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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**WHY HAS MONGOLIA CHOSEN TO PARTICIPATE IN
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS? AN ANALYSIS OF
CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES**

by

Ariunbold Dashjivaa

June 2012

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**WHY HAS MONGOLIA CHOSEN TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS? AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE
OPPORTUNITIES**

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Lieutenant Colonel, Mongolian Armed Forces
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Since 2002, Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations has dramatically increased and broadened the country's bilateral and multilateral military engagement throughout the world. By participating in UN peacekeeping and other peace-support operations, Mongolia and its military have gained tremendous experience, learned valuable lessons, and identified challenges in several critical areas that needed improvement. This thesis argues that Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations is based on its national interest of survival between two great powers. Additionally, that commitment to peace-support operations strengthens Mongolia's position in the world arena and increases its prestige, gaining it international recognition from other countries, international organizations, and international security institutions.

Moreover, active involvement in peace-support operations creates favorable conditions for an independent foreign and defense policy and accelerates military modernization. Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations influenced the acceleration towards modernization and transformation of its military; helping to identify the vulnerabilities in old military planning, training, equipment, and acquisition processes that desperately required changes. The existing literature on Mongolia's participation in international peace-support operations is very limited. Therefore, this study will contribute a deeper and more detailed analysis and assessment of Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations for scholars.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BELUX	Belgium – Luxemburg
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSS	Combat Service Support
DoD	Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GSMAF	General Staff of Mongolian Armed Forces
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IMET	International Military Education Training
ISAF	International Security Force in Afghanistan
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAF	Mongolian Armed Forces
MDR	Mongolian Defense Reform
MINURSO	Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental (United Nations Mission in Western Sahara)
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo)
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
OEF	Operations Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operations Iraqi Freedom
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
RMA	Revolutionary Military Affairs
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSO	Peace Support Operations
UN	The United Nations
UNAMID	African Union-UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIMIG	United Nations Mission in Georgia
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USA	United States of America
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE MAJOR ISSUE TO BE STUDIED

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist bloc had a great impact on the international system, as a multipolar world replaced the formerly bipolar world. At the same time, the security environment has changed, as new non-traditional threats have increasingly threatened international peace and security, and the complexity of conflict has required more commitment from member states. The dynamics of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have changed as the size, number, and costs of operations have increased. These changes in the security environment have affected Mongolia's foreign and defense policies, and there has been a great impact on the Mongolian defense sector and its armed forces.

This thesis will argue that Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations is based on its national interest of survival between great powers. That commitment strengthens Mongolia's position in the world arena and increases its prestige, gaining it international recognition from great powers, international organizations, and international security institutions. Moreover, active involvement in peace-support operations creates favorable conditions for independent foreign and defense policies and accelerates military modernization. This thesis argues that the motivation behind Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations is based on its national security policies and military reform needs, not its economic needs.

The government of Mongolia has been adjusting its foreign and defense policy structures to meet the new security challenges of the contemporary world. To strengthen bilateral and multilateral military cooperation and secure its military relations with neighboring countries, Mongolian defense policy is developing the military into a professionally oriented force and participating in UN peacekeeping and other international peace-support operations. Since 2002, Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations has dramatically increased, and Mongolia has broadened its bilateral and multilateral military engagement throughout the world.

Mongolia is continually contributing military personnel and gradually increasing its participation in international peace-support operations. These have gained Mongolia considerable support at both the political and the popular levels,¹ in participating in UN peacekeeping and other peace-support operations, Mongolia and its military have gained tremendous experience, learned valuable lessons, and identified challenges in several critical areas that need improvement. This thesis examines the past ten years of Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations.

This thesis seeks to answer two main questions: why has Mongolia chosen to participate in international peace-support operations, and what are the current trends. To answer these questions, the following sub-questions need to be answered: 1) What are the primary motivations behind Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations? 2) What is the impact on Mongolian military institutional reform and modernization? 3) What is the future vision as to how will improve Mongolia's existing peace-support operations capability?

B. IMPORTANCE

This thesis has theoretical and empirical importance. Theoretically, this thesis helps us understand the security challenges of one small state's policy and suggests viable security options for small states in general. For a small country like Mongolia, sandwiched between two giants, security remains a major concern. The findings of this study should enhance our understanding of the motivations behind small states' commitment to peace-support operations. Furthermore, this thesis will identify a possible way to improve existing peace-support operations capabilities. In addition, it offers valuable information about an underdeveloped country working with other international partners in order to improve its peace-support operations capability.

Like Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Romania, Mongolia is one of the countries successfully transforming its old communist social and political structure to democracy. At the same time, Mongolia is successfully transforming its defense sector,

¹ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia's Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, March 2007), 3.

especially its military, through participation in peace-support operations. Mongolia offers an important case study for several reasons. It is transitioning to democracy; its commitment to international peace-support operations has achieved a significant success in quite a short time despite serious challenges; and peace-support operations have created favorable conditions for Mongolia's security environment. Thus Mongolia's commitment offers us lessons in both successes and challenges.

The existing literature on Mongolia's participation in international peace-support operations is very limited. This study will contribute a deeper and more detailed analysis and assessment of Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations for scholars and readers.

The empirical importance of this thesis is to analyze and define the current Mongolian foreign and defense policy for participation in international peace-support operations, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the armed forces' peace-support operations capability, and suggest how that policy might be modified or altered for evolving UN requirements. Furthermore, this study will help predict the future of Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations, assess the possibility of modifying its strategic view and plans, and identify potential solutions for future involvement and capability development.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

To analyze Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations, this thesis will examine the following hypotheses.

First, balance-of-power theory may explain small countries' policies related to participation in peace-support operations, particularly Mongolia's policy, of protecting its national security and sovereignty from immediate neighbors. Small states mostly pursue bandwagoning or a balanced relationship with neighbors, seeking strong allies and exercising multi-pillar foreign policy in order to survive. In this thesis, I will examine the fact that through its participation in international peace operations, Mongolia is pursuing a balanced foreign policy, not a bandwagon policy, to ensure its security. Mongolia promotes peace-support operations as a means of improving and increasing its position

and prestige in the world arena, gaining it recognition from great powers, international organizations, and international security institutions.

The second hypothesis explores how each nation's commitment to international peace-support operations is driven by different motivations and has huge implications for a country's military institutional reform and modernization. States have different national, political, and economic motivations for different types of peace-support operations. Mongolia's participation in international is driven by its national security and foreign policy priorities and by military institutional reform motivations. I hypothesize that the military's engagement in international peace-support operations ultimately improves Mongolia's capacity to provide its own national security. Participating in peace-support operations brings financial benefits for small and developing countries. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan's participation in peace-support operations have brought enormous financial benefits to these countries' economies. This thesis will argue that Mongolia's participation in peace operations is not mainly driven by economic incentives and does not bring financial benefits to its economy. Instead, Mongolia is spending an extra amount of money beyond reimbursements received from the UN because its participation in international peace-support operations guarantees its national security.

Third, participating in peace-support operations helps the military survive and modernize. Mongolian defense and defense-related laws, policies, and concepts are directed to improve its defense capability and seek an appropriate and capable force structure while changing the roles of traditional military capabilities to deployment-oriented operational capabilities. This achievement provides an opportunity for Mongolia and its military to increase their peace-support operations capability and acquire new capabilities in order to operate more effectively with foreign forces in overseas operations, catch up with other foreign militaries, professionalize its personnel, and improve civil–military relations.

Today, Mongolia needs to identify its future involvement in international peace operations. This should include sending civilian police mentors, police units, and civilians in various political positions in the mission headquarters and UN departments.

D. METHOD AND SOURCES

This thesis is based on a single case study that focuses on Mongolia's participation in international peace-support operations. Using this study, this thesis investigates what should be improved and provides critical analysis of Mongolia's current policies related to participation in peace-support operations, as well as the prospects for developing further peace-support capability. The analysis in international relations will help explain external and internal factors that prompted Mongolia's commitment to international peace and security.

The existing literature on Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations is limited. The main primary sources include Mongolia's laws, government and agency policy papers, publications, publicly available statistical databases, official views, foreign and domestic scholarly references, journal articles, journal reports, research papers, surveys, and documents from international and nongovernmental organizations. The secondary sources include the media, newspapers, and various Internet sources. Moreover, I will review the Mongolian Armed Forces deployment records and operation-completion reports in order to identify applications and lessons learned from past and current operations. In this thesis, I will also rely on my own personal experience. From 2002–2010, I worked in the peace-support operations division of the operations directorate of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces (GSMAF) as a staff officer and was involved the planning and execution of Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations.

E. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis will consist of five chapters. Chapter I will present the major issues, the research question, its importance, the research methodology, and research tools. The second chapter will discuss the evolution of Mongolia's security environment from post-Cold War to the present. It will also look at the evolution of Mongolia's participation in three phases: lessons learned, challenges facing Mongolia, and past and future participation in peace-support operations.

Chapter III will identify the principal motivations behind Mongolia's active participation in peace-support operations. This chapter will focus on external (national security and survival) and internal (military institutional reform) motivations.

Chapter IV identifies the impact of Mongolia's evolving participation in international peace-support operations on its military institutional reform and modernization effort. This chapter will especially, focus on Mongolia's existing peace-support operations capability and attempt to answer and recommend ways for Mongolia to improve existing capability and suitably measure future capability developments. Moreover, this chapter will analyze and discuss a possible solution to Mongolia's future involvement in international peace-support operations.

Chapter V will recapitulate the findings of the previous three chapters and offer policy recommendations and a concluding analysis.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF MONGOLIA'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Since the end of the Cold War, the security environment in the world has changed significantly. These changes have had a wide impact on Mongolia's security environment. As compared to other ex-communist countries, Mongolia is one of the most successful at transforming to democracy and a free-market economic system. The external and internal changes involved profoundly affected Mongolia's traditional national-security concepts. For a small country like Mongolia, sandwiched between two giants, security remains a major concern. The security of small states depends on their particular geographical, domestic, and regional environments. Before the end of the Cold War, Mongolia's national security concept was based on a threat-based scenario, the "China threat," and security was managed through a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Since its peaceful democratic revolution in 1990, Mongolia's traditional national-security approach has changed to a multilateral, neoliberal approach. Mongolia recognized that military alliances with either of its two neighbors could not provide a favorable security environment in the new globalized world. Therefore, Mongolia chose to develop a balanced relationship with these two neighbors while developing a "third-neighbor policy" and actively participated in regional and international security and economic integration. It is impossible to secure Mongolia's national security without cooperating with neighboring and other countries, and actively participating in regional and international security activities.

Mongolia recognized that one of the ways to ensure its security and develop peaceful relationships with other countries was to participate in international peace-support operations. Mongolia's recent commitment to international peace and security produced exceptional prestige for its image in the world and became one of the tools to promote national security and implement a multilateral foreign policy, as well as the means to develop and transform its military.

This chapter analyzes how Mongolia's commitment to international peace-support operations evolved through its changing security environments in post-communist times.

In addition, the chapter will illustrate past and current participation in peace-support operations in three distinct phases and analyze the lessons learned and the challenges.

A. THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (POST-COLD WAR TO THE PRESENT)

The end of the communist regime totally changed the external and internal security environments of Mongolia and led to the quest for newer forms of economic and security arrangements.² From the 1990s, Mongolia, like some other ex-communist countries, chose to establish a democratic and humane society with a new constitution and political, social, and economic changes, thus starting a new page in Mongolian history. Mongolia's national security has always been directly influenced by external factors. Even in today's era of globalization, it is still questionable and difficult to discover the ways that Mongolia can successfully lessen these pressures.

Historically, Mongolia's security environment has always been defined by external, rather than internal, factors. Mongolia was under the Manchu Empire between 1691 and 1911, gained a short-lived independence between 1911 and 1919, and was occupied by the new Republic of China between 1919 and 1921. During these periods, the occupiers exercised a ruthless policy in Mongolia. Even during the short period of its independence, Mongolia did not actually exercise its own independent national security and foreign policy because of external influence from neighboring countries.

In 1921, Mongolia declared its independence again and established the Mongolian People's Republic. Since then, and until 1990, Mongolia was the first military and political ally of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and was a member of the communist camp. During the Cold War, this close relationship offered economic assistance, and a nuclear and conventional arms umbrella, with the USSR guaranteeing Mongolia's independence and national security.³ In the 1960s–1970s, when the tension

² Batbayar Tsedendamba, "The Recent Security Developments in The Region: A View from Mongolia," *Regional security issues and Mongolia*, Vol. 8, (The Institute for Strategic studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia), 7.

³ L.Molomjamts, "Northeast Asia: Mongolia's Security Interest", *Mongolian Journal of Strategic Studies*, (The Institute for Strategic studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2008), 93.

between the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC) led to military confrontation between the two, Mongolia was involved in a double Cold War situation. Soviet troops were stationed in Mongolia for long durations because Mongolia's territorial location gave an advantage to the Soviets in their effort to protect their territory and use Mongolia as the front line of a possible war with the PRC. In general, during the Cold War, the USSR was the only pillar of Mongolia's security policy, and it had an overwhelming influence on Mongolia's national security and foreign policy decision-making process. There was no other option for Mongolia. This alliance came to the end with the collapse of the USSR. Mongolia's dependency on the national security and foreign policy of another country clearly shows the distorted and uneasy starting point for Mongolia's transition to democracy.⁴

National security and territorial and economic independence are the critical concerns for every country, as well as for Mongolia. Since 1990, the government of Mongolia has been adjusting its national security and foreign and defense policies, pursuing a peaceful foreign policy based on its national interests and modifying political and economic structures to meet the new security challenges of the contemporary world. This policy is defined in its constitution, and the country's specific external and internal situation constitutes the basis for determining its foreign-policy objectives, principles, and priorities.⁵ Through its proactive foreign policy, Mongolia has made unique and positive contributions to world security, and actively engaged in world and regional political and economic integration efforts and regional security dialogues.

In 1992, Mongolia adopted a new constitution. Article 10 of "The Constitution of Mongolia" states, "Mongolia shall adhere to the universally recognized norms and principles of international law, and pursue a peaceful foreign policy".⁶ One of Mongolia's foreign-policy objectives is to seek new opportunities, strengthen a good-

⁴ Ibid., 94.

⁵ *The Concept of Foreign Policy of Mongolia*, Available online at: http://www.mfat.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=34&Itemid=53&lang=en, accessed March 20, 2012.

⁶ *The Constitution of Mongolia*, 1992, article 4.1, Available online at: http://www.mongolianembassy.us/government_and_policy/the_constitution_of_mongolia, accessed on March 16, 2012.

neighbor partnership with its two neighboring countries, and develop friendly relationships with other countries.⁷ “The Concept of National Security of Mongolia,” supports this idea and clearly states that Mongolia will seek its national security and economic security by diplomatic and political means.⁸ Also, it states that active support of the UN and other international organizations is one of the ways and means to ensure the security of the existence of Mongolia.⁹

Aiming to achieve its foremost priorities in foreign policy, Mongolia is pursuing a more open, balanced foreign- and national-security policy that maintains and develops a balanced, long-term, stable, friendly relationship with its two giant neighboring countries, while maintaining a multilateral policy. To secure its existence, Mongolia signed a strategic partnership agreement with both neighboring countries. “Based on the universal principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful co-existence, these agreements laid a legal foundation for the bilateral relations with these two nations”.¹⁰ However, due to recent booming mining industries and mineral discoveries, Russia and China are competing for Mongolia’s mineral resources and putting pressure on Mongolia. When the Chinese–Russian relationship weakens, the importance of Mongolia to both parties increases and other powers’ interest in Mongolia also increases.¹¹ In other words, Mongolia could exercise its own independent policy, choose its friends, and successfully implement a “third-neighbor” policy.

The core principle of Mongolia’s “third neighbor” policy is that attracting attention from powerful Western countries in order to contain neighboring countries

⁷ *Diplomatic Blue Book*, (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2006), 146.

⁸ *The Concept of National Security of Mongolia*, Available online at: http://www.mongolianembassy.us/government_and_policy/the_concept_of_national_security#05, accessed on March 16, 2012.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy”, Official website of Embassy of Mongolia in the U.S., available online at: http://www.mongolianembassy.us/government_and_policy/foreign_policy.php, accessed on March 16, 2012.

¹¹ Bold Ravdan, *The Security of Small State: Option for Mongolia* (The Institute for Strategic Studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2000), 27.

creates political and economic pressures that guarantee Mongolia's independence and security, while maintaining a balanced relationship between Russia and China.¹² However, maintaining a balanced relationship with neighbors "does not mean keeping equidistance between them or taking identical positions on all issues, but this policy does mean strengthening trust and developing all-round good neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with both of them."¹³ Within the framework of the "third neighbor" policy, Mongolia seeks to diversify its partnerships and promote its relations with other countries. The political and economic support of other powerful countries has yielded significant contributions to Mongolia's political and economic development since 1990. For instance, Mongolia is developing a mutually beneficial partnership with the U.S., a country with enormous influence in the world and the region's security environment. Especially, Mongolia's commitment to the global war on terrorism (GWOT) and participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars leveraged both countries' military-to-military relationship. Mongolia's strengthening military cooperation with the United States is based on the realities of its national security.¹⁴ Overall, through "third neighbor" policy, Mongolia is strengthening its position in world political and economic affairs and participating in the political and economic integration process in the region.¹⁵ Mongolia will continue to pursue a "third neighbor policy" that balances Russia and China and better guarantees an external security environment.¹⁶

Mongolian cooperation with other powerful Western countries and its "third neighbor" policy are constrained and endangered by its neighbors. For instance, the U.S. Millennium Fund cancelled its investment in a railroad development project because of Russian pressure, making Mongolia the loser. Furthermore, due to Russian political

¹² Ibid., 27.

¹³ *The Concept of National Security of Mongolia*, point 27, 2-2. Available online at: http://www.mfat.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=35&Itemid=54&lang=en, accessed March 20, 2012.

¹⁴ Wang Peiran, "Mongolia's Delicate Balancing Act", *China Security*, Vol.5, no.2, (2009), 24.

¹⁵ Munkhochir Dorjjugder, "Same rules, New Dimensions for Mongolia's National Security: Adapting to the New Geo-Economic Environment", *Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary*, no. 32, (October 2009), available online at: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/10_mongolia_dorjjugder.aspx, accessed April 15, 2012.

¹⁶ Ibid.

pressure and China's refusal of military over-flight permission, Mongolia has had to cancel its participation in several international and coalition missions and exercises in Lebanon, Kosovo, Iraq, and Turkey. It is clear that if China and Russia refuse to open up transportation access to Mongolia, all assistance and aid from the world to Mongolia will be cut off.¹⁷ Moscow and Beijing are carefully observing the U.S.–Mongolian military-to-military relationship and fear any U.S. military presence in Mongolia, such as a possible option for the establishment of military base. These two countries would not tolerate Mongolia becoming a military base used to threaten their security.¹⁸ However, the Mongolian and the U.S. governments have no intent to increase the U.S military presence in Mongolia.

At the same time, while developing a relationship within Western powers, Mongolia pays close attention to confidence building among regional countries, strengthening its relationship particularly with Northeast Asian countries and increasing its involvement in both regional security and economic cooperation and organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and Shanghai Security Cooperation. For instance, Mongolia is developing and maintaining a friendly relationship with both South and North Korea and declares its interest in the peaceful resolution of the Korean peninsula crisis.¹⁹ In addition, Mongolia has declared itself a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has proposed expanding the nuclear-free zone beyond its boundaries throughout Northeast Asia.²⁰ This initiative was based on Mongolia's desire to contribute to regional security; Mongolia wants to be an example for other small states in the world.

Today's Mongolia's foreign and national security policy is clearly dominated by a need to secure its existence, sovereignty, and economic independence.²¹ To stay neutral

¹⁷ Ibid., 25.

¹⁸ Ibid., 21.

¹⁹ Munkhochir Dorjjugder, "Same rules, New Dimensions for Mongolia's National Security: Adapting to the New Geo-Economic Environment", *Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary*, (No. 32, October 2009)

²⁰ 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/Conf.2010/12, (22 March 2010, New York),1.

²¹ Sarah Telford, "To What Extend Does Post -1990 Mongolia Pursue an Independent Foreign Policy", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, (October 2004), 1.

between two neighbors is one of the best options for Mongolia, as well as for any small state. Mongolia's geographical position also reinforces this concept. Alicia Campi points out “Mongolia’s geographical location between the nuclear powers heavily influences its freedom of actions and the scope of its relations with other foreign states”.²² If Mongolia fails to balance its multi-pillared policy, there could be a serious impact on its national security.²³ Mongolia is trying to remain neutral on many security issues in the broader context. It makes Mongolia a good place for parties to meet and solve their problems without external interference. In addition, Mongolia does not have any intention of joining any military alliance organization or signing any binding mutual security treaties.²⁴

There is no argument that the Russian–Chinese relationship continues to affect Mongolia’s national interest. Mongolia needs to maintain a beneficial relationship with its neighbors—there is no other choice. Munkhochir Dorjjugder asserted that “Mongolia has learned a single indelible lesson in terms of national sovereignty and security, that the nations should seek balanced, equidistant relations with two neighbors while seeking wider recognition and global interaction to the utmost degree”.²⁵ Some literature supports his conclusion that the best way to provide national security is for Mongolia to use diplomatic and political security measures, such as maintaining balanced relationships with Russia and China and continuing to seek a way to establish relationships with other powerful countries and implement independent foreign policy.²⁶

Beginning in the 1990s, Mongolia realized that its “...security can be ensured through a collective security system by joint efforts or participation in such a system” and

²² Alicia Campi, “Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations: Challenges for the New Century”, (February 2004), Available online at: http://usmongoliagroup.com/article_chinese.htm , accessed April 08, 2012.

²³ Wang Peiran, “Mongolia’s Delicate Balancing Act”, 24.

²⁴ Munkhochir Dorjjugder, “Same rules, New Dimensions for Mongolia’s National Security: Adapting to the New Geo-Economic Environment”, *Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary*, (No. 32, October 2009).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ See Bold Ravdan, *The Security of Small State: Option for Mongolia*, (The Institute for Strategic Studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2000), G. Tumurchuluun, “Security of small states in the eve of the 21st century”, *Regional security issues and Mongolia*, Vol. 7, (The Institute for Strategic studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 1997).

that it must “support the activities of the United Nations Organization and other international institutions aimed at strengthening world peace and security, and closely cooperate with them [in order to create favorable conditions for its national security].”²⁷ The Government Action Plan states, “The Government shall effectively participate in the activities of the United Nations Organization, in an endeavor to fruitfully benefit from the potentials of these organizations for guaranteeing national security.”²⁸ The findings of this thesis agree that promoting Mongolia’s involvement in international peace and security through participation in peace-support operations is the one of the best ways for Mongolia to ensure its national interest and security.²⁹

To understand why participation in peace-support operations has become one of the best ways and tools for Mongolia to ensure its national security and national interest and implement its proactive foreign policy, this thesis will examine and analyze the stages of Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations in the next chapter.

B. AN OVERVIEW OF MONGOLIA’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS

United Nations peacekeeping operations evolved in response to a changing international political environment,³⁰ from traditional missions to those that incorporate a complex, multidimensional frameworks involving military, police, and civilian components, including government, businesses, non-governmental organizations and non-state actors.³¹ All peacekeeping operations require significant contributions from UN

²⁷ *The Concept of National Security of Mongolia*, Available online at: http://www.mfat.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=35&Itemid=54&lang=en, accessed March 20, 2012.

²⁸ *The Government Action Plan of Mongolia*, Available online at: <http://www.pmis.gov.mn/cabinet/English/index.php>, accessed March 16, 2012. (Mongolian transcript).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁰ Michael W. Doyle, “War Making and Peacemaking: The United Nations’ Post Cold War Record”, in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press), 15.

³¹ Adam Roberts, “The United Nations and International Security”, *Survival: The IISS Quarterly*, Vol.35, no.2 (Summer 1993), 12.

member nations, who must ensure sufficient resources and capabilities and more involvement and systematic planning in the future.³²

Mongolia has directed its military to participate to the greatest extent possible in international efforts and its cooperation is designed to strengthen trust in the military field.³³ The evolution of Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations is all the more interesting given the country's position on matters of national security and the implementation of its foreign policy focused on a balanced relationship with neighbors and other countries under a non-aligned approach. The Mongolian military recognizes and sees the advantages of participation in peace-support operations and sees possibilities for improving its capabilities and reforming itself structurally and doctrinally.

Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations is very recent. Since its admission to the UN in 1961, Mongolia never had the chance and opportunity to contribute in peace-support operations until 2002. Beginning in 1999, Mongolia's concept of participating in peace-support operations gained considerable support at both the political and public levels, and gradually increased.³⁴ As of March 2012, Mongolia ranked 67th among 115 UN troop-contributing countries. ³⁵ In addition to its participation in UN operations, Mongolia has been a strong partner in the GWOT. Mongolia became one of the first 33 countries to support the U.S. after 9/11 and joined both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Understanding the evolution of the Mongolian military's participation in peace-support operations is possible by analyzing the development of its participation in the three phases: between 1999 and 2003; between 2003 and 2006; and between 2006 and the

³² William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, Moira K. Shanahan, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 5.

³³ *The Concept of National Security of Mongolia*, Available online at: http://www.mfat.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=35&Itemid=54&lang=en, accessed March 20, 2012.

³⁴ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia's Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, 3.

³⁵ "Country contributions list", Available online at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml, accessed on February 21, 2012.

present day. These phases are characterized by unique differences and events that occurred at the domestic and international level. There are also aspects in terms of lessons learned and challenges faced.

1. First phase: 1999–2003

The period from 1999 to 2003 was the first phase of Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations. During this period, the government of Mongolia and its military dedicated their efforts to creating the legal foundation for participation in peace-support operations, training and educating personnel for the brand new missions. At the end of the period, Mongolia had established a firm policy with regard to the use of armed forces in peace-support operations.

Mongolia promulgated a new constitution in 1992. There is no specific language in the constitution that allows participation in peace-support operations. In 1998, the “State Great Hural,” adopted “The Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia”. According to this policy document, “to carry out functions within the UN Peace-keeping forces”³⁶ became one of the primary functions of the Mongolian armed forces in peacetime. The following year, Mongolia adopted a decision, so-called “Participating in peacekeeping activities” in July 1999. In September 1999, Mongolia signed a memorandum of mutual understanding between the Mongolian government and the UN. In accordance with these agreements with the UN, Mongolia assumed the responsibility of preparing its military personnel, contributing to peace-support operations, and ensuring readiness to fulfill its duties as a member state. These steps taken by the Mongolian government allowed it to draft and establish a domestic legal foundation for its participation in peace-support operations.

In connection with these documents, the State Great Hural adopted laws that regulate its military participation in peace-support operations. The Law of Armed Forces (2002) defined “participation in peace-support operations” as one of the primary tasks for the Mongolian armed forces, and the Law of Military and Police defines personnel

³⁶ The Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia, 26.

participation in the UN peacekeeping and other international operations (2002)³⁷. This law also defines and separates the responsibilities of the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and other government agencies. In accordance with these laws, the government adopted a series of regulations and procedures that regulate its participation in peace-support operations.³⁸ All these laws, regulations, and procedures established the legal foundation for Mongolian participation in peace-support operations and defined relations with respect to management, organization, and preparation for peace-support operations.

In order to implement relevant laws and regulations, the ministry of defense (MOD) and GSMAF created an office in 1999 responsible for the implementation of laws and regulations. The main tasks of the office include developing doctrine and concepts for participation in peace-support operations; managing, monitoring, and evaluating overall deployments; training and preparing personnel and units deploying to missions; and collecting, analyzing, and applying lessons learned from overseas operations. Since then, this office has expanded and has the main responsibility for facilitating armed forces participation in peace-support operations, coordinating and managing all deployed operations, maintaining close relationship with the UN and other government agencies, and building peace-support operations capabilities.

