

## Russia, America and missile defense

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Russia has sharply objected to US plans for ballistic missile defense. The Russian official explanation is that the real purpose of the US missile defense plan is to make it impossible for Russia to retaliate against a US nuclear (or massive conventional) attack, thus making Russia subject to military blackmail by the US. The Russian response has been the result of a sum total of various factors, mostly political and cultural, while the technical capabilities of the proposed system have played a secondary role.

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### Introduction

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, US–Russian relations were dominated by a sharp conflict over US plans for ballistic missile defense (BMD) to be deployed in Europe. The George W. Bush administration's plan to deploy missile defense radar in the Czech Republic and ground-based interceptors (GBI) in Poland provoked a furious response from the Kremlin which insisted that these interceptors would be able to destroy Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in flight and thus make Russia unable to retaliate against a US nuclear attack. Passions in Moscow seemed to subside somewhat after President Obama canceled his predecessor's plan and announced a phased adaptive approach (PAA) to missile defense, emphasizing protection of Europe against medium-range ballistic missiles. The initial stages of this deployment exclude any capability for intercepting ICBMs. The Russians, however, have been apparently disappointed that the new US–Russian strategic offensive arms control treaty, signed in April 2010, failed to put any limits on US missile defense. Russian concern has focused on Phase IV of the missile defense program (to be reached around 2020), when it could acquire the capability to intercept a very small number of ICBMs, and on further possible developments of the system.

In November 2010, President Dmitri Medvedev came up with a plan for sector-based missile defense in Europe. Under this scheme, Russia would defend Europe from missiles flying over its zone of responsibility (primarily its own territory), while NATO would defend Russia from attacks over the territories of NATO countries. Once NATO had made it clear that the Russian plan was unacceptable, the Kremlin's verbal attacks on European missile defense plans escalated. Russia is demanding legal guarantees that the US missile defense system would have no capability against Russian ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), a guarantee that the US is not likely to give under either Democratic or Republican administrations. Western experts on Russia on 11 November 2011, the Prime Minister

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(and soon likely President for a third term) Vladimir Putin stressed that Russia was not going to go along with US missile defense plans.<sup>2</sup> On 23 November 2011, the outgoing President Dmitri Medvedev made a statement promising various counter-measures to US missile defense in Europe.<sup>3</sup> Recent statements by Russian officials suggest a dead end has been reached in discussions of missile defense.

### **Russian response to US initiatives**

Why has the Russian attitude to US initiatives been so consistently and sharply negative? The official Russian explanation is that the real purpose of the US missile defense plan is to make it impossible for Russia to retaliate against a US nuclear (or massive conventional) attack, thus making Russia subject to military blackmail by the US. Given the size of the Russian strategic forces and the difficulty of intercepting ballistic missiles of advanced design, such an outcome is even theoretically possible only in decades. The Russians, however, behave as if they are facing an imminent and deadly threat. The Russian response has been the result of a sum total of various factors, mostly political and cultural, while the technical capabilities of the proposed system have played a secondary role.

The PAA of the US missile defense program is not supposed to develop any capability against ICBMs until its Phase IV is introduced, and not earlier than 2020.<sup>4</sup> According to a group of Russian experts including retired General Vladimir Dvorkin, former Director of the main think-tank of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of Russia, it would take five US interceptors to reliably shoot down one first-generation Iranian warhead. The same report notes (and there is no disagreement on this subject among Russian experts) that Russian ICBMs and SLBMs are equipped with highly effective penetration aids that have been developed over several decades and are currently being modified. The Bush administration had planned to deploy a small number of GBIs in Poland; according to Russian experts it would have taken 10 GBIs to intercept one Russian strategic nuclear warhead.<sup>5</sup> The Russian Federation currently has 1566 deployed strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers;<sup>6</sup> the ICBMs and SLBMs in the Russian arsenal are capable of delivering up to 1835 warheads, if the limits of the new START agreement are ignored.<sup>7</sup> It is obvious from these numbers that a reliable defense against Russian strategic weapons (and such a defense must be practically leak-proof) would require a very large number of interceptors and a vast system of sensors, command facilities, etc.

