The Attrition Dynamics of Multilateral War
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Authors
Kress, Moshe
Lin, Kyle Y.
MacKay, Niall J.
Subjects
Lanchester model
multiplayer nonzero-sum game
multiplayer nonzero-sum game
Advisors
Date of Issue
2018-07-23
Date
We extend classical force-on-force combat models to study the attrition dynam- ics of three-way and multilateral war. We introduce a new multilateral combat model—the multiduel—which generalizes the Lanchester models, and we solve it under an objective function that values one’s own surviving force minus that of one’s enemies. The outcome is stark: either one side is strong enough to destroy all the others combined, or all sides are locked in a stalemate, which results in collective mutual annihilation. The situation in Syria fits this paradigm.
Publisher
INFORMS
Language
Abstract
We extend classical force-on-force combat models to study the attrition dynamics of three-way and multilateral war. We introduce a new multilateral combat model—the multiduel—which generalizes the Lanchester models, and we solve it under an objective function that values one’s own surviving force minus that of one’s enemies. The outcome is stark: either one side is strong enough to destroy all the others combined, or all sides are locked in a stalemate, which results in collective mutual annihilation. The situation in Syria fits this paradigm.
Type
Article
Description
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1718
Series/Report No
Department
Operations Research (OR)
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
16 p.
Citation
Kress, Moshe, Kyle Y. Lin, and Niall J. MacKay. "The attrition dynamics of multilateral war." Operations Research 66.4 (2018): 950-956.
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.