Economic burden-sharing in military alliances.
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Authors
Delp, Larry Eugene.
Subjects
Military Alliances
Economic Burden sharing
Theory of Collective goods
Economic Burden sharing
Theory of Collective goods
Advisors
Carrick, P.M.
Date of Issue
1973-09
Date
September 1973
Publisher
Language
en_US
Abstract
It has been claimed that the United States is bearing a
disproportionate share of the burden of the alliance system
in which it is involved. In this thesis, two prominent concepts
used for explaining military alliances, balance of
power and the theory of collective goods , were studied to
determine if they provide precise answers on the subject of
burden-sharing. It was concluded that the balance of power
philosophy is far too subjective to provide any precise
answer. On the other hand, the theory of collective goods,
as authored by Olson and Zeckhauser, yields the conclusion
that a positive correlation exists between the size of a
country's income and the size of its contribution to the
alliance. However, their conclusion holds only when the
alliance is in equilibrium and when their other assumptions
are met. It is, therefore, of limited applicability.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Department of Operations Research and Administrative Sciences
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.