FROM TACTICAL VICTORY TO STRATEGIC DEFEAT: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES’ MISALIGNMENT IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Abstract

This thesis investigates the persistent paradox of U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) achieving tactical success in Unconventional Warfare (UW) while simultaneously experiencing strategic defeat. Using a comparative, qualitative methodology, this research analyzed four historical case studies (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua) through Yarger’s Ends-Ways-Means framework and a functional model based on DuClos’ UW Ecosystem, Selection-Connection-Capability-Control (SC3), and Time, Space, Material (TSM) Cost Imposition frameworks. The findings reveal that strategic failure is the predictable result of a systemic breakdown, identified as an SC3 Failure Cascade, which begins with flawed partner selection and results in an inability to impose meaningful strategic costs on the adversary. The thesis concludes that ARSOF’s traditional, ad-hoc approach to UW is insufficient for strategic competition and leaves its forces tactically active but strategically impotent. This research recommends a holistic reform for ARSOF, centered on adopting the Resilience-Resistance-Deterrence-Defense (R2D2) model for strategic perspective, institutionalizing the UW Ecosystem for functional planning, and shifting the operational mindset to one of cost imposition.