Publication:
The Art of the Intelligence Autopsy

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Authors
Wirtz, James J.
Subjects
Advisors
Date of Issue
2014
Date
2014
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Language
Abstract
Although intelligence postmortems are a common practice in the aftermath of intelligence failure, little is known about how they are conducted. This article explores the methodology employed by Robert Jervis in intelligence postmortems that followed the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the formulation of the 2002 Iraq national intelligence estimate that warned of the possibility that Iraq had restarted its nuclear program. The analysis reveals the challenges faced by scholars as they attempt to assess why analysts failed to offer accurate estimates and the way contemporary international relations theory can be applied to the realm of policy. The findings of the postmortems also shed light on areas where additional collaboration among scholars and analysts can advance the art of intelligence analysis.
Type
Article
Description
This article was previously published in a collection of essays in honor of Robert Jervis; see James W. Davis (ed.), Psychology, Strategy and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations (Oxford: Routledge 2012).
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.748371
Series/Report No
Department
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
18 p.
Citation
Wirtz, James J. "The art of the intelligence autopsy." Intelligence and National Security 29.1 (2014): 1-18.
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
Collections