



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

1966

The evolution of United States foreign policy
towards Spain 1945 to 1955.

Patton, James Matthew.

Tufts University

<https://hdl.handle.net/10945/9507>

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun




Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.


Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

**NPS ARCHIVE
1966
PATTON, J.**



Thesis
P2705



DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101

THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SPAIN
1945 TO 1955

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

April 1, 1966

James M. Patton
LCdr. // USN

This paper is submitted as one half
of the thesis requirement for
the M.A.L.D. degree.

NPS Archive
1966
Patton, J

~~Thesis~~
P2705

1966
1966
1966

PREFACE

In the study of the conduct and control of foreign policy we are seldom able to discern with clarity the exact point of departure from one course of action with regard to another country to a different course, perhaps diametrically opposed to the first. The locus of change is more often than not obscured by the many and complex variables affecting both nations involved in any particular policy set. Fruitful analysis becomes haphazard, if not downright impossible, when more than one participant must react dramatically and sometimes unpredictably to daily internal and external pressures.

It is indeed rare in modern times to discover a policy set of some importance whose twistings and turnings stand out relatively open and unobscured. This can occur only when one of the two participants has remained frozen throughout the duration of the policy under analysis; frozen in the sense that it has remained immutable against all pressures for change. Among the nations of the world Franco Spain stands nearly alone as just such a frozen constant within an arena of variables. For over one quarter of a century the administration, its governmental hierarchy, its politics, and its modus operandi has remained fundamentally unchanged. It is this characteristic of almost drastic sameness that endows Spain with utility for research and an appeal for the student of foreign policy.

By far the most interesting point of focus in policy analysis is in the vicinity of radical alteration. In the history of United States foreign policy there have been few alterations as swiftly made or as total in their effect as that which occurred vis-à-vis

Spain during the period from 1945 to 1955. The actions and purposes of the United States throughout that decade as it altered its course and evolved its policy with Spain stand out all the more clearly for analysis because of the latter's nearly desperate inflexibility.

This paper will trace the events that took place during that span of ten years, emphasizing those that were causative or focal to United States policy, and pausing only briefly with those that were merely contributory. As a necessary preamble, certain events that predated the 1945 to 1955 period will be given some initial attention. Otherwise, all other events chosen to illustrate policy evolution will be drawn from within the period and will be presented in chronological order.

Having assumed Spain to be a fixed quantity, attention is given only incidentally to actions taken by the Spanish Government. Due to the necessarily restricted depth of this study some events that were germane, but of minor importance, to the formulation of United States policy have been entirely omitted. The Spanish occupation of Tangier was one such event. Where lengthy details have been left out suitable explanations accompany the text.

Some running analysis follows the presentation of the more important events and at the conclusion of the account a short summary enumerates such essentials of analysis as the assumptions held by various policymakers and the possible alternatives to those assumptions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|-----|------------------------------------|----|
| I | The Background Years | 1 |
| II | The Beginnings of a Spanish Policy | 10 |
| III | The Policy Takes Shape | 19 |
| IV | The Initiative Passes to Europe | 28 |
| V | Spain is Seen in a New Prospective | 36 |
| VI | The Spanish Policy is Reversed | 49 |
| | Summary | 55 |
| | Bibliography | 57 |

I

THE BACKGROUND YEARS

No treatment of Spain in the post World War II era is possible without a backward glance at the Spanish Civil War of 1936 to 1939. Perhaps the single most important character of that war was Don Francisco Franco Y Bahamonde who, until 12:30 A.M., July 17 1936, was an outwardly loyal general in the regular army of Republican Spain. Franco, at 44, was a much decorated hero of the bloody Riff campaign in Spanish Morocco and also a product of the aristocratic officer corps typical of most European armies. A graduate of the Alcázar and one of the organizers of the rugged Spanish Foreign Legion, the General's first loyalty was to the Army, and through the Army to the social order which it protected. Included in this social order was, of course, the Roman Catholic Church in Spain, of which Franco and many of his fellow officers were devout members.

In the few years since the birth of the Spanish Republic in 1931, General Franco and his military contemporaries had watched with growing alarm as "Radical" and "Popular Front" governments had whittled away at the power of the Church in the name of the "democratic republic of workers."¹ Religious orders were suppressed, divorce was legalized, Church property was confiscated, and the Jesuits (who controlled much of the educational system in Spain) were expelled. Then came the Army's turn. The socialist government that came to power in February 1936, slashed the Army's

¹Carlton J. H. Hayes, The United States and Spain (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951), p. 90.

appropriation, reduced its authorized strength, and forceably retired 8,000 commissioned officers. Generals known to be of conservative sympathies were removed from positions of power and politely exiled to distant posts.² General Franco, who had risen to Chief of Staff of the Army was dispatched to the island of Tenerife in the Canaries.

These rapid changes to the long entrenched social system were not accomplished without serious popular unrest and friction. Ideological differences gave way to demonstrations and then to riots. The riots brought police repression in ever severer terms. Gun battles in the streets between Left and Right (the "Popular Front" and the Falange Party) became the order of the day.³

At some point during that spring and early summer of 1936, the long-simmering dissatisfaction and frustration of the Spanish Officer Corps crystallized into a full-blown conspiracy. Loosely allied with the Falange Party, the senior army commanders plotted to remove the incumbent socialist government by force. By late June three key general officers were committed to action: General Mola in Navarra and Old Castile, General Queipo de Llano in Andalucía, and General Francisco Franco, who was still on Tenerife. Franco's role would be the assumption of command of all Spanish forces in Morocco and the movement of those forces to Spain where they would link up with those of Mola and Queipo de Llano to form a pincers around the seat of the Republican Government in Madrid. General José Sanjurjo, "The Lion of the Riff," who had led an abortive officers' revolt in 1932,

²Hayes, The United States, p. 101.

³An excellent account of the period leading up to the revolt is found in Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), pp. 3 - 130.

would fly from exile in Portugal to Salamanca where he would take command of the insurgents, who were soon to be known as the Movimiento Nacional.

Plans were carefully laid for Franco's trip from Tenerife to Tetuan, in Morocco. If he arrived before the moment of revolt his presence would alert the Government; if he delayed, the rank and file might hesitate to follow rebellious officers of less distinguished reputation. A network of agents arranged for a modern British airplane of private ownership to be placed at his disposal on the airfield at Las Palmas, the main island of the Canaries.⁴ The date chosen for the revolt was July 18 1936, and two nights earlier General Franco caught the midnight interisland steamer that would take him to Las Palmas.

Awaiting this uprising by its generals was a Spain already in agony. On July 11, a bitter attack had been made on the floor of the Spanish Cortes against the Government by José Calvo Sotelo, a distinguished Conservative deputy and former Minister of Finance. "That," screamed Dolores Ibarruri, the Communist deputy known as La Pasionaria, "is your last speech!" Before dawn on July 13, Sotelo was taken from his home by members of the Guardias de Asalto (shock police), and squeezed into an official car for a ride to a local cemetery. En route, he was shot twice in the back of the neck by a professional pistolero brought along especially for the occasion.⁵ The shock and sense of outrage that swept the Spanish nation in the following days

⁴An interesting view of this side light on the conspiracy is given in Sir Robert Hodgson, Spain Resurgent (London: Hutchinson, 1953), pp. 39-40.

⁵Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 121-124.

aptly set the stage for the Army revolt.

The revolt however, did not proceed exactly as planned. Catalonia had been promised autonomy by the Government and indeed provided much of the proletarian base for the socialist movement. When General Goded, one of Franco's fellow conspirators, arrived in Barcelona to lead the uprising there he was arrested, court-martialed, and executed. Then, on July 20, General Sanjurjo's plane crashed on the way to Salamanca and the uprising was left without a leader to face a legitimate government that was fast rallying support. Besides having the advantage of controlling the machinery of the central government with unified leadership, the Republic also possessed the gold reserves of the Bank of Spain and two well trained military organizations distinct from the Army - the Guardia Civil, and the Guardia de Asalto. Using the loyal province of Catalonia as its base, the Republican Government showed that it was capable of tenacious resistance to the Army's rebellion. What perhaps had begun as a typical coup by a military junta now became war; war with all of its attendant trappings and with that special ferocity peculiar to those conflicts where a nation state attempts to kill a part of itself.

As the Government's counterattack grew in intensity the rebels found themselves desperately lacking two necessary ingredients for success in a protracted struggle: central leadership and an industrial base of supply. The first ingredient was provided at the earliest opportunity for a conference of the senior partners in the revolt. After nearly two months of continuous seesaw fighting the

generals met at the airfield at Salamanca on September 12. Obviously, the unified command of the rebel soldiery must be given to the most capable warrior; but also to the warrior with the greatest prestige and popular appeal. The "Lion of the Riff" was dead and the other generals were mostly unknown to (or hated by) the people of Spain. The one exception was Franco, and so, by unanimous consent, he became the Generalissimo, El Caudillo, and, by a Decree dated September 29 1936, the "Head of the Government of the Spanish State."⁶

The second ingredient, the source of supply, was more difficult to procure. It was to become even more of a difficulty for the Republicans. Leon Blum's French "Popular Front" Government in Paris was a first cousin of the Madrid Government and therefore received the Republicans' first call for help. Blum was anxious to respond immediately but first had to overcome the resistance of his President, M. Albert Lebrun, who feared that to supply arms to the socialist government of Spain would provide the fascist states, Nazi Germany and Italy, with an excuse for sending arms to Franco, with whom they seemed to be in sympathetic communication. Blum had his way however, and by August 1, less than two weeks after the revolt began, French bombers and bombs, artillery pieces, machineguns and bullets were arriving in Republican Spain. Just north of the Pyrenees training camps were opened and the recruiting of international volunteers began.

