Modeling the Extended Warranty: A Managerial Focus
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Authors
Myung, Noah
Eger, Robert J.
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Date of Issue
2015
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Abstract
We provide a model of an extended warranty. To maximize profit, a producer always wants to sell with some type of warranty as opposed to selling with no warranty. The extended warranty is more likely to be provided as the consumer becomes more patient, as the producer becomes impatient, or if the likelihood of product failure does not increase too much in the extended period. We show that there is a separating equilibrium in which the high quality producers sell with warranties and the low quality producers sell without warranties. We discuss the implications of warranty management in a government.
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Article
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Graduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP)
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Citation
N. Myung, R.J. Eger, "Modeling the Extended Warranty: A Managerial Focus," Journal of Applied Business and Economics, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2015, pp. 126-140.
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.