Mongolia and its military have taken several actions to accelerate the implementation of initiatives involving peace-support operations. In 1997, the Mongolian armed forces established a 150th infantry battalion.³⁹ Initially, the primary mission of this unit was combat, but was changed to peace support. Two platoons from this unit participated in the joint field training exercise CENTERAZBAT-2000 in Kazakhstan and the multinational peacekeeping exercise SHANTEE-DOOT in Bangladesh in 2002.

³⁷ In 2010, The State Great Hural was made the amendments to this law and renamed “Participation in Peace Support Operations”.

³⁸ Some of these regulation and procedures are “The procedure of the border and customs service inspection for the vehicles and equipment of the foreign units assigned for peacekeeping field exercise in Mongolia”(2003), “The procedure on type and quantity of supplies and equipment issued for personnel participating in peacekeeping and international missions”(2003).

³⁹ The Armed Forces unit #150 is established in 1997 and became the first unit that designated for peace-support operations. Since then, the Mongolian Armed Forces has established the second unit #330 in 2008 and the establishment of third designated unit is under the way.

Given the new task of preparing for and participating in peace-support operations, Mongolia has established and expanded its military-to-military relationship with other developed and developing countries, including the U.S., Germany, Turkey and the United Kingdom in order to solve logistic and technical problems and educate personnel.

At the beginning of 1995, Mongolia started to send officers to different countries around the world, such as the U.S., Germany, Holland, Canada, Ireland, Switzerland, Ireland, Norway, Nepal, and Iran, for UN peacekeeping courses, training, workshops and seminars organized by the UN, USPACOM and regional organizations. For instance, Mongolian officers attended the PKO symposium in Thailand in 2000, the PKO trainers course in Hawaii in 2000, the South Asian PKO seminar-game in Nepal in 2001, and the peacekeeping command-post exercise in India in 2003. At the same time, Mongolia sends its Armed Forces personnel abroad for professional military education and training. From 1992 and 2011, Mongolia sent 298 officers and NCOs to the U.S for various kinds of military courses, training, schools and colleges.⁴⁰

From 1999 and 2003, despite a shortage of experienced and trained personnel, Mongolia hosted several joint, bilateral, and multinational training exercises, courses and seminars with the UN, U.S., and Belgium. For instance, Mongolia hosted the Northeast Asia Peacekeeping Operations seminar-game in 2002, conducted a joint exercise with the Belgium Armed Forces in 2003, and, for the first time, conducted the bilateral exercise called “Khaan Quest” with the U.S. Armed Forces in September 2003.⁴¹ Since then, domestically organized training courses and exercises have become an essential part of the training and educational system.

Active participation and new knowledge extracted from overseas and domestic training courses and exercises allowed Mongolia to develop new peace support operations training program in 2003. In accordance with the program, all armed forces units are required to include peace-support operations training in their annual training

⁴⁰ The statistical data are provided by Human Resource Department of the Ministry of Defense of Mongolia.

⁴¹ Initially, “Khaan Quest” exercise was designed for joint exercise of Mongolian Armed Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces and annually conducted until 2006. In 2006, this exercise was expanded and became one of the top 5 multinational peace-support operations exercises in the region.

programs, and the GSMAF is responsible for conducting pre-deployment and specialized trainings for deploying units and personnel. At the same time, the peacekeeping operations office in the GSMAF started translating peace-support training manuals and documents from English to use in training. However, the MAF faced a language barrier: they had very few personnel who could understand English. The first English-language training laboratory was established in 2002 with assistance from the U.S.

In 2002, GSMAF drafted a plan for further development of the Five Hills Training Center as a National Peace Support Operations Training Center in the short run and a regional center in the long run, with assistance from the U.S. and partners. Mongolia has tailored its military training base to be a venue for peace-support operations for regional militaries to improve interoperability and confidence-building among regional nations.

In August 2002, Mongolia deployed two military observers to the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC) that marked the first time for the Mongolian Armed Forces participation in the UN peacekeeping operations.

2. Second Phase: 2003–2006

Between 2003 and 2006, Mongolia's commitment to peace-support operations steadily increased and diversified. Mongolia started participating in coalition operations and gradually added personnel to UN peacekeeping operations during this period.

The first qualitative change in Mongolia's national security and foreign policy came after the horrific terrorist attack on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001. Since 9/11, Mongolia has been a strong partner in the GWOT, becoming one of the first among 33 countries to support U.S. counterterrorism. In March 2003, a U.S.-led coalition force invaded Iraq and started Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Mongolia was one of the first supporters of this operation. In April 2003, the Mongolian government decided to participate in the U.S.-led coalition operations in Iraq and deployed a light infantry company to OIF for missions within the Polish-led multinational division in August. It was a remarkable event for Mongolia—the first time it had deployed its troops to overseas combat operations since 1945. In addition, it was a tough choice for Mongolia in

terms of its security environment, given its location between Russia and China, which are potential adversaries of the U.S. However, Mongolia made an independent decision to participate in coalition operations, and it paid off. The decision brought controversy at home among politicians and the public, but there were few opponents of this commitment. Mongolia observed the advantages of it and gained support from the highest political levels, including the president, parliament and government. Since 2003, Mongolia has deployed 1195 personnel within ten rotations to OIF and withdrew its troops in 2008.

Mongolia deployed an artillery mobile training team to OEF in Afghanistan to support the training of the Afghan National Army in October 2003. This still continues. In 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush praised the professional ability, endurance and courage of Mongolian troops participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom.⁴² With the assistance of the Belgium Defense Force, the Mongolian Armed Forces participated in the NATO mission (KFOR) in Kosovo from September 2005 to 2007, deploying 72 personnel. A Mongolian platoon attached to the BELUX Company in the French battalion was Mongolia's first commitment to peace and stability support for the Balkans and NATO missions.⁴³ All these commitments to coalition operations gave unique experiences and knowledge to the Mongolian government and military. That knowledge was used to prepare a deployment of contingent of troops to the UN peacekeeping missions in following years.

In addition to its impressive participation in coalition operations during this period, Mongolia gradually expanded its commitment to UN peacekeeping operations. In December 2002, Mongolia sent three officers to the United Nations Mission in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) as UN military observers. In 2005, Mongolia sent two officers to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). In 2006, one officer deployed to the United Nations Mission in Georgia (UNIMIG) and five to the United Nations

⁴² Judy Keen, "Bush cheers Mongolia for pushing democracy", USA Today, available online at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-11-21-bush-mongolia_x.htm, accessed April 18, 2012.

⁴³ The statistical data are provided by Peace Support Operations division, J3 Operations Directorate, The General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces.

Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Until its shutdown, two officers served in the UNIMIG mission. In addition, ten officers served in the UNMEE mission until its shutdown in 2009.

Besides the deployments to peace-support operations, the Mongolian government and its military have focused on expanding their peace-support-operations capability. In 2005, the second infantry battalion designated for peace-support operations was established. Since its active participation in peace-support operations, the government of Mongolia has concluded that military reform is crucial for capability development and started in 2005 to implement a transformation program called "The Armed Forces Development Program through the Year 2015."⁴⁴ In the framework of this new program, the GSMAF created the "Development of Peace Support Operations Capability of the Armed Forces" project, attached to the main project. The main objective is to reform, reorganize, modernize, and transform the armed forces through defense resource-management procedures and create "world-class" peacekeeping forces compatible with the United Nations and coalition operations.⁴⁵

3. Third Phase: 2006 to the Present

During this period, Mongolia has gradually expanded its commitment to peace-support operations, and participation in international peace-support operations has become the day-to-day mission of its military. The participation in international peace-support operations became one of the most successful tools for implementing Mongolia's national security and foreign policy. The uniqueness of this period is characterized by two phenomena. On the one hand, Mongolia started to deploy a full-sized infantry battalion to UN missions; on the other hand, Mongolia was increasing the number of its troops in coalition operations and starting to participate in NATO missions in Afghanistan.

⁴⁴ *The Armed Forces Development Program through the year of 2015*, Available online at: <http://www.legalinfo.mn/insys/lawmain.php?vlawid=16315>, accessed March 02, 2012. (Mongolian transcript)

⁴⁵ Ibid.

In January 2006, Mongolia deployed an infantry company consisting of 250 personnel to UNMIL for protection of the Special Court of Sierra-Leone. It opened a brand new history page in its military and marked the first time that Mongolia had deployed contingent-sized troops to UN peacekeeping operations. 2,300 personnel served in this mission until it closed in 2010. In November 2009, the Mongolia decided to send an advance party of infantry battalion, 264 personnel, to the United Nations mission in Chad and CAR (MINURCAT).⁴⁶ This marked the first time Mongolia deployed such a large number of troops (full battalion size) abroad since 1945. Until its shutdown in 2010, 528 personnel served in this mission.

At present, there are eight military observers with United Nations missions (four in Western Sahara /MINURSO/, two in the Republic of South Sudan /UNMISS/, two with the in the Democratic Republic of Congo /MONUSCO/) and eight staff officers (six with in South Sudan /UNMISS/, two with the African Union-UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur /UNAMID/) serving in the UN missions.

Moreover, Mongolia has deployed two contingents of 425 personnel in two UN peacekeeping missions. Among these, in 2010, a Level II field medical hospital that consists of 75 personnel was deployed to the UNAMID mission and is still operating in the mission area. Recently, the Mongolian government decided to send a full infantry battalion of 850 personnel to the newly established peacekeeping mission in South Sudan and an advance party of infantry battalion, 350 personnel, will be deployed to the mission area at the end of the April 2012.

In addition, at the present time, Mongolia has deployed an artillery mobile training team of 24 personnel, a helicopter mobile training team of six personnel, and a light-infantry company of 126 personnel to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom and an infantry platoon of 154 personnel to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In 2011, with the assistance of the Belgium Defense Force, Mongolia deployed a light infantry company of 57 personnel for an airfield protection mission of Kabul International Airport, under the ISAF command.

⁴⁶ Under some circumstances, Mongolia is not fully deployed full battalion to this mission and the UN closed the MINIRCAT mission in 2010.

To sum up, since the first deployment of two military officers as United Nations military observers to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2002, as of 03 April 2012, Mongolia has deployed 5840 military men and women personnel to eight UN peacekeeping missions and four coalition operations, including military observers, staff officers and contingent-sized troops.⁴⁷

In 2006, Mongolia for the first time hosted the multinational peace-support operations exercise “Khaan Quest”. Since then, this exercise has become one of the top five multinational exercises in the region. At the same time, Mongolia has hosted bilateral exercises with India since 2004, with Russia since 2008, with Qatar since 2008 and with China since 2009. In 2007 and 2010, Mongolia hosted a “Non-lethal Weapons” regional seminar. Since 2004, with assistance from the Center of Civil–Military Relations, Monterey, California, and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) fund, Mongolia has hosted various peace-support operations courses, including the United Nations staff officer course, United Nations military observer course, peace support operations instructor course and train-the-trainers course. In addition, Mongolia has participated in multinational and bilateral military exercises conducted abroad. They include the “Anadolu” multinational special force operations exercise in Turkey (2006), “Garuda Shield” multinational peace support operations exercise in Indonesia (2009), “Ankhor Sentinel” exercise in Cambodia (2010), and “Ayara Guardian” exercise in Thailand (2011).

C. THE CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

1. Challenges

At the beginning of Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations, everything was new and its armed forces had not had any operational experience since the end of World War II. Like other troop-contributing countries, Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-support operations faces many challenges at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They include challenges at the political and

⁴⁷ The statistical data are provided by Peace Support Operations division, J3 Operations Directorate, The General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces.

economic levels and organizational, doctrinal, self-sustainment capability, interoperability, and manpower issues. Reliability of major and minor equipment, lack of inter-agency cooperation, and lack of language proficiency and proper education are also hurdles.⁴⁸ In order to resolve these immediate challenges, Mongolia has taken deliberate steps to develop its peace-support operations capability. It continues to do so.

At the strategic level, establishing the legal foundation and proper decision-making process to participate in peace-support operations has been one of the biggest challenges for Mongolia. For instance, the decision to participate in the U.S.-led coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the NATO operations in Kosovo challenged Mongolia's leadership because of Mongolia's external and internal security environment always depends on its relationship with immediate neighbors, and they have massive influence in the political and economic life of Mongolia. Mongolia needs to show these countries that the armed forces transformation and peace-support-operations capability development is focused on increasing its reputation in the world and contributing to international peace and security.

At the beginning of its participation, Mongolia's decision making at the strategic level was slow. It still cannot meet today's requirements, and its fast-growing contribution to peace-support operations requires rapid decisions to some degree. Slow decision-making processes impede operational planning and preparation. The lack of a theoretical basis of the operational doctrine affects operational planning. Mendee Jargalsaikhan states that:

The decision-making procedures for international peacekeeping operations have been established in legislation, there are a number of procedural gaps that need to be closed. For instance, specific duties and responsibilities of various government agencies have not been clearly defined; therefore, the decision-making process becomes an obstacle for military planning and preparation.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Bayarmagnai Byambasuren, "Challenges Facing Mongolia's Participation in Coalition Military Operations", *USAWC Strategy Research Project* (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks: 2005), 22.

⁴⁹ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia's Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, 18.

UN and coalition operations require a high financial outlay and additional financing for training, service, maintenance, and equipment. Mongolia's self-sustaining capability is restricted by its limited economic capability. "Operational funding issues need to be well-articulated in order to maintain consistent and adequate financial support for pre-deployment and deployment".⁵⁰

One of the most challenging issues is that major and minor equipment does not meet rapidly changing operational requirements and UN standards. Currently, weapon systems being used in overseas operations are from the 1970–1980s and not operable within other countries' modern weapons system and equipment used in peace-support operations. For instance, based on my experience in Iraq, there are significant gaps between the weapons and equipment of Western developed countries and Mongolia's military. Bayarmagnai Byambasuren asserts that, "Mongolian troops are highly skilled on that weapon and equipment, [however] they are not interoperable with the rest of the coalition members...it is top priority for Mongolia to [be] equip[ed]...with modern weapons and equipment that could meet the future peace operations requirements".⁵¹ To provide modern weaponry and modernize old weapon systems and equipment will remain the most demanding challenge for the Mongolian armed forces. This is observed not only on the weapons, equipment and logistic side, also observed in the command and control structure, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Interoperability with foreign armed forces in international operations is a challenging issue. Interoperability is a crucial aspect of planning and execution in any UN peacekeeping and joint or combined coalition operation, particularly at the operational and tactical levels. The disparities in command-and-control structures, organization, doctrine, operational concepts and tactics, language, equipment, and logistics create vast difficulties in peace-support operations.⁵² The difference in doctrine,

⁵⁰ Ibid.,18.

⁵¹ Bayarmagnai Byambasuren, "Challenges Facing Mongolia's Participation in Coalition Military Operations", 15.

⁵² Ibid.,18.

command and control structure, tactics, rules of engagement, equipment, and logistics chains creates difficulties in MAFs participation in UN and coalition operations.

The consequence of the disbandment of the Mongolian military justice system in the 1990s created a huge gap in the military legal system. Mendee Jargalsakhan goes on to explain this problem:

Due to the lack of legal expertise, international operations are lead to the wrong interpretation of laws and practices related to operations and the protection of the personnel. In addition, a shortage of the defense legal experts is one of the challenges and lessons learned for Mongolia. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense could prepare a team of legal experts in international law, particularly in legal matters related to military operations. These matters are particularly acute in coalition operations, which are usually established on an ad-hoc basis and require extensive knowledge and expertise in international legal matters.⁵³

A coherent and efficient training and education system for military personnel is crucial to mission success, particularly in peace-support operations. This not only applies to the military, but also educates the public, especially politicians, and provides a broad understanding of peace-support operations. In the case of Mongolia, from the beginning of its involvement in peace-support operations, there have not been enough personnel who are trained for peace support. Mongolian armed forces personnel have gained tremendous experience and knowledge and provided useful insights to the development of training and education programs of peace-support operations. However, the Mongolian military has not fully integrated and circulated all this knowledge and experience into military training and educational institutions, especially at the National Defense University, and that remains one of the country's challenges.

Language is an important and critical factor for mission success and for operating with other multinational forces in peace-support operations. All personnel, especially in the command group, are required to understand and communicate with the official language of any peace-support operations. Lack of English speakers has contributed to some difficulties. Due to misunderstandings between forces deployed to peace-support

⁵³ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia's Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, 16-18.

operations, whole operations might be jeopardized. This language barrier created a vast challenge at the beginning of Mongolian deployments to international peace-support operations, and Mongolian military is still struggling with it. For instance, each rotation that deployed to OIF in Iraq had between eight to twenty English speakers out of the hundred to hundred and thirty personnel.⁵⁴ Due to a shortage of English speaking personnel and in order to avoid misunderstanding in operations, Mongolia requested U.S. staff embeds to assist Mongolian rotations, and the Alaska National Guard deployed two guardsmen with each rotation of Mongolian forces in Iraq.⁵⁵ I assume that the language challenge will remain in the near and mid future. It is necessary to train key officers and non-commissioned officers in language courses overseas, which in turn enables them to plan and execute military operations in cooperation with other foreign military forces in peace-support operations.⁵⁶

The UN peacekeeping and coalition operations require each troop-contributing country to provide a sufficient number personnel and logistics for their deployed troops. After the communist era, the Mongolian military downsized significantly. The consequences are that the Mongolian military is facing challenges to fulfill manpower needs for peace-support operations designated units and to provide and sustain enough manpower for multiple missions. The significant increase in Mongolian military participation in peace-support operations in the last five years clearly demonstrated this challenge. “Over time, multiple peacekeeping deployments can overload and stress critical portions of a military by relying on small numbers of well-trained cadre for repeat peacekeeping missions, thus potentially damaging their personal morale and welfare”.⁵⁷ Any type of peace-support operation requires from the contributing countries total responsibility for their sustainment, logistics support for their deployed personnel, and the cost of maintaining troops, particularly in coalition operations. Adequate and

⁵⁴Bayarmagnai Byambasuren, “Challenges Facing Mongolia’s Participation in Coalition Military Operations”, 22.

⁵⁵ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia’s Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, 18.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

sufficient logistical support for troops on the ground is “always of paramount importance in this respect”.⁵⁸ That is the challenge Mongolia has been facing since its participation. Due to limited economic and financial resources, Mongolia’s self-sustaining capability is restricted, especially while maintaining its troops in coalition operations, and even in some UN peacekeeping operations. “Some major funding requirements include pre-deployment training, procurement of necessary supplies and equipment, troop salaries and insurance”.⁵⁹ I assume that Mongolia will continue to face this sustainment challenge in the near and perhaps long-term, until its economy can provide all necessary sustainment.

2. Lessons Learned

To successfully accomplish its mission and tasks while achieving desired political and foreign policy goals and elude further mistakes, a nation-state must learn from the experience. Mongolia and its military are still learning from the past and recent experiences in peace-support operations. Some of its peacekeeping missions were successful, but some faced many difficulties.

In terms of lessons learned from participation in peace-support operations, there are six lessons significant to this thesis:

First, in general, the Mongolian government and public clearly understand that participation in peace-support operations increases Mongolia’s image and prestige in the world arena.⁶⁰ Mongolia fulfills its responsibility to contribute to international peace and security, at the same time that, as Mendee Jargalsaikhan asserts,

The Mongolian government has had an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of the procedures, inter-agency committees, and working groups established by the relevant concerning legislation for participation

⁵⁸ Bayarmagnai Byambasuren, “Challenges Facing Mongolia’s Participation in Coalition Military Operations,” 22.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 22.

⁶⁰ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia’s Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, 16.

in peace support operations, and therefore the opportunity to introduce necessary changes and improvements.⁶¹

All peace-support operations must have the support of and get political will from other nations, especially in UN peacekeeping operations. The political will of the UNSC permanent members or coalition-led nations is most important; however, these nations still struggle with their national interests in war-torn areas. Mongolia has learned that public support and political will from politicians in ruling and competing political parties are important factors that have a vast impact on participation in peace-support operations. In addition, before deciding to send any troops abroad, Mongolia needs to consider factors vital to its national security and interest. In other words, Mongolia does not need to send troops to all peace-support operations conducted throughout the world. This assessment is directly connected to the next lesson.

Second, Mongolia has learned that one of the important factors of successful participation in peace-support operations is picking and choosing peace-support operations with clearly and precisely worded mandates and tasks that are within the capability of the deployed forces to execute. Ambiguous and vague mandates make a good mission difficult and a difficult mission impossible to accomplish. One of the factors contributing to the success of a mission is the ability to implement a mandate. However, there is a “fantastic gap” between the resolutions and the means available to military commanders.⁶² In reality, Mongolia is still struggling with providing sufficient capability and ability to its military commanders to implement tasks designated for Mongolian troops in peace-support operations, and this has often prevented operational, and even overall, mission success.

Third, for the military, Mongolian armed forces participation in peace-support operations has helped the forces evaluate their current force structure, training and education institutions, major and minor equipment, and most importantly, readiness of

⁶¹ Ibid., 16.

⁶² Michael W. Doyle, “War Making and Peacemaking: The United Nations’ Post Cold War Record”, 537.

military units.⁶³ When participating in peace-support operations, personnel must maintain the highest standards of professional conduct and discipline and be aware of and proactively manage their impact on the host country and local communities. In order to demonstrate its full capacity in future peace-support operations and fully meet the requirement and challenges in complex peace-support operations, Mongolia must consider what kind of capabilities will be necessary and develop them.

Fourth, the ability to successfully implement a mandate and specified tasks also will depend on collaboration between government agencies, local public support, and support from the international community. Each government and non-government organization has its own strengths that fill in the gap and weaknesses of others. Mongolia has learned that it must develop close working relationships with all government agencies and non-government organizations, be transparent and impartial in its dealings, and attract and retain highly qualified personnel for peace-support operations. One of the outcomes of the successful achievement of Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations that its civil-military relations have improved significantly. Mongolia has learned that civil-military relations must be improved and that close cooperation, shared interest and information-sharing between civilian and military bureaucracies are important for successful decision-making process in peace-support operations. So far, Mongolia has not faced critical civil-military tensions and difficulties in the decision-making process in issues related to peace-support operations.

Fifth, Mongolia has learned that peace-support operations require a precise and clear command-and-control structure, a sustainable logistic system, adequate operational procedures, and robust capabilities. UN peacekeeping operations and coalition operations are based on an ad-hoc coalition. No troop-contributing country is willing to delegate their national command to the UN. The UN mission in Somalia was a clear example of how field commanders lacked command and control of the forces in their area of

⁶³ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia's Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, 16.

operations.⁶⁴ In the case of Mongolia, in the initial phase of its deployment, there was no full national command and control. From time to time, at the strategic and operational level, Mongolia has learned and established and maintained a clear chain of command and control over its troops overseas and, at the tactical level, sometimes delegated its national command and control authority to leading nations or organizations. Nonetheless, Mongolian peacekeepers are still struggling with a secure a national command-and-control system and network in both the mission area and homeland.

Sixth, without adequate financial support for peace-support operations, the mission cannot implement its goals. Modern peacekeeping operations are not very cost efficient. The Mongolian Government has learned that in order to increase its commitment to required peace-support operations, it must allocate sufficient funding for training, equipping and sustaining enough forces in peace-support operations. “Mongolia sees that maintaining soldiers in coalition operations is much more difficult than with the UN peacekeeping operations”.⁶⁵ Today’s peace-support operations have become more complex. They are shifting their characteristics from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If Mongolia decides to participate in peace-enforcement missions in war-torn areas,, troops need more sophisticated and protective equipment and that requires generous financial support. The current economic boom in Mongolia might allow the government to allocate enough financial resources for its participation in peace-support operations.

D. CONCLUSION

To conclude, during the decade of Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations, its armed forces personnel have consistently demonstrated professionalism, outstanding accomplishment of tasks, high spirit, and an ability to fulfill their commitments to peace-support operations. Therefore, they have received many compliments from the UN, its agencies, nation-states and the local population. In

⁶⁴ Michael W. Doyle, “War Making and Peacemaking: The United Nations’ Post Cold War Record”, 537.

⁶⁵ Bayarmagnai Byambasuren, “Challenges Facing Mongolia’s Participation in Coalition Military Operations”, 22.

addition, “these commitments provide an opportunity for the Mongolian government to contribute to global peace and security in a highly visible way”.⁶⁶ Mongolia always attaches importance to and supports implementation of peacekeeping operations in line with the spirit of the UN charter. Mongolia holds that UN peacekeeping operations should strictly abide by the purposes and principles of the UN charter, especially those basic principles that have proven to be effective in peacekeeping practices. Since the first deployment, the Mongolian armed forces have been collecting and analyzing all lessons from its experiences in peace-support operations and applying them to future commitments. At the same time, Mongolia and its military are identifying and solving challenges facing its commitment and developing its peace-support capabilities in order to participate and operate with the UN and other military forces more effectively and efficiently.

Mongolia’s changing security environment in the post-communist era enabled and encouraged Mongolia to choose to participate in peace-support operations, and Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations is distinguished by three distinct phases. This analysis will give a broad understanding of the evolution of Mongolia’s participation and help to identify the principal motivations for its commitment to peace-support operations. These motivations are will be explained in detail in the next chapter.

⁶⁶ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia’s Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, 20.

III. THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVATIONS BEHIND MONGOLIA'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

According to Article 43 of the UN charter, all member nations have an obligation to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.⁶⁷ Every nation's commitment is very important because of the success of peace-support operations depend on it.⁶⁸ However, some nations contribute enormously to peace-support operations, even beyond their capabilities, while other nations contribute little. The main reason behind that is that states have different motivations for their peace-support involvement.

Scholars explain the motivation behind states' participation in peace-support operations from realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives. Realist scholars explain that a state's motivation to participate in peacekeeping operations is tied to the state's national interests and each state acts to maintain the international status quo.⁶⁹ Liberal scholars explain states' motivations in terms of multilateral foreign and domestic policy, involvement and cooperation of international organizations, and civil-military relations. Constructivists explain that democratic normative considerations drive states' commitments.⁷⁰ In truth, all these perspectives may or may not apply. All theoretical approaches to explaining the motivations behind state commitment are not enough to explain the full spectrum of reasons.

This chapter shall consider the main motives that prompted a small country like Mongolia, with limited resources and economic strengths at its command, to venture into participation in global peace-support operations. There are no empirical studies or literature evaluating Mongolia's choice and the principal motivations behind it.

⁶⁷ *The Charter of the United Nations*, Article 43, Chapter 2.

⁶⁸ Andreas Andersson, "United Intervention by United Democracies? State commitment to UN Interventions 1991-99", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 37, no. 4, (2002), 364.

⁶⁹ Laura Neack, "UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.32, No. 2 (May 1995), 181.

⁷⁰ Arturo C. Sotomayor Velazquez, "Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations", *Security Studies*, No.19, (2010), 170.

Jargalsaikhan Mendee asserts four the principal motivations: first, a foreign policy of national survival; second, military modernization; third, the utility of external standards for readiness; and fourth, “rebranding” the army for international service.⁷¹

Mongolia’s relatively quick success in peace-support operations should not be mainly credited to external motives; it is should equally be attributed to internal motives. Externally, Mongolia’s commitment to peace-support operations is directly related to its own national interests, and provided a good opportunity to increase international reputation and prestige. Internally, participating in peacekeeping operations brings military experience and opportunities to reorient and modernize and transform the military into a modern military force capable of today’s complex challenges, increasing its effectiveness to perform tasks and missions. In addition, peace-support operations bring financial benefits, especially for small and developing countries. As in the case of Mongolia, economic incentives can be used to develop its military.

