The domestic and international dimensions of risk: prospect theory and Argentina

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Authors
McClure, Jason B.
Subjects
Advisors
Trinkunas, Harold
Rasmussen, Maria
Date of Issue
2004-09
Date
Publisher
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
For years, contemporary analysts have stated that Argentine foreign policy has followed incoherent patterns, oscillating back and forth between open support and defiance of the U.S. on a variety of different issues, regardless of regime. Only in the 1990s, under the presidency of Carlos Menem, did Argentina begin consistently following a foreign policy with apparent consistency. The claim of inconsistency seems to be rooted in rational-choice decision theory, expecting that policymakers should make policy choices based on perceptions of absolute utility. However, analyzing Argentine foreign policy from an historical perspective using a relatively new theory yields interesting results and points to general consistency the nation's projection of itself. Prospect theory is a decision making theory which claims that decision makers make choices in terms of relative rather than absolute utility, based on a status-quo reference point. Based on this theory, individuals are likely to take risks when facing losses and avoid risk facing games. Traditionally applied at one level of analysis, this thesis applies prospect theory across both the domestic and international level, examining how losses or gains at one level can affect decisions made at the other and vice versa. By applying prospect theory as a two level, Argentine foreign policy appears to be based on its fall from "grace" throughout the twentieth century.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
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NPS Report Number
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Format
xiv, 79 p. ;
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Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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