Preventive War against Iraq, Strategic Insight
| dc.contributor.author | Russell, James A. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wirtz, James J. | |
| dc.contributor.corporate | Center for Contemporary Conflict | |
| dc.contributor.department | National Security Affairs | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-05T19:52:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-12-05T19:52:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
| dc.description.abstract | With the clouds of war gathering over Iraq, several long standing guides to U.S. defense policy, especially about when to go to war, have become the first casualties in the effort to end the threat posed by the regime in Baghdad. For nearly sixty years, U.S. officials have relied on the concept of deterrence as the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy. The nation went to war when it had either been attacked (Pearl Harbor) or when its "vital interests" were at stake (Korea, the Gulf War). | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10945/43863 | |
| dc.publisher | Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School. | en_US |
| dc.rights | This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States. | en_US |
| dc.title | Preventive War against Iraq, Strategic Insight | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication |