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**NAVAL
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THESIS

**AN OLD HATRED: ANTI-SEMITISM IN GERMANY
AND POLAND AS A FEATURE OF PAST AND
PRESENT PEACE, SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

by

Alicia M. Jobe

June 2021

Co-Advisors:

Donald Abenheim
Carolyn C. Halladay

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A FEATURE OF PAST AND PRESENT PEACE, SECURITY,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Anti-Semitism, as an ancient and subtle ethnic and religious discrimination, is the precursor for more violent forms of biases that manifest themselves in today's newer generations as a need for nationalism, opposed to a unified Europe. Anti-Semitism, among other discriminations, is a deviation from the shared values that the Western European nations agreed to uphold through the supranational organizations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). How does anti-Semitism among member states affect these organizations and what does that mean in the grand scheme of stability and security in Europe? If the democratic member states of NATO and the EU cannot count on the inclusive, tolerant, democratic rhetoric of their populations or enforce the value systems that they established, the security of Europe is in danger. This thesis examines these issues in the context of Poland (a newer member of both organizations) and Germany (a founding member of both organizations), with an eye toward the past and present of anti-Semitism in each state and the future of the leading principles of these regional/supranational organizations.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative for Deutschland
AJC	American Jewish Committee
BDS	Boycott Divestment and Sanctions
BRD	Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany; West Germany)
DPs	Deported Persons
EU	European Union
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany; Post WWII Unified Germany)
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
NRC	National Radical Camp
NSU	National Socialist Underground
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PiS	Law and Justice Party (Polish Far-Right political party)
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party)
SS	Schutzstaffel (German Nazi Party paramilitary organization)
UN	United Nations

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I. INTRODUCTION

Anti-Semitism, as an ancient and subtle ethnic and religious discrimination, is the precursor for more violent forms of biases that manifest themselves in today's newer generations as a need for nationalism, opposed to a unified Europe. Anti-Semitism, among other discriminations, is a deviation from the shared values that the Western European nations agreed to uphold through the supranational organizations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). How does anti-Semitism among member states affect these organizations and what does that mean in the grand scheme of stability and security among Europe? Anti-Semitism acts as a warning for bad things to come, like the proverbial canary in the coal mine. If the democratic member states of NATO and the EU cannot count on the inclusive, tolerant, democratic rhetoric of their populations or enforce the value systems to which they established, the security of Europe is in danger. This thesis examines these issues in the context of Poland (a newer member of both organizations) and Germany (a founding member of both organizations), with an eye toward the past and present of anti-Semitism in each state and the future of the leading principles of these regional/supranational organizations.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Provided the complex and critical stability and security frameworks among European nations and the value systems to which they depend, this thesis asks the following question: What are the ramifications of anti-Semitism in democratic European societies and governments, through the case studies of Poland and Germany, and how does it affect NATO and the EU?

B. SIGNIFICANCE

At the very least, anti-Semitism contradicts the foundational values of contemporary Europe—which, in turn, imperils European and Western security. Security in Europe can never be separated from the most fundamental issues of human rights. An important definition for this analysis is that of human rights, specifically international human rights. The EU defines human rights the same as the United Nations (UN) and

strongly presses its member states along with partners in trade or other dealings to uphold the same values.¹ These UN human rights are international norms according to which the EU as well as NATO pull their definition, while incorporating them into the value system of democratic states.²

The UN defines human rights in a series of thirty articles, where, as stated on the UN website, the General Assembly

Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.³

The UN defines Rule of Law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”⁴

The rule of law also comes from the UN definition from which NATO and the EU draw their shared values.⁵ Specifically, NATO identifies the rule of law as a principle that all members must uphold and defend. NATO is committed to the rule of law definition as the UN articulates it.⁶ Article 2 of the Washington Treaty states, according to the Atlantic

¹ Marika Lerch, “Human Rights,” European Parliament, September 2020, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/165/human-rights>.

² Lerch.

³ “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, April 18, 2021, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.

⁴ Eric Doss, “What Is the Rule of Law,” United Nations and the Rule of Law, April 5, 2021, <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/>.

⁵ “Relations with the European Union,” NATO, February 15, 2021, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm.

⁶ “NATO’s Purpose,” NATO, September 24, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm.

council website, the NATO member states will “contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded,” reinforcing UN preambles.⁷

The European Commission defines the Rule of law as follows: “The rule of law includes principles such as legality, implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibiting the arbitrary exercise of executive power; effective judicial protection by independent and impartial courts, effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights; separation of powers; and equality before the law.”⁸

Any quick glance at the founding documents in which the core principles of the Washington treaty of 1949, or the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009, quickly indicates that democracy equals human rights, and they are indeed at the heart of both supranational organizations.⁹

1. NATO

NATO was established in 1949 by 12 founding countries.¹⁰ NATO now has 30 member states, adding North Macedonia in 2020.¹¹ According to NATO’s website, NATO was established to “safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and

⁷ Damon Wilson and Will O’Brien, “Reimagine the Washington Treaty,” Atlantic Council, October 14, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/reimagine-the-washington-treaty/>.

⁸ “2020 Rule of Law Report -Questions and Answers,” European Commission, September 30, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_1757.

⁹ European Parliament, “Treaty of Lisbon,” European Parliament in plain language, accessed May 6, 2021, <https://europarlamenti.info/en/European-union/treaty/treaty-of-Lisbon/>; Wilson and O’Brien, “Reimagine the Washington Treaty”; “NATO in History: Purpose and Evolution,” CGTN, February 15, 2015, https://news.cgtn.com/news/316b444e33677a6333566d54/share_p.html; “NATO’s Purpose”; “The History of the European Union,” European Union, June 16, 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en.

¹⁰ “NATO in History.”

¹¹ “NATO on the Map,” NATO, December 27, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/nato-on-the-map/#lat=51.72673918960763&lon=4.84911701440904&zoom=0&layer=1&infoBox=Poland>; “NATO in History.”

military means.”¹² Its purpose changed after the fall of the Soviet Union, as it redefined its goals following the 1991 Rome Summit through a new strategic concept developing cooperation and opening options for expanding membership.¹³ The true significance comes from the nationalism which gave rise to the world wars, armed to dismantle democracy and which go against human rights. The need to counter such armed nationalism is the key in defending democracy, human rights, and the rule of law— the shared values of NATO and the EU for all member states and beyond.

2. EU

The EU was created in 1993 by six founding countries, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany, through uniting their steel and coal communities; this linkage of the European nations politically and economically promised to secure a lasting peace.¹⁴ It currently has 27 members and many aspiring members including Turkey.¹⁵

The history of the Holocaust and the trauma associated with the genocide have left lasting impressions on the generations in Europe, and anti-Semitism affects the EU and EU member states in many ways. Notably, Roman Prodi, a former president of the EU, exclaimed that all EU states must fight against all manifestations of racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia.¹⁶

Internal issues within the union itself have caused rifts, endangering the union’s stability and authority at its core. In 2004, Prodi, while in his presidential capacity, was accused of anti-Semitism by Jewish world leaders for censorship he imposed on an EU-sponsored study that claimed European Muslims were largely responsible for attacks on

¹² “NATO’s Purpose.”

¹³ “NATO in History.”

¹⁴ “The History of the European Union.”

¹⁵ “About the EU,” European Union, June 16, 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu_en.

¹⁶ J.M. Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany* (Rutgers University Press, 2005), <https://books.google.com/books?id=ZYhtWcKp2QEC>.

Jews, and also for cancelling an anti-Semitism conference, swiftly reinstating the event upon receiving word of such accusations.¹⁷ Whether these claims were accurate or anti-Semitism was used as a tool to alter decisions in favor of the Jewish community, anti-Semitism is a key factor in how the EU makes decisions, manages its member states, and projects itself around the world.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars are unable to agree on a precise definition of anti-Semitism, and often rely on examples to define it.¹⁸ Lipstadt explains that anti-Semitism can be seen as an attitude and cannot be measured in numbers of recorded anti-Semitic actors or by numbers of people categorized as anti-Semites.¹⁹ If one looks at anti-Semitism as an attitude—Jewish hatred will exist, like all attitudes—this view will be seen in different intensity levels and in different shades.²⁰ These different levels are displayed throughout history from what scholars believe to be anti-Semitism’s origins. In this thesis, anti-Semitism is characterized as an attitude and a bias that influences European societies and governments, which will be examined in hopes of addressing its ramifications in today’s Europe. This section provides a review of a portion of the abundant scholarship established surrounding the topic of anti-Semitism and how Jews in Europe have lived with a constant hatred against them, never being seen as part of any community, group, or nation state until the establishment of Israel and even then, their own nation is still seen as an outcast. Something

¹⁷ Peck, 113.

¹⁸ Deborah E. Lipstadt, *Antisemitism: Here and Now*, First edition (New York: Schocken Books, 2019), 12; “Defining Anti-Semitism,” *United States Department of State* (blog), accessed May 19, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/defining-anti-semitism/>; “Definition of Antisemitism,” European Commission, accessed May 19, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combating-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/combating-antisemitism/definition-antisemitism_en; Tim Anderson, “What’s Wrong with the IHRA ‘Working Definition’ of Anti-Semitism?,” *TheAltWorld* (blog), January 29, 2020, https://thealtworld.com/tim_anderson/whats-wrong-with-the-ihra-working-definition-of-anti-semitism; Peter G. J. Pulzer and Peter Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany & Austria* (Harvard University Press, 1988).

¹⁹ Lipstadt, *Antisemitism*, A Note to Reader.

²⁰ L. Daniel Staetsky, “Antisemitism in Contemporary Great Britain: A Study of Attitudes towards Jews and Israel” (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, September 2017), 3–5.

to be feared as the Other who threatens other nations. The Jews have played the role as the scape goat for countless non-Jewish communities throughout the centuries and has not stopped even after the Holocaust. New forms of hatred against the Jews still press against democratic values established on the principle of stopping the hate, protecting the Jews, and extending equal rights to all people. The literature articulates a continuation of anti-Semitism, which is a precursor to greater atrocities against minorities. Ethnic backgrounds were not supposed to play a role in the Western democratic value system, yet this study will identify many cases where the system is not upholding its own proscription for a better world of equality and freedom for all mankind and protection of their human rights.

1. On Ethnic Identity in the Context of Anti-Semitism

Ethnic identity beliefs are not developed in a vacuum but influenced according to different ethnicities' economic status', social environments, wars or other significant events, persecutions or extreme difficulties which push them to extreme circumstances.²¹ Racial and ethnic borders are social constructions that fluctuate continually, are described as a separation between an Other by all groups toward other groups, and are continually evolving and they have real consequences on the underlying construction of social hierarchies.²² Although anti-Semitism is not the only factor in why these groups make their decisions or establish policy, the role it plays is significant.

The archetypal notion of Jews as folk devils, nefarious feeders of children's blood and perpetrators of violent global conspiracies, draws on old rhetoric that persists in the anti-Semitic attitudes in modern Europe.²³ Bonacich describes the Jews as a "middleman

²¹ Claire Rosenson, "Jewish Identity Construction in Contemporary Poland: Dialogue between Generations," <http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1080/13501679608577831> (Taylor & Francis Group, June 19, 2008), 67–78, world, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501679608577831>.

²² Aziza Khazoom, "The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel," *American Sociological Review* 68, no. 4 (2003): 481, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1519736>.

²³ Pnina Werbner, "Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism: Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism in the Twenty-First Century," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 3 (March 1, 2013): 450–67, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.734384>.

minority group.”²⁴ Middleman minorities are economically successful, highly assimilated, cultured, wealthy and successful, and as Werbner explains, are subject to another archetypal folk devil called the witch.²⁵

2. On Nationalism and its Connection with Anti-Semitism

Nationalism, according to Robert Gildea, is defined as “the feeling that belonging to a nation is more important than belonging to a town, province, class, social order, or religious group, and the struggle for a state to defend the interests and identity of that nation.”²⁶ Nationalism must be analyzed in its two opposed visions, civic and ethnic.²⁷ Civic nationalism is associated with the West and is generally seen as being more liberal and positive, while ethnic nationalism is associated with the East and is generally seen as racial and populist. Ethnic nationalism is more exclusive and organic in nature; civic nationalism is more inclusive and emphasizes the legal, political, and ideological requirements of belonging to their nation.²⁸ However, these distinctions can lead to misconceptions of the two forms of nationalism, as some see them as opposed to each other or mutually exclusive in principle but not in practice causing confusion.²⁹ Zubrzycki suggests that the two terms, civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, be used as ideal types, following the Weberian model to ease this confusion.³⁰

²⁴ Edna Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities,” *American Sociological Review* 38, no. 5 (October 1973): 583–594, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2094409>.

²⁵ Werbner, “Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism.”

²⁶ Robert Gildea, *Barricades and Borders: Europe, 1800–1914*, 3rd ed (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 52.

²⁷ Genevieve Zubrzycki, “‘We, the Polish Nation’: Ethnic and Civic Visions of Nationhood in Post-Communist Constitutional Debates,” *Springer* 30, no. 5 (2020): 654.

²⁸ Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas, “What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe’s New Nationalism? Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Europe,” *Nations and Nationalism* 25, no. 2 (April 2019): 409–34, <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12515>.

²⁹ Zubrzycki, “‘We, the Polish Nation’: Ethnic and Civic Visions of Nationhood in Post-Communist Constitutional Debates,” 629.

³⁰ Zubrzycki, 629–30.

a. *Categories of Nationalism*

Zubrzycki offers that nationalism should be observed in four categories.³¹ First, the methodological guide for how civic and ethnic ideal types can be used in the cultural construction of a nation.³² Second, relative successes of the model in historical and specific narratives or events which frame a nation.³³ Third, nationalist sentiments and how powerful they are for a nation and affixed symbolic texts, memorial locations, among other sites for a nation.³⁴ Finally, that nations are not fixed but free-floating in their idea of nationalism.³⁵ Using these categories when judging European state nationalism as a concern and linking a state's nationalistic mindset with ethnic, specifically anti-Semitic, discourse will allow an outside observer to better understand why nationalism is a stress on democratic values.

When contemporary social scientists write about nationalism, they tend to stress the dependent aspects of group identity, which draws on cultural and political manufacturing by politicians and ideologists.³⁶ Benedict Anderson explained that the concept of imagined communities is constructed, not natural.³⁷ The ethnonational identity is not innate or inevitable as many nationalists would argue, as the identity is partly constructed making it fragile and easily manipulated.³⁸ Modern state creation has highlighted enduring propensities of the human spirit sourced in solidarity and enmity, through ethnonationalism, which will remain for generations to come.³⁹

³¹ Zubrzycki, 630.

³² Zubrzycki, 630.

³³ Zubrzycki, 630.

³⁴ Zubrzycki, 630.

³⁵ Zubrzycki, 631.

³⁶ Jerry Z. Muller, "Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 2 (2008): 35.

³⁷ Muller, 35.

³⁸ Muller, 35.

³⁹ Muller, 35.

b. New Nationalism

“New nationalism” combines populism, the commonly understood concept of nationalism already discussed, and the far-right elements commonly associated with populism. Populism and nationalism are two different concepts. Populism pulls from the hostile relationships between the “real people” of a country and the corrupt elites—the “us versus them” concept.⁴⁰ Populism is associated with the far right and draws on the idea of the pure people, where the popular will for the democratic portion of the people and liberal in its critiques of intermediary democratic institutions, empower the populists to seek to bypass the checks and balances of institutions, to include the rule of law and scrutiny from parliaments.⁴¹ Under this definition, populism is described often as a type of democratic illiberalism.⁴²

Nationalism is an antagonistic relationship amid an in group and an out group and is described by Freeden as a “thin ideology.”⁴³ He explains that a thin ideology “is one that, like mainstream ideologies, has an identifiable morphology but, unlike mainstream ideologies, a restricted one” and it serves itself from wider contexts.⁴⁴ The goal of nationalistic groups is to attain and preserve unity, identity, and autonomy of their nation.⁴⁵ National homogeneity and sovereignty are key concepts wherein exclusion is an inherent byproduct.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Jan-Werner Müller, *What Is Populism?* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 1–123; Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas, “What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe’s New Nationalism? Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Europe,” *Nations and Nationalism* 25, no. 2 (April 2019): 409–34, <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12515>.

⁴¹ Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, “What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe’s New Nationalism?,” April 2019, 409–34.

⁴² Takis S. Pappas, *Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis*, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2019), 52, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198837886.001.0001>.

⁴³ Michael Freeden, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), 98.

⁴⁴ Freeden, 98.

⁴⁵ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993), 8–11.

⁴⁶ Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, “What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe’s New Nationalism?,” April 2019, 409–34.

New nationalism is a common rise of parties with a shared emphasis on their national sovereignty, positions on immigration, and national preferences, who are skeptical of supranational institutions such as the EU and are supporters of anti-elitism.⁴⁷ The new nationalism is a mostly uniform phenomenon across Europe where parties emphasize their similarities.⁴⁸ The key difference between new and old nationalism is that new nationalism merges populism with nationalism drawing on social antagonistic relationships.⁴⁹ The new nationalism combines the will of the people, identifying the people as “the pure people,” according to Halikiopoulou and Vlandas drawing from the Economist 2016, and thus narrowing the ethnic understanding of a nation and portraying the pure people as struggling against the corrupt elites from both the domestic and international levels.⁵⁰ In this thesis, the word nationalism will henceforth be used to describe this new nationalism.⁵¹

Nationalism complicates the distinction between Jews and true citizens of a nation, where definitions of who is Jewish and who is a true or real national citizen are questions among the people of the state searching for their identity.⁵² If identity is based not only on the presumptions of blood “purity,” but on the civic allegiance one has, precise definitions of who citizens truly are becomes much more difficult.⁵³ Nationalism provides a base for exclusion in a state and in turn promotes anti-Semitism, as Jews continue to be perceived as foreigners or aliens within European nations.

⁴⁷ Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 409–34.

⁴⁸ Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 409–34.

⁴⁹ Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 409–34.

⁵⁰ Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 409–34.

⁵¹ Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 409–34.

⁵² Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany*, xiii.

⁵³ Peck, xiii.

3. Anti-Semitism

This “alien” aspect owes something to the fact that, throughout history, the Jews were in seemingly continual exile.⁵⁴ Jews under the Soviet era, for example, were not considered to be members of their states; Jews were decisively separate and one recount of this was explained that anti-Semitism is not seen in terms of Christians and Jews, but of nationality and Jew.⁵⁵ The alien is seen as the source of all the misfortunes among the people and as such, the alien becomes the scapegoat for those misfortunes.⁵⁶

a. *On the Levels of anti-Semitism*

Anti-Semitism may be thought of in terms of “weak” and “strong.” Some groups, organizations, or individuals are strongly anti-Semitic while others may only hold certain anti-Semitic attitudes that are small in number or weak in intensity.⁵⁷ Weak anti-Semites use what are called dog whistles to project their messaging. A dog whistle is a sort of coded message passed between groups of a similar racial or political outlook that contains undertones that unsuspecting listeners or viewers will not grasp.⁵⁸ Mark Liberman’s explains: “While many people might hear ‘international banks’ quite literally...anti-Semites hear something very different. After all, the supposed existence of a cabal of international Jewish bankers working to undermine U.S. democracy is a recurring theme.”⁵⁹ He adds an example: “Take the use of the word “coincidence” as a dog whistle. In the recent kerfuffle over the “Coincidence Detector” app, many news readers learned

⁵⁴ David Vital, “Writing Jewish History,” *Israel Affairs* 22, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 258, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2016.1140346>.

⁵⁵ Peter Kenez, *Varieties of Fear: Growing up Jewish Under Nazism and Communism* (Lanham, Maryland: The American University Press, 1995), 177.

⁵⁶ Aleksander Hertz, Lucjan Dobroszycki, and Czeslaw Milosz, *The Jews in Polish Culture* (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 53.

⁵⁷ Staetsky, “Antisemitism in Contemporary Great Britain: A Study of Attitudes towards Jews and Israel,” 3–5.

⁵⁸ Ian Olosov, “Offensive Political Dog Whistles: You Know Them When You Hear Them. Or Do You?,” *Vox*, November 7, 2016, <https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/11/7/13549154/dog-whistles-campaign-racism>.

⁵⁹ Olosov.

that internet anti-Semites use “coincidence” to mean, roughly, a Jewish conspiracy.”⁶⁰ Dog whistles only work if no one outside the intended audience identifies them as anti-Semitic, but once visible, many are clearly identified as anti-Semitic.⁶¹ There can be arguments to the use of coded dog whistles as conspiracies, as some use terms without any meaning behind them and readers or listeners take offense quite easily.⁶² For example, after World War II, as described by Phyllis Goldstein, “the slightest remark or any official measure, be it one not even intended to apply to [Jewish DPs], [(deported Persons)], would be discussed on a single criterion: ‘Is it or is it not antisemitic?’”⁶³ But the Jews had good reason to be suspicious of anyone after the horrors of the concentration camps and as Goldstein writes, “anti-Semitism remained a force in the world” despite the Holocaust and the efforts to bring the responsible murderers to justice.⁶⁴

Strong anti-Semites are open with their anti-Semitism, and care less to disclose their messages in code. These anti-Semites are seen today in Neo-Nazi groups and far right parties across Europe.⁶⁵ Many governments have expressed openly their anti-Semitic views, pushing acceptance of anti-Semitism in their nations.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Olasov.

⁶¹ Olasov.

⁶² Olasov.

⁶³ Phyllis Goldstein and Harold Evans, *A Convenient Hatred: The History of Antisemitism* (Brookline, MA: Facing History & Ourselves, 2012), 4832.

⁶⁴ Goldstein and Evans, 4807.

⁶⁵ Eva Cossé, “The Alarming Rise of Anti-Semitism in Europe,” Human Rights Watch, June 4, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/04/alarming-rise-anti-semitism-europe>; Vivienne Walt, “Europe’s Jews Are Resisting a Rising Tide of Anti-Semitism,” Time, June 20, 2019, <https://time.com/longform/anti-semitism-in-europe/>; Maria Zawadzka, “November 11th: „Fascism Shall Not Pass”,” Polish Righteous, November 10, 2010, <https://sprawiedliwi.org.pl/en/news/november-11th-fascism-shall-not-pass>.

⁶⁶ Adam Balcer, “Islamophobia without Muslims as a Social and Political Phenomenon, The Case of Poland,” in *Europe at the Crossroads: Confronting Populist, Nationalist, and Global Challenges*, ed. Pieter Bevelander and Ruth Wodak (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2019), 208; Ararat Osipian, “Anti-Semitism Raises Its Ugly Head in Ukrainian HE,” University World News, accessed May 25, 2021, <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20200224150336130>.

b. New Anti-Semitism

Like nationalism, anti-Semitism has evolved in its meaning and expression, emerging as a new phenomenon in recent years. Ron Rosenbaum, in his book *Those Who Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism*, expresses his views on new anti-Semitism as having not just one definition in the post-Holocaust period. He identifies two waves of new-antisemitism and further explains that another scholar, Yehuda Bauer, believes there have been four post-war waves, although we will only focus on two here.⁶⁷

In the first post war wave, Rosenbaum suggests that anti-Semitism was not exactly new and it was the scale of the evils of the Holocaust that was the new addition.⁶⁸ Holocaust anti-Semitism differs from pre-1939 anti-Semitism by way of the Holocaust shadowing and staining what might have been if the Jews were not brutally murdered in WWII.⁶⁹ The Holocaust has become the standard by which extreme evil is now measured.⁷⁰ Rosenbaum explains that “casual” anti-Semitism is identified by anti-Semitic remarks, slurs or jokes.⁷¹ After the war, these previously permitted prejudices and persecutions in culture became seen as unacceptable.⁷²

The second wave, after 9/11, which took the form of a conspiracy that the Jews were behind the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, was a way of explaining the attacks that were blamed, unjustly, on “innocent Islamic terrorists” as Rosenbaum describes the anti-Semitic way of thinking.⁷³ One such conspiracy was that Ariel Sharon worked with the Mossad and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to carry out the attacks,

⁶⁷ Ron Rosenbaum, ed., *Those Who Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2004), XXIV.

⁶⁸ Rosenbaum, XXIV.

⁶⁹ Rosenbaum, XXV.

⁷⁰ Yehuda Bauer, “Comparison of Genocides,” in *Studies in Comparative Genocide*, ed. Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999), 32, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27348-5_3.

⁷¹ Rosenbaum, *Those Who Forget the Past*, XXV.

⁷² Rosenbaum, XXV.

⁷³ Rosenbaum, XX.

blamed them on the Taliban, and took over the opium trade in Afghanistan after the U.S. invaded in retaliation.⁷⁴

Ehud Rosen explains that there is a campaign to arrest senior Israeli leaders on war crime charges as they visit European countries.⁷⁵ These campaigns and attitudes, casting the Israelis as war criminals and the aggressors, are in conjunction with left-wing groups who campaign for supporting the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, that accuses the state of Israel of being an “apartheid” state.⁷⁶ Diasporic Liberal-left Jews are seeking ways to counter the new anti-Semitic rhetoric portrayed by Islamic organizations, which call Israel a Nazi state.⁷⁷

New anti-Semitism is described as an updated version of historical anti-Semitism. Arguments about when old anti-Semitism became new anti-Semitism vary across the literature, with no consensus.⁷⁸ The non-consensus makes pinning down a definition difficult. Is the anti-Semitism seen today a manifestation of the old or is it something completely different?

New anti-Semitism was distinguished from the old upon the *Haskalah*, also known as the Jewish Enlightenment, and assimilated and integrated the Jewish people, to an

⁷⁴ “Unraveling Anti-Semitic 9/11 Conspiracy Theories” (New York, NY: Anti-Defamation League, May 25, 2003), <https://www.adl.org/news/article/unraveling-anti-semitic-911-conspiracy-theories>.

⁷⁵ Ehud Rosen, *Mapping the Organizational Sources of the Global Delegitimation Campaign against Israel in the UK* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2011), 34.

⁷⁶ Rosen, 37; Werbner, “Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism.”

⁷⁷ Werbner, “Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism.”

⁷⁸ Kenneth Marcus, “Jurisprudence of the New Anti-Semitism,” *Wake Forest Law Review* 44, no. 2 (January 20, 2009): 399, <http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2009/01/jurisprudence-of-the-new-anti-semitism/>; Werbner, “Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism”; Rosenbaum, *Those Who Forget the Past*, 274; Marius Turda and Paul J. Weindling, *Blood and Homeland: Eugenics and Racial Nationalism in Central and Southeast Europe, 1900–1940*, NED-New edition, 1 (Central European University Press, 2007), 359–60, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7829/j.ctt2jbmdp>; David Vital, *A People Apart: The Jews in Europe, 1789–1939*, Oxford History of Modern Europe (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 136–65; Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “A National Colonial Theology: Religion, Orientalism, and Construction of the Secular in Zionist Discourse,” *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch Ruer Deutsche Geschichte* 31 (2002): 317.

extent, into the Christian dominated European nations.⁷⁹ During the Haskalah, Jewish people would refrain from wearing their traditional dress, start speaking the local languages, adopt local grooming standards, and essentially adapt to the local way of life, treating their Jewish traditions as more private and personal.⁸⁰ Yet these gestures led to further anti-Semitic rhetoric, as now Jews were seen as indistinguishable from the local populace.⁸¹ Conspiracy theories took hold and pushed anti-Jewish rhetoric to new heights.⁸² As Gilman writes, “now that they didn’t wear their traditional clothing now where are the Jews?”⁸³ This question of not being able to identify the Jews among the population struck fear in the minds of the non-Jewish citizens, as they saw the Jews as a hidden and lurking threat.

Turda and Weindling argue that new anti-Semitism began in the early twentieth century alongside the new nationalism, creating a political sphere with racial characteristics.⁸⁴ The new anti-Semitism used a new form of propaganda, revealing anti-Semitism as a political current, independent from other parties and factions.⁸⁵ Zuckerman explained that the new anti-Semitism has transcended boundaries, nationalities, social systems and politics, re-emerging as anti-Zionism in Europe.⁸⁶

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis uses two case studies—Poland and Germany—chosen for both their membership in the supranational organizations and by their distinct pasts surrounding anti-

⁷⁹ David Vital, *A People Apart The Jews in Europe 1789–1939*, (New York: Oxford,1999), 136–165.

⁸⁰ David Vital, *A People Apart The Jews in Europe 1789–1939*, (New York: Oxford,1999), 164.

⁸¹ David Vital, *A People Apart The Jews in Europe 1789–1939*, (New York: Oxford,1999), 164.

⁸² Benjamin W. Segel and Richard Simon Levy, *A Lie and a Libel: The History of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Pr, 1995), 88.

⁸³ Sander L. Gilman, *The Jew’s Body* (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1991) 76 and 177.

⁸⁴ Turda and Weindling, *Blood and Homeland*, 359–60.

⁸⁵ Turda and Weindling, 359–60..

⁸⁶ Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “Graffiti On History’s Walls,” *U.S. News & World Report* 135, no. 15 (2003): 44–51..

Semitism. Both countries' entrance into NATO and the EU are also reason for their case study selection to investigate the research question. The focus is on Poland and Germany but can be applied to many other European nations and to an extent, even those outside the supranational organizations identified here. The Polish-German relationship, as identified by Piotr Buras and Josef Janning, "forms the principal bridge between east and west, connecting two still rather different parts of the EU."⁸⁷ Poland is a notable case study because of its unique domestic makeup of its homogeneous society on both ethnic and religious fronts, coupled with its accession to NATO and the EU from the former Soviet Bloc. Germany is also significant as a case study because of its anti-Semitic past and its status as an early member of both NATO and the EU. Their relationship, therefore, is key in any future European project and issues within either country is a problem for the entire bloc.⁸⁸

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter I provides a historical background of anti-Semitism in Europe, establishing the reason for asking the research question on how anti-Semitism ramifies in European government and society and how it impacts the grater supranational organizations. The assumption in this study of the hatred of Jews in Poland and Germany proceeds from many similarities but also by differences, essentially comparing and contrasting the two countries. The Polish case in Chapter III reviews anti-Semitism from the interwar period 1919 to the present. Moreover, the chapter examines the role of contemporary anti-Semitism in Poland, and how it relates to NATO and the EU, as well as bilateral relations with Germany. Finally, the Polish case since 2015, when the PiS right wing party took over, reveals a disturbing increase in anti-Semitic manifestations in government and society, supported by both the church and right-wing politicians. Chapter IV examines Germany in the past and present. In addition to the unfortunate record

⁸⁷ Piotr Buras and Josef Janning, "Divided at the Centre: Germany, Poland, and the Troubles of the Trump Era," European Council on Foreign Relations, December 19, 2018, https://ecfr.eu/publication/divided_at_the_centre_germany_poland_and_the_troubles_of_the_trump_era/.

⁸⁸ Buras and Janning.

of the past, the chapter scrutinizes contemporary questions of the German anti-Semitism and NATO and the EU. The German case expresses the distance for anti-Semitic attitudes by the government and the older German generations clashing with the new generations whose ideas of German nationalism bring about anti-Semitic acceptance in the society at large. Finally, Chapter V analyses the observed evidence of the challenges NATO and the EU face when dealing with the issue of anti-Semitism and what both case studies bring to the larger picture of European stability and security under the anti-Semitism resurgence, raising questions of human rights violations and the dissolving shared values among member states.

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II. A HISTORY OF ANTI-SEMITISM

During the time of Roman reign (around the first century BCE), Jewish leadership in Palestine, along with the Diaspora, cooperated and pressed for coexistence amongst Rome and the Jews, and a privileged status was established for the Jews in Roman society.⁸⁹ The elevated status started to deteriorate upon Christianity's founding as the official religion of the Roman Empire (380CE), which created anti-Semitic legislation under what is known as Christian anti-Semitism.⁹⁰ Roman laws were created to protect the Roman dominance from anything that could jeopardize their rule.⁹¹ Christian anti-Semitism must be recognized as a unique and new factor of antique anti-Semitism, which predated Christianity.⁹² The unique hatred for Jews by Christians comes from their dispute over Christ as the true Messiah, which is at the heart of Christian faith.⁹³

A. GEOGRAPHY

Geography has had a large influence on anti-Semitism seen across Central Europe. There are significant differences between the Eastern and Western Jews, but boundaries are not clearly defined in much of the literature. The Polish and German Jews of medieval times noticeably varied naturally from one another, as German Jews were more prosperous and assimilated far more than Polish Jews, for example.⁹⁴ Medieval anti-Semitism called for the "lying Jews" to be expelled from the West, notably Germany, sending Jews fleeing eastward toward the border of Poland that abutted Russia.⁹⁵ The eastward migration

⁸⁹ R.R. Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 1996), 28, <https://books.google.com/books?id=XNJJAwwAAQBAJ>.

⁹⁰ Ruether, 28.

⁹¹ Ruether, 28.

⁹² Ruether, 28.

⁹³ Ruether, 28.

⁹⁴ Steven Lowenstein, "The Shifting Boundary between Eastern and Western Jewry," *Jewish Social Studies* 4, no. 1 (1997): 60.

⁹⁵ Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 213.

resulted in major Western areas having few to no professing Jews and those who remained were economically broken, socially degraded, and seen as the dregs of society, effectively ruining Western Jewry.⁹⁶

B. RULING OVER THE JEWS

At its start, anti-Semitism was used to legitimize the rule of those in power beginning with the Christians, moving into the realm of other nations as they adopted Christianity as the dominant state religion, and politically for those leaders within the nations to retain their power based on both the support of the church and the majority of the population's religious beliefs.⁹⁷ Lindemann explains that, during the times of the Jewish enlightenment (from the late 1700s through the late 1800s), Jewish immigrants were less of a concern in western Europe than they were in Russia.⁹⁸ The Western Jewry was less of a concern due to the blending of Jewish and non-Jewish values and cultures, as Jews were becoming "perfect citizens" in the west in the early nineteenth century.⁹⁹ In the words of Moses Mendelssohn, "Be a Jew in your home and a man outside it."¹⁰⁰ The idea was that the only way a Jew could be a man in society was by concealing his Jewish identity.¹⁰¹

The Jews of the early 20th century transformed themselves to look with equanimity towards those who did not adhere to the sacred Jewish religious traditions and laws.¹⁰² Yiddish and Spagnuoli were not spoken as much and vernacular was employed by their

⁹⁶ Ruether, 213.

⁹⁷ Ruether, 28.

⁹⁸ Albert S. Lindemann, *The Jew Accused: Three Anti-Semitic Affairs Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank 1894–1915*, 1. paperback ed (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), 133–36.

⁹⁹ Lindemann, 133–36.

¹⁰⁰ Rabbi Jacobs, "Haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment," My Jewish Learning, May 6, 2021, <https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/haskalah/>.

¹⁰¹ Jacobs.

¹⁰² Maurice Fishberg, *The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment ...*, Contemporary Science Series (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), 554, <https://books.google.com/books?id=3aB5AAAAMAAJ>.

non-Jewish neighbors, which integrated them into the western countries.¹⁰³ The integration included changing their names, appearance, and general attempts to gain commonalities among their fellow (Christian) citizens.¹⁰⁴

Many English literature investigations previous to 1911, according to Fishberg, showed that the scholar's opinions of that era were that Jews allegedly maintained an absolute racial purity for several thousands of years and would prove hard to assimilate into societies.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, many European Jews were proud of their established blood-lines while other Jews felt a state harboring an alien race indefinitely was likely to allow for mixture within the general population and would be to their peril.¹⁰⁶

C. CONCLUSION

From the mid-19th century Anti-Semitism became nationalistic and racial rather than Christian, as anti-Judaism beginning especially in a period from the late 1850s until the years prior to 1914, took hold.¹⁰⁷ Anti-Semitism was the tool for non-Jews to disenfranchise and destroy Jews as they were seen as a separate alien race.¹⁰⁸ The position would be used to justify massacres, racial anti-Semitism, violence, and pogroms against Jews who could no longer seek protection from the state.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰³ Fishberg, 554.

¹⁰⁴ Fishberg, 554.

¹⁰⁵ Fishberg, v.

¹⁰⁶ Fishberg, v–vi.

¹⁰⁷ Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, 224.

¹⁰⁸ Ruether, 224.

¹⁰⁹ Ruether, 224.

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III. POLAND: NATIONALISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

Anti-Semitism is typically associated with extreme right-wing ideology; however, in the case of Poland, it has become infused with mainstream government and Polish society through the country's trend toward nationalism. Poland is a country whose government and society center to a great extent on religious beliefs and nationally shared ideal values. It is arguably one of the least diverse countries in the world, and, due in part to the country's overwhelming ethnic and religious homogeneity, anti-Semitism is increasingly becoming accepted in its society.¹¹⁰ Poland is not unique among European nations in its anti-Semitic rhetoric, which is increasing especially within Catholic circles; however, the Polish people reject attempts to identify anti-Semitism in their country as anything other than an imagined East European backwardness, believing Poland to be untainted by such ideological blight.¹¹¹

The homogeneity of the current Polish ethnic and religious structure is a byproduct of recent, violent, historical, and political processes.¹¹² Following World War II, most of Europe vowed to never again engage in human rights violations and ethnic violence, and created organizations that promoted racial respect and diversity.¹¹³ Polish Jews tend to view Polish history as a perpetual process of increasing anti-Semitism, however, that process has infused modern nationalism to become the new anti-Semitism.¹¹⁴ While Polish

¹¹⁰ Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II*, 4th ed (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 61–65.

¹¹¹ Brian Porter, *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 273, <http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3054143>.

¹¹² Rothschild and Wingfield, *Return to Diversity*, 64; Geneviève Zubrzycki, "Nationalism, 'Philosemitism,' and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 58, no. 1 (January 2016): 66–98, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417515000572>.

¹¹³ "'NEVER AGAIN' Association," "NEVER AGAIN" ASSOCIATION, accessed October 11, 2020, <https://www.nigdywiecej.org/en/>; "FARE Eastern European Development Project," "NEVER AGAIN" ASSOCIATION, accessed October 11, 2020, <https://www.nigdywiecej.org/en/projects/fare>.

¹¹⁴ Aleksander Smolar, "Jews as a Polish Problem," *Daedalus* 116, no. 2 (1987): 32.

Jews, in general, do not feel physically threatened in today's Poland, they do feel angry about the government's apparent reluctance to condemn racial and other biases.¹¹⁵

Democracy within Poland, increasingly influenced by national anti-Semitism as seen in the Polish government and society, is in jeopardy. The influence also threatens the democratic goal of democratization in the region. Poland, since its admittance as a member of NATO and the EU, has reversed its aspirations to maintain the shared values of both organizations, a post-national Europe with a focus on equality while preserving sovereignty. Poland's populist and ethno-nationalist frameworks strain the shared goals through increasing anti-Semitism, among other issues, significantly impeding combined efforts on foreign policy.¹¹⁶

Historically, anti-Semitism has been so tied to Polish nationalism, which casts the Jews as the anti-Poles, that it persisted even when the Polish state disappeared during WWII. It has survived various, and variously illiberal, preconceptions of the nation throughout the 20th century to the present day. The assessment is not to say that all Poles are anti-Semitic and that the entire country is part of the far right; rather, it expresses the concern that government and church pressures on the public, using Polish nationalism as a convenient tool, is significantly normalizing anti-Semitism in the country and, in turn, threatens the values the democratic nation ought to protect. It is not the rise of anti-Semitism, but the rise in political power of anti-Semites, that threatens present-day Poland.

This chapter will review the history of Polish anti-Semitism, examine how anti-Semitism is used in Polish government and society, observe the relationship between Polish nationalism and anti-Semitism, identify manifestations stemming from anti-Semitism in the country, and finally, examine the ramifications of Polish anti-Semitism on such supranational organizations as NATO and the EU.

¹¹⁵ "Jewish Life in Poland" May 05, 2020, DW Documentary, video, 42:25, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=psWarhwc4eY>.

¹¹⁶ Erin K Jenne, "Populism, Nationalism and Revisionist Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 97, no. 2 (March 8, 2021): 323–43, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iaa230>.

A. RELATIONSHIPS: POLAND, NATO, AND THE EU

The Polish government fought vigorously for Poland's accession to NATO and the EU. NATO and the EU were established organizations, with NATO even called the European fraternity, and Poland wanted to become a member as quickly as possible prior to further conflicts between the East and West and the need to protect themselves from the new Russian Federation.¹¹⁷

At the time of Poland's pending NATO membership between 1993 and 1995, observers considered Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia as front runners for gaining membership.¹¹⁸ Multiculturalism and diversity within the established democratic value system were among the ideals of the two supranational organizations and the highest hurdles for aspiring members to clear. However, the Polish government worked tremendously hard to prove itself a reliable democracy capable of collaboration within the alliance, and finally achieved membership in March of 1999.¹¹⁹ As Alexandra Ghenciu explains, Poland—along with Hungary and the Czech Republic—were all admitted to NATO in the first round of post-Cold War enlargement, but Slovakia was denied, due to its anti-democratic parties and a deficiency of regard for human rights.¹²⁰ In other words, NATO enlargement into formerly communist east-central Europe presumed or at least required a certain basic affirmation of human rights, civil liberties, and democracy—presumably to include a rejection of anti-Semitism, as well.

¹¹⁷ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, "Building Poland's Security: Membership of NATO a Key Objective" 44, no. 3 (1996): 3–7; Daine Eisold, "NATO Enlargement: Poland's Response" (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 4, <https://scholarsprogram.wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/nato-enlargement-polands-response>.

¹¹⁸ Alexandra Ghenciu, *NATO in the "New Europe": The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2005), 72.

¹¹⁹ Ryszard Zięba, "The 20th Anniversary of Poland's Accession to NATO," in *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War*, ed. Daniel S. Hamilton and Kristina Spohr (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, 2019), 207, <https://transatlanticrelations.org/publications/open-door-nato-and-euro-atlantic-security-after-the-cold-war/>.

¹²⁰ Ghenciu, *NATO in the "New Europe,"* 72.

Poland has been part of the EU for more than 16 years. It has been hailed as an exemplary example for other aspiring post-war democracies to follow.¹²¹ Yet the promises Poland made as part of its membership are being undermined by the country's re-emergent and very open anti-Semitism, made acceptable by a now mainstream nationalistic idea of the Polish identity. Because of the authoritarian changes its government made to the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, Poland is now the object of looming sanctions.¹²² The transition suggests the beginning of the end of the promise to NATO and the EU, through the silent majority following the few in power who continue to allow such divergence in values. Like Slovakia years before, Poland now seems to lack both democratic values and a concern for human rights. Unlike Slovakia, Poland does not seem especially keen to right its course toward these vaunted Western values.

Polish nationalism is to some extent inherently anti-Semitic in that the country has historically used anti-Semitism as a tool to maintain political regimes and enable the Catholic church to maintain legitimacy. The civic and ethnic ideal type of society for Poles has been significantly impacted by the ethnic and religious homogeneity that formed up after WWII. Polish nationalism is strongly ethnic in nature, and Poles continue to seek clarity on the cultural construction of their nation. As Poland has fought throughout its history for independence and sovereignty and has pushed back oppressing regimes from both the West and the East, its patriotism and sense of pride has developed largely in terms of threats from "Others," which is key to identifying how anti-Semitism falls in line with Polish nationalism. The Jews, outside of ethnic Poles and Catholic Poles, have essentially been branded as Other, meaning they are excluded from all that is Polish. The separation

¹²¹ Tsveta Petrova and Senem Aydın-Düzgit, "Democracy Support Without Democracy: The Cases of Poland and Turkey," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 5, 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/05/democracy-support-without-democracy-cases-of-poland-and-turkey-pub-83485>.

¹²² Mira Marody, "Transformations of Polish Society," *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 86, no. 1 (2019): 57; Anna Brigeovich, "The Post-Cold War Wave of Democratization: Regime Transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Postcommunist States Compared" (master's thesis, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 2008), 50, <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/5h73px40b>; "Poland," European Union, July 5, 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/poland_en; Darragh Moriarty and Eóin O'Keeffe, "Maintaining the Rule of Law in Poland: What next for the Article 7 Proceedings?" (Dublin: IIEA, 2018), 2–4, <https://www.iiea.com/publication/maintaining-rule-law-poland-next-article-7-proceedings/>.

equates to a threat to the Polish nation's continued existence as a democracy, and its civic nationalism functions as a facade to bolster outside views of the country as a democratic and multicultural state.

B. ANTI-SEMITIC HISTORY IN POLAND (1800-1989)

Poland was significantly diverse for most of its pre-WWII history, populated by different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.¹²³ It was a multi-religious state with Protestant, Uniate Catholic, Roman catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, and Jewish citizens, with three-quarters of the world's Jewish population living in Poland prior to WWII.¹²⁴ The diversity that was so prominent prior to the war was dramatically changed after the war and in post-war border shifts, state-sponsored ethnic cleansing, pogroms, and anti-Semitic purges.¹²⁵

The main nationalist party in the late 19th century and early 20th century, the National Democrats, led by Roman Dmowski, saw Jews as a security threat to the nation and they became known as a fifth column, alleged to have engaged in many conspiracies threatening the survival of Poland as a nation.¹²⁶ (Naturally, the more extremist parties, including those that emerged as or became fascist between the world wars, embraced various degrees of anti-Semitism, as well.¹²⁷ The alarming point about the National Democrats is that this nationalist party was so openly and thoroughly anti-Semitic.)

¹²³ Zubrzycki, "Nationalism, 'Philosemitism,' and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland," 73.

¹²⁴ Halik Kochanski, *The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 1, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=3301167>.

¹²⁵ Zubrzycki, "Nationalism, 'Philosemitism,' and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland," 73.

¹²⁶ Balcer, "Islamophobia without Muslims as a Social and Political Phenomenon, The Case of Poland," 213.

¹²⁷ Michelle G Smith, "The Influence of Anti-Semitic Imagery and Rhetoric in Germany During the Early to Mid-20th Century" (master's thesis, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2021), 24, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/67184>; "Weimar Political Parties," Facing History and Ourselves, accessed May 19, 2021, <https://www.facinghistory.org/weimar-republic-fragility-democracy/readings/weimar-political-parties>.

Dmowski's ideas led to comparisons of the Jews to disease and parasites, another supposed threat to the Polish people.¹²⁸ Dmowski also argued that Jews undermined morality through sexual perversion.¹²⁹ In consequence, all attempts to integrate or assimilate Jews, according to Dmowski, were doomed to fail.¹³⁰

After the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1919–1921, an agnostic anti-Russian ex-revolutionary named Marshal Jozef Piłsudski sought to establish a multicultural, multi-confessional Poland, where like-minded counterparts of Catholic Poles—ethnic Jews, Germans, and Ukrainians—would share civic life.¹³¹ Dmowski took dominance over the public in voting approval but in 1926, Piłsudski took over in a coup, lasting as the effective ruler of Poland until 1935; but did not see his vision accomplished prior to his death and the outbreak of WWII.¹³²

With the German assault on Poland in 1939, a horrible new chapter of Jewish existence in Poland dawned in the face of Nazi aggression.¹³³ German policy immediately made the Jews of Poland into a target within the campaign of national dismemberment. Polish Jews were singled out by Schutzstaffel (SS) killing squads in the first days of the Polish campaign.¹³⁴ Once the Nazi division of Poland took hold by 1940, the creation of a ghetto structure especially in the so called General Government represented an escalation of this misery which then took on a new stage of horror with the campaign in the USSR.¹³⁵

¹²⁸ Balcer, “Islamophobia without Muslims as a Social and Political Phenomenon, The Case of Poland,” 213.

¹²⁹ Balcer, 213.

¹³⁰ Balcer, 213.

¹³¹ Piotr H. Kosicki, “Masters in Their Own Home or Defenders of the Human Person? Wojciech Korfanty, Anti-Semitism, and Polish Christian Democracy’s Illiberal Rights-Talk,” *Modern Intellectual History* 14, no. 1 (January 2015): 3–4, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244314000857>.

¹³² Norman Davies, *God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume II: 1795 to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 312.

¹³³ Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 281.

¹³⁴ Snyder, 121–23.

¹³⁵ Snyder, 281, and 297.

The final most awful events in 1941–1942 concerned the decision to embark on industrialized mass murder with the extermination camp at Birkenau and the Operation Reinhard camps in the East of Poland.¹³⁶

Poles would later participate in pogroms, killing Jews on their own, taking advantage of the Nazis’ mutual hatred for the Jews during the occupation.¹³⁷ The Nazis helped to normalize and promote anti-Semitism during the war, allowing it to emerge strengthened and more outwardly violent just after war’s end.

1. Post-War Impacts on Poland

Following WWII, the desire of the Poles for a homogeneous nation in whichever borders were left to them excluded all who were not ethnically Polish, and as Jews were not considered to be Polish, but Jewish by ethnicity, they were not part of this aspiration for the new Poland.¹³⁸

The Central Committee for Jews in Poland estimated that out of 3,000,000 Jews who resided in pre-war Poland, just 50,000 were left after the cessation of hostilities.¹³⁹ Approximately 90 percent of the Jewish population in pre-war Poland had been killed during the war—mostly in the Nazi death camps or in the ghettos that fed them.¹⁴⁰ The Jews returning trying to resettle their old residences, and seeing further violence toward the returning Jewish communities, appealed to the Catholic church for assistance and protection.¹⁴¹ They were told that as Jews, and part of the communist party, they did not

¹³⁶ Snyder, *Bloodlands*, 253, 255–56, 291–92.

¹³⁷ Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, *Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of the Holocaust* (Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press, 2018), ix.

¹³⁸ Kosicki, “Masters in Their Own Home or Defenders of the Human Person?,” 26.

¹³⁹ Kochanski, *The Eagle Unbowed*, 548.

¹⁴⁰ Kochanski, 532.

¹⁴¹ David Cotter, “Special Report: Ethical Implications of Large Scale Combat Operations: The Persistent Holocaust and the Kielce Pogrom of July 1946” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Arthur D. Simons Center, October 9, 2019), 32, <https://thesimonscenter.org/special-report-ethical-implications-of-lsco/>.

warrant protection by the church and were turned away.¹⁴² The refusal of the Church to provide any assistance to the Jews, inciting acts such as the Kielce pogrom, and retaining a negative view of Jews, allowed the continuance of anti-Semitism seen in much of the religious interactions within Poland today.

2. Soviet Occupation

In the post-war period, when the logic of socialism was meant, in part, to replace the fondest notions of nationalism with the communist collective utopia, Poles still engaged in anti-Semitism that ranged from the bureaucratic and conversational to the murderous. The state advocated Polish homogeneity during the post war period.¹⁴³ State institutions built and bolstered their own legitimacy by putting emphasis on the new ethnonational and denominational homogeneity and by suppressing the historical memory of Polish diversity to gain and maintain power.¹⁴⁴

For example, the population of Jewish residents in Kielce grew from 212 in 1945 to 304 in 1946.¹⁴⁵ However, Kielce proved far from a haven. In Kielce, as in many other parts of Poland, communists were equated with being ruled by the Jews and under Stalin's direct control.¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁷ In July of 1946, Soviet authorities and Polish secret police conducted a massive pogrom, resulting in the deaths of 42 Jews.¹⁴⁸ The attacks were prolonged and sustained by the town community against a Jewish center, where both the police and

¹⁴² Cotter, 32.

¹⁴³ Zubrzycki, "Nationalism, 'Philosemitism,' and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland," 74.

¹⁴⁴ Zubrzycki, 74.

¹⁴⁵ Tadeusz Piotrowski, *Poland's Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918–1947* (North Carolina: McFarland, 2007), 134.

¹⁴⁶ Bozena Szaynok, "The Kielce Pogrom," accessed May 19, 2021, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-kielce-pogrom>; Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe* (Budapest-New York: CEU Press, 2009), 39–40 and 146, <https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/40000>.

¹⁴⁷ Szaynok, "The Kielce Pogrom"; Tismaneanu, *Stalinism Revisited*, 39–40, and 146.

¹⁴⁸ Piotrowski, *Poland's Holocaust*, 134; Cotter, "The Persistent Holocaust and the Kielce Pogrom of July 1946," 32.

security services took no actions to stop the massacres.¹⁴⁹ The act was not a random outburst of rage against a group of Jews; it was a telling sign that both Poles and communist authorities were complicit in the continued hatred for Jews after the war's end.¹⁵⁰

In the late 1950s and 1960s, anti-Semitism was quiescent at surface level, but at the political core it was a factor of factional struggles within the internal Communist party.¹⁵¹ After Nikita Khrushchev gave his unprecedented speech to the Soviet Communist party denouncing the horrible abuses of Stalinism, Poland felt the effects of the speech right away.¹⁵² Hardline policies were eased, which made it easier for Jews to obtain exit visas but also allowed political freedoms to all which gave voice to the old anti-Semitism.¹⁵³

In March of 1968, the Communist secret police instigated an anti-Semitic purge.¹⁵⁴ The socialist government pushed an anti-Zionist media campaign in conjunction with the massive purge of Jewish employees from government institutions and the party organs within the country.¹⁵⁵ The purge of personnel continued into the latter part of summer, 1968.¹⁵⁶ Months of anti-Semitic responses across Poland followed and many Jewish Poles fled the country as a result.¹⁵⁷ This crushing government purge of Polish Jews resulted in

¹⁴⁹ A. Prazmowska, "The Kielce Pogrom 1946 and the Emergence of Communist Power in Poland," *Cold War History* 2, no. 2 (January 1, 2002): Abstract, <https://doi.org/10.1080/713999953>.

¹⁵⁰ Prazmowska, Abstract.

¹⁵¹ Robert S. Wistrich, "Anti-Semitism in Europe Since the Holocaust," *The American Jewish Year Book* 93 (1993): 10.

¹⁵² Yascha Mounk, *Stranger in My Own Country: A Jewish Family in Modern Germany* (New York, NY, 2014), 68, <https://www.overdrive.com/search?q=298AB1EE-E1DD-458C-BA13-7DB37BEDF416>.

¹⁵³ Mounk, 68.

¹⁵⁴ Jan Tomasz Gross, *Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz : An Essay in Historical Interpretation* (New York: Random House, 2006), 73, <http://site.ebrary.com/id/10235235>.

¹⁵⁵ Anat Plocker, "'Zionists to Dayan': The Anti-Zionist Campaign in Poland, 1967-1968" (Dissertation, Stanford, 2009), 1, <http://search.proquest.com/openview/5bcf3e7edb7e0ef4d4f85bf9fbd2e61/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y>.

¹⁵⁶ Plocker, 1.

¹⁵⁷ Maurice Friedberg, "Antisemitism as a Policy Tool in the Soviet Bloc," *The American Jewish Year Book* 71 (1970): 126-32; DW, *Jewish Life in Poland*.

the complete suppression of a student led reform movement and within a year, drove fifteen thousand Jews out of Poland.¹⁵⁸ Polish leader Edward Gierek participated in the 1968 anti-Jewish campaign and did not dissociate himself or his government from the event, with no condemnation for the government's anti-Jewish aspect.¹⁵⁹ Anti-Zionist literature and Judeophobic works were created in a vast industry of books that the Communist party fully sponsored from the 1960s through the 1970s.¹⁶⁰ An example of such literature can be seen in Figure 1, as one such publication depicts Jews using their tentacles to reach all across the globe. A total of 112 books of this type were created during this timeframe.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Plocker, “Zionists to Dayan,” 1.

¹⁵⁹ Joanna B. Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present* (Lincoln, Nebraska: U of Nebraska Press, 2006), 258.

¹⁶⁰ Henrietta Mondry, “Sadists' Bodies of the Anti-Zionist Campaign Era: 1960s-1970s,” in *Exemplary Bodies: Constructing the Jew in Russian Culture, 1880s to 2008* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2009), 147, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt21h4wgs.12>; Wistrich, “Anti-Semitism in Europe Since the Holocaust,” 12.

¹⁶¹ Wistrich, “Anti-Semitism in Europe Since the Holocaust,” 12.



Anti-Zionist caricature displayed in the Soviet magazine, *Krokodil*, 1972.

Figure 1. Anti-Zionist Literature¹⁶²

¹⁶² Izabella Tabarovsky, "Soviet Anti-Zionism and Contemporary Left Antisemitism," *Fathom*, May 2019, <https://fathomjournal.org/soviet-anti-zionism-and-contemporary-left-antisemitism/>.

In the beginning of the 1970s, several Soviet propagandists, such as Yuri Ivanov and Vladimir Bolshakov, pushed anti-Semitism through the theory of Zionism as the prime enemy of the Soviet people.¹⁶³ In 1974, Valery Emelyanov developed an especially toxic form of anti-Zionism in the communist party, telling audiences in Moscow that Zionism was aimed at mastering the world and would rise to completion in the year 2000.¹⁶⁴ The campaigns against the Jews in Moscow caused fears to rise about Jews across the Soviet Union, to include Poland, resulting in additional rhetoric and propaganda within Poland as well. Gierek's regime employed anti-Jewish themes in his official propaganda during events between 1975 and 1976 as new Polish constitution debates were in full swing.¹⁶⁵ Emelyanov published his work, *De-Zionisation*, in 1980, which used the classic Russian Protocols fashion back to King Solomon from 3,000 years ago to further anti-Semitic feeling among Poles.¹⁶⁶ He equated the Jews of Israel legitimizing themselves as a chosen people to an ideology of racial superiority as key evidence for his discrimination against the Jews.¹⁶⁷ *De-Zionisation* and other works were mushrooming across the Soviet Union pushing anti-Zionistic rhetoric and discrimination against the Jews in higher education as well as exclusion from military, political and diplomatic careers.¹⁶⁸

3. Anti-Semitism in Democratic Poland (1989–2015)

The 1990 Polish elections were filled with anti-Semitic sentiments that took a new turn as Lech Walesa began a smear campaign against his opponent, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the liberal Catholic prime minister.¹⁶⁹ Walesa called Mazowiecki a crypto-Jew and soft on Communism, playing on a theme that Mazowiecki was controlled by the Jews so that “Real

¹⁶³ Wistrich, “Anti-Semitism in Europe Since the Holocaust,” 12.

¹⁶⁴ Wistrich, 12.

¹⁶⁵ Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other*, 258–59.

¹⁶⁶ Wistrich, “Anti-Semitism in Europe Since the Holocaust,” 12.

¹⁶⁷ Wistrich, 13.

¹⁶⁸ Wistrich, 13.

¹⁶⁹ Wistrich, 18–19.

Poles” must take control and govern the Polish state.¹⁷⁰ As Walesa’s campaigns were successful, the use of anti-Jewish sentiments demonstrates quite clearly that anti-Semitism in Poland remained alive and well during this time.¹⁷¹

Poles were reacquainted with the notion that they had a role in the Holocaust, as expressed in Jan Gross’ book *Neighbors*, which recounted ethnic Poles murdering Jewish neighbors in July of 1941.¹⁷² The realization that they were not just victims but had historical ties to the plight of the Jews has led to a process of Polish national demystification which continues today.¹⁷³

Poland saw a dramatic increase in the size and popularity of many Jewish cultural festivals in the 1990s and 2000s.¹⁷⁴ As of 2013, there were nearly forty festivals dedicated to the Jewish culture held in many cities across the nation.¹⁷⁵

The post-Soviet and post-EU Poland saw a vigorous political battle over pluralism.¹⁷⁶ Intellectuals, the Catholic church, and politicians alike, from the left and center, stressed Polish ideological heterogeneity, arguing that a plural society, religion, and particularly for Poland, Catholicism, was competing among many overlapping value systems.¹⁷⁷ The notion led to a demand among these groups to defend a confessional neutrality of the nation to protect the rights of the minorities.¹⁷⁸ Bringing together the majority, under the religious, national, and cultural umbrellas, makes gaining votes easier

¹⁷⁰ Wistrich, 18–19.

¹⁷¹ Wistrich, 19.

¹⁷² Zubrzycki, “Nationalism, ‘Philosemitism,’ and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland,” 68.

¹⁷³ Zubrzycki, 68.

¹⁷⁴ Zubrzycki, 67.

¹⁷⁵ Zubrzycki, 67.

¹⁷⁶ Zubrzycki, 74.

¹⁷⁷ Zubrzycki, 74.

¹⁷⁸ Zubrzycki, 74.

and empowers those who wish to exclude the others from Poland.¹⁷⁹ Jews were left as the outsiders in this outbursts of nationalism by the Polish majority, which has sown continued hate and discontent toward Poland's few remaining Jews.

C. ANTI-SEMITISM IN POLAND TODAY

Poland holds elections every five years, and the citizens vote for political candidates through direct elections, from a multi-party-political system.¹⁸⁰ In Polish democratic elections, candidates rely heavily on the Church and on support by their society to keep office.¹⁸¹ The political parties push the values which they feel will keep them in power and are most popular with the public.

The effort of social activists, ordinary citizens, state agencies, and Jewish and non-Jewish elites to combat extreme (or even extremist) nationalism within Poland using the country's historical diversity is the hope to build a more open society and renew the lost polity to meet standards within the international normalcy model of nationhood.¹⁸² These international democratic values, which encourage pluralism and multiculturalism, are important for Poland to remain in good standing with the other democracies around the world and security institutions within Central Europe.¹⁸³

Media platforms contribute to the Polish society's anti-Semitism. Zubrzycki explained that "ethno-religious nationalists contend that 'Jews' are contaminating the [Polish] nation with their civic ideals, building a pernicious post-national, cosmopolitan

¹⁷⁹ Wojciech Woźniak, Radosław Kossakowski, and Przemysław Nosal, "A Squad with No Left Wingers: The Roots and Structure of Right-Wing and Nationalist Attitudes among Polish Football Fans," *Problems of Post-Communism* 67, no. 6 (November 1, 2020): 518, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2019.1673177>.

¹⁸⁰ Jan Wendt and Agnieszka Bógdał-Brzezińska, "Presidential Elections in Poland and the United States and Democracy" XXII, no. 2 (August 18, 2020): 63, <https://doi.org/10.30892/rgrp.222102-340>.

¹⁸¹ Zubrzycki, "Nationalism, 'Philosemitism,' and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland," 74.

¹⁸² Zubrzycki, 68–69.

¹⁸³ Zubrzycki, 70.

world, and must therefore be politically marginalized.”¹⁸⁴ Newspapers such as *Nasz Dziennik*, *Gazeta Polska*, or the Catholic weekly *Niedziela* all regularly display anti-Semitism.¹⁸⁵ The anti-Semitism seen in these media platforms are typically based on two main themes.¹⁸⁶ One is that of the Jew as an alien and discrediting opponents by accusing them of having Jewish origins and in turn accusing them of mysterious alien control or loyal to other countries or organizations.¹⁸⁷ These accusations without bases, such as calling a political opponent a Jew to discredit their campaign, can be a form of magical anti-Semitism. The second relates to the economy and accuses foreign Jewish capital of taking control of key businesses within Poland and Polish citizens’ claims on prewar property ownership. The Jews are blamed for exploiting or conspiring to control the country.¹⁸⁸

Radio broadcasting is an extremely influential medium among the Polish population, as it enables the proliferation of anti-Semitic rhetoric and agendas in Poland. Radio Maryja is one such radio station and is arguably one of the most influential in the country.¹⁸⁹ The station has empowered the radical right and has been a leading voice in the Polish Catholic Church.¹⁹⁰ Funded by groups in the United States and by a noted anti-Semite, Jan Kobyłanski, a Polish émigré millionaire, the radio station promotes narratives

¹⁸⁴ Zubrzycki, 78–79.

¹⁸⁵ Zubrzycki, 78.

¹⁸⁶ Michał Bilewicz, Mikołaj Winiewski, and Zuzanna Radzik, “Antisemitism in Poland: Economic, Religious, and Historical Aspects,” *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* 4 (December 12, 2012): 2803, https://www.academia.edu/17713713/Antisemitism_in_Poland_Economic_Religious_and_Historical_Aspects.

¹⁸⁷ Bilewicz, Winiewski, and Radzik, 2803.

¹⁸⁸ Bilewicz, Winiewski, and Radzik, 2803.

¹⁸⁹ Rafał Pankowski and Rafał Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 2, 65, 95–98, 108, 110, 119, 125, 156–57, 166, 174–75, 177, and 190–91., <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=484783>; “Polish Media: Public Outlets are not Really Public, They are One Party Propaganda Tools,” July 14, 2020, France 24 English, video, 4:48, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x8y4aRBep2w>.

¹⁹⁰ Pankowski and Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland*, 2, 65, 95–98, 108, 110, 119, 125, 156–57, 166, 174–75, 177, 190–91, and 93.

that are based on national extremism, anti-Semitism, as well as conspiracy theories, both openly displayed and shrouded in code.¹⁹¹ Anti-Semitic content on radio Maryia has included ugly stereotyping, theories that claim Jews were responsible for communist-era repression, and accusations that Jews use the Holocaust to leverage compensation payments from the Polish government.¹⁹² The radio station is used as a political platform and helps push clearly xenophobic and anti-Semitic agendas.¹⁹³

Poland's current government is the Law and Justice party (PiS) as of 2015, which identifies Poland as a monolithic state where ethnicity, not civic national identity, forms its base.¹⁹⁴ An example of the government's tolerance of anti-Semitism using Polish nationalism occurred in November of 2018, when the Polish media reported that Tomasz Greniuch, a nationalist and historian, was nominated to become the leader of the Opole Institute of National Remembrance office.¹⁹⁵ He had been the chief of the National Radical Camp (NRC) in Opole and organized a commemoration march for a historical anti-Jewish pogrom in 2005.¹⁹⁶ The UN Committee for the Elimination of Radical Discrimination has identified the NRC as fascist and called on Poland to ban the group for promoting national hatred.¹⁹⁷

Seeing anti-Semitism as a key influencer in elections within Poland indicates the deep connection that anti-Semitism has on the country's proceeded values. Nationalism is seen as one of the most, if not the most, important aspects of the political environment in

¹⁹¹ Pankowski and Pankowski, 96.