A. EXTERNAL MOTIVATION

The key external factor behind Mongolia’s motivations is the country’s national security environment, national interests, and overall effort to raise its image, profile, and prestige in the international arena. Understanding the principal external motivations behind Mongolia’s interest in participating in peace-support operations requires understanding Mongolia’s main strategic interest: the continued survival and existence of Mongolia.⁷² “If national leaders see their states’ interests inexorably linked to the continuation of the international status quo, they will support and defend the status quo.”⁷³

⁷¹ Mendee Jargalsaikhan and David Last, “Whole of Government Responses in Mongolia: From Domestic Response to International Implications”, in *Opportunities for Enhancing Cooperation and Coordination in Peace Operations*, ed. Ann Livingstone, and Kristine St-Pierre, *The Pearson Papers*, Volume 11, Issue 2, (Fall 2008), 6-7.

⁷² Bold Ravdan, *The Security of Small State: Option for Mongolia*, 7.

⁷³ Laura Neack, “UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?”, 184.

Mongolia is among those countries with this philosophy. Participation in peace-support operations gives countries an opportunity to increase their reputation and prestige in the international arena.⁷⁴

Laura Neack explains that a state's motivation to participate in peacekeeping operations is tied to the state's national interests and that each state acts to maintain the international status quo.⁷⁵ From a realist perspective, the commitment of states is driven by national interest.

The realist explanation of state participation in UN peace-keeping is that states do whatever they can, given their power resources, to protect and preserve their national interests. If national leaders see their states' interests inexorably linked to the continuation of the international status quo, they will support and defend the status quo.⁷⁶

For example, Mongolia faces political challenges to its participation in peace-support operations, as it is located between the two giant military powers of Russia and China. Mongolia needs to show these countries that its armed forces transformation and PSO capability development is only focused on increasing its international reputation and contributing to international peace and security.

Countries usually do not want to be involved in a crisis or conflict that directly impacts their national interest. However, we can see that many African nations are participating in peacekeeping missions because of geographic proximity and because it directly impacts them. Another example is the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Conflicting interests among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, USA, France, and China) and regional countries (Vietnam, Australia, Japan, Indonesia) has affected the implementation of the overall mission mandate.⁷⁷ In Mongolia's case, there is no conflicting interest in any crisis or situation that directly impacts its national security.

⁷⁴ Bayarmagnai Byambasuren, "Challenges Facing Mongolia's Participation in Coalition Military Operations."

⁷⁵ Laura Neack, "UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?", 181.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 184.

⁷⁷ Lise Morje Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 139-142.

Collective security plays an important role in maintaining and promoting international peace and security. The UN provides the framework for an effective collective security system; however, the system often fails to work perfectly. The success of collective security depends on the commitment of UN member states. Thomas G. Weiss states that UN member states need to be willing to sacrifice some national interests in the name of collective security.⁷⁸ In this regard, the question occurs whether Mongolia needs to sacrifice its national interest. The answer is unclear. Mongolia needs to ponder thus.

States' interests and commitment to peace-support operations are shaped by their foreign and defense policies. According to Arturo C. Sotomayor,

Countries with externally oriented doctrines and integrated foreign and defense policies are more likely to commit troops to the UN than countries with national security doctrines, segregated military and foreign policy roles.⁷⁹

He also stresses that such missions “can provide a means to transit from one doctrine to another without provoking large budgetary and operational cuts justifying some levels of expenditure at a time when immanent internal security threats are eroding.”⁸⁰ States use peacekeeping to reorient the mission of the military and provide it with an externally oriented mission.⁸¹ There is an interesting observation that cannot be ignored. In Mongolia's case, this conclusion leads to different insights and raises interesting questions. Currently, Mongolia's foreign and defense policies are more integrated than previously. One of the primary missions of the Mongolian military is participation in peace-support operations, which became a brand new mission for the armed forces. From this point of view, some people argue that Mongolia have an externally oriented defense doctrine. In contrast, the basic principle of Mongolia's

⁷⁸ Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coats and Kelly-Kate Pease, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 5th edition (The Westview Press, 2008), 7.

⁷⁹ Arturo C. Sotomayor Velazquez, “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations”, 168.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁸¹ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge: Massachusetts, 2003), 55.

defense doctrine is self-defense. Based on this principle, someone may argue that Mongolia had an internally oriented national-security doctrine, based on the country's threat assessment or geographical location. Some also claim that in recent years, Mongolia has been reorienting its primary territorial self-defense mission to an externally oriented mission. In both cases, Mongolia's foreign and defense doctrines have not been segregated, before or now.

The questions that arise from these insights are: What is the principal characteristic of Mongolia's foreign and defense doctrine as relates to its commitment to peace-support operations? Is Mongolia's commitment to peace support based on externally oriented doctrine and integrated policies, or on internally oriented doctrine and segregated policies, or mixed (internal and external) doctrinal principles?⁸² In the author's perception, Mongolia's commitment to peace-support operations is unique and based on externally and internally oriented doctrine and policies. On the other hand, Mongolia might belong to the group of countries with externally oriented doctrines and integrated foreign and defense policies, as Arturo Sotomayor mentions in his work.⁸³

A country's regime type is another factor affecting its commitment to peace-support operations. The record indicates that democratic countries are more committed to peacekeeping than are autocratic and totalitarian countries. Democratic states share democratic values and norms, while autocratic and totalitarian do not necessarily share any values or ideologically charged norms.⁸⁴ This does not explain why states like Jordan and China have given enormous contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. As a democratic country, Mongolia has followed those universally accepted democratic values and norms that have allowed Mongolia to participate in peace-support operations.

⁸² Arturo C. Sotomayor Velazquez, "Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations", 177.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁸⁴ Andreas Andersson, "United Intervention by United Democracies? State commitment to UN Interventions 1991-99", 368.

Some states have refused to participate in peacekeeping operations because they have already identified their friends and enemies.⁸⁵ The UN Security Council (UNSC) does not always respond to conflicts fast enough and the permanent members of the UNSC always consider their own national interests first when deciding to use military force. Bottom line, most troop-contributing countries are not willing to send their military personnel to this kind of mission, especially a peace-enforcement mission, except when a vital national interest has been challenged.⁸⁶ Currently, Mongolia does not face a situation in which its vital national interests are challenged. Peaceful cooperation with other countries, its prestige in the world arena and its multi-pillar foreign policy allow Mongolia to make friends with many countries around the world and increase its commitment to peace-support operations.

Another factor influencing the decision to participate in peacekeeping operations is that participation gives an opportunity for countries to increase their reputation and prestige in the international arena. For instance, small and developing countries realize that participation in peacekeeping and coalition operations gives the country the opportunity to support diplomatic policy and provide for the security of the country through political-diplomatic means. Likewise, political and military leaders understand that peace-support operations can complement this aspect of diplomacy

For example, China's contribution to maintaining international peace and security has significantly increased over the last two decades. China's military has been participating in an international effort to combat piracy and has contributed hugely to peacekeeping and humanitarian disaster-relief operations around the world. Increased participation in PKO contributes to China's international reputation. All these commitments are directly connected to their foreign policy and national interests. A country's foreign policy always determines its commitment to UN peacekeeping operations.

⁸⁵ Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate and Kelly-Kate Pease, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 5.

⁸⁶ Michael W. Doyle, "War Making and Peacemaking: The United Nations' Post Cold War Record", 545.

Another example is Brazil's participation in peacekeeping operations due to their foreign policy. Brazil is seeking to be an emerging power in regional and world affairs.⁸⁷ Peacekeeping is one of the tools by which they can implement this policy. Like these countries, active participation in peace-support operations creates favorable conditions for Mongolia to implement its national security and foreign policy.

For Mongolia, the main external factors to participate in peace-support operations are national security and national survival. In order to understand Mongolia's motivation to participate in peace-support operations completely, internal factors must also be examined.

B. INTERNAL MOTIVATION

In recent years, Mongolia's commitment to peace-support operations has been rapidly increasing and counts as one of the top troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. It is a surprising development for a country that faced a large manpower and funding reduction after the demise of its communist regime.

Some states send troops to peacekeeping operations in order to institutionalize and enhance capabilities and skills, or to gain military experience for their military. In other words, participating in peacekeeping operations helps developing and young democratic countries, such as Mongolia, that are seeking to develop a professional army and establish an interoperable, compact, capable, professional military.⁸⁸ In addition, some countries use peacekeeping to reorient the mission of the military and provide an externally oriented mission. For instance, after its defeat in the Falklands War, Argentina's government reoriented its military from an internal to an externally oriented mission. The solution was to participate in peacekeeping operations.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Arturo Sotomayor, "Why the send troops and what they get in exchange", lecture note at Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.

⁸⁸ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia's Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, 3.

⁸⁹ Arturo Sotomayor, "Why the send troops and what they get in exchange", lecture note at Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.

The objective to develop a modern military is the most important internal motivation factor for Mongolia. A state's decision to deploy its military overseas must have the consent and support of its military institutions. Some states are reluctant to provide their military for peace-support operations because they are offered few institutional and professional incentives, while others more willing to contribute.⁹⁰ In Mongolia's case, the military institutions, including the armed forces, internal troops, border troops, and national police force, all comprehended that participation in peace-support operations would actually benefit Mongolia's military institution. Each returning rotation brought back new and valuable experience and knowledge that helped the modernization of the Mongolian armed forces and improved its overall capability, particularly peace-support operations capability. Participation in peace-support operations has provided real-time combat and non-combat experience and expertise. For instance, in a miserable event that occurred right after the parliamentary elections on 1 July 2008, the armed forces used experiences and expertise gained from overseas operations to stabilize and neutralize the situation during a declared state emergency.

Some people may argue that state commitment is driven by economic incentives and these are the most important internal motivation factor. But it is not the most important motivating factor for state commitment to peace-support operations. Some state contributions are driven by economic incentives, which can add up to significant windfalls for a developing economy. That is why most states participating in peacekeeping operations are developing countries.⁹¹ Participating in peacekeeping operations brings financial and economic benefits to troop-contributing countries because most of them are developing countries. For example, Uruguay's commitment to peacekeeping operations is driven by economic motivation.⁹² There is no question but that a peacekeeping operation brings significant financial advantages and additional

⁹⁰ Arturo C. Sotomayor Velazquez, "Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations", 162.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁹² Arturo Sotomayor, "Why the send troops and what they get in exchange", lecture note at Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.

finances are needed for training, service, maintenance, and equipment. Trevor Findlay points out, “Some poorer states can indeed make a profit on such transactions, but the UN is usually so slow in paying and the amount so relatively niggardly that [it] cannot be a sole motivating factor.”⁹³

Some countries are using the money received from the UN for their military development or the development of other economic sectors. Mongolia’s commitment to peacekeeping operations is driven by the desire to develop its military rather than to develop other economic sectors. For instance, the Mongolian government established “The Armed Forces Development Fund” and transferred all reimbursement money from the UN and other countries to this fund. Between 2005 and 2011, Mongolia received USD \$2.7 million from the U.S. and USD \$25.6 million from the UN in reimbursement.⁹⁴ Those reimbursements helped Mongolia finance its military institutional reform and improve its personnel social welfare and life conditions.⁹⁵ According to statistical data, in 2011, the income collected in the fund was approximately USD \$4.5 million and almost all that money was spent: approximately USD \$4.0 million was used for pre-deployment training and preparation, multinational training exercises, renovation of major and minor equipment, and social welfare and allowances of deployed personnel.⁹⁶ These figures clearly illustrate and support the argument that the motivation for Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations was not based on economic incentives; instead, it was based on creating and improving a strong peace-support capability and transforming its armed forces into a capable, professional, and deployable force. The Mongolian military spent all financial resources from outside sources for this purpose, even spending additional money to meet the standards and requirements of peace-support operations.

⁹³ Trevor Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and The New Peacekeeping”, 9.

⁹⁴ The news article on Mongolian website, Available online at: <http://zindaa.mn/j3x> , accessed on 04 April 2012. (Mongolian transcript).

⁹⁵ Bayarmagnai Byambasuren, “Challenges Facing Mongolia’s Participation in Coalition Military Operations”, 19.

⁹⁶ 2011 Annual Report of the Ministry of Defense of Mongolia, (Mongolian transcript).

There are other factors determining Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations. For instance, the economic levels of Mongolia affect its commitment to these operations. The current peace-support operations in which Mongolia is participating require more financial support. The recent global economic crisis has affected Mongolia's economic capability of sustaining and continuing its commitment.

The risk of casualties is also a very important concern for Mongolia, as for all countries participating in peace-support operations. Coalition-led operations, such as the Iraq and Afghanistan operations and some UN peace enforcement missions require engaging in combat and taking casualties. Not all countries are willing to contribute to peace-enforcement operations because of this risk of casualties. Luckily, Mongolia hasn't suffered any combat casualties since its participation in peace-support operations. In the future, Mongolia needs to prepare its military and public physiologically and mentally for the risk of taking casualties.

The altruistic motivation of peacekeepers is another important factor that cannot be ignored in states' motivations. We need to comprehend the factors that motivate soldiers and civilians to participate in peace-support operations and implications for states commitment. Patriotism, nationalism, and the ideology to sacrifice for the country are not the only motivating factors; other factors, such as family influence, and social and living environment also count as motivating factors of the peacekeepers. Fabrizio Battistelli argues that motives such as being useful to others, strengthening the country's image, earning extra money, learning new things that could be useful for life, gaining new experience and knowledge, and satisfying a desire for adventure drive and motivate many military personnel to participate peace-support operations.⁹⁷

In the case of Mongolia, there are no any studies or literature about the motivation of Mongolia's peacekeepers. Systematic in-depth analysis on this topic is required. To understand the main motivating factors of Mongolia's peacekeepers, the author here shares his view on the topic. For Mongolia's peacekeepers, there are several motivating

⁹⁷ Fabrizio Battistelli, "Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier", *Armed Forces and Society*, Issue 23, Vol.3 (1997), 467-84.

factors that have influenced peacekeepers to participate in peace-support operations. However, the following three factors are the most important from the author's viewpoint.

Financial advantages and economic rewards are the most important factor for Mongolia's peacekeepers. According to the CIA–The World Factbook statistical data, overall Mongolia's GDP (gross domestic product) of USD \$13.28 billion placed 141st among the world countries and spending was about 1.4% of GDP for the defense sector.⁹⁸ GDP per capita is USD \$4,500, in 156th place, and 39.2% of the population lives below the poverty line, including some armed forces personnel.⁹⁹ The average salary of military personnel is approximately USD \$400 per month. That salary is not enough to cover all personal living expenses. On one hand, such a figure is understandable, because of the limited financial resources, shortage of money, and overall small economic strength of Mongolia. On the other hand, this low income for soldiers encourages and pushes them unswervingly to participate in peace-support operations and creates competition between them for selection because they earn more money than they might at home.

In addition, participation in peacekeeping operations helps Mongolia's government finance its military while providing salary incentives for soldiers. The UN pays a fixed amount of money (\$1,028) per soldier per month. Mongolia's government takes 30% of this money and puts it in the armed forces development fund. Another 70% goes to the individuals. In addition, soldiers receive \$1.28 per day while serving in the field for their daily use and a full salary back home. Overall, individual soldiers/officers gain from their participation in peacekeeping operations. This money helps individuals to improve their life conditions, so money plays a substantial role in the decision to participate in the mission.

Second, participation in different peace-support operations constitutes an important element in their future military career and development, especially for the officers, and probably for their future civilian careers when they retire. For officers, as

⁹⁸ "The CIA-The World Factbook", Available online at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html>, accessed April 5, 2012.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

well as for non-commissioned officers, to participate in peace-support operations has become one of the requirements for promotion to the next rank or higher position. Another reason for this might be that it increases the chance to be select for various levels of professional military training schools, colleges, and universities overseas.

Finally, Mongolian peacekeepers are motivated by the desire to learn new things that could be useful for life and to gain new military experience and knowledge. Since its first deployment to peace-support operations, Mongolian peacekeepers have gained a tremendous amount of knowledge and experience and learned new tactics, doctrine, and procedures from fellow soldiers from around the world. The peacekeepers recognize that participating in peace-support operations is an opportunity to experience real-life combat situations, exciting adventures, and a chance to learn about a different culture and different people. Furthermore, it is an opportunity to test their professional military skills and knowledge. Participation in peace-support operations gives a unique experience of effectively acting in difficult situations, to cooperate and communicate and command in unsafe, non-predictable environments, and unstable situations and circumstances.¹⁰⁰

However, we need to consider the aforementioned factors, because motivations of the peacekeepers vary, depending on individual characteristics and physiological levels. In addition, motivations may vary from mission to mission.¹⁰¹ In peace-support operations, the soldiers' duty, tasks, missions, mandate, and rules of engagement are different from those in major combat operations. To study the motivation of Mongolian peacekeepers would help Mongolian political and military officials explore, recognize, and identify the problems of military personnel, develop concepts and doctrine of participation in peace-support operations, and discover possible actions to fill the gap between reality and concepts, tactics, doctrine and capabilities. This could change the level of motivation. Most importantly, further research on this topic could provide the

¹⁰⁰ Marcin Sinczuch, Marian Kloczkowski and Mariusz Wachowicz, "Polish Military Forces in Peacekeeping Missions and Military Operations Other Than War: Experiences after 2000", in *Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos Part 1 (Contributions to Conflict management, Peace Economics and Development)*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (Volume 12A, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2009), 167.

¹⁰¹ Ljubica Jelusic, "Motivation for participation in Peace Support Operations: Initial Findings among Slovenian Soldiers", *The Quarterly journal*, Vol. 3, No.4, (December 2004), 42.

strategy and concepts for solving one of the substantial challenges of recruitment and provide and sustain the level of manpower in peace-support operations of the near future. The ability to fulfill this requirement depends on motivating personnel and civilians, including young men and women, to participate in peace-support operations.

C. CONCLUSION

This chapter has focused on the question of the principal motivations behind Mongolia's commitment to participation in peace-support operations. This analysis provides the specific background analysis as to why small countries like Mongolia commit to international peace and security missions. However, this analysis cannot provide a full spectrum of state motivations behind these contributions, so it is difficult to apply to all other countries.

Peace-support operations are conducted in a very complex security environment. The size, number, and cost of such operations have significantly increased in the last two decades. It would be a mistake to assume that the UN and other countries will inevitably move away from traditional peacekeeping towards peace enforcement. These realities make peacekeeping operations increasingly complex and dangerous, increasing the risk of mission failure. This requires that states increase their contributions to peace-support operations.

Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations is not encouraged so much by economic gains as by the concomitant modernization and reorganization of its armed forces, in line with global standards and development of "world-class" peacekeepers and fighting forces. On the other hand, its participation is bolstered by national security and national survival.

In terms of civil–military relations, Mongolia's civilian and military bureaucracies that deal with the country's foreign and national-security affairs have always supported each other since Mongolia started its contribution to peace-support operations. A mechanism and level of cooperation are already in place between the foreign affairs and defense ministries in order to participate in peace-support operations, and there is no argument about who will dominate in the policy decision-making process. For Mongolia,

the use of the military is a tool for implementing foreign policy, not diplomatic failure. It is an opportunity to obtain political gains.¹⁰² Politically, Mongolia wins prestige in the world community, increasing its image and promising its survival and existence through active participation.

¹⁰² Arturo C. Sotomayor Velazquez, "Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations", 171.

IV. IMPLICATION FOR MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND MODERNIZATION

In the last decade, the Mongolian military has been developing its peace-support capability in conjunction with a military modernization effort. It is important to analyze the modernization of the Mongolian military and peace-support operations capability development process in order to ascertain what kind of capabilities they have and what needs to be improved and is required for their future commitment. Furthermore, this analysis give readers a broad understanding of Mongolian military modernization and the measures taken to improve its peace-support operations capability. It also offers some possible recommendations.

Mongolian defense and defense-related laws, policies, and concepts are directed towards improving its defense capability, seeking an appropriate and capable force structure while also changing the roles of traditional military capabilities to deployment-oriented operational capabilities and domestic disaster-relief operation capabilities. In other words, these changes will bring the military closer to the standards of a professionally-oriented military by making fundamental and qualitative changes in its legal establishment, force structure, organization, modernization of equipment, personnel management, training, and educational system, logistic system and improvements civil-military relations. USPACOM Commander Admiral Robert F. Willard emphasizes that “The Mongolian Defense Reform (MDR) assists the Mongolian Armed Forces with its transformation into a self-sustaining, international peacekeeping force capable of contributing to UN, international, and coalition missions.”¹⁰³

¹⁰³ *U.S. Pacific Command Posture: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 111th Congress, (March 24, 2010), (Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command).*

A. IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND MODERNIZATION

1. Mongolia's Military Modernization Process

For the Mongolian military, the origin of the idea of modernization began after the Cold War with the collapse of the communist political and social structures and the rapidly changing security environment that followed. After the change in political and economic structures in the 1990s, the use of the military, and the state of the Mongolian military, was debated among politicians, the military and the public in general. During the communist regime, the Mongolian armed forces were basically designed to protect the territory of Mongolia. Defense planning and doctrines were based on threat-based scenarios or planning approaches like the Soviet Union's. Forces were trained to fight in conventional warfare, not asymmetric warfare as in other Western militaries.

Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001, continuing terrorist attacks, increasing interstate and intrastate conflicts, secessionist wars around the globe, and growing asymmetrical threats in the 21st century, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational crimes, clearly display that the old defense-planning approach, organizational structures, and platforms cannot meet today's challenges and satisfy Mongolia's desire to secure its national interest, territory and existence. Mongolia's civilian and military bureaucracy initiated military modernization in order to meet today's requirements and catch up with other militaries.

The Basis of State Military Policy of Mongolia asserts, "Mongolia shall have a compact, capable, and professionally-oriented armed forces tailored to the peace-time needs and the economic potential of its country".¹⁰⁴ In the last decade, Mongolia has implemented several projects for the development, modernization, and restructuring of its military to cope with new types of challenges and strategic uncertainties. Before 2000, some programs and projects took place; however, they were postponed because of financial restraints. Due to the initial successful participation in peace-support operations,

¹⁰⁴ *The Basis of State Military Policy of Mongolia*, 2006.

Mongolia's government and its military observed that military reform was crucial for capability development, reconsidered its development and modernization plans, and made necessary changes.

In 2006, Mongolia started to implement a new defense development and modernization program called "The Armed Forces Development Program through the Year 2015".¹⁰⁵ This program succeeded the previous program, the "Development Program of Military Establishment till 2005," which was a mid-term development plan for the armed forces. In the framework of a new transformation program, the GSMAF developed the "Development of Peace Support Operations Capability of the Armed Forces" project, and this became one of the key projects attached to the main program.

The primary objective of this program is:

Along with carrying out its primary mission, the Armed Forces will develop a capable and professional force to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping missions, to counter terrorism and conduct humanitarian efforts in emergency situations of natural and man-made disasters as well as non-traditional threats.¹⁰⁶

The main directions of the plan are to enhance the capabilities of the armed forces to participate in UN peacekeeping and international missions; to modernize weapons platforms and equipment through defense-resource management and acquisition processes—in particular, focusing on upgrading the air defense system through cooperation between commercial air and the air force in peacetime—and to prepare to support efforts to protect the population and environment during emergency situations, such as natural and manmade disasters and other non-traditional threats; fourth, to enhance counterterrorism capabilities; fifth, to transform organizational structure and concept development.¹⁰⁷ In other words, the priorities of this program are to adjust the

¹⁰⁵ *The Armed Forces Development Program through the Year of 2015*, available online at: <http://www.legalinfo.mn/insys/lawmain.php?vlawid=16315>, accessed April 02, 2012. (Mongolian transcript)

¹⁰⁶ *The Armed Forces Development Program through the Year of 2015*, available online at: <http://www.legalinfo.mn/insys/lawmain.php?vlawid=16315>, accessed April 02, 2012. (Mongolian transcript)

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

Mongolian armed forces structure and organization to a non-traditional threat environment and new missions imposed by the law, enhance peace-support operations capability, improve defense resource management, renew and renovate old equipment, acquire new platforms and technology, change the current education and training system and improve the social welfare system of the personnel.

In the author's estimation, the current "Armed Forces Development Program through the Year of 2015" is only focused on the further development and modernization of the Mongolian military in alignment with national and international operational needs, not on complete transformation. The plan is mainly focused on upgrades or adapting existing capabilities, weapon systems and modernization of current operational concepts and doctrines based on capabilities that they have. The main problem is that the Mongolian military is still struggling to understand the meaning and differences in military transformation and modernization. From this point of view, the author argues that Mongolia's current implementation of military reform does not contain the main characteristics of the transformation; it is just a modernization plan that contains fewer transformation elements.

Transformation is intended to improve the overall capabilities of the military to conduct full-spectrum operations in complex asymmetric environments, including peace-support operations. The Department of Defense of the U.S. states:

Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organization.¹⁰⁸

In his book, Scott Jasper says that transformation is:

...[a] process that shapes the nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies, streamlined organization structures, innovative processes, and adaptive personnel developments that exploit national advantage and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities and has no end state.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ "Transformation Planning Guidance", The Department of Defense, (April 2003), 3.

¹⁰⁹ Scott Jasper, "The Capabilities-Based Approach", in *Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security*, ed. Scott Jasper, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 3.

Transformation “encompasses accelerated technological modernization, doctrinal reform, and reorganization of force structures, a culture open to change, and willingness to accept risk”.¹¹⁰ Transformation must involve new ideas and concepts, as well as the modernization of old platforms to meet the challenges of the new environment.¹¹¹

Modernization can be defined as a process to “acquire and develop new equipment, or improve, upgrade or adapt existing weapons platforms and equipment to meet identified capability gaps and to achieve dominance in core capabilities.”¹¹² In this regard, transformation is a completely different concept from modernization. Transformation is a revolutionary process creating new “breakthroughs” or “leaps ahead” in innovative technologies, operational doctrine, tactics, and capabilities. By contrast, in terms of military capability, modernization manifests itself in the technical sophistication of structures, weapons systems, and equipment.

From this point of view, the current military reform plan of Mongolia does not contain the main characteristics of transformation. The changes fall under the label of modernization, not transformation. The current reform plan identifies a number of areas that need changes; however, it does not well cover or pay attention to creating or acquiring new sets of breakthrough or leap-ahead, innovative technologies, operational doctrines, training, and education systems; nor does it rethink organizational structures, tactics, and capabilities. This is understandable because of limited resources and funds and a shortage of educated personnel who can lead this effort.

Since its first deployment overseas, the Mongolian military has identified several gaps that are necessary for military reform and its military modernization plan and taken several steps. Within this program, the Mongolian military is transforming its organization structure from old Soviet-based structures to Western military structures. In

¹¹⁰ Understanding NATO Military transformation, (Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk, Virginia, October 2009).

¹¹¹ *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, (Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense, Fall 2003), 9.

¹¹² *Army Modernization Plan-2012*, Department of The Army, United States, available online at: <http://www.bctmod.army.mil/news/pdf/Army%20Modernization%20Plan%202012.pdf>, accessed April 11, 2012, 5.

2009, the GSMAF reorganized its structure to the “J” system (joint system). The significance of this reform was the establishment of two service commands, the general-purpose troops command and the air and air-defense command.¹¹³ Previously, the air and air defense (air force) component was inside the land component. Nonetheless, this structural change stagnated at the general staff level and was not implemented at the regiment-battalion-company levels until now.

One of the areas for consideration of this program was to reform the current acquisition and budgeting system and to establish a reliable defense-resource management system. The MAF acquisition and budgeting system was based on a centralized planning system. In other words, Mongolia’s defense planning was directly dependent on the allocated budget from the government. Previously, the military had no input in its own budget. Currently, Mongolia’s defense budgeting system is changing and trying to match current standards. Financing for overseas operations still remains a big constraint and challenge for the Mongolian military.