President Medvedev's proposal of sector-based missile defense co-operation with the US/NATO put on the table the Russian missile defense system, inherited from the USSR. The BMD system, A-135, is located near Moscow and is supposed to defend the Moscow region. It consists of a phased array radar, a command post and 68 endoatmospheric interceptors of the 53T6 (Gazelle) type. It also has exoatmospheric 51T6 (Gorgon) interceptors, which, however, have been deactivated. The Gazelle interceptors were originally designed to use nuclear warheads and were armed with them. In 1998, these nuclear warheads were reportedly replaced by conventional ones because of the extreme danger of using nuclear-armed interceptors over and around the densely populated Moscow region.<sup>8</sup>

The A-135 system was originally designed to intercept one or two modern ICBMs and up to 35 Pershing-type missiles.<sup>9</sup> In addition, Russia has a well-developed system of early warning radars.<sup>10</sup> The existing A-135 system offers nothing to the defense of Europe, because of its narrow regional focus and lack of certainty that its interceptors, designed to use nuclear warheads, would operate sufficiently well with conventional ones. The future interceptors S-500, that are supposed to have a capability against medium-range ballistic missiles, are yet in the design stage. Testing them for the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) mission would substantially increase

the cost of the project, because it would require launches of at least 10 SS-27 ICBMs would need to be launched as targets.<sup>11</sup>

The Achilles heel of the Russian strategic offensive and defensive forces is the condition of the Russian defense industry; it delivers new strategic delivery systems to the military at a slow rate<sup>12</sup> and it is doubtful that the production of such systems can be increased significantly in response to new challenges. The problems with the new Bulava SLBM, which has been undergoing flight testing since 2004, with seven failures out of 18 launches, illustrate the difficulty experienced by the Russian defense industry when developing and building new complex systems.<sup>13</sup> The A-135 missile defense system has not received any significant upgrades since 1994, and according to Dr Yuri Solomonov, the chief designer of the Russian SS-27 ICBMs, no R&D work on missile defenses has been conducted for a long time. As he noted, the Russians, “are hopelessly behind the US in this field as far as R&D work and field experiments.”<sup>14</sup>

In 2011, the Kremlin authorized an enormous increase in defense spending from 1.5 trillion rubles in 2011 to 2.75 trillion rubles in 2014.<sup>15</sup> This increase is supposed to give a boost to the 10-year armaments program (2010–2020). About 10% of the weapons acquisition spending in this decade is supposed to go to the SNF, the program’s top priority. The next priority is the strategic defensive forces, including a new system of missile defense.<sup>16</sup> Many experts doubt that this massive monetary injection will succeed. Alexei Kudrin, who had served as the finance minister since May 2000 and overseen Russia’s remarkable recovery from the financial meltdown of 1998, resigned in September of 2011 rather than sign-off on a budget which included what he considered to be an irresponsible increase in defense spending. Not only does Kudrin believe that the sharply increased budget would destabilize the fragile Russian economy, he is also convinced that Russian industry is simply unable to absorb such amounts of money, given that even the much smaller weapon acquisition programs in 2010 and 2011 had failed.<sup>17</sup>

### **Russian threat assessment**

The Russian government lacks a mechanism for balanced threat assessments. Russian intelligence agencies (External Intelligence Service (SVR) and Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU)) have evolved primarily as collection instruments with weak habits of objective analysis. There is no external evaluation of intelligence products. The two agencies do not cooperate in producing something akin to US National Intelligence Estimates. In the Soviet days, the intelligence services suffered from “intelligence-to-please” syndrome. The most prominent example of this was the failure to issue a clear warning to Stalin about the impending German attack in 1941, despite the overwhelming available evidence. In the very recent past, the GRU systematically engaged in a gross overestimate of NATO members’ military capabilities because it found it impossible to confront the Russian high command with new information that would have contradicted existing views and war plans.<sup>18</sup> Threat inflation served as a good method for demonstrating vigilance. In 1979, the KGB invented the threat of Afghanistan falling under US influence, thus bearing the major responsibility for the disastrous Soviet invasion of that country.<sup>19</sup>

The GRU continues to be responsible for analyzing the military capabilities of foreign countries. Since it is part of the General Staff, its analyses are likely to reflect the military high command’s preferences.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, Konstantin Kosachev, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee of the State Duma (the lower house of the Federal Assembly, the Russian Parliament), said that when it comes to missile defense, the Russian government gets most of its information from the Russian military, who always present the worst-case scenarios and are driven by the need to increase the defense budget.<sup>21</sup> Several well-informed Russian experts, in meetings with

their US counterparts, have stated that the military plays a very important role in informing policy-makers about US missile defense, which it believes to be (or at least portrays as) a threat to the Russian strategic deterrent.<sup>22</sup>