¹⁹² Pankowski and Pankowski, 96.

¹⁹³ Pankowski and Pankowski, 96.

¹⁹⁴ Balcer, "Islamophobia without Muslims as a Social and Political Phenomenon, The Case of Poland," 208–9.

¹⁹⁵ US Department of State, *2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Poland* (US Department of State, June 10, 2020), 1–22, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/poland/>.

¹⁹⁶ US Department of State, 1–22.

¹⁹⁷ US Department of State, 1–22.

Polish political elections as campaigns in recent years are centered around nationalism.¹⁹⁸ As described by Pankowski and Pankowski, political commentary has focused mostly on the construction of a collective identity for the “real Poles.”¹⁹⁹

Continuing the ideals of Dmowski, this political landscape for excluding Jews is still ever present in today’s politics. The need to have an enemy to retain legitimacy seems to be the continual theme with these views. Racial and ethnic differences make it difficult for Poland to move away from homogeneity as well as the far-right movements that have pushed their way into the mainstream political arena by suppressing the historical memory of Polish diversity to gain and maintain power.²⁰⁰ The homogeneity goes hand in hand with nationalism, which still represents the “us versus them” mentality of today.

D. CONCLUSION

In summary, this case study has shown that anti-Semitism is far from removed within Polish government and society and plays a large factor in how the country manages its population, religion, and international affairs. Poland, as an ethnically and denominationally homogeneous society, pulling away from democratic values, pushing towards far-right authoritarian and totalitarian rule, and embracing the acceptance of anti-Semitism among other ethnic and religious biases, will negatively affect Central European security institutions by degrading the overall stability and strength of the collective democracies, as well as decreasing the project of democratization within the region.²⁰¹ Poland as well as other countries across Europe have seen a rise in anti-Semitism in recent years, as seen in the case of Germany, and as the international community feeds off approval or condemnation for other country actions. The new hatred could deterioration of peace, progress, and security is setting a bad example in central Europe. In the year 2021,

¹⁹⁸ Woźniak, Kossakowski, and Nosal, “A Squad with No Left Wingers,” 518.

¹⁹⁹ Pankowski and Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland*, 58, 69, and 121.

²⁰⁰ Zubrzycki, “Nationalism, ‘Philosemitism,’ and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland,” 74.

²⁰¹ Zubrzycki, 69.

despite Poland's near perfect assimilation into western democratic values this hatred puts into question the democratic system in central Europe.

IV. GERMANY: OLD HATREDS AND NEW THREATS

Anti-Semitism, typically associated with the extreme right, is increasingly becoming more mainstream among German youth, where their enthusiasm for nationalism has brought out old anti-Semitic hatreds in German society. Germany is a country whose government and society, after WWII and upon reunification, centered to a great extent on rebranding their nation to bring about never again beliefs and a liberal globalization mindset. Germans after the war have strived to foster shared ideal values across Europe and rely upon unity as the pillars to German economic success, but as the youth press towards the nationalistic mindset, anti-Semitism and other manifestations stemming from the inherent need to preserve the German nation, have increased in recent years.

A. RELATIONSHIPS: GERMANY, NATO, AND THE EU

For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), accession to NATO and the EU—as an early member of both organizations—signified the democratic intentions and context of the Bonn Republic, which the unified FRG continues to uphold and advance at the highest levels. Following the horrors of state-organized genocide in World War II, the Germans made promises to themselves and the world that, among other things, the Holocaust as well as the integral nationalism and ethnic hatred that drove it would “never again” gain any currency in German culture or politics. Nonetheless, anti-Semitism persists, presenting grave concerns about how Germany will hold together the European unity under NATO and the EU with a decline of democratic values persisting among member states by increases in human rights violations through anti-Semitism as just one example of hatreds undermining the fundamental values of the supranational organizations.

Civic nationalism within Germany emerged after World War II to replace ethnic nationalism, but as multi-culturalism increased, fear of integration with the perceived “other”—including most particularly Jews—has revived ethno-nationalism and populism, where conflict with rival states and NATO and the EU, respectively, feed demands for

extreme right sovereigntist movements to exclude all others not ethnically German—and raising the acceptance of anti-Semitism.²⁰²

This chapter first will review the FRG’s post-war policies on and about NATO and the EU, particularly the values that both organizations espouse and enshrine. Then it will explore the history of German anti-Semitism, as well as manifestations of anti-Semitism in the FRG today and observe the ramifications of German anti-Semitism on external entities such as NATO and the EU.

B. ANTI-SEMITIC HISTORY IN GERMANY (1848-1989)

There are deep roots of anti-Semitism in Germany, where religious anti-Semitism shifted to scientific anti-Semitism, as a modern hate for modern times.²⁰³ The Jewish enlightenment, the *Haskalah* in Germany, beginning in the 18th century, aspired, among other things, to eliminate the visible differences between Jews and their Christian neighbors in the name of assimilating into German society on a more equal footing. The blurring of differences, rather than facilitating acceptance or equality, gave rise to anti-Semitism in the form of conspiracy theories that claimed the Jews were hiding among the German people, just waiting to take advantage of unsuspecting Germans.²⁰⁴

Formal emancipation of Jews in Germany came with the French Republic’s proclamation in June of 1798 that Jews would be afforded civic rights not based on religious beliefs after France took over German lands and imposed their liberal ideals.²⁰⁵ In 1848, Jews achieved the right to vote and hold political office in places such as the

²⁰² Erin K Jenne, “Populism, Nationalism and Revisionist Foreign Policy,” *International Affairs* 97, no. 2 (March 8, 2021): Abstract, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa230>.

²⁰³ Smith, “The Influence of Anti-Semitic Imagery and Rhetoric in Germany During the Early to Mid-20th Century,” 7.

²⁰⁴ Sander L. Gilman, *The Jew’s Body* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 76 and 177.

²⁰⁵ Shulamit S. Magnus, *Jewish Emancipation in a German City: Cologne, 1798–1871* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 4–24, 25.

Frankfurt National Assembly, bolstering the Jewish idea of becoming truly German.²⁰⁶ Thus, on the one hand, formal assimilation—and equality—for Germany’s Jews was widespread by the middle of the 19th century.

On the other hand, anti-Semitism intensified rapidly following 1850 after Prussia, the largest German state, took back lands from the French and degraded the values promulgated under (more) democratic rule.²⁰⁷ The rampant integral nationalism that characterized the late 19th century and, arguably, marched into World War I on all sides, caught up with Germany’s Jews, not unlike the rest of Europe. The loss of World War I was humiliating for Germans and many Germans went looking for scapegoats to blame.²⁰⁸ The resentment of Jews after the war, especially the prominence of Jews in the new civilian government, led to politicized and often virulent anti-Semitism alongside nationalism and anti-Communism.²⁰⁹

To be sure, the 1920s saw a rise in the prominence of Jews in German culture, particularly in the new realms of popular music and film. One such successful 1920s composer was Kurt Weill, a son of a Jewish cantor, who fled Germany to America upon the Nazi takeover in 1933.²¹⁰ Another was Kurt Gerron, a singer and actor in the 1920s who was murdered in Auschwitz during the Nazi era.²¹¹ Dora Gerson was a 1920s film actress and prominent singer who was also murdered along with her family in Auschwitz.²¹² Still, many assimilated German Jews retained a degree of insecurity even

²⁰⁶ James Chastain, “Jewish Emancipation,” *Jewish Emancipation*, 2004, <https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/jewemanc.htm>; Amos Elon, *The Pity of It All: A History of the Jews in Germany, 1743–1933* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 2002), 179–80.

²⁰⁷ Elon, *The Pity of It All*, 179–80.

²⁰⁸ “Nationalism and the First World War,” The Wiener Holocaust Library, February 23, 2021, <https://www.theholocaustexplained.org/how-and-why/why/nationalism-and-the-first-world-war/>.

²⁰⁹ The Wiener Holocaust Library, “Nationalism and the First World War.”

²¹⁰ Gregg Wager, “Composers Kurt Weill,” The OREL Foundation, accessed April 9, 2021, http://oreloundation.org/composers/article/kurt_weill.

²¹¹ “Kurt Gerron,” Music and the Holocaust, April 9, 2021, <https://holocaustmusic.ort.org/places/camps/western-europe/westerbork/gerronkurt/>.

²¹² Music and the Holocaust, “Kurt Gerron.”

amid the notional equality of the interwar period.²¹³ The 1922 assassination of Walther Rathenau, a German Jewish liberal politician then serving as foreign minister, by right-wing extremists, seemed symbolically to derail Germany's first democratic experiment and the progress of assimilation and acceptance for Jews in the Weimar Republic.²¹⁴

Also in the 1920s, there was a drastic inflation crisis, caused by currency reform and German reparation demands from World War I.²¹⁵ The crisis affected the German middle class the most and stressed the population tremendously, but Germany pushed hard to overcome the hardships.²¹⁶ At the cusp of the German inflation crisis recovery, Germans faced another devastating crisis, the Great Depression in 1929.²¹⁷ This time, the combination of both crises was too much to bear for the middle class, who comprised the largest percentage of the voting population.²¹⁸ The middle class became socially radicalized, angered by the frustrations of the crises, and then politically extreme, as they voted the Nazis into power.²¹⁹

At the time of the Nazi takeover in 1933, an estimated 500,000 Jews resided in Germany, with 160,000 dwelling in Berlin.²²⁰ Of the 500,000, (about 1 percent of the German population), in turn, 25 percent were from elsewhere in Eastern Europe as refugees; foreigners.²²¹ Another 100,000 people living in Germany were not registered but

²¹³ Elon, *The Pity of It All*, 377.

²¹⁴ Elon, 370.

²¹⁵ "The Great Depression," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, April 9, 2021, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-great-depression>.

²¹⁶ Larry Eugene Jones, "Inflation, Revaluation, and the Crisis of Middle-Class Politics: A Study in the Dissolution of the German Party System, 1923–28," *Central European History* 12, no. 2 (1979): 143–68.

²¹⁷ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "The Great Depression."

²¹⁸ Jones, "Inflation, Revaluation, and the Crisis of Middle-Class Politics," 145–53.

²¹⁹ Jones, 145–53.

²²⁰ Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany*, xi.

²²¹ John Borneman, *Sojourners: The Return of German Jews and the Question of Identity* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 4.

identified one or both of their grandparents as Jewish.²²² As the Nazis consolidated their power in 1933–1935, the government constructed a series of anti-Semitic policies.

The National Socialists centered their movement and eventually their policies on the folkish ideal, the nation as an ethno-nationalist extreme trend of Germanness.²²³ The radical racial theory, which found its culmination in the Final Solution policy, did not distinguish among Jewish Nationalists, Orthodox Jews, assimilated Jews, or first- or second-generation converts to Christianity.²²⁴ Hitler, a vicious anti-Semite, pressed ideologies which established his justification and basis for war; ethnic supremacy over all others was central in his war efforts, which were geared towards the destruction of the Jews.²²⁵ The extreme nationalism in the rhetoric was celebrated by Germans who wished to regain their dignity after the defeat in World War I.

In 1935, Hitler implemented the Nuremberg Laws, officially defining Judaism as a race, and withdrew the right for Jews to be German citizens.²²⁶ Nazis tried to reorder the map along ethnic lines for the continent by force.²²⁷ Hitler and his ideas of a supreme race gained acceptance among his followers, driving the mass genocide in stages, as he tried to rid Europe of its Jews.²²⁸ Propaganda promoted negative stereotypes and false narratives about Jews. One such example is the propaganda flyer comparing Jews to diseases in Germany, urging the necessity to finish off the Jews, as they were cursed.²²⁹

²²² Borneman, 4.

²²³ Muller, “Us and Them,” 26.

²²⁴ Leni Yahil, Ina Friedman, and Haya Galai, *The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932–1945*, Studies in Jewish History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 458.

²²⁵ Muller, “Us and Them,” 26.

²²⁶ “Germany Virtual Jewish History Tour,” Jewish Virtual Library, February 24, 2021, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/germany-virtual-jewish-history-tour>.

²²⁷ Muller, “Us and Them,” 26.

²²⁸ Muller, 26.

²²⁹ “Origins of Neo-Nazi and White Supremacist Terms and Symbols: A Glossary,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, February 24, 2021, [//www.ushmm.org/antisemitism/what-is-antisemitism/origins-of-neo-nazi-and-white-supremacist-terms-and-symbols](https://www.ushmm.org/antisemitism/what-is-antisemitism/origins-of-neo-nazi-and-white-supremacist-terms-and-symbols).

Another such cruelty toward Jews during the pre-war years was seen in 1938, the so-called Night of Broken Glass or Crystal Night (*Kristallnacht*), when Jewish businesses and synagogues were destroyed, and Jews were beaten and killed in riots.²³⁰ At the time, *Kristallnacht* actually presented something of an image problem for the Nazis, who worried that everyday Germans would find the images of racial violence revolting.²³¹ Thereafter, in 1938–1939, as Nazi aggression grew, Hitler’s approach to anti-Semitic policy and practice became more escalatory using incremental steps.²³² Still, anti-Semitism was a foundation of National Socialism and was considered the national socialist’s most essential propaganda weapon.²³³ While pro-Nazi Germans in 1930 or 1933 were not voting for the Holocaust (which did not come to the planning table until 1940), the steady stream of anti-Jewish laws, policies, images, and rhetoric certainly helped bring about the “unthinkable,” particularly considering how many hands worked toward it and in it every day.

Initially, Hitler implemented a gradual indirect extermination lasting until 1941; for many of the measures were legalistic or administrative, and they focused on removing Jews from the everyday functions of the Third Reich.²³⁴ Then, however, as the war turned out of Hitler’s favor, and the Nazi’s last efforts to achieve victory were failing, a Final Solution was conceived to murder the Jews.²³⁵ Nazi Germany used the most ruthless aggression

²³⁰ Jewish Virtual Library, “Germany Virtual Jewish History Tour.”

²³¹ “Reactions to *Kristallnacht*,” Jewish Virtual Library, April 9, 2021, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/reactions-to-kristallnacht>; Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*. (London: W.H.Allen, 1961), 56–70, 410.

²³² Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*., 56–70, 410; “*Kristallnacht*,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed April 9, 2021, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/kristallnacht>; Jewish Virtual Library, “Reactions to *Kristallnacht*.”

²³³ Max Weinreich, *Hitler’s Professors: The Part of Scholarship in Germany’s Crimes Against the Jewish People* (London: Yale University Press, 1999), 237.

²³⁴ Smith, “The Influence of Anti-Semitic Imagery and Rhetoric in Germany During the Early to Mid-20th Century,” 31, and 38–39.

²³⁵ Yahil, Friedman, and Galai, *The Holocaust*, 458.

and legislation seen against European Jewry in European history in its Jewish mass murders.²³⁶

Anti-Semitism was a foundation of national socialism and was considered the national socialist's most essential propaganda weapon.²³⁷ When Heinrich Himmler's plans to resettle Germans into the new German occupied territories were disrupted by the assassination of his deputy, Reinhard Heydrich, Himmler pushed Adolf Eichmann, to accelerate his plans for the Final Solution across Europe, employing the killing to a massive scale.²³⁸ Together, these men were the major organizers of the Holocaust, increasing the killing of Jews, rapidly trying to ethnically cleanse the continent which spiraled into the full-blown genocide that is today known as the Holocaust or the Shoah.

1. West Germany

West Germany, also known as the Federal Republic of Germany or Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) joined NATO in 1955 and the EU in 1958, strengthening its desire to uphold democratic values of equality for all citizens.²³⁹ These democratic values included protection for the Jews and the eradication of anti-Semitism along with any other ethnic or racial biases. In the quest to do right by the Jews after their traumatic and devastating ordeal under the Nazis, the new German democracy also established a special relationship with Israel since its founding.²⁴⁰ Bonn, the capital of the BRD stood to lose quite a bit in terms of foreign policy with the Arab middle east by establishing relations with Israel, as well as

²³⁶ William W. Hagen, "Before the 'Final Solution': Toward a Comparative Analysis of Political Anti-Semitism in Interwar Germany and Poland," *The Journal of Modern History* 68, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 351–81, <https://doi.org/10.1086/600769>.