The British, sensing the escalation that might result if the restless tigers in Berlin, Rome, and Moscow were to choose sides in the Spanish conflict desperately pressed for neutrality. The Conserva-

⁶Hodgson, Spain Resurgent, pp. 45-46.

tive Baldwin Government was involved in the process of reversing an eighteen year trend of disarmament in view of the menacing complexion of the continent and simply could not risk another impotent adventure in leadership like the Abyssinian debacle of the previous year. Even Winston Churchill, from his seat in the House of Commons, would admit "an absolute rigid neutrality with the strongest possible protest against any breach of it is the only safe course at the present time."⁷

Britain took the lead in establishing the International Non-Intervention Committee on September 9 1936. The Agreement fostered by this Committee and "adhered to" by every nation in Europe had the dual effect of denying the historical rights of a belligerent to Franco and making it next to impossible for the Republican Government to procure arms through normal channels.

Across the Atlantic, the United States was also in a mood for neutrality. The post World War I Revisionists had done their work so well that even membership on the World Court was considered a dangerous entanglement. Franklin Roosevelt, facing a fall election, was busy administering trial and error economics to a still largely depressed nation. During the previous February an apprehensive Congress had passed the second in a series of Neutrality Acts, designed to ensure that the administration's interest could not turn toward foreign conflicts. Roosevelt's interest had turned however, but only in a private way. We are told by Mrs. Roosevelt that "Franklin frequently refrained from supporting causes in which he believed because of political realities. In the case of the Spanish

⁷Hodgson, Spain Resurgent, p. 47.

Civil War, for instance, we had to remain neutral, though Franklin knew quite well he wanted the democratic government to be successful."⁸

The former Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson however, was ready to make it very clear that the failure of the United States to help Republican Spain (through misdirected observance of the Non-Intervention Agreement) would be a cause for national guilt.

The Republican Government of Spain has been recognized as the true Government of Spain by our Government... . One of the most important of these rights which a state like Spain is entitled to expect from another Government, which has recognized it as a friendly neighbor in the family of nations, is the right of self-defense against any future rebellions which may challenge its authority.

Such a nation (has) the exclusive right ... to purchase the necessary supplies and munitions for the purpose of putting down the rebellion.

The first thing to be said about this agreement was that it was a complete abandonment of a code of practice which the international world had adopted through preceding ages The non-intervention agreement at once became a mockery and a failure

If this Loyalist Government is overthrown, it is evident now that its defeat will be solely due to the fact that it has been deprived of its right to buy from us and from other friendly nations the munitions necessary for its defense.⁹

While the Republican Government of Spain could not buy munitions from its old friends, a new friend suddenly appeared to provide willing assistance of various kinds. Prior to the revolt the Republicans had had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but on August 27, six weeks after the fighting started, Comrade Marcel Rosenberg arrived from Moscow to present himself as Stalin's Ambassador. Three weeks later the Russian Premier expressed his sentiments and his intentions

⁸Anna Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 161.

⁹Henry L. Stimson, Letter to The New York Times; published by the Times, January 24, 1939.

in a telegram to the Communist Party in Spain.

The workers of the Soviet Union in rendering all their aid to the revolutionary masses in Spain, are merely doing their duty. They are aware that to liberate Spain from oppression by Fascist reactionaries is not the duty of Spaniards only, but the common task of advanced and progressive humanity. Brotherly greetings!"¹⁰

On the heels of this telegram came Russian technicians, military instructors, engineers, and a handful of generals under assumed names. To maintain surveillance on these advisers Stalin provided a contingent of the Tcheka which was allowed by the Republican Government to employ the same methods that it used within the Soviet Union. In addition to the advisers Russia provided military planes, artillery, vehicles and other munitions on a strictly cash basis.

Now, despite pledges to the Non-Intervention Committee, both France and the Soviet Union were helping the Republicans to resist the Franco forces which had begun to call themselves Nationalists. If they should overwhelm Franco, Spain would emerge as a socialist-communist triumph and the balance of power in Europe would shift toward a Moscow, Paris, Madrid axis and away from the other axis that ran through Berlin and Rome.

Both Hitler and Mussolini were acutely aware of the stakes being risked in Spain and agreed that they could not afford a Leftist victory that would effectively flank both of them. On November 18 1936, both the German and Italian Governments formally

¹⁰Hodgson, Spain Resurgent, p. 51.

broke off diplomatic relations with Republican Spain and recognized the Franco Nationalist Government in Salamanca. Ten days later Franco signed a secret treaty of friendship and non-aggression with El Duce and the problem of the second ingredient, a source of supply, was solved.

It is not within the scope of this paper to detail either the relative effectiveness of the various external assistance provided to both sides of the Spanish Civil War or the events of the war itself. Suffice it to say that the Axis Powers provided enough of whatever was necessary to tip the scales in favor of Francisco Franco. On March 18 1939, the victorious Nationalist Army paraded in Madrid and two weeks later Franco declared the war to be officially over.

II

THE BEGINNINGS OF A SPANISH POLICY

Throughout the world liberal democrats, laborites, fellow travelers, socialists, and communists were shocked and dismayed by the Civil War's outcome. Dismay turned to foreboding as the now unchallenged ruler of Spain became the fourth signatory (with Germany, Japan, and Italy) to the Anti-Comintern Pact and later withdrew from the League of Nations. Of course, Hitler's growing incursions had already alerted most of Europe to the coming conflagration and in an effort to allay suspicions of Spain's intentions after the Civil War Franco informed Britian on September 27 1938, that,

The Government of Spain intends to maintain complete neutrality in the event of the outbreak of war in Central Europe on condition that no Power provokes war in Nationalist territory. Their air and armed forces will in no circumstances cross the Spanish frontier so long as Spain is not attacked.¹

After signing the Anti-Comintern Pact, Franco felt it necessary to give similiar assurances of neutral intentions to the French Ambassador to Madrid and finally, on September 4 1939, the Decree of Neutrality was issued.

As, officially war has broken out and unfortunately exists between Poland, Great Britian and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, I ordain by the present Decree the most strict neutrality on the part of Spanish subjects in accordance with the contemporary laws and principles of International Law.²

¹Hodgson, Spain Resurgent, p. 131.

²Ibid., p. 165.

Neutrality for Spain was of course the only sensible path open to Franco. Spain had not been either strong or wealthy before the Civil War and could ill afford the disrupted economy and physical loss of manpower brought on by nearly three years of fighting. No real degree of recovery had been accomplished during the five month span between the Civil War and Hitler's invasion of Poland and it was obvious that Franco could make no meaningful contribution to any joint venture with the Axis. A belligerent Spain that might, with luck (and a good deal of German help) seize Gibraltar and seal off the Mediterranean might also be a vulnerable Spain accessible as a backdoor into "Fortress Europe." Why should Hitler care to divide the spoils of his triumphant early campaigns with a non-productive ally; particularly after side-stepping any communist menace by signing the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union?

However, on meeting with the unexpected tenacity of Winston Churchill and the Royal Air Force in August 1940, and the general shift of focus from Europe to North Africa, the Führer decided that Spain might just serve to turn the British flank. But Franco proved even less eager to join in the hostilities than had Mussolini. Nazi documents captured by the Allies after the war show that Spain's endurance as an active belligerent could last no more than two or three months and that any military success that Franco might achieve against Britain would necessitate an unacceptable level of support from Germany.³ With the coming of fall and the indefinite postponement of the invasion of Britain Hitler decided that Spain's partici-

3U. S., Department of State, The Spanish Government and the Axis, European Series No. 8 (Washington, 1946), pp. 3-6.

pation would be worth the support required. A personal meeting took place between Hitler and Franco in the former's private parlor car at the railroad station at Hendaye, France, on October 23, 1940. Franco was quick to express his sympathy for the Axis cause and his willingness to take his place as a full partner in war. However, there must be extensive preparations in Spain before she could become such a partner; these he enumerated in the economic, military, and political spheres. Despite a plea by Hitler for immediate action the conference ended with no firm commitment of Spanish entry.⁴

Although Franco agreed in December 1940, to allow German tankers to refuel U-boats and Nazi destroyers in out-of-the-way bays on the Spanish coast he balked at a German proposal to employ German troops within Spain on the following month for an assault on Gibraltar.⁵ By February Hitler had reached the point of bribing Franco with promises of much needed grain to make up for a poor Spanish harvest and curtailed shipments from the western hemisphere. Still Franco demurred, though again with many earnest confirmations of his loyalty towards Berlin and Rome.⁶ Finally, in June 1941, Hitler began his push into Russia and plans for a more active role on the part of Spain no longer interested him. Indeed, within twenty months Berlin would be satisfied with a simple pledge that Spain would not allow herself to be invaded by the Allies.⁷

Naturally, Spain's non-participation was pleasing to the Western

⁴Department of State, The Spanish Government, pp. 21-25.

⁵Ibid., pp. 26-28.

⁶Ibid., pp. 28-35.

⁷Ibid., p. 35.

Powers who had more than enough to do in containing Germany and Italy (and later Japan). Churchill's, and then Roosevelt's objectives were to prevent Spain from (1) joining the Axis as a belligerent, (2) giving military assistance short of going to war, (3) supplying the Axis with strategic materials, and (4) withholding strategic materials from the Allies.⁸ Due to an effective policy of economic coercion and concession and to Franco's delaying tactics with Hitler all of these objectives were either completely or relatively successful.