For a graphic example of the Russian military's habit of threat inflation, consider the slide detailing the threats to Russia, as presented in November 2011 by the Chief of General Staff General Nikolai Makarov to the Public Chamber, a semi-official advisory body to the Russian President. In addition to the usual "threats" of NATO enlargement and US missile defense, the slide lists as military threats: the build-up of ice-breaker fleets in the Arctic (Russia has by far the largest ice-breaker fleet); the emergence of the European Union's joint armed forces; the territorial claims by tiny Estonia and Latvia and neutral Finland to Russia; as well as drug trafficking and migration from Central Asia.<sup>23</sup> Such exaggeration must depend on the continuing production of intelligence to please. Add to this trend the general decline in the professionalism of Russian intelligence services (as amply demonstrated by the case of 10 Russian illegal operatives arrested in the USA in 2010).<sup>24</sup> These services should not be expected to provide an unbiased threat assessment.

### **Russian perceptions of US BMD policy**

The threat assessment of missile defense is likely to be affected by traditional Russian concern about the West's technological advantages and Russia's relative economic backwardness.<sup>25</sup> The history of the cold war reveals a Soviet preoccupation with technological backwardness and tendency to exaggerate US technological prowess. The initial Soviet panic over the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative is the best-known case of such a reaction. Today, the Russian media is full of references to advanced new Russian weapons to be produced in the future that will outstrip anything the West may have. The shriller such boasts become, the more likely is a sense of profound inferiority behind them. Indeed, the Russian defense industry has recently been subject to criticism by the military top brass for its inability to produce modern weapons at competitive prices. This concern must be serious enough, because the Ministry of Defense decided to purchase two Mistral amphibious assault ships from France and to build two more under license in Russia. It evidently did not believe that the Russian defense industry was up to the task.<sup>26</sup>

The American missile defense project is another reminder of Russia's relative backwardness. This is quite obvious from contradictory Russian pronouncements on its armament policy: on the one hand, it insists that it would not waste money pursuing missile defense; on the other hand, it announces the formation of air and space defense troops and plans to buy new missile defenses.<sup>27</sup> The desire not to look inferior to the US appears to override common sense: if the US cannot hope to defend itself against the Russian strategic arsenal, what chance does Russia have of building defenses against American missiles? If Russia is not planning to build such defenses against the US, then against which potential enemy? Given what is known about the state of the Russian defense industry, no new missile defenses will be built; but Russian leaders will at least put a band aid on the wounded pride of many Russians (including themselves), who do not like to see the United States so far ahead in military technology.

Russian policy-makers are also influenced by powerful business interests who lobby, in alliance with parts of the military establishment, for a vastly inflated threat of US BMD. The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Command has justified its decision to procure a new heavy liquid-fuel ICBM (currently under development) capable of carrying up to 10 multiple independent targeted warheads, by the need to overwhelm the future multi-layered US missile defense.<sup>28</sup> There are, of course, no plans for such a system. The irony of the situation is that the main Russian argument against the US missile defense plan is that Iran does not yet have ICBMs!

The contract has been given to the Makeev State Missile Center, which previously specialized in liquid-fueled SLBMs and has never designed a land-based ICBM. This decision appears to be the culmination of the decade-long battle between the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) and the Makeev Center.

The MITT, after successfully developing the SS-25 and SS-27 solid-fuel ICBMs, won the contract for designing a new solid-fuel SLBM over the Makeev Center, which was promoting a new version of its liquid-fuel SLBM. The SRF gave the Makeev Center a new lease of life with the decision to contract it to develop a new heavy MIR-ed ICBM. The Minister of Defense, Anatoly Serdyukov, is a member of the board of directors of the Makeev Center – one of the arrangements introduced by Putin, in which high-ranking government officials serve as directors of enterprises where the government holds a majority share.<sup>29</sup> This practice is often blamed for the enormous extent of corruption in Russia and for influencing government policy to benefit various politically connected business interests.

Today, unlike during the cold war, the Russians find it difficult to believe that their country is simply one of the many concerns for the US, whereas the US continues to be the focus of Russian foreign policy.<sup>30</sup> As a result of this disparity, Russians are convinced that US missile defense policy is about Russia. The Russian debate on the subject shows no awareness of such aspects of US politics as: the perception of Iranians as outlaws, since the US Embassy hostage crisis of 1979–1980; the political importance of the American public, informed about Iran primarily by TV images of suicidal (and therefore, not subject to deterrence) militant Muslims; the impact on that public of the likely taunting by a nuclear-armed Iran; and therefore, the enormous political cost to whichever political party is unlucky enough to be in the White House when Iran steps over the nuclear threshold.

There is no mention whatsoever in these debates of the condition of US finances, which most likely precludes any plans for a missile defense with hundreds of interceptors. The US hope of dissuading Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and long-range missiles by developing defenses in advance is ignored by the Russians. The arguments of a number of prominent Russian experts, such as Yuri Solomonov and Vladimir Dvorkin, that US missile defense is not likely to devalue the Russian strategic deterrent have been apparently dismissed out of hand.<sup>31</sup>

Since the collapse of the USSR, the Russian military high command has described nuclear weapons as the guarantee of its country's sovereignty and security. Russian political leaders have treated their nuclear arsenal as the top priority in their budgets and as an important legitimizing device. Unlike other world leaders who rarely, if ever, allow any light to be shed on their possible role in unleashing a nuclear holocaust, Russian leaders seem to relish such opportunities.<sup>32</sup> Every successful test launch of a new ICBM or SLBM is trumpeted on television; the public is subjected to a barrage of reports about the exceptional power of Russian nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Impressing Russia's nuclear might upon the Russian public has been part and parcel of Putin's proclaimed policy of Russia's "rising up from her knees," the humiliating posture in which Gorbachev and Yeltsin allegedly left the country, in contrast to Putin who has been saving Russian national honor and sovereignty.

### **Russian leadership and domestic politics**

Demonstration of power is the currency of Russian politics. It is of supreme importance, because Putin has dismantled a legitimate electoral system in Russia. The rules of the game, established by Putin with the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and alleged acquisition of his empire by Putin's allies, are quite brutal: the losers forfeit their fortunes and freedom or their right to live in their country. In this game, projecting an image of weakness is an invitation to competing predators.

Once Putin had committed himself to opposing US missile defense, he could not back down without damaging his image as a powerful leader.<sup>33</sup>

The ruthlessness of Russian domestic politics influences Russian leaders' perception of the outside world, since they, like their Western counterparts, tend to engage in mirror-imaging.<sup>34</sup> The world interpreted within the frame of reference of Russian politics, with its zero-sum game mentality and lack of transparency, indeed looks like a place rife with secret cabals – a place where the more powerful US is bound to try to eliminate the still dangerous Russian nuclear arsenal. Thus Russia's nuclear weapons, as well as being a reassuring factor for the Kremlin, are also the source of their fears, often fanned by the conspiracy theories that are prominent in Russian political discourse.<sup>35</sup>

Whereas the ideas of the US as Russia's enemy and conspiratorial thinking emerged spontaneously in the 1990s, the Putin regime has done much to encourage such views, even, perhaps, to embrace them wholeheartedly. Alleged US plans to rob Russia of its nuclear weapons or to destroy Russia in order to remove its nuclear arsenal have pride of place in the catalogue of Russian conspiracy theories. When Putin signed in February 2005 the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative – the agreement on co-operation “on nuclear safety and security by upgrading and modernizing security at Russia's nuclear weapons storage sites”<sup>36</sup> – the Russian media were filled with rumors that under the agreement, control over the Russian strategic arsenal would be handed over to the United States. These rumors were taken seriously enough by the Russian authorities that they dispatched various official spokesmen to debunk them.<sup>37</sup>

When he comes under pressure, Putin tends – or pretends – to see a western plot to destroy Russia in order to remove its nuclear arsenal. He blamed the horrific terrorist act by Islamic militants in Beslan, which killed hundreds of school children, on the intrigues of western powers that allegedly wanted to partition Russia in order to disable its nuclear arsenal.<sup>38</sup> Very recently, when faced with accusations of a massive fraud in the 4 December 2011 elections to the Duma and by growing public outrage, Putin suggested that the protests in Russia were organized by the US in order to weaken the rival nuclear power.<sup>39</sup>

It is indicative of the state of mind of Russian military and security officialdom that two decades of co-operation with the US on enhancing nuclear security in Russia under the Co-operative Threat Reduction Act (CTR) have done little to dissuade the minds of the general staff from entertaining conspiracy theories about the US trying to seize Russian nuclear weapons. The above-mentioned slide presented by General Makarov lists as one of the military threats to Russia activities under the CTR, which he described as the, “US striving to seize control over the Russian nuclear complex (accusations of the vulnerability of nuclear facilities on the territory of the Russian Federation).”<sup>40</sup>