²³⁷ Weinreich, *Hitler's Professors*, 237.

²³⁸ Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 395, <http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9781101666678>; "An Architect of Terror: Heinrich Himmler and the Holocaust," The National WWII Museum, May 23, 2020, <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/heinrich-himmler-holocaust>.

²³⁹ "Germany in the EU," European Union, July 5, 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/germany_en; "NATO on the Map," January 27, 2021, <https://www.nato.int/nato-on-the-map/#lat=51.72673918960763&lon=4.84911701440904&zoom=0&layer-1&infoBox=Germany>.

²⁴⁰ Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany*, x.

diminishing the West German claim as the only legitimate Germany, to which Bonn's foreign policy was based in the 1960s.²⁴¹ Even with this looming concern, the relationship was forged, and special in that, many of the communications and transactions between the two countries were done in secret to avoid retaliations by the Arab states.²⁴² One example of secret interactions was when the West German Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, agreed to expand the Israeli-West German bilateral cooperation to the security realm after a secret meeting held in December 1957.²⁴³

On the other hand, during the mid-1950s, the atrocities conducted by the Third Reich were nearly completely excluded from the public discussion in BRD, leading to a loss of Holocaust awareness in the country.²⁴⁴ Still, after the coming of age of the BRD's first fully post-war generation in the middle-1960s, the Nazi past was continually confronted with an ascendance of a left-of-center prevailing wisdom about the evils of the German past. In November of 1968, for example, a woman confronted the Chancellor of the Christian Democratic Union party congress in Berlin, Kurt Georg Kiesinger. She called him a Nazi, assaulted him with a slap, and read a statement expressing the German youth's rage over the government to allow former Nazis to hold leadership roles.²⁴⁵ The concerns that the older generations of Germans, those who killed Jews in the War were holding government positions and allowed to continue living their lives, and not changing attitudes to fall in line with the youth of the time, was shocking to many in the younger generation.²⁴⁶ The youth in the 1960s-1970s wanted to know what their parent's

²⁴¹ Lorena De Vita, "German-Israeli Ties in 2015 and 1965: The Difficult Special Relationship," *International Affairs* 91, no. 4 (July 2015): 840, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12335>.

²⁴² De Vita, 841.

²⁴³ De Vita, 841.

²⁴⁴ Harold Marcuse, "The Revival of Holocaust Awareness in West Germany, Israel, and the United States," in *1968: The World Transformed*, ed. Carole Fink et al., 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 421–22, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139052658.017>.

²⁴⁵ Marcuse, 427.

²⁴⁶ Detlef Siegfried, "'Don't Trust Anyone Older Than 30?' Voices of Conflict and Consensus between Generations in 1960s West Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 4 (2005): 729–44.

generation did in the war and felt deceived and deprived of the knowledge that their parents kept from them.²⁴⁷ The West's new orthodoxy, allowing for integration of those deemed evil into society, was also the objection pressed by the far right.

2. East Germany

Anti-Semitism was deemed essentially abolished by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) government after purging the remaining Nazis from its party and governmental ranks by the 1950s.²⁴⁸ The supposed history of anti-fascism, made the claim that the Socialist Unity Party (SED) corrected any lingering issues relating to anti-Semitism and crimes of the Nazis, and the Holocaust and that Eastern German party leaders did not need any further debate on the matter.²⁴⁹

Marxist theory suggested that postwar Germany would resolve the Jewish question quite easily, as under communist rule and in socialist ideology, all religions were considered equally worthless.²⁵⁰ Religion, the “opium of the oppressed masses,” and anti-Semitism, a tool of the Western capitalist ruling classes, would be removed completely in the new socialist freedom under the Communists.²⁵¹ The simplistic view of anti-Semitism as a vestige of quasi-feudal religious “superstition” ignored the integral-nationalistic aspects of modern anti-Semitism amid a broader disregard of nationalism as a force in

²⁴⁷ Siegfried, 727–29.

²⁴⁸ Emily Pugh, *Architecture, Politics, and Identity in Divided Berlin* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), 37, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=2041555>.

²⁴⁹ Pugh, 37.

²⁵⁰ Guenter Lewy, *Jews and Germans: Promise, Tragedy, and the Search for Normalcy* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2020), 180.

²⁵¹ Lewy, 180.

properly communist society.²⁵² Anti-Semitism thus was officially laid to rest, according to the party, and rapidly became a taboo subject to discuss in the GDR.²⁵³

Despite improved standards of living offered to the Jewish-German residents in East Germany, their numbers fell significantly during the mid- to late 1980s. By 1986, there were just 350 Jews in East Germany, with 200 registered as living in the Berlin community.²⁵⁴ The promise of socialism allowing equality to all was not the reality for Jews in East Germany, and as dreams of a free and equal socialist state deteriorated, Jews were still persecuted through purges and anti-Semitic violence, even as the Soviet Union fell in 1989.

3. The Reunification of the German Nation (1989-2000)

The unification of the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1990 was a momentous occasion for Germans, a triumph, it seemed, of the FRG's western orientation and thereby a confirmation of the German commitment to a liberal democracy.²⁵⁵ The period was known as *die Wendezeit*, the time of change, and it was characterized by extreme flux, also for divisions and tensions regarding Jews and their identities.²⁵⁶ Jewish identity was an issue, especially for Russian Jews living in Germany after reunification and the Union's fall.²⁵⁷ Germany established liberal immigration policies for Jews, and although some German officials and many Jewish functionaries were not pleased with the immigration reforms, prohibiting Jews who were inclined to settle in Germany was

²⁵² Landon Schnabel, "Opiate of the Masses? Inequality, Religion, and Political Ideology in the United States," *Social Forces* 99, no. 3 (March 1, 2021): 979–1012, <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soaa027>; Charles Villa-Vicencio, *A Theology of Reconstruction: Nation-Building and Human Rights*, Cambridge Studies in Ideology and Religion (Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Shlomo Avineri, "Marxism and Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 3 (July 1, 1991): 637–57, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002200949102600315>.

²⁵³ Pugh, *Architecture, Politics, and Identity in Divided Berlin*, 37.

²⁵⁴ Borneman, *Sojourners*, 6.

²⁵⁵ Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany*, x.

²⁵⁶ Borneman, *Sojourners*, 3.

²⁵⁷ Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany*, 65.

unimaginable.²⁵⁸ The question for many outside observers, regarding Jews in Germany during this time, was why they should live there, in the land of their former oppressors.²⁵⁹ Nonetheless, the Jewish population continued to increase.²⁶⁰

C. ANTI-SEMITISM TODAY

A resurgence of German anti-Semitism came at the turn of the century and has grown significantly through right-wing extremism and violence.²⁶¹ Germany, like other EU countries, saw increases in anti-Semitism in the early 2000s, as al-Aqsa Intefada inspired radical Islamists to pursue actions of anti-Jewish violence, serving to enthuse anti-Semitism from the extreme far-Right.²⁶² The anti-Semitism is linked to the Israel-Middle East conflicts where criticism of Israel is, on one side, justifiable to some, and on the other side, is anti-Semitic.²⁶³ Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27, 2021, was commemorated with comments from Wolfgang Schäuble, the president of the Bundestag, who proclaimed that “the past is very much part of the present here.” Schäuble highlighted the anti-Semitic threat that has returned to Germany.²⁶⁴

Nationalism has risen as a key topic in political debates; the far right has now taken ground using nationalistic biases, spreading fear of the Others and is popular among voters

²⁵⁸ Peck, 43.

²⁵⁹ Peck, 5–6.

²⁶⁰ Peck, 5–6.

²⁶¹ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz Merianstraße, “Situation Report on Antisemitism July 2020” (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, July 2020), 20–21, <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/2020/lagebild-antisemitismus.html>.

²⁶² “Anti-Semitism in the EU: Germany,” Jewish Virtual Library, December 2003, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/anti-semitism-in-the-eu-germany>.

²⁶³ Jewish Virtual Library.“

²⁶⁴ Deutsche Welle, “Holocaust Remembrance Day: ‘Anti-Semitism Starts with Conspiracy Theories,’” DW, March 21, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/holocaust-remembrance-day-anti-semitism-starts-with-conspiracy-theories/a-56356697>.

today.²⁶⁵ One such right-wing populist group active in today's Germany is Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The AfD's platform is based on xenophobic sentiments emphasizing nationalism and past German glories.

The party won over voters by emphasizing the Euro sovereign debt crisis and expressing xenophobic sentiments.²⁶⁶ The AfD is a strong performer in state elections and specifically in the former GDR.²⁶⁷ The AfD did well in the 2017 elections.²⁶⁸ It obtained 12.6 percent of the vote in the national parliament and 92 seats in the Bundestag.²⁶⁹ Germany diverged from those democratic virtues and aspirations of post-nationalism and no race hate, particularly toward Jews, by showing support for a blatantly anti-Semitic, nationalistic, and far right political party. Much of the support for the far right and the AfD party comes from states in the former East German side of the country, creating an East West divide in values again among the nation.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁵ "Jewish Community Fears Rise of Anti-Semitic Violence in Germany," October 9, 2020, DW News, video, 7:08, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ERlpegEipZ4>; D. Clark, "Share of Votes for Populist and Nationalist Parties in the European Parliamentary Elections of 2019," Statista, February 19, 2020, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1027735/populist-vote-share-in-eu-elections/>; Jeffrey Gedmin, "Right-Wing Populism in Germany: Muslims and Minorities after the 2015 Refugee Crisis," Brookings, July 24, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/right-wing-populism-in-germany-muslims-and-minorities-after-the-2015-refugee-crisis/>; Jasmin Siri, "The Alternative for Germany after the 2017 Election," *German Politics* 27, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 141–45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2018.1445724>; Kim Bode et al., "The Man Who Divided Germany: Why Sarrazin's Integration Demagoguery Has Many Followers," Spiegel International, June 9, 2010, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-man-who-divided-germany-why-sarrazin-s-integration-demagoguery-has-many-followers-a-715876.html>.

²⁶⁶ Siri, "The Alternative for Germany after the 2017 Election," 141–45.

²⁶⁷ Jeffrey W Arroyo, "AFD's Rise: The Historical Significance and Impact on German Politics" (master's thesis, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 1, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/60373>; "Freedom In the World 2020 Germany," Freedom House, January 11, 2021, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2020>.

²⁶⁸ Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, "What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe's New Nationalism?," April 2019, 409–34.

²⁶⁹ Gedmin, "Right-Wing Populism in Germany."

²⁷⁰ Arroyo, "AFD's Rise: The Historical Significance and Impact on German Politics," 71.

As of March 2021, the AfD held 88 seats in the German Bundestag out of a total 709 seats.²⁷¹ The German government, as authorized under its constitution, placed the AfD under surveillance as of 2021 in taking steps to protect itself and its democracy, the first time such action has been taken in Germany's postwar history.²⁷² Courts have since blocked the surveillance as of March 2021, citing that the party is not a significant national security threat.²⁷³

One of the most significant events bringing to light the modern German anti-Semitic resurgence is a neo-Nazi group in the country called the National Socialist Underground (NSU). From 2000 to 2007, the NSU murdered ten people in several cities across the country.²⁷⁴ The killers shot their victims, the majority of whom were of Turkish descent, in execution style.²⁷⁵ The German authorities attributed these crimes initially to Turkish mafia turf wars, but as the killings continued through the years, they concluded that the neo-Nazi group was responsible, as the same gun, and later bombs, had been used.²⁷⁶ These neo-Nazi murderers, it was revealed, had a history of attending far-right band concerts and playing fantasy Jew killing games while wearing self-tailored SS uniforms.²⁷⁷ The group had three confirmed members but the investigation of the NSU indicated that around 100 may have belonged to the group's support network, with more

²⁷¹ "Parliamentary Groups in the German Bundestag," Deutscher Bundestag, February 20, 2021, <https://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/groups>.

²⁷² Katrin Bennhold, "Germany Places Far-Right AfD Party Under Surveillance for Extremism," *The New York Times*, March 3, 2021, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/world/europe/germany-afd-surveillance-extremism.html>.

²⁷³ Deutsche Welle, "German Court Suspends Surveillance of Far-Right AfD, for Now," DW, May 6, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/german-court-suspends-surveillance-of-far-right-afd-for-now/a-56785125>.

²⁷⁴ Thomas Meaney and Saskia Schäfer, "The Neo-Nazi Murder Trial Revealing Germany's Darkest Secrets," *the Guardian*, December 15, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/15/neo-nazi-murders-revealing-germanys-darkest-secrets>; Kate Connolly, "Neo-Nazi Logo Linked to Map of Murders, Says German MP," *the Guardian*, April 28, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/28/neo-nazi-logo-linked-to-map-of-murders-says-german-mp>.

²⁷⁵ Meaney and Schäfer, "The Neo-Nazi Murder Trial Revealing Germany's Darkest Secrets."

²⁷⁶ Meaney and Schäfer.

²⁷⁷ Meaney and Schäfer.

than 20 of them admitting to supporting the group in the Munich trial.²⁷⁸ The group, with its many supporters confirms an underground culture of neo-Nazis within Germany who believe violence against minorities is their justified method of preserving German blood and soil nationalism.

At the same time, curiously, much of the German population in the early to mid-2000s found being Jewish, as well as being associated with anything Jewish, “trendy.”²⁷⁹ The newly found enthusiasm for Jewish restaurants, cafes, cultural and religious reconstruction, and important historical sites, namely in the former East Berlin area, was part of a Jewish Renaissance. Tours of the area, denoted on maps as “Jewish Berlin,” were popular.²⁸⁰

Yet acts of violence continued throughout the 2000s. In 2002, two Jewish women wearing Jewish symbolic jewelry were attacked in Berlin. A Jewish monument and Jewish graves in Dachau were destroyed. A synagogue attack was attempted in Berlin. Such acts brought anti-Semitism concerns back into the media spotlight.²⁸¹ In 2003, a prominent Jewish man from Berlin expressed the idea that, for Jews living in Germany, “Abnormality is normality.”²⁸² In 2005, a memorial was opened in Berlin, dedicated to the Murdered Jews of Europe.²⁸³ Amid the early years of the new millennium, as Peck explained, Jewish culture in Germany, especially in Berlin, seemed less exotic to many young Germans, yet not quite traditionally “the appropriate object of the ethnographic gaze.”²⁸⁴

In 2009, at the height of a refugee inflow into Europe, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) conducted a study that found overwhelmingly anti-Israeli and anti-

²⁷⁸ Deutsche Welle, “Bundestag: Neo-Nazi NSU ‘Had More than Three Members,’” DW, February 23, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/bundestag-neo-nazi-nsu-had-more-than-three-members/a-19530129>.

²⁷⁹ Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany*, 4.

²⁸⁰ Peck, 4–5.

²⁸¹ Jewish Virtual Library, “Anti-Semitism in the EU: Germany.”

²⁸² Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany*, 4.

²⁸³ Peck, 5.

²⁸⁴ Peck, 5.

Jewish attitudes among migrants from the Arab world.²⁸⁵ The statistic directly correlates with German Jewish community concerns about potential radicalization of a few refugees.²⁸⁶ The far right, latching onto the anti-Semitic tones outwardly expressed by a few immigrants, led to a large German domestic acceptance of anti-Semitism.

To curb this disturbing trend, education pertaining to the Jewish communities in Germany, both inside and outside the country, is a vital part of efforts to decrease anti-Semitism and stereotypes associated with these communities. Rent a Jew is a program created by the Jewish community in 2014 aimed at educating non-Jewish Germans on Jewish culture and history to assist in further cultural understanding.²⁸⁷ The program is composed of Jewish volunteers who talk about their lives and answer questions about their faith to break down stereotypes and prevent anti-Semitism in Germany.²⁸⁸ The effort is hopeful but even with the educational efforts, anti-Semitic violence persists.

Although anti-Semitism is clearly seen in some refugees recently residing in Germany, and programs such as Rent a Jew, are trying to address the educational gap for the German youth, the re-emergence of anti-Semitism cannot be blamed on the immigrants alone, nor are the Jewish efforts enough to fight the systemic problem. Schools in Berlin were found to hold widespread anti-Semitic attitudes in a 2017 investigation conducted by AJC called “Salafism and Anti-Semitism in Berlin Schools.”²⁸⁹ One teacher expressed in an interview during the investigation that there is “a pronounced conflict between the religious ideas of some students on the one hand and the values of a democratic society on

²⁸⁵ “Combating Antisemitism,” American Jewish Committee, September 16, 2017, <https://www.ajc.org/berlin/combating-antisemitism>.