2. Peace Support Operations Capability Development

Mongolia has taken deliberate steps and is progressing in developing its peace-support operations capability in order to integrate and operate more effectively with foreign forces in peace-support operations. In the framework of “The Armed Forces Development Program Through Year 2015”, the GSMAF developed the project, “Development of Peace Support Operations Capability of the Armed Forces,” one of the key projects essential for military modernization efforts. Within this project, three sub-projects were developed: “Development of Peace Support Operations Training Center,” “Development of Equipment Acquisition of Designated Units Assigned to Participate Peace-Support Operations,” and “Military Police.”

The main objective of this project is to reform and reorganize the armed forces and transform them through defense-resource management procedures in order to develop world-class peacekeeping forces compatible with the United Nations and

¹¹³ The General Purpose Troops Command is can interpreted to Land Force Command.

coalition operations.¹¹⁴ This project started in 2006 and will continue until 2015 in three phases. The project not only focuses on establishing a brigade-size peace-support operations force, but also on establishing suitable organizational command-and-control structures, a legal framework, modifying and changing old Soviet military doctrine and tactics, improvements in the existing peace-support-operations training system, and development of deployable and sustainable logistic capability.¹¹⁵

The existing capabilities of Mongolia's armed forces for peace-support operations are two partially-manned designated infantry battalions, some combat-service support units, including a UN Level II deployable field medical hospital, a military-police company, three combat engineering battalions, an armed forces foreign-language training center, and a national peace-support operations training center.

A typical Mongolian deployment to peace-support operations is a mid or full-sized infantry company and above with small, specialized, mobile-training units and a handful of military observers and staff officers. The Mongolian military aims to establish a brigade-size force for peace-support operations, along with all necessary support capabilities, by 2015. The brigade will consist of three light-infantry battalions and a combat-service support (CSS) battalion totaling 2,500 personnel. The CSS battalion will consist of a deployable medical hospital, military police, and engineering, nuclear, biological, chemical, transportation, and logistic detachments. The third battalion will be established in 2012. Those battalion's equipment, weaponry, manpower, and structures still do not fully meet UN force requirements and standards. A new brigade will serve as a blueprint for the rest of the units. In this regard, international military aid and assistance is essential in achieving the objectives. This will allow Mongolia to provide fully operationally capable brigade-sized peacekeepers for peace-support operations.

In order to develop its peace-support-operations capability, the Ministry of Defense decided to establish a peacekeeping office in GSMAF in 1999. Since then, the

¹¹⁴ *The Armed Forces Development Program through the Year of 2015*, available online at: <http://www.legalinfo.mn/insys/lawmain.php?vlawid=16315>, accessed April 02, 2012. (Mongolian transcript)

¹¹⁵ *Development of Peace Support Operations Capability of the Armed Forces*, (The General Staff of Mongolian Armed Forces, 2006). (Mongolian transcript)

responsibility of this office has expanded and the main tasks include overseeing, coordinating, monitoring, evaluating and building peace-support operations capacity within the armed forces and the comprehensive management, planning, and execution of overseas deployment.

Mongolia is modifying its national peace-support operations training center (known as Five Hills) to become a regional training center as a venue for Asian–Pacific countries for training and improving interoperability and confidence building among regional countries. Mongolia annually hosts and cosponsors several multinational, bilateral field exercises such as Khan Quest, MPAT Tempest Express, Non-Lethal Weapons Executive Seminar, and multinational and bilateral conferences, seminars, and courses in its own training center. Mongolia has invested in building new training facilities (an urban-operations training facility), training lanes, mobile accommodations and logistic capabilities to conduct multinational, bilateral, and regular exercises; however, this effort is struggling with lack of funding. Since 2005, the U.S. government has invested approximately USD \$5.7 million for the renovation of national peace-support-operations training center facilities and other activities.¹¹⁶ The investment is coming through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the program for building peacekeeping capacity around the world, created by the George W. Bush administration.

At the same time, Mongolian military is actively engaged in several joint, combined, and multinational exercises and various courses abroad. These exercises and activities are designed to upgrade the peace-support operations capabilities of the Mongolian military, enhance its interoperability with other foreign militaries, and develop common tactics, techniques, and procedures for peace-support operations.

In the framework of a new capability-development project, one of the important steps Mongolia has taken is the development of a new peace-support operations doctrine. The Mongolian military is analyzing and applying lessons from participation in peace-support operations and using those experiences as a basis for a new doctrine, while working with several countries including the US, Canada, France, UK, and Switzerland.

¹¹⁶ The statistical data taken from the briefing of Ministry of Defense of Mongolia for Mongolia-U.S. Bilateral Consultative Committee meeting, Washington D.C., June 2010.

However, this process has stagnated because of lack of will and lack of education. Mongolia could use other countries' doctrines as references and starting points.

Since 1995, the Mongolian military has sent its officers and non-commissioned officers abroad for professional military-education training and courses. Sending its military personnel to overseas educational institutions has enabled the Mongolian military to learn and experience peace-support operations. Between 1992 and 2011, the U.S spent around USD \$13 million for the education and training of Mongolian military personnel. Approximately 298 Mongolia military personnel were trained and educated in U.S. military educational institutions under the IMET (International Military Education Training) program during this period.¹¹⁷

Mongolia is paying attention to training and educating its leadership at the strategic and operational decision-making levels. Forty-one personnel¹¹⁸ out of 298 have received professional military education and master's degrees in the U.S. National Defense University, Industrial College, U.S Army and Air Force Command and General Staff College, USMC Command and Staff College, and the Naval Postgraduate School, and most of them hold leadership positions in the ministry of defense and general staff headquarters. They are contributing vast amounts of knowledge and expertise crucial to Mongolian defense reform and peace-support operations capability development.

One of the challenges associated with deployment is the language barrier. In order to solve this problem, Mongolia has established an armed forces foreign language training center within the framework of the capability-development project. However, it still cannot meet its current requirement and lacks English-speaking personnel.

The Mongolian military is still equipped with old Soviet-style weaponry and equipment. That weaponry and equipment cannot meet current operational requirements and are not interoperable with other militaries. In order to supersede this demand, and implement a capability development plan, Mongolia is working closely with the U.S.

¹¹⁷ The statistical data is provided by Human Resources Department of Ministry of Defense of Mongolia.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

government and receiving budgetary and technical assistance for its defense reform and modernization through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). For instance, the U.S. had contributed USD \$4.52 million to Mongolia for peace-support-operations capability development as of June 2010.¹¹⁹ It included battalion-level communication equipment, individual gear, and battalion-logistics equipment, vehicles, and training. Moreover, within the framework of the development program, the Mongolian military has received several weaponry systems and equipment from other countries. For instance, in 2009, Mongolia received approximately USD \$900 million in military aid from Russia, including MI24B attack helicopters, an MI8 transport helicopter, T-72 tanks, BTR-70 and BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, an air-defense system, and mobile maintenance systems. It also received approximately 88 million Yuan (Chinese currency) in military aid and assistance from China between 1999 and 2008.¹²⁰

In military terms, a capability is defined as “the ability to generate desired effects in a military operation, under a set of conditions, and to a specific standard”.¹²¹ In other words, military capability gives the ability to produce expected effects in specific environments in which the military force operating. For Mongolia to identify and fulfill the gap in its peace-support operations capabilities, it is necessary to accomplish a brand new mission: peacekeeping. Today, Mongolia’s peace-support operations capability is limited because of inadequate funding, a shortage of experienced manpower, lack of major and minor equipment, and inappropriate doctrine, tactics, training and military education.

B. IDENTIFYING WAYS TO INCREASE MONGOLIA’S FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Until today, no deep-cutting reform, modernization, or transformation has been completed in the Mongolian military. Only partial changes have been made. Still required

¹¹⁹ The data taken from the briefing of Department of Defense in the U.S.-Mongolia Executive Steering Committee meeting, which held in Washington D.C, June 2010.

¹²⁰ Sh.Palamdorj, Ts. Erdenee and S.Ulziiduuren, *Мэргэжлийн Зэвсэгт хүчин: Түүний хөгжлийн хандлага*, (Mongolian National Defense University Press, 2010), 187. (Mongolian transcript).

¹²¹ Scott Jasper, “The Capabilities-Based Approach”, in *Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security*, 7.

are more efforts and resources and critical thinking in order to complete the reform and peace-support operations-capability development process. Based on the author's analysis and research, the following recommendations can be made to increase and improve efficiency and effectiveness of Mongolia's commitment to peace-support operations.

First, at the strategic level, the Mongolian military still does not have a clear understanding of the difference between modernization and transformation. Mongolia's recent military-development plan mainly focused on modernization. Transformation creates new competitive areas, identifies new sources of power, and changes military culture. In contrast, modernization is focused on modifying and improving existing platforms and capabilities. The development of core and specific capabilities, which include intelligence gathering and information sharing (an early-warning system), surveillance, mobility, training, integrated joint mission planning, and a sustainable long-term logistic system will accelerate the modernization process and help Mongolia increase its commitment to peace-support operations.

Second, Mongolia has not made full capability-based assessments in its defense capability until now. Mongolia needs to make such assessments and determine how to use its military in the future. That will help increase its peace-support operations capability overall. A capability-based approach should reflect Mongolia's national security and threat environments, its economic capacity, and the need to incorporate RMA components into its modernization program. This assessment or analysis requires joint efforts and a high degree of cooperation between civilian and military bureaucracies. Political will, strong support from the legislative and executive branches, sufficient budget allocations, and interagency cooperation and coordination are required to accomplish this reform program. In other words, Mongolia needs to support long-term, precise, and defined reform planning.

Third, a comprehensive, coherent strategic framework (mission specific, with a unified doctrine and guidelines), backed by political support, is essential for modernization and capability development. One of the weak links of Mongolia's military modernization plan is its outdated military strategy and doctrines. The Soviet's military doctrine and tactics heavily influenced Mongolia's military doctrine. Active participation

in peace-support operations demands that Mongolia's military reconsider and rewrite its military doctrine and defense policy related to the use of the military in the future. A capability development must be based on doctrinal documents that contain analysis of the predicted security environment, potential types of future missions on which the military force could be sent, and clearly defined capability needs and requirements. In addition, peace-support operations doctrine must be relevant to and based on Mongolian military culture, national laws, experiences, the nature of peace-support operations, and an assessment of the current and future security environment of Mongolia. In order to fill this gap, the MAF should establish a doctrine-development and lessons-learned center and pay attention to applying lessons from the past to future peace-support operations. Right now, there is no written comprehensive review, research survey, or book on this topic.

Fourth, one of the essential elements of peace-support-operations capability development is enhancing training and educational institutions. The Mongolian military needs to improve its professional military education and training institutions and training curriculum, increase cooperation with foreign military-education institutions and international organizations, and increase its participation in multinational/bilateral exercises and training events that enhance regional cooperation and improve interoperability. The National Defense University of Mongolia and other military educational institutions are required to modify and adjust their educational and training programs in order to meet today's requirements, and they need to recruit experienced, knowledgeable and trained academics and scholars. The development of a modernization program and peace-support-operations capability development is dependent on the training of a new generation of officers and NCO corps.

In the author's view, the Mongolian military needs to change the foundation of the current Soviet-style military education system completely. Without changing it, the military cannot achieve its desired end-state and objectives of pursuing education and training capability development. Pre-deployment and post-deployment training standards should be developed. Currently, the Mongolian armed forces have deployment training packages, but they do not meet operational requirements.

Senior leadership, who have been trained, educated, and have international exposure and experience, should lead in fostering innovation and adaptation for the new century, ensuring that process is on the right track. They will contribute vast amounts of knowledge and expertise crucial to Mongolian defense reform and peace-support-operations capability development. For this reason, Mongolia should continue to send its officers and NCOs for training to Western, developed countries¹²² and require a complete change in the foundations of military-education institutions.

Fifth, a capability development must be tied with organizational structural changes. When the Mongolian military changes its force structure, it needs to consider its own military culture, needs, and security environment. The Mongolian military not only needs to copy the Western military structure, it needs to take and apply the most applicable pieces to meet Mongolia's requirements. The Mongolian military needs an organizational structure that supports its commitments to peace-support operations and the capability-development process. Flexible, highly independent, mobile, proper force structures are essential when the Mongolian military deploys to various peace-support operations. Newly created and restructured peace-support operations designated units could be the example for reorganizing all its military units and helping to make the Mongolian military more interoperable with foreign forces in peace-support operations.

The Mongolian military needs to reconsider the current planned structure of the peace-support-operations brigade. The Mongolian military does not have the capability to deploy a full brigade in the near term. Current capability allows the MAF to deploy one battalion at a time. Mongolia's currently deployed units to peace-support operations consist of representatives of different units, which has both negative and positive effects. On the positive side, they are gaining expertise and learning from foreign militaries and each other while performing their tasks in the mission. When they return to their designated units, those soldiers share their knowledge and experience with others and input knowledge into the modernization of the military. On the negative side, choosing personnel from different units could adversely affect the combat readiness of those

¹²² Bold Ravdan, "New Defense Strategy", in *The Mongolian Strategic View*, (The Institute for Strategic Studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 1996), 15.

specific military units and undermine overall combat readiness. Furthermore, it creates some disciplinary problems in deployed units from lack of understanding among soldiers and even officers, affecting the social environment and physiological and moral strength of participants. Based on reality and experiences, the author recommends that the Mongolian military focus on deploying organic units to peace-support operations instead of sending units composed of personnel from different units. This will help to improve combat readiness, coherence, and training in those particular unit. Moreover, it will assist modernization of the force structure and command-and-control structures, spread expertise and experience throughout the military, and promote training for peace-support operations. Besides that, Mongolia needs to identify a way to increase the number of personnel in the mission area and international organization. This should include sending civilian police mentors, police units, and civilians in various political positions to mission headquarters and UN departments.

In addition, the Mongolian military is required to establish a combined operation command or joint-operations center, responsible for command and control, planning, monitoring, evaluation of overseas operations and strategic and military leadership, with a range of options in making decisions. The MAF does not have a joint-operation doctrine or strategic guidance for newly established service commands.

Another area that needs improvement is the development of the NCO corps, the foundation of every armed force on the globe. In recent years, the role and responsibility of Mongolia's NCO corps has dramatically increased and its ability to perform tasks and missions is improving. If the military has not been properly trained or instructed to perform peace-support operations tasks and missions, then it might not be capable of performing them when actually participating in such. Mongolia should maintain and continue this crucial developmental track of NCO-corps development.

Sixth, Mongolia is required to identify potential peace-support missions they could participate with in the future. Mongolia needs to analyze the future security environment and challenges, neighboring countries' political environments, and its own policy regarding international peace and security, and then carefully choose which peace-support operations to send its peacekeepers to. For instance, in 2009, Mongolia reached

an agreement with France to deploy peacekeepers to the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. However, this deployment has been cancelled because of Russian political pressure. Mongolia does not need to participate in all peace-support operations conducted around the world. Also, Mongolia needs to develop contingency plans for participating in future operations.

Seventh, lack of knowledge on the rules of engagement, status of force agreements, and memoranda of understanding, and the absence of national rules of engagement, standard operating procedure, field manuals and guidelines, and insufficient legal experts and advisors within the military are generating problems associated with the capability development process and have contributed negatively to capability development. Furthermore, these affect participation in peace-support operations. To overcome this challenge, Mongolia needs to recruit or train lawyers and legal advisors and provide legal training for all military members to some degree, in order to develop clear, coherent, flexible, and realistic doctrines and procedures.

Eight, adequate funding for modernization and peace-support-operations capability development effort is required for Mongolia and its military. Currently, Mongolia is spending 1.4% of its GDP for defense.¹²³ The percentage of GDP spending on defense sounds like enough for maintaining and equipping the military in the current status; however, it is not sufficient for completing its modernization program. In recent years, the Mongolian defense budget has been increasing, but about 75% of the defense budget goes to day-to-day sustainment operations and maintenance of combat readiness; there is also a small amount of money for investment and acquisition of equipment. If the Mongolian armed forces want to acquire advanced military technologies and equipment, they need a big chunk of money. The Mongolian military needs to link the acquisition and budgeting systems to new concepts in order to provide capabilities essential to complete modernization and future military operations overseas. This system should be incorporated into the modernization or transformation process. In addition, compared to

¹²³ CIA-The World Fact Book, available online at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>, accessed April 12, 2012.

the foreign investment into the establishment of a peace-support-operations training center, Mongolia is investing too low and needs to increase its investment.

Ninth, in order to achieve the desired end-state and fully implement its modernization program, Mongolia needs to develop good partnerships with other countries, including neighboring countries. For instance, Mongolia's commitment to the global war on terrorism and participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars has increased Mongolia's prestige in the eyes of the great powers, including the U.S., and has leveraged the relationship with these countries. This is the most influential argument for the implementation of the program.¹²⁴ Mongolia needs to continue to strengthen and expand its existing military-to-military partnerships and bilateral, multinational security relationships with other countries in order to accelerate its peace-support operations capability development. Mongolia needs to carefully consider which partners to cooperate with. In the author's view, Mongolia must maintain its non-alignment and neutrality policy, while closely cooperating with neighboring countries, NATO and its allies, and Northeast Asian militaries.

Finally, to re-equip, upgrade, modernize, acquire and provide new technologically advanced weapons platforms and equipment and create sustainable logistical capacity for peacekeepers are crucial elements of a capability-development program. In the framework of this development program, Mongolia is required to develop a strategic communication and navigation system capability and an information and cyber-warfare capability in order to meet operational requirements. Recently, Mongolia's government reached an agreement with Japan to develop and launch a navigation and communication satellite.¹²⁵ Perhaps, this initiative could open opportunities for the Mongolian military in terms of acquiring new technology and developing a military navigation system or strategic communication capability. Mongolia needs to be innovative and adaptable when confronting capability gaps. Due to lack of funding, these programs will take several

¹²⁴ Mendee Jargalsaikhan, *Mongolia's Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, 8.

¹²⁵ J.Bat-erdene, "Preparing Mongolian cosmologists and satellites", Interview on UB Post, available online at: <http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/index.php/others/88888954-othertop/7033-j-bat-erdene-preparing-mongolian-cosmologists-and-satellites> , accessed April 13, 2012.

years to develop. In Mongolia's case, the defense budget for innovation and experimentation is not enough. Mongolia's government and the Ministry of Defense should manage its defense budget plan accurately, spending wisely on this matter.

C. CONCLUSION

Today, the aim of Mongolia's defense reform is focused on continuing participation in peace-support operations in much greater degree, while maintaining combat readiness and acquiring enough capacity to protect the homeland and counter military challenges. The progress of Mongolia's military modernization has been slow and should increase in the near and mid-term.

Mongolia continues to build more manageable and professional armed forces within its available resources. By the end of the implementation of the program, the MAF is expecting a significant improvement. Overall, MAF readiness and preparedness for combat and non-combat missions, peace-support operations, and counterterrorism capability, as well as its military training and education institution and welfare system, will improve.'

However, the MAF has a number of shortages. In spite of the fact that limitations on Mongolia's economy, like an insufficient budget and funds, a lack of interagency coordination, a lack of professional military education that fully meets today's requirement, an absence of clear strategic planning and vision, reliance on foreign military aid, and the political will which are the major difficulties for implementing these development programs. Mongolia's military modernization is shaped by the military dimensions of the peace-support operations issue, and also by contextual and non-contextual drivers, including Mongolia's desire to maintain its survival, gain international prestige, create favorable conditions for economic development and military reform, and form defense policy. Military modernization of Mongolia is much more dependent on peace-support operations capabilities and training, education, and professionalization of officer and NCO corps than on an upgrade of weapon systems and equipment. The vulnerability of the current modernization program is dependence on foreign military assistances (China, Russia, U.S., etc.).

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V. CONCLUSION

Mongolia's commitment towards peace-support operations is recent, effective, and constructive. Its visible peacekeeping contribution began a decade ago. Today Mongolia is a notable troop-contributing nation to UN and NATO peace-support operations. To survive in a complicated geostrategic environment, Mongolia employs peacekeeping as a way to substantiate its third-neighbor policy with the EU and NATO members and increase its profile as a good, responsible member of the international community with real commitment. The military participation in peace-support operations plays constructive roles to consolidate democratic civilian control over the military, increase the military's professionalism, and implement defense-reform policies. Unlike other developing nations, Mongolia does not view peace-support operations as a way to generate hard currency; rather it accepts it as a tool to demonstrate its independent foreign and defense policies. To corroborate this key argument, the thesis examines the changes in Mongolia's national-security environment in the post-Cold War era, the developments of Mongolia's growing contributions to peace-support operations, the factors that motivate Mongolia and its military, and the prospects for peace-support-operations related activities. Importantly, the thesis presents policy recommendations for academic and policy community based on in-depth analyses of Mongolia's commitment to peace-support operations. Mongolia's lessons learned is applicable for many other small states that are struggling with transitional challenges.

The significant changes that occurred after the collapse of the communist system have had a significant impact on Mongolia's security environment and completely changed its view on national security and foreign policies. Mongolia needs to consider the global and regional geostrategic environment and broaden its approach to maintain favorable conditions for national security. Mongolia needs to pursue a balanced strategy that does not upset either China and Russia, because its security always depends on the behaviors of its two neighbors. At the same time, it is crucial that Mongolia continue balancing its relationship with other countries, particularly with Western powers and Northeast Asian countries. Mongolia's new security environment in the post-communist

era has enabled and encouraged Mongolia to participate in peace-support operations. Through its active participation in peace-support operations, Mongolia is counterbalancing neighbors' pressures and influences, thus making the peace-support operations an important foreign policy tool.

To increase its international profile of a responsible member of the UN, Mongolia upholds the purposes and principles of the UN charter, especially the principles that are pertinent to peacekeeping. From the first deployment, the Mongolian armed forces have analyzed and reflected all the lessons learned and operational experiences for its ongoing and future operations. At the same time, the Mongolian government and its military are identifying and solving the challenges to developing sustainable peace-support capabilities for the UN and coalition peace-support operations.

Besides its survival strategy in a tough neighborhood, the key factor behind Mongolia's motivations is the country's overall effort to raise its image, profile, and prestige in the international arena. To transform its military into a modern, capable, and professional force is another key factor. The MAF benefits from its participation in peace-support operations in terms of experience, training, education, and military-to-military cooperation with other countries. The military is aware of its shortcomings, like limited capabilities, lack of personnel, poor operational language proficiency (i.e., English and French), operational and tactical training, and improper equipment. However, Mongolia looks to NATO as its model of a world-class military force and therefore, orients its reform efforts to achieving the level of new NATO members. To recap, Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations is closely linked to its strategy of survival and elevates Mongolia's international prestige to that of a responsible member, while its participation offers spin-off benefits for the Mongolian military as it moves forward.

The ability to participate in peace-support operations largely depends on how the military accomplishes and implements modernization. Mongolian defense policies and concepts are generally directed to improving its defense capability and developing an appropriate and capable force structure. The progress of Mongolia's military modernization has been slow and should increase in the near and mid-term. The

Mongolian military modernization plans seem to be implemented in some degree; however, deep reform is not being implemented. Adequate funding, highly educated civilian and military personnel, and sustainable capabilities are required for Mongolia in order to accelerate efforts in its military modernization. Mongolia's participation in peace-support operations will influence any acceleration towards modernization and transformation of the military, identifying the vulnerabilities in old military planning, training, equipment, and acquisition processes that desperately require changes.

The government of Mongolia has supported its military and formulated its defense policies based on peace-support capability development at every level. Mongolia has made all necessary changes within existing laws and adopted new laws, directions, guidelines, procedures, recommendations, orders and other documentation in this matter. Developing peace-support operations capabilities makes Mongolia more able to deploy full-size, sustainable battalions and brigade-size forces to peace-support operations in complex peacekeeping environment. If modernization and capability development are implemented as predicted, the Mongolian military could become "world-class" peacekeepers that operate more effectively with other multinational forces. Although Mongolia now has several plans for capability development, which are reflected in key national security statements as well as in each government's action plans, in reality, Mongolia's military modernization efforts much depends on foreign military assistance.

Foreign military assistance is one of the most critical and influential factors for Mongolia's peace-support capability development and modernization. Mongolia needs to continue and strengthen its military-to-military relationship with other countries, especially with the U.S., in order to get the necessary training and logistics assets to support its deployments and develop peace-support operations capability. Mongolia has used effectively and efficiently the limited foreign military assistance it has received to develop tactical capability; now Mongolia needs the foreign assistance to achieve much more strategic and operational levels of goals, for example, civil-military relations and in particular, defense-education reform.

The Mongolian case is a classic example of healthy civil-military relations, characterized by a democratic civil-military decision-making process and effective

interagency collaboration between civilians and military institutions. Civilian and military institutions have closely cooperated and supported each other since Mongolia started its contribution to peace-support operations. The military has provided professional military advice to civilians in a decision-making level, and foreign policy and defense agencies have shared and exchanged information as well as educated each other in order to make decisions to participate in peace-support operations. Mechanisms are already in place between the foreign affairs and defense ministries to participate in peace-support operations, and there is no an argument about who will dominate in the policy decision-making process. To sustain healthy democratic, civil-military relations, Mongolia needs a system to educate civilian decision-makers and their staff at their civilian or defense institutions. Moreover, needs to fix gaps and overlaps that exist in relevant laws, regulations, and networks, between not only civilian and military institutions, but also among security institutions, and develop the national overarching strategy for peace-support operations at the level of the National Security Council. This process should not be led by parochial interests, but rather, it should be done in more scientific and pragmatic manner.

The Mongolian Armed Forces personnel have gained tremendous experience and knowledge since their participation in peace-support operations. However, the Mongolian military have not fully integrated and circulated all this knowledge and experience into the military training and education institutions. The National Defense University of Mongolia and other military educational institutions are required to modify and adjust their educational and training programs to meet today's requirements and the need to recruit experienced, knowledgeable, and trained academics and scholars. The education system changes will take time to develop because the foundation of the current military education system is still based on Soviet-style military education, especially at the National Defense University. Without changing it, the Mongolian military cannot achieve its desired end-state and objectives of pursuing education and training capability development. However, quite later in 2010, Mongolian civilian and military leaders realized the importance of the defense educational institutions for developing civilian defense experts and military professionals to lead and implement military modernization

goals, which basically revolve around Mongolia's ambition to provide soldiers for peace-support operations. Since adjustments to increase research, educational, and training capabilities of the National Defense University for peace-support operations were limited in 2010, it would be risky to predict the results. But Mongolia presents useful lessons for others who are embarking on global peacekeeping ambitions—the sustained participation in peacekeeping operations could be challenged if the defense educational institutions are not on board. The defense educational institutions should serve as the main source of research, education, and training to expose civilian and military professionals to a systemic understanding of peace-support operations.

Recently, the military played a dominant role in Mongolia's commitment to peace-support operations. However, in order to gain support from the public and politicians and increase efficiency in peace-support operations, Mongolia needs to diversify its commitment further by including uniformed personnel from other security institutions: border troops, internal troops, emergency forces, intelligence, and police. Mongolia needs to change its policy and incorporate civilians and civilian police personnel in peace-support operations. This will help increase its commitment. Also, this policy will increase the niche capabilities of the Mongolian security forces for more complex peace-support operations, because all players will bring a unique set of capabilities, skills, and knowledge. At the same time, these diversified deployments will increase the interagency cooperation and interoperability of Mongolian security forces as well as civilians. Mongolia seeks new approaches and ways in its commitment to peace-support operations without a well-prepared and good road map.

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