### **Russian officialdom**

This particular “threat assessment” warrants a closer look, as it reveals much about the mindset of Russian officialdom. The threat assessment seems patently absurd, because the Russian government approves US activities under the CTR. The peculiar dialectic that Lenin would have envied makes this piece of double-think, however, perfectly logical in the mind of the Russian official, and regrettably many a member of the Russian public. The fact that “US initiated CTR and have paid hundreds of millions of dollars for it” means, in that logic, that they must have a nefarious purpose because, by definition, they must want to deprive Russia of its nuclear weapons.

This attitude is the product of the dominant Russian narrative of recent history, which treats the ending of the cold war as Russia's defeat by the United States, an interpretation helped by US

politicians' incessant boasting of their "victory" throughout the 1990s. According to this narrative, the real goal of US cold war strategy was not the end of Soviet domination of Central Europe, but the destruction of Russia as a state and competitor to the US. Even the destruction of the USSR, therefore, was just a step toward that final goal. The last line of Russia's defense against this plot is its nuclear arsenal; it is reasonable, therefore, to expect any kind of nefarious conspiracy by the US to remove this arsenal from Russia's control.

This mirror-imaging and conspiratorial thinking is probably responsible for the most absurd aspect of the disagreement between the two countries on missile defense – Russian insistence that the US has a secret plan to develop a territorial missile defense system capable of protecting the US homeland from Russian retaliation in a nuclear conflict. Ruslan Pukhov, one of the prominent civilian defense analysts in Moscow and a member of the Advisory Council to the Ministry of Defense, formulates this view quite clearly: "The fundamental reason behind Washington's activity in the field of missile defense is its desire to achieve *complete security* [author's emphasis] for the entire continental United States. That goal drives all of Washington's national security policy and thinking."<sup>41</sup> Russia's representative to NATO, Ambassador Dmitri Rogozin, has similarly referred to US plans of achieving "absolute security."<sup>42</sup>

The fact that a program of such a cost and scale cannot be hidden from the public in the US; the widely available historical evidence of past furious public debates about missile defense and other major military programs; and the well-established tendency of the two main US political parties to discontinue each other's military programs – none of these matter to a conspiratorial mindset. Careless statements by US politicians, designed to impress their electorate, feed such conspiracy theories. For example, in his speech on 11 November 2011, outlining Russian counter-measures to the US BMD, President Medvedev made a thinly veiled reference to the pronouncements of Republican Senator Jim DeMint, who demanded a capability to "defend" the US against Russian missiles.<sup>43</sup>

### Russian policy options

Since the days of Gorbachev's *perestroika*, Russia has been trying to become part and parcel of the European security system and of Euro-Atlantic civilization. To its considerable annoyance, these attempts have been frustrated, partially because Russia wants to be accepted on its own terms. The missile defense problem touches on this sore spot. As Ambassador Rogozin has said:

BMD is, first of all, an ideological project, and not just missiles. If you are [a participant] in BMD, you are inside the system, you are one of them. But if you are outside. . . , then you are a stranger, which means that eventually this system can be turned against you.<sup>44</sup>

Their place in the European security system and in Euro-Atlantic civilization is not only a practical but an emotional issue for Russians, and rejection puts into doubt their sense of identity as Europeans. Any challenge to identity is painful, and this contributes to the vehemence of the Russian reaction.

The Russians complain about President Bush's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (concluded by the USSR and US in 1972) once it no longer suited American interests. Americans, they say, are not reliable partners. Then why insist on legal guarantees that the future American missile defense will not be able to target Russian missiles? After all, what prevents the US from complying with a new agreement to silence Russian protests for several years and then, once it is ready, withdrawing from that agreement? No one seems to be asking this simple question in Moscow.

The fervent Russian insistence on getting an agreement is caused not by concern over what may happen in a dozen years but rather by the political needs of Vladimir Putin. His image of

a strongman would profit from making the reluctant Americans sign an agreement that would remind them of the ABM Treaty and thus appeal to the still present nostalgia for Soviet “greatness.” The PR package being prepared by the Kremlin for the presidential election to be held in March 2012 would certainly benefit from boasting of such an achievement.