²⁸⁶ Deidre Berger, “Refugees and Antisemitism,” AJC Global Voice, August 2, 2016, <https://www.ajc.org/news/refugees-and-antisemitism>.

²⁸⁷ “Debunking Jewish Stereotypes in Germany,” The Jewish Agency For Israel, February 24, 2021, <https://www.jewishagency.org/rent-a-jew-debunking-jewish-stereotypes-in-germany/>.

²⁸⁸ The Jewish Agency, “Debunking Jewish Stereotypes in Germany.”

²⁸⁹ Global Jewish Advocacy, “Combating Antisemitism.”

the other.”²⁹⁰ The report explained that anti-Semitic attitudes “are so widespread that many Jewish students are leaving public schools due to bullying from peers. The phrase ‘You Jew’ is a common insult among students.”²⁹¹

In 2016, the murderous far-right lone survivor of the NSU stood trial for the racist neo-Nazi killings.²⁹² The court case brought to light the systemic issues Germany is facing with the rise of the far right.²⁹³ The findings of the trial suggested that Germany, a nation priding itself on its ability to confront its dark past with unique diligence, nevertheless has a thriving underground right-wing extremist culture.²⁹⁴

In 2018, a group of 12 neo-Nazis committed a significant anti-Semitic attack in the eastern German town of Chemnitz.²⁹⁵ The group graffitied a Jewish storefront with swastikas, smashed the store sign, and left a pig’s head with the star of David marked on its forehead.²⁹⁶ The attackers shouted, “Get out of Germany, you Jewish pig,” according to the 2018 U.S. Human Rights Report on Germany.²⁹⁷ The incident was one of more than 1600 anti-Semitic crimes committed in Germany in 2018.²⁹⁸ The number of attacks increased by 20 percent from 2017, when Germany saw 1,420 anti-Semitic crimes.²⁹⁹ Violent incidents increased by two-thirds from 2017 to 2018, worrying Felix Klein,

²⁹⁰ “AJC Study Reveals Danger of Salafism in Berlin Schools,” American Jewish Committee, September 23, 2017, <https://www.ajc.org/news/ajc-study-reveals-danger-of-salafism-in-berlin-schools>.

²⁹¹ AJC, “AJC Study Reveals Danger of Salafism in Berlin Schools.”

²⁹² Meaney and Schäfer, “The Neo-Nazi Murder Trial Revealing Germany’s Darkest Secrets.”

²⁹³ Meaney and Schäfer.

²⁹⁴ Meaney and Schäfer.

²⁹⁵ “Germany 2018 Human Rights Report,” Country Report (US Department of State, 2018), 24–25, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>; DW News, “Anti-Semitism on the Rise in Germany.”

²⁹⁶ US Department of State, “Germany 2018 Human Rights Report,” 24–25.

²⁹⁷ US Department of State, 24–25.

²⁹⁸ DW News, *Anti-Semitism on the Rise in Germany*.

²⁹⁹ US Department of State, “Germany 2018 Human Rights Report,” 23.

German Anti-Semitism Commissioner.³⁰⁰ Klein was appointed by the German government to head the commission after the drastic spike in anti-Semitic violence, mostly attributed to the Far Right, from 2017 to 2018.³⁰¹ He stated in a Deutsche Welle interview that the spike was not surprising, and that the attacks should give Germans the impetus to “take preventative action soon.”³⁰² He attributed the recurrence of anti-Semitism to the AfD party and not to Muslim immigrants, whom many Far Right supporters accused as the true perpetrators of the anti-Semitic violence.³⁰³ He also recognized that anti-Semitism was a growing concern across Europe, and he advocated for making anti-Semitism initiatives a priority for the EU.³⁰⁴

In October of 2019, a far right extremist attempted to attack a synagogue on Yom Kippur, in Halle, Germany, killing two bystanders with explosives meant for the Jewish holy site.³⁰⁵ The attack was widely believed to be a result of growing anti-Semitism within Germany.³⁰⁶ Earlier in 2019, the German Jewish Council had already identified that anti-Semitism was on the rise and warnings from the federal commissioner against anti-Semitism urged Jews to avoid wearing their Kippahs in public for fear of further attacks or harassment.³⁰⁷ The Halle attack was the most serious anti-Semitic attack in post-reunification Germany and served as further evidence that the trend of anti-Semitism was

³⁰⁰ DW News, *Anti-Semitism on the Rise in Germany*.

³⁰¹ “Antisemitism on the Rise in Germany,” 2020, Margaret Evans video, 6:52, <https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1689460803888>.

³⁰² DW News, *Anti-Semitism on the Rise in Germany*.

³⁰³ Evans, “Antisemitism on the Rise in Germany.”

³⁰⁴ DW News, *Anti-Semitism on the Rise in Germany*.

³⁰⁵ Freedom House, “Freedom In the World 2020 Germany.”

³⁰⁶ Freedom House.

³⁰⁷ Freedom House.

rapidly growing within the country.³⁰⁸ The German foreign minister described anti-Semitism as the largest threat to the country.³⁰⁹

Marina Weisband, a Green Party member, criticized police forces in Germany for not doing enough to support and protect the Jewish community. A Jewish community member herself, she argued that the government projected the belief that there was no racism in the police.³¹⁰ According to Weisband, a Minister President of Saxony, when questioned on the matter of providing more protection to German Jews, expressed that more police protection was not possible as the police were not able to respond to other citizen needs if the police must protect the Jews.³¹¹

D. CONCLUSION

In closing, Germany continues to struggle to come to terms with its violent history even as today, its ethnically biased society engages in an increasingly violent nationalistic discourse. As far-right attitudes gain legitimacy through political parties such as AfD, as traditionally democratic values are called into question, and as anti-Semitism and other ethnic biases become commonly accepted, it becomes clear that not only German but European security and security institutions are under threat, as is the overall project of spreading democracy within the region.³¹²

Germany, as a prominent and leading member of NATO and the EU, aspires to maintain the shared values of both organizations: a post-national Europe with a focus on equality and preservation of sovereignty. However, populist, and ethno-nationalist frameworks strain this goal, and anti-Semitism, among other forms of discrimination, significantly hinder combined efforts on foreign policy.³¹³

³⁰⁸ DW News, *Jewish Community Fears Rise of Anti-Semitic Violence in Germany*.

³⁰⁹ DW News.

³¹⁰ DW News.

³¹¹ DW News.

³¹² The Wiener Holocaust Library, "Nationalism and the First World War."

³¹³ Jenne, "Populism, Nationalism and Revisionist Foreign Policy," March 8, 2021, Abstract.

NATO and the EU were founded on shared values of democratic multi-nationalism and liberalism that made it clear anti-Semitism would not be tolerated. The rise of anti-Semitism in Germany in recent years poses a significant threat to the promises Germany herself helped forge in the aftermath of a catastrophic war borne of hatred of the Other. The younger generation's embrace of German nationalism and anti-Semitism does not bode well for the future of the two supranational organizations and the mission and values that they represent.

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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC REGIONAL CONSOLIDATION

Poland and Germany are both similar and different in regard to the re-emergence of anti-Semitism within their countries, and these similarities and differences demonstrate a wider trend of undemocratic behavior across Europe. One of the issues is bilateral; Poland and Germany have a very close yet rocky relationship. Germany, starting in the mid-1990s, was one of the most influential advocates for Poland's accession into the EU, as well as approving eastward enlargement all together.³¹⁴ The two countries' relationship today has weakened, negatively affecting the European project of integration. Poland and Germany have taken different paths in their respective responses to European policies. Poland's government is looking for a more nationalistic way forward, while the German government is trying to hold together the European unity.³¹⁵

Poland is an enlargement member of both NATO and the EU, and as such, Poland differs from Germany significantly in the impact its democratic decline threatens to bring upon the supranational institutions. Poland was not forced into the agreements as was Germany and having model members of democracy assisting Poland in its quest to become a newer model democracy, Poland should be better at upholding the values. In other words, they learned from the rough drafts and proved to be a final product of what an ideal type of democracy could look like, and now with the PiS party in power, they have lost the sustainment of those values.

Germany is an early member of both organizations, and if Germans allow their nation to spiral toward anti-democratic trends through anti-Semitism and other biases, NATO or the EU would likely be unable to withstand the country's withdrawal. The ties between Germany and the other nations within both organizations form the stability in Europe.

³¹⁴ Piotr Buras and Josef Janning, "Divided at the Centre: Germany, Poland, and the Troubles of the Trump Era," 2018, 3.

³¹⁵ Buras and Janning, 4.

The peace would not be guaranteed as it is today, and democracies would be left vulnerable to anti-democratic movements both internally and externally upon a collapse of the supranational structure. There is currently a mistrust between Poland and Germany that is worsening as their ideological values continue to drift apart, which prevents the EU and NATO from formulating common challenge responses.³¹⁶ Anti-Semitic tendencies manifest in different ways in these two case study countries, but both Poland and Germany have the same underlying issue—trends toward anti-democratic racial and ethnic biases—which are cause for concern in all states across Europe.

The attacks in Würzburg and Ansbach in 2016 made the widespread and increasing anti-Semitism concerns more visible in the mainstream European scene, with more voices calling for recognition across Europe of this serious problem.³¹⁷ In both Würzburg and Ansbach, the attacks one with an axe and the other through bombing, were described as lone-wolf attacks linked to the Islamic State and exacerbated heightened security fears across Europe, causing the fear of the Other to spike.³¹⁸

Democratic vulnerabilities stemming from a lack of basic human rights, where varying degrees of anti-Semitism are the catalyst for more violent forms of ethnic, religious, and ultimately anti-democratic acts among societies and governments in Europe, are clearly demonstrated and degrade the supranational institutions to which they belong. Specifically, the similarities and differences seen in the case studies of Poland and Germany, and the overall impact their cases of anti-Semitism are likely to play in the future of the supranational organizations, indicate a lack of willingness for these European states to uphold the fundamental values of their democracies.

On one hand, Poland is undermining democratic values by committing human rights violations within its own borders with little to no regard for the reactions of its fellow NATO and EU member states. On the other hand, Germany is grounded in the need to hold

³¹⁶ Buras and Janning, 21.

³¹⁷ Berger, “Refugees and Antisemitism.”

³¹⁸ Eugene Quinn, “The Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Europe’s Challenge,” *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 105, no. 419 (2016): 275.

Europe together to ensure stability and security for the continent but has an underground of anti-Semitic and dissatisfied youth who see nationalism as their way forward. Despite these differences in overarching democratic value divergence, both countries have the same underlying problems, not dissimilar to their other NATO and EU member states. The problem is nationalism and populism among their societies, which display strong anti-Semitism and show no rejections of hatreds and biases against minorities. In 2004, Rockwell Schnabel, American ambassador to the EU, claimed, amid the turmoil occurring during this time, that anti-Semitism throughout Europe was nearing the point it was in the 1930s.³¹⁹ Discriminations, still seen today, are forms of human rights violations that run directly contrary to the democratic values which all NATO and EU states pledged to uphold.

A. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE POLISH CASE

How far can Poland stray from the shared values of the collective without breaking ties with both organizations and at least rupturing its own relations with them? If Poland separates from the EU, the separation would have less of an impact on the EU's continued existence, but Poland would lose much in terms of financial and trade-related advantages. If Poland were to exit NATO, the alliance would lose an advantaged footprint as a close steppingstone to Russia. Poland would be openly exposed to its largest threat—Russia—who would surely take advantage of the vulnerable lone state. Poland benefits from NATO membership in three main ways: increased security and prestige of the Polish nation; the transformation of the Polish armed forces in technological modernization and professionalization, among other advantages; and infrastructure investments.³²⁰

Another concern is seen in changes made by Poland's PiS with regard to media censorship and intimidation similar to the communist-era fear influencing committed under

³¹⁹ Allan Brownfeld, "European Anti-Semitism Is Described as Both a 'Genuine' and 'Illusory' Problem," February 2005, http://www.acjna.org/acjna/articles_detail.aspx?id=349.

³²⁰ "Poland in NATO - More than 20 Years," Ministry of National Defence, accessed April 4, 2021, <https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/poland-in-nato-20-years>.

the Soviets.³²¹ The ruling party has taken control of 40 out of 42 media outlets in Poland as of 2020.³²² The anti-Semitism seen in the ruling government is a large part of this turn to authoritarianism. Adam Michnik expresses a fear of Poland's media censorship as an all-out assault on the fundamental values of the EU, as he goes on to say, "Poland, together with a number of other countries in Europe, is witnessing a creeping authoritarian coup. The rule of law is being transformed into the rule of coterie of a single party."³²³ Anti-Semitism that effects the government's behaviors can be seen in the current media restrictions fully supported by the PiS as they open a war on civil society and Polish democracy.³²⁴ The violation and the EU's recognition of the issue is a clear indication that further tensions will have larger implications for Poland and in turn threaten the overall stability of the EU. Poland's democratic decline is clearly seen through its disregard for the shared Western European values. Figure 2 provides a depiction of Poland's decline after its successful democratic progression following the Cold War, now turning in this downward trend. The decline in democratic values and in turn, the increase of authoritarian rule within Poland started after the PiS's election win in 2015 and has continually declined each year following.


³²¹ Rob Schmitz, "Poland's Government Tightens Its Control Over Media," January 4, 2021, in *All Things Considered*, produced by NPR, 4:00 <https://www.npr.org/2021/01/04/951063118/polands-government-tightens-its-control-over-media>.

³²² Schmitz.

³²³ Adam Michnik, "The Attack on Media Freedom in Poland Clears Way For an All-Out Assault on Fundamental EU Values," *Wyborcza*, March 8, 2021, <https://wyborcza.pl/7,173236,26863100,the-attack-on-media-freedom-in-poland-clears-the-way-for-an.html?disableRedirects=true>.

³²⁴ Michnik.

POLAND'S TEN-YEAR DECLINE



Poland significantly declined starting after 2015, when the PiS took power.


Figure 2. Poland's Democratic Decline³²⁵

Polish democratic decline relative to other states in other Europe can be seen in Figure 3, where other well-known declining democracies see Poland following suit.

³²⁵ Zselyke Csaky, "Dropping the Democratic Facade," Freedom House, accessed January 10, 2021, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade>.

Leading the Democratic Decline

The breakdown of the democratic consensus has been most visible in Central Europe and the Balkans, which experienced the greatest gains after the end of the Cold War.



Freedom House

This infographic is from the Nations in Transit 2020 report by freedomhouse.org

From 2010 to 2020, Poland declined more sharply than other countries in terms of democratic consensus.

Figure 3. Democratic Decline Across Nations³²⁶

As described by the Polish national defense government webpage, “For almost 70 years, NATO has been the most important pillar of European security by providing a necessary link between Europe and North America in the political and defence sphere.”³²⁷ Poland, being part of NATO for 21 years, has contributed to dozens of joint operations and has played vital roles in securing the Western European continent from threats like the Russian Federation and Islamic terrorists in the Middle East.³²⁸ Poland has boasted that it can and does provide the monetary requirements over most other NATO countries and is doing its part to contribute with hopes that in return, its fellow member states will back the country if ever they need the support.³²⁹ Poland fears Russia as its largest national threat;

³²⁶ Csaky.

³²⁷ Ministry of National Defence, “Poland in NATO - More than 20 Years.”

³²⁸ Ministry of National Defence.

³²⁹ Lidia Kelly, Justyna Pawlak, and Anna Wlodarczak-Semczuk, “Special Report: Why Poland Fell out of Step with Europe,” *Reuters*, October 18, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-nationalism-special-report-idUSKCN1MS1M3>; Ministry of National Defence, “Poland in NATO - More than 20 Years.”

this has been a longstanding fear and rightfully so, given Poland's past contentious relationship with their large neighbor.³³⁰

Fears aside, Poland demanded acceptance into NATO in the aftermath of the Soviet Union collapse and made clear its goals for the newly sovereign nation. The Prime Minister of Poland, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, explained in 1996 that "Poland is determined to contribute to collective efforts to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples, founded on individual liberty and the rule of law."³³¹ The initial stance was supported, according to Cimoszewicz, by 80 percent of the Polish population, and he added that Poland should contribute significantly to the security produced by NATO, not be a mere consumer.³³²

The 1997 NATO Review expressed that "In joining NATO they [states aspiring for NATO membership] will join an Alliance not only firmly committed to cooperative relations, but also open to other democracies able and willing to pursue the common cause of security and stability in Europe."³³³ It was very clear to Poland in its attempts to join NATO what the expectations of the deal would be. The U.S. Senate Executive Report from the 105th Congress stated, "The government [Poland] has been a strong supporter of human rights and civil liberties. The judiciary is independent, and freedom of the press is upheld."³³⁴

The initial push for democratic values has turned in recent years. There is a clear disconnect with the new generation of Poles and their outlook on what it means to be a NATO member state. Poland has initiated a divide in the EU, because they feel that the

³³⁰ Kelly, Pawlak, and Włodarczyk-Semczuk, "Special Report"; Zięba, "Open Door," 197.

³³¹ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, "Building Poland's Security: Membership of NATO a Key Objective," *NATO Review* 44, no. 3 (1996): 3–7.

³³² Cimoszewicz.

³³³ Gebhardt von Moltke, "Accession of New Member to the Alliance: What Are the next Steps?," *NATO Review* 45, no. 4 (1997): 4–9.

³³⁴ "Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic," Senate Executive Report (US Government, March 6, 1988), 8–17, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-105erpt14/html/CRPT-105erpt14.htm>.

U.S. will support them in a potential conflict over any of their European allies.³³⁵ The Polish view that European NATO members are unwilling to support them on military footing, coupled with Poland's disregard for the union's shared democratic values, has left both NATO and the EU in a state of internal contention.³³⁶ There will be no stability in Europe without upholding the shared values of the European democracies.

As explained in a 2000 Harvard study, Poland is on the outer NATO fringe of the historically unstable border with the East, and with the re-emergence of great power competition, Poland is a key strategic player in contributing to the NATO alliance in future contention between Russia.³³⁷ It is in NATO's and Poland's best interest to continue the alliance.

Poland joined the EU in 2002 after negotiations took place between Polish Prime Minister Miller and EU representatives, ending in its successful acceptance.³³⁸ If Poland turns to an authoritarian rule and breaks away from the EU, the country may find it difficult to sustain the relationships held in NATO as well. The scenario where Poland separates from the NATO alliance is possible, but given its greater fear of Russia, the likelihood of Poland willingly leaving NATO is far from realistic, as approximately 70 percent of Poles view their membership in NATO as directly improving Poland's security.³³⁹ The xenophobic and antisemitic views that are a large source of contention between Poland and other members of NATO and the EU will be a more likely cause for concern. Should Poland ever need article 5 collective defense from allies, such support would likely be impacted by the states' opinions on Poland's aggressive authoritarian style under the PiS since 2015.

³³⁵ Deutsche Welle, "Poland: More Aligned to U.S. than to European Partners?," DW, August 30, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-more-aligned-to-us-than-to-european-partners/a-50232484>.

³³⁶ Cordelia Ponczek, "What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?," CEPA, February 4, 2021, <https://cepa.org/what-can-we-do-about-poland-and-hungary/>; Welle, "Poland."

³³⁷ Eisold, "NATO Enlargement," 36.

³³⁸ Ray Taras, "Poland's Accession Into the European Union: Parties, Policies and Paradoxes," *The Polish Review* 48, no. 1 (2003): 3.

³³⁹ Ministry of National Defence, "Poland in NATO - More than 20 Years."

Since the PiS took office in November of 2015 with an overwhelming majority, the party and the EU have been at odds over issues concerning Poland's Rule of Law.³⁴⁰ Changes were made by the Polish parliament to the Constitutional Tribunal in December of 2015, and by January, the European Commission had already launched formal dialogue regarding their concerns with the Polish government.³⁴¹ The Rule of Law issue in Poland, according to the European Commission, is that it puts the independence of the Polish judiciary and separation of powers at serious risk.³⁴² Maintaining pluralism and non-discrimination, tolerance and justice in the country are all critical democratic values to which the EU member states are required to uphold.³⁴³ Poland's government's reluctance to become more pluralistic in its religious and ethnic spheres has increased the narrow-minded views; and its reluctance to take advice from fellow EU members, the Council, the Parliament, and non-governmental organizations, has not made it popular within the union.³⁴⁴ Officials from the EU identify parties such as Poland's PiS as creating a false distinction between a sense of European community and of patriotism.³⁴⁵ In a speech given in September of 2018, Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission President, described unchecked nationalism as riddled with poison and deceit.³⁴⁶

In some views, it can be argued that Poland's government is moving to become more inclusive of the Jewish faith. A prime example of the state's acceptance and support for the Jews is the Warsaw Hanukkah lighting ceremony, which has continued since the mid-2000s.³⁴⁷ The lighting event is highly publicized, and members of the Jewish

³⁴⁰ Moriarty and O'Keeffe, "Maintaining the Rule of Law in Poland: What next for the Article 7 Proceedings?," 2.

³⁴¹ Moriarty and O'Keeffe, 2.

³⁴² Moriarty and O'Keeffe, 2.

³⁴³ Moriarty and O'Keeffe, 1.

³⁴⁴ Moriarty and O'Keeffe, 3.

³⁴⁵ Kelly, Pawlak, and Wlodarczak-Semczuk, "Special Report."

³⁴⁶ Kelly, Pawlak, and Wlodarczak-Semczuk.

³⁴⁷ Zubrzycki, "Nationalism, 'Philosemitism,' and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland," 81–83.

leadership from across the country, as well as city and state officials, participate.³⁴⁸ Because the Jewish vote is inconsequential in the grand scheme of Polish politics, political participation in hopes of gaining Jewish votes cannot be said to be a motivating factor. Rather than promoting domestic unity, government officials seem more interested in attracting the attention of an international audience for the purpose of rebranding Poland abroad.³⁴⁹ Poland has been acutely aware that its image needs to be improved when it comes to diluting the dominance of Catholicism in the country.³⁵⁰ The visible marker is a perfect mechanism to make ideological differences materialize and undermine critical claims of Catholic uniformity.³⁵¹ Items such as concerns over the rule of law in Poland and recent lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) exclusion zones, reminiscent of anti-Semitic exclusionary measures seen in Nazi Germany, leave more questions than answers on what the future for Poland will look like if the decline in democratic values continues.³⁵²

Poland has seemingly lost the desire to mask the anti-democratic nationalism and anti-Semitism in its government. The clear use of anti-Semitic rhetoric by the ruling party, the exclusion zones for LGBT Poles, the Islamophobia without a significant Muslim population, the dismissal of rule of law issues among the Polish Judiciary, and the censorship of the Polish media all indicate Poland's disregard for democratic values.

It is in Poland's best interest to reevaluate its status as a democratic society and make appropriate changes to retain the values it has sworn to protect. The need to strengthen ties with its allies is vital in maintaining peace within the region, and without a swift change to upholding these values, Poland will face alienation from allies and be left behind in the progressive open democracies of the world. By progressing from the ethnic

³⁴⁸ Zubrzycki, 81–83.

³⁴⁹ Zubrzycki, 81–83.

³⁵⁰ Zubrzycki, 81–83.

³⁵¹ Zubrzycki, 81–83.

³⁵² Kelly, Pawlak, and Włodarczak-Semczuk, “Special Report”; Ponczek, “What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?”

and religious homogeneity to an open and pluralistic society, governed in a manner to retain such values, it can once again become the example it was for aspiring democracies to emulate. Anti-Semitism is a central factor in mainstream Polish politics and society, and as the country becomes increasingly accepting of far-Right governance, which promotes manifestations of anti-Semitic origin, ethnic and religious discrimination will no doubt continue.

B. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE GERMAN CASE

Germany is shaped by its Nazi past in all aspects of its current national consciousness.³⁵³ Its pre-WWII military aggression and the Holocaust cast long shadows on the issues of today, and German demilitarization with a renunciation of war are key components in how postwar Germany established its democracy.³⁵⁴ These founding principles in the reestablishment of today's Germany after reunification make it a seemingly sound and strong democratic state to emulate, but recent events have shown that threats of anti-democratic hatred have re-emerged in the form of younger German generations identifying with nationalism instead of the collective European framework. The very framework that has elevated Germany to the high standing it enjoys is being undermined by populist, anti-Semitic, and anti-democratic youth who contradict all that Germany has preserved and promoted for over 75 years.

Germany was one of the six founding members of the steel and coal community that would eventually form the basis of the EU.³⁵⁵ The international group held commitments to uphold security through democratic union with European neighbors and unite European nations politically and economically to secure a lasting peace. The union, which then established the EU, between the Western nations of Europe, was vital for the German post-war recovery. Germany was an early member of NATO, and Germans used

³⁵³ Thomas U. Berger, "The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy," *German Politics* 6, no. 1 (April 1997): 40, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644009708404463>.

³⁵⁴ Berger, 40.

³⁵⁵ European Union, "The History of the European Union."

the alliance to build back their legitimacy through mechanisms that anchored the German military institutions in the supranational framework of NATO and the EU.³⁵⁶

If Germany removes itself from either of the two supranational organizations, it is unlikely that the system will survive. When the Federal Republic of Germany stood up and said no to hate, inequality, and helped to establish the rule-of-law requirements for the supranational system, as the successor of the Third Reich, its first significant action was to reestablish relations with Israel.³⁵⁷ As Thomas Berger explained, “After having initiated and lost two world wars which killed as many as 60 million people and ended in national partition and global opprobrium, German leaders feel constrained to demonstrate to domestic and foreign audiences that they have drawn the appropriate lessons from history.”³⁵⁸ But in recent times, these lessons seem to have slipped away from the younger German generations.

With Germany’s AfD party rising in popularity, political dialogue poses questions about Germany’s future in the Schengen Agreement, EU Monetary Union, and the EU Common Foreign and Security Political goals.³⁵⁹ Nationalistic parties such as the AfD see Jews as cosmopolitan, working their way into societies to which they do not belong.³⁶⁰ The notion of nationalism in countries joined together in the EU is difficult to comprehend considering the extent to which countries are now so interconnected on the economic, political, and social levels; dissolving the supranational states into national sovereignties would only lead to weaker and more fragile states. States feeling vulnerable to outside threats might well resort to war to assert their strength. German nationalism is especially difficult to comprehend, as popular opinion reflects an anti-war mindset; the notion of civic

³⁵⁶ Berger, “The Past in the Present,” 40.

³⁵⁷ Guy Katz, *Intercultural Negotiation: The Unique Case of Germany and Israel* (McFarland, WI: Books on Demand, 2011), 5,13-16, 77, 114, and 152.

³⁵⁸ Berger, “The Past in the Present,” 40.

³⁵⁹ Arroyo, “AFD’s Rise: The Historical Significance and Impact on German Politics,” 92.

³⁶⁰ Ralf Havertz, *Radical Right Populism in Germany: AfD, Pegida, and the Identitarian Movement* (Oxfordshire, England: Routledge, 2021), 107.

nationalism, excluding Jews, and a more independent Germany seems counterproductive and irrational.³⁶¹

A generational shift in values is the issue most pressing in today's Germany. The older generation, the so called 68ers and what are left of the 45ers have a broken relationship with Germany where Germanness is seen as distasteful and the need to forgive and forget in a sense was their way forward.³⁶² Now the younger generation, who have not experienced the crimes of the Holocaust or have no direct links to the wartime tragedies, cannot understand the broken relationship of their parents and grandparents.³⁶³ The broken relationship causes confusion and also anger among them, where expressions of national pride belonging, and identity have been forbidden by their parents and the lack of understanding causes great strife between the young and the old.³⁶⁴ The idea of Germanness as racial rather than civic to many of the youth, while the previous generation pressed to integrate the civic definition into German thinking and mindset.³⁶⁵ The younger generation, according to Miller-Idriss, "no longer feels the pressure to force this national accountability onto the public agenda because for the younger generation, it's totally clear that it's different."³⁶⁶ At what point will Germany's youth-led nationalism conflict with the EU such that Germany can no longer abide by the value system it created? So many years after WWII and the vows of the "never again" generation, as those with experiences or memories of the Holocaust are aging and passing away, how can the youthful fever of anti-Semitic nationalism in a new Germany be broken? These are the questions for which scholars have no answer. Germany will either embrace the reality that nationalism is truly dead, an idea of past times which should never be revived, or it will press on in hopes of

³⁶¹ Hans Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power," *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (August 2011): 39, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2011.587950>.

³⁶² Cynthia Miller-Idriss, *Blood and Culture: Youth, Right-Wing Extremism, and National Belonging in Contemporary Germany* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 16.

³⁶³ Miller-Idriss, 93, and 143.

³⁶⁴ Miller-Idriss, 143.

³⁶⁵ Miller-Idriss, 45 and 78.

³⁶⁶ Miller-Idriss, 143.

regaining its national roots while subsequently destroying the nearly 77 years of peace seen in Europe since the end of WWII.

Anti-Semitism among NATO member states as well as in aspiring members is perhaps the most urgent danger to the project of democracy in Europe because its trend of increasing acceptance is a direct threat to human rights. The acceptance of anti-Semitism, leading to human rights violations, inherently undermines the premise of a democratic state and the democratic values of a supranational institution. The nearly 77 years of peace in Europe since WWII has at times been tenuous; internal strife between member states has arisen, and tensions among the members related to external threats are also threats to the organizational core values within the member states themselves. The brand of Other in populist and nationalistic movements across Europe has proven that anti-Semitism, among other forms of racism, has re-emerged as a critical point of contention which has the potential to disrupt the shared value systems of these organizations.

The majority of Germany's population is certainly not anti-Semitic, but a majority who allows an anti-Semitic and anti-democratic minority to impose their will is all that is required for another catastrophe to occur in Europe. The promises Germany made following WWII are becoming undermined by the new generations of Germans pressing for their version of nationalism with its resurrection of anti-Semitism, and the potential that the silent majority will unwittingly enable the minority to end the promises the country made to NATO and the EU is real. The majority, or the approximately 80 percent who do not shut down the 20 percent, must speak up if this problem is to end.

In conclusion, anti-Semitism is a subtle, ancient, and many times overlooked racial and religious hatred in Europe. It may be thought of as the canary in the coal mine, an indicator of looming disaster. As the case studies of Poland and Germany indicate, anti-Semitism is a rising trend not only in these two countries but across Europe. Regardless of the amount of effort and emphasis governments place on upholding democratic values, anti-Semitism is a hatred that takes hold again and again. As long as there are those who accept and embrace hatreds and biases, who can publicly accept anti-Semitism after a catastrophic Jewish genocide, then they will likely be willing to adopt further prejudices

such as Islamophobia, xenophobia, anti-LGBT, anti-feminism, and others. In other words, another disaster may be looming.

One recommendation presented in the literature is that pressure should be placed on Poland to advocate for minority rights and to support regional civil society.³⁶⁷ The recommendation is that the United States, NATO, and the EU should establish democratic expectations for Poland, with accountability governance through the rule of law and the established democratic norms, in order to maintain European stability and continued partnerships.³⁶⁸ This study gives an endorsement of the prescribed recommendation but would include among these expectations and measures not just the rule of law issues, but the human rights violations stemming from anti-Semitism and other biases.

A recommendation for how the United States, NATO, and the EU should face the issues seen in Germany will be more challenging to formulate. Germany needs its fellow EU members to remain in good democratic standing to hold together the union that is so vital to the German economy, non-military interventionist attitudes, and its current way of life. Germany must continue, alongside the United States and fellow member states, to advocate for democratic values and call for all citizens within the EU, regardless of nationality, to rebuke anti-Semitism and all manifestations of hate and bias that undermine the unified democratic values and bolster the need for a unified Europe to ensure security and stability in the region.

With Europe's vow to "Never Again" allow fascism, anti-Semitism, and discrimination on the continent, far right ideologies, most notably fascist rhetoric undercut the nearly 80 years of efforts to fight against such oppressive and hateful convictions.³⁶⁹ The need for monitoring stations and Respect Diversity programs after the clear atrocities conducted in WWII, condemned by NATO and the EU, identify a clear re-emergence of anti-Semitism, and with it, fascist ideologies to which pose dangers for not just Jews but

³⁶⁷ Ponczek, "What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?"

³⁶⁸ Ponczek.

³⁶⁹ "'NEVER AGAIN' Association."

all minority populations and the foundation of the pillars of security and stability in Europe.³⁷⁰

³⁷⁰ “‘NEVER AGAIN’ Association.”

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