After entering the war the United States initially followed a policy of coercion only and stopped all shipments to Spain, probably due to a notion prevalent in the State Department hierarchy that Spain would ultimately join the war on the Axis side in any case.⁹ Sumner Welles however, acting during March 1942, as Secretary of State in Cordell Hull's absence, persuaded President Roosevelt to order continuation of shipments and to appoint as Ambassador to Spain a distinguished Roman Catholic, Carlton J. H. Hayes.¹⁰ Concession and conciliation had their desired effects and the groundwork was laid for further disassociation of Madrid from Berlin and Rome.

Again, it is not within the scope of this paper to relate the many and varied details of Spain's neutral policy (or of the breaches thereof) during the course of the war. It is enough to point out that Spain took no hostile action against the Allies (with one notable exception, the Blue Division, which will be mentioned in connection with the Potsdam

⁸Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 32.

⁹Ibid., pp. 32-33.

¹⁰For a personal account of this appointment see Carlton J. H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), pp. 1-19.

Conference), and denied the Axis Powers all but token use of her territory for military operations. It is however, very important to relate the attitudes of the western leaders of that period because those attitudes would determine the post war policies vis-à-vis the Franco Government in Spain.

quote by Eleanor

Franklin Roosevelt, it is recalled, was sympathetic with the Republican forces during the Spanish Civil War but on the occasion of the North African invasion in November 1942, he wrote to reassure Franco:

Your nation and mine are friends in the best sense of the word ... you and I are sincerely desirous of the continuation of that friendship for our mutual good I believe the Spanish Government and the Spanish people wish to maintain neutrality and to remain outside the war. Spain has nothing to fear from the United Nations. I am, my dear General, your sincere friend.¹¹

But despite the warm tone of that letter Roosevelt was still far from being convinced that Franco was altogether respectable. In June 1944, the President disparaged Spain's "neutrality" because "in his judgement Spain had not yet sufficiently reduced the volume of its material aid to Germany" and he "did not think any of us were satisfied with what the Government of Spain had been doing since we have been in the war."¹²

Simultaneously, in Congress sentiments stronger than lack of satisfaction were being voiced by lawmakers who were eager to see Franco share the impending fate of Hitler. During the previous

¹¹Hayes, Wartime Mission, p. 91.

¹²Conversation with President Roosevelt quoted by the Honorable F. C. Crawford, U. S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 90, pt. 9, p. A2751.

February the Honorable John M. Coffee of the State of Washington had cited several examples of Spanish assistance to the Axis. The most important (to Coffee) being the contribution of Franco's neutral merchant fleet in bringing various products from North and South America to Spain for, according to Coffee, eventual shipment to Germany. With surprising lack of respect for international law (and a strange interpretation of the principle of freedom of the seas) Representative Coffee urged Congress to "drive Spanish shipping from the free waters of the world until Spain once again returns to the family of civilized democratic nations."¹³

Now, in June of 1944, Coffee took encouragement from Roosevelt's attitude and proposed House Resolution 600. After reciting the history of Franco's association with the Axis Powers Coffee alleged that it was Franco's goal to win back the lost empire of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. In addition Coffee described conditions of subversion and pro-Nazism in Latin America induced by the Falange, Spain's single political party. The remedy, in the words of Coffee's resolution was to:

... speed our victory and guarantee a lasting peace by immediately breaking off all diplomatic relations with the Nazi-Falangist Government of Spain," and further,

... that the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Axis Government of Spain should be followed by the appointment of a military commission which will be charged with the task of getting arms, ammunition and medical supplies to the heroic Republican guerrilla armies of Spain when their revolt, timed to weaken the Nazi armies in their moment of greatest crisis, creates in Spain one of the active and decisive battlefields of this global war.¹⁴

¹³U. S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Vol.90, pt. 2, pp. 2040-2044.

¹⁴U. S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Vol.90, pt. 10, pp. A3134-3135.

Although the House Foreign Affairs Committee did little more than politely ignore this resolution (or a second, almost identical one the following year), it did serve as an indicator that the political passions raised by the 1936 to 1939 war had not yet cooled. A measure of those anti-Franco passions was a Madison Square Garden rally of the following January where the same Congressman Coffee warned a packed house of 18,000 sympathizers that:

Spain is a rich country, an industrial Mldas. Spain has everything to forge a powerful industrial bastion. A post war Spain controlled by German cartels would be a powerful industrial and political base of operations against one main target: the United States of America.¹⁵

Two months later President Roosevelt took the occasion of changing ambassadors to Spain for an opportunity to define his precise views toward the government in Madrid. Because the letter he wrote to the new ambassador, Mr. Norman Armour, largely set the theme for the policy that took shape in the years immediately following it is quoted here in full.

March 10, 1945

My Dear Mr. Armour:

In connection with your new assignment as Ambassador to Madrid I want you to have a frank statement of my views with regard to our relations with Spain.

Having been helped to power by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and having patterned itself along totalitarian lines the present regime in Spain is naturally the subject of distrust by a great many American citizens who find it difficult to see the justification for this country to continue to maintain relations with such a regime. Most certainly we do not forget Spain's official position with and assistance to our Axis enemies at a time when the fortunes of war were less favorable to us, nor can we disregard the activities, aims, organizations, and public utterances of the Falange, both past and present. These memories cannot be wiped out

by actions more favorable to us now that we are about to achieve our goal of complete victory over those enemies of ours with whom the present Spanish regime identified itself in the past spiritually and by its public expressions and acts.

The fact that our government maintains formal diplomatic relations with the present Spanish regime should not be interpreted by anyone to imply approval of that regime and its sole party, the Falange, which has been openly hostile to the United States and which has tried to spread its fascist party ideas in the Western Hemisphere. Our victory over Germany will carry with it the extermination of Nazi and similiar ideologies.

As you know, it is not our practice in normal circumstances to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries unless there exists a threat to international peace. The form of government in Spain and the policies pursued by that Government are quite properly the concern of the Spanish people. I should be lacking in candor, however, if I did not tell you that I can see no place in the community of nations for governments founded on fascist principles.

We all have the most friendly feelings for the Spanish people and we are anxious to see a development of cordial relations with them. There are many things which we could and normally would be glad to do in economic and other fields to demonstrate that friendship. The initiation of such measures is out of the question at this time, however, when American sentiment is so profoundly opposed to the present regime in power in Spain.

Therefore, we earnestly hope that the time may come soon when Spain may assume the role and the responsibility which we feel it should assume in the field of international cooperation and understanding.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt¹⁶

One month later President Roosevelt was dead, but it was soon to become apparent that his views on the Spanish question would guide American policy throughout the early post war period. Indeed, the letter to Ambassador Armour gave more than an outline for the conduct of United States relations with Spain. "We do not forget ... nor can we disregard" wrote Roosevelt, those memories that "cannot be wiped

¹⁶J. S., Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1945, p. 466.

out." Therefore there would be no absolution for Spain's past derelictions. The President took care to emphasize that normal relations should not "imply approval" of the Franco regime or of the Falange, thus leaving the door open for future disassociation.

After linking Spain with Nazi Germany Roosevelt's prediction that Nazi and "similiar ideologies" would be exterminated after Allied victory casts the dark shadow of a threat. As if to provide a path for future assault Roosevelt went on to qualify American non-interference in foreign internal affairs, "unless there exists a threat to international peace." The question of exactly what constitutes such a threat would be debated at length in the future handling of the Spanish problem. But, according to President Roosevelt, the resolution of that problem should be the "concern of the Spanish people." And, if they should fail (to replace the Franco Government) they could have "no place in the community of nations" and more, they could not expect American help "in economic and other fields."

The implication was clear; the people of Spain must act. They must somehow rid themselves of their unacceptable government. Further, they must act "soon" so that they might assume whatever responsibilities that the United States would assign to them. Now that the policy had been formulated the implementation would be left to Roosevelt's successors.

III

THE POLICY TAKES SHAPE

Two weeks after the President's death the United Nations Conference on International Organization opened in San Francisco. Spain, who had never declared war on either Germany or Japan was not eligible to attend.

During the session of June 19, ¹⁹⁴⁵ the delegation from Mexico requested that an interpretation be made concerning Article 4, Chapter II of the United Nations Charter, which states:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.¹

Mention was made of the close relationship between Franco Spain and Nazi Germany and the representatives of Mexico submitted the following interpretive commentary:

It is the understanding of the delegation of Mexico that paragraph 2 of Chapter III (Article 4, Chapter II, of the Charter) cannot be applied to the States whose regimes have been established with the help of military forces belonging to the countries which have waged war against the United Nations, as long as those regimes are in power.²

The United States Assistant Secretary of State, James Dunn moved immediately to the support of the Mexican position:

¹United Nations, Yearbook for 1946-1947, Charter of the United Nations, p. 832.

²Ibid., p. 20.

The United States delegation is in complete accord with the statement of interpretation made by the delegation of Mexico and desires to associate itself with that declaration.³

It is interesting to speculate on this example of parliamentary finesse. The Mexican commentary seems almost a paraphrasing of the policy suggested by Franklin Roosevelt. However, had the United States introduced such an interpretation there might well have been some objection from the normally pro-Spanish Latin American nations. Indeed, only three, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay rose to join the United States (and Australia, Belgium, and the USSR), in support of adopting the interpretation.

Former Ambassador Hayes suggests that Mexico's initiative stemmed from pressure brought by Spanish Republican exiles living in Mexico.⁴ It is true that about 150,000 Republican refugees did escape to Mexico and other Latin American countries and in fact, Mexico was the seat of the Republican Government in exile. Moreover, the Mexican Government of the Civil War period was itself derived from a reaction against the aristocracy and the clergy and had therefore actively assisted the Loyalists against Franco. President Lázaro Cárdenas defied the Non-Intervention Agreement to send two million dollars worth of military aid to the Republican Government. By the time of the San Francisco Conference, Cárdenas had been replaced by the government of Avila Camacho who had worked with Washington

³U. S., Department of State, United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25 to June 26, 1945: Selected Documents (Washington, 1946), p. 577.

⁴Hayes, The United States, p. 157.

to reduce fascist influence in the western hemisphere and to bring Mexico into closer cooperation with the United States. During World War II Mexico had even come to appreciate American Lend-Lease (over \$38 million) and grants-in-aid.⁵ The extent to which Roosevelt's Spanish policy may or may not have influenced the Mexican delegation cannot be determined without additional evidence. In any case, the commentary submitted by the Mexicans was approved by the Conference.

In Britian meanwhile, a parallel policy had been developing in regard to Spain. On May 24 1944, Churchill had been moved to praise certain features of Franco's wartime conduct.

There is no doubt that if Spain had yielded to German blandishments and pressure ... our burden would have been much heavier In the dark days of the war the attitude of the Spanish Government in not giving our enemies passage through Spain was extremely helpful to us. It was especially so at the time of the North African liberation I must say that I shall always consider a service was rendered at this time by Spain not only to the British Empire and Commonwealth, but to the cause of the United Nations. I have no sympathy therefore with those who ... insult and abuse the Government of Spain whenever occasion serves.⁶

The tone of this speech and the success of the Allied armed forces prompted an overture by Franco on October 18, 1944. The Caudillo noted with alarm the dual ascendancy of the United States and the Soviet Union and suggested to Churchill a "grouping" of Spain and Britian. Churchill replied (with copies to both Ropsevelt and Stalin) that:

⁵For an interesting account of the evolution of Mexican foreign policy see Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 387-407.

⁶Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill, 1874-1952 (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1952), pp. 494-495.

Now that plans for the future of Europe and the world were under consideration the British Government could not overlook the constantly hostile attitude of the Falangist Party and its close relationship with the Nazis and Fascists. ...

It was out of the question for the British Government to support Spanish aspirations to participate in the future peace settlements. Neither was it likely that Spain would be invited to join the future world organization.⁷

and further,

I should be seriously misleading you if I did not at once remove any misconception that His Majesty's Government ~~are~~ prepared to consider any grouping of Powers in Western Europe or elsewhere on a basis of hostility towards, or of the alleged necessity of defense against, our Russian allies. The policy of His Majesty's Government remains firmly based upon the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 and they regard the continuance of Anglo-Russian collaboration, within the framework of the future world organization, as essential, not only to their own interests, but also to the future peace and prosperity of Europe as a whole.⁸

It is clear then that when the United States and the United Kingdom arrived at Potsdam on July 17 1945, their views on the Spanish question were roughly the same. The United States was, of course, represented by Harry Truman in place of Franklin Roosevelt, but Mr. Truman had been President less than one hundred days and had not begun to alter the pattern of policy which his predecessor had arranged.

The third member of the Potsdam Conference also had views on the Spanish question. To Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union Franco Spain was an undeclared belligerent enemy. After Hitler's break with Russia Franco had seen his opportunity to make a commitment in favor of the Axis and against his arch enemy of the Civil War days. Mindful of the

⁷Broad, Winston Churchill, p. 496.

⁸U.S.S.R., Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, etc., Vol. 1, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), pp. 395-396.

Soviet assistance rendered to the Republicans, Franco, in September 1941, presented Hitler with an 18,000 man military unit, named for the color of its shirts, the Blue Division. This group, allegedly of Falangist volunteers, were to be used by Germany only on the eastern front. These volunteers have been variously described; by some as "a good hearted gang of exceptionally virile men" and by others as "thieves and rapists."⁹ It is difficult to ascertain their real military contribution, if any. In July 1943, Ambassador Hayes took it on himself to suggest strongly to Franco that an adventure such as the Blue Division would be weighed more heavily by the Western Powers as support of Hitler rather than as revenge against Stalin.¹⁰ By the following October the Division was on its way back to Spain. Regardless of the true extent of the Spanish unit's military effectiveness, Stalin had been attacked within his borders by Spanish troops. This, coupled with the knowledge of Franco's attempt to lure the British into an anti-Soviet understanding provided the Russians with credible grievances to bring to the conference table.

At the very first session at Potsdam Stalin digressed from a discussion of the agenda to bring the matter of Franco Spain before the Allied leadership.¹¹ He expressed his opinion that the Spanish regime did not originate in Spain but had been imported and forced on the Spanish people by Germany and Italy. Stalin went on to declare that he considered that regime a danger to the United Nations and that

⁹Emmet John Hughes, Report From Spain (New York: Henry Holt, 1947), p. 235.

¹⁰Hayes, Wartime Mission, p. 159.

¹¹Harry S. Truman, Memoirs By Harry S. Truman (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), Vol. 1, p. 347.

he thought it would be well to create conditions that would enable the Spanish people to establish the regime they wanted. The problem was formally placed on the conference agenda and at the third session Prime Minister Churchill stated his views. "He said that he was against interfering in the affairs of a country which had not molested the Allies and believed it was a dangerous principle to break off relations because of Spain's internal conduct. He would deplore anything that might lead Spain back into civil war. He pointed out that the United Nations Charter had a provision against interference in the domestic affairs of a nation, and that it would be inconsistent, while preparing to ratify that Charter, to resort to action that would be prohibited under it."¹²

President Truman followed with a similar statement. He later recalled in his memoirs that, "I made it clear that I had no love for Franco and also that I had no desire to have any part in starting another civil war in Spain. There had been enough wars in Europe. I said that I would be happy to recognize another government in Spain but that I thought Spain itself must settle that question."¹³

Stalin, as Truman remembered, "said that this was no internal affair, because the Franco regime had been imposed on the Spanish people by Hitler and Mussolini. He said that he believed that his colleagues had no love for Franco and that he did not propose to renew civil war in Spain either. If breaking relations was too

¹²Truman, Memoirs, pp. 357-358.

¹³Ibid., p. 358.

severe a demonstration, he asked if there were not some other more flexible means by which the Big Three could let the Spanish people know that the three governments were in sympathy with the people of Spain and not Franco."¹⁴

Again, according to Truman, Churchill balked at breaking relations. "He referred to the valuable trade relations which Britain maintained with Spain. Unless he were convinced that breaking relations would bring about the desired results he did not want this old and well-established trade with Spain stopped."¹⁵

For the moment it seemed that the lines were drawn. No one of the Big Three was sympathetic with the Franco regime. They were all desirous of seeing it replaced, but not at the cost of another civil war. The question was one of interpretation of what action might constitute interference in Spain's internal affairs. Churchill believed that breaking diplomatic relations would constitute such interference (as well as jeopardize British trade). Truman, unused to summit conferences, seemed to be of the same opinion, but was probably less sure of his ground. Stalin held the opposite opinion and, though he appeared adamant, might settle for something less. According to Truman, Churchill, with his customary stubbornness, pressed for an immediate resolution of the discussion but, as Stalin seemed prepared to drag out the matter Truman lost patience. The President told the other two leaders that they could return to the problem at any time and, in any case, that he "did not come there to hold a police court hearing on

¹⁴Truman, Memoirs, p. 358.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 358.

something that was already settled or which would eventually be settled by the United Nations" and "that if they did not get to the main issues I was going to pack up and go home."¹⁶

But, as it turned out, it would be Churchill who would "pack up and go home." On the morning of July 26, he found himself out of office and by such an overwhelming vote of the British electorate that he "did not wish to remain even for one hour responsible for their affairs."¹⁷ Indeed, he would later repudiate responsibility "for any of the conclusions reached at Potsdam."¹⁸ However, it was Churchill's argument that held sway and the final conclusion concerning Spain was much closer to the existing policy of Britain and the United States than the strong line suggested by Stalin. In the words of the Protocol (Section IX):

The three governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record, and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.¹⁹

Thus, an article of faith enumerated in Churchill's letter to Franco (of October 1944), Roosevelt's letter to Armour (of March 1945), and the Mexican commentary at San Francisco had been nailed down. Spain was not wanted in post war international organization as long as the Franco Government remained in power. It would remain for future

¹⁶Truman, Memoirs, pp. 359-360.

¹⁷Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Abridged ed., London: Cassell, 1959), p. 950.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 947.

¹⁹U. S., Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-1949 (Washington, 1950), p. 45.

debates to decide what else, if anything, would be done to hasten the amputation of the Spanish Government from the body of the Spanish nation.

IV

THE INITIATIVE PASSES TO EUROPE

Throughout the closing months of World War II the Franco Government had of course discerned the strength and direction of the prevailing winds. In an effort to provide at least a show of movement towards becoming the kind of government that might be palatable to the Allies Franco took a series of steps. On July 13 1945, he fired José Luis Arrese, an ardent Falangist, from his post as Secretary-General of the Party.¹ Four days later Franco announced that his Cortes had passed a Fuero de los Españoles, a bill of rights. Although the bill contained such basic points as no incommunicado detainment, no search without warrant, universal eligibility to hold public office, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech, the rights were so hedged with exceptions and provisos as to be of little real value. Also, on July 17, Franco revealed that it was his intention to restore to Spain "the traditional monarch" but not until "some future date" which was left indefinite.²

Next, a new cabinet was formed which contained only two members of the Falange. The role of the Party was changed from a state political organization to an administrative "instrument of national unification." On July 27, the Vice-Secretariat of Popular Education, which controlled propaganda, was taken out of the Falange structure and placed under the Ministry of National Education.³ But even had the

¹Current History, September 1945, p. 264.