Nostalgia for the superpower past is counterproductive. One of Russia’s best commentators on foreign affairs has observed that, “The sooner Russia views itself as a self-sufficient and fully-fledged state rather than a fragment of ‘something real’, the greater the chance it will be able to channel the nation’s energy into a constructive endeavor.”<sup>45</sup> US missile defense is not likely to harm Russia, but continuing conflict over it very well might. In military terms, Russia can do very little about American missile defense. The countermeasures announced by President Medvedev on 23 November 2011 are a combination of programs already initiated earlier and of threats that are primarily psychological.

The most prominent among the latter is targeting Iskander (SS-26), operational–tactical missiles that can be armed with nuclear weapons, at future US missile defense facilities in Europe. General Dvorkin has observed, however, that these missiles could destroy US defenses only in a first strike, before American interceptors have a chance to fly, which would mean starting a nuclear war against NATO or if NATO had started a war against Russia; both scenarios are equally unthinkable in the view of the Russian expert.<sup>46</sup> Military measures thus are not likely to be cause for a serious deterioration of relations between Russia and NATO.<sup>47</sup>

### Future prospects

The situation may change if Russia decides to use its energy weapon against its neighbors who co-operate with US/NATO missile defense, or even worse, if Russia withdraws its permission for NATO to transport its troops and materials to Afghanistan, which would be a very damaging move because the other supply route – via Pakistan – is no longer reliable. In both cases, however, Russian interests would also be hurt: it would once again demonstrate that it is not a reliable energy supplier, and it is not interested in a rebirth of the Taliban. It is to be hoped that common sense would prevent Moscow from following the confrontational path in order to serve short-term domestic political needs, and that missile defense would not become the source of another crisis in Russia’s relations with the West.

### Notes

1. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, or any agency of the US government.
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30. Jeffrey Mankoff, 'Generational Change and the Future of U.S.–Russian Relations', *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010): 3.
31. The above-mentioned Duma Deputy Konstantin Kosachev, by suggesting that expert advice should be more actively sought by the government on the missile defense issue, implied that it is not being sought. (Perendzhiyev, 'Protivorechivoye partnerstvo'.)
32. See Mikhail Tsyppkin, 'Russian Politics, Policy-Making and US Missile Defence', *International Affairs* 85, no. 4 (2009): 784–5.
33. For the origins of Putin's opposition to US missile defense plans, see Tsyppkin, 'Russian Politics, Policy-Making' 785–7.

34. For several examples of Putin's mirror-imaging, see Tsyppkin, 'Russian Politics', 789.
35. On conspiracy theories in Russia, see Boris Kagarlitsky, 'The Religion of Evil', *The Moscow Times*, July 28, 2011. Conspiracy theories appeal to people because, as noted by one of Russia's most astute political observers, "they create a comprehensible world run by someone. The reality is much more gloomy, because no one is in charge." Fedor Lukyanov, 'Zagovor ot rasteryannosti', *Moskovskiyev novosti*, July 6, 2011.
36. 'Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative', <http://www.dtra.mil/missions/NunLugar/Bratislava.aspx> (accessed November 20, 2011).
37. See Tsyppkin, 'Russian Politics, Policy-Making', 783.
38. Vladimir Putin, 'Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina', September 4, 2004, <http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2004/09/76320.shtml> (accessed August 19, 2006).
39. Vladimir Putin, Premier Putin Conducts the Meeting of the Coordinating Council of the Russian Popular Front, December 8, 2011, <http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/17330/> (accessed December 8, 2011).
40. Safronov, 'Genshtab gotovitsya k voyne'.
41. Ruslan Pukhov, 'Medvedev's Missile Threats Are His "Plan B"', *The Moscow Times*, December 1, 2011.
42. Dmitri Rogozin, 'Press konferentsiya D. Rogozina', November 23, 2011, <http://natomission.ru/print/39/157/> (accessed December 3, 2011).
43. Jim DeMint, 'The Treaty Is Mad', *The National Review Online*, July 29, 2010, <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/243568/treaty-mad-jim-demint> (accessed November 12, 2011). DeMint made similar statements during the hearings on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in the US Senate.
44. Yelena Chernenko, 'PRO ili nichego', *Kommerstant*, December 8, 2011.
45. Fedor Lukyanov, 'Destructive Soviet Nostalgia', <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Destructive-Soviet-nostalgia-15389> (accessed December 12, 2011).
46. Andrei Lipskiy, 'Ugrozy net. Otvetnye mery bessmyslenny', *Novaya gazeta*, November 24, 2011.
47. Ibid.