Publication:
BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY FOR UNCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: A SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR ASYMMETRIC DEFENSE IN TAIWAN

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Authors
Waits, John B.
Subjects
building partner capacity
BPC
security cooperation
security force assistance
system dynamics
integrated deterrence
unconventional deterrence
total defense
comprehensive defense
asymmetric
Asymmetric Warfare Group
AWG
great power competition
GPC
global strategic competition
strategic communication
deception
Taiwan
China
PLA
SOF
SFAB
ROC
resistance operating concept
resilience
resistance
Thucydides trap
Melian dialogue
strategic interaction
CFT
civil affairs
PSYOP
Advisors
Blanken, Leo J.
Date of Issue
2021-12
Date
Publisher
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
Building partner capacity (BPC) is a vital strategic tool for the U.S. to compete with great power adversaries and deter aggression against partners and allies. But security partnerships and alliances are unique and complex adaptive systems; they display certain characteristics at the local level that lead to non-linear, system-wide emergent properties over time. Currently, the Joint Force and SOF enterprise lack a systems-based approach to develop and implement effective BPC strategies for great power competition (GPC). This thesis presents a systems approach to the trilateral relationship between Taiwan, China, and the U.S. in order to develop a common framework for BPC in the context of deterrence and GPC. Conventional "deterrence by punishment" strategies for Taiwan primarily focus on high-end arms sales, but an unconventional "deterrence by denial" strategy focused on civil resilience and threats of organized resistance could deter China by rendering its relative military superiority irrelevant, protracting a fait accompli indefinitely, and sabotaging its grand strategy. The Asymmetric Warfare Group's (AWG) advisory support in Taiwan as well as the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) and NSHQ's Comprehensive Defence Handbook (CDH) provide ready-made frameworks to build Taiwan's capacity for resilience, resistance, and asymmetric defense. Additionally, strategic communication and deception through a continued policy of "strategic ambiguity" are essential elements.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Defense Analysis (DA)
Other Units
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
Collections