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# Three Wars of Ideas about the Idea of War

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*Strategic debates have long characterized the discourse on military affairs. Three lively disputes concern: 1) Whether set “principles of war” can be codified and mastered; 2) The relative strengths and limitations of maritime and continental power; and 3) The potential for waging successful “short wars.” Carl von Clausewitz provided the sharpest critique of the principles of war, arguing that “friction” can overwhelm even highly refined military art. A.T. Mahan’s concept of sea power was challenged by Halford Mackinder’s theory of “heartland power.” Short-war notions animated by Moltke the Elder’s victories in the 19th Century German wars of unification, and expanded upon by his successors, were rebutted by Ivan Bloch. Each debate remains relevant: technological advances prompt reappraisal of principles of war; the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia as great continental powers challenge American naval mastery; and insurgents and terrorists continue to prove the value of “long wars.”*

## Introduction

Throughout the long history of conflict, there have been many duels between “great captains.” Scipio v. Hannibal, Wallenstein v. Gustavus Adolphus, Montcalm v. Wolfe, Napoleon v. Wellington, Grant v. Lee, and Rommel v. Montgomery are some of the best known. But there have been many others. And away from the battlefield, “inside the tent,” there have also been many great intellectual duels. Call them wars of ideas about the idea of war. These remain somewhat less closely examined than the decisive campaigns of the finest commanders; but the debates they have sparked have often had just as profound effects on the course of history. For nations have girded themselves and gone to war in particular ways based on their ideas *about* war. And so there is merit in understanding the context, content, and consequences of the debates about military and security affairs that, in our view, have so profoundly shaped and continue to mold the world system.

Strategic debates can be found at least as far back as the fifth century B.C.E., when Themistocles had to overcome his fellow Athenians’ preference for relying primarily on heavy infantry and convince them to invest in building a navy against the looming Persian threat. His opponents bitterly resisted the idea, noting that their *hoplites* had beaten the Persians handily at Marathon. Themistocles countered with the argument that, until Greeks commanded the sea, the Persians could keep coming back, and might one day conquer. This line of thought finally prevailed, a substantial fleet was built, and a great naval victory was won at Salamis, crippling the second major Persian expeditionary force that had invaded Greece within a decade.

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Salamis ensured the salvation of Athens, the future of an independent Greece and, as some have argued, enabled the very rise of the West as well.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, many resented Themistocles because, as Plutarch summarized, “he took away from the Athenians the spear and the shield, and bound them to the bench and the oar.”<sup>2</sup> And so, for all the success he had made possible, Themistocles fell prey to his enemies’ lingering resentments and wound up an exile, first from Athens, later from Greece, ending his days in service to the Persian Empire as a provincial governor in Asia Minor. The ultimate irony.

Some seven centuries later the Roman emperor Gratian won an argument in favor of making his armies more mobile on the march by ridding his soldiers of their heavy body armor. But he began a process that lost all when Roman troops ever after became easy prey to barbarian horse archers. In Gibbon’s words, they “overwhelmed the naked and trembling legions,” enjoying a military advantage that “may be considered as the immediate cause of the downfall of the empire.”<sup>3</sup>

In more recent history, there was a high-level debate that led to the American shift away from emphasizing small numbers of military advisors, “combined action platoons,” and other unconventional warfare tactics in Vietnam, to reliance on a “big-unit war.” The result was an increase in destruction and in the “body count” of insurgents killed in action, but without concomitant strategic gains being generated against an enemy “that attacked in small units on its own initiative . . .” and “was simultaneously nowhere and everywhere.”<sup>4</sup> In the end, the big units could not quell the insurgency and the war was given up for lost.

The cautionary lesson here is that sometimes those who have won the debates have gone on to lose the wars. Clearly, the quality and clarity of the discussion matters. Thus, there are compelling reasons to examine the great strategic debates that have steered the course of military affairs. While, as noted, they may have informed and guided the approach to conflict since ancient times, it is really just during the past two hundred years that these discourses have become highly refined, and have had broad, persistent effects in their own eras and beyond.

With this in mind, we focus on three debates that have steered—but also sometimes misguided—the profession of arms since the end of the Napoleonic era in 1815. Put most concisely, they address: canonical principles v. “a genius for war”; sea v. land power; and notions of short v. long wars. Most of the debates that have flowed from these topics have featured leading protagonists on each side; and so this brief survey is also to some small extent a story of individual thinkers as well as of schools of thought. From the start, we note, the intellectual battle lines have been sharply drawn—as they should be in any good debate, much less in ones with such life-and-death consequences.

## Principles v. “Genius”

Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, a Napoleonic-era staff officer, was hardly the first but was surely the most articulate advocate for codifying the principles of war.<sup>5</sup> He distilled from his experiences, observations, others’ works, and historical ruminations such notions as “interior lines” (having one’s unified force poised between the separated forces of one’s enemies), the profound potential of logistical matters to shape the face of battle, and the concept of maneuvering so as to concentrate more of one’s own forces against a smaller proportion of the enemy’s at a to-be-determined “decisive point.”<sup>6</sup>

The U.S. military was well exposed to his thinking by the mid-nineteenth century, and the nine canonical principles that all American military leaders still learn—the objective, the offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, simplicity, security, and surprise—derive to a great extent from Jomini. His influence was perhaps best reflected

in the introduction to the 1862 edition of *The Art of War*, which was then being used as a text at West Point. As Henry Halleck, a senior Union general in the Civil War, put it: “General Jomini is admitted by all competent judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this or any other day.”<sup>7</sup> High praise indeed.

Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian soldier and philosopher of war, was a contemporary and sharp critic of Jomini. He had considerable field experience, which no doubt influenced his belief that the inherent difficulties of battle created “friction” and a knowledge-depriving “fog of war” that would override any attempt to adhere to formal principles. Instead, he argued, in almost mystic terms, that only “genius” could master the psychological and strategic challenges of war.

This perspective—a dominant theme in Clausewitz’s *On War*—took deep root in the Prussian/German military, and was built upon by Moltke the Elder, the architect of the great victories against Austria (1866) and France (1870–71). Commenting on Clausewitz’s notion of friction, Moltke famously observed: “No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter.”<sup>8</sup> From this perspective, it seems that only individuals with the highest reasoning powers can find the path to victory in war. As Clausewitz put it, they must have “gifts of mind and temperament that in combination . . . constitute *the essence of military genius*.”<sup>9</sup>

Interestingly, this strategic debate mirrored a larger cultural one between Enlightenment thinkers, who believed that science, structure, and rationalism could solve virtually all problems, and Romantics who reacted to and resisted the notion that the world could be mastered by reason, believing instead in the deep power of human will and emotion to prevail over and against all obstacles. Clausewitz’s emphasis that “the passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people”<sup>10</sup> resonated strongly with Romanticist thought. And during his lifetime—he died in 1831—the Romantics had great influence. But it didn’t last. As the noted historian of strategic thought Azar Gat has observed, “By the 1840s . . . the tide of Romanticism was ebbing throughout Europe, and it was the descendants of the Enlightenment who dominated the mid-century.”<sup>11</sup>

In the military realm during this period, the preeminence of Jominian rationalism extended to the United States—as we can see in Halleck’s abovementioned assessment of *The Art of War*—encompassing leaders on both sides during the Civil War.<sup>12</sup> Not only did Jomini’s ideas dominate, but, later on when Clausewitz’s work became better known, some of the key formulations from *On War* were coopted and reshaped to fit into a framework of “principles.” For example, some have tried to assert the similarity between Clausewitz and Jomini in the matter of “decisive points.” But this is a notion about which Jomini was detailed, systematic, and hortatory; Clausewitz was, at best, terse, vague, and elusive when he asserted: “The best strategy is always *to be very strong*; first in general, and then at the decisive point.”<sup>13</sup> Where Jomini created a clear typology based on the notion that decisive points derived both from geographic position and from the maneuvers of opposing forces in the field, Clausewitz remained slippery, at times describing “decisiveness” in positional terms, on other occasions referring to this factor temporally, as the “culminating point” when the initiative moved from one side to the other.

It is one of the bitter ironies of strategic thought that someone like Clausewitz, who abhorred dogma, should end up having so many of his ideas poured into Jominian molds. To make matters worse, his principal audience of professional soldiers got him almost completely wrong early on, the most egregious error being an extreme overemphasis on his ideas about “battle.” Seizing upon a few catchphrases (e.g., “There is only one means in war: combat”),<sup>14</sup> late-nineteenth-century and twentieth-century generals all too often “reduced the art of war to the mechanics of mass-slaughter,” as Liddell Hart put it.<sup>15</sup>

What was and continues to be missed here is Clausewitz's strong emphasis on the requirement to seek out battle under *advantageous* conditions—both material and psychological. Liddell Hart goes on to note that this sort of misinterpretation arose easily out of the abstruse philosophizing that Clausewitz routinely engaged in: “Not one reader in a hundred was likely to follow the subtlety of his logic.”<sup>16</sup> True enough.

Jomini, on the other hand, had a gift for clarity of thought and expression—which is perhaps why his ideas caught on so widely. And his views were not only attractive among generals; Jomini's geometric approach to strategy had particular appeal in naval settings as well. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American apostle of sea power, can be clearly seen as a disciple of Jomini—as was his father, Dennis Hart Mahan, a professor at West Point prior to the Civil War. The son's ideas were to have, and to some extent still retain, a wide global appeal that will be discussed next in our consideration of the sea power v. land power debate. In the particular case of A. T. Mahan, though, as it pertains to this debate, it should be sufficient, as Philip Crowl has noted, that the “ingredients of Jomini's art of war . . . were to be borrowed by Mahan to form the framework of his own system of naval strategy.”<sup>17</sup>

More broadly speaking about Jomini's appeal, however, the very idea of having “principles of war” is soothing, as it suggests that there is indeed a practical path to the mastery of military affairs. This remains something of an ideal, and in recent years efforts have been mounted to look at just which principles of war may still apply to, or have to be amended to deal with, challenges likely to arise in information-age conflicts and irregular wars.<sup>18</sup>

On balance, it seems clear that Jomini's Enlightenment-oriented perspective has carried the day against Clausewitz. As John Shy has observed, ironically, Clausewitz's name is “known even to those ignorant of history, but Jomini is familiar only to military specialists, although his influence on both military theory and popular conceptions of warfare has been enormous.”<sup>19</sup> Given the hecatombs of the world wars, and the wildly successful spate of anti-colonial and other irregular conflicts ever since, one has to question the enduring value of Jominian principles. For it seems that Clausewitz's emphases on complexity and the psychological domain, especially notions of “the passions of the people”—the first element he mentions in his “trinity of war”<sup>20</sup>—are more relevant to our troubled times. It is thus somewhat galling that Clausewitz's fame rests, all too heavily, on a few longstanding misconceptions about his core ideas. But by returning to and accurately parsing his true message, we may yet find insights of exceptional present—and future—value.

## Sea v. Land Power

Among the more persistent historical patterns of conflict have been the recurring struggles that have arisen between land-based and maritime-oriented powers. In ancient times, Persia v. Greece, Sparta v. Athens, and Rome v. Carthage come quickly to mind. In all three cases, the land powers had to “go to sea” in order to win, respectively, the Persian, Peloponnesian, and Punic Wars. Sea power was also crucial to the very survival of the Byzantine Empire, which outlasted Rome by a thousand years—falling in the end only when the Imperial navy had crumbled into disrepair, and no rescuing fleet came from the West to relieve the Ottoman siege and tight maritime blockade of Constantinople in 1453.<sup>21</sup>

The following century, and extending for some four hundred years thereafter, Britain became the quintessential naval power, confronting, in succession, protracted challenges from primarily land-based foes: Spain (sixteenth century); France (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries); and Germany (nineteenth and part of the twentieth centuries).<sup>22</sup> Each, in its time, mounted serious naval efforts; none prevailed strategically, save for the brief

period during the American Revolution when a French fleet succeeded in isolating British forces at Yorktown, leading to their capture.

In the wake of World War II, the United States became the leading maritime state, and spent forty years dealing with the threat posed by the land-oriented Soviet Union. The Cold War never turned into a hot global conflict, and so the threat the Red Navy posed to American naval mastery never matured into action. But today Russian naval capabilities remain robust, and Moscow is clearly still an important player in world affairs—as has been borne out by the events of recent years in Syria, Iran, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the primary new naval challenge seems to be coming from China, yet another classic continental power dipping its toe in the sea.

To A. T. Mahan, it seemed obvious that sea–land rivalries extended from ancient to modern times. Jomini’s ideas—in particular the precise geometric elements—fit very neatly into Mahan’s studies of British sea power covering the period from the seventeenth-century Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars to the Napoleonic era.<sup>23</sup> Though situated on the outer edge of Europe, Britain nevertheless enjoyed Jomini’s favored “interior position,” given that the Royal Navy could interpose itself between any single power, or hostile alliance, trying to unite fleets that had first to transit the North Sea, the Atlantic, and/or the Mediterranean.

For Mahan, naval mastery was the key to great power, and to ensuring victory in large-scale wars. Like Themistocles, Mahan believed that who commanded the sea commanded all. As to the benefits of maritime dominance during a conflict, Mahan was very much in agreement with Francis Bacon, who put the matter in these terms at the dawn of British sea power: “Thus much is certain, that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will.”<sup>24</sup>

Mahan was also drawn to two of Jomini’s other important concepts: the emphasis on concentration of forces—which led him to formulate the aphorism “Don’t divide the fleet!”—and appreciation of the profound connection between logistics and the conduct of battle.<sup>25</sup> There is also a significant strand in Mahan’s thinking devoted to the straightforward notion that whoever controls the sea will be in better position to win longer wars, because holding the maritime advantage allows one to draw on the trade, wealth, and resources of the world, whereas land-based opponents have more limited capacities that can be worn down by blockade. For all these ties to Jominian thought, however, Jon Sumida has insightfully observed, in the specific matter of “command in war,” as opposed to the more general notions of command of the sea, that Mahan’s “greater emphasis on art than on science [e.g., as can be seen in his *Types of Naval Officers*] resembled Clausewitz rather than Jomini.”<sup>26</sup>

Like Jomini before him, Mahan, who poured out a steady stream of books and articles from 1890–1914, enjoyed tremendous popularity. He was loved in Britain for affirming the wisdom of British grand strategy, and widely admired at home and in Japan and Germany for having shared the secret of how to rise to the first rank of nations.<sup>27</sup> However, the emergence of these new sea powers inevitably undermined the preeminent position of the Royal Navy, leading, in the years before World War I, to a serious battleship-building race with Germany and an uneasy Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Tensions with the United States during this era were relatively mild by comparison, but did spike during the Anglo-Venezuelan crisis of 1895. In France there was a more curious response: instead of building large battle fleets as Mahan urged, the French navy, guided by the off-design thinkers of the *Jeune École*, such as Admiral Aube, at first focused much more on development of swift, light coastal vessels capable of firing torpedoes. Minelaying was also emphasized. Mahan was very sharp in his criticism of this strand of French naval thought.<sup>28</sup>

It is also interesting to note that Mahan used his studies of the pre-industrial age of sail to try to guide naval thought for a machine age. He dealt with this problem by asserting that:

While many of the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal application, can be elevated to the rank of general principles.<sup>29</sup>

But this finesse that allowed Mahan to slip past the possibly unique problems posed by changing technology could not work as easily against a fresh challenge emanating from the great British geographer, Halford Mackinder, whose framework for analysis and criticism relied on belief in the enduring features of an everlasting struggle to control the Eurasian “heartland.”

As Mackinder argued in his famous 1904 article, this great land mass was, and continued to be, “the pivot region of the world’s politics.”<sup>30</sup> Surrounding it was an “inner crescent” running from Western Europe through the Middle East and on to South and East Asia. The United States was relegated to the “outer crescent,” reflecting its insularity. Later, as Mackinder’s ideas became even more crystallized, he stated his fundamental argument in the form of three closely linked hypotheses: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island [i.e., Europe, Asia, and Africa]; and Who rules the World-Island commands the world.”<sup>31</sup> These three assertions grew from Mackinder’s belief that the latest advances in technology—particularly in attack from the air and rapid transportation of forces on the ground—were favoring land powers over sea powers; Britain’s long run of global leadership, in his view, was in danger of ending.

Given that Mackinder wrote his three key formulations just after World War I, twenty years before the Nazi effort to achieve world power via eastward expansion, his work seems most prescient. His idea also neatly depicts the position, and perhaps the aims, of the Russians after World War II and throughout the Cold War. That to this day perceived Russian expansionism still generates close interest, much concern—and the occasional international crisis—suggests the continuing relevance of Mackinder’s thinking.

Thus were the ideas of Mahan, the great champion of maritime supremacy, challenged by Mackinder, the critical questioner who believed that continental power had the potential to prevail in world affairs. If these two were, respectively, thesis and antithesis, then a third strand of thought introduced during the same period, the notion of a crucially important “rimland,” provided a kind of Hegelian synthesis. It was Yale Professor Nicholas Spykman who advanced the rimland concept, the main contention of which was that the lands and seas on the immediate edges of the heartland were the true pivot of history, control of which would determine the course of world events.

Spykman’s analysis was quite sophisticated, even allowing for and explaining why a heartland power like Russia might align with “rimland Britain” against another aggressive rimland power—such as France in the early nineteenth century, or Germany in the twentieth century. The key, per Spykman, was to control the littorals of Eurasia, what Mahan called the “debated and debatable zone” in which land and sea powers contested on relatively equal terms. And Spykman’s firm belief was that the rimland could contain the heartland. This formulation has led some to see him as a progenitor, even before George Kennan, of Cold-War-era notions of containment.<sup>32</sup>

With the foregoing in mind, one should think of Spykman as being deterministic—whereas Mackinder is not. Indeed, it is important to note that Mackinder did not see the triumph of continental power over sea power as inevitable. What he observed, rather, was that technological, economic, and political conditions in the world of the twentieth century seemed to be moving in a direction favoring land power—much as he recognized that the state of play for these factors in the nineteenth century had favored the preeminence of sea power.

Despite his thoughtfully reasoned and carefully qualified lines of argument, Mackinder was advancing ideas that were absolutely iconoclastic. As a major text on political geography put it, “Mackinder’s land power thesis which, appearing at what seemed to be the height of the Victorian sea power age, seemed shocking and fantastic.”<sup>33</sup> But the course of the major wars over the past century has nonetheless borne out his key point about the ongoing struggle between continental and maritime powers. That the latter prevailed, narrowly, in both world wars, hardly disproves the land power thesis. To explain the outcomes of these conflicts, Spykman would no doubt simply note that each of the world wars featured a great heartland power (Russia) aligning with rimland powers to defeat another “rimlander.”

As to the Cold War, this too seems a struggle—largely ideational and economic, at its core—whose outcome was driven by the steady, sturdy alliance of rimland powers that were able to outlast the will and resources of their continental challenger, the Soviet Union. Still, the Russians were able to operate on a global basis and had their innings in many proxy wars throughout the period from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. In the end, though, someone taking the sea-power side of the debate can point out that Mahan’s formulations about the likelihood that maritime powers will prevail in protracted conflicts are clearly borne out in this case. Indeed, Colin Gray has provided just such an analysis—and affirmation—of the role of sea power in the twentieth century:

The twentieth century has seen the leverage of sea power challenged by the rise of great industrialized continental states, the invention and development of the airplane, and most recently the coming of nuclear weapons. Experience has shown, however, that reports of the strategic demise or even obsolescence of sea power have been greatly exaggerated. Sea power in this century has coopted or otherwise neutralized every takeover challenge that has appeared.<sup>34</sup>

Will Mahan continue to trump Mackinder in the twenty-first century? Perhaps. But clearly, the ideas of both will continue to matter a great deal. The key to solving this particular puzzle, though, may actually lie in the third great strategic debate—which is about short v. long wars. If maritime powers can hold out long enough, as in the Napoleonic era and during the world wars, they generally prevail.

### Short v. Long Wars

The leading German historian Hans Delbrück—a contemporary of Mahan and Mackinder—divided wars into two fundamental types: those of “annihilation” (*Niederwerfungsstrategie*), in which a swift end is sought through decisive battle; and those of “exhaustion” (*Ermattungsstrategie*), where the aim is to wear down the opponent via a long series of battles, maneuvers, blockades, and the like. In his magisterial multi-volume *History of the Art of War*, Delbrück pointed to Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon as the best practitioners of decisive battle. The masters of attrition, in his view, were Pericles of ancient Athens, Belisarius the Byzantine, both Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus during



the Thirty Years' War—and Frederick the Great. Delbrück's listing of Frederick as a master of attritional warfare brought down upon him, as Gordon Craig put it, "a flood of angry criticism . . . The most vocal of his critics were the historians of the [German] general staff who [were] convinced that the strategy of annihilation was the only correct strategy."<sup>35</sup>

One of those German military historians who criticized Delbrück was Friedrich von Bernhardi, who was also an accomplished soldier who had distinguished himself early on in the Franco-Prussian War and, at the end of his career, served extremely effectively as a general on both the Eastern and Western fronts during World War I. More than anyone else at the time, Bernhardi was *the* great advocate of decisive battle. His basic line of reasoning was that the sheer size of modern armies, their destructive power, and the great complexity of their logistical support and command control systems made it both essential, and likely, that decisive action would ensue very quickly at the outset of a major conflict. As he put it shortly before the outbreak of war in August 1914: "It is inherent in the nature of war itself that we must proceed offensively as far as circumstances will ever admit; we *must strive to gain a victory as rapidly as possible*."<sup>36</sup>

Bernhardi may have been the most ardent believer in the likelihood of and need for a short war, but he was clearly not alone in his views. His German colleagues were completely steeped in this notion, the Schlieffen Plan that they undertook at the outset of World War I being the clearest manifestation of their faith in the short-war concept.<sup>37</sup> And the vast majority of professional soldiers serving the other European powers also concurred with Bernhardi about the need to attack from the outset and seek a swift victory. This view was so widely held that historian Theodore Ropp focused on French Marshal Joffre's phrase "the cult of the offensive" to describe the persistent, almost mindless devotion to seeking out a grand decisive battle—a goal still blindly pursued even after years of senseless slaughter on the Western Front.<sup>38</sup>

This school of thought seemed quite consistent with Clausewitz's emphasis on the need to seek battle under advantageous conditions. What Bernhardi brought to the discourse was the subtle insight that industrialization, with its mass production and transport systems, would result in a far more sizeable proportion of a nation's capabilities coming into the field much sooner. Added to this, the scale and complexity of modern field operations meant that conditions could easily become "disadvantageous," so Bernhardi and his adherents at home and abroad believed that it was imperative to seek a rapid decision in war.

The most articulate argument against the short-war concept was advanced by Ivan Bloch, also known as Jean de Bloch, a Polish banker who had served as an advisor to the Tsar on supply and transport during the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78). However, in his *La Guerre Future*, Bloch focused less on the complexity associated with the movement of large forces and supplies by rail and other logistics-related matters, and more on the range, accuracy, and killing power of weapons—which he believed would wreak absolute havoc upon an attacking army. He took the position that "it will be impossible for the battle of the future to be fought out rapidly."<sup>39</sup>

Bloch went on to predict with uncanny clarity of vision what would transpire in the next great conflict—not a fast-paced, decisive campaign but rather a mutually exhausting war of attrition. He foresaw "increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to push the battle to a decisive issue . . . [followed by] a long period of increasing strain upon the resources of the combatants."<sup>40</sup> In the opinion of Michael Howard, Bloch's work was full of "astonishing insights" and constituted a "remarkably accurate blueprint for the war which was to break out in Europe in 1914."<sup>41</sup> Bloch's foresight should be seen as even more impressive, given that he died in 1900.

Thus, even though most professional soldiers concurred with Bernhardt's views—to their great detriment—what we might call the substantive aspect of the short v. long war debate clearly went to Bloch over Bernhardt and his adherents. And, as to the *blitzkrieg*-era German strategists of the 1930s, who came to believe that they had rediscovered a recipe for winning short wars—like those victories attained by Prussian arms against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870—the great panzer thrusts into Poland, France, and Russia during World War II did little to avoid a long war. For Britain's sea power kept the home island safe from invasion, and enabled empire resources to be brought into play. Russia, the quintessential heartland power, was able to trade space for time, while American "rimland" capabilities—sea, air, and land—also came to the conflict. Thus, in the end, *blitzkrieg* foundered as a short-war formula because, as Gwynne Dyer has observed: "No innovation in warfare stays a surprise for very long, and by the middle of the war, when German forces were fighting deep inside the Soviet Union, attrition had returned with a vengeance."<sup>42</sup>

Clearly, World War II also provides some evidence of the interplay between the debates about land-sea conflicts and short and long wars. In this instance, Germany was also in violation of Spykman's guidance to avoid being opposed by a coalition consisting of both continental and maritime powers—the worst of all worlds. Japan, as Spykman put it, was similarly "encircled" geostrategically.<sup>43</sup> In the end, the Germans were not so much outfought as gang-tackled—a situation that befell them due to the mistaken belief that they were positioned to win a short war despite their geopolitical position being so vulnerable as to militate against this possibility.

Japanese grand strategy, when viewed through the lens of the land v. sea power and short v. long war debates, reflects a similar sort of fuzzy thinking, given that the *Kido Butai* began the Pacific War with a carrier-based form of naval/amphibious *blitzkrieg*—landing a series of swift, stunning blows from Pearl Harbor to Singapore. But the core Japanese concept was about being able to wage a long war under favorable conditions, the prospective costs of which, they hoped, would deter American counterattacks against the defensive perimeter that they had created. Their intent was to be able to strike out from time to time at different points along this perimeter, a strategy that was discarded after defeat at Midway—a fatal mistake. As Ronald Spector has noted, "The Japanese still had sufficient forces after Midway to again take the offensive . . . Instead they reverted to the defensive."<sup>44</sup> Thus was their fate sealed.

A static defensive—save for occasional "rice offensives" in China and a misguided effort to push from Burma on to India—was hardly the correct choice for dealing with an opponent so outraged by the manner in which the war had begun. But the Japanese had failed to reckon with one of the key formulations from Clausewitz's *On War*—the "passions of the people." The cost of rolling back Japanese conquests, and the bitter fighting that would be required to do so, were simply not issues for the American people. Severe punishment of the aggressor was all that mattered after Pearl Harbor.

This point about national will is crucially important. Even Hans Delbrück was aware of this factor, noting its salience as far back as the Second Punic War. He used the example of Hannibal, who had won a great victory at Cannae, destroying a major Roman field army in one of the most superbly conducted battles in all the history of armed conflict. Yet even the great Carthaginian captain found himself still embroiled in a long war, because the Roman people, despite the defection of some allies, refused to lose heart. Hannibal continued to roam Italy for over a decade, winning battles here and there, but never achieving his aim. As Delbrück put it, Hannibal "said to the Romans that it was not a war of complete destruction"—per Livy, *non internecivum sibi esse cum Romanis bellum*—and he offered

to discuss peace terms. The Romans rejected the offer.”<sup>45</sup> And in the long war that dragged on, it was the legions that eventually prevailed.

Indeed, the staying power of the Roman soldier was clearly reflected in the composition of the expeditionary force that invaded North Africa and won the great battle at Zama that ensued. It was largely made up of survivors of the great defeat at Cannae.<sup>46</sup> We also note that Rome retained its naval mastery—initially gained in the First Punic War (264–241 B.C.E.)—throughout the sixteen years (218–202 B.C.E.) of the Second.

A similar phenomenon can be seen in the wake of the German invasion of Russia in June 1941. Their panzers won huge “cauldron” battles of encirclement, again and again, in the opening months of the war, with Russian losses in killed, wounded, or captured quickly approaching five million.<sup>47</sup> German casualties were about one-fifth this number. Vast tracts of territory were overrun as well. Some of this was due to German skill; but just as big a role was played by Soviet blunders. Yet the war went on and the Russians ultimately won, thanks to the sheer grit of their soldiery. Alan Clark summed up their resilience this way:

Foremost must come the ordinary Russian soldier. Abominably led, inadequately trained, poorly equipped, he changed the course of history by his courage and tenacity in the first year of fighting.<sup>48</sup>

In both the Roman and the Russian examples, horrendous early defeats in the field were overcome by finding ways to prolong these wars. The Romans relied on “Fabian” delaying tactics<sup>49</sup> in Italy – i.e., on avoiding main battles while raiding and otherwise harrying the enemy—and used their sea power both to make it hard for Carthage to reinforce Hannibal and eventually to launch counter-offensives of their own under the command of Publius Cornelius Scipio (later Africanus) in Spain and North Africa. Two millennia later, the Russians traded space to gain time to rebuild, slowly wearing the Germans down, while their Western allies used sea power to strike at vulnerable points of the Nazi imperium along the occupied Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts. *Plus ça change . . .*

Guerrilla wars have also tended to follow this pattern of “temporal extension.” Napoleon overran Spain quickly in 1808, but his forces were soon caught in the toils of an extremely bitter insurgency that lasted until the French were expelled several years later. At the turn of the twentieth century in South Africa, British forces beat the Boers in open battle; but the Afrikaaners’ irregular small-unit *Kommandos* fought on with much skill and great effect for years thereafter. As the twentieth century unfolded, Mao Zedong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and other guerrilla leaders all strove in their times and places to win by ensuring that their conflicts would be protracted. Lewis Gann saw this pattern clearly in his survey of irregular warfare, and it led him to conclude: “The successful guerrilla must be resigned to waging a long drawn-out war.”<sup>50</sup>

No doubt the same can be said of terrorists. Today al Qaeda seeks to win a long war, and there has been some recognition of this long-war notion on the part of American strategic leadership as well. However, it has proved hard to sustain “the passions of the people” opposed to terrorism, given the open-ended nature of this first protracted conflict between nations and terror networks—as can be seen by the complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, and the relatively muted American reaction to the resurgence of extremism in that sad land. The looming departure of most of the security assistance force from Afghanistan is yet another example of how a lack of “passion” for the cause undermines the ability to sustain the fight.<sup>51</sup>

On balance, it seems that decisive short wars have been more the exception than the rule. Yes, the Israelis won the Six-Day War in 1967, swiftly and with great skill. But this

result was to be a rare one—even for the Israeli Defense Forces, who soon after were mired in an irregular war of attrition (1969–1970) and then had a very close call in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Next they invaded Lebanon in 1982 and were subjected to some eighteen years of insurgent operations by Hezbollah guerrillas, who finally impelled the IDF to withdraw. Six years later, the Israelis thought better of staying on again in Lebanon after their thirty-three-day incursion in 2006, withdrawing after another hard fight with Hezbollah irregulars. Simply put, short wars are still around—e.g., see also the five-day Russo-Georgian War of 2008—but are becoming ever harder to find. And, as the most recent Israeli experience in Lebanon suggests, the outcome of the short war may not be as expected; i.e., the much more powerful side may not always emerge clearly victorious.

So it seems that Bloch still trumps Bernhardt and others who have chased the chimera of the short war. While most of the discussion in this section has been about fighting on land, this assessment of the debate seems to apply very well to air power, too. Its early advocates—most notably the Italian Giulio Douhet, but he had adherents in many nations—tended to agree strongly with Bernhardt, the thought being that strategic bombardment of the enemy homeland would swiftly bring about material and psychological collapse. This, coupled with the belief that, as Bernard Brodie once observed of air power advocates, that air forces are “incomparably powerful on offense,”<sup>52</sup> has inspired quite a number of strategic bombing campaigns over the past century. But almost none of them have been decisive, from the London Blitz to the bombing of Germany and Japan during World War II, to the leveling of Pyongyang during the Korean conflict, and on to massive air attacks on Hanoi, Belgrade and, most recently, Iraq during the American-led invasion in 2003.<sup>53</sup>

It is interesting to note that even the specter of nuclear devastation, steeped for so long in notions of a spasmodic “mutual assured destruction,” has featured a long-war variant as well. It was stated succinctly in Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Directive 59, which outlined a way to pursue protracted nuclear warfare by focusing attacks solely on military targets, the key idea being that more skillful, accurate aim at “counterforce” capabilities might cripple an enemy, allowing a nuclear war to come to an end, over time, absent a result of civilization-destroying Armageddon.<sup>54</sup>

For the most part, this idea of protracted nuclear war was rejected, not least by Ronald Reagan, who put it bluntly: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Still, the counterforce approach—versus the notion of simply aiming at population centers, so-called “countervalue” targets—in support of more protracted operations may be inadvertently reinvigorated by current efforts to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals sharply. Were this to happen, then a carefully crafted counterforce campaign might well come to the fore again, since it would be possible to think about disabling an adversary’s nuclear capabilities without having to incinerate population centers. As James Schlesinger and Keith Payne have put it in their analysis of the “deep reductions” school of thought,

Claims of effective deterrence at very low force levels appear to ignore the reality that the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. deterrent forces may on some critical occasions be tied to the flexibility and diversity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and thus to its size.<sup>55</sup>

To close this survey of the long v. short war debate, we must also consider how it plays out at sea. Naval strategists a century ago, so steeped in Mahanian ideas, were deeply divided on this subject. Mahan was, too. He was very willing to note the utterly decisive impact of key battles, such as Quiberon Bay during the Seven Years’ War and the Battle of

Trafalgar during the Napoleonic era. But at the same time he observed that these “decisive engagements” only settled a preliminary matter: command of the sea. Both these wars dragged on many years after the seemingly decisive naval clash. For Mahan, blockade, a quintessential long-war tool, was the ultimate key to victory.

This ambivalence about how to wield sea power was also manifested from the outset of World War I, when Winston Churchill held that the Commander of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet, Admiral John Jellicoe was “the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.”<sup>56</sup> In light of this dire possibility, the British preferred to eschew such a risk and emphasized blockade instead. The Germans seemed similarly skittish, generally avoiding a major fleet confrontation and relying instead on a counter-blockade with U-boats. But when a titanic clash did occur nearly two years on in the war, the Germans won the Battle of Jutland tactically—the Royal Navy’s losses in ships and men were shockingly high.<sup>57</sup> Yet the war was not lost in an afternoon. And the blockade of Germany remained in place unbroken, given the correlation of forces at the time, and the Germans were ultimately “exhausted” in the long war that dragged on for two-and-a-half years after Jutland.

The story of sea power in World War II is similar, with the Western Allies—those Spykman labeled rimland powers—imposing a blockade from the outset. The German counter-effort came primarily in terms of another U-boat campaign. Thus, both sides clearly reflected dominant long-war views. Even the Japanese maritime *blitzkrieg* in the Far East, as we noted earlier, was designed to create a security zone that would compel the Allies to wage a long war against the Imperial Navy.

Overall, then, it seems that in conflicts on land, in the air, and at sea, the long-war paradigm has prevailed. And while there have been a relative handful of short, sharp, land wars, the insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—and now, apparently, the covert warriors aligned with Russian strategic interests—who dominate today’s landscape of conflict have all focused on Delbrück’s notion of winning by wearing down their enemies. Indeed, so much so that, in an age replete with irregular wars, it seems that the triumph of the long-war notion heralds an era of perpetual conflict.

## Two Key Interconnections and Conclusions Drawn from Them

Perhaps the most important connecting point among the three strategic debates we have explored herein is the tight linkage between national will—that is, the concept of the “passion of the people” that was so important to Clausewitz—and the notion of the “long war.” This relationship strikes at both the Jominian view that adherence to particular principles will most often lead to victory, and the school of thought that blossomed—from Bernhardt to the advocates of *blitzkrieg*—in support of the notion that technological change had brought the principles of the offensive and maneuver to the forefront of military and strategic affairs and made the waging of “short wars” a real possibility, even a necessity. In all too many cases, though, we have seen that an asymmetry of motivation redounds to the benefit of the more determined side in a conflict—despite material, technological, or other deficiencies. Historian Peter Paret summarized Clausewitz’s view about the preeminence of the passions of the people this way: “The raw emotions that provide energy for all effective action [in war] rest in society.”<sup>58</sup>

We have also seen how elusive the short war itself has been—even before the current age of protracted conflicts between nations and networks. The massive numbers of troops mobilized by the Allies and the Central Powers in August 1914 did not, as expected, result in a swift resolution via decisive battle. Instead, a hard, four-year slog unfolded. A generation later, the marriage of tank, plane, and radio unleashed a *blitzkrieg* that was

supposed to win short, sharp wars—yet another long struggle ensued once all parties began using similar weapons systems and tactics. After World War II, the world's remaining colonial powers—and later the superpowers—saw their material advantages largely offset by determined insurgents. Short wars are hardly to be found in any of these realms.

Today, some (the authors included) see the possibility of the skillful use of advanced information systems—and of the crippling of adversary communications, by cyber and other means—as offering yet another chance to resurrect the short-war notion through innovations in the Jominian “maneuver” principle.<sup>59</sup> The shift, in this case, would be from *blitzkrieg* to what we call *bitskrieg*. Some small evidence of the potential of this mode of conflict may have been on display in the Russo-Georgian War (2008), in which Russian attacks on Georgian information systems created serious disruptions that degraded the latter's military effectiveness sharply. Indeed, the Georgian military leadership itself admitted that its critical “inability to communicate effectively in combat” was the proximate cause of defeat.<sup>60</sup> The Russians would most likely have won this war under any circumstances; but their skillful use of cyber and other means of disrupting Georgia's command and control processes brought success more swiftly and at lesser cost.

It is important not to attach too much weight to Russian field and information operations in 2008, as an eventual “leveling” may occur. This was the case with rail mobility, when the skillful German practices that did so much to enable the great victories in the Seven Weeks' War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) could not be replicated in 1914—because their opponents had learned to mobilize just as fast, and millions on both sides poured swiftly into the field, which soon became a bloody quagmire. The same fate awaited armored *blitzkrieg*. After big wins in Poland, France, and early on in Russia (1939–1941), a reaction set in during which Allied maneuver warfare capabilities matched those of the Germans. Thus, the result of even very big innovations seems to have been a relatively short run of dominance in the field. Perhaps a very skillful form of *bitskrieg* will emerge and, like previous advances in military affairs, see some initial success. Still, it too may ultimately prove a “wasting asset.”

On balance, then, this connection between the passion of the people and the long-war concept seems to overmatch the idea that advances in the principles of war can enable conflicts to be waged sharply and won swiftly. And so in this particular strategic tag-team match-up, Clausewitz and Bloch have the edge over Jomini and Bernhardt. That said, technological advances continually come on the scene in ways that do increase the pace and complexity of operations, opening up the possibility of victory in short, sharp wars.

A second important linkage is also to the notion of long wars—this time with sea power. Naval mastery seems made for protracted conflict, both in terms of enabling the leading sea power to withstand a big land power's initial blows, and then in terms of gathering up the resources required to prevail over time. It is crucial, though, that we not dismiss Mackinder's heartland theory—especially not now, given the resurgence of Russia in world power politics after a few decades of quiescence in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. If the world wars of the twentieth century offer any particular lesson in this issue area, it is that continental powers have the potential to become quite formidable at sea. The German U-boats came perilously close to winning each conflict. The Cold War never became truly hot, so we cannot say with certainty how the Russians would have performed at sea. But they too would have posed a very serious naval challenge in a shooting war.

And if we are willing to cast our gaze all the way back to ancient and medieval times, there are the alarming lessons to be drawn from land powers that, in long-enough periods of conflict, were able to transform themselves into victorious sea powers: Athens over Persia; Sparta over Athens; Rome over Carthage; the Ottomans over the Byzantines. The pattern

has not been repeated in modern times—yet—but is worth keeping in mind, especially in an era in which high politics and military affairs may be dominated by the rise of China and the return of Russia—two continental powers with robust and growing naval capabilities. Mackinder still matters, even if Mahan still prevails.

A concluding thought prompted by some consideration of these interconnections is that they are of especially lively relevance to our world today. Take, for example, the linkage between energizing the passions of the people and tying it to a long-war concept. Clearly this was the idea behind the al Qaeda strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's *Global Islamic Resistance Call*. His basic plan has been to mobilize jihadis at an emotional level, with a powerful narrative about the excesses of foreign military powers in Muslim lands, and of the corruption of the “apostate” governments they put in place.

After mobilization, al-Suri envisions a “global swarm” emerging over many years, enlivened by countless semi-autonomous cells located around the world, with the network eventually overwhelming nations' abilities to cope with this mode of conflict.<sup>61</sup> It is fascinating to note that, in response, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the head of the Special Operations Command came together to craft a document that puts “the passions of the people” at the center of American strategic thought. In their phrasing, “the significance of the ‘human domain’ in future conflict is growing, not diminishing.”<sup>62</sup> Thus the “heartland” that Mackinder saw in geographical terms is now complemented by the complexities of the human heart.

That said, the more traditional notion of the heartland must not be forgotten, nor dismissed due to complacency or undue faith in the ultimate triumph of sea power over continental challengers. As the historical record amply shows, land powers have sometimes gone to sea successfully. On other occasions, as in the world wars, they have come very close to victory. And in a time when the quintessential heartland power, Russia, is reasserting itself forcefully, it seems clear that the long struggle between land and sea may resume. Indeed, the strategic equipoise between the two may elevate the importance of nations that can wield influence in both realms. China comes to mind first, and it may be that both Moscow and Washington should be contemplating the possibility that the “holder of the balance” resides in Beijing. India, a purer “rimland” power, will also prove important—a point that recent American diplomacy toward New Delhi seems to affirm. But President Obama's “pivot to the Pacific” appears aimed more at containment of, rather than engagement with, China—leaving an opening for Russia to exploit. Thus does the Mahan–Mackinder debate still resonate.

No doubt there are other linkages across the three major strategic debates to discover and explore. In this regard, we hope that this brief exposition of some key “wars of ideas about the idea of war” will serve to stimulate a continuing, ever-improving discourse.

## Notes

1. The latest affirmation of this point can be found in Barry Strauss, *The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter that Saved Greece—and Western Civilization* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

2. Plutarch, *Lives of Illustrious Men* (New York: The Cuneo Press, 1936), 4.

3. Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury, vol. 2 (New York: The Heritage Press, 1946), 883.

4. Scott Sigmund Gartner, *Strategic Assessment in War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 127.

5. John I. Alger, *The Quest for Victory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982) remains the most thorough survey of efforts to identify settled principles of war.

6. While the concept of “decisive points” animates much of Jomini’s work, the most detailed discussion of this idea can be found in his *Art of War* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862), 85–88.

7. Henry Halleck, “Preface,” *ibid.*, 1. Halleck was the one of the translators of Jomini’s work. Note his use of the present tense in referring to Jomini, who lived until 1869.

8. Cited in Daniel J. Hughes, ed., *Moltke on the Art of War* (New York: Presidio Press, 1993), 45–6. Of Moltke’s overall intellectual debt to Clausewitz, Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 60, observes that Moltke’s musings “echo Clausewitz to the point of plagiarism.”

9. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 100. The emphasis is his.

10. *Ibid.*, 89.

11. Azar Gat, *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 3.

12. The case for Jomini’s influence on Union and Confederate generals was best made by T. Harry Williams, “The Military Leadership of North and South,” in David Donald, ed., *Why the North Won the Civil War* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, Inc., 1962), 33–54.

13. Clausewitz, *On War*, 204. Again, the emphasis is his.

14. *Ibid.*, 96.

15. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd revised edition (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), 342.

16. *Ibid.*, 342. This difficulty was dealt with to some degree by Michael Howard and Peter Paret in their elegant 1976 translation of *On War*, which helped clarify Clausewitz’s deep, complex thinking.

17. Philip Crowl, “Mahan,” in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 457.

18. Notable efforts along these lines include: Robert Leonhard, *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (Novato: Presidio Press, 2000); and Anthony D. McIvor, ed., *Rethinking the Principles of War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005). Admiral William McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995) reviews the classic principles in light of the requirements of small, elite forces that are called upon to conduct raids.

19. John Shy, “Jomini,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 143. But see also Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds., *Clausewitz in the 21st Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), an anthology that reflects a broad effort to clarify the concepts and demonstrate the continuing relevance of Clausewitz.

20. The other two elements of the trinity are the policymakers of the government and the professional soldiers.

21. Two classic histories that extol the historical importance of ancient and medieval sea power are by William Ledyard Rogers: *Greek and Roman Naval Warfare* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1937), and *Naval Warfare under Oars* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1940). A more critical analysis of early maritime affairs is offered in Chester Starr, *The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

22. For an excellent, much-quantified survey of the contest for maritime supremacy during these centuries, see George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).

23. Mahan’s seminal works are: *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890) and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812*, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1892). He wrote many other books, including a two-volume life of Lord Nelson and, later, a one-volume summary of his strategic thought, *Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles of and Practices of Military Operations on Land*, that clearly confirmed his deep reliance on Jominian thought.



24. From "Of Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," in *The Essays of Francis Bacon*, ed., Mary Augusta Scott (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908), 144.
25. Philip A. Crowl, "Mahan," *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 457.
26. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 110.
27. Mahan's influence on the great powers' naval policies is examined in W. D. Puleston, *Mahan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), 324–36.
28. Puleston notes that Mahan was "brutally frank in his criticism" of the *Jeune École*. *Ibid.*, 332.
29. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, 2.
30. Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 23, no. 4 (April 1904): 421–437.
31. Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919; reprint, London: Faber and Faber, 2009), 194.
32. The most comprehensive exposition of the rimland theory can be found in Nicholas Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944).
33. Hans Weigert et al., *Principles of Political Geography* (New York: Appleton-Crofts, 1957), 215.
34. Colin S. Gray, *The Leverage of Sea Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 263.
35. Gordon A. Craig, "Delbrück: The Military Historian," in Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 342.
36. Friedrich von Bernhardi, *How Germany Makes War* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1914), 254. This is the English-language title given to his *Vom heutigen Kriege* [On War of Today]. The emphasis is Bernhardi's.
37. See Gerhard Ritter, *The Schlieffen Plan* (New York: Praeger, 1958).
38. Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1962), 249. An early use of "*le culte de l'offensive*" is found in Joseph Joffre, *Mémoires* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1932), 33. See also Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
39. Jean de Bloch, *Is War Now Impossible?* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1899), xxviii. This was the title of the English-language version of the last book of his six-volume *La Guerre Future*.
40. *Ibid.*, xlvi.
41. Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 100.
42. Gwynne Dyer, *War* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1985), 88.
43. Nicholas Spykman, *America's Security in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1942), 151.
44. Ronald Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 178.
45. Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War*, vol. I, *Warfare in Antiquity*, 3rd edition, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (1920; Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 338.
46. Robert L. O'Connell, *The Ghosts of Cannae* (New York: Random House, 2010), 230.
47. William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), 952, pegged the number of prisoners alone "taken by the Germans in the first phase of the Russian campaign" at 3.8 million. Hitler's "Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories," Alfred Rosenberg, reckoned the total over the same period at 3.6 million. See Rosenberg-Keitel correspondence, February 28, 1942, cited in *Nuremberg Documents on the Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. 3, (N.D. 081-PS), 126–130.
48. Alan Clark, *Barbarossa: The Russo-German Conflict, 1941–1945* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965), xx.
49. Named after the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator ("the Delayer").
50. Lewis Gann, *Guerrillas in History* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 84.

51. All these themes are explored in some detail in Mark T. Berger and Douglas A. Borer, eds., *The Long War: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Collapsing States*, special issue, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 2 (2007).

52. Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 87.

53. A thoughtful critique of the utility of strategic aerial attack can be found in Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

54. The seminal work on this theme is Richard Fryklund, *100 Million Lives: Maximum Survival in a Nuclear War* (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

55. James Schlesinger and Keith Payne, *Limited Deterrence: A Strategic Analysis*, a special issue of *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 33, no. 1, (January-March, 2014), 30.

56. Cited in Geoffrey Bennett, *The Battle of Jutland* (London: B. T. Batsford Limited, 1964), 42.

57. The Royal Navy lost 14 ships sunk and 6,097 sailors killed, while the German High Sea Fleet lost 11 ships and just 2,551 killed. *Ibid.*, 155.

58. Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 369.

59. An early glimpse of this idea is in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar Is Coming!" *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 12, no. 2 (April-June, 1993), 141-65.

60. C. J. Chivers and Thom Shanker, "Georgia Eager to Rebuild Its Defeated Armed Forces," *The New York Times*, September 3, 2008. For a more general account of the conflict and its implications, see Charles King, "The Five-Day War," *Foreign Affairs* (November-December 2008), 2-11.

61. The most thorough analysis of this concept can be found in Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). Peter Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and al-Qaeda* (New York: The Free Press, 2011), 202-3, offers a thoughtful assessment of this form of networked "leaderless jihad."

62. General Raymond T. Odierno (USA), General James F. Amos (USMC), and Admiral William H. McRaven (USN), *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills* (United States Department of Defense, 2013), 2.

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