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Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR)

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Working in the Same Space
(Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013-09-10) Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); Center for Civil-Military Relations; National Security Affairs; National Security Affairs (NSA)
This workshop will emphasize cross-community understanding and communication skills that focus on ways in which government civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations and the armed forces can work more effectively alongside each other in insecure environments—particularly in Latin America. Participants will be exposed to the organizational cultures, capacities and motivations of these diverse communities, as well as current and emerging issues from each community.
Continuing to assist Albania's Defense Ministry
(Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012-12-07) Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); Center for Civil-Military Relations; National Security Affairs; National Security Affairs (NSA)
Course Catalogue
(Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012) Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); Center for Civil-Military Relations; National Security Affairs; National Security Affairs (NSA)
Democratizing Civil-Military Relations: What do Countries Legislate? Occasional Paper #7
(2001) Giraldo, Jeanne Kinney; Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); National Security Affairs; National Security Affairs (NSA)
After a transition away from authoritarianism, one of the central challenges facing new democratic elites is redefining civil-military relations. Among other things, this means writing or revising constitutions and laws that regulate the roles, rights, and obligations of the military so that they conform to the basic democratic principles of accountability to democratically elected leaders and respect for civil liberties.1 Under the preceding non-democratic regimes, militaries were often accustomed to acting in ways that violated these principles, by operating autonomously within the defense arena, playing an important role in non-defense areas, and participating in regime violations of human rights.2 Although writing new laws designed to modify this behavior will not automatically lead to a change, it is a necessary first step.
Responses to Maritime Terrorism
(Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013-04-04) Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); Center for Civil-Military Relations; National Security Affairs; National Security Affairs (NSA)
Intelligence & Democracy
(Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013-02-25) Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); Center for Civil-Military Relations; National Security Affairs; National Security Affairs (NSA)
The military role in internal defense and security: some problems
(1999-10) Rasmussen, Maria Jose Moyano; Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); National Security Affairs; Center for Civil-Military Relations; National Security Affairs (NSA)
Defense Budgets and Civilian Oversight, Occasional Paper #9
(2001-06) Giraldo, Jeanne Kinney; Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); National Security Affairs; National Security Affairs (NSA)
As countries democratize, newly-elected governments find that they must quickly assert control over the budget, especially the defense budget, if they are to meet their policy goals for all sectors and assert civilian control over the military. Fiscally, the process by which budget decisions are made should be structured so that defense spending does not “break the bank” by exceeding the government’s capacity to pay. Sectorally, defense should compete with other government ministries so that the final overall budget is a monetary expression of the priorities of the nation, its choice between “guns and butter.” Within the defense sector, the allocation of resources for training, personnel, and equipment should reflect the roles and missions for the armed forces established during a process of national security planning. Finally, the power of the purse provides civilians with a key lever of control over the military: government preferences are more likely to be taken into account when they are backed by the provision or withholding of resources.
Civil-Military Relations In Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond, Occasional Paper #4
(1999-09) Callahan, Mary P.; Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); National Security Affairs; National Security Affairs (NSA)
During the months of economic hardship, riots, rapes, disappearances, military schemes, and peaceful protests that led to the resignation of Suharto from his three-decade presidency of Indonesia, opposition groups coalesced around the primary theme of “reformasi” (reform) and a singular goal of dethroning the dictator. On May 21, 1998, the latter goal was accomplished when Suharto ceded power to his hand-picked vice president, B.J. Habibie.
Legislatures and Defense: The Comparative Experience, Occasional Paper #8
(2001-06) Giraldo, Jeanne Kinney; Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); National Security Affairs; National Security Affairs (NSA)
Democratically elected representatives in a country’s legislature have an important role to play in formulating defense and military policy and monitoring its implementation (i.e., oversight). Legislative participation in these areas is desirable for a number of reasons. Democracy as “rule by the people” is enhanced by input from all elected officials, not just those who comprise the executive branch. The needs of society and the military are more likely to be balanced to the extent that representatives from all segments of society are consulted in the policy process. Although consulting multiple actors in the Congress on defense issues may be time-consuming, the end result is usually better and longer lasting policy. The policy produced tends to be better as both the executive and military actors involved are forced to defend their positions publicly.