²Current History, December 1945, p. 536.

³Stanley G. Payne, Falange (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 240-241.

Big Three, then meeting at Potsdam, known of these moves it is doubtful that they would have been significantly impressed.

Would the quarantine of Spain from the United Nations now lead to other actions? In response to this question Truman's Secretary of State, James Byrnes, said on August 22 1945,

No change in United States policy toward Spain would be announced except that policy which was made plain at Potsdam. Economic policy would be changed only where it would be helpful to the United States and where it would promote the peace of Europe.⁴

Indeed, in the months following Potsdam the United States was much too busy mopping up Japan, demobilizing its giant military machine, and getting adjusted to living with the Russians to allow itself to be concerned with Spain. The next move, when it came, would be made by France.

During the period of German occupation in France the Communist Party had contributed greatly to the Resistance Movement and at the end of the war many départements throughout the country found themselves controlled by bands of armed and disciplined reds. Even General DeGaulle, who bore the Communists no love, was unable to exclude them from entering the Provisional Government in force. In the election of October 21 1945, the Communists polled over five million votes and the socialists over four and a half million; together, exactly fifty percent of the entire electorate. The Communist Party demanded, and received five cabinet posts, controlling the whole economic structure of France. Moreover, they exerted great pressure on DeGaulle for the top three portfolios, Foreign Affairs, War, and Interior. On January 20,

⁴U. S., Department of State Bulletin, August 26, 1945, p. 284.

1946, DeGaulle resigned from the Provisional Government and was replaced by Georges Bidault.⁵ Four weeks later, on February 27, the French Government formally requested the support of the United States in bringing before the United Nations Security Council the question of "certain recent developments" in Spain. The Department of State replied that such support could not be given because "the Government of the United States does not believe that a situation exists, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."⁶ On March 1 1946, before this exchange had been completed, France closed the Pyrenees frontier and broke off diplomatic and trade relations with Spain. On the same day, in Washington, the Honorable Charles Savage of the House of Representatives introduced House Resolution 539 which claimed that:

- 1) the present regime in Spain was exposed as being guilty of plotting against the military security of the United Nations.
- 2) the Nazi-Falange regime has permitted over one hundred German cartel factories to be established in Spain.
- 3) Nazi scientists are at work on atomic energy projects in laboratories in Spain.
- 4) German cartel managers are planning a third World War against the democracies.

and resolved,

to urge the President to protect American lives and security by immediately declaring an embargo ... until the Franco regime is replaced by a democratic Spanish government.⁷

In retrospect, the French actions and the Savage Resolution seem

⁵An interesting account of this period is given in Alexander Werth, France, 1940-1955 (London: Robert Hale, 1956), pp. 273-293.

⁶U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIV, p. 486.

⁷U. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 92, pt. 9, p. A1049.

perfectly in keeping with the prevailing international accord on the Spanish question. During the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly (January 10 to February 14, 1946), which had just come to a close in London, the Members had accepted a Panamanian resolution endorsing the anti-Franco statements made at San Francisco and Potsdam, and recommending that "the Members of the United Nations should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of these statements in the conduct of their future relations with Spain."⁸

No doubt the French Government believed that it was acting in accordance with the "spirit" of San Francisco and Potsdam when it closed its frontier and tried to bring Franco before the Security Council. Representative Savage must certainly have felt that he too was acting in the "spirit." Indeed, at the London session, the Soviet Union had acted to bar Spain (as a non-Member of the United Nations) from receiving aid under the newly established United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and no nation had seriously objected to that.⁹

But the wording of the Panamanian resolution was dangerously vague and already France had gone beyond whatever limits the U. S. Department of State had in mind. In order to unify and define their views the three governments, Great Britain, France, and the United States released, on March 4 1946, a Tripartite Statement.

It is agreed that so long as General Franco continues in control of Spain, the Spanish people cannot anticipate

⁸United Nations, Yearbook for 1946-1947, p. 67.

⁹Ibid., pp. 71-72.

full and cordial association with those nations of the world which have, by common effort brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian Fascism, which aided the present Spanish regime in its rise to power and after which the regime was patterned.

There is no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain On the contrary it is hoped that leading patriotic and liberal-minded Spaniards may soon find means to bring about a peaceful withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of the Falange, and the establishment of an interim or caretaker government under which the Spanish people may have an opportunity freely to determine the type of government they wish to have and to choose their leaders. Political amnesty, return of exiled Spaniards, freedom of assembly, and political association and provision for free public elections are essential. An interim government which would be and would remain dedicated to these ends should receive the recognition and support of all freedom-loving peoples.

Such recognition would include full diplomatic relations and the taking of such practical measures to assist in the solution of Spain's economic problems as may be practicable in the circumstances prevailing. Such measures are not now possible.¹⁰

Ambassador Armour had resigned in November 1945, and no successor had been appointed. Now it was clear why not. The three Western Powers were going to gamble that a policy of isolating Spain diplomatically and economically (in so far as they could) would shake Franco's hold on the country without starting another civil war. Perhaps if Franco weakened, even a little, some "patriotic and liberal-minded" Spaniards might be found to bloodlessly depose him and his government and his political party. Despite the blushing protest that there was "no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain" the policy of the West had now all but come to match the views of Stalin at Potsdam.

By way of justification of this extension in policy the Department

¹⁰U. S., Department of State Bulletin, March 17 1946, p. 412.

of State issued, together with the text of the Tripartite Statement, a little booklet containing copies of official German documents under the title, The Spanish Government and the Axis. Known as the "White Paper on Spain" this booklet of captured material illustrated the depth and character of Franco's involvement with Hitler and Mussolini.

Now it was obvious that the proper "conduct of future relations with Spain" was to have no relations with Spain. However, there was already some evidence of resistance to this program. In the House of Representatives the Honorable William Barry took exception.

... if we are to break off diplomatic relations with Spain because the Spanish Government ... was pro-Axis ... what about Soviet Russia which not only collaborated with Hitler in starting the war, but took half of Poland as a pay off and then attacked and seized a part of tiny Finland? Are we going to establish one principle for Spain because she is weak and the Communists do not like her, and another for Russia because she is strong?¹¹

The answer seemed to be, "Yes." On April 8 1946, the Polish representative to the United Nations requested the Security Council examine the situation arising from the existence and activities of the Franco regime in Spain. Poland claimed that such existence and activities "have led to international friction and endangered international peace and security."¹² Poland moved that all nations who maintained diplomatic realtions with the Franco Government sever them immediately. The Polish position was supported by France, Mexico and the Soviet Union, but Great Britian was concerned that any collective action taken might interfere with matters that were

¹¹U. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 91, pt. 13, p. A5457.

¹²United Nations, Yearbook for 1946-1947, p. 345.

within domestic jurisdiction. A sub-committee was set up to investigate the Franco regime and to determine whether or not an actual threat to world peace existed. The sub-committee submitted its report on June 6 1946. While it was able to confirm the facts leading to the San Francisco and Potsdam decisions, it could not find cause, under the rules of the United Nations Charter, for the kind of action that Poland had proposed. There had been no breach of the peace, no act of aggression had been proven, and no threat to the peace of the world had been established.

By the following December the Polish delegation had shifted its attack to the General Assembly of the United Nations. "The situation in Spain had deteriorated" since June, according to the Poles, and now it was imperative that "the General Assembly should recommend that each Member of the U. N. terminate forthwith diplomatic relations with the Franco regime."¹³ In addition, the Byelorussian representative submitted an amendment to the Polish resolution to the effect that economic relations be terminated as well.

Although these suggestions seemed to conform remarkably with the program expressed by France, Britain, and the United States in their Tripartite Statement of March, neither Britain or the United States were anxious now, in December, to see them adopted by the United Nations. *(US delegate to the UN)* Senator Tom Connally, appearing before the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly, expressed the feeling that the termination of diplomatic relations with Spain would only result in "cutting off the Spanish people from communication with the rest of the

¹³United Nations, Yearbook for 1946-1947, p. 127.

world" and that terminating economic relations would produce "economic and political chaos ... which could not be prevented from degenerating into civil war with serious international complications."¹⁴

Britian, who had no objection to breaking off diplomatic relations (they withdrew their Ambassador the following month) opposed a recommendation (by France) that Members should put an end to imports of Spanish foodstuffs and other products on the grounds that such measures would interrupt channels of trade and lower the food standards of the British people.

The United States, in a compromise effort, submitted a resolution recommending that Spain be excluded from membership in the United Nations or any international agency related to it. Since the United Nations had already officially endorsed the prohibitions made at San Francisco and Potsdam this resolution could only be a superfluous gesture. However, on December 12 1946, the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the Franco Government as a guilty party with Hitler and Mussolini, debarring that Government from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations, and from participation in conferences or other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations, and recommending that all Members immediately recall their ambassadors and ministers accredited to Madrid.¹⁵ "In the interests of harmony and of obtaining the closest possible approach to unanimity in the General Assembly on the Spanish problem" the U.S. voted for the resolution.¹⁶

¹⁴U.S., Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1946, p. 1086.

¹⁵United Nations, Yearbook for 1946-1947, pp. 129-130.

¹⁶U. S., Senate Committee, A Decade, p. 890.

SPAIN IS SEEN IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Why had the United States tried to side step the implementation of the Tripartite Statement? What had transpired between the signing of the Statement in March and the adoption of the United Nations resolution in December? The answer is that during those ten months the opening skirmishes of the Cold War had taken place. On March 2 1946, the Soviet Union violated its agreement to evacuate its troops from Iran and began supplementing its forces there. On March 5, Winston Churchill reminded the United States of the extent to which the Russians had pushed their influence in his "iron curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. On March 26, the Russian representative on the Allied Control Council in occupied Germany blocked all further flow of farm products from the agricultural Soviet Zone to the industrial Western Zones, thus preventing Germany from becoming a single economic unit as had been agreed at Potsdam.¹

In April Molotov dismissed plans proposed by the United States for the drafting of a German peace treaty. In June the Russians deadlocked the American attempt to establish an International Atomic Development Authority.² On into the summer and fall the

¹In September, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes, in an address at Stuttgart, restated United States policy on the future of Germany in an effort to clarify for the Russians the sincerity and the depth of American involvement. See, U.S., Department of State Bulletin, September 15 1946, pp. 496-501.

²For further details in this period of breakdown in East-West relations see, Richard E. Loepold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 634-647.

chasm between East and West widened, The Truman administration elected to pursue a hard line with the Russians and in September the President's dismissal of Henry Wallace from his cabinet demonstrated that it was no longer fashionable to be indulgent towards communism.³ As international cooperation took its first steps towards international co-existence the residual threat of fascism was eclipsed and American statesmen began to realize that they could no longer afford the luxury of "exterminating" fascist systems when such extermination might turn a profit for the Soviet Union.

By spring, 1947, it was clear that the United States must direct its efforts toward the forceable containment of communism, and on May 22, in the passage of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, peacetime military assistance was adopted for the first time as a regular tool of diplomacy. But, if Western Europe, close to economic chaos, was not to fall helplessly into communist hands much more than military assistance would be required.

The European Recovery Program (the Marshall plan), as visualized by William Clayton, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Secretary of State *George C. Marshall*, would provide the spark needed to rekindle the furnaces of capitalism within the European States. A healthy system of free enterprize would soon become its own best defense against the incursions and temptations of communism. In order to pursue the program without aggravating the split with the Soviet Union the initiative was passed to the European nations

³Truman, Memoirs, pp. 555-560.

themselves and most particularly to Great Britain and France. Although Secretary Marshall had emphasized at his Harvard speech of June 5 1947, that this American policy was "directed not against any country or doctrine,"⁴ British Foreign Secretary Bevin and French Foreign Minister Bidault pointedly neglected to invite Spain's participation in the Committee of European Economic Cooperation which they formed three weeks later. Even the Soviets and all their satellites were asked to join but, ever distrustful of American motives, they declined.

As the Marshall plan moved beyond the stage of CEEC estimates and began to take shape as legislation (the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948), questions were raised in Congress concerning the omission of Spain. On March 12 1948, Senator Smith of New Jersey (a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) responded to such an inquiry in these words:

We did not select the nations which joined the agreement The question was considered originally ... by France and England. They invited the other nations to participate. As I recall, they left out Spain. We had nothing to do with that. That was their move We had nothing to do with the selection of the countries ...

In order to illustrate the slight degree of U. S. involvement in this decision concerning the spending of billions of American dollars Senator Smith went on to quote from the CEEC report (section 8, page 13):

Of all the sovereign states of Europe, Spain was

⁴U.S., Department of State Bulletin, June 15 1947, pp. 1159-1160.

the only one which was not extended an invitation to attend the Paris conference. From an economic point of view Spain might be able to make a contribution to such a program. On the other hand, due to the nature of the Franco regime, and due to the resolutions adopted at various international conferences, the CEEC countries at the Paris conference did not believe it appropriate or consistent with the spirit of such resolutions to invite Spain to participate at that time.

Whether she eventually takes part in the program will depend on her own willingness to assume the obligations involved, the willingness of the participating countries to admit her, and the ability of Spain to conclude a satisfactory bilateral agreement with the United States.⁵

The CEEC then, under the leadership of Bevin and Bidault, had excluded Spain "due to the nature of the Franco regime, and due to the resolutions adopted at various international conferences." By this they could only mean that, 1) the fascist Spanish Government was totalitarian and undemocratic, which of course it was, and 2) that the Spanish Government had been condemned and debarred at San Francisco, and at Potsdam, and by the Tripartite Statement and the United Nations resolution for its close association with the Axis, which of course it had been.

The CEEC admission that Spain might be able to make a contribution to the European Recovery Program was confirmed by Senator Dennis Chavez.

Spain is the only nation in Western Europe which today is exporting food. Three million tons of food-stuffs are shipped annually from Spain. That amount would be increased to nine million tons if we could assist her with credits for farm machinery and fertilizer, and that would relieve the strain on our own agricultural production and shipping.⁶

⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 94, pt. 2, p. 2617.

⁶U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 94, pt. 3, pp. 4044-4046.

During Senate hearings Mr. Mervin K. Hart, President of the National Economic Council, testified,

The present Spanish Government long since paid not only all foreign loans contracted by its government, but also those contracted by the Republic before it... . Compared with the countries to which the Marshall plan proposes to extend loans, Spain would be a first class credit risk.⁷

In addition Mr. Hart raised an issue that had begun to appeal to others,

Spain has been clearly left out through deference to the communistic influence throughout Europe and in our own Government, especially the State Department.⁸

But the number one man in the State Department, Secretary Marshall, had already testified himself that,

There is nothing in the bill, as we say, that prevents that [giving Spain the right to the same beneficial arrangements offered to the Soviet Union], but you have a general situation over there in the economic accord of these nations where they, on their own initiative, decided not to invite Spain to participate. That was decided by them and not by us.⁹

Marshall would later go on record as having no objection to including Spain in the list of countries to receive aid under the Marshall plan.¹⁰

One of those puzzled by Secretary Marshall's suggestion that a lack of "economic accord" had prompted European exclusion of Spain was the Honorable Representative of Wisconsin, Alvin E. O'Konski, who reminded the House that Great Britain had just asked for and received a two year credit of ten million pounds sterling from Franco.¹¹ (France

⁷U.S., Congressional Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 80th Cong., 1947-1948, Vol. 2, (January 24, 1948), p. 874.

⁸Ibid., p. 873.

⁹U.S., Congressional Hearings, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 80th Cong., 1947-1948, Vol. 2, (January 12, 1948), p. 102.

¹⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 94, pt. 3, p. 3911.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 3428-3429.

at this time was about to conclude a new Trade and Payments Agreement with Spain). Recalling Marshall's words that the policy embodied in the program was "directed not against any country or doctrine" O'Konski questioned the right of the CEEC to deny Spain American aid under the plan, and the logic of explaining that denial (as the CEEC's report had done) on the basis of "the nature of the Franco regime" and its association with the Axis. If the Government of Spain was totalitarian and undemocratic were not the Governments of Russia and her satellites also totalitarian and undemocratic? Participation in the plan had been offered to them, had it not? If Spain had been closely associated with the Axis Powers, what of Italy, who had been an Axis Power? Now Italy was to be included in the CEEC. If the underlying purpose of the Foreign Assistance Act was to build a Europe healthy enough to resist communism why refuse to aid the one country that had completely driven communism from its territory?

By what rule of logic should Spain be excluded?
To eliminate Spain from this bill is nothing but shameful and stupid appeasement of the pinkos in Moscow and the pinkos in our own State Department and Department of Commerce.¹²

Being the President of the American Anti-Communist Organization and the Director of the World League to Stop Communism, O'Konski's interest and point of view are not surprising. However, there were many others in American government who shared at least some of O'Konski's bewilderment at the administration's unquestioning acceptance of the CEEC's authority to make exclusive exceptions to an American aid program. On March 12 1948, Senator Homer Capehart queried the former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally,

¹²U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 94, pt. 3, pp. 3428-3429.

about this and received the reply, "Spain has not been playing along much in foreign relations lately. I do not know exactly why."¹³ Senator Capehart might have replied that any nation publically debarred from the United Nations and all international agencies, having seen its diplomatic relations reduced (or broken off entirely), and its trade restricted might reasonably be accused of failure to "play along." Instead, possibly troubled by the sudden fall of Eduard Benes and the communist coup in Czechoslovakia of two weeks ^(date) before, Capehart wondered aloud why,

We are told by the able Senator from Texas [Connally] and the able Senator from Michigan [Arthur Vandenberg], then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Secretary of State, and the President of the United States that we are going into this program to stop communism. Yet the one nation in Europe that stopped communism [Franco Spain] is not a part of the program.¹⁴

One of the prerequisites for Spanish membership, as given by the CEEC, was "her own willingness to assume the obligations involved." Was Spain willing to participate? How did Spain feel about her exclusion from the program? Alberto Artajo, Franco's Minister for Foreign Affairs described it as "mortifying." In a speech before the Cortes describing the various economic sanctions taken against Spain, he said,

The most important one ... was to keep us out of the generous economic aid given by America to Europe, and to which we were as much entitled as any other country of the Old Continent, if that aid was to be given, as the Act proclaimed, to raise Europe out of her penury; and to which we had a much better right if,

¹³U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 94, pt. 2, p. 2696.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 2696.

as was afterwards stated, the real aim of the Marshall Plan was to fight Communism.

By the denial of that aid, we were doubly injured: first, because we were deprived of the necessary means of rapid economic recovery and of our very subsistence; and next, because, by strengthening the neighbouring economies of Western Europe in comparison with our impoverished one with a stream of over ten thousand million dollars, they placed us in a situation of commercial inferiority in consequence of which a large part of the Spanish goods that were traditionally exported to ... other European countries were totally displaced from those markets, while we were deprived of their counterparts, because, naturally, it was much easier for those countries to import goods free of expense to themselves with the Marshall dollars in which they abounded.¹⁵

If then, as we have noted, Spain would have been most willing to have become a recipient of Marshall plan aid (and indeed was already economically involved with the leaders of the CEEC), and the Secretary of State had voiced willingness to include her as such a recipient, why was she not included? If the aid was for the needy, Spain was needy; if the aid was to bolster anti-communism, Spain was certainly anti-communist. Why was she not qualified?

Representative O'Konski decided to address himself to these questions by proposing an amendment adding Spain to the list of nations that would receive the benefits of the Foreign Assistance Act. The limited debate in the House over O'Konski's amendment brought forth only the familiar protests (from Representatives Isacson, and Holifield) about Franco's association with and support of the Axis Powers, the Falangist activities in Latin America, the "program of Spanish territorial expansion," and the "atomic research being

¹⁵Spain, The Policy of Isolation of Spain Followed by the United Nations From 1945 to 1950 (Madrid: Oficina de Informacion Diplomatica, 1950), pp. 18-19.

conducted in Spain by German scientists." Apparently unimpressed by another airing of these charges, the House voted, 149 to 52, for approval of the amendment and the inclusion of Spain.¹⁶ But, regardless of the decision of the House of Representatives, the inclusion was not to be made.

On April 1, two days after the House vote, an editorial in the Washington Star observed that,

It is claimed, for example, that the bid to Franco to return to the democratic family, coming at this time may swing a million doubtful votes into the Communist column in the forthcoming Italian election. If there is any truth in this, then it obviously would be unwise to go through with the invitation to Spain.¹⁷

A new refinement in United States foreign policy had begun swelling and taking shape as early as the previous January, and was now rising rapidly to the surface. The Star editorial was one indicator of the immediate presence of this refinement.

On January 13 1948, Foreign Secretary Bevin had informed Secretary Marshall and President Truman of Britain's intention to approach France and the Benelux nations with a series of bilateral defense agreements. Heartened by the British initiative, Truman promised his "wholehearted sympathy" and followed by detailing Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett and Senator Arthur Vandenberg to open negotiations with the Western Europeans.¹⁸ On March 17, the proposed bilateral agreements were reduced, at Brussels, to one collective, self-defense pact.

¹⁶U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 94, pts. 2, 3, pp. 3704-3705, 3911.

¹⁷Washington Star, editorial, April 1, 1948.

¹⁸Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 243.

The existence of this pact at once drew a clear military line across Europe and the implication to the Russians could not be mistaken. Some sort of reply was certain and, in fact, General Clay had already cabled from Berlin that he had detected "a subtle change" in the Russian attitude which made him feel that war "may come with dramatic suddenness."¹⁹ The Truman administration was naturally anxious to inflate the Brussels Pact into some kind of viable defense force as quickly as possible; first, by allying the United States with the Pact, and second, by bringing in as many other nations as were mutually acceptable. The positive alignment of Italy, due to her strategic position, became of immediate importance and the communists could not be allowed to pull her away into their camp. If Italian communists could point to an entente between the Western Powers and Franco, an old crony of the passionately discredited Mussolini and the hated German Führer, they might just succeed in winning the seat of government in Rome, or at least in preventing any other Italian Government from joining the West.

As the Congressional Joint Conference Committee met in Washington to consider the final form of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, the Russians were beginning to detain Allied military trains enroute to Berlin and to restrict freight movement out of the city. The pressure was on.

On April 2, Senator Vandenberg, who had managed the Foreign

¹⁹Leopold, Growth of American Foreign Policy, p. 653.

Assistance Act in the Upper House, made the following statement:

The Senate may be interested in knowing that the Confereres removed from the bill the recognition of Spain as a participating country, as voted originally by the House. It was the attitude of the Senate Confereres - and the House Confereres ultimately agreed - that the membership in the European Recovery Program is an autonomous institution of its own, that the 16 European participating countries are the ones who control the right of membership in their cooperative adventure and that it is not for us to undertake to dictate the membership. It is for that reason, fundamentally, without passing upon the merits of the question itself, that the Spanish amendment was eliminated.²⁰

To those who had championed Spain's right to a partnership in the international family of nations this seemed to be the ultimate rejection, the high water mark in exclusion. In time, the extent and depth of the communist conspiracy within the United States would be defined and then such clues as the presence of Alger Hiss on the Executive Committee for the Marshall Plan might serve as an indicator of subversive activity behind that particular frustration of Spanish hopes. However, it is not within the scope of this paper to attempt a determination of that elusive undercurrent in United States foreign policy.

Rather, it would seem more proper to suggest that, on the evidence, the threat of imminent East-West hostilities had caught American policy towards Spain in mid-stream; that the gradual shift of emphasis away from anti-fascism and towards anti-communism had suddenly accelerated, rapidly eclipsing all other considerations. The whole Spanish problem was suddenly out of date, as fears about imaginary atomic research in

²⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 94, pt. 3, p. 4034.

Spain turned into fears of real nuclear weapons in Russia. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that during this period of crisis American statesmen might find it expedient to shun Franco Spain in the interest of harmony within the Atlantic community. After all, Spain would not - could not - "go away." There was no fear of Franco joining the communists and, if war should come, the Spanish Government would be the first to recognize that everything possible must be done to keep the Russians far from the Pyrenees.

President Truman tells us in his memoirs that although it was suggested at a meeting of the National Security Council in May, 1948, that Spain be given a role in the forthcoming North Atlantic Treaty, the Berlin blockade that began in earnest the following month brought postponement of any factor that might cause argument or delay in the fashioning of the alliance.²¹ Once the alliance was established however, on April 4 1949, no invitation could be extended to Spain without the unanimous consent of all the members. Being loath to discuss divisive issues, the NATO members were hardly likely to enter into serious debates about Spanish membership.

So now, in the spring of 1949, although few Americans could believe that Spain represented any real menace, the United States and its Western European allies had isolated Franco and his country as much as they could from international relationships. Spain was debarred from the United Nations, found ineligible for participation in the Marshall plan, and too controversial for membership in NATO. By 1949, none of these exclusions really made any sense. Certainly they and various other sanctions had not had the desired effect of toppling the Franco Government.

²¹Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 243.

Before he resigned from the Cabinet, Secretary Marshall had admitted that "the United Nations ban on accrediting ambassadors to Franco is no longer justified."²² But Marshall's successor, Dean Acheson, was not quite ready to admit that in its policy toward Spain the United States was already simply going through the motions of implementing an anachronism. In May 1949, when four South American countries submitted a resolution before the United Nations calling for full freedom of action of members in their relations with Spain, Acheson instructed the United States delegation to abstain from the voting, thereby contributing to the failure of the resolution. By way of explanation, Acheson said,

It seems perfectly clear to the Western European countries that you cannot have an intimate working partnership with such a regime [as Franco's] in the economic field and in the defense field.

United States policy is a policy directed toward working with the Spaniards and with the Western Europeans, bringing about a situation where these fundamental liberties [habeas corpus, religious freedom, right of association, etc.] do exist in Spain and where the Western Europeans can bring Spain into the community.²³

It is strange that Acheson, who had seen the United States and Great Britain involve themselves in an "intimate working partnership" with the Soviet Union (a regime infinitely more ruthless than Franco's), and do so with success against a common enemy, could make such a statement. It is stranger still, that as late as spring, 1949, an American Secretary of State could feel free to indulge in the luxury of choosing allies by the amount of personal liberty they allowed their citizens.

²²Hayes, The United States and Spain, p. 165.

²³U.S., Department of State Press Release, May 11, 1949.

VI

THE SPANISH POLICY IS REVERSED

On September 23 1949, President Truman informed the American people that the Soviet Union had broken the United States monopoly on nuclear devices, and in the Pentagon "big bomber" men began measuring distances to the Russian heartland. The scramble for advanced bases was not far in the future.

A little more than three months after the Soviet atomic explosion Secretary Acheson was ready to redefine his position on Spain. In a letter to the now Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally, Acheson reviewed briefly the post war policy which the United States had been following and he took care to emphasize that American support of the 1946 anti-Franco resolution in the United Nations had been less than wholehearted.

Experience since that time has served to confirm our doubts about these recommendations. They were intended as a gesture of disapproval and an attempt to bring about a change in the Spanish Government. In retrospect, it is now clear, however, that this action has not only failed in its intended purpose but has served to strengthen the position of the present regime.¹

The Secretary then explained that the United States had adhered to the recommendations in order to lend support to the United Nations, but now, in January 1950,

In our view, the withdrawal of Ambassadors from Spain as a means of political pressure was a mistaken departure from established principle.

¹U.S., Department of State Bulletin, January 30, 1950, pp. 156-159.

and that,

It is the opinion of this Government that the anomalous situation with respect to Spain should be resolved. The United States is therefore prepared to vote for a resolution in the General Assembly which will leave members free to send an Ambassador or Minister to Spain if they choose.

additionally,

... we would favor the amendment of the 1946 resolution of the General Assembly to permit specialized agencies to admit Spain to membership if, in the opinion of the specialized agencies, Spanish membership would contribute to the effective work of these organizations. We believe that membership in these agencies should be determined, to the extent practicable, on the technical and nonpolitical basis.

Acheson was anxious to stress that,

These conclusions by the United States Government do not imply any change in the basic attitude of this Government toward Spain.

but rather, were,

... based on the recognition of certain essential facts. First, there is no sign of an alternative to the present Government.

Second, the internal position of the regime is strong and enjoys the support of many who, although they might prefer another form of government or chief of state, fear that chaos and civil strife would follow a move to overthrow the Government.

Third, Spain is a part of Western Europe which should not be permanently isolated from normal relations with that area.

After reiterating the desirability of seeing fundamental liberties extended to the people of Spain, and the various difficulties attendant to Spanish cooperation with the other Western European nations, Acheson

laid the groundwork for economic assistance to the Franco Government.

United States economic policy toward Spain is directed to the development of mutually beneficial economic relations. This policy is based on purely economic, as distinct from political, grounds. We believe that private business and banking arrangements and trade activities with Spain should be conducted on a free and normal basis. The Department interposed no political objections and restrictions on such activities.

So far as economic assistance from this Government is concerned, Spain is free to apply to and consult with the Export-Import Bank for credits for specific projects on the same basis as any other country.

Spain - Mutual Defense Assistance Act

This letter acted to open the gates in United States relations with Spain; it was a clear repudiation of the post war tactics that had been employed, and it provided some indication of future American plans for Spain.

Within a few months the Chase Bank and the National City Bank provided Spain with a loan of thirty million dollars. The Congress, spurred by the outbreak of the Korean War, voted to extend credits of sixty-two and a half million dollars for Spanish aid under the General Appropriations Act of 1951.² Later, much larger sums would flow to Spain under Mutual Defense Assistance Acts, which provide the pocketbook for NATO.

In the United Nations, on October 27 1950, seven Latin American countries, plus the Philippines, submitted a resolution to revoke the 1946 exclusion of Spain. This time, the United States actively supported the move in a "desire to return to normal practice

²U.S., Department of State Bulletin, November 27, 1950, p. 856.

in exchanging diplomatic representation."³ By the following March, ^{new} United States Ambassador to Spain, Stanton Griffis, would present his credentials to General Franco in Madrid.

With the restoration of full diplomatic relations and economic agreements between the United States and Spain a military arrangement was sure to follow. The McClellan Resolution, which passed the Senate in April, 1951, called on the administration to make use of Spain's military potential.⁴ Within eight weeks the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, arrived in Madrid to open negotiations for naval and air bases. The Western European nations, which had done nothing toward incorporating Spain into NATO, were upset at this unilateral move of the United States. Secretary Acheson, now apparently reconciled to the necessity of doing business with Franco made this justification:

Military authorities are in general agreement that Spain is of strategic importance to the general defense of Western Europe We have been talking with the British and French Governments for many months about the possible role of Spain We have not been able to find a common position on this subject However ... the United States has initiated these exploratory conversations... . It has been and is our firm intention to see to it that if Western Europe is attacked it will be defended - and not liberated.⁵

The Republican administration of General Eisenhower which entered office in January 1953, seemed to hold the same "firm intention" in regard to the defense of Western Europe. Secretary of State Dulles

³U.S., Department of State Bulletin, November 6 1950, p. 754.

⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 97, pp. 2363, 3294.

⁵U.S., Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, p. 170.

concluded, on September 26 1953, the Madrid Pact with General Franco. According to the Pact agreements, the United States was allowed to build (at a cost of \$400 million) three airbases and one naval base in Spain. The land under the bases, and all permanent buildings built on the bases would belong to Spain. Each base would have a Spanish officer commanding (with the help of an American deputy commander) and would fly only the Spanish flag. The security for the bases would be provided by Spanish armed forces who would be given American equipment for their task. ^(bases of 58-17-1953) The manner in which the bases would be utilized in event of war is strictly dependent on the mutual agreement of both nations.⁶ Obviously then, when the United States revised its policy toward Franco, for better or worse, it was forced to do so on Franco's terms. But what of Franco? What had he to say after his long period in quarantine?

In a speech before the Cortes, Franco said of the United States,

Now, there exist no conflicting interests between our two nations. If, so far, our relations have erred on the poor side and have progressed precariously, this has been due to torpedoing by other countries If it is true that the American nation strives after ideals of peace and justice, the Spanish people has followed that road without turning aside.⁷

Francisco Franco had certainly not changed; he had never questioned his right to rule Spain as had Roosevelt and many others, he had not concerned himself with allowing the fundamental liberties that Acheson had been interested in; he had simply waited, and he had survived. Now the United States would provide him, unilaterally, with all the

⁶U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 1696-1698.

⁷Spain, The Policy of Isolation, pp. 50-51.

nourishment he might require.

The United Nations however, had been doing some soul-searching. By the fall of 1955, the General Assembly had reoriented itself towards a completely liberalized view on eligibility for membership. Henceforth, no applicant State would be denied on account of its political regime (provided it satisfied the normal conditions required by the Charter). Henceforth, the UN would not be a "private club" but rather, a truly representative organization. Henceforth, every State would be presumed to be peace-loving until the contrary was established.⁸

On December 14 1955, with the endorsement of its friend and ally, the United States, Franco Spain was accepted as a Member of the United Nations.⁹

⁸United Nations, Yearbook for 1955, pp. 22-27.

⁹Ibid., p. 27.

SUMMARY

Foreign policies are most often determined by two factors:

- a) the attitudes, opinions, and moral values of the statesmen who are responsible for the policy formulation, and,
- b) the law of political expedience.

In this brief review of United States relations with Spain we have seen an initial policy based largely upon the first factor ultimately give way to a complete reversal brought about by the second factor.

Franklin Roosevelt's policy, stemming largely from his moral conviction of the Franco regime (due to its having replaced by force of arms, and with the help of totalitarian governments, what was considered to be a "democratic" system), was based on two assumptions. First, that because the primary enemies of Roosevelt's time were fascist states, it would be of primary importance to "exterminate" all fascist political systems. Second, that the latent communist threat would not mature into a menace against which the democracies would have to mobilize all available world strength.

Because Roosevelt's second assumption was incorrect, every action taken to implement the first assumption during the post war years would necessarily be counter-productive. That this should have become obvious much earlier than it did is debatable. Probably Roosevelt's successors suffered to a degree from inertia

in moving from a morally sound policy that had been wonderfully (to them) successful to any new and uncertain policy based on fear of the Russians and political expediency.

That is not to say that the American statesmen of the 1945 to 1955 period did not have alternatives in their implementation of Roosevelt's policy. They certainly should have weighed each move in the light of such questions as:

a) would the application of external pressure for the purpose of toppling a foreign regime constitute "internal intervention?"

b) would the Soviet Union be charmed into cooperation by American compliance?

c) would a national people, faced with difficult times because of foreign dislike of their regime, rise up and overthrow that regime - or would they rally to its support?

Had the Truman, Acheson administration answered these questions differently they might have overcome their inertia at an earlier date. It is argued that they faced many European complications in trying to choose a more realistic policy with regard to Spain. Yet, when the counter-productivity of the basic assumptions of their policy finally became clear, even to them, they did not shrink from telling the Western Europeans, straight out, that European "complications" would not deter, or further delay, vital American policy.

That vital policy was, and is, of course, the policy of national security, and herein lies a truth that must always be borne in the minds of statesmen: All foreign policy must be a part of national security policy. In the conduct and control of foreign policy, any independent policy that runs counter to the national security must eventually be reversed or eliminated altogether.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Broad, Lewis, Winston Churchill, 1874-1952
(London: Hutchinson, 1952).
- Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War
(Abridged ed., London: Cassell, 1959).
- Cline, H. F., The United States and Mexico
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).
- Hayes, C. J. H., The United States and Spain
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951).
- Hayes, C. J. H., Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945
(New York: Macmillan, 1945).
- Hodgson, Sir E., Spain Resurgent
(London: Hutchinson, 1953).
- Hughes, E. J., Report on Spain
(New York: Henry Holt, 1947).
- Leopold, R. W., The Growth of American Foreign Policy
(New York: Knopf, 1962).
- Payne, S. G., Falange
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).
- Roosevelt, A. E., This I Remember
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949).
- Smith, G., American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945
(New York: John Wiley, 1965).
- Spain, The Policy of Isolation of Spain Followed by The United Nations From 1945 to 1950
(Madrid: Oficina de Informacion Diplomatica, 1950).
- Thomas, H. , The Spanish Civil War
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961).
- Truman, H. S., Memoirs
(Volumes 1 and 2, Garden City: Doubleday, 1955).
- U.S.S.R., Correspondence Between The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and The Presidents of The USA and The Prime Ministers of Great Britian, Vol. 1
(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957).

- United Nations, Yearbooks for 1946-1947, 1949, 1950, 1955
- United States, Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents 1941-1949 (Washington: US Gov. Printing Office, 1950).
- United States, Congressional Hearings House Foreign Affairs Committee 80th Cong., 1947-1948, Vol.2. (Washington: US Gov. Printing Office, 1948).
- United States, Congressional Hearings Senate Foreign Relations Committee 80th Cong., 1947-1948, Vol. 2. (Washington: US Gov. Printing Office, 1948).
- United States, Congressional Record Volumes 90, 91, 92, 94, 97.
- United States, Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Vol. 1. (Washington: US Gov. Printing Office, 1957).
- United States, Department of State Bulletin, 1944-1956.
- United States, Department of State Press Release, May 11, 1949.
- United States, Department of State, The Spanish Government and the Axis, European Series No. 8. (Washington: US Gov. Printing Office, 1946).
- Werth, A., France, 1940-1955 (London: Robert Hale, 1956).

| | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|
| <u>Current History</u> | September; December, 1945. |
| <u>New York Times</u> | January 24, 1939. |
| <u>Washington Star</u> | April 1, 1948. |

thesP2705

The evolution of United States foreign p



3 2768 001 98081 6

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY

DUDLEY KNOX
LIBRARY
DURHAM, N.C.