Quantum Cryptography for Nuclear Command and Control
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Authors
Hall, Derek
Sands, Timothy
Subjects
quantum key distribution
secret-key cryptography
quantum safe cryptography
applied cryptography
wireless technologies for advanced applications
security and privacy issues
CPS security and privacy
CPS fault detection and recovery
quantum internet
secret-key cryptography
quantum safe cryptography
applied cryptography
wireless technologies for advanced applications
security and privacy issues
CPS security and privacy
CPS fault detection and recovery
quantum internet
Advisors
Date of Issue
2020-01
Date
2020-01
Publisher
ccsenet.org
Language
en_US
Abstract
The nuclear inventory of Russia and the USA currently comprises 12,685 warheads in a large network of vehicles; and the interconnected network is managed by a command and control communication system. This command and control communication system (C3) must also relay information from numerous airborne, space-born, and ground sensors throughout the network in potentially degraded environments and are nonetheless meant to securely hold transmissions that must be held to the highest standards of encryption. C3 systems are also arguably one of the most challenging systems to develop, since they require far more security, reliability, and hardening compared to typical communication systems, because they typically must (absolutely) work while other systems fail. Systems used for C3 are not always cutting-edge technology, but they must be upgraded at crucial junctures to keep them at peak performance. This manuscript outlines a blueprint of a way to embed current and future systems with revolutionary encryption technology. This will transform the security of the information we pass to our C3 assets adding redundancy, flexibility, and enhanced speed and insure vehicles and personnel in the system receive network message traffic. Quantum key distribution (QKD) has the potential to provide nearly impregnable secure transmissions, increased bandwidth, and additional redundancy for command and control communication (C3). While QKD is still in its adolescence, how QKD should be used or C3 must be charted out before it can be engineered, tested, and implemented for operations. Following a description QKD functionality, its pros and cons, we theorize the best implementation of a QKD system for C3.
Type
Article
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
The APC was funded by corresponding author (Timothy Sands)
Format
8 p.
Citation
Hall, Derek, and Timothy Sands. "Quantum Cryptography for Nuclear Command and Control." Computer and Information Science 13.1 (2020).
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.