Organization: Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR)
orgunit.page.dateEstablished
orgunit.page.dateDissolved
City
Country
Description
Type
Website of the organization
ID
4 results
Publication Search Results
Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
Publication Are the Maras Overwhelming Governments in Central America?(Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School, 2006) Boraz, Steven C.; Bruneau, Thomas C.; Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); National Security Affairs (NSA)Violence in Central America has grown so much in the last half decade that Colombia is no longer the homicide capital of the region. In fact, it now ranks fourth in that ignominious distinction behind El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.1 The violence is mostly due to the phenomenon of street gangs, also called pandillas or gangas, but most often maras. They have grown in number, sophistication, and stature and have largely overwhelmed the security forces of Central America’s fledgling democracies. Altogether, these maras represent a significant threat to the security of the countries in the region. Numerous national, binational, multinational, regional, and hemispheric conferences have sought to address the problem.Publication Ministries of Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations, Occasional Paper(2001-08) Bruneau, Thomas C.; Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); National Security Affairs (NSA)The very existence of a ministry of defense (MOD) is an important basic indicator of the overall situation of civil-military relations in a country. Although some of these ministries are but hollow shells with no power whatsoever, others have assumed increasingly important roles as catalysts and platforms in consolidating democratic civil – military relations. This paper situates the founding and development of ministries of defense in historical context, namely the current era of democratization at the end of the Cold War; explains why they are created; and identifies conditions and actions required for the ministries to fulfill major roles and responsibilities in achieving effective and efficient defense while also ensuring democratic civilian control.Publication Ministerios de Defensa y Relaciones Cívico-Militares en Democracia(2001-08) Bruneau, Thomas C.; Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); National Security Affairs (NSA)La sola existencia de un ministerio de defensa (MOD por sus siglas en inglés) es un indicador importante de la existencia de relaciones cívico-militares en un país. A pesar de que algunos de estos ministerios no son sino cascarones vacíos sin poder alguno, otros han ido adquiriendo un papel cada vez más importante como catalizadores y plataformas en la consolidación de relaciones cívico-militares democráticas. Este documento ubica los cimientos y el desarrollo de los ministerios de defensa en un contexto histórico, a saber, la actual era de democratización después del fin de la Guerra Fría; explica por qué fueron creados e identifica, de igual manera, las condiciones y acciones necesarias para que los ministerios cumplan con su papel y responsabilidades principales, consistentes en el logro de una defensa eficaz y eficiente que asegure, al mismo tiempo, un democrático control civil.Publication Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies(2014-06-04) Bruneau, Thomas C.; Dombroski, Kenneth R.; Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); National Security Affairs (NSA)Within the realm of civilian control of the armed forces as a subset of civil-military relations, probably the most problematic issue is control of the intelligence services. This is due not only to the legacies of the prior, non-democratic regimes, in which the intelligence or security apparatus was a key element of control, and in which human rights abuses often were allowed, but also to the inherent tension everywhere between intelligence and democracy. Democracy requires accountability of the governors to the governed, and transparency. Intelligence services, by contrast, must operate in secret to be effective, thus violating to some degree both accountability and transparency (also called oversight). While well-established democracies have developed mechanisms to deal with this dilemma, new democracies are still in the process of creating them.