Japan’s maritime security under the DPJ and multi-party system, greater value will be placed on articles, newspapers and blogs (sparingly) that track current events pertaining to the topic. Based on recent news and posts, it could be possible to surmise that the under the DPJ, the policies of the Japanese government have shifted to some degree and reflect those previously suggested. For example, Peter Ennis recently posted in his blog that relations between the United States and Japan have been strained in the wake of the Iraq War, as Japan seeks a “‘more equal’ alliance relationship.” He also references the priority placed on orienting policy towards that of the UN.²³ While this type of analysis and information is important, it highlights the fact that research still needs to be done to address the impact the new domestic political dynamic will have on maritime security.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis seeks to identify the potential for the DPJ to effect change in maritime security policy in Japan. Therefore, a basic historical study of maritime security policy during LDP rule and the single party system that existed for more than five decades will serve as a starting point for addressing this potential for change following the recent shifts in domestic politics. Constructivist and realist theory will be useful in facilitating

²² Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon. “Rethinking Japan as an Ordinary Country,” in *The United States and Northeast Asia*, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 94.

²³ Peter Ennis, “The Iraq War’s damage to US-Japan relations,” *Dispatch Japan*, September 1, 2010, <http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2010/09/the-iraq-wars-damage-to-us-japan-relations.html>.

this discussion, as it will help to identify the domestic concerns and international context the LDP faced in the past, and under which maritime security policy was formed. For example, by analyzing the policies that emerged during the period from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War, the theories can speak to the broader international security concerns and influences for Japan, the role of societal norms,²⁴ and the manner in which the LDP addressed them, which resulted in the specific security policies to emerge during these periods. The results of such analysis can then be used as a baseline to measure the potential for consistency or change in maritime security policy under the new ruling party and domestic dynamic.

By drawing comparisons between the LDP and DPJ, this thesis assesses the likelihood that elements of Japanese maritime security previously mentioned could change. Among those aspects of maritime security to be considered are the continued strength of Japan's bilateral alliance with the United States, and focusing primarily on the efforts of the two countries in the field of ballistic missile defense, as well as Japan's pursuit of and role in more multilateral efforts abroad, which emphasizes its participation in antipiracy efforts in the HOA region. This is not to suggest that these two elements of maritime security are representative of policy across the board, as other aspects could potentially indicate change or lack thereof. Among these changes are the future development of force composition; interoperability exercises and operations with current strategic partners both regionally and abroad, and the potential to develop future relationships; and maritime force projection and posturing, within the context of the current and potentially amended constitution. However, priority is given to BMD and antipiracy in this thesis based on their importance to U.S security interests.

Based on the recentness of the emergence of the DPJ and the multiparty system in Japan, a majority of the sources for the comparative aspect of this thesis are drawn from journal and newspaper articles. Recent papers and studies from organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Congressional Research Service on the topic are drawn from them as well. Papers and articles on the topic from these sources, along with

²⁴ This thesis assumes that societal norms are important for any representative body to address.

those pertaining to maritime security, should prove useful, as they will provide the most current information on the recently occurring events, from which patterns and estimates might be established in the course of this thesis.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis continues with an international relations (IR) analysis of the broader security policies that emerged in Japan during three periods: post-World War II, the Cold War, and post-Cold War. This IR approach emphasizes constructivist and realist interpretations of Japan's security policies. The influential factors derived from these interpretations are then measured against one another and the ruling party (in this section, mainly the LDP). This analysis is being done to weigh the impact of the party against other factors in shaping policy in general, which serves as the foundation for discussing the DPJ and whether it has the potential to influence maritime security policy in later chapters.

Having contextualized the general influence parties have relative to other factors in shaping and forming security policy, the discussion then turns to the differences between the LDP and DPJ (both structural and ideological), each parties' outlook on security in general as reflected in their stance on maritime security policy, and most importantly, how the new party may seek to change policy. This last aspect of the discussion centers on the parties' perspectives on Japan's bilateral alliance with the United States, and how each is reflected in ballistic missile defense, along with their stance on multilateral efforts, as reflected in involvement abroad in antipiracy efforts.

After identifying the stance of the DPJ relative to the LDP on the aforementioned topics, the discussion focuses on the most current maritime security policies tied to BMD and antipiracy, and the role and perspective the DPJ had on the policy formation and implementation process. These policies are weighed against expectations of what the DPJ might have argued for based on its structure and ideology. From this analysis, consideration is also given to the current influence of societal norms and external

influences as driving factors of Japan's maritime security policy today, in addition to simple institutional practices that may or may not serve as obstacles to the DPJ's ability to change policy in the applicable areas.

Having established the potential for change (or lack thereof) in maritime security under the new domestic political dynamic, the last chapter offers final thoughts on the findings, and contextualizes them within the current international security environment. For example, given how the DPJ has addressed BMD and antipiracy, some conclusions can be drawn as to how the party may approach other maritime and broader security issues. Consideration are also given to areas in which the new government may make or has made any changes to maritime security policy, as has been the case with Indian Ocean refueling operations. The results of the research are also a used to expand briefly the discussion as to what impact the DPJs decisions on BMD and antipiracy may have beyond Japan. Particular consideration is given to the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance and relations with other regional actors as BMD progresses, along with the potential for Japan to develop new alliances abroad as it becomes more involved in antipiracy efforts. Finally, the influence of recent events and potential future events on maritime security policy under the DPJ, with the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, as well as the potential for continued provocative activity by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) or China serving as points of discussion is also considered.

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II. JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY AND ITS SOURCES

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: it aims to identify some of the important factors that have influenced the direction of security policy since the end of World War II, and to address the evolution of broader Japanese security policy over the same period of time. This task is valuable for a variety of reasons. First, the manner by which the country was rebuilt and emerged from the war produced a variety of influential domestic and foreign factors that have created a unique and dynamic security environment for Japan. Analyzing the combination of these factors offers valuable insight into the broader security priorities and the subsequent policies to emerge during the period. More importantly, this analysis contextualizes the role and influence of political parties in the process of shaping and implementing such policy, all of which is useful for subsequently discussing the potential influence of the DPJ on maritime security policy.

As no theory singlehandedly explains this evolution of Japan's security policy, a focused discussion on the international relations theory of constructivism offset against realist balancing theory provides the clearest picture possible of the more influential factors and important security policies within the country. To reiterate, it is not the goal of this thesis to advocate or challenge constructivist or realist posits regarding the security policy of Japan. Rather, the constructivist arguments, coupled with realist counter-arguments, are both relevant and useful in determining the role and influence of political parties in shaping security policy in general.

A. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CONSTRUCTIVIST ARGUMENT

A number of academics have used the international relations theory of constructivism to explain Japanese security policy since the end of World War II. Those advocating the theory and writing on the topic broadly suggest that domestically "central tenets that have shaped Japan's security practice for the past fifty years,"²⁵ exist, which created an antimilitarist, if not entirely pacifist security identity. Building on this constructivist argument, these "central tenets" are norms prevalent across Japanese

²⁵ Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice*, 1.

society, which have emerged and become entrenched over time as a result of society's collective experience and identity, particularly since the end of World War II. These norms include an "underlying fear of the military [that] has remained strong into the present era,"²⁶ and an emphasis on developing the economy in lieu of traditional military might. The notion that such norms are highly influential in shaping security policy is particularly relevant when attempting to determine the influence and role of a country's domestic political structure as well. This notion is all the more relevant in the case of Japan, as the recent domestic events provide a foundation for discussing the balance between these normative and structural factors, and subsequently, raise the question of how viable each is in explaining how Japanese security policy is formed.

The remainder of this chapter begins with a brief narrative of Japan's security policy since the end of World War II. The discussion then shifts to an outline of constructivist theory, and includes ways in which norms might influence security policy. Examples supporting this argument then are drawn from the narrative of Japan's security policy throughout the years, in an effort to highlight how norms and identity might shape security policy. While this sets the context for determining whether a constructivist argument holds true for Japan, it also facilitates a discussion of what other factors play into the formation of security policy, both internal and external to Japan (the realist theory of balancing offers an alternative explanation of the influence of external factors, in addition to discussing the role of political structure as a means of providing depth to the discussion). Lastly, the chapter concludes with a summary and overall assessment of how effective each of these theoretical explanations is in promoting the influence of each factor on shaping Japanese security policy, and alludes to the limited influence of domestic political structures and any subsequent changes to it.

²⁶ Thomas U. Berger, "Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Constructivist Interpretation," in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 393.

B. JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II

The purpose of tracing Japan's security policy since the end of World War II is simply to identify hallmark events, basic trends, and practices of the past 50 to 60 years, independent of theoretical explanations for such policies. Theoretical arguments can then be applied to this information in an effort to explain the policy outcomes. The section is divided into three time frames: post-World War II years, Cold War years, and post-Cold War years. Once the important events and policy trends have been identified from each period, the constructivist argument is applied, as well as how to assess its validity in explaining Japanese security policy against that of realist balancing, and the importance of domestic structures.

1. Post-World War II (1945–1952)

Security policy in the aftermath of World War II was heavily shaped by Japan's loss, and more importantly, by the allied (predominantly U.S.) occupation. The objective at the time was to demilitarize the country, and "remove all obstacles to the revival and strength[en]ing of democratic tendencies."²⁷ This focus on demilitarization was echoed in the new Japanese constitution, in particular in Article 9:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.²⁸

These examples during the post-World War II period are indicative of a time when security policy was not entirely in the hands of the Japanese people. It is important to understand that despite the fact they were not the sole architects, elements of the policies

²⁷ "Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan" (Potsdam Declaration), July 26, 1945, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945 2*, pt. 2 (1960): 1474–1476.

²⁸ Japanese Constitution, Chapter II, art. 9.

of this period still endure today (i.e., Article 9); “[however], with the onset of the Cold War, Japan began to move away from this highly demilitarized stance.”²⁹

2. Cold War Years (1952–1991)

External events and influences were responsible for drawing Japan into the Cold War, which forced a change in the country’s approach to security policy. The role of the United States remained important. For example, as the Cold War was unfolding, some American policy makers (such as George Kennan) viewed Japan as a center of industrial power. As a result, it was a critical element to keeping Soviet expansion in check, which was a reversal from previous pacifist policies. NSC 13/2 speaks to this reversal, stating “if Russia continues to present threat to world peace which she does today... we must retain allied forces in Japan or we must permit Japan to re-arm.”³⁰ This reversal served as the foundation for further change in security policy as the Cold War progressed.

As the Cold War progressed, Japan had clearly departed from full demilitarization in aligning itself with the United States and beginning to develop a capable SDF. The security relationship was first solidified in 1960 with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, and was revisited during the course of the Cold War. Whereas the 1960 treaty placed much of Japan’s security needs in the hands of the United States, by 1978 the nature of the relationship was beginning to change. The 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation called for “closer coordination of U.S. and Japanese forces ... bilateral cooperation relating to Japan’s immediate defense ... and for cooperation in regional contingencies in the Far East.”³¹ This dynamic expanded the country’s ability to provide for its own self-defense, while remaining under the greater U.S. security umbrella. Japanese security policy had evolved during this period and was more proactive than ever since the end of World War II. Calls for further expansion and increased capability of the JSDF under the National Defense Programme Outline are indicative of this evolution, although the reasons behind

²⁹ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 23.

³⁰ NSC 13/2: “Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan,” October 7, 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948* 6 (1974): 858–862.

³¹ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, 24.

such calls for expansion were “not a result of U.S. pressure, but rather because of growing fear about abandonment,” following Nixon’s Guam Doctrine of 1969.³² However, “remilitarization... was subject to significant brakes,”³³ as evidenced by the decision “to keep defense spending below one percent of GNP”³⁴ and the fact that security remained heavily tied to the United States. This situation was the pattern throughout the Cold War, although with its end came the necessity for further reappraisals of Japanese security policy.

3. Post Cold War Years (1991–Present)

As Christopher Hughes has stated, Japan has been faced with a number of decisions about its security policy due to “changes in the regional and global security environment since the end of the Cold War.”³⁵ First, the once bipolar international system has become dominated for the time being by the United States, and although Japan has kept close ties with its Cold War partner since, the security policy of orienting with the United States against a monolithic communist threat has become less relevant. Next, other regional concerns have emerged in the absence of the Soviet threat, namely, the threat from a nuclear capable North Korea, and the emergence of China as an ever-growing economic and military power. These concerns, coupled with significant world events, such as 9/11 and subsequent wars in the Middle East, have forced Japan to re-evaluate (with greater frequency) its once relatively consistent security policies, in an effort to determine the role it will play beyond its borders.

Now that the basic elements of Japanese security policy through the years have been outlined, the constructivist explanation behind why such policy was formed can now be discussed. The realist explanation of balancing is then briefly discussed, in addition to the role of domestic structures to provide alternative explanations. The three

³² Glenn D. Hook et al., *Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 151-153.

³³ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, 25.

³⁴ Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 124.

³⁵ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, 27.

are then weighed against one another to determine their validity in explaining both Japan's security policies of the past, and those of the future given the more recent changes in the country's domestic political environment.

C. EXPLAINING SECURITY POLICIES OF THE PAST

Before addressing the constructivist explanation of Japan's security policy following World War II, a brief review of the theory is provided. Constructivist theory argues that culture, identity, and norms, which are formed over time by a society's collective experience, influence the interests and subsequent policies of states. One advocate of the theory, Peter Katzenstein, more eloquently defines constructivism in terms of norms "whose effects are potentially as important in shaping politics as raw power or rational calculations... [and] typically inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish."³⁶ In a broader theoretical context, this concept proves useful in explaining why states displaying certain characteristics and strengths (i.e., relative wealth or power) pursue and implement policies that seem counterintuitive to such traits. Furthermore, from a security perspective, this concept can offer insight regarding:

[The] tactical predispositions of specific military services, to broader strategic preferences of a nation or military, to the broadest national interests and international security norms.³⁷

In the case of Japan, the next step is to apply these constructivist concepts in an effort to determine what the theory argues are the reasons behind the security policy that has emerged since the end of World War II.

1. Application of Constructivism to Japanese Security Policy of the Past

Before attempting to test the validity of the constructivist argument amidst recent changes for Japan, it would be useful to analyze and assess its validity with respect to

³⁶ Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, ix.

³⁷ Christopher P. Twomey, "Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security," *Contemporary Security Policy* 29, no. 2 (2008): 339–340.

Japanese security policy of the past. Therefore, similar to Peter Katzenstein's approach,³⁸ the events, trends and practices of the World War II and Cold War periods previously outlined are analyzed through the constructivist lens. The two periods of time are assessed on the following three criteria: the societal climate, external influences, and domestic actors (leaders). This assessment is done in an effort to determine the existence and role of pacifist norms, how they were formed, and their influence on the policy that emerged during those times.

a. Post-World War II Period

As a reminder prior to assessing the role of norms in post-World War II Japanese security policy, the key security trends, events, and practices of the period included the occupation (primarily) by the United States, the demilitarization of Japan, and Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. The first trend produced the subsequent events and practices. This trend also speaks to the role of external influences and greater societal climate in producing a pacifist norm, which in turn, influenced security policy. Constructivists argue that the efforts of the U.S. led occupation to demilitarize Japan “were designed to downgrade the military profession in the eyes of the public... [and involved] a thorough campaign to discredit the former Japanese armed forces and prevent their restoration.”³⁹ Coupled with the fact that World War II ended in embarrassing defeat and unconditional surrender, it makes sense that an “anti-militarist climate of opinion was generated”⁴⁰ across greater society.

Some evidence that the occupation had successfully produced greater societal norms of anti-militarism and pacifism is reflected in the domestic rhetoric and action taken concerning the Japanese education system:

³⁸ In his book, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, Peter Katzenstein used the norms and security policies and practices of the pre-World War II period as a point of comparison against what he saw to be the norms and policies after the war.

³⁹ Douglas H. Mendel, Jr. “Public Views of the Japanese Defense System,” in *The Modern Japanese Military System*, ed. James H. Buck (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), 154.

⁴⁰ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World* (Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Series, 1993), 109.

The climate was encouraged by the firing of all “nationalistic” schoolteachers (those who had been military officers or executives of veterans organizations) and widespread censorship of textbooks to remove any favorable references to past military heroes and victories.⁴¹

Of course, arguably the most important indicator that pacifist norms had permeated society and were influencing security policy was the ratification of the Japanese “Peace Constitution” with its hallmark, Article 9.

While the bulk of Article 9 speaks to security policy, pacifist norms are echoed in the first sentence, “aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order.”⁴² That this document contained such words, and was ratified by Japanese leaders, reinforces the constructivist argument that pacifist norms existed across society, and in this case, were being addressed and finding their way into security policy. The constructivist argument that norms have influenced Japanese security policy does not end with the post-World War II period. Rather, it serves as a foundation for discussing its applicability during the Cold War.

b. Cold War Period

In similar fashion, some of the important security trends, events, and practices of the Cold War period are revisited prior to applying the constructivist argument. These include the continued role of the United States during the period, the formation and role of the SDF, the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of 1976, and the defense budget.

This assessment of the constructivist argument during the Cold War period begins with the security trend of continued relations with the United States, and attempts to identify how norms factored into this policy. This trend was easily anti-militarist and pacifist in nature during the post-World War II period. However, after only a few short years, this changed, and “demilitarization was... stood on its head as growing tensions with the Communist world prompted Americans to rethink Japan’s possible defense role

⁴¹ Mendel, Jr., “Public Views,” 154–155.

⁴² Japanese Constitution, Chapter II, art. 9

in East Asia.”⁴³ This reversal seems to complicate the constructivist argument, as the one major external influence responsible for ensuring demilitarization and promoting pacifism was calling for Japan to rearm. The uniformity of norms across the three criteria for evaluating their influence on security policy no longer existed. Despite this shift in priorities for the United States, which eliminates an external source of pacifist norms, the interaction among the three criteria provide enough examples of how pacifist norms influenced the security policy to emerge during this period.

While the policy reversal of the United States did much to push Japan toward rearmament, the pacifist norms across greater Japanese society did much to temper efforts to do so. The issues associated with the formation and role of the SDF speak to this. As domestic actors were faced with having to address legitimate security concerns and took heed of Washington’s call to rearm, the greater societal climate continued to reflect pacifist tendencies. Although the SDF would be formed, the fact that its role during this period has been subject to interpretation, underscores the power such a societal climate had on Japanese security policy. Douglas Mendel traces this back to the occupation years, and “how effective the demilitarization reforms... were in the wake of the Japanese public’s disillusion with their own military.”⁴⁴ He even draws from studies done from August to September 1957, including his own regional ones, which asked “should Japan in the future try to follow American policy in various matters?”⁴⁵ While not exact, the numbers of each study done were quite similar, with only approximately one-third of the population responding “yes.” The other two-thirds either responded “no,” or “other; don’t know.” Therefore, in some regard, the very external factor that had now shifted its perspective to rearmament was still responsible for the societal pacifist stigma that would keep the governments security policies in check for the duration of the Cold War.

⁴³ James L. McClain, *Japan: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002), 554.

⁴⁴ Mendel, Jr., “Public Views,” 156.

⁴⁵ Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 55.

Other examples of greater societal pacifism influencing government security policy decisions were seen in the 1970s as well. The 1976 NDPO, for example, was the government's "long term defense policy... based on the concept of threshold deterrence and the mobilization of a 'standard defense' force."⁴⁶ Although it called for modernization of the SDF and the ability to respond to threats, Katzenstein and Okawara argue that the terminology in the NDPO is vague and limiting, representative of "prevailing domestic political sentiments at the time."⁴⁷ Lest the constructive argument sound redundant, however, another factor had to play into the pacifist tendencies of the time, which can be found in the domestic actors who in the long run enacted the security policies.

The LDP was the party that had the difficult task of juggling public opinion, with the needs of the day, to include addressing security issues; but more existed to the dynamic of implementing certain security policies than just catering to societal pacifism. McClain emphasized that:

Organizationally the LDP functioned as a party of factions. Throughout its political heyday a half dozen or so major alliances jockeyed with one another for influence... Because of its coalitions, the LDP advocated an eclectic set of policies, even while projecting an image of conservative pragmatism.⁴⁸

Although much of the internal squabbling was over domestic issues, the 1960 revision of the United States-Japan Security Treaty was one example of party factionalism causing a stir. The ruling faction under Kishi Nobusuke faced stiff opposition, but managed to pass the treaty extension. This example, although not a solid example of pacifism within the LDP, shows how domestic actors during the Cold War not only had to contend with pacifist society and the opposition parties in government, but opposition from within as well.

Having outlined a constructivist argument for explaining Japanese security policy from the end of World War II through the Cold War, a case can be reasonably

⁴⁶ Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan's National Security*, 125.

⁴⁷ Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan's National Security*, 126.

⁴⁸ McClain, *Japan: A Modern History*, 567–568.

made that a number of factors played into the formation and perpetuation of pacifist norms during the period of time. Alone, neither one can explain the existence of such norms. For example, if an attempt is made to argue that pacifist norms were simply inherent across greater Japanese society, a legitimate question then follows: Would they have been as prevalent and had as great an impact if the occupation had not encouraged, if not outright forced, such pacifism in the postwar years? Therefore, no one factor alone can support the constructivist argument; but together, they make a valid case for the way norms influence Japanese security policy. Other theories, such as that of realist balancing, offer different explanations as to how security policy is formed, which are equally as useful in understanding the relative influence domestic structure truly has in shaping and implementing security policy.

2. Balancing—A Realist Argument

In an effort to provide depth to the discussion regarding the formation and implementation of security policy in Japan, briefly discussing the theory of balancing can offer an alternative explanation of Japan's post-World War II and Cold War years. First, as it pertains to structural realist theories, balancing falls under a systems level of analysis, which would describe the international environment in which Japan exists as being anarchic in nature. Also, as a primary actor within the system, little regard is given to domestic apparatus in Japan. Building off these most basic of realist assumptions and drawing heavily from Stephen Walt, balancing occurs when states form an alliance to protect against the threat posed by an opposing state or alliance, and occurs for two reasons:

First, [states] put their survival at risk if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong... Second, joining the weaker side increases the new member's influence within the alliance, because the weaker side has greater need for assistance.⁴⁹

Walt's posit is applied to the events previously outlined from the periods above (mainly the Cold War), but not in an extended discussion.

⁴⁹ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning," in *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, ed. Robert Art and Robert Jervis, 6th ed. (New York: Longman Publishers, 2003), 96.

Using Walt's description and reasoning behind balancing to understand the Japanese security situation from the end of World War II through the Cold War, the theory would argue that based on Japan's external security environment, it felt the need to balance against a potential threat. In that sense, Japan saw the Soviet Union as a threat to its security, and therefore, balanced with the United States against it. This argument does make sense, as the Soviet Union was certainly a proximate threat based on geography. However, the second argument of balancing may be questionable.

Walt's argument that a state would join the weaker side because of a relatively greater amount of influence it would have, and the need for assistance on the part of the weak, does not seem to fit Japan's security profile of the entire period. Much of the discussion under the constructivist section pertains to Japan's weakened state in the wake of World War II. Thus, the country had little it could offer the United States; not to belabor the point, but the United States also further weakened Japan during the occupation and demilitarization, which is certainly not characteristic of a state in need of assistance. Therefore, the balancing argument may not hold as much weight for Japan during the postwar and early Cold War years, or any other state to have suffered such defeat and dismantling. What about after Japan began to rearm and modernize militarily with its economic success as the Cold War progressed?

The case for the second balancing argument may improve as the Cold War progressed. Periods of perceived Soviet strengthening relative to the United States, coupled with rearming and subsequent modernizations of the SDF, such as those undertaken following the 1976 NDPO, speak to a weaker United States valuing a stronger Japan. Perhaps the best case to be made is that periods in which balancing is more applicable than others do occur. Neither advocating, nor dismissing this realist theory, the more pertinent take away is that both theories offer a legitimate a case for explaining the security policy to emerge in Japan from the post-World War II period through the Cold War. Perhaps each will prove equally useful in piecing together and explaining Japanese security policy since the end of the Cold War, and, thereby, providing a degree of perspective in determining the role of domestic structure in the process, especially following the recent domestic changes there.

D. CONSIDERING THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

The subsequent sections seek to identify some of the major security events of interest to Japan in this era since the end of the Cold War. Once they have been identified, a similar constructivist/realist discussion is offered in an attempt to discern how the policies of the period are potentially being shaped and implemented, and where domestic structural changes factor into the process. This discussion proves most useful for subsequent chapters, as the discussion also helps identify important security issues for Japan in which maritime security may have a prominent role.

1. Security Events of the Post-Cold War

Major security events for Japan since the end of the Cold War have been marked by a shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world, the emergence of regional nuclear, military, and economic powers, and dramatic acts of terror by non-state actors, followed by allied efforts to squelch out such security threats all over the world. Amidst these rather significant changes in Japan's security environment, there has been as significant turmoil has occurred in producing a consistent security policy. In an attempt to piece together some of the major policy decisions to emerge during this time, it is possible to identify where Japan has attempted to engage its regional partners more unilaterally. Attempts have been made to involve the SDF abroad,⁵⁰ and Japan, at times, has sought to exert itself more in its alliance with the United States. These events serve as a foundation for presenting the constructivist and realist explanations of Japan's more recent security policy.

2. Constructivist Explanation of Recent Security Policy

Turning to the constructivist explanation of more recent security related events for Japan, the first to be addressed is the shift from a bipolar security environment to one that has been more or less dominated by the United States since the end of the Cold War. Recall that in the bipolar environment of the Cold War, Japan maintained close ties to its post-World War II occupier. This single relationship did much to stoke the fires of

⁵⁰ Yasuhiro Izumikawa, "Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security Policy," *International Security*, 35, no. 2 (2010): 123–160.

pacifist norms initially, but later also called for a rearmed Japan. Pacifism seemed strong enough to have endured such pressures from the outside however, despite the emergence of a modern and capable SDF. Today, notice that the United States and Japan have continued their alliance, and Japan has even increased its ability to operate outside of simple self-defense, as evidenced by numerous defense reviews from 1995 to 1997, and in “[providing] non-combat logistical and reconstruction support to the US-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq.”⁵¹ The key term in the sentence above, however, is “non-combat;” it would appear some concern for maintaining pacifist tendencies still exists. However, how do such tendencies hold up in the face of a rapidly evolving regional environment?

While a degree of consistency that the dynamics of the U.S.-Japan alliance has done little to eliminate pacifism as factor influencing Japanese security policy does appear, it might be expect that as regional concerns increase, action might be taken to reduce the effects of such norms. However, if the constructivist argument is correct, pacifist norms will temper the approach to dealing with the rise of new regional powers that may pose a threat to Japanese security. Depending on the threat however, the result has varied. Concerning nuclear North Korea, the leadership “has been cautious not to sound soft on North Korea... [but] approves of economic sanctions... and have called for reinforcing Japan’s maritime security posture to counter North Korean spy boats and smuggling.”⁵² This attitude seems to be more of a hard-line approach to dealing with a threat than seen in the past out of Japan, and with a state such as North Korea, such policy could lead to escalation that might force Japan to have to take military action it has not done in the past 50 to 60 years. Dealing with other countries in the region has produced a different tone, one that is more pacifist in nature.

China’s economic rise and increased military strength could pose just as much of a threat to Japan as North Korea, if not more so. The fact China has become the second largest economy in the world, while Japan remains in heavy debt, coupled with its efforts

⁵¹ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, 33.

⁵² Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aoki Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan,” *Asia Policy*, no. 9 (January 2010): 57–58.

to modernize militarily, could be perceived as a tremendous threat to which Japan should respond with even more aggressive policy than against North Korea if necessary. However, in this case:

[The] Japanese role is premised on the perceived necessity to work together with other East Asian countries who share the same interests and agenda, as demonstrated by former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2002 when he advanced the concept of an East Asian Community.⁵³

This sort of policy and rhetoric speaks at the very least to continued antimilitarism, if not entirely pacifist security policy, and are examples of how the dynamic between the greater societal climate, domestic actors, and external influences may still indicate pacifist norms play into the formation of broader security policy for Japan. Two more examples that further support the existence of pacifist norms are seen in Okinawa and the cap on defense spending. While the events surrounding this island are worthy of their own thesis, suffice it to say that calls for the relocation of U.S. facilities on the island are indicative of pacifism. Similarly, the self-imposed cap on defense spending at one percent reflects a desire to limit military expansion, again an indication that pacifism is present in Japanese society. However, just as was the case in analyzing the post World War II and Cold War periods, an alternative explanation is offered.

3. Realist Explanation of the Post-Cold War Period

In an even more concise manner, an alternative explanation to the constructivist argument is offered. Keeping with balancing theory, it would be expected to see Japan balance against a potential hegemonic threat to its security. In this case, it is possible to look at a hegemonic threat, both regional or global, in two ways. If speaking from a regional perspective, the threat would more than likely be associated with China, and for similar reasons as to why the Soviet Union was a threat, based on geographic proximity. However, if looking at the situation through a global lens, the threat becomes the United

⁵³ Yoshihide Soeya, "Japanese Domestic Politics and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," *Council on Foreign Relations*, (December 2009), 7.

States, and Japan would balance with those in its region to counter the threat. However, does this really add up based on the security events and policies outlined in the post-Cold War period?

It would be difficult to argue that Japan is balancing at the global level against the United States. The countries have maintained their close ties despite any desires among domestic actors calling for a change in the dynamic of the alliance. Nor does balancing fully explain Japan's handling of regional threats. Engaging China through an East Asian Community forum and handling North Korea with economic sanctions does little to support a realist balancing argument centered on relative power and security. However, the post-Cold War environment is still young and evolving, and Japan is not the only state adapting its security policies in "real time." As the environment unfolds, the balancing argument may become more and more relevant.

E. CONCLUSION

The theoretical explanations offered by constructivism and realist balancing serve as a mechanism for identifying important security concerns that have been prominent in Japan throughout the years, and the policies the country has formed and implemented to address them. The constructivist argument that Japan's collective experience has shaped a pacifist identity, and in turn, influenced the formation of security policy in Japan is a reasonable explanation for the policies that have emerged since the post-World War II period. Likewise, realist-balancing theory presents some valid arguments regarding why Japan pursued the security policies it has throughout the years. However, neither the constructivist norms of pacifism, nor balancing, adequately answer each question involving the state's security policies. It is apparent that a combination of factors and explanations are necessary to understand the nature of Japanese security policy fully. Part of such an understanding includes determining the role and influence of domestic structure and parties in shaping security policy. This discussion helps contextualize their role in the policy formation process, and it is from this point it is possible to address the impact and role of these domestic factors both in the past under the LDP, and currently,

under the recently elected DPJ. Lastly, the broader concerns outlined above will help in identifying the most applicable aspects of maritime security to be discussed in subsequent chapters.

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III. COMPARING THE LDP AND THE DPJ: STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY AS REFLECTED IN MARITIME SECURITY POLICY

Having used general international relations theories to contextualize the role of domestic actors and structure in the policy formation process, the discussion of this chapter turns to the parties that have ruled Japan since the end of World War II. The narrative consists of the background of the LDP, its perception of Japan's broader security environment through the years, and its experience and perceived involvement in shaping and implementing security policy relative to other factors outlined in Chapter II, offset against a brief discussion of the DPJ, namely its background and points of departure with the LDP pertaining to maritime security policy, which is expanded upon in the next chapter.

A. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

This discussion of the LDP will briefly highlight its origins and background, followed by an outline of the party's views of Japan's broader security environment throughout the years. In addressing these views, consideration is given to the influence the party has had in shaping and implementing security policy relative to the normative and external factors previously outlined by constructivist and realist theories in Chapter II. The discussion then turns to the party's perspective and influence on more recent maritime security related issues pertaining to bilateralism and multilateralism, as indicated by policy tied to ballistic missile defense and antipiracy operations.

1. Origins and Background: LDP Structure and Ideology

Before the elections of 2009 and the arrival of the DPJ, the LDP had been the dominant ruling party of Japan (barring a brief period in the early 1990s) since its founding in 1955. The result of a merger between two smaller conservative parties at the time,⁵⁴ the LDP was the face of Japanese domestic politics. From a structural perspective, it is worth noting that factionalism and politically influential party members have been

⁵⁴ Bradley Richardson, *Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 50.

important factors of the LDP. Factionalism has been prevalent since the party's inception, and "[many] observers of postwar Japanese politics identify persistent factionalism as the most important organizational attribute of the... Liberal Democratic Party."⁵⁵ Likewise, influential party members carried their own incentives and influenced the party's agenda throughout the years. However, structure is not the only important aspect of the party worthy of discussion.

Ideology has also been important to the party's dominance, perhaps more so than its structure. Without breaking down LDP ideology in its entirety, an argument can easily be made that the party's ideology had to evolve over time and consider a range of issues to sustain its dominance through the years. As such, the LDP portrayed itself and its ideology in a manner that made it "a giant catchall party during its hegemony."⁵⁶ With this understanding of party ideology, it stands to reason that the LDP addressed security concerns and policy only when such issues were at the forefront of domestic politics.

With this simplified understanding of the LDP, the argument could be furthered that the structural balance within the LDP and the nature of its ideology during its period of rule were a microcosm of what was determined to be of political importance to the country, and reflect the efforts of the party to remain in power. This argument builds upon the discussion from Chapter II, and further contextualizes the role of domestic structure and parties in shaping security policy amidst the role and influence of broader societal norms (constructivism) and external factors (realist concerns). Considering this, it is easier to understand the LDP's views of the security environment, and the party's role in the formation and implementation of security policy.

2. LDP Views of the Security Environment and Influence on Policy

Having briefly summarized the LDP and its priorities during its years in power, the discussion can now turn to the party's view of the security environment, in particular during the post-Cold War years, and interpreting its ability to influence security policy in

⁵⁵ Masaru Kohno, "Rational Foundations for the Organization of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan," *World Politics* 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 370.

⁵⁶ Richardson, *Japanese Democracy*, 68.

more recent years. However, in the interest of continuity, a brief outline of LDPs views and influence on security policy in the period leading up to the post-Cold War years is provided.

The best approach to summarizing the LDPs views and influence in the realm of security policy leading up to the post-Cold War era is to combine Gerald L. Curtis' phased outline of LDP rule⁵⁷ with significant security related events that occurred during each phase similar to those raised in Chapter II. This combination is useful for a number of reasons. First, in the interest of brevity, it allows a significant portion of LDP rule to be covered quickly. Second, Curtis' phased outline accounts for some of the opposition the LDP had to face, which is further useful in contextualizing the party's interests and role in security related matters of the period.

a. Phase One

Phase one of this discussion covers LDP rule from its founding in 1955 to the mid-sixties, as delineated by Curtis. During this phase, the contentious nature of the domestic climate was closely tied to Japan's security environment. The party was opposed by an ideologically left-leaning Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), which sought to hinder the LDP's "objective of overturning the constitutional order established during the American Occupation."⁵⁸ This is a fairly clear example of a time the LDP had readily identifiable views and a desire to alter the nature of Japan's security policy and environment. Another example pertaining to the security relationship with the United States that arose during this time was the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty of 1960. The question then becomes whether or not the party was in fact capable of influencing security policy in either of the two instances.

In the case of the overturning constitutional order, the LDP sought such action based on the notion that "if Japan [was] to be truly independent, it must have the

⁵⁷ Gerald L. Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 15–37.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

power to defend itself,”⁵⁹ which is hindered by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Efforts to alter Article 9 were impeded and have been routinely opposed by political opposition to the LDP, which highlights the limited impact the party had in influencing this security policy during this period. A similar conclusion could be reached in assessing the security treaty of 1960. While the treaty was passed, and could be construed as a victory for the LDP in influencing security policy, the circumstances of the treaty’s ratification paint a starkly different picture. The passing of the treaty had more to do with governmental gridlock than effective political campaigning on the part of the LDP, as it faced tremendous governmental opposition from the JSP, and publicly, from portions of society advocating neutralism. These examples suggest a constrained ability on the part of the LDP during this period to influence security policy in support of its overarching views. However, that is not to suggest the party viewed security related success in terms of simply being able to revise Article 9.

Taking into account the constructivist and realist arguments from Chapter II, a balance was certainly struck between addressing domestic norms and external threats. With this perspective, it could be argued that although the party did not succeed in revising Article 9, and despite difficulty in passing the 1960 treaty, the LDP was able to operate within a constrained political environment in a manner that best served its political needs and the security needs of the nation. In the aftermath of this period, the party still maintained power, and the country had established a reliable bilateral relationship with the United States that did more to enhance its security environment.

b. Phase Two

The second phase to be analyzed ranges from the mid-sixties to the late 1970s, as indicated by Curtis. This period is characterized by the rise in the number of opposition parties, as well as a decline in overall support for the LDP. Despite the increased competition, the LDP was able to maintain its hold on government, as “the inability of any of the new challengers to develop into anything more than minor

⁵⁹ Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 129.

parties... [helped] the LDP retain power by fragmenting opposition to it.”⁶⁰ Regardless, in trying to understand the security related views and influence of the LDP during the period, this dynamic is not seemingly conducive for a majority party to act unilaterally on any issue, let alone those dealing with security. Therefore, the discussion must turn to the security policies that emerged during this phase to identify better the LDPs views and influence at the time.

Two important and related events pertaining to Japan’s security environment and associated policy occurred during this period, which offer some insight into the views and influence of the LDP. The first is the Nixon Doctrine, and the second is the NDPO of 1976. Looking back at the security environment and policy outlined in phase one, the Nixon Doctrine had significant implications for Japan’s relationship and reliance on the United States, “and seemed to define an American response of foreign policy retrenchment,”⁶¹ during this time. The 1976 NDPO aimed to address this significant change in Japan’s security environment. Sparing the details, the NDPO called for a defense buildup in lieu of U.S. presence and support. Recalling the constructivist argument on behalf of prevalent pacifist, anti-militarist norms across Japanese society, the NDPO “met with surprisingly little public resistance.”⁶² Given its status as the ruling party, this incident seemingly illustrates an instance in which the LDP was able to influence security policy based on its views. However, it is important to acknowledge that this policy was passed amidst significant changes in Japan’s security environment, as well as during a time when the party itself was in relative decline, which made it difficult to argue that the changes were a result of the influence of the LDP.

Once more, the balance between the influence of parties, norms, and external factors helps to explain this dynamic. While the LDP was instrumental in the passing of the NDPO, the importance of external threats cannot be dismissed as a driving

⁶⁰ Curtis, *The Japanese Way*, 21.

⁶¹ Thomas A. Drohan, *American-Japanese Security Agreements, Past and Present* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2007), 101.

⁶² Steven Kent Vogel, “A New Direction in Japanese Defense Policy: Views from the Liberal Democratic Party Diet Members,” *Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies* 63, no. 4 (1984): 9.

factor behind its passing as well. Although the constructivist argument would suggest the NDPO should not have passed given pacifist societal norms, the country as whole had to consider the prospects of being helpless against the communist threat of the period, especially in the potential absence of U.S. presence as the Nixon Doctrine had indicated.

c. Phase Three

The final phase of the Cold War era spans from the late 1970s to the war's end in the early 1990s. Turning once more to Curtis' discussion of LDP rule, this period is characterized by the party's consolidation of power against domestic opposition along with "a continuing decline in ideological polarization."⁶³ While some projected the rise of security and defense minded individuals, and subsequently, more hawkish policies,⁶⁴ the party factionalism, structure, and individuals previously outlined remained, as well as the need to cater to a broad swath of society to stay in power. This situation speaks to the fact that while Japan continued to grow economically, policies and growth pertaining to security were limited. LDP leadership and the nature of Japan's security relationship with the United States are indicative of this.

While some LDP leaders, such as Yasuhiro Nakasone, were hawkish and in favor of "a strong, proud, and militarily independent Japan,"⁶⁵ it was other, more dovish LDP leaders, such as Zenko Suzuki, that saw to the renegotiation of the treaty with the United States in 1981. While Nakasone, and an arguably more hawkish government, would succeed Suzuki as Prime Minister, the terms of the 1981 agreement set the tone for Japanese security policy through the end of the Cold War. Degrees of expansion were associated with the agreement, such as increased capabilities of the SDF, and expansion of Japan's area of responsibility. However, "due to Japan's [normative] self-defense constraints, increased economic contributions were natural offsets for [an] American military guarantee... [after all, even 35 years later], the Occupation

⁶³ Curtis, *The Japanese Way*, 35.

⁶⁴ Vogel, "A New Direction," 46.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

Constitution clearly prohibited war potential of any kind.”⁶⁶ Once more, it is difficult to make a case that LDP views and influence during this phase were wholly reflected in the security policies of the time.

The policies that emerged and the role of the LDP during the era of the Cold War further the notion that while not entirely irrelevant in the security policy process, the party was constrained. In general, this discussion suggests that Japanese security policy of the era was shaped as much by a balance between societal constraints, and the influence of external events and actors, as the governing party. While the LDP was able to consolidate enough power during the period to maintain its hold on the domestic system, in the realm of security policy, the party was consistently challenged at any given time by the influence of the United States, a looming communist threat, and pacifist norms, in addition to waves of political opposition. It is also important to mention however, that no single factor was truly able to dominate security policy during the period. The end of the Cold War signaled an end to this dynamic. Discussing the post-Cold War Era offers an opportunity to address these changes, while also lending to a more focused discussion of maritime security policy under the LDP and later, the DPJ.

3. LDP Views and Influence: Post-Cold War Era and Maritime Security

During the Cold War years, Japan navigated the security environment by keeping close ties to the United States. The role of the LDP in the relatively consistent policy decision-making process of the period has been identified. However, in the absence of the monolithic communist threat, the security environment in the post-Cold War era has been no less dynamic for Japan and the LDP, which provided greater depth to the discussion of the party’s views and influence on security policy, and a more detailed foundation for comparison against the recently elected DPJ. The most important overarching theme in this section for understanding the LDPs views and influence in the post-Cold War era pertains to the new generation of leaders that emerged in 2001, and is outlined by Richard Samuels:

⁶⁶ Drohan, *American-Japanese Security Agreements*, 102.

Rather than focus on their elders' traditional issues of defense technology, budgets, and equipment procurement, this group urged Japan to "defend its national interest based upon 'realism'". They had the unqualified support of young conservatives... not to mention the support of the United States.⁶⁷

However, just as it was difficult to outline the views and influence of the LDP during the Cold War era, the same can be said for the post-Cold War period. Therefore, keeping in mind Samuels' description, the discussion unfolds as follows. First, although some analysis is drawn from the period of the 1990s, emphasis is placed on Japan's security environment and policies to emerge following the September 11 attacks. Second, the discussion begins to focus on two aspects of security policy for Japan, each involving the maritime realm, BMD and antipiracy.

a. The United States and Ballistic Missile Defense

An understanding of the party views and influence on security policy alluded to by Samuels in the post-Cold War period can begin with an analysis of Japan's continued bilateral ties with the United States as evidenced in its BMD policy. The issue of bilateralism with the United States has existed since the end of World War II, and BMD predates the end of the Cold War, with its origins in the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s. Using the period of the 1980s as a starting point, rhetoric from Prime Minister Nakasone at the time suggested Japan continued to support its alliance with the United States, as well as the SDI. However, following the end of the Cold War, significant debate occurred over how Japan should proceed in the security environment in general, and it was not until missile tests by the DPRK in 1998 that Japan "agreed to undertake joint research with the United States on what was then called 'theater missile defense'."⁶⁸ Participation was limited in nature. A 2001 RAND report indicated that problems for Japan associated with developing BMD with the United States stemmed from costs, legality, and regional relationships.⁶⁹ These issues weighed

⁶⁷ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 72–74.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁶⁹ Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Arlington: RAND, 2001), 7–8.

heavily on LDP leadership at the time, namely the Prime Ministers, who “[continued] to adopt a relatively cautious stance on BMD, absent an immediate threat to Japan’s security.”⁷⁰ However, the September 11 attacks, followed by events in subsequent years, had a significant impact on the LDP and Japan, and its outlook on the alliance and BMD.

The September 11 attack itself was an important event for Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States. In the aftermath of the attack, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed support to the United States. While this act of solidarity was more in support of the war on terror and did little to further development of BMD at the time, it was of importance in the long run for two reasons. First and foremost, it reinforced the “realist” approach emerging in the LDP as outlined by Samuels, and strengthened the bilateral relationship with the United States. Secondly, along the lines of terrorist threats, and in conjunction with the United States, Japan came to identify the DPRK as a source of angst and a threat to the security environment. Subsequent action on the part of the DPRK including continued testing of ballistic missiles, and withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty furthered this notion, and emphasis was placed on the importance of BMD. Whereas security policy was arguably derived from the influence of norms and external factors during the era of the Cold War, more so than party views and influence, this situation is an example of a time when party views and influence had become incrementally more relevant in the process of forming and implementing security policy.

Examples of the increased role of LDP views and influence in shaping security policy are evident in the development of the BMD program. For example, under Prime Minister Koizumi, action taken by the party brought into question the effectiveness of the arms export ban, as “the Koizumi government declared that the BMD project would be excluded from nonexport principles... [and] reserved the right to relax restrictions in future cases other than those related to missile defense.”⁷¹ Likewise, LDP influence is further evidenced by the party’s introduction of the Basic Law for Space Activities, which legitimized the development of space technologies that directly support

⁷⁰ Swaine, Swanger, and Takashi, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*, 42.

⁷¹ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 106.

BMD, and shifted the interpretation of the “peaceful” use of space to “permitting the use of space for ‘defensive’ [military] purposes.”⁷² These examples, however, do not diminish the importance of domestic norms or external factors in Japan, as the LDP did not eliminate their influence in shaping security policy. Although the party arguably sought to develop the program sooner, it still had to navigate a historically pacifist society for a number of years:

Insisting that the entire effort was only research and stopped short of system development, the Japanese government bought three additional years to evaluate its technological options and, more important, to develop a political strategy to sell collaborative missile defense with the United States.⁷³

Similarly, the role of external factors cannot be dismissed. For example, concerning the United States:

[one] cannot deny that the policies and actions of the United States – as a strong advocate of BMD systems, as the only alliance partner upon whom Tokyo depends greatly for its security, and as a provider of military forces based on Japanese territory – also greatly influence Japanese perspectives and calculations.⁷⁴

Also, central to the discussion of BMD is the external threat from the DPRK. While this discussion of bilateralism and BMD in the post-Cold War era contextualizes the role and relative influence of the LDP, an analysis of party views and influence regarding multilateralism and antipiracy provides further depth, and highlights the complexity of the security environment since the end of the Cold War.

b. Antipiracy

In the context of the Cold War, security policies geared toward multilateralism may have taken a back seat to the assurances found in Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States. An effort to pursue such relationships still existed, with “Japan’s interest in and support for strong multilateral arrangements [dating] back to

⁷² Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarization*, 49.

⁷³ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 104.

⁷⁴ Swaine, Swanger, and Takashi, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*, 19.

the 1960s.”⁷⁵ With the end of the Cold War and the dynamic nature of the security environment, Japan’s pursuit of multilateral arrangements has perhaps become more apparent. One important example of this has occurred in the realm of antipiracy. Being an island nation, a desire to mitigate the threat of piracy makes sense for Japan, as security of sea lines of communication (SLOC) are critical to the nation’s economy. As a result, while the LDP was still the ruling party, conferences were routinely held to address the issue, illustrating its importance to the party.⁷⁶ While emphasis was initially centered on “[developing] a regional antipiracy agreement,”⁷⁷ more recent events in the HOA region expanded the party’s interest to partake in a multilateral effort.

As the number of piracy incidents increased in the HOA region, Japan’s Ministry of Defense took the necessary steps to dispatch forces to support maritime security operations. Even though the force was small in number, a critical element reinforcing a desire for multilateralism was seen in the minister’s instructions, which called for “coordination with the Government of Djibouti, U.S. Forces, and related organizations.”⁷⁸ While this issuance of instruction was being executed, debate over what was legally appropriate action for deployed MSDF assets arose. The LDP, as represented by Prime Minister Taro Aso at the time, argued “that the use of weapons against pirates, who are criminals, does not constitute a military action as prohibited by the Constitution,”⁷⁹ and in turn, passed a contentious antipiracy bill that expanded the rules of engagement and “[authorized] the Self Defense Forces to protect any commercial ship

⁷⁵ H. Richard Friman et al., “Immovable Object? Japan’s Security Policy in East Asia,” in *Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraiishi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 91.

⁷⁶ Ibid., “Immovable Object?,” 91.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 92.

⁷⁸ Japanese Ministry of Defense, “Issuance of Instruction and an Order on the Preparations for Dispatching P-3C Patrol Aircraft Concerning Measures Against Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden,” <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressrele/2009/090417.html>. While “related organizations” sounds vague, it is reasonable to assume this implies other nations and organizations such as the UN and NATO, given the multinational effort to quell the acts of piracy in the region.

⁷⁹ “Anti-Piracy Law,” *The Japan Times Online*, June 23, 2009, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20090623a1.html>.

from pirates, regardless of a Japanese connection.”⁸⁰ These efforts on the part of the LDP highlight the party’s views and influence on what has become an important maritime security issue.

It is important to note that in the new security environment of the post-Cold War era, the dynamic among the influential factors (societal norms, external events and influences, and the party) shifted. The role and influence of the party in issues during the Cold War period may not have been prominent, but the new security environment, particularly after September 11, afforded the LDP “an opportunity to achieve policies it had long wanted to pursue but believed to be impossible.”⁸¹ This new environment sets the stage for discussing the DPJ, and the role and influence it may have in Japan’s future security environment, as reflected in the maritime security issues above.

B. THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN

Before DPJ influence on maritime security policy relative to the LDP can be determined, a similar outline of the party’s origins and background must be provided. This serves the purpose of identifying structural and ideological differences the party may have with the LDP, and lends to some expectations of where points of departure on maritime security policy may exist between the two parties. An assessment of whether or not these expectations hold true is saved for the next chapter, and the discussion now turns to the DPJ’s history.

1. Origins and Background: DPJ Structure and Ideology

The Democratic Party of Japan is relatively new to Japan’s domestic political scene, emerging in 1998 as another opposition party to the LDP. Reason exists to assume that its nature as an opposition party is useful to identifying its ideologies at the very least, but consideration must also be given to its structure as well. The party was a product of merging factions that had split from the LDP. In that sense, the party has a

⁸⁰ “Antipiracy Law Authorizing SDF Protection of Any Ship Enacted,” *Japan Today: Japan News and Discussion*, June 24, 2009, <http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/antipiracy-law-authorizing-sdf-protection-of-any-ship-enacted>

⁸¹ Friman et al., “Immovable Object?,” 105.

similar core structure to the LDP, forming “as a consequence of a merger of formerly independent parties.”⁸² At the time of its formation, the joining of these parties was centered on “reform-minded politicians... with the aim of establishing a genuine opposition force capable of taking power from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).”⁸³ However, the same limitations and constraints experienced by the LDP in its early years were evident in the case of the DPJ, as factionalism, strong minded individuals and interest based politics limited the party’s overall impact on the political scene in the years leading up to 2009.

Factionalism in the DPJ alone can account for many of the hurdles the party had to overcome on its way to winning the 2009 elections. Whereas the LDP was a product of conservative parties joining together, Patrick Kollner states that the DPJ “proved to be much more heterogeneous.” As a result, a variety of perspectives, both conservative and liberal in nature, on a range of issues did much to challenge party cohesiveness within the DPJ. For every challenge factionalism presented the party, party leadership was able to keep the DPJ from disintegrating. Unlike the importance of seniority in the LDP, which determined the positions and posts to which the party members had access, DPJ leadership took strides to distribute important positions among the different factions in an effort to keep the party together.⁸⁴ Although these structural characteristics may not have been conducive to maintaining a formidable opposition party, let alone defeating the LDP, the DPJ has been able to overcome them. The discussion can now shift to the DPJ’s ideology, with particular emphasis on the party’s views on security policy.

Reviewing the DPJ during its opposition years, the party certainly attempted to identify itself as “left” of where the LDP was on a range of issues. This view was no less different for security policy. In 1998, the DPJ outlined a basic philosophy that included commentary on security issues:

⁸² Patrick Kollner, “From Would-be ‘Third Force’ to Governing Party: The Democratic Party of Japan” [September 2009 draft], in *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*, ed. Ronald Hrebener (Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming), 2. Note: This article was a draft provided during Professor Weiner’s class on the Government and Security of Japan.

⁸³ The Democratic Party of Japan, “Brief History of the DPJ,” http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/about_us/dpj_profile.html.

⁸⁴ Kollner, “From Would-be ‘Third Force,’” 10.

We shall embody the fundamental principles of the Constitution: popular sovereignty, respect for fundamental human rights, and pacifism. Finally, as a member of the global community, we shall establish international relations in the fraternal spirit of self-reliance and mutual coexistence, and thereby restore the world's trust in Japan.⁸⁵

This basic philosophy was followed up with a party outline of basic security policies, which offered more concrete examples of party ideology. The document highlighted the DPJ's recognition of the evolving security environment in the post-Cold War era, reinforces pacifist tendencies, stresses greater autonomy, understands the importance of the security alliance with the United States, and lastly, calls for greater multilateralism across the region even in dealing with the United Nations, all in an effort to "[ensure] an active Japanese contribution to building world peace."⁸⁶ These policies cast an arguably wider net compared to the LDP, and certainly stress pacifist tendencies and varying degrees of security independence for Japan. However, Kollner indicates that despite the ideological differences between the parties on the surface, "[the] DPJ's absorption of a number of center-right groups... certainly did not make the party more homogeneous in terms of the policy positions held."⁸⁷ This point is revisited in the next chapter, but using the policy differences outlined above, some expected points of departure regarding the previously discussed maritime security policies could be offered.

2. Expected Points of Departure with the LDP

Prior to assessing whether the DPJ is in fact willing and/or able to shift aspects of maritime security policy, and in turn, broader security policy, it is important to identify what might be expected from the party based on its broader security policy outline.

a. The United States and BMD

Reason may exist to believe the DPJ might drag its feet on BMD policy that furthers the program along. At first glance, the program seems counterintuitive to the

⁸⁵ The Democratic Party of Japan, "Our Basic Philosophy: Building a Free and Secure Society," http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/about_us/philosophy.html.

⁸⁶ The Democratic Party of Japan, "The Democratic Party of Japan's Basic Policies on Security (June 1999)," <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/security.html>.

⁸⁷ Kollner, "From Would-be 'Third Force,'" 15.

party's initial policy statements that echo pacifism and enhance a peaceful global environment. The statement in the party's Defense Policy Principles that maintains, "Japan will adhere to the three principles of arms exports", supports this stance.⁸⁸ If the party adheres to this statement, it would contradict the LDP's efforts to modify arms export bans as it saw fit to develop the BMD program, as well as diminish the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance in favor of promoting its original security policy objectives outlined above.

b. Antipiracy

With respect to multilateral efforts and antipiracy, perhaps reason does exist to believe the DPJ would at the very least support if not expand on current policy. Supporting the antipiracy effort abroad is certainly based in "defense-oriented policy," and enhances positive relations for Japan outside of its bilateral relationship with the United States. Issues obviously worthy of further discussion as the nature of rules of engagement for the MSDF in support of antipiracy operations have been debated, but at first glance, it would seem that this aspect of maritime security policy builds upon the DPJ broader policy platform.

C. CONCLUSION

The focus of this chapter was to discuss the role of parties in the security policy-making process, further contextualizing their influence relative to other factors pertaining to international relations theories, while introducing elements of maritime security policy to further the discussion and serve as a point for discussing the recent changes in domestic structure. Taking the insights from this chapter regarding structural and ideological differences between the LDP and the DPJ, as well as the experience of the LDP in both the broader and maritime security policy-making process during its years as the dominant party, the discussion can now shift to an analysis of what changes, if at all, under the DPJ as reflected in the specific maritime security policy realms outlined above. The next chapter discusses in greater detail the current state of BMD and antipiracy, and

⁸⁸ The Democratic Party of Japan, "The Democratic Party of Japan's Basic Policies on Security."

addresses the expectations and assumptions for the DPJ on these policy issues as raised in the last section, all in an effort to determine the impact of the recent election on Japanese maritime security and broader security policy.

IV. BMD AND ANTIPIRACY UNDER THE DPJ

This chapter begins by focusing on the current disposition and critical elements of the MSDF regarding BMD and antipiracy, along with recent policies tied to these elements of maritime security. Once the policies have been identified, the discussion turns to the role the DPJ has had in influencing and implementing relevant maritime security policy, particularly since coming to power in 2009. This focus is an effort to further the discussion regarding the role of parties in security policy formation relative to normative and external factors, as well as to determine whether initial assessments made in Chapter III regarding the positions of the DPJ are in fact correct. Recalling the initial assessments from Chapter III, based on the structure and ideology of the DPJ relative to the LDP, the expectation is that policy tied to BMD will serve as a point of departure for the DPJ, while efforts will be made to expand policy regarding antipiracy.

A. THE CURRENT STATE OF BMD AND ANTIPIRACY

Prior to assessing the role and influence the DPJ has had in BMD and antipiracy, it is important to outline the current state of BMD and antipiracy. An understanding of the current disposition and critical elements of the MSDF in support of these two elements of maritime security offers insight regarding what the country has been willing to commit to each mission area in the interest of enhancing the security environment. A second important aspect to this discussion also identifies recent policy that has contributed to the evolution of BMD and antipiracy to date. This viewpoint will serve as a baseline for determining whether the current state and policies of each mission area are aligned with the expectations for the DPJ mentioned above, as well as later discussing the influence and contributions of the DPJ in shaping not only these aspects of maritime security, but broader security policy as well.

1. MSDF: Contribution to BMD

Many components to Japan's BMD architecture exist, to include land, sea, and space based systems. This section focuses solely on those components attributed to the MSDF, and its support of the larger, layered BMD architecture, beginning with the sea

based platforms to be used. Four MSDF Kongo-class Aegis destroyers⁸⁹ were to be outfitted by the end of 2010 “with a Standard Missile-3 Block IA (SM-3 BLK IA) from the [United States].”⁹⁰ It is the assumption of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) that at any given time, “the entire territory can be defended by two to three Aegis BMD ships,” serving as midcourse interceptors.⁹¹ However, the systems on these platforms serve only to deliver the second, and arguably, more critical components of the sea based BMD program.

In addition to outfitting the four MSDF Aegis destroyers, the maritime component of the BMD program relies heavily on the continued improvement of the SM-3. The SM-3 is a unique component of Aegis, and the MOD has identified further development of the SM-3 as critical to the program, as the ministry, “aims to improve future capabilities of interceptors in order to expand all possible means to ensure Japan’s national defense.”⁹² This combination of platform and delivery system represent the current force composition of the MSDF in support of Japan’s BMD program, but it is important to address their effectiveness as well.

The final aspect of understanding the current disposition of the MSDF in support of BMD, is addressing the successful testing of the system. On December 17, 2007, the first BMD outfitted ship, JDS Kongo, successfully completed an operational test of the system.⁹³ Since then, three more tests have been completed, which highlights the effectiveness of the platform and delivery system in detecting, tracking, and eliminating a ballistic missile threat. While this identifies the current state of the MSDF and its efforts to support BMD, it is also important to outline the recent maritime security policy tied to BMD that has influenced the MSDF.

⁸⁹ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Japan’s BMD,” https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/bmd/bmd.pdf.

⁹⁰ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarization*, 46.

⁹¹ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Japan’s BMD.”

⁹² Japan Ministry of Defense, “Statements by the Chief Cabinet Secretary and Preparation of the BMD System, etc.,” http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/44Reference_1_63.pdf

⁹³ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Successful Completion of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Intercept Flight Test in Hawaii,” <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/remarks/2007/press20071217.html>.

2. Recent Maritime Security Policy Tied to BMD

Given the multifaceted nature of Japan's BMD architecture, it is difficult to say that policy tied to the program is in the interest of maritime security alone. However, the policies do influence the maritime component and MSDF, and therefore, must be discussed. Among the most important policy considerations associated with BMD are collective security and the importance of the bilateral relationship with the United States, the defense budget, and arms exportation controls.

a. *Collective Security and Bilateralism*

Some of the policies tied to BMD have dealt with matters of collective security and the bilateral relationship with the United States. Christopher Hughes addresses some of the possibilities and concerns associated with collective security:

Japan's closer cooperation with the [United States], and possession of an Aegis BMD system largely interoperable with that of the [United States], is likely to increase U.S. expectation that Japan will deploy these assets in support of U.S. and multinational coalitions outside its territory ... There are also expectations [the system] should function if necessary for the defense not just of Japan but also of the U.S. homeland.⁹⁴

While some may have taken issue with the decision to pursue an integrated BMD architecture with the United States given the implications for collective security, Japanese leadership adopted a policy stance arguing that "the system the Government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan... and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries."⁹⁵ However, this has not prevented additional policy addressing continued bilateralism with the United States as evidenced by the SM-3 Cooperative Development Project (SCD). The SCD centers on the effort "to develop Advanced SM-3 [missiles] for ballistic missile defense making the most of the cutting edge technologies of the U.S. and Japan."⁹⁶ This SCD also has policy implications for Japan's arms exportation rules, which is discussed in more detail below.

⁹⁴ Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarization*, 93.

⁹⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense, "Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2011 Budget," http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/230401.pdf.

⁹⁶ Japan Ministry of Defense, "Japan's BMD."

b. Budgetary Policy

The cost of the BMD program has had significant implications for Japan's defense budget. As a result, certain policy decisions have had to be made regarding the cost of pursuing the program versus maintaining the cap on defense spending. With this in mind, Richard Samuels emphasizes that in 2004, "the development phase alone would cost \$8-\$10 billion over five years, and Japan had agreed to pay one-third."⁹⁷ To this day, continued research and development in BMD is expected to cost Japan approximately half a billion dollars,⁹⁸ which includes funding for enhanced SM-3 BLK IIA BMD interceptor missiles. These costs have forced decision makers to prioritize defense programs, in an effort to keep to the budgetary cap.

c. Arms Exportation

Arms exportation has also been subject to policy revisions based on the implementation of the BMD program. Directly related to the SCD mentioned above, the continued development and improvement of the SM-3 with the United States has called for "Japanese-developed components... to be transferred to U.S. partners."⁹⁹ This development reflects a departure from previous arms exportation policy under the Three Principles of Arms Exports from 1967, namely the third that prevented exportation to "countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts."¹⁰⁰

3. MSDF: Contribution to Antipiracy

Securing SLOCs continues to be important to Japan. While the waters of Southeast Asia have been at the forefront of Japan's antipiracy efforts since the beginning of last decade, increased piracy in the HOA region in recent years has led to an increased Japanese presence further away from the home islands. On March 14, 2009, two MSDF Destroyers, DD Sazanami and DD Samidare, departed Japan for the waters off the HOA,

⁹⁷ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 105.

⁹⁸ Japan Ministry of Defense, "Defense Programs and Budget of Japan."

⁹⁹ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 106.

¹⁰⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Policies on the Control of Arms Exports," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/index.html>. It is assumed that given the timing of this policy, the third principle pertains to the United States.

and began routine escorts of merchant vessels two weeks later.¹⁰¹ This operation has been sustained since, with the MOD releasing monthly activity updates that reflect the number of ships escorted by MSDF ships. It is also important to note that MSDF ships have coordinated with other UN ships in the region, shared information and used organic helicopter assets to support the multilateral antipiracy effort.¹⁰² However, the ability of MSDF assets to operate in such a manner during these operations has been the result of adopting new security policy.

4. Recent Security Policy Tied to Antipiracy

As the number of piracy incidents increased in 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) issued statements that supported UN efforts to quell pirate activity, and reiterated the importance of SLOCs to Japan:

Japan has been gravely concerned about the acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Japan regards this issue as an urgent matter from the point of view of ensuring the safety of sea lanes as well as of protecting the lives and assets of our nationals. Against this backdrop, Japan held close consultations with Security Council members for the adoption of this resolution and joined in its co-sponsorship. Japan strongly hopes that the resolution will enhance the ongoing efforts to address the issue of piracy and armed robbery in this area.¹⁰³

Three months later, MSDF assets were on station and actively involved in antipiracy operations. However, initially deployed under the premise of a police action, these forces were limited to protecting only Japanese merchant vessels or those vessels with Japanese nationals or cargo onboard. Policymakers would debate and enact a separate law known as the Anti-Piracy Measures Law that has “established punitive provisions for such acts

¹⁰¹ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Departure of the Dispatched Maritime Forces for Response to Piracy,” <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressrele/2009/090313b.html>.

¹⁰² Japan Ministry of Defense, “Record of Escort Operations Performed by Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Units Dispatched for Anti-Piracy Activities (June 2010),” http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/somalia/pdf/20100706a.pdf.

¹⁰³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, on the Adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution to Address the Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery off the Coast of Somalia,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/12/1185309_1080.html.

[of piracy] while also stipulating among other things the expansion of protection to vessels of all countries,”¹⁰⁴ as well as allow MSDF ships to “use force not only for self-defense but also to compel pirate vessels to halt if no other reasonable means is available.”¹⁰⁵

B. ROLE OF THE DPJ IN BMD AND ANTIPIRACY

The current state of Japan’s BMD and antipiracy efforts and policies outlined above provide a basis for discussing the role of the DPJ in shaping both realms of maritime security. This discussion first seeks to identify whether the party’s policy perspectives on BMD and antipiracy have differed at all from those of the LDP, and second, addresses its influence on relevant policy relative to normative and external factors previously mentioned since the party’s rise to power in 2009.

1. BMD: DPJ vs. LDP

The subject of BMD in Japan is highly useful for comparing the policy perspectives of the DPJ and LDP, since it has been an important issue dating back to when the DPJ first formed in 1998. As a result, an opportunity exists to analyze the DPJ’s policy outlook on the issue as both an opposition party, as well as since coming to power. The policy issues outlined under the discussion of BMD above are used as a basis of comparing the two parties.

a. Collective Security and Bilateralism

Collective security and bilateralism are two policy issues that have certainly been part of the BMD debate, and their sensitive nature resulted in a cautionary approach on the part of Japanese leaders for a number of years prior to committing to the BMD program fully. As for collective security, while the LDP was in power, it was evident that policy statements had to be routinely made, which suggested the BMD

¹⁰⁴ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Statement by Prime Minister Taro Aso (Concerning the ‘Draft Law on the Penalization of Acts of Piracy and Measures Against Acts of Piracy’ and the Cabinet Decision on the Approval of the Prime Minister concerning Maritime Security Operations),” http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/asospeech/2009/03/13danwa_e.html

¹⁰⁵ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarization*,” 88.

system was “ a inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan”¹⁰⁶ against ballistic missiles. This statement was made despite the prospects that integration of Japan into the system was a useful tool for the United States in engaging intercontinental ballistic missiles, which potentially involved the island nation in collective security. As the project proceeded, LDP leaders eventually addressed the issue head on with statements that stressed the system was solely for the purpose of defending Japan:

“[It] does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan’s own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan’s own sensors.”¹⁰⁷

However, while these statements were being issued that suggested Japan was acting independently in its pursuit of BMD, it was quite apparent that implementing a viable system relied heavily on the country’s bilateral relationship with the United States. The same statements by the LDP suggested that independent defense would also echo bilateral sentiments, “promoting further cooperation with the United States on technology and operation.”¹⁰⁸ This cooperation has since been evidenced by the SCD, as the two nations jointly continue to research and improve SM-3 interceptor technology.

Meanwhile, in the midst of these statements and the developmental and research phase, the DPJ was emerging as an opposition party. Leaders within the party acknowledged the issues of BMD, and given the party’s basic security policies, it might be expected that the DPJ would have voiced opposition to the program. This opposition is supported in the party’s Basic Policies on Security document that outlines defense policy principles, one of which was “Japan will not exercise the right to collective self-defense... [a principle that] should continue to be respected.”¹⁰⁹ The same document also

¹⁰⁶ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Statements by the Chief Cabinet Secretary and Preparation of the BMD System, etc.,” http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/44Reference_1_63.pdf.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ The Democratic Party of Japan, “The Democratic Party of Japan’s Basic Policies on Security.”

challenges the nature of the bilateral relationship with the United States, and calls for greater autonomy on the part of the Japan. However, with time, it seems as though the party has acquiesced to the policies and structure of the BMD program.

While some of the DPJ leadership expressed reservations with the BMD program, others, although cautious, were willing to undertake the effort. One individual, Yukio Hatoyama, who would later become the party's first Prime Minister after winning the 2009 elections, is among the DPJ leaders willing as early as 2000 to concede to implementing the system and its implications, "[going] on record saying he could support Japan's participation in collective defense."¹¹⁰ The further along the program proceeded, the more it seemed the DPJ backed the effort. Samuels indicates, "[the] strategic importance of jointly developing BMD had overridden differences... and had received widespread support from LDP and DPJ politicians."¹¹¹ That is not to sell short the internal debate within the DPJ on the issue. One article in late 2009 highlights that "one DPJ Lower House member and DPJ deputy spokesmen urged the new government to eliminate BMD altogether."¹¹² The same article continues to describe that the foreign minister at the time, Katsuya Okada, had not been entirely supportive of the program; however, the program's successful testing and collaboration with the United States were enough to have seemingly quelled some of the concerns within the party that may have stemmed from the issue of collective security. These examples are disconfirming to the notion that the DPJ would be against continued development of BMD once it came to power in 2009. Other policy aspects to BMD further this reality.

b. Budgetary Policy

The costs associated with implementing the BMD system have been at the forefront of defense budgetary issues since the late 1990s. During the DPJ's early years, Hatoyama again was among the leaders to offer an opinion on the matter, which suggests the cost of the program could be to the detriment of Japan, "providing technology and

¹¹⁰ Swaine, Swanger, and Takashi, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*, 59.

¹¹¹ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 106.

¹¹² Peter J. Brown, "U.S. Frets Over Tokyo Drift," *Asia Times*, November 5, 2009, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KK05Dh02.html>.

money to the United States but gaining nothing worthwhile in return.”¹¹³ This budgetary perspective on the costs of BMD contributes to the notion that the system would serve as a point of departure between the DPJ and LDP. However, turning again to the DPJ’s Basic Policies on Security, it would appear that the party has had more in common with the LDP in the long run on the issue of BMD.

The DPJ’s Basic Policies on Security from 1999 address the defense budget in the context of arms procurement. The document recommended adopting a defense budget that addresses realistic threats to Japan, instead of what had been “the traditional approach whereby equal priority is given to the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF.”¹¹⁴ This call for the prioritization of defense programs and budgeting alludes to concerns regarding Japan’s fiscal deficit, which had become “the largest in the industrial world”¹¹⁵ by the time the LDP decided to embrace the program. However, at this point, where it might be assumed the LDP implemented the program with reckless abandon and in complete disregard of the one percent defense-spending cap, the opposite occurred. Along the lines of the DPJ’s Basic Policies on Security, then LDP Prime Minister Koizumi:

...insisted instead on restructuring Japan’s defense force posture ... [and the] uniformed services would have to get used to the idea that the political leadership was no longer content simply to supervise a “shopping ministry.”¹¹⁶

This policy outcome once more runs counterintuitive to what might be expected, as the DPJ and LDP again arrived at a similar policy conclusion in pursuit of BMD. Again, this is not to suggest that internal debate did not occur for the DPJ, as the *Asian Times* article from 2009 states that party members in the House of Representatives, such as Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, “objected strongly to a request for more than a 50%

¹¹³ Swaine, Swanger, and Takashi, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*, 59.

¹¹⁴ The Democratic Party of Japan, “The Democratic Party of Japan’s Basic Policies on Security.”

¹¹⁵ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 105.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

increase in missile defense-related expenditures in [the 2010] budget.”¹¹⁷ However, it would seem that a degree of alignment between the parties regarding the best approach to spending money, coupled with the idea that despite the costliness of the program it has had positive results, has again been enough to overcome any concerns within the DPJ, as it has done little to suggest it will not see the program through to fruition.

c. Arms Exportation

The final policy realm of BMD to be discussed is that of arms exportation. Like collective security and budgetary issues, the DPJ’s perspective on arms exportation was originally outlined in the party’s Basic Policies on Security document; and like collective security, it was the belief of the party that the three principles of arms exports were to be upheld and respected. However, the circumstances involving BMD and arms exportation have again shown the DPJ to be more aligned with the LDP than might be expected.

As a reminder, the SCD calls for the transfer of Japanese developed SM-3 components to the United States as part of the joint effort to research and improve interceptor technology continuously. It was announced by the Koizumi administration that such activity “[in support of] the BMD project would be excluded from non-export principles.”¹¹⁸ Using the most literal interpretation of the DPJ’s Basic Policies of Security, such activity would be in violation of the third principle of arms exports. However, that possible violation has not prevented the party from supporting BMD related exports in the past, nor has it been the case since the party’s rise to power.

The arms export issue has been recently raised with respect to continued system development and expanding the transfer of BMD beyond Japan and the United States to other countries, particularly in Europe. The DPJ-led government initially stated it could not support such activity, as “Japan’s current self-imposed ban on arms exports

¹¹⁷ Peter J. Brown, “US Frets Over Tokyo Drift,” *Asia Times*, November 5, 2009, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KK05Dh02.html>.

¹¹⁸ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 106.

in principle prohibits exporting weapons or weapons-related technology.”¹¹⁹ Some have argued, however, that as the prospect arose that the United States might forgo Japanese approval if need be, the DPJ was forced to recognize “BMD [as] the #1 security mission [for Japan],”¹²⁰ the importance of the United States to the program, and consider relaxing the arms export principles. Combined with the DPJ’s unexpected policy stance on other BMD related issues (even as the party in power), the discussion turns to analyzing what may have influenced BMD policy in terms of societal norms and external factors.

2. BMD: The Influence of Normative and External Factors

Having determined that the DPJ and LDP have had more in common to date on the issue of BMD than might be expected, perhaps, other influential factors must be identified in an effort to explain this dynamic and the BMD policies that have emerged. Holding to the theme of comparing the influence of parties against that of societal norms and external factors, the discussion turns to identifying their role and influence on Japan’s decision to implement a BMD system.

a. Societal Norms and BMD

Recalling that when discussing societal norms and security in Japan, they have for the most part, been pacifist in nature, the question becomes whether such pacifist tendencies have influenced BMD policy. Prior to determining their influence, a pacifist argument is presented. The heart of the argument suggests that if Japan implements a BMD system, the potential exists that North Korea (or China) could be provoked into “[increasing] the size and sophistication of their missile forces capable of reaching Japan.”¹²¹ This logic is supported by an issue raised by Samuels, who in describing the system, states the possibility exists for the “acquisition of preemptive capabilities that would target North Korean missiles prior to launch,”¹²² which could be further

¹¹⁹ “Govt to OK U.S. Transfers of Missiles,” *Daily Yomiuri Online*, January 10, 2011, <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110109002586.htm>.

¹²⁰ Kyle Mizokami, “Led by BMD Projects, Japan Stepping into the World of Arms Exports,” *Japan Security Watch*, January 13, 2011, <http://newpacificinstitute.org/jsw/?p=3592>.

¹²¹ Swaine, Swanger, and Takashi, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*, 8.

¹²² Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 174.

interpreted as an offensive capability for Japan; the next logical step for North Korea would be to improve its offensive weapons. Given the argument and information at hand, it might be perceived that a generally pacifist society would pressure the government into avoiding the implementation of BMD and this scenario; however, such views have not been prevalent across Japanese society.

Among the reasons societal norms have not been as influential on BMD policies have been the efforts of the Japanese government to ensure the citizens and neighboring countries that the system is strictly defensive in nature, as well as the influence of external threats. With respect to the defensive nature of the system, the government has repeatedly issued statements reflecting such sentiments. For example:

BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attack, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy. Therefore, it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect the regional stability.¹²³

Samuels continues to reaffirm the notion that such statements are not only intended for neighboring countries, but for the purpose of “[reassuring] the domestic population.”¹²⁴ As far as the domestic population is concerned, these statements seem to have served their purpose, as there has been little public outcry against Japan’s BMD endeavor and any threat it may pose to pacifism; but government statements are only half of the argument against pacifism.

The role of external threats must also be considered, in addition to DPRK’s activity that spawned the project in the first place. Pacifist tendencies may exist, but it stands to reason that a populace may reconsider such tendencies in the face of a looming threat, especially when pacifism is doing little to improve the situation. Regardless of whether or not BMD may have pre-emptive, or even offensive potential, in Japan’s case, it is a system that over time is continuing to prove useful against missile threats, unlike pacifist rhetoric.

¹²³ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Statements by the Chief Cabinet Secretary and Preparation of the BMD System, etc.”

¹²⁴ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 174.

b. External Factors and BMD

The first external factor to consider in BMD is the role of the United States, the partner to Japan in the entire process of implementing the system. An analysis of U.S. influence begins with its effort to convince Japan to collaborate and research BMD, which was no easy task, particularly during the early 1990s, for a number of reasons to include issues already been outlined, such as collective defense, arms exportation, and costs. However, by the mid-nineties, the United States had convinced Japan to partake in a working group and research program that would consider the range of issues, and “whether or not [Japan should] cooperate with the United States on... development.”¹²⁵ The observations made as a result of these programs arguably reflect the influence of the United States in convincing Japan to pursue BMD, but other aspects highlight U.S. influence, namely in terms of addressing the programs costs and continued development.

The considerable amount of funding that has fallen on the shoulders of the United States has been another mechanism for influencing Japan to partake in the BMD program. Although the costs were considerable to Japan, the fact it was responsible for only one-third of the initial development costs was a huge bargaining chip for the United States. The United States Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on average has contributed over \$7 billion annually to the program since 2002,¹²⁶ just as the collaboration between the two countries was really beginning to increase. While the figure represents the MDA’s responsibility for funding the entire U.S. missile defense architecture, a large portion of the fiscal commitment is allocated to development of the BMD system with Japan. It is not a stretch to suggest this figure has factored heavily into Japan’s commitment to the program, as reflected in the country’s continued participation in the SCD. However, the ability of the United States to influence Japan on BMD has a direct correlation to another external factor, which plays heavily into Japan’s BMD policy process.

¹²⁵ Swaine, Swanger, and Takashi, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*, 32.

¹²⁶ Missile Defense Agency, “Historical Funding for MDA FY85-10,” <http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/histfunds.pdf>.

The DPRK is the final external factor to be addressed, and has had a significant influence on society and the parties, perhaps making it the most influential on BMD policy. DPRK influence is evidenced by the lack of willingness on the part of Japan to commit fully to developing a BMD system with the United States until 1998. That year, the DPRK launched a Taepodong-1 missile through Japanese airspace, “[creating] an atmosphere conducive to more open discussion in the Diet about BMD—in particular, about joint technical research on the system with the United States.”¹²⁷ A Christmas statement from the Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time capitalized on the North Korean launch, reinforcing the notion that BMD was worth considering given the threat:

It should be noted that the Diet resolution of September this year by the lower house regarding the ballistic missile launch by North Korea states: The Government will take every measure to ensure the safety of the people of the nation.¹²⁸

Based on the limited approach to collaboration on the part of the Japanese government prior to the DPRK launch, it would be difficult to argue that the LDP or American influence alone was able to force the issue of BMD, particularly in the face of a pacifist society. However, North Korean activity both then and even in more recent years, has proven to be not only influential on BMD policy, but on parties and society as well.

Evidence that parties have been influenced by the external DPRK threat can be found in the defense budget, and the prioritization of BMD over other defense programs, as well as the decision to loosen arms exportation rules in favor of continued system development. Likewise, the pacifist perspective that a BMD system might have provoked the DPRK was instantly replaced with a public desire “[for protection] against North Korean missiles... [and demands for a] virtually leak-proof protection against all conceivable types of missile attacks.”¹²⁹ These examples speak to the influence of

¹²⁷ Swaine, Swanger, and Takashi, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*, 34.

¹²⁸ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Statements by the Chief Cabinet Secretary and Preparation of the BMD System, etc.”

¹²⁹ Swaine, Swanger, and Takashi, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*, 34.

external factors (namely the DPRK threat) on the BMD policy decision-making process. The discussion now shifts to the second element of maritime security, antipiracy, and identifying where the DPJ stands on issue relative to the LDP.

3. Antipiracy: DPJ vs. LDP

Although the issue of antipiracy and analysis on differences between the two parties might be traced back to Southeast Asia and the turn of the century, the discussion centers on Japan's involvement in the HOA region since 2008, and the passing of the Anti-Piracy Measures Law. To reiterate, the expectation regarding antipiracy is that the DPJ will uphold if not take further efforts to expand on policy enacted during LDP rule, which is based on the notion that to the party, antipiracy activity is grounded in "defense-oriented policy," and enhances positive relations with nations other than the United States.

a. Support for MSDF Involvement

The decision to send assets to the HOA region appears to have had a degree of support from the DPJ while it was still the opposition party. However, issue was taken with respect to which agency should be used for antipiracy operations. The DPJ argued to send Japan Coast Guard (JCG) ships to conduct operations, because at the time, "the MSDF [lacked] powers of arrest, whereas the JCG is able to detain and gather evidence for the prosecution of pirates."¹³⁰ The LDP argued on behalf of sending MSDF ships and ultimately, won, and handled the issue by attaching JCG personnel to the deployed units. Despite the differing opinion as the opposition party, the DPJ has not taken action to reverse the policy of deploying MSDF ships.

b. DPJ Views on Anti-Piracy Measures Law

The Anti-Piracy Measures Law was also passed prior to the DPJ coming to power. Hughes suggests, "many DPJ members sympathized with the anti-piracy cause," and perhaps supported its passing.¹³¹ However, the law was controversial since it

¹³⁰ Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarization*, 87.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 88.

expanded the use of force for MSDF assets, and the ability to protect merchant ships of any flag. The DPJ did oppose the bill, but once again, since coming to power, the party has done little to overturn it. In July 2010, the party “[extended] the MSDF mission... for another year, [and even] began studying the possibility of sending MSDF refueling ships to support the mission.”¹³² The latter is an example supporting the expectation that the DPJ might expand on LDP efforts, but another example is seen in the decision to construct a naval base in Djibouti:

The facility, intended to boost the fight against Somali pirates preying on vital shipping lanes, will be Japan’s first foreign military base since World War II.¹³³

Based on these findings, it would appear the DPJ and LDP hold similar perspectives on antipiracy. The possibility also exist, however, that given the success of antipiracy efforts in terms of operations, costs, and favorable support, the DPJ considers the issue not worth the political capital of overturning. The operation represents only a fraction of the funding allocated by the MOD for “Improving the Global Security Environment,”¹³⁴ and accounts for nearly 1800 successful escorted vessels since the start of the operation two years ago under the Anti-Piracy Measures Law.¹³⁵ Again, it may not be fruitful for the DPJ to cease such a seemingly successful operation.

4. Antipiracy: The Influence of Normative and External Factors

The influence of norms and external factors on antipiracy policy is worth considering based on the controversial policies that have emerged and the expanded scope of deploying forces overseas.

¹³² Jeffrey Hornung, “With a Left Like This, Who Needs the Right?,” *Japan Chair Platform* (2011), 2, http://csis.org/files/publication/110211_Hornung.pdf.

¹³³ “Japan to Build Navy Base in Gulf of Aden,” *United Press International, Inc.*, May 11, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/05/11/Japan-to-build-navy-base-in-Gulf-of-Aden/UPI-60511273596816/.

¹³⁴ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2011 Budget.”

¹³⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense, “Record of Escort Operations Performed by [JMSDF] Units Dispatched for Anti-Piracy Activities (May 2011),” http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/somalia/pdf/20110606a.pdf.

a. Societal Norms and Antipiracy

Societal norms based on pacifism would argue that the decision to deploy MSDF forces and expand their rules of engagement goes beyond self-defense and protection of the Japanese people, and runs the risk of setting a new precedent for overseas deployments of the SDF. However, similar to BMD, public opinion (a reasonable indicator of societal norms) may not holistically reflect such pacifist concerns over the issue. In fact, as MSDF ships were being dispatched back in 2009, poll data suggested the opposite:

Recent newspaper polls have shown growing public support for the anti-piracy mission, with a survey this week by the top-selling Yomiuri Shimbun showing 61 percent of respondents in favour and 27 percent against.¹³⁶

Based on such data and the fact the operation continues, it would appear that pacifist based norms have had little influence on antipiracy policy decisions. Similar to BMD, this attitude may be the result of society's recognition that pirate activity, although thousands of miles away, has the potential to impact the nation's economy and way of life. It may be one thing for a society to be pacifist on certain issues, but it is another to expect that a society would simply allow criminal activity to continue at the expense of its well-being.

b. External Factors and Antipiracy

Unlike societal norms, some would argue that external factors based in realist thinking have had a significant influence on Japanese antipiracy policy. Although the piracy threat is not tied directly to state sanctioned activity, the response it has engendered by the international community has raised concern for Japan regarding its current security relationships and obligations. Based on such pretexts, Japanese leaders enacted antipiracy policies in response to a UN resolution from 2008, which "authorized

¹³⁶ "Japan Orders Warships on Somalia Anti-Piracy Mission," *France 24*, <http://www.france24.com/en/20090313-japan-orders-warships-somalia-anti-piracy-mission->

a series of decisive measures to combat [piracy],”¹³⁷ as well as due to concerns stemming from Chinese involvement in the effort, which might strengthen U.S.-China relations at the expense of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.¹³⁸ In conjunction with valid economic and security concerns regarding Japan’s SLOCs and the need to keep them open, it would seem the realist-based argument that external threats factor into the antipiracy policy-making process is legitimate. However, it is difficult to say such influence comes at the expense of party influence.

C. CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion offers some perspective as to the role the DPJ has had on elements of maritime security policy, relative to the LDP and other international relations based factors. While the party was in an opposition role, it initially maintained policy views that countered those of the LDP. However, as the party grew in strength, its views adapted, particularly on the issue of BMD. As for IR based factors, there is reason to believe external influences have played into the policy-making process, again particularly with respect to BMD. The policy progress made however indicates the influence of pacifist norms may be waning. This newfound balance among parties, norms and external factors in the post Cold War environment are worth discussing in greater detail, namely, the seemingly increased influence of parties in Japan over the last decade, and what may have contributed to this dynamic.

¹³⁷ “Resolution 1816 (2008),” United Nations Security Council, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9344.doc.htm>.

¹³⁸ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarization*, 87.

V. CONCLUSION

The monumental shift in Japanese domestic politics in 2009 has provided an opportunity to discuss the potential for change across a range of policy issues. This thesis has attempted to address a small sampling of policy issues tied to maritime security, by focusing on BMD and antipiracy in an effort to determine whether changes may come under the DPJ. Recalling the hypothesis from Chapter I, the findings of the thesis pertaining to BMD and antipiracy can now be used to determine the validity of the hypothesis.

A. ASSESSING THE HYPOTHESIS

It was hypothesized that although policy changes from the newly elected DPJ might be expected, in the near term, few instances would occur in which the party would depart from the policy practices of its predecessor. The findings of this thesis seem to support the hypothesis, as both BMD and antipiracy have experienced little, if any policy changes since the DPJ came to power. In each case, examples highlight varying degrees of acquiescence on the part of the DPJ, and in some instances, further policy expansion on what the LDP had enacted prior to its decline. Continued collaboration exists with the United States, as well as funding for BMD, and the current administration has overseen the opening of the first overseas base in Djibouti in support of antipiracy operations. However, the continuity of policy cannot be perceived as the DPJ simply holding to the status quo, as external influences factor heavily into the current state of each maritime security realm, whether it is the potential missile threat from the DPRK or persistence of the United States that has given way to BMD, or the need to secure SLOCs by conducting antipiracy operations.

It is also important to recognize that this thesis has a limited approach in assessing this hypothesis, as BMD and antipiracy are only two elements of maritime security, which falls into a much broader security policy realm. The very nature of BMD, given its necessity for defending against ballistic missile threats, its costliness, and scope of integration with the United States, suggests it is perhaps one of the most critical

components of Japanese security. Likewise, in the uncertainty of the post-Cold War security environment, a case could be made that it is in the interest of any country, especially Japan, to undertake antipiracy efforts to ensure the security of a major source of its economic vitality. However, not every security policy realm carries the same weight, which makes it difficult to suggest that based on these findings the DPJ will simply hold to the policy practices of its predecessor across the board. While the policy nature of the thesis is limited in scope, and could use further examples to test the validity of the hypothesis, another element of the thesis helps identify the significance of the DPJ in the policy making process.

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF IR FACTORS

Simply comparing the positions of the DPJ and LDP on BMD and antipiracy might lead one to believe the two parties have similar policy perspectives in both realms and perhaps across the board. While the heart of the discussion focused on identifying any differences between the two parties, particular attention was also given to the role of pacifist societal norms and external factors that have historically influenced the nature of Japan's security policy. This focus served the purpose of contextualizing the role of parties in the policy-making process, and helps to counter any notion that based on the results pertaining to BMD and antipiracy, the DPJ and LDP are simply homogenous on security in general.

It would be difficult to assess a party's perspective and influence on security policies without addressing the influence of societal norms and external influences. For example, during the Cold War years, the LDP was not free to implement whatever security policies it deemed necessary for the benefit of Japan. Rather, security policy was the result of a delicate balance between pacifist norms that argued against any sort of remilitarization, the influence of the broader international environment that included the United States and the communist threat, and lastly, the ability of the party to address the issues effectively and pass acceptable legislation. The nature of this balance has changed

in the post-Cold War environment, as a more dynamic security environment has arguably replaced a decline in pacifist tendencies, but the LDP, and now the DPJ, continue to operate relative to these influences.

IR factors expand the discussion by considering other influences on security policy to which the parties are subject. This combination of party perspective and IR factors provides a clearer picture for understanding both past and near term security policy decisions in Japan, and thereby, countering any notion that security policy is simply the result of the whims of parties that view the threat environment in the same manner.

C. EXPANDING THE DISCUSSION

Although the findings of this thesis are useful, room exists to expand the discussion to identify better how and where the DPJ might change security policy in the future, both in the maritime realm and more broadly. Additionally, the findings on BMD and antipiracy alone have implications beyond Japan, namely for the United States, other regional actors, and multilateral security efforts abroad. Each of these matters is worth briefly outlining.

1. Indian Ocean Refueling Operations

While certainly other security policy issues would expand the analysis of this thesis, one example in the maritime security realm that would enhance the discussion pertains to Indian Ocean refueling operations. The operation began in 2001, following the terrorist attack of September 11, and passing of the Antiterror Special Measures Law. Japan positioned a refueling vessel in the Indian Ocean with destroyers, and provided fuel to ships from the United States, Canada, Pakistan, and a number of European nations until the beginning of 2010.¹³⁹ The duration of the support operation may suggest great willingness on the part of Japan to support the coalition effort (Operation Enduring Freedom in particular), but the Indian Ocean refueling operation did not go without controversy.

¹³⁹ Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarization*, 81.

From the beginning, the issue of collective security has been at the forefront of the Indian Ocean refueling debate. The LDP was initially able to overcome internal debate on the issue. However, as the coalition effort expanded beyond Afghanistan and the DPJ became a more formidable opposition party, the refueling operation was heavily criticized, especially as news emerged “in late 2007 that the MSDF had incorrectly reported fuel-supply figures, and suspicions arose that the [United States] had diverted Japanese fuel to operations in Iraq.”¹⁴⁰ On this basis, the DPJ opposed the continued renewal of the operation, and the ruling party eventually suspended refueling operations. The question is why the DPJ decided to reverse this policy, while BMD and antipiracy continue to be at the forefront of Japan’s maritime security priorities? With more time, this question would have been addressed in greater detail; however, a number of reasons can be offered.

Two comparisons come to mind when considering the decision to discontinue the refueling operation in the Indian Ocean. The first pertains to cost differentials with BMD; the second deals with the multilateral nature of the operation versus that of antipiracy. In the first case, BMD has been costly from the start, and although controversial, these costs have arguably committed Japan for the long haul, as it would not prove fruitful to have contributed such large funding for the greater part of a decade and not see returns. Cost figures for the entire refueling operation are said to have been approximately \$300 million,¹⁴¹ which provides an opportunity for the DPJ to cease operations based on ideological differences with the LDP rather than having to worry about sunken costs. Another point to consider is the multilateral nature of the operation. Initially conducted in support of U.S. led antiterrorism operations in Afghanistan, the operation had the approval of the UN. However, the controversial 2003 Iraq invasion served as a point of contention. Unlike the UN-backed antipiracy efforts in the HOA region today, the lack of UN backing for operations in Iraq provided the DPJ with a reason to cease refueling operations.

¹⁴⁰ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarization*, 82.

¹⁴¹ “MSDF Wraps Up Eight Year Indian Ocean Mission,” *Kyodo News*, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100116a2.html>.

These are only brief thoughts on one other policy issue that in and of itself highlights a different set of circumstances under which the DPJ might be willing to alter the previous security policies of the LDP. Further analysis would be welcomed to offer greater clarity on what the DPJ is willing and able to change, and under what circumstances. However, the outcome of the analysis pertaining to BMD and antipiracy has further use given the implications each has beyond Japan.

2. Policy Implications for the Future and Beyond Japan

The decision on the part of the DPJ to maintain and even expand on policy tied to BMD and antipiracy has implications beyond Japan worth considering. For obvious reasons, BMD policy has the greatest implications for the United States and Japan's regional neighbors, while policy decisions on antipiracy may reflect some broader implications for the UN or other multilateral entities that Japan has interests in or is tied. Each of these is discussed only briefly, but serve as a foundation for further research. Lastly, based on the findings of this thesis as to how the DPJ has addressed these specific maritime security issues, some basic conclusions are offered as to how the party may address security policy in the near term.

a. BMD: Implications for the United States and Regional Actors

The decision on the part of the DPJ to continue with BMD has a number of positive implications for the United States. Aside from the obvious cooperation between the two countries and the strengthening of the bilateral relationship that dates back to the post-World War II era, the integration also solidifies U.S. presence in the East Asia region. This integration is critical amidst recent U.S. concerns tied to the budget and potential scaling back of forces. Additionally, continued U.S. presence in the region via BMD collaboration provides the United States with the opportunity to monitor and meet potential challenges tied to the rise of China and improvement of DPRK ballistic missile technology. Christopher Hughes summarizes the importance of such continued collaboration to the United States, stating that it “continues to bolster U.S. regional

military hegemony,”¹⁴² and it could easily be argued that BMD accomplishes this point in lieu of a more conventional U.S. presence. While BMD has positive implications for the United States, it comes at the expense of regional relations for Japan.

China and the DPRK are less likely to have a positive outlook on Japan’s continued pursuit of a viable BMD system. As an established nuclear power, China’s concerns stem from fears that an integrated BMD system in its immediate vicinity “would undermine its deterrent capability.”¹⁴³ Also, with other regional interests involving a U.S. backed Taiwan, concern exists the BMD umbrella could potentially extend to its cross strait interests. Meanwhile, although it is difficult to read into North Korean policy on BMD, Japan’s pursuit of the system has done little to halt the country’s own pursuit of improved delivery systems. Debate over whether or not an effective system would mitigate any DPRK threat is best saved for other research, but it would not be a stretch to suggest that a BMD system does little to instill comfort into North Korean leadership.

b. Antipiracy: Multilateral Implications

MSDF involvement in antipiracy efforts off the HOA has implications for future multilateral efforts, as it signals a willingness on the part of Japan to contribute to security efforts globally. Should Japan continue to support such efforts, it could eventually expand its involvement to include multilateral combat efforts, but again, such a scenario is subject to further research. However, just as BMD has the potential for negative implications regionally, so to do antipiracy or similar multilateral operations. In this case, China may take issue with an active Japan that has expanded its area of influence beyond the East Asia region, “[countering] China’s rising influence... and [protecting] its SLOCs.”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarization*, 143.

¹⁴³ Nick Bisley, “Securing the ‘Anchor of Regional Stability’? The Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and East Asian Security,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 30, no. 1 (April 2008): 91.

¹⁴⁴ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarization*, 143.

c. Near Term Implications for Broader Security Policy

The manner in which the DPJ has handled BMD and antipiracy offers some insight as to how the party may address broader security policies in the near term. With respect to BMD, while it could be argued that sunken costs might have forced the DPJ to proceed with a program it otherwise would have terminated (which may be true), consideration must also be given to the very real threat BMD is intended to counter. Therefore, it stands to reason that the DPJ will handle future security policy and programs aimed at countering potentially significant threats, be it DPRK missiles, or an increased Chinese military presence, in the same way. In this post-Cold War security environment, the potential for threats of this nature may be increased, but fortunately for Japan, it is safe to assume security issues, such as involvement in antipiracy efforts abroad, may be more common.

The party's handling of antipiracy efforts provides some insight as to how it may handle similar security issues in the future. Two aspects of the operation come to mind, namely the fact it is a multilateral effort, and that it deals with securing vital sea lanes. The fact the party has since expanded the scope of the mission to include forward basing suggests a willingness to commit to each. Therefore, it would not be surprising to see the DPJ pursue other multilateral efforts in which it could contribute to enhancing peace in the international security environment, while also ensuring its own national interests were met.

D. FINAL THOUGHTS

The circumstances involving BMD and antipiracy offer some insight as to how the DPJ will handle security policy in general. However, there are certain to be more events and issues that may indicate the DPJ will take a different approach to security from what has been seen in less than two years of rule. Such events do not have to be directly related to security, as is the case with the March 2011 earthquake in Japan. Not to downplay the tremendous loss of life and tragedy that has befallen the country, but the damage and costliness of the quake has already impacted the economy and the government, perhaps having implications for the defense budget and potentially

continuity of rule, all of which can influence future security policy. Likewise, the recent global economic concerns, should they persist, stand to impact the ability of Japan to afford the cost of securing itself, especially since the country's debt ratio was estimated at 197% of GDP in 2010.¹⁴⁵ These circumstances alone may elongate the process of determining the DPJ's broader security policies, which makes this subject one worthy of greater research and discussion.

¹⁴⁵ Lily Nonomiya, "Japan's Debt Ratio to Rise to 197% of GDP Next Year, OECD Says," *Bloomberg*, March 31, 2009, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDDufj4SrzYo